AC - Grievability NC - TT nibs Skep Disclosure 1AR - All 2NR - Disclosure 1AR - Case Disclosure
Apple Valley
3
Opponent: Holy Cross ND | Judge: Aidin OBrien
AC - Grievability NC - Warren rest was all
Apple Valley
6
Opponent: Mission San Jose SR | Judge: Leo Matthes
AC - Grievability NC - Read all clarifications out loud CP Racist Riots CP Tribal Law Tournament Name Butler Reps K Case 1AR - All perfcon glang 2NR - Tournament Name Case 2AR - Case Tournament Name
AC - Practical Reason NC - Queerpess performative must defend reduction by body politic Rest was all
Bronx
4
Opponent: King CP | Judge: Roberto Fernandez
AC - Practical reason NC - Accessibility theory Skep Case 1AR - All 2N - Skep 2AR - All
Bronx
6
Opponent: Mission San Jose SS | Judge: Doron Darnov
AC - Practical Reason NC - Setcol rest was all
Valley
2
Opponent: DTHS HV | Judge: Chris Castillo
AC - Practical Reason NC - Berardi case 1AR - all 2NR - RVIs K 2ar - all
Valley
4
Opponent: Scarsdale BS | Judge: Isabella Nadel
AC - Practical Reason NC - TJFs bad must not read args that auto affirm underview 1AR - All 2NR - must not read args that auto affirm underview 2AR - all
Valley
6
Opponent: BASIS Independent Silicon Valley SK | Judge: Breigh Plat
AC - Practical Reason NC - T implement cant say aff theory is dtd no rvi ci and aff fairness issues come before nc arguments Hobbes Theory hedge Aff tjfs 1AR - AFC all 2N - T implement 2AR - T implement
Yale
4
Opponent: Stuyvesant LC | Judge: Annie Wang
AC - Practical Reason NC - Cap must not bracket off offense AR - Condo bad Spec status all 2NR - must not bracket off offence condo spec AR - condo spec must not bracket off offence
Yale
6
Opponent: Catonsville AT | Judge: Cyprian Dumas
AC - Practical Reason NC - Business confidence DA Case 1AR - All 2NR - Case turns 1AR - Case
Yale
1
Opponent: American Heritage Broward MC | Judge: Luke Gastelu
AC - Kant NC - Definitions theory incoherent kant homophobic kant ableist perfcon 1AR - All 2N - nibs reject theory case 2AR - reject theory case
Yale
Triples
Opponent: Scarsdale BS | Judge: Rohit Lakshman, Stephen Scopa, Scott Klein
AC - Practical Reason NC - PP negate Round Reports Ev Ethics indict 1AR - AC Substance Shah Condo logic NC offs 2NR - Round Reports Condo logic 2AR - Condo logic Round Reports case
x
Finals
Opponent: x | Judge: x
Contact Info
To modify or delete round reports, edit the associated round.
Cites
Entry
Date
00 - Contact Info
Tournament: x | Round: Finals | Opponent: x | Judge: x etya3977@gmail.com (preferred) Elizabeth Yamamoto on fb 240-994-7354 She/They (please lmk yours before the round if you're comfortable with it, I'll default to they/them otherwise)
Please tell me if there are any specific interps you would like me to meet before round (spikes on top, rob spec, etc.) This is terminal defense to your shell.
Feel free to message me if there are some docs you can't access - I'll send them to you.
I don't have any triggers, but please tell me if you have any before the round so it can be as accessible and comfortable as possible.
9/12/21
SeptOct AC - Practical Reason v1
Tournament: Yale | Round: 1 | Opponent: American Heritage Broward MC | Judge: Luke Gastelu
AC
Framing
The meta-ethic is practical reason:
~1~ Regress – any other justification for ethics can have its authority infinitely questioned, but reason is a self-justifying source of authority which solves. Asking why use reasons intrinsically asks for a reason to use reason which concedes reason's authority.
~2~ Collapses – other sources of ethical authority presume a logical system of justification to make them coherent, which means reason functions as a side constraint on other theories and they presuppose the authority of reason.
~3~ Action Theory - any action can be divided into infinite states of affairs—only intent can unify our action into intended means and ends.
That generates an obligation to follow only universalizable laws. Only universal law can be constitutive of agency because it applies to all agents in all instances. A maxim is universalizable if it can be known by all reasoners and applied to all reasoners without causing a contradiction.
Thus the standard is consistency with principles of equal and outer freedom
~1~ Universal reason grants agents the right to freedom because acting on a maxim to coerce produces a conceptual contradiction.
Engstrom ~Stephen Engstrom, (Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Pittsburgh) "Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge" http://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal_Legislation_As_the_Form_of_Practical_Knowledge, DOA:5-5-2018 WWBW~ Given the preceding considerations, it's a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of AND a person's outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.
~2~ Inescapability – the exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.
Wood 07 ~Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 WWBW~ Kant holds that the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is AND is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.
~3~ Value theory – the existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth.
Korsgaard 83 (Christine M., "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as AND -and, in general, to make the highest good our end.
Impact calculus –
1~ Ethics are based on intent, but the state does not have intentions and cannot know the intentions of other agents. Instead, the state acts a procedural mechanism to punish those who violate rights claims. Those rights are derived from the structure of intent.
2~ The state does not have the authority to act to preempt future rights violations, because consequences of action are contingent and cannot be derived from the structure of the maxim on which one acts. Thus, the state does not have the jurisdiction to take them into account.
This means if their theory doesn't provide an account of how the state functions they have no offence on the framing debate.
Prefer additionally –
~1~ Performativity - Truth claims can only be proven by argumentation which contains the axiomatic assumption that freedom is good.
Kinsella 11 ~Stephan Kinsella, (Stephan Kinsella is an attorney in Houston, director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and editor of Libertarian Papers.) "Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide" Mises Institute, 5-27-2011, https://mises.org/library/argumentation-ethics-and-liberty-concise-guide, DOA:5-4-2020~ In setting the stage, Hoppe first observes that the standard natural-rights argument AND goods must be assumed to exist. (TSC, p. 161).
~2~ Frameworks are an evaluative filter that determines what offence is legitimate and it's a topicality interpretation of the word "ought" – thus all framing must be theoretically justified. Prefer mine –
Ought is defined as consistency with the categorical imperative.
Durand 01 Kevin K. J. Durand, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Henderson State University. The Logic of Morality: Georg Henrik von Wright, Immanuel Kant, and the "Ought/Can" Inference. Academic Forum, 2000-2001, http://www.hsu.edu/academicforum/2000-2001/2000-1AFThe20Logic20of20Morality.pdf This passage also serves to clarify Kant's assertion that the moral law depends on the AND able to will that the maxim be necessary for the perfectly rational will.
Prefer my interpretation:
~a~ Research Burdens—questions of universalizability do not require evidence dumps or statistics to access offense because they don't have to do with empirics—only analytics are necessary to access offense. That outweighs to accessibility—other frameworks are structurally inaccessible to small school debaters since they'll never have as much evidence or big enough back files to win card wars.
~b~ Strategic thinking—Kantian offense can be derived purely from reasoning, which allows more innovation from debaters and better in-round strategic thinking—debaters aren't totally reliant on their coach's prep. That outweighs since its portable—thinking on your feet is applicable in every profession.
~c~ Philosophical education—my interpretation allows contestation of the role of the state under the categorical imperative—people have argued that Kant justifies anything from libertarianism to socialism.
Advocacy
Thus I affirm resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.
I'll defend the resolution as a general principle, further specification in the doc. This means potential negative implications of reducing protections for certain drugs doesn't link as that's merely a hypothetical instance of an object protected by IP medicine laws. Counterplans and PICs affirm because they do not disprove the general thesis of my advocacy. To resolve means settle or find a solution to (a problem, dispute, or contentious matter). Since it is in the past tense, the resolution is already the solution so you vote aff since it is already true (definition is hyper linked)
All hyper linked and from Merriam Webster - "Of" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate origin or derivation "The" is defined as: used as a function word before a singular noun to indicate that the noun is to be understood generically "Reduce" is defined as: to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number "Medicines" is defined as: a substance or preparation used in treating disease
Offence
There is a distinction between personal rights and property rights – property rights govern material objects that can be appropriated and stolen, however personal rights concern intangible concepts such as ideas and speeches. Thus it is a contradiction to attribute property rights to ideas as an idea can be accessible by all without resource constraints. And even the most stringent property rights allow for copying and modification of a legitimate purchase as a function of the new owner's property rights so it's a freedom violation to restrict doing so. And intellectual property rights actively suppress the freedom of speech, which is necessary for agents to actualize their wills.
Pievatolo 10 Pievatolo, Maria. "Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?" Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?, 7 Feb. 2010, bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html. WWEY, altered for glang In the Metaphysik der Sitten, we can find a clear distinction between ius reale and ius personale. The ius reale or ius in re is a right on things. 14 The ius personale is defined as the «possession of another's choice ~Willkür~, in the sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed». 15 In other words, it is a right entitling someone to obtain acts from other persons. As moral subjectivity involves freedom, personal rights cannot be established without the concerned persons' consent. According to Kant, the ius reale cannot be applied to ideas, or, better, to thoughts, because they can be conceived by everyone at the same time, without depriving their authors. Surprising as it may seem, the ius reale protects the freedom to copy, if it is taken seriously. If a thing has been purchased in a legal transaction and the purchasers copy it by their own means, they are simply working on their legitimate private property. For the very principle of private property, it is not fair to restrain the ways in which its legitimate purchaser may use it. For this reason, no ius reale can be opposed to the reprinter. If we see the book as a material thing, whoever buys it has the right to reproduce it: after all, it is his book. Furthermore, in Kant's opinion, we cannot derive any affirmative personal obligation from a ius reale: 16 a ius personale on someone cannot be claimed by simply purchasing some related things without obtaining his or her expressed consent. Kant, by conceiving the book as an action, adopts a strategy based on the ius personale only. By using such a strategy, he concludes that the unauthorized printer has to be compared to an unauthorized spokesperson rather than to a thief. Therefore, it is not necessary to go beyond the Roman law tradition, by inventing a new ius reale on immaterial things. Kant's argument goes as follows: when I speak to a public, I engage a relationship with them. The book may be viewed as a medium through which authors can transmit their speeches to a wider public. In the age of printing, such a medium used to be provided by publishers. Thus publishers can be considered as spokespersons who speak in the name of the authors. But, as such, they need the authors' authorization. 17 Why? Because to speak in the name of another without his authorization is like engaging him in a relationship without his consent. As personal rights, according to Kant, concern relations among free beings, they can arise only from expressed agreements. Hence, the unauthorized printer is like an unauthorized spokesperson, who produces a relation of the author with the public without being entitled to do it. However, the scope of Kant's justification of copyright is very narrow: it applies only to the publishing of texts, it does not touch th so-called derivative works, and it is justified only as far as it helps the public to get the texts. Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 3 Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke or opera, i.e. things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or operae, i.e. actions. As the works of art are simply physical objects, we can derive from Kant's assumption that every legitimate purchaser may reproduce them and may donate or sell the copies to others. 18 Every time an object can be treated only as a product, its legitimate owner may do what he wants with it, because of his ius reale, which has to be taken seriously on both sides. Moreover, as the injustice of reprinting books depends on their communication to the public, we can deduce that their reproduction for personal use is not to be forbidden. As regards as the derivative works, Kant states that, if one shortens, augments, retouches or translates the book of another, ~they~ produces a new speech, although the thoughts can be the same Therefore, such works cannot be seen as Nachdruck and are perfectly lawful. 19 In other words,in a Kantian environment, everyone may become a "wreader" - a reader and writer at the same time - without being hindered by copyright restrictions The goal of the transaction between the author and the publisher is conveying his text to the public. The public has a right to interact with the author, if the latter has chosen to do it. According to Kant, the publisher may neither refuse to publish – or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it himself – a text of a dead author, nor release mutilated 20 or spurious works, nor print only a limited impression that does not meet the demand. If the publisher does not comply, the public has the right to force him to publish. 21 In a Kantian environment the publisher's rights are justified only when they help authors to reach the public. Copyright should be neither censorship nor monopoly. In the 1785 essay Kant stated that the mandate of an author to a publisher should be exclusive 22 because the publisher becomes willing to publish a book only if he is certain to earn something from it; therefore, he is interested in avoiding competition. But later, in the Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant does not mention the exclusivity requirement at all, perhaps because he has realized that it was based on an empirical contamination, depending on the current state of technology. In Kant's world the press used to be the medium that provided for the widest distribution of ideas. Printing required both specific tools and skills, and specialized and centralized organizations. And as long as the publishers of printed texts provided the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, Kant was inclined to bow to their interest. However, from a conceptual perspective, there is no reason to deny that an author should be entitled to authorize everyone to distribute his work to everyone else, just like a person may hire more than one spokesperson. Such a practice is now fairly usual on the Internet, when authors choose a Creative Commons License and grant the right to publish their works to everyone, because they are interested in the widest possible spreading of their ideas. In Kant's times such a strategy would hardly be paying because the major publication technology, the press, was not cheap and easy like the digital reproduction of texts, but difficult and expensive. Kant's thesis is based on the technical assumption that publishing requires an intermediation - just as it used to be in the age of print -, which is lawful only it has the author's consent. Where the intermediation is not necessary any longer, where no one is speaking in the name of another, copyright makes no sense. 23 3. A term of comparison: Fichte's theory of intellectual property In 1793 the Berlinische Monatschrift published a short essay, Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable, 24 written by Fichte two years ago. The essay connects originality to intellectual property and advocates the enforcing of the latter by means of criminal sanctions. It is worth mentioning the Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 4 final parable by means of which Fichte illustrates his thesis, because it contains in itself all our commonplaces on intellectual property. In the time of the Caliph Harun al Rashid, an alchemist used to prepare a beneficial drug and to entrust the commercial side of the business to a merchant who was the sole distributor throughout the land and who earned a goodly profit by his monopoly. Another medicine merchant stole the drug from the monopolist and started to sell it at a cheaper price. The latter brought him before the Caliph. The former pleaded for his case by arguing that his selling the drug for a cheaper price was useful to the sick persons and to the society at large. What was the judgment of the Caliph? «He had the useful man hanged». 25 To be accurate, the medicine merchant of the parable had not copied the drug, but had materially stolen it. Fichte suggested that copying is like stealing. In the 18th century, however, Fichte had to demonstrate the commonplace of today. According to Fichte, we can distinguish two aspects of a book: 1. its physical aspect (das körperliche), i.e. the printed paper 2. its ideational aspect (das geistige) The ideational aspect of a book is in turn divisible into: a. a material aspect, i.e. the ideas the book presents; b. the form of these ideas, i. e. the way in which they are presented. All the aspects of a book, except one, can be appropriated by anybody: we can buy the printed paper and assimilate the ideas it conveys. We cannot, however, appropriate its form, because it is strictly personal. And, according to Fichte, it is self-evident that «we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible». 26 As the form can be only mine, the author is the proprietor of his text and his authorized publisher is its usufructuary. However sophistical this shift from originality to property may seem, it is not the only seminal element of our commonplaces on copyright contained in Fichte's essay. It is also worth remarking that in the Harun al Rashid parable the alchemist - the author - transfer his rights and disappears from the scene; the most powerful interests are these of a monopolist - the publisher -; only the other medicine merchant - the pirate - pleads for the interests of the public, but his arguments are rejected as criminal; as regards as the Caliph - the government -, he bows to the monopolist's interests without saying a word; and, last but not least, the criminal sanction for piracy - capital punishment - is out of all proportion. The young Fichte believed that his ideas on authors' right were similar to the ones of Kant. 27 However, there are at least three outstanding differences between Kant and Fichte: Fichte bases copyright on the individual originality in the form of expression; 28 Kant does not mention originality at all; 1. Fichte equates copyright with private property; 29 Kant rejects the very possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale; 2. Fichte thinks that copyright violators deserve the same harsh punishment of thieves. 30 According to Kant, the unauthorized printer should simply compensate all the damages he caused to the author or to his authorized publisher. 31 3. While Fichte is an intellectual property endorser, Kant is an "enlightened" conservative who supports the Roman law tradition, against the propertization trend. He accepts the copyright principle, according to which Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 5 authors are entitled to decide how to publish their works. The rights of the publishers, however, are justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public, while the personal use of the texts and the so-called "wreading" should remain free. And, above all, all that can be viewed as a product is, in his opinion, outside the scope of copyright and may be copied without restrictions. What is, in any, the philosophical meaning of Kant's "conservatism"? To answer such a question, we need to link his ideas on authors' right to his general theory of property, as it is explained in the Metaphysics of Morals. 4. What is a thing? In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of real rights are only corporeal entities or res corporales: «Sache ist ein Ding, was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches selbst der Freiheit ermangelt, heiß daher Sache (res corporalis)». 32 Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate to incorporeal things as well. According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished from its sensible possession. Something external would be rightfully mine «only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even though I am not in possession of it» (AA.06 245:13-16). The rightful possession is an intelligible, not sensible, relation. I can claim that my bicycle is mine only if I am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the backyard. Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property as explained in his 1793 essay, according to which we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author to claim a rightful property on his work. Is it really so obvious that originality implies property? Property is a comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all the time over the use of material objects. It is so comfortable just because it is physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property when something cannot be separated from someone. I say both that my fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But these two "mine" have a different meaning: the former is the "mine" of attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property. The former can be used to identify someone, and conveys the historical circumstance that something is related exclusively to someone; the latter points only to an accidental relation with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. It is possible to lie on a historical circumstance, by plagiarizing a text, i.e. by attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no one can "steal" the historical connection between "my" writing style and me: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if Fichte's principle were the only justification of property right, it would undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations. Although he defines things as res corporales, Kant determines the rightful possession of a thing as a possession without detentio, by ignoring all its sensible facets. Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - is exerted on an object that is "merely distinct from me", regardless of its position in space and time. Space and time, indeed, are sensible determinations and should be left out of consideration. According to the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a permissive law of reason: 33 if a rightful possession were not possible, every object would be a res nullius and nobody would be Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 6 entitled to use it. Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res corporales. Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (AA.6, 249:5-7). If property is a merely intelligible relation with an object that is simply distinct from the subject, we have no reason to deny that such an object might be immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property. Why, then, does Kant refrain from using the very concept of it? According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of personal rights. A person who is speaking to the people is engaging a relationship with them; if someone else engages such a relationship in his name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with property: he is only an agent without authority. Speeches, by Kant, cannot be separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised land of intellectual property without entering it. According to Kant, before the acquired rights, everyone has a moral capacity for putting others under obligation that he calls innate right or internal meum vel tuum (AA.06, 237:24-25). The innate right is only one: freedom as independence from being constrained by another's choice, insofar it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity: in other words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the very possibility condition of law. Freedom implies innate equality, «that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone, and finally his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it - such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them.» (AA.06, 237-238) 34 In spite of his intellectual theory of property, 35 Kant does not enter in the realm of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without suppressing freedom itself. If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to mix copyright protection and censorship. 36 Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used. We cannot, however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from speeches would be like excluding them from freedom. Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the scope of copyright to publishing, or, better, to the publishing of the age of print: the Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without the author's permission and distributes its copies to the public. If someone copies a book for his personal use, or lets others do it, or translates and elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone. Kant does not stick to the Roman Law tradition because of conservatism, but because of Enlightenment.
IPP is nonuniversalizable – universalizing the act of restricting the production of a certain medicine terminates in a contradiction because it entails that you restrict your own ability to produce the medicine
Underview
~1~ Presumption and permissibility affirm – a) We always default to assuming something true until proven false, or it would be almost impossible to make any claim at all because if the entire burden of proof is to show truth b) If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral ie drinking water is not morally right or wrong but if I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions and freezes action, it's a practical requirement of action.
~2~ AFF theory is no RVI, Drop the debater, competing interps, under an interp that aff theory is legit regardless of voters a) infinite abuse since otherwise it would be impossible to check NC abuse b) it would justify the aff never getting to read theory which is a reciprocity issue c) Time crunched 1ar means it becomes impossible to justify paradigm issues and win the shell and this comes first because time skew means I couldn't respond to all neg args so they're false. And, reject theory and Ks on spikes since it would be a contradiction since they indict each other, but prefer mine since they are lexically prior. This means all contradiction flow aff since I spoke first which makes any contradictions their fault. AFF fairness issues come prior to NC arguments a) The 1ar can't engage on multiple layers if there is a skew since the speech is already time-crunched b) Sets up an invincible 2n since there are a million of unfair things you can collapse to to win every round. Treat each of the spikes as separate offensive theory arguments, which if the neg contests is drop the debater – key to normsetting since it provides strong incentive to set paradigm norms.
~3~ If I win one layer vote aff a) The NC is reactive and has the ability to uplayer to exclude or preclude the layer I spend half the round justifying what makes mooting that layer extremely unfair b) I don't have time to win multiple layers since I have to preclude your 2n responses, answer NC arguments, and extend my own in 4 min. As a model becomes complete it becomes less understandable as it becomes just as difficult to understand complex models that have too many parameters leading to insoluble systems, means expanding debate's parameters to the 1NC and onward makes the round irresolvable due to a lack of understanding so just vote aff.
~4~ Neg can't read framing issues against aff spikes or use embedded clash – they must line by line. 1AR can't tell the implication of their arguments so negs can outspread me with them in the 2NR – 2AR has no chance to recover because 6-3 time skew and no new 2AR args. Accept aff interpretations since aff speaks first which means they constitutively define the terms of the round, any abuse is solved for you next round which makes fairness a question of your ability to engage in the same practice, any other conception is incoherent since the rules are clearly defined before entering. And, allow new 2ar responses to neg analytics – 1ar too short to answer a blip storm of aprioris and since the implication wasn't articulated completely they aren't full arguments anyways so new responses is implied.
~5~ Affirming is harder, a time crunched 1ar makes it uniquely hard to respond to a 7 min dump but the neg has more time to develop their position and make responses – all theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard because of huge side bias – outweighs neg fairness arguments unless they prove how it uniquely outweighs the disparity since it's structural.
Shah 19 Sachin "A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIDE-BIAS ON THE 2019 JANUARY-FEBRUARY LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE TOPIC" NSD, 15 February 2019. http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/** SJCPJG To further quantify the side-bias, the proportion of negative wins when the affirmative was favored (p1) can be compared with the proportion of affirmative wins when the negative is favored (p2). Ideally the difference between the proportions would be 0; however, p1 = 34.84 while p2 = 28.77, a staggering 6.07 difference. Now the question is whether this difference is statistically significant. In order to determine the answer, a two-proportion z-test was used. The null hypothesis is p1 – p2 = 0 , because that means both sides are able to overcome the debating level skew equally. The alternative hypothesis is then p1 – p2 0, meaning the negative is able to overcome the skew more than the affirmative is able, demonstrating a side-bias. This two-proportion z-test rejected the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (p-value 0.0001). There is sufficient evidence that the negative is able to overcome the skew more often than the affirmative can. This implies there is a less than 0.01 chance that there is no side-bias because it demonstrates the higher proportion of negative wins when the affirmative is favored is significant. In short, the negative has a greater ability to win difficult rounds than the affirmative does, which indicates there exists a skew in the negative's favor. This analysis is statistically rigorous and relevant in several aspects: (A) The p-value is less than the alpha. (B) The data is on the current January-February topic, meaning it's relevant to rounds these months ~2~. (C) The data represents a diversity of debating and judging styles across the country. (D) This analysis accounts for disparities in debating skill level. (E) Type I error was reduced by choosing a small alpha level. The combination of these points validates this analysis. As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds from 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (2017 – 2019 YTD), the negative won 52.99 of ballots (p-value 0.0001) and 54.63 of upset rounds (p-value 0.0001). This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics. Therefore, this analysis confirms that affirming is in fact harder again on the 2019 January-February topic ~3~. So don't lose the flip!
~6~ The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the Resolution; the aff must prove it true and the neg must prove it false.
Prefer: ~A~ Text: Five dictionaries define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm as to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution's truth or falsity. This outweighs on common usage – it is abundantly clear that our roles are verified. Any other role of the ballot enforces an external norm on debate, but only truth testing is intrinsic to the process of debate i.e. proving statements true or false through argumentation. Constitutivism outweighs because you don't have the jurisdiction not to truth test – a practice only makes sense based on its intrinsic rules. Jurisdiction is also an independent voter and a meta constraint since every argument you make concedes the authority of the judge fulfilling their jurisdiction to vote aff if they affirm better and neg the contrary – otherwise they could just hack against or for you which means it also controls the internal link to fairness since that's definitionally unfair. ~B~ Logic: Any counter role of the ballot collapses to truth testing because every property assumes truth of the property i.e. if I say, "I am awake" it is the same as "it is true that I am awake" which means they are also a question of truth claims because it's inherent. It also means their ROB warrants aren't mutually exclusive with mine. ~C~ Inclusion: Any offense can function under truth testing whereas your specific role of the ballot excludes all strategies but yours. This is bad for inclusive debates because people without every technical skill or comprehensive debate knowledge are shut out of your scholarship which turns your ROB- truth testing solves because you can do what you're good at and so can I. This is also better for education because me engaging in a debate I know nothing about doesn't help anyone. o/w since it is a real-world implication in round rather than a thought experiment that doesn't do anything
~7~ The Negative may not contest the Aff Framework if it's Kant – Concession is key to check neg time skew and ability to layer the debate by forcing the debate to one layer where I can weigh–else negs can spread out affs and collapse to the layer I undercover. This controls the internal link to all education args because no clash occurs when negs can just extend dropped layers to win. Concession is best for phil ed and topic lit if it's Kant – cross apply the third point of the TJFs section. And, statistics prove that the neg is at significant advantage, meaning generic responses to timeskew aren't responsive. Timeskew is the strongest link into fairness because it's the only objective measure we have coming into the round. Any theoretical response to this shell is a defensive counter-interp at best because it merely justifies the neg can contest it.
1ar
Fwk
1~ Reject ad homs – Kant's ideas are important precisely because his abstract ideas were more advanced than his political beliefs and ad homs don't implicate the truth of Kant's theory.
Wood 07 ~Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 WWBW~ This seems to me a fundamentally wrong way to look at the matter. For one thing, great figures in the history of philosophy are often great precisely because their insights into highly abstract matters of principle far outrun the capacity of their own time – and often enough, also their own capacity – to understand fully what these insights mean in practice. To see this gap – either in the case of the philosopher or in the case of the entire age – as a case of simple hypocrisy is to misunderstand badly the relation of important philosophical principles to the historical conditions of their genesis. To a more judicious way of looking at things, it might even be expected that the greatest philosophical insights will be those that furthest outrun the philosopher's own ability to absorb and apply them. Kant's assertion of the equal dignity of rational nature in all persons is a striking example of this, when we come to some of his opinions about the family, political, and economic relations, and the concept of race. The other main disanalogy between the historical philosopher and the hypocritical politician is that when we study texts in the history of philosophy in order to learn from them, we should care only marginally, if at all, about the moral character of the philosopher. Politicians are people who wield power over us, and it is important that we be able to have personal trust in their sincere adherence to the principles they advocate. This is not true of long-dead philosophers whose texts we study, or at least it should not be. What we learn from them should rest not on the author's moral authority but on the content of the doctrines and the strength of the arguments for them. Whether Kant's personal adherence to the moral principles he articulated was sincere or hypocritical might be of interest to biographers, but it should be of little or no interest to philosophers today who are attempting to construct a Kantian ethical theory. 12
9/19/21
SeptOct AC - Practical Reason v10
Tournament: Bronx | Round: 6 | Opponent: Mission San Jose SS | Judge: Doron Darnov
Ethics must solve the internalism-externalism paradox—either reasons for action are based on an agent's internal motivation, or on a priori objective reasons. However, both of these accounts fail since internal motivations are contingent and arbitrary, while external reasons beg the question of a source for these reasons. The solution is constitutivism, or the idea that ethics must be based on the nature of agency. Only this can solve the paradox—concerns derived from the nature of agents are objective and non-optional, yet are motivational for all agents. Thus, the metaethic is constitutivism.
Prefer: ~1~ Agency is the only non-optional enterprise—everything is part of it. Every action part of an optional enterprise is part of agency. This round is part of my identity as a debater, but it's also engagement in agency. ~2~ Regress—trying to escape agency necessitates using rational reflection about what I ought to do, which is part of agency. ~3~ Cartesian skepticism – it's impossible to confirm objective knowledge of the world or morality – we could be hallucinating or inside a simulation. Constitutivism solves - it's impossible to deny one's own existence as an agent since denial of one's agency would be an instantiation of agency.
Next, reason is constitutive of action: ~1~ Reason is what makes a movement an action—seizures aren't actions because they aren't intentional ~2~ Decision making—Agents have infinite ends available to pursue but have a limited means to pursue them—that requires reason to choose which ends to pursue. ~3~ Collapses – other sources of ethical authority presume a logical system of justification to make them coherent, which means reason functions as a side constraint on other theories and they presuppose the authority of reason.
Prefer additionally:
~1~ Contingency – frameworks that rely on contingent circumstances can't guide action since agents are incapable of calculating everything about the external world – it's impossible to apply rules that rely on material conditions.
~2~ Uncertainty – we can't use experience to guide action since we can only understand our limited perception of the world, so we can't derive morality from it.
~3~ Non contradiction - statements cannot be both true and false. Denial results in a DB where the system is non-normative and doesn't care about application of itself to action in the material world.
Only reasons that can be universalized across all actions can be constitutive of agency since agency is the ability to set and pursue ends—that means reasons that can't be universalized can't be applied to all instances of agency. There's no prior distinction between agents so everyone must be able to will a maxim universally.
Thus, the standard is consistency with equal and outer freedom.
~1~ Universal reason grants agents the right to freedom because acting on a maxim to coerce produces a conceptual contradiction.
Engstrom ~Stephen Engstrom, (Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Pittsburgh) "Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge" http://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal_Legislation_As_the_Form_of_Practical_Knowledge, DOA:5-5-2018 WWBW~ Given the preceding considerations, it's a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of AND a person's outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.
~2~ Inescapability – the exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.
Wood 07 ~Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 WWBW~ Kant holds that the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is AND is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.
~3~ Value theory – the existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth.
Korsgaard 83 (Christine M., "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as AND -and, in general, to make the highest good our end.
Impact calculus –
1~ Ethics are based on intent, but the state does not have intentions and cannot know the intentions of other agents. Instead, the state acts a procedural mechanism to punish those who violate rights claims. Those rights are derived from the structure of intent.
2~ The state does not have the authority to act to preempt future rights violations, because consequences of action are contingent and cannot be derived from the structure of the maxim on which one acts. Thus, the state does not have the jurisdiction to take them into account.
This means if their theory doesn't provide an account of how the state functions they have no offence on the framing debate.
Prefer additionally –
Applying Kantian ideals in a racialized context can help repudiate oppression and promote self-respect. The end of any approach to solving oppression is universal respect which demands a Kantian focus Mills 18:
To the extent that the dominant varieties of colonial/imperial liberalism were originally racist (Mehta 1999; Pitts 2005; Hobson 2012), presup- posing a hierarchy of European superiors and non-European inferiors (biologically and/or culturally), they got the social ontology wrong in an obvious way. But to the extent that postwar postcolonial (at least nom- inally) liberalism retroactively sanitized its racial past and transformed this hierarchical essentialist metaphysics into an ontology of morally equal and symmetrically positioned atomic individuals, it still continues, I would contend, to get the social ontology wrong. The Afro-modern claim is that neither is correct, because (contra the first) blacks and other people of color are equal and because (contra the second) the socially constructed inequali- ties and their historic legacy cannot be metaphysically ignored considering how fundamentally and asymmetrically they have shaped the modern world order and the raced individuals within that order. In other words, the Afro-modern tradition is insistent that modernity is established on and structured by a social ontology of race. It is not, of course—assuming meta-ethical objectivism—that these racist social conven- tions and structures actually make blacks and other people of color less than full persons. But the denial to them of social recognition as full persons, depriving them of equal rights, freedoms, and protections, and unjustly privileging whites at their expense, foundationally affects both these racial groups and the moral and political dynamics of the societies so created. Objectively, their personhood is unaffected, along with the rights, freedoms, and protections they should have, as persons. But intersubjectively, insofar as white social recognition is dominant and determinant, their socially effective personhood—the rights, freedoms, and protections they actually have—is denied.5 Thus, we have an ontology—races as central existents profoundly shaping one's being as an individual—but an ontology socially rather than biologically created—the product of "sociogenesis," in Frantz Fanon's (1991 ~1967~) famous coinage. As George Fredrickson (2015 ~2002~, 11–12) has pointed out, pre- modern social ontologies are characterized by social hierarchies of multiple kinds. So even if race existed then (which Fredrickson denies, as an expo- nent of the short periodization), it would not have been sharply differen- tiated from the others. It is the advent of modernity, which is supposed to flatten these systems of ascriptive hierarchy into simple personhood (as in the conventional portrayal of Kant), that sets racial inferiority so sharply into relief, since the R2s are then being stigmatized as less than human while the R1s become (making allowance for gender differentiation) coextensive with the human. The Afro-modern diagnosis of a metaphysics of personhood that is actually racialized is thus different from standard Euro-modern discussions of personhood and its implications for ethico- political theory. It is making a different claim than the anti-utilitarian critique within liberalism that it permits the disrespecting of persons. The putative problem with utilitarianism is not that it regards a set of persons as sub-persons, but that the fungibility of (equal) persons opens the door to the rights-violations of some (equal) persons if social welfare for (equal) persons as a whole can thereby be maximized. The Afro-modern analysis is saying that, independent of this issue, some persons are not recognized as equal persons in the first place. So it is also different from the Marxist critique from outside liberalism. The putative problem here, as originally stated in "On the Jewish Question" (Marx 2000) and later in Capital (Marx 1990 ~1976~, 279–280), is that in assuming individuals of equal moral and juridical status, equal recognized personhood, liberalism's social ontology is ignoring the effects of the material differences in wealth and property ownership in the liberal state that in reality make the (white) working class effectively unequal. But the Afro-modern claim is that for blacks and other people of color, not even ethico-juridical equality, limited as it may be, is attained, so that their positioning in the liberal state is different from the beginning. Consider some classic statements of this realization from figures across the black diaspora. In his second autobiography, My Bondage and My Freedom, Frederick Douglass (1996, 213) describes how, after he had escaped from slavery to the North, and was giving abolitionist speeches, "I was generally introduced as a 'chattel'—a 'thing'—a piece of southern 'property'—the chairman assuring the audience that it could speak." But this was not surprising to him, because the experience of enslavement had taught him that "A man, without force, is without the essential dignity of humanity. Human nature is so constituted, that it cannot honor a helpless man, although it can pity him" (199). W. E. B. Du Bois's Darkwater (2007 ~1920~, 35) concludes that "By reason of a crime ~Atlantic slavery~ (perhaps the greatest crime in human history) the modern world has been system- atically taught to despise colored peoples. . . . all this has unconsciously trained millions of honest, modern men into the belief that black folk are sub-human." The Jamaican anti-colonial activist Marcus Garvey (1992 ~1923–1925~) judges of blacks that "A race without authority and power is a race without respect." French colonial subject Aimé Césaire (2016 ~1972~, 202) draws up the equation "colonization equals 'thingification'," an assessment echoed and elaborated upon in his Martiniquan compatriot Frantz Fanon's (1991 ~1967~, 8), description of "the zone of nonbeing," in which "the black is not a man." Black American writer Ralph Ellison (1995 ~1952~) uses Invisible Man as the title of his celebrated first novel, signifying not, as in its predecessor, H. G. Wells's (2017) early 1897 science-fiction classic The Invisible Man, a physico-chemical invention to make the body imperceptible to our fellow-humans, so that the inventor cannot be seen, but rather the lack of equal social recognition given to blacks by their white fellow humans, who simply refuse to see them. Malcolm X (Breitman, ed. 1965, 51) recounts how "I grew up with white people. . . . and I have never met white people yet—if you are around them long enough—who won't refertoyouasa'boy'ora'gal,'nomatterhowoldyouare. . . . All of our people have the same goals, the same objective. That objective is freedom, justice, equality. All of us want recognition and respect as human beings. We don't want to be integrationists. Nor do we want to be separationists. We want to be human beings." Across the Atlantic, South African militant Steve Biko (2002 ~1978~) declares that: In terms of the Black Consciousness approach we recognize the existence of one major force in ~apartheid~ South Africa. This is White Racism. It is the one force against which all of us are pitted. . . . What Black Consciousness seeks to do is to produce . . . real black people who do not regard themselves as appendages to white society. . . . We do not need to apologise for this because . . . the white systems have produced through the world a number of people who are not aware that they too are people. (50–51) So the common theme is the demand for equal recognition, equal dignity, equal respect, equal personhood, in a white-supremacist world where disre- spect rather than respect is the norm, the default mode, for blacks. A race- sensitive Kantianism not merely purged of Kant's own racism but attuned (in a way nominally color-blind Kantianism is not) to these racially demar- cated particularities for the different sub-sections of the human population— a black radical Kantianism—will thus understand the need to "universalize" the categorical imperative in a very different way to register the crucial differences between those socially recognized as persons and those socially recognized as sub-persons. I suggest that we divide the different moral relations involved into two categories based on whether one is a member of the privileged race, the R1s, or the subordinated race, the R2s. That gives us the following six-way breakdown: (1) one's duty as an R1 to give respect to oneself, (2) one's duty as an R1 to give respect to one's fellow-R1s, (3) one's duty as an R1 to give respect to R2s, (4) one's duty as an R2 to give respect to oneself, (5) one's duty as an R2 to give respect to one's fellow-R2s, and (6) one's duty as an R2 to give respect to R1s. Historically, each of these will have been affected by race (as racism), leaving an ideological and psychological legacy, habits of disrespect, that will shape the "inclinations" most likely to be determinative and most imperatively to be resisted. Instead of (what could be graphically thought of as) "horizontal" relations of reciprocal and symmetrical race-indifferent respect among equal raceless persons, the R1s will have historically respected themselves and each other as R1s, while "vertically" looking down on, disrespecting, R2s as inferiors. In turn, the ~inferiors~ R2s will have been required to show racial deference to the R1s, looking up to them as R2s, and—having most probably internalized their lower ontological status—will have been prone to regard both themselves and their fellows with racial contempt. Thus, a morally reclamatory project now self-consciously cognizant of race as social positioning rather than biology will need both to identify and expunge these corrupt inherited reflexes, and to rethink what genuine race-sensitive universalization now requires of us. Universalization for the goal of respecting objective personhood in a Kantian "impure ethics" of this kind will require advertence to these differentiated histories, this differentiated positioning, and the need for addressing and redressing them. To treat everyone in a "color-blind" way would in this context be equivalent to ignoring the history, and thus particularizing rather than universalizing respect by taking as one's reference point those persons (the R1s) whose personhood has not historically been in question. Abstracting away from the history and (possibly ongoing) reality of social disrespect for the R2s and social deference for the R1s, tempting as it may be, actually undermines universality, because it does not genuinely include the ~inferior~ R2s on the terms necessary to correct their situation. Rather, by assimilating the R2s to the R1s, it renders their R1 particularity the universal, which is a bogus universal considering how radically different their normative positioning in the social order and the social ontology has been. This revisionist framework, I would claim, enables us to better under- stand and appreciate the dynamics both of the long black tradition of moral uplift through what has been called "racial vindicationism" and the more recent activism (albeit with older precedents) of white anti-racists urging a critical rethinking of "whiteness." These can both legitimately be framed as "Kantian" exercises once we acknowledge how divergent from the ideal Kantian community actual racialized societies have been. I am not, of course, suggesting that anyone in either camp had to have read Kant to be motivated to take on this moral-political task. Rather, the idea is to bring out, especially for a largely white philosophical readership, how recognizable these projects should be, how illuminating their translation into, and analysis from the perspective of, Kantian discourse could be, once one recognizes the radical difference a racially partitioned personhood would make to the assumptions of that world of discourse. We could think of it as the systematic working out of personhood theory under non-ideal conditions. Whereas mainstream ideal-theory Kantianism tends to presup- pose an already-achieved social ontology of socially recognized equals, here a social-ontological transformation is being sought to bring that equality about. Such a transformation will require the repudiation of internalized inferiority on the part of blacks and of internalized superiority on the part of whites, with their associated asymmetries and non-reciprocities. Far from being themselves racist, then (as, through an apprehensive mainstream white lens, both, but particularly the black project, are often represented as being), they should ideally culminate in a convergence, an equalization of respective socially recognized metaphysical statuses. But to repeat: precisely because these respective standings have been tied to race, a "color-blind" ig- noring of race cannot accomplish this end. Rather, the history and its legacy need to be admitted and confronted for the Kantian ideal of a community of reciprocally respecting persons to be realized. Moreover, as briefly mentioned in the previous section, the obstacles to such universalization will be far more extensive, and they require far more theorization than in mainstream Kantianism, including as they will cognitive and motivational hurdles manifest not just in individualist but group-linked and social-structural forms. One of the virtues of the left tradition, going back to Marx, is the realization that in class society, ruling- class-linked "ideology" is a central barrier to the objective apprehension of the social world. Correspondingly, Ideologiekritik is a crucial part of the struggle for the new socialist order. However, Marxism's general weakness on normative matters means that the specifically moral dimension of this critique was historically undeveloped, so that those sympathetic to the project of moralizing historical materialism had to seek theoretical resources elsewhere, as discussed in section 2. What I am now suggesting is that a black radical Kantianism needs a com- parable theorization of white racial ideology, both for the achievement of individual and civic virtue. Liberalism in general, especially considering the (descriptive) individualism of its dominant versions, and its ideal-theoretic orientation in Rawls in particular, has not historically paid much atten- tion to such issues. But contractarian liberalism in particular is nominally committed to the ideal of what Rawls (1999, 15, 48–49, 152–156) calls the "publicity" (what we would now term "transparency") of the society's political principles, institutions, and basic structure, taken (in ideal theory) to be the result of general agreement, and consistent with people's moral psychology and desire to secure their self-respect. Given the deviation from ideality of real-life racialized societies calling themselves liberal, however, these actual principles, institutions, and basic structure will reflect a white rather than race-inclusive agreement, with deleterious effects for both white and black moral psychologies. So the achievement of "Enlightenment" and the overcoming of "immaturity"—here on both an individual and a group level—will require a recognition of the distinctive opacities, the peculiar systemic violations of transparency, necessary to maintain the racialized social order, and their effect at different racial poles on people's self-respect. To the extent that the R2 sub-persons have internalized the ideology of the dominant R1s, they will look up to them as superior beings, who are owed not just respect but deference, while looking down on themselves. The Kantian duty to respect oneself will potentially then have very powerful corrective implications here (cf. Hay 2013), since it will require one to repudiate the status of sub-personhood. And this repudiation will be linked with epistemic duties also, the obligation to develop an enlightenment that sees through white-supremacist ideology, and to not inflict "epistemic injustice" on oneself by refusing to give one's own counter-hegemonic perceptions and alternative conceptualizations a fair hearing. Thinking of oneself as a sub-person is not adventitious but is based on a certain inculcated historical and social picture of the world. Achieving moral virtue will of necessity be intimately tied up with achieving epistemic virtue. As an ~inferior~ R2, one will need to seek out the actual history that has put ~people~ R1s in a position of domination over R2s, and to recognize and repudiate the ideology that has justified it—hence the long-standing emphasis in the black radical tradition of educating oneself about black history, against the myth of the history-less "negro," and of understanding the actual social forces that have brought about the present social order. fbe sympathetically read as asserting equal personhood and the entitlement to equal respect for a population traditionally subjugated and denied both. A 1933 essay by Du Bois (2016 ~1933~) makes the connection explicit in his title: "On Being Ashamed of Oneself: An Essay on Race Pride." "Pride" in this context is not racial self/group glorification, the assertion of superiority, but the corrective to "shame," aimed at equalization. From the classic civil rights placards that simply (but revolutionarily) declared "I AM A MAN" to the recent "Black Lives Matter!" movement (Lebron 2017), we find a thematic continuity of protest against the reality of continuing racial subordination. It is the repudiation of psychologically internalized inferiority ("You are not a man/person") and the demand for an end to socially prescribed inferiority ("Black lives do not matter"), the aspiration to equalization rather than to superiority. And "race" as blackness needs to be part of this moral declaration rather than being jettisoned as irrelevant because of its historic signification as sub-personhood. In Malcolm X's (Breitman, ed. 1965, 169) typically blunt assessment: You know yourself that we have been a people who hated our African characteristics. . . . ~W~e hated the color of our skin, hated the blood of Africa that was in our veins. And in hating our features and our skin and our blood, why, we had to end up hating ourselves. . . . Our color became to us a chain—we felt that it was holding us back. . . . It made us feel inferior; it made us feel inadequate; made us feel helpless. And when we fell victims to this feeling of inadequacy or inferiority or helplessness, we turned to ~the white man~ to show us the way. Overcoming self-hatred and the lack of self-respect will thus require not merely the nominal repudiation of racial deference to the racially superior R1s, but the genuine affirmation of a personhood not defined on R1 terms, not tacitly tied to "whiteness," and its derogation of oneself and one's fellow R2s.
====~Charles W. Mills. "Black Radical Kantianism." Res Philosophica, Vol. 95, No. 1, January 2018, pp. 1–33 https:// doi.org/ 10.11612/ resphil.1622.~====
Advocacy
Thus I affirm resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.
I'll defend the resolution as a general principle, further specification in the doc. This means potential negative implications of reducing protections for certain drugs doesn't link as that's merely a hypothetical instance of an object protected by IP medicine laws. Counterplans and PICs affirm because they do not disprove the general thesis of my advocacy.
All hyper linked and from Merriam Webster unless otherwise noted - "Member" is defined as: part of a whole "Nations" is defined as: a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government "Of" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate origin or derivation "The" is defined as: used as a function word before a singular noun to indicate that the noun is to be understood generically "World Trade Organization" is: An international body founded in 1995 to promote international trade and economic development by reducing tariffs and other restrictions. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "To" is defined as: used to indicate that the following verb is in the infinitive form "Reduce" is defined as: to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number "Intellectual Property" is defined as: A work or invention that is the result of creativity, such as a manuscript or a design, to which one has rights and for which one may apply for a patent, copyright, trademark, etc. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "Protections" is defined as: The act of protecting : the state of being protected (Merriam Webster Legal Dictionary) "For" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate the object or recipient of a perception, desire, or activity "Medicines" is defined as: a substance or preparation used in treating disease
Offence
There is a distinction between personal rights and property rights – property rights govern material objects that can be appropriated and stolen, however personal rights concern intangible concepts such as ideas and speeches. Thus it is a contradiction to attribute property rights to ideas as an idea can be accessible by all without resource constraints. And even the most stringent property rights allow for copying and modification of a legitimate purchase as a function of the new owner's property rights so it's a freedom violation to restrict doing so. And intellectual property rights actively suppress the freedom of speech, which is necessary for agents to actualize their wills.
Pievatolo 10 Pievatolo, Maria. "Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?" Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?, 7 Feb. 2010, bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html. WWEY, altered for glang In the Metaphysik der Sitten, we can find a clear distinction between ius reale and ius personale. The ius reale or ius in re is a right on things. 14 The ius personale is defined as the «possession of another's choice ~Willkür~, in the sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed». 15 In other words, it is a right entitling someone to obtain acts from other persons. As moral subjectivity involves freedom, personal rights cannot be established without the concerned persons' consent. According to Kant, the ius reale cannot be applied to ideas, or, better, to thoughts, because they can be conceived by everyone at the same time, without depriving their authors. Surprising as it may seem, the ius reale protects the freedom to copy, if it is taken seriously. If a thing has been purchased in a legal transaction and the purchasers copy it by their own means, they are simply working on their legitimate private property. For the very principle of private property, it is not fair to restrain the ways in which its legitimate purchaser may use it. For this reason, no ius reale can be opposed to the reprinter. If we see the book as a material thing, whoever buys it has the right to reproduce it: after all, it is his book. Furthermore, in Kant's opinion, we cannot derive any affirmative personal obligation from a ius reale: 16 a ius personale on someone cannot be claimed by simply purchasing some related things without obtaining his or her expressed consent. Kant, by conceiving the book as an action, adopts a strategy based on the ius personale only. By using such a strategy, he concludes that the unauthorized printer has to be compared to an unauthorized spokesperson rather than to a thief. Therefore, it is not necessary to go beyond the Roman law tradition, by inventing a new ius reale on immaterial things. Kant's argument goes as follows: when I speak to a public, I engage a relationship with them. The book may be viewed as a medium through which authors can transmit their speeches to a wider public. In the age of printing, such a medium used to be provided by publishers. Thus publishers can be considered as spokespersons who speak in the name of the authors. But, as such, they need the authors' authorization. 17 Why? Because to speak in the name of another without his authorization is like engaging him in a relationship without his consent. As personal rights, according to Kant, concern relations among free beings, they can arise only from expressed agreements. Hence, the unauthorized printer is like an unauthorized spokesperson, who produces a relation of the author with the public without being entitled to do it. However, the scope of Kant's justification of copyright is very narrow: it applies only to the publishing of texts, it does not touch th so-called derivative works, and it is justified only as far as it helps the public to get the texts. Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 3 Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke or opera, i.e. things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or operae, i.e. actions. As the works of art are simply physical objects, we can derive from Kant's assumption that every legitimate purchaser may reproduce them and may donate or sell the copies to others. 18 Every time an object can be treated only as a product, its legitimate owner may do what he wants with it, because of his ius reale, which has to be taken seriously on both sides. Moreover, as the injustice of reprinting books depends on their communication to the public, we can deduce that their reproduction for personal use is not to be forbidden. As regards as the derivative works, Kant states that, if one shortens, augments, retouches or translates the book of another, ~they~ produces a new speech, although the thoughts can be the same Therefore, such works cannot be seen as Nachdruck and are perfectly lawful. 19 In other words,in a Kantian environment, everyone may become a "wreader" - a reader and writer at the same time - without being hindered by copyright restrictions The goal of the transaction between the author and the publisher is conveying his text to the public. The public has a right to interact with the author, if the latter has chosen to do it. According to Kant, the publisher may neither refuse to publish – or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it himself – a text of a dead author, nor release mutilated 20 or spurious works, nor print only a limited impression that does not meet the demand. If the publisher does not comply, the public has the right to force him to publish. 21 In a Kantian environment the publisher's rights are justified only when they help authors to reach the public. Copyright should be neither censorship nor monopoly. In the 1785 essay Kant stated that the mandate of an author to a publisher should be exclusive 22 because the publisher becomes willing to publish a book only if he is certain to earn something from it; therefore, he is interested in avoiding competition. But later, in the Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant does not mention the exclusivity requirement at all, perhaps because he has realized that it was based on an empirical contamination, depending on the current state of technology. In Kant's world the press used to be the medium that provided for the widest distribution of ideas. Printing required both specific tools and skills, and specialized and centralized organizations. And as long as the publishers of printed texts provided the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, Kant was inclined to bow to their interest. However, from a conceptual perspective, there is no reason to deny that an author should be entitled to authorize everyone to distribute his work to everyone else, just like a person may hire more than one spokesperson. Such a practice is now fairly usual on the Internet, when authors choose a Creative Commons License and grant the right to publish their works to everyone, because they are interested in the widest possible spreading of their ideas. In Kant's times such a strategy would hardly be paying because the major publication technology, the press, was not cheap and easy like the digital reproduction of texts, but difficult and expensive. Kant's thesis is based on the technical assumption that publishing requires an intermediation - just as it used to be in the age of print -, which is lawful only it has the author's consent. Where the intermediation is not necessary any longer, where no one is speaking in the name of another, copyright makes no sense. 23 3. A term of comparison: Fichte's theory of intellectual property In 1793 the Berlinische Monatschrift published a short essay, Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable, 24 written by Fichte two years ago. The essay connects originality to intellectual property and advocates the enforcing of the latter by means of criminal sanctions. It is worth mentioning the Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 4 final parable by means of which Fichte illustrates his thesis, because it contains in itself all our commonplaces on intellectual property. In the time of the Caliph Harun al Rashid, an alchemist used to prepare a beneficial drug and to entrust the commercial side of the business to a merchant who was the sole distributor throughout the land and who earned a goodly profit by his monopoly. Another medicine merchant stole the drug from the monopolist and started to sell it at a cheaper price. The latter brought him before the Caliph. The former pleaded for his case by arguing that his selling the drug for a cheaper price was useful to the sick persons and to the society at large. What was the judgment of the Caliph? «He had the useful man hanged». 25 To be accurate, the medicine merchant of the parable had not copied the drug, but had materially stolen it. Fichte suggested that copying is like stealing. In the 18th century, however, Fichte had to demonstrate the commonplace of today. According to Fichte, we can distinguish two aspects of a book: 1. its physical aspect (das körperliche), i.e. the printed paper 2. its ideational aspect (das geistige) The ideational aspect of a book is in turn divisible into: a. a material aspect, i.e. the ideas the book presents; b. the form of these ideas, i. e. the way in which they are presented. All the aspects of a book, except one, can be appropriated by anybody: we can buy the printed paper and assimilate the ideas it conveys. We cannot, however, appropriate its form, because it is strictly personal. And, according to Fichte, it is self-evident that «we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible». 26 As the form can be only mine, the author is the proprietor of his text and his authorized publisher is its usufructuary. However sophistical this shift from originality to property may seem, it is not the only seminal element of our commonplaces on copyright contained in Fichte's essay. It is also worth remarking that in the Harun al Rashid parable the alchemist - the author - transfer his rights and disappears from the scene; the most powerful interests are these of a monopolist - the publisher -; only the other medicine merchant - the pirate - pleads for the interests of the public, but his arguments are rejected as criminal; as regards as the Caliph - the government -, he bows to the monopolist's interests without saying a word; and, last but not least, the criminal sanction for piracy - capital punishment - is out of all proportion. The young Fichte believed that his ideas on authors' right were similar to the ones of Kant. 27 However, there are at least three outstanding differences between Kant and Fichte: Fichte bases copyright on the individual originality in the form of expression; 28 Kant does not mention originality at all; 1. Fichte equates copyright with private property; 29 Kant rejects the very possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale; 2. Fichte thinks that copyright violators deserve the same harsh punishment of thieves. 30 According to Kant, the unauthorized printer should simply compensate all the damages he caused to the author or to his authorized publisher. 31 3. While Fichte is an intellectual property endorser, Kant is an "enlightened" conservative who supports the Roman law tradition, against the propertization trend. He accepts the copyright principle, according to which Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 5 authors are entitled to decide how to publish their works. The rights of the publishers, however, are justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public, while the personal use of the texts and the so-called "wreading" should remain free. And, above all, all that can be viewed as a product is, in his opinion, outside the scope of copyright and may be copied without restrictions. What is, in any, the philosophical meaning of Kant's "conservatism"? To answer such a question, we need to link his ideas on authors' right to his general theory of property, as it is explained in the Metaphysics of Morals. 4. What is a thing? In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of real rights are only corporeal entities or res corporales: «Sache ist ein Ding, was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches selbst der Freiheit ermangelt, heiß daher Sache (res corporalis)». 32 Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate to incorporeal things as well. According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished from its sensible possession. Something external would be rightfully mine «only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even though I am not in possession of it» (AA.06 245:13-16). The rightful possession is an intelligible, not sensible, relation. I can claim that my bicycle is mine only if I am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the backyard. Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property as explained in his 1793 essay, according to which we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author to claim a rightful property on his work. Is it really so obvious that originality implies property? Property is a comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all the time over the use of material objects. It is so comfortable just because it is physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property when something cannot be separated from someone. I say both that my fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But these two "mine" have a different meaning: the former is the "mine" of attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property. The former can be used to identify someone, and conveys the historical circumstance that something is related exclusively to someone; the latter points only to an accidental relation with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. It is possible to lie on a historical circumstance, by plagiarizing a text, i.e. by attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no one can "steal" the historical connection between "my" writing style and me: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if Fichte's principle were the only justification of property right, it would undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations. Although he defines things as res corporales, Kant determines the rightful possession of a thing as a possession without detentio, by ignoring all its sensible facets. Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - is exerted on an object that is "merely distinct from me", regardless of its position in space and time. Space and time, indeed, are sensible determinations and should be left out of consideration. According to the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a permissive law of reason: 33 if a rightful possession were not possible, every object would be a res nullius and nobody would be Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 6 entitled to use it. Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res corporales. Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (AA.6, 249:5-7). If property is a merely intelligible relation with an object that is simply distinct from the subject, we have no reason to deny that such an object might be immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property. Why, then, does Kant refrain from using the very concept of it? According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of personal rights. A person who is speaking to the people is engaging a relationship with them; if someone else engages such a relationship in his name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with property: he is only an agent without authority. Speeches, by Kant, cannot be separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised land of intellectual property without entering it. According to Kant, before the acquired rights, everyone has a moral capacity for putting others under obligation that he calls innate right or internal meum vel tuum (AA.06, 237:24-25). The innate right is only one: freedom as independence from being constrained by another's choice, insofar it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity: in other words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the very possibility condition of law. Freedom implies innate equality, «that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone, and finally his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it - such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them.» (AA.06, 237-238) 34 In spite of his intellectual theory of property, 35 Kant does not enter in the realm of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without suppressing freedom itself. If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to mix copyright protection and censorship. 36 Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used. We cannot, however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from speeches would be like excluding them from freedom. Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the scope of copyright to publishing, or, better, to the publishing of the age of print: the Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without the author's permission and distributes its copies to the public. If someone copies a book for his personal use, or lets others do it, or translates and elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone. Kant does not stick to the Roman Law tradition because of conservatism, but because of Enlightenment.
IPP is nonuniversalizable – universalizing the act of restricting the production of a certain medicine terminates in a contradiction because it entails that you restrict your own ability to produce the medicine
Underview
~1~ The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the Resolution; the aff must prove it true and the neg must prove it false.
Prefer: ~A~ Text: Five dictionaries define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm as to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution's truth or falsity. This outweighs on common usage – it is abundantly clear that our roles are verified. Any other role of the ballot enforces an external norm on debate, but only truth testing is intrinsic to the process of debate i.e. proving statements true or false through argumentation. Constitutivism outweighs because you don't have the jurisdiction not to truth test – a practice only makes sense based on its intrinsic rules. Jurisdiction is also an independent voter and a meta constraint since every argument you make concedes the authority of the judge fulfilling their jurisdiction to vote aff if they affirm better and neg the contrary – otherwise they could just hack against you so it also controls the internal link to fairness since that's definitionally unfair. ~B~ Logic: Any counter role of the ballot collapses to truth testing because every property assumes truth of the property i.e. if I say, "I am awake" it is the same as "it is true that I am awake" which means they are also a question of truth claims because it's inherent. It also means their ROB warrants aren't mutually exclusive with mine. ~C~ Inclusion: Any offense can function under truth testing whereas your specific role of the ballot excludes all strategies but yours. This is bad for inclusive debates because people without every technical skill or comprehensive debate knowledge are shut out of your scholarship which turns your ROB- truth testing solves because you can do what you're good at and so can I. This is also better for education because me engaging in a debate I know nothing about doesn't help anyone. o/w since it is a real-world implication in round ~D~ Isomorphism: ROBs that aren't phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms mean that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it's solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn't a closest estimate.
~2~ 1ar theory – the aff gets it otherwise infinite abuse as it would be impossible to check NC abuse and it's a reciprocity issue. Reject theory and Ks on spikes since it would be a contradiction since they indict each other, but prefer mine since they are lexically prior. Education – the only portable thing from debate and the goal of the activity.
~3~ The Haitian Revolution proves that enlightenment philosophy is liberatory – reclaiming humanism is the best way to ground radical action which justifies the perm.
Buck-Morss 09 ~Susan Buck-Morss, (Susan Buck-Morss is professor of political philosophy and social the- ory in the department of government, Cornell University, and Visit- ing Distinguished Professor in the Public Intellectuals Program, Florida Atlantic University.) "Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History" 2009, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7zwbgz, DOA:9-19-2020 WWBW~ If vèvès and altar arrangements in Haitian Vodou temples replicate in miniature the cosmograms paced out by Lemba members on African meadows, if the names of the Dahomean divinities reappears in the dominant Rada cult of Vodou loa, in short, if the words and the structure of cultural language remained, what was said in this language in response to historical events was totally new.127 This is nowhere more obvious than in the case of the secret societies of warriors that are said to have played a part in the Haitian Revolution.128 Warrior societies existed in Kongo, in Dahomey, and elsewhere in Africa, but their purpose was never to initiate an event of slave insurrection. On the contrary: "The slave trade intensi0ed the Dahomean warrior way of life," because prisoners of war were sold to the traders.129 None of Vodou's precedents in Africa ever conceived of eliminating the institutional arrangement of master and slave altogether. No European nation did either. The radical antislavery articulated in Saint-Domingue was politically unprecedented. The de0nition of universal history that begins to emerge here is this: rather than giving multiple, distinct cultures equal due, whereby people are recognized as part of humanity indirectly through the mediation of collective cultural identities, human universality emerges in the historical event at the point of rupture. It is in the discontinuities of history that people whose culture has been strained to the breaking point give expression to a humanity that goes beyond cultural limits. And it is in our empathic identification with this raw, free, and vulnerable state, that we have a chance of understanding what they say. Common humanity exists in spite of culture and its diferences. A person's nonidentity with the collective allows for subterranean solidarities that have a chance of appealing to universal, moral sentiment, the source today of enthusiasm and hope. It is not through culture, but through the threat of culture's betrayal that consciousness of a common humanity comes to be. The rightful source of Haitian religious practice is the experience of slavery, leading to the insurrection of 1791. The rightful source of universal history, however, is not in the specifically Haitian articulation of that event—even less in its absorption by narratives of the French Revolution. Universality is in the moment of the slaves' self-awareness that the situation was not humanly tolerable, that it marked the betrayal of civilization and the limits of cultural understanding, the nonrational, and nonrationalizable course of human history that outstrips in its inhumanity anything that a cultural outlaw could devise.130 At the same time, we are pushed to the point where Hegel's dialectic of master and slave falls silent. Self-awareness must lead to action, and yet action endangers precisely what is at stake in the idea of universal humanity. The dilemma of the insurgent, then as now, is that violent resistance, apparently justi0ed by moral sentiment, sets the stage for new brutalities that are repugnant to that sentiment, because against the enemy of humanity, every barbarism is allowed. What dialectical understanding, what political struggle will provide liberation from this contradiction?
~4~ Rejecting humanism is ontologically bankrupt – it creates reliance on the oppressor's epistemic claims and can't explain general theories of oppression.
Harfouch 19 ~Ali S. Harfouch, (Lecturer at the American University of Beirut where he also received his Master of Arts (2017) in Political Studies.) "Hegel, Fanon, And The Problem Of Recognition" In: Frantz Fanon And Emancipatory Social Theory, 9-13-2019, https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004409200/BP000008.xml?language=en, DOA:9-19-2020 WWBW~ Explains oppression generally – i.e. prior to start of k's theory of power Reliance on colonizer for identity absent general theory Something can only be oppressive if it transcends correct order – that requires a moral fw K makes specific ontological/metaphysical presumptions but can't warrant them absent general theory K can't explain distinction between good and bad power There are several reasons why we must take the Hegelian dialectic seriously. First and foremost, the dialectic provides the basis for a general theory of oppression as opposed to the post-colonial theorization of one mode-of-oppression (colonization). That is to say, we can conceptualize the origins and modalities of oppression reducing oppression to colonial oppression. Paradoxically, this reduction of oppression to a singular moment (the colonial trauma) – this inter-subjective relationship (the colonized and the colonizer) becomes the constitutive element in the colonized's self-recognition, one in which the very identity of the colonized is based on a negation (that is to say, a negation of the colonizers' negation).2 Thus, the slave/colonized attains self-recognition vis-à-vis a negation of the master/the colonizer. Otherwise, the "new" man who emerges from the colonial trauma could not have been without the colonizer. To be is to negate, and to negate is to recognize (the colonizer); the "Other" remains "the theme of his action ~the colonized~." As McClintock explains: "post-colonial," despite its critical deconstruction of post-Enlightenment binaries, "re-orients the globe once more around a single, binary opposition: colonial/post-colonial."3 This new colonial/post-colonial and/or colonizer/colonized binary becomes, paradoxically, universalized and comes to serve as the new "master-narrative." At the level of praxis, the colonized/slave is left in a quandary; Post-colonial discourse tells us little of what those occupying Tahrir Square or Wall Street ought to do, or how to proceed? To speak of "strategic essentialism" is to oscillate a thin line between liberational-emancipatory politics on one hand, and pragmatic self-essentialization on another; between liberating the colonized from the confines of identity-politics to recreating an equally problematic identity-politics based fundamentally on a negation. If, as the post-colonialist bemoans; the hegemonic colonial matrices of power are rooted in an exclusionary and racist logic of exploitative capitalism, and that this logic is sustained through the State's omnipresent and all-pervading machinations of power, what is to be done vis-à-vis the State? Perhaps, this is why the reception of the work of Edward Said in the Arab-Muslim world was less prophetic than its reception in Western academia. Furthermore, the post-colonial reading of the Master-Slave dialectic reduces reality to that which is created through the reified inter-subjective relations between the Master and the Slave. It does not, however, tell us about the world outside of this dialectic. It displaces ontology through an elusive latent ontology (the ontology of no ontologies), which replaces questions of metaphysics and ontology with questions relating to power. This is fallacious in that (1) it is blind to its own metaphysics and ontology assumptions; (2) it negates the very same epistemic grounds according to which it can make such assumptions, and (3) it displaces any form of emancipatory praxis-politics by failing to recognize that power, "as a quantum in which less of it is good and more of it is bad: the issue is not the concentration of power, but its accountability."4 As Jason Schulman aptly notes, "a movement that rejects seeking power is ultimately rejecting the possibility of lasting radical change."5 Power can corrupt, it is not intrinsically corrupt – it is merely a capacity that can be used to mediate between the oppressed and the emergence of a "new order," or a capacity that can sustain a subversive order. Power, from this perspective, becomes an instrument for liberation rather than a philosophy of fatalism (à la Foucault). To return to the first two points made above; any normative proposition on what ought-to be is predicated on a consciousness of what-is, i.e. the "natural" order of things, and the extent to which an oppressive reality is not in accordance with what-is.6 To speak of oppression is to speak of the transgression of certain boundaries, and such boundaries cannot escape ontological considerations. In other words, how is it possible for the slave to attain self-recognition, or as Paulo Freire would put it, a critical consciousness, when the consciousness of the slave is determined positively or negatively by the ontological consciousness of the Master? To what extent can the slave step out of the Master-Slave dialectic in his engagement with nature and objects? Otherwise, we must claim that beyond the ontology of the colonizer-master (that is, the imputation of an epistemic perspective onto the world and conflating it with ontology) there is nothingness. The Arabs have a name for such blindness: al-Jahl (ignorance). For the Arabs, Jahl is not only the absence of knowledge, but rather knowledge which is not in accord with reality. But they went a step further: to be ignorant of one's ignorance is Jahl Murakab (compound ignorance/double-ignorance). However, I am not sure the Arabs have a word for a "philosophy" that makes truth-claims on the basis of professed ignorance (the "incredulity with meta-narratives"). We will have more to say about this later on.
~5~ Methodological pluralism is necessary to any sustainable critique – we impact turn your notion of "severance" or "exclusivity".
Bleiker 14 – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, "International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique," International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327) Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a "constellation": an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate "multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing" (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be "checked at the source" and this is how a "critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable" (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to "balance foundationalisms against one another" (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.
~6~ The neg may not read utilitarianism or any consequentialist ethical theory as a standard – a) resolvability: 1~ Induction fails—induction assumes that things will always happen the same way in the future as they have in the past. But this begs the question of how we know what happened in the past will happen in the future. Thus, induction is logically fallacious. 2~ Moral cluelessness—consequences are wholly unknowable and any action can lead to a domino effect that has unpredictable bad consequences in the end which means it can't guide action 3~ Infinite consequences—any harm stretches on into the infinite future and makes it impossible to compare harms—results in calculative regress—you have you calculate how much time to spend calculating and so on—destroys decision-making 4~ Aggregation fails—happiness is only happy for you, but not for me, so you can't compare across people—also can't compare 10 headaches to a migraine to the value of friendship b) psychological violence: util and other consequentialist theories justify atrocities such as slavery if it benefits a marginal majority or for hypothetical benefits that might not even materialize
~7~ Presumption and permissibility affirm – a) We always default to assuming something true until proven false, or it would be almost impossible to make any claim at all b) If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral. If I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions which lead to action freeze, it's a practical requirement of action c) Negating an obligation means proving a prohibition of that act, means permissibility affirms because negating is prohibiting the aff action.
~1~ Regress – any other justification for ethics can have its authority infinitely questioned, but reason is a self-justifying source of authority which solves. Asking why use reasons intrinsically asks for a reason to use reason which concedes reason's authority.
~2~ Collapses – other sources of ethical authority presume a logical system of justification to make them coherent, which means reason functions as a side constraint on other theories and they presuppose the authority of reason.
~3~ Action Theory - any action can be divided into infinite states of affairs—only intent can unify our action into intended means and ends.
That generates an obligation to follow only universalizable laws. Only universal law can be constitutive of agency because it applies to all agents in all instances. A maxim is universalizable if it can be known by all reasoners and applied to all reasoners without causing a contradiction.
Thus the standard is consistency with principles of equal and outer freedom
~1~ Universal reason grants agents the right to freedom because acting on a maxim to coerce produces a conceptual contradiction.
Engstrom ~Stephen Engstrom, (Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Pittsburgh) "Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge" http://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal_Legislation_As_the_Form_of_Practical_Knowledge, DOA:5-5-2018 WWBW~ Given the preceding considerations, it's a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of AND a person's outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.
~2~ Inescapability – the exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.
Wood 07 ~Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 WWBW~ Kant holds that the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is AND is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.
~3~ Value theory – the existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth.
Korsgaard 83 (Christine M., "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as AND -and, in general, to make the highest good our end.
Impact calculus –
1~ Ethics are based on intent, but the state does not have intentions and cannot know the intentions of other agents. Instead, the state acts a procedural mechanism to punish those who violate rights claims. Those rights are derived from the structure of intent.
2~ The state does not have the authority to act to preempt future rights violations, because consequences of action are contingent and cannot be derived from the structure of the maxim on which one acts. Thus, the state does not have the jurisdiction to take them into account.
This means if their theory doesn't provide an account of how the state functions they have no offence on the framing debate.
Prefer additionally –
~1~ Performativity - Truth claims can only be proven by argumentation which contains the axiomatic assumption that freedom is good.
Kinsella 11 ~Stephan Kinsella, (Stephan Kinsella is an attorney in Houston, director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and editor of Libertarian Papers.) "Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide" Mises Institute, 5-27-2011, https://mises.org/library/argumentation-ethics-and-liberty-concise-guide, DOA:5-4-2020~ In setting the stage, Hoppe first observes that the standard natural-rights argument AND goods must be assumed to exist. (TSC, p. 161).
~2~ Frameworks are an evaluative filter that determines what offence is legitimate and it's a topicality interpretation of the word "ought" – thus all framing must be theoretically justified. Prefer mine –
Ought is defined as consistency with the categorical imperative.
Durand 01 Kevin K. J. Durand, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Henderson State University. The Logic of Morality: Georg Henrik von Wright, Immanuel Kant, and the "Ought/Can" Inference. Academic Forum, 2000-2001, http://www.hsu.edu/academicforum/2000-2001/2000-1AFThe20Logic20of20Morality.pdf This passage also serves to clarify Kant's assertion that the moral law depends on the AND able to will that the maxim be necessary for the perfectly rational will.
Prefer my interpretation:
~a~ Research Burdens—questions of universalizability do not require evidence dumps or statistics to access offense because they don't have to do with empirics—only analytics are necessary to access offense. That outweighs to accessibility—other frameworks are structurally inaccessible to small school debaters since they'll never have as much evidence or big enough back files to win card wars.
~b~ Strategic thinking—Kantian offense can be derived purely from reasoning, which allows more innovation from debaters and better in-round strategic thinking—debaters aren't totally reliant on their coach's prep. That outweighs since its portable—thinking on your feet is applicable in every profession.
~c~ Philosophical education—my interpretation allows contestation of the role of the state under the categorical imperative—people have argued that Kant justifies anything from libertarianism to socialism.
Advocacy
Thus I affirm resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.
I'll defend the resolution as a general principle, further specification in the doc. This means potential negative implications of reducing protections for certain drugs doesn't link as that's merely a hypothetical instance of an object protected by IP medicine laws. Counterplans and PICs affirm because they do not disprove the general thesis of my advocacy.
All hyper linked and from Merriam Webster unless otherwise noted - "Member" is defined as: part of a whole "Nations" is defined as: a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government "Of" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate origin or derivation "The" is defined as: used as a function word before a singular noun to indicate that the noun is to be understood generically "World Trade Organization" is: An international body founded in 1995 to promote international trade and economic development by reducing tariffs and other restrictions. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "To" is defined as: used to indicate that the following verb is in the infinitive form "Reduce" is defined as: to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number "Intellectual Property" is defined as: A work or invention that is the result of creativity, such as a manuscript or a design, to which one has rights and for which one may apply for a patent, copyright, trademark, etc. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "Protections" is defined as: The act of protecting : the state of being protected (Merriam Webster Legal Dictionary) "For" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate the object or recipient of a perception, desire, or activity "Medicines" is defined as: a substance or preparation used in treating disease
Offence
There is a distinction between personal rights and property rights – property rights govern material objects that can be appropriated and stolen, however personal rights concern intangible concepts such as ideas and speeches. Thus it is a contradiction to attribute property rights to ideas as an idea can be accessible by all without resource constraints. And even the most stringent property rights allow for copying and modification of a legitimate purchase as a function of the new owner's property rights so it's a freedom violation to restrict doing so. And intellectual property rights actively suppress the freedom of speech, which is necessary for agents to actualize their wills.
Pievatolo 10 Pievatolo, Maria. "Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?" Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?, 7 Feb. 2010, bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html. WWEY, altered for glang In the Metaphysik der Sitten, we can find a clear distinction between ius reale and ius personale. The ius reale or ius in re is a right on things. 14 The ius personale is defined as the «possession of another's choice ~Willkür~, in the sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed». 15 In other words, it is a right entitling someone to obtain acts from other persons. As moral subjectivity involves freedom, personal rights cannot be established without the concerned persons' consent. According to Kant, the ius reale cannot be applied to ideas, or, better, to thoughts, because they can be conceived by everyone at the same time, without depriving their authors. Surprising as it may seem, the ius reale protects the freedom to copy, if it is taken seriously. If a thing has been purchased in a legal transaction and the purchasers copy it by their own means, they are simply working on their legitimate private property. For the very principle of private property, it is not fair to restrain the ways in which its legitimate purchaser may use it. For this reason, no ius reale can be opposed to the reprinter. If we see the book as a material thing, whoever buys it has the right to reproduce it: after all, it is his book. Furthermore, in Kant's opinion, we cannot derive any affirmative personal obligation from a ius reale: 16 a ius personale on someone cannot be claimed by simply purchasing some related things without obtaining his or her expressed consent. Kant, by conceiving the book as an action, adopts a strategy based on the ius personale only. By using such a strategy, he concludes that the unauthorized printer has to be compared to an unauthorized spokesperson rather than to a thief. Therefore, it is not necessary to go beyond the Roman law tradition, by inventing a new ius reale on immaterial things. Kant's argument goes as follows: when I speak to a public, I engage a relationship with them. The book may be viewed as a medium through which authors can transmit their speeches to a wider public. In the age of printing, such a medium used to be provided by publishers. Thus publishers can be considered as spokespersons who speak in the name of the authors. But, as such, they need the authors' authorization. 17 Why? Because to speak in the name of another without his authorization is like engaging him in a relationship without his consent. As personal rights, according to Kant, concern relations among free beings, they can arise only from expressed agreements. Hence, the unauthorized printer is like an unauthorized spokesperson, who produces a relation of the author with the public without being entitled to do it. However, the scope of Kant's justification of copyright is very narrow: it applies only to the publishing of texts, it does not touch th so-called derivative works, and it is justified only as far as it helps the public to get the texts. Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 3 Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke or opera, i.e. things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or operae, i.e. actions. As the works of art are simply physical objects, we can derive from Kant's assumption that every legitimate purchaser may reproduce them and may donate or sell the copies to others. 18 Every time an object can be treated only as a product, its legitimate owner may do what he wants with it, because of his ius reale, which has to be taken seriously on both sides. Moreover, as the injustice of reprinting books depends on their communication to the public, we can deduce that their reproduction for personal use is not to be forbidden. As regards as the derivative works, Kant states that, if one shortens, augments, retouches or translates the book of another, ~they~ produces a new speech, although the thoughts can be the same Therefore, such works cannot be seen as Nachdruck and are perfectly lawful. 19 In other words,in a Kantian environment, everyone may become a "wreader" - a reader and writer at the same time - without being hindered by copyright restrictions The goal of the transaction between the author and the publisher is conveying his text to the public. The public has a right to interact with the author, if the latter has chosen to do it. According to Kant, the publisher may neither refuse to publish – or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it himself – a text of a dead author, nor release mutilated 20 or spurious works, nor print only a limited impression that does not meet the demand. If the publisher does not comply, the public has the right to force him to publish. 21 In a Kantian environment the publisher's rights are justified only when they help authors to reach the public. Copyright should be neither censorship nor monopoly. In the 1785 essay Kant stated that the mandate of an author to a publisher should be exclusive 22 because the publisher becomes willing to publish a book only if he is certain to earn something from it; therefore, he is interested in avoiding competition. But later, in the Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant does not mention the exclusivity requirement at all, perhaps because he has realized that it was based on an empirical contamination, depending on the current state of technology. In Kant's world the press used to be the medium that provided for the widest distribution of ideas. Printing required both specific tools and skills, and specialized and centralized organizations. And as long as the publishers of printed texts provided the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, Kant was inclined to bow to their interest. However, from a conceptual perspective, there is no reason to deny that an author should be entitled to authorize everyone to distribute his work to everyone else, just like a person may hire more than one spokesperson. Such a practice is now fairly usual on the Internet, when authors choose a Creative Commons License and grant the right to publish their works to everyone, because they are interested in the widest possible spreading of their ideas. In Kant's times such a strategy would hardly be paying because the major publication technology, the press, was not cheap and easy like the digital reproduction of texts, but difficult and expensive. Kant's thesis is based on the technical assumption that publishing requires an intermediation - just as it used to be in the age of print -, which is lawful only it has the author's consent. Where the intermediation is not necessary any longer, where no one is speaking in the name of another, copyright makes no sense. 23 3. A term of comparison: Fichte's theory of intellectual property In 1793 the Berlinische Monatschrift published a short essay, Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable, 24 written by Fichte two years ago. The essay connects originality to intellectual property and advocates the enforcing of the latter by means of criminal sanctions. It is worth mentioning the Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 4 final parable by means of which Fichte illustrates his thesis, because it contains in itself all our commonplaces on intellectual property. In the time of the Caliph Harun al Rashid, an alchemist used to prepare a beneficial drug and to entrust the commercial side of the business to a merchant who was the sole distributor throughout the land and who earned a goodly profit by his monopoly. Another medicine merchant stole the drug from the monopolist and started to sell it at a cheaper price. The latter brought him before the Caliph. The former pleaded for his case by arguing that his selling the drug for a cheaper price was useful to the sick persons and to the society at large. What was the judgment of the Caliph? «He had the useful man hanged». 25 To be accurate, the medicine merchant of the parable had not copied the drug, but had materially stolen it. Fichte suggested that copying is like stealing. In the 18th century, however, Fichte had to demonstrate the commonplace of today. According to Fichte, we can distinguish two aspects of a book: 1. its physical aspect (das körperliche), i.e. the printed paper 2. its ideational aspect (das geistige) The ideational aspect of a book is in turn divisible into: a. a material aspect, i.e. the ideas the book presents; b. the form of these ideas, i. e. the way in which they are presented. All the aspects of a book, except one, can be appropriated by anybody: we can buy the printed paper and assimilate the ideas it conveys. We cannot, however, appropriate its form, because it is strictly personal. And, according to Fichte, it is self-evident that «we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible». 26 As the form can be only mine, the author is the proprietor of his text and his authorized publisher is its usufructuary. However sophistical this shift from originality to property may seem, it is not the only seminal element of our commonplaces on copyright contained in Fichte's essay. It is also worth remarking that in the Harun al Rashid parable the alchemist - the author - transfer his rights and disappears from the scene; the most powerful interests are these of a monopolist - the publisher -; only the other medicine merchant - the pirate - pleads for the interests of the public, but his arguments are rejected as criminal; as regards as the Caliph - the government -, he bows to the monopolist's interests without saying a word; and, last but not least, the criminal sanction for piracy - capital punishment - is out of all proportion. The young Fichte believed that his ideas on authors' right were similar to the ones of Kant. 27 However, there are at least three outstanding differences between Kant and Fichte: Fichte bases copyright on the individual originality in the form of expression; 28 Kant does not mention originality at all; 1. Fichte equates copyright with private property; 29 Kant rejects the very possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale; 2. Fichte thinks that copyright violators deserve the same harsh punishment of thieves. 30 According to Kant, the unauthorized printer should simply compensate all the damages he caused to the author or to his authorized publisher. 31 3. While Fichte is an intellectual property endorser, Kant is an "enlightened" conservative who supports the Roman law tradition, against the propertization trend. He accepts the copyright principle, according to which Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 5 authors are entitled to decide how to publish their works. The rights of the publishers, however, are justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public, while the personal use of the texts and the so-called "wreading" should remain free. And, above all, all that can be viewed as a product is, in his opinion, outside the scope of copyright and may be copied without restrictions. What is, in any, the philosophical meaning of Kant's "conservatism"? To answer such a question, we need to link his ideas on authors' right to his general theory of property, as it is explained in the Metaphysics of Morals. 4. What is a thing? In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of real rights are only corporeal entities or res corporales: «Sache ist ein Ding, was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches selbst der Freiheit ermangelt, heiß daher Sache (res corporalis)». 32 Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate to incorporeal things as well. According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished from its sensible possession. Something external would be rightfully mine «only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even though I am not in possession of it» (AA.06 245:13-16). The rightful possession is an intelligible, not sensible, relation. I can claim that my bicycle is mine only if I am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the backyard. Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property as explained in his 1793 essay, according to which we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author to claim a rightful property on his work. Is it really so obvious that originality implies property? Property is a comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all the time over the use of material objects. It is so comfortable just because it is physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property when something cannot be separated from someone. I say both that my fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But these two "mine" have a different meaning: the former is the "mine" of attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property. The former can be used to identify someone, and conveys the historical circumstance that something is related exclusively to someone; the latter points only to an accidental relation with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. It is possible to lie on a historical circumstance, by plagiarizing a text, i.e. by attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no one can "steal" the historical connection between "my" writing style and me: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if Fichte's principle were the only justification of property right, it would undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations. Although he defines things as res corporales, Kant determines the rightful possession of a thing as a possession without detentio, by ignoring all its sensible facets. Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - is exerted on an object that is "merely distinct from me", regardless of its position in space and time. Space and time, indeed, are sensible determinations and should be left out of consideration. According to the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a permissive law of reason: 33 if a rightful possession were not possible, every object would be a res nullius and nobody would be Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 6 entitled to use it. Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res corporales. Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (AA.6, 249:5-7). If property is a merely intelligible relation with an object that is simply distinct from the subject, we have no reason to deny that such an object might be immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property. Why, then, does Kant refrain from using the very concept of it? According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of personal rights. A person who is speaking to the people is engaging a relationship with them; if someone else engages such a relationship in his name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with property: he is only an agent without authority. Speeches, by Kant, cannot be separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised land of intellectual property without entering it. According to Kant, before the acquired rights, everyone has a moral capacity for putting others under obligation that he calls innate right or internal meum vel tuum (AA.06, 237:24-25). The innate right is only one: freedom as independence from being constrained by another's choice, insofar it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity: in other words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the very possibility condition of law. Freedom implies innate equality, «that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone, and finally his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it - such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them.» (AA.06, 237-238) 34 In spite of his intellectual theory of property, 35 Kant does not enter in the realm of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without suppressing freedom itself. If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to mix copyright protection and censorship. 36 Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used. We cannot, however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from speeches would be like excluding them from freedom. Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the scope of copyright to publishing, or, better, to the publishing of the age of print: the Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without the author's permission and distributes its copies to the public. If someone copies a book for his personal use, or lets others do it, or translates and elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone. Kant does not stick to the Roman Law tradition because of conservatism, but because of Enlightenment.
IPP is nonuniversalizable – universalizing the act of restricting the production of a certain medicine terminates in a contradiction because it entails that you restrict your own ability to produce the medicine
Underview
~1~ The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the Resolution; the aff must prove it true and the neg must prove it false.
Prefer: ~A~ Text: Five dictionaries define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm as to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution's truth or falsity. This outweighs on common usage – it is abundantly clear that our roles are verified. Any other role of the ballot enforces an external norm on debate, but only truth testing is intrinsic to the process of debate i.e. proving statements true or false through argumentation. Constitutivism outweighs because you don't have the jurisdiction not to truth test – a practice only makes sense based on its intrinsic rules. Jurisdiction is also an independent voter and a meta constraint since every argument you make concedes the authority of the judge fulfilling their jurisdiction to vote aff if they affirm better and neg the contrary – otherwise they could just hack against or for you which means it also controls the internal link to fairness since that's definitionally unfair. ~B~ Logic: Any counter role of the ballot collapses to truth testing because every property assumes truth of the property i.e. if I say, "I am awake" it is the same as "it is true that I am awake" which means they are also a question of truth claims because it's inherent. It also means their ROB warrants aren't mutually exclusive with mine. ~C~ Inclusion: Any offense can function under truth testing whereas your specific role of the ballot excludes all strategies but yours. This is bad for inclusive debates because people without every technical skill or comprehensive debate knowledge are shut out of your scholarship which turns your ROB- truth testing solves because you can do what you're good at and so can I. This is also better for education because me engaging in a debate I know nothing about doesn't help anyone. o/w since it is a real-world implication in round rather than a thought experiment that doesn't do anything ~D~ Isomorphism: ROBs that aren't phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it's solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn't a closest estimate
~2~ The Haitian Revolution proves that enlightenment philosophy is liberatory – reclaiming humanism is the best way to ground radical action which justifies the perm.
Buck-Morss 09 ~Susan Buck-Morss, (Susan Buck-Morss is professor of political philosophy and social the- ory in the department of government, Cornell University, and Visit- ing Distinguished Professor in the Public Intellectuals Program, Florida Atlantic University.) "Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History" 2009, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7zwbgz, DOA:9-19-2020 WWBW~ If vèvès and altar arrangements in Haitian Vodou temples replicate in miniature the cosmograms paced out by Lemba members on African meadows, if the names of the Dahomean divinities reappears in the dominant Rada cult of Vodou loa, in short, if the words and the structure of cultural language remained, what was said in this language in response to historical events was totally new.127 This is nowhere more obvious than in the case of the secret societies of warriors that are said to have played a part in the Haitian Revolution.128 Warrior societies existed in Kongo, in Dahomey, and elsewhere in Africa, but their purpose was never to initiate an event of slave insurrection. On the contrary: "The slave trade intensi0ed the Dahomean warrior way of life," because prisoners of war were sold to the traders.129 None of Vodou's precedents in Africa ever conceived of eliminating the institutional arrangement of master and slave altogether. No European nation did either. The radical antislavery articulated in Saint-Domingue was politically unprecedented. The de0nition of universal history that begins to emerge here is this: rather than giving multiple, distinct cultures equal due, whereby people are recognized as part of humanity indirectly through the mediation of collective cultural identities, human universality emerges in the historical event at the point of rupture. It is in the discontinuities of history that people whose culture has been strained to the breaking point give expression to a humanity that goes beyond cultural limits. And it is in our empathic identification with this raw, free, and vulnerable state, that we have a chance of understanding what they say. Common humanity exists in spite of culture and its diferences. A person's nonidentity with the collective allows for subterranean solidarities that have a chance of appealing to universal, moral sentiment, the source today of enthusiasm and hope. It is not through culture, but through the threat of culture's betrayal that consciousness of a common humanity comes to be. The rightful source of Haitian religious practice is the experience of slavery, leading to the insurrection of 1791. The rightful source of universal history, however, is not in the specifically Haitian articulation of that event—even less in its absorption by narratives of the French Revolution. Universality is in the moment of the slaves' self-awareness that the situation was not humanly tolerable, that it marked the betrayal of civilization and the limits of cultural understanding, the nonrational, and nonrationalizable course of human history that outstrips in its inhumanity anything that a cultural outlaw could devise.130 At the same time, we are pushed to the point where Hegel's dialectic of master and slave falls silent. Self-awareness must lead to action, and yet action endangers precisely what is at stake in the idea of universal humanity. The dilemma of the insurgent, then as now, is that violent resistance, apparently justi0ed by moral sentiment, sets the stage for new brutalities that are repugnant to that sentiment, because against the enemy of humanity, every barbarism is allowed. What dialectical understanding, what political struggle will provide liberation from this contradiction?
~3~ AFF theory is no RVI, Drop the debater, competing interps, under an interp that aff theory is legit regardless of voters a) infinite abuse since otherwise it would be impossible to check NC abuse b) it would justify the aff never getting to read theory which is a reciprocity issue c) Time crunched 1ar means it becomes impossible to justify paradigm issues and win the shell and this comes first because time skew. And, reject theory and Ks on spikes since it would be a contradiction since they indict each other, but prefer mine since they are lexically prior. AFF fairness issues come prior to NC arguments a) The 1ar can't engage on multiple layers if there is a skew since the speech is already time-crunched b) Sets up an invincible 2n since there are a million of unfair things you can collapse to to win every round. Inclusion first is the fallacy of origin – don't apply it. Fairness is a voter debate is a competitive activity wins/losses prove that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Education – the only portable thing from debate and the goal of the activity.
~4~ Affirming is harder, a time crunched 1ar makes it uniquely hard to respond to a 7 min dump but the neg has more time to develop their position and make responses – all theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard because of huge side bias – outweighs neg fairness arguments unless they prove how it uniquely outweighs the disparity since it's structural.
Shah 19 Sachin "A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIDE-BIAS ON THE 2019 JANUARY-FEBRUARY LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE TOPIC" NSD, 15 February 2019. http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/** SJCPJG To further quantify the side-bias, the proportion of negative wins when the affirmative was favored (p1) can be compared with the proportion of affirmative wins when the negative is favored (p2). Ideally the difference between the proportions would be 0; however, p1 = 34.84 while p2 = 28.77, a staggering 6.07 difference. Now the question is whether this difference is statistically significant. In order to determine the answer, a two-proportion z-test was used. The null hypothesis is p1 – p2 = 0 , because that means both sides are able to overcome the debating level skew equally. The alternative hypothesis is then p1 – p2 0, meaning the negative is able to overcome the skew more than the affirmative is able, demonstrating a side-bias. This two-proportion z-test rejected the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (p-value 0.0001). There is sufficient evidence that the negative is able to overcome the skew more often than the affirmative can. This implies there is a less than 0.01 chance that there is no side-bias because it demonstrates the higher proportion of negative wins when the affirmative is favored is significant. In short, the negative has a greater ability to win difficult rounds than the affirmative does, which indicates there exists a skew in the negative's favor. This analysis is statistically rigorous and relevant in several aspects: (A) The p-value is less than the alpha. (B) The data is on the current January-February topic, meaning it's relevant to rounds these months ~2~. (C) The data represents a diversity of debating and judging styles across the country. (D) This analysis accounts for disparities in debating skill level. (E) Type I error was reduced by choosing a small alpha level. The combination of these points validates this analysis. As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds from 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (2017 – 2019 YTD), the negative won 52.99 of ballots (p-value 0.0001) and 54.63 of upset rounds (p-value 0.0001). This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics. Therefore, this analysis confirms that affirming is in fact harder again on the 2019 January-February topic ~3~. So don't lose the flip!
~5~ The Negative may not contest the Aff Framework if it's Kant – Concession is key to check neg time skew and ability to layer the debate by forcing the debate to one layer where I can weigh–else negs can spread out affs and collapse to the layer I undercover. This controls the internal link to all education args because no clash occurs when negs can just extend dropped layers to win. Concession is best for phil ed and topic lit if it's Kant – cross apply the third point of the TJFs section. And, statistics prove that the neg is at significant advantage, meaning generic responses to timeskew aren't responsive. Timeskew is the strongest link into fairness because it's the only objective measure we have coming into the round. Any theoretical response to this shell is a defensive counter-interp at best because it merely justifies the neg can contest both layers.
~6~ The neg may not read utilitarianism or any consequentialist ethical theory as a standard – a) resolvability: 1~ Induction fails—induction assumes that things will always happen the same way in the future as they have in the past. But this begs the question of how we know what happened in the past will happen in the future. Thus, induction is logically fallacious. 2~ Moral cluelessness—consequences are wholly unknowable and any action can lead to a domino effect that has unpredictable bad consequences in the end which means it can't guide action 3~ Infinite consequences—any harm stretches on into the infinite future and makes it impossible to compare harms—results in calculative regress—you have you calculate how much time to spend calculating and so on—destroys decision-making 4~ Aggregation fails—happiness is only happy for you, but not for me, so you can't compare across people—also can't compare 10 headaches to a migraine to the value of friendship b) psychological violence: util and other consequentialist theories justify atrocities such as slavery if it benefits a marginal majority or for hypothetical benefits that might not even materialize
~7~ The neg must only defend the converse of the resolution – The res is a stasis point for both sides so if you do anything other than defending the converse there is no way to plan the 1N strategy. That is supercharged in the context of today's debate in which it is a very widespread practice for the aff to tell the negative debater what aff they are going to read while the aff goes into the round in the dark. Key to fairness because negative will be at an inherent advantage before the round begins.
~1~ The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the Resolution; the aff must prove it true and the neg must prove it false.
Prefer: ~A~ Text: Five dictionaries define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm as to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution's truth or falsity. This outweighs on common usage – it is abundantly clear that our roles are verified. Any other role of the ballot enforces an external norm on debate, but only truth testing is intrinsic to the process of debate i.e. proving statements true or false through argumentation. Constitutivism outweighs because you don't have the jurisdiction not to truth test – a practice only makes sense based on its intrinsic rules. Jurisdiction is also an independent voter and a meta constraint since every argument you make concedes the authority of the judge fulfilling their jurisdiction to vote aff if they affirm better and neg the contrary – otherwise they could just hack against or for you which means it also controls the internal link to fairness since that's definitionally unfair. ~B~ Logic: Any counter role of the ballot collapses to truth testing because every property assumes truth of the property i.e. if I say, "I am awake" it is the same as "it is true that I am awake" which means they are also a question of truth claims because it's inherent. It also means their ROB warrants aren't mutually exclusive with mine. First, what the neg reads doesn't prove the resolution false, but challenges an assumption of it. Secondly, statements which make assumptions like the resolution should be read as a tacit conditional which is an if p then q statement. Thirdly, for all conditionals, if the antecedent is false, then the conditional as a whole is true. If the aff is winning, they get the ballot is a tacit ballot conditional which means denying the premise proves the conclusion that I should get the ballot. ~C~ Inclusion: Any offense can function under truth testing whereas your specific role of the ballot excludes all strategies but yours. This is bad for inclusive debates because people without every technical skill or comprehensive debate knowledge are shut out of your scholarship which turns your ROB- truth testing solves because you can do what you're good at and so can I. This is also better for education because me engaging in a debate I know nothing about doesn't help anyone. o/w since it is a real-world implication in round rather than a thought experiment that doesn't do anything ~D~ Isomorphism: ROBs that aren't phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it's solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn't a closest estimate
~2~ AFF theory is no RVI, Drop the debater, competing interps, under an interp that aff theory is legit regardless of voters a) infinite abuse since otherwise it would be impossible to check NC abuse b) it would justify the aff never getting to read theory which is a reciprocity issue c) Time crunched 1ar means it becomes impossible to justify paradigm issues and win the shell and this comes first because time skew. And, reject theory and Ks on spikes since it would be a contradiction since they indict each other, but prefer mine since they are lexically prior. AFF fairness issues come prior to NC arguments a) The 1ar can't engage on multiple layers if there is a skew since the speech is already time-crunched b) Sets up an invincible 2n since there are a million of unfair things you can collapse to to win every round. Inclusion first is the fallacy of origin – don't apply it. Fairness is a voter debate is a competitive activity wins/losses prove that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Education – the only portable thing from debate and the goal of the activity.
~3~ Affirming is harder – all theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard because of huge side bias – outweighs neg fairness arguments unless they prove how it uniquely outweighs the disparity since it's structural.
~4~ The Negative may not contest the Aff Framework – Concession is key to check neg time skew and ability to layer the debate by forcing the debate to one layer where I can weigh–else negs can spread out affs and collapse to the layer I undercover. This controls the internal link to all education args because no clash occurs when negs can just extend dropped layers to win. Concession is best for phil ed and topic lit if it's Kant – cross apply the third point of the TJFs section. And, statistics prove that the neg is at significant advantage, meaning generic responses to timeskew aren't responsive. Timeskew is the strongest link into fairness because it's the only objective measure we have coming into the round. Any theoretical response to this shell is a defensive counter-interp at best because it merely justifies the neg can contest both layers.
~5~ The neg may not read utilitarianism or any consequentialist ethical theory as a standard – a) resolvability: 1~ Induction fails—induction assumes that things will always happen the same way in the future as they have in the past. But this begs the question of how we know what happened in the past will happen in the future. Thus, induction is logically fallacious. 2~ Moral cluelessness—consequences are wholly unknowable and any action can lead to a domino effect that has unpredictable bad consequences in the end which means it can't guide action 3~ Infinite consequences—any harm stretches on into the infinite future and makes it impossible to compare harms—results in calculative regress—you have you calculate how much time to spend calculating and so on—destroys decision-making 4~ Aggregation fails—happiness is only happy for you, but not for me, so you can't compare across people—also can't compare 10 headaches to a migraine to the value of friendship b) psychological violence: util and other consequentialist theories justify atrocities such as slavery if it benefits a marginal majority or for hypothetical benefits that might not even materialize
~6~ The neg must only defend the converse of the resolution – The res is a stasis point for both sides so if you do anything other than defending the converse there is no way to plan the 1N strategy. That is supercharged in the context of today's debate in which it is a very widespread practice for the aff to tell the negative debater what aff they are going to read while the aff goes into the round in the dark. Key to fairness because negative will be at an inherent advantage before the round begins.
Framing
The meta-ethic is practical reason:
~1~ Regress – any other justification for ethics can have its authority infinitely questioned, but reason is a self-justifying source of authority which solves. Asking why use reasons intrinsically asks for a reason to use reason which concedes reason's authority.
~2~ Collapses – other sources of ethical authority presume a logical system of justification to make them coherent, which means reason functions as a side constraint on other theories and they presuppose the authority of reason.
~3~ Action Theory - any action can be divided into infinite states of affairs—only intent can unify our action into intended means and ends.
That generates an obligation to follow only universalizable laws. Only universal law can be constitutive of agency because it applies to all agents in all instances. A maxim is universalizable if it can be known by all reasoners and applied to all reasoners without causing a contradiction.
Thus the standard is consistency with principles of equal and outer freedom
~1~ Universal reason grants agents the right to freedom because acting on a maxim to coerce produces a conceptual contradiction.
Engstrom ~Stephen Engstrom, (Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Pittsburgh) "Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge" http://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal_Legislation_As_the_Form_of_Practical_Knowledge, DOA:5-5-2018 WWBW~ Given the preceding considerations, it's a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of AND a person's outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.
~2~ Inescapability – the exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.
Wood 07 ~Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 WWBW~ Kant holds that the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is AND is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.
~3~ Value theory – the existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth.
Korsgaard 83 (Christine M., "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as AND -and, in general, to make the highest good our end.
Impact calculus –
1~ Ethics are based on intent, but the state does not have intentions and cannot know the intentions of other agents. Instead, the state acts a procedural mechanism to punish those who violate rights claims. Those rights are derived from the structure of intent.
2~ The state does not have the authority to act to preempt future rights violations, because consequences of action are contingent and cannot be derived from the structure of the maxim on which one acts. Thus, the state does not have the jurisdiction to take them into account.
This means if their theory doesn't provide an account of how the state functions they have no offence on the framing debate.
Prefer additionally –
~1~ Performativity - Truth claims can only be proven by argumentation which contains the axiomatic assumption that freedom is good.
Kinsella 11 ~Stephan Kinsella, (Stephan Kinsella is an attorney in Houston, director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and editor of Libertarian Papers.) "Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide" Mises Institute, 5-27-2011, https://mises.org/library/argumentation-ethics-and-liberty-concise-guide, DOA:5-4-2020~ In setting the stage, Hoppe first observes that the standard natural-rights argument AND goods must be assumed to exist. (TSC, p. 161).
~2~ Frameworks are an evaluative filter that determines what offence is legitimate and it's a topicality interpretation of the word "ought" – thus all framing must be theoretically justified. Prefer mine –
Ought is defined as consistency with the categorical imperative.
Durand 01 Kevin K. J. Durand, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Henderson State University. The Logic of Morality: Georg Henrik von Wright, Immanuel Kant, and the "Ought/Can" Inference. Academic Forum, 2000-2001, http://www.hsu.edu/academicforum/2000-2001/2000-1AFThe20Logic20of20Morality.pdf This passage also serves to clarify Kant's assertion that the moral law depends on the AND able to will that the maxim be necessary for the perfectly rational will.
Prefer my interpretation:
~a~ Research Burdens—questions of universalizability do not require evidence dumps or statistics to access offense because they don't have to do with empirics—only analytics are necessary to access offense. That outweighs to accessibility—other frameworks are structurally inaccessible to small school debaters since they'll never have as much evidence or big enough back files to win card wars.
~b~ Strategic thinking—Kantian offense can be derived purely from reasoning, which allows more innovation from debaters and better in-round strategic thinking—debaters aren't totally reliant on their coach's prep. That outweighs since its portable—thinking on your feet is applicable in every profession.
~c~ Philosophical education—my interpretation allows contestation of the role of the state under the categorical imperative—people have argued that Kant justifies anything from libertarianism to socialism.
Advocacy
Thus I affirm resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.
I'll defend the resolution as a general principle, further specification in the doc. This means potential negative implications of reducing protections for certain drugs doesn't link as that's merely a hypothetical instance of an object protected by IP medicine laws. Counterplans and PICs affirm because they do not disprove the general thesis of my advocacy. To resolve means settle or find a solution to (a problem, dispute, or contentious matter). Since it is in the past tense, the resolution is already the solution so you vote aff since it is already true (definition is hyper linked)
All hyper linked and from Merriam Webster unless otherwise noted - "Member" is defined as: part of a whole "Nations" is defined as: a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government "Of" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate origin or derivation "The" is defined as: used as a function word before a singular noun to indicate that the noun is to be understood generically "World Trade Organization" is: An international body founded in 1995 to promote international trade and economic development by reducing tariffs and other restrictions. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "To" is defined as: used to indicate that the following verb is in the infinitive form "Reduce" is defined as: to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number "Intellectual Property" is defined as: A work or invention that is the result of creativity, such as a manuscript or a design, to which one has rights and for which one may apply for a patent, copyright, trademark, etc. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "Protections" is defined as: The act of protecting : the state of being protected (Merriam Webster Legal Dictionary) "For" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate the object or recipient of a perception, desire, or activity "Medicines" is defined as: a substance or preparation used in treating disease
Offence
There is a distinction between personal rights and property rights – property rights govern material objects that can be appropriated and stolen, however personal rights concern intangible concepts such as ideas and speeches. Thus it is a contradiction to attribute property rights to ideas as an idea can be accessible by all without resource constraints. And even the most stringent property rights allow for copying and modification of a legitimate purchase as a function of the new owner's property rights so it's a freedom violation to restrict doing so. And intellectual property rights actively suppress the freedom of speech, which is necessary for agents to actualize their wills.
Pievatolo 10 Pievatolo, Maria. "Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?" Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?, 7 Feb. 2010, bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html. WWEY, altered for glang In the Metaphysik der Sitten, we can find a clear distinction between ius reale and ius personale. The ius reale or ius in re is a right on things. 14 The ius personale is defined as the «possession of another's choice ~Willkür~, in the sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed». 15 In other words, it is a right entitling someone to obtain acts from other persons. As moral subjectivity involves freedom, personal rights cannot be established without the concerned persons' consent. According to Kant, the ius reale cannot be applied to ideas, or, better, to thoughts, because they can be conceived by everyone at the same time, without depriving their authors. Surprising as it may seem, the ius reale protects the freedom to copy, if it is taken seriously. If a thing has been purchased in a legal transaction and the purchasers copy it by their own means, they are simply working on their legitimate private property. For the very principle of private property, it is not fair to restrain the ways in which its legitimate purchaser may use it. For this reason, no ius reale can be opposed to the reprinter. If we see the book as a material thing, whoever buys it has the right to reproduce it: after all, it is his book. Furthermore, in Kant's opinion, we cannot derive any affirmative personal obligation from a ius reale: 16 a ius personale on someone cannot be claimed by simply purchasing some related things without obtaining his or her expressed consent. Kant, by conceiving the book as an action, adopts a strategy based on the ius personale only. By using such a strategy, he concludes that the unauthorized printer has to be compared to an unauthorized spokesperson rather than to a thief. Therefore, it is not necessary to go beyond the Roman law tradition, by inventing a new ius reale on immaterial things. Kant's argument goes as follows: when I speak to a public, I engage a relationship with them. The book may be viewed as a medium through which authors can transmit their speeches to a wider public. In the age of printing, such a medium used to be provided by publishers. Thus publishers can be considered as spokespersons who speak in the name of the authors. But, as such, they need the authors' authorization. 17 Why? Because to speak in the name of another without his authorization is like engaging him in a relationship without his consent. As personal rights, according to Kant, concern relations among free beings, they can arise only from expressed agreements. Hence, the unauthorized printer is like an unauthorized spokesperson, who produces a relation of the author with the public without being entitled to do it. However, the scope of Kant's justification of copyright is very narrow: it applies only to the publishing of texts, it does not touch th so-called derivative works, and it is justified only as far as it helps the public to get the texts. Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 3 Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke or opera, i.e. things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or operae, i.e. actions. As the works of art are simply physical objects, we can derive from Kant's assumption that every legitimate purchaser may reproduce them and may donate or sell the copies to others. 18 Every time an object can be treated only as a product, its legitimate owner may do what he wants with it, because of his ius reale, which has to be taken seriously on both sides. Moreover, as the injustice of reprinting books depends on their communication to the public, we can deduce that their reproduction for personal use is not to be forbidden. As regards as the derivative works, Kant states that, if one shortens, augments, retouches or translates the book of another, ~they~ produces a new speech, although the thoughts can be the same Therefore, such works cannot be seen as Nachdruck and are perfectly lawful. 19 In other words,in a Kantian environment, everyone may become a "wreader" - a reader and writer at the same time - without being hindered by copyright restrictions The goal of the transaction between the author and the publisher is conveying his text to the public. The public has a right to interact with the author, if the latter has chosen to do it. According to Kant, the publisher may neither refuse to publish – or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it himself – a text of a dead author, nor release mutilated 20 or spurious works, nor print only a limited impression that does not meet the demand. If the publisher does not comply, the public has the right to force him to publish. 21 In a Kantian environment the publisher's rights are justified only when they help authors to reach the public. Copyright should be neither censorship nor monopoly. In the 1785 essay Kant stated that the mandate of an author to a publisher should be exclusive 22 because the publisher becomes willing to publish a book only if he is certain to earn something from it; therefore, he is interested in avoiding competition. But later, in the Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant does not mention the exclusivity requirement at all, perhaps because he has realized that it was based on an empirical contamination, depending on the current state of technology. In Kant's world the press used to be the medium that provided for the widest distribution of ideas. Printing required both specific tools and skills, and specialized and centralized organizations. And as long as the publishers of printed texts provided the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, Kant was inclined to bow to their interest. However, from a conceptual perspective, there is no reason to deny that an author should be entitled to authorize everyone to distribute his work to everyone else, just like a person may hire more than one spokesperson. Such a practice is now fairly usual on the Internet, when authors choose a Creative Commons License and grant the right to publish their works to everyone, because they are interested in the widest possible spreading of their ideas. In Kant's times such a strategy would hardly be paying because the major publication technology, the press, was not cheap and easy like the digital reproduction of texts, but difficult and expensive. Kant's thesis is based on the technical assumption that publishing requires an intermediation - just as it used to be in the age of print -, which is lawful only it has the author's consent. Where the intermediation is not necessary any longer, where no one is speaking in the name of another, copyright makes no sense. 23 3. A term of comparison: Fichte's theory of intellectual property In 1793 the Berlinische Monatschrift published a short essay, Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable, 24 written by Fichte two years ago. The essay connects originality to intellectual property and advocates the enforcing of the latter by means of criminal sanctions. It is worth mentioning the Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 4 final parable by means of which Fichte illustrates his thesis, because it contains in itself all our commonplaces on intellectual property. In the time of the Caliph Harun al Rashid, an alchemist used to prepare a beneficial drug and to entrust the commercial side of the business to a merchant who was the sole distributor throughout the land and who earned a goodly profit by his monopoly. Another medicine merchant stole the drug from the monopolist and started to sell it at a cheaper price. The latter brought him before the Caliph. The former pleaded for his case by arguing that his selling the drug for a cheaper price was useful to the sick persons and to the society at large. What was the judgment of the Caliph? «He had the useful man hanged». 25 To be accurate, the medicine merchant of the parable had not copied the drug, but had materially stolen it. Fichte suggested that copying is like stealing. In the 18th century, however, Fichte had to demonstrate the commonplace of today. According to Fichte, we can distinguish two aspects of a book: 1. its physical aspect (das körperliche), i.e. the printed paper 2. its ideational aspect (das geistige) The ideational aspect of a book is in turn divisible into: a. a material aspect, i.e. the ideas the book presents; b. the form of these ideas, i. e. the way in which they are presented. All the aspects of a book, except one, can be appropriated by anybody: we can buy the printed paper and assimilate the ideas it conveys. We cannot, however, appropriate its form, because it is strictly personal. And, according to Fichte, it is self-evident that «we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible». 26 As the form can be only mine, the author is the proprietor of his text and his authorized publisher is its usufructuary. However sophistical this shift from originality to property may seem, it is not the only seminal element of our commonplaces on copyright contained in Fichte's essay. It is also worth remarking that in the Harun al Rashid parable the alchemist - the author - transfer his rights and disappears from the scene; the most powerful interests are these of a monopolist - the publisher -; only the other medicine merchant - the pirate - pleads for the interests of the public, but his arguments are rejected as criminal; as regards as the Caliph - the government -, he bows to the monopolist's interests without saying a word; and, last but not least, the criminal sanction for piracy - capital punishment - is out of all proportion. The young Fichte believed that his ideas on authors' right were similar to the ones of Kant. 27 However, there are at least three outstanding differences between Kant and Fichte: Fichte bases copyright on the individual originality in the form of expression; 28 Kant does not mention originality at all; 1. Fichte equates copyright with private property; 29 Kant rejects the very possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale; 2. Fichte thinks that copyright violators deserve the same harsh punishment of thieves. 30 According to Kant, the unauthorized printer should simply compensate all the damages he caused to the author or to his authorized publisher. 31 3. While Fichte is an intellectual property endorser, Kant is an "enlightened" conservative who supports the Roman law tradition, against the propertization trend. He accepts the copyright principle, according to which Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 5 authors are entitled to decide how to publish their works. The rights of the publishers, however, are justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public, while the personal use of the texts and the so-called "wreading" should remain free. And, above all, all that can be viewed as a product is, in his opinion, outside the scope of copyright and may be copied without restrictions. What is, in any, the philosophical meaning of Kant's "conservatism"? To answer such a question, we need to link his ideas on authors' right to his general theory of property, as it is explained in the Metaphysics of Morals. 4. What is a thing? In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of real rights are only corporeal entities or res corporales: «Sache ist ein Ding, was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches selbst der Freiheit ermangelt, heiß daher Sache (res corporalis)». 32 Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate to incorporeal things as well. According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished from its sensible possession. Something external would be rightfully mine «only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even though I am not in possession of it» (AA.06 245:13-16). The rightful possession is an intelligible, not sensible, relation. I can claim that my bicycle is mine only if I am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the backyard. Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property as explained in his 1793 essay, according to which we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author to claim a rightful property on his work. Is it really so obvious that originality implies property? Property is a comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all the time over the use of material objects. It is so comfortable just because it is physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property when something cannot be separated from someone. I say both that my fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But these two "mine" have a different meaning: the former is the "mine" of attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property. The former can be used to identify someone, and conveys the historical circumstance that something is related exclusively to someone; the latter points only to an accidental relation with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. It is possible to lie on a historical circumstance, by plagiarizing a text, i.e. by attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no one can "steal" the historical connection between "my" writing style and me: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if Fichte's principle were the only justification of property right, it would undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations. Although he defines things as res corporales, Kant determines the rightful possession of a thing as a possession without detentio, by ignoring all its sensible facets. Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - is exerted on an object that is "merely distinct from me", regardless of its position in space and time. Space and time, indeed, are sensible determinations and should be left out of consideration. According to the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a permissive law of reason: 33 if a rightful possession were not possible, every object would be a res nullius and nobody would be Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 6 entitled to use it. Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res corporales. Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (AA.6, 249:5-7). If property is a merely intelligible relation with an object that is simply distinct from the subject, we have no reason to deny that such an object might be immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property. Why, then, does Kant refrain from using the very concept of it? According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of personal rights. A person who is speaking to the people is engaging a relationship with them; if someone else engages such a relationship in his name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with property: he is only an agent without authority. Speeches, by Kant, cannot be separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised land of intellectual property without entering it. According to Kant, before the acquired rights, everyone has a moral capacity for putting others under obligation that he calls innate right or internal meum vel tuum (AA.06, 237:24-25). The innate right is only one: freedom as independence from being constrained by another's choice, insofar it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity: in other words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the very possibility condition of law. Freedom implies innate equality, «that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone, and finally his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it - such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them.» (AA.06, 237-238) 34 In spite of his intellectual theory of property, 35 Kant does not enter in the realm of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without suppressing freedom itself. If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to mix copyright protection and censorship. 36 Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used. We cannot, however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from speeches would be like excluding them from freedom. Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the scope of copyright to publishing, or, better, to the publishing of the age of print: the Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without the author's permission and distributes its copies to the public. If someone copies a book for his personal use, or lets others do it, or translates and elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone. Kant does not stick to the Roman Law tradition because of conservatism, but because of Enlightenment.
IPP is nonuniversalizable – universalizing the act of restricting the production of a certain medicine terminates in a contradiction because it entails that you restrict your own ability to produce the medicine
9/18/21
SeptOct AC - Practical Reason v4
Tournament: Yale | Round: Triples | Opponent: Scarsdale BS | Judge: Rohit Lakshman, Stephen Scopa, Scott Klein
AC
Framing
The meta-ethic is practical reason:
~1~ Regress – any other justification for ethics can have its authority infinitely questioned, but reason is a self-justifying source of authority which solves. Asking why use reasons intrinsically asks for a reason to use reason which concedes reason's authority.
~2~ Collapses – other sources of ethical authority presume a logical system of justification to make them coherent, which means reason functions as a side constraint on other theories and they presuppose the authority of reason.
~3~ Action Theory - any action can be divided into infinite states of affairs—only intent can unify our action into intended means and ends.
That generates an obligation to follow only universalizable laws. Only universal law can be constitutive of agency because it applies to all agents in all instances. A maxim is universalizable if it can be known by all reasoners and applied to all reasoners without causing a contradiction.
Thus the standard is consistency with principles of equal and outer freedom
~1~ Universal reason grants agents the right to freedom because acting on a maxim to coerce produces a conceptual contradiction.
Engstrom ~Stephen Engstrom, (Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Pittsburgh) "Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge" http://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal_Legislation_As_the_Form_of_Practical_Knowledge, DOA:5-5-2018 WWBW~ Given the preceding considerations, it's a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of AND a person's outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.
~2~ Inescapability – the exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.
Wood 07 ~Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 WWBW~ Kant holds that the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is AND is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.
~3~ Value theory – the existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth.
Korsgaard 83 (Christine M., "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as AND -and, in general, to make the highest good our end.
Impact calculus –
1~ Ethics are based on intent, but the state does not have intentions and cannot know the intentions of other agents. Instead, the state acts a procedural mechanism to punish those who violate rights claims. Those rights are derived from the structure of intent.
2~ The state does not have the authority to act to preempt future rights violations, because consequences of action are contingent and cannot be derived from the structure of the maxim on which one acts. Thus, the state does not have the jurisdiction to take them into account.
This means if their theory doesn't provide an account of how the state functions they have no offence on the framing debate.
Prefer additionally –
~1~ Performativity - Truth claims can only be proven by argumentation which contains the axiomatic assumption that freedom is good.
Kinsella 11 ~Stephan Kinsella, (Stephan Kinsella is an attorney in Houston, director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and editor of Libertarian Papers.) "Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide" Mises Institute, 5-27-2011, https://mises.org/library/argumentation-ethics-and-liberty-concise-guide, DOA:5-4-2020~ In setting the stage, Hoppe first observes that the standard natural-rights argument AND goods must be assumed to exist. (TSC, p. 161).
~2~ Frameworks are an evaluative filter that determines what offence is legitimate and it's a topicality interpretation of the word "ought" – thus all framing must be theoretically justified. Prefer mine –
Ought is defined as consistency with the categorical imperative.
Durand 01 Kevin K. J. Durand, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Henderson State University. The Logic of Morality: Georg Henrik von Wright, Immanuel Kant, and the "Ought/Can" Inference. Academic Forum, 2000-2001, http://www.hsu.edu/academicforum/2000-2001/2000-1AFThe20Logic20of20Morality.pdf This passage also serves to clarify Kant's assertion that the moral law depends on the AND able to will that the maxim be necessary for the perfectly rational will.
Prefer my interpretation:
~a~ Research Burdens—questions of universalizability do not require evidence dumps or statistics to access offense because they don't have to do with empirics—only analytics are necessary to access offense. That outweighs to accessibility—other frameworks are structurally inaccessible to small school debaters since they'll never have as much evidence or big enough back files to win card wars.
~b~ Strategic thinking—Kantian offense can be derived purely from reasoning, which allows more innovation from debaters and better in-round strategic thinking—debaters aren't totally reliant on their coach's prep. That outweighs since its portable—thinking on your feet is applicable in every profession.
~c~ Philosophical education—my interpretation allows contestation of the role of the state under the categorical imperative—people have argued that Kant justifies anything from libertarianism to socialism.
Advocacy
Thus I affirm resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.
I'll defend the resolution as a general principle, further specification in the doc. This means potential negative implications of reducing protections for certain drugs doesn't link as that's merely a hypothetical instance of an object protected by IP medicine laws. Counterplans and PICs affirm because they do not disprove the general thesis of my advocacy. To resolve means settle or find a solution to (a problem, dispute, or contentious matter). Since it is in the past tense, the resolution is already the solution so you vote aff since it is already true (definition is hyper linked)
All hyper linked and from Merriam Webster unless otherwise noted - "Member" is defined as: part of a whole "Nations" is defined as: a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government "Of" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate origin or derivation "The" is defined as: used as a function word before a singular noun to indicate that the noun is to be understood generically "World Trade Organization" is: An international body founded in 1995 to promote international trade and economic development by reducing tariffs and other restrictions. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "To" is defined as: used to indicate that the following verb is in the infinitive form "Reduce" is defined as: to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number "Intellectual Property" is defined as: A work or invention that is the result of creativity, such as a manuscript or a design, to which one has rights and for which one may apply for a patent, copyright, trademark, etc. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "Protections" is defined as: The act of protecting : the state of being protected (Merriam Webster Legal Dictionary) "For" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate the object or recipient of a perception, desire, or activity "Medicines" is defined as: a substance or preparation used in treating disease
Offence
There is a distinction between personal rights and property rights – property rights govern material objects that can be appropriated and stolen, however personal rights concern intangible concepts such as ideas and speeches. Thus it is a contradiction to attribute property rights to ideas as an idea can be accessible by all without resource constraints. And even the most stringent property rights allow for copying and modification of a legitimate purchase as a function of the new owner's property rights so it's a freedom violation to restrict doing so. And intellectual property rights actively suppress the freedom of speech, which is necessary for agents to actualize their wills.
Pievatolo 10 Pievatolo, Maria. "Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?" Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?, 7 Feb. 2010, bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html. WWEY, altered for glang In the Metaphysik der Sitten, we can find a clear distinction between ius reale and ius personale. The ius reale or ius in re is a right on things. 14 The ius personale is defined as the «possession of another's choice ~Willkür~, in the sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed». 15 In other words, it is a right entitling someone to obtain acts from other persons. As moral subjectivity involves freedom, personal rights cannot be established without the concerned persons' consent. According to Kant, the ius reale cannot be applied to ideas, or, better, to thoughts, because they can be conceived by everyone at the same time, without depriving their authors. Surprising as it may seem, the ius reale protects the freedom to copy, if it is taken seriously. If a thing has been purchased in a legal transaction and the purchasers copy it by their own means, they are simply working on their legitimate private property. For the very principle of private property, it is not fair to restrain the ways in which its legitimate purchaser may use it. For this reason, no ius reale can be opposed to the reprinter. If we see the book as a material thing, whoever buys it has the right to reproduce it: after all, it is his book. Furthermore, in Kant's opinion, we cannot derive any affirmative personal obligation from a ius reale: 16 a ius personale on someone cannot be claimed by simply purchasing some related things without obtaining his or her expressed consent. Kant, by conceiving the book as an action, adopts a strategy based on the ius personale only. By using such a strategy, he concludes that the unauthorized printer has to be compared to an unauthorized spokesperson rather than to a thief. Therefore, it is not necessary to go beyond the Roman law tradition, by inventing a new ius reale on immaterial things. Kant's argument goes as follows: when I speak to a public, I engage a relationship with them. The book may be viewed as a medium through which authors can transmit their speeches to a wider public. In the age of printing, such a medium used to be provided by publishers. Thus publishers can be considered as spokespersons who speak in the name of the authors. But, as such, they need the authors' authorization. 17 Why? Because to speak in the name of another without his authorization is like engaging him in a relationship without his consent. As personal rights, according to Kant, concern relations among free beings, they can arise only from expressed agreements. Hence, the unauthorized printer is like an unauthorized spokesperson, who produces a relation of the author with the public without being entitled to do it. However, the scope of Kant's justification of copyright is very narrow: it applies only to the publishing of texts, it does not touch th so-called derivative works, and it is justified only as far as it helps the public to get the texts. Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 3 Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke or opera, i.e. things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or operae, i.e. actions. As the works of art are simply physical objects, we can derive from Kant's assumption that every legitimate purchaser may reproduce them and may donate or sell the copies to others. 18 Every time an object can be treated only as a product, its legitimate owner may do what he wants with it, because of his ius reale, which has to be taken seriously on both sides. Moreover, as the injustice of reprinting books depends on their communication to the public, we can deduce that their reproduction for personal use is not to be forbidden. As regards as the derivative works, Kant states that, if one shortens, augments, retouches or translates the book of another, ~they~ produces a new speech, although the thoughts can be the same Therefore, such works cannot be seen as Nachdruck and are perfectly lawful. 19 In other words,in a Kantian environment, everyone may become a "wreader" - a reader and writer at the same time - without being hindered by copyright restrictions The goal of the transaction between the author and the publisher is conveying his text to the public. The public has a right to interact with the author, if the latter has chosen to do it. According to Kant, the publisher may neither refuse to publish – or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it himself – a text of a dead author, nor release mutilated 20 or spurious works, nor print only a limited impression that does not meet the demand. If the publisher does not comply, the public has the right to force him to publish. 21 In a Kantian environment the publisher's rights are justified only when they help authors to reach the public. Copyright should be neither censorship nor monopoly. In the 1785 essay Kant stated that the mandate of an author to a publisher should be exclusive 22 because the publisher becomes willing to publish a book only if he is certain to earn something from it; therefore, he is interested in avoiding competition. But later, in the Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant does not mention the exclusivity requirement at all, perhaps because he has realized that it was based on an empirical contamination, depending on the current state of technology. In Kant's world the press used to be the medium that provided for the widest distribution of ideas. Printing required both specific tools and skills, and specialized and centralized organizations. And as long as the publishers of printed texts provided the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, Kant was inclined to bow to their interest. However, from a conceptual perspective, there is no reason to deny that an author should be entitled to authorize everyone to distribute his work to everyone else, just like a person may hire more than one spokesperson. Such a practice is now fairly usual on the Internet, when authors choose a Creative Commons License and grant the right to publish their works to everyone, because they are interested in the widest possible spreading of their ideas. In Kant's times such a strategy would hardly be paying because the major publication technology, the press, was not cheap and easy like the digital reproduction of texts, but difficult and expensive. Kant's thesis is based on the technical assumption that publishing requires an intermediation - just as it used to be in the age of print -, which is lawful only it has the author's consent. Where the intermediation is not necessary any longer, where no one is speaking in the name of another, copyright makes no sense. 23 3. A term of comparison: Fichte's theory of intellectual property In 1793 the Berlinische Monatschrift published a short essay, Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable, 24 written by Fichte two years ago. The essay connects originality to intellectual property and advocates the enforcing of the latter by means of criminal sanctions. It is worth mentioning the Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 4 final parable by means of which Fichte illustrates his thesis, because it contains in itself all our commonplaces on intellectual property. In the time of the Caliph Harun al Rashid, an alchemist used to prepare a beneficial drug and to entrust the commercial side of the business to a merchant who was the sole distributor throughout the land and who earned a goodly profit by his monopoly. Another medicine merchant stole the drug from the monopolist and started to sell it at a cheaper price. The latter brought him before the Caliph. The former pleaded for his case by arguing that his selling the drug for a cheaper price was useful to the sick persons and to the society at large. What was the judgment of the Caliph? «He had the useful man hanged». 25 To be accurate, the medicine merchant of the parable had not copied the drug, but had materially stolen it. Fichte suggested that copying is like stealing. In the 18th century, however, Fichte had to demonstrate the commonplace of today. According to Fichte, we can distinguish two aspects of a book: 1. its physical aspect (das körperliche), i.e. the printed paper 2. its ideational aspect (das geistige) The ideational aspect of a book is in turn divisible into: a. a material aspect, i.e. the ideas the book presents; b. the form of these ideas, i. e. the way in which they are presented. All the aspects of a book, except one, can be appropriated by anybody: we can buy the printed paper and assimilate the ideas it conveys. We cannot, however, appropriate its form, because it is strictly personal. And, according to Fichte, it is self-evident that «we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible». 26 As the form can be only mine, the author is the proprietor of his text and his authorized publisher is its usufructuary. However sophistical this shift from originality to property may seem, it is not the only seminal element of our commonplaces on copyright contained in Fichte's essay. It is also worth remarking that in the Harun al Rashid parable the alchemist - the author - transfer his rights and disappears from the scene; the most powerful interests are these of a monopolist - the publisher -; only the other medicine merchant - the pirate - pleads for the interests of the public, but his arguments are rejected as criminal; as regards as the Caliph - the government -, he bows to the monopolist's interests without saying a word; and, last but not least, the criminal sanction for piracy - capital punishment - is out of all proportion. The young Fichte believed that his ideas on authors' right were similar to the ones of Kant. 27 However, there are at least three outstanding differences between Kant and Fichte: Fichte bases copyright on the individual originality in the form of expression; 28 Kant does not mention originality at all; 1. Fichte equates copyright with private property; 29 Kant rejects the very possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale; 2. Fichte thinks that copyright violators deserve the same harsh punishment of thieves. 30 According to Kant, the unauthorized printer should simply compensate all the damages he caused to the author or to his authorized publisher. 31 3. While Fichte is an intellectual property endorser, Kant is an "enlightened" conservative who supports the Roman law tradition, against the propertization trend. He accepts the copyright principle, according to which Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 5 authors are entitled to decide how to publish their works. The rights of the publishers, however, are justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public, while the personal use of the texts and the so-called "wreading" should remain free. And, above all, all that can be viewed as a product is, in his opinion, outside the scope of copyright and may be copied without restrictions. What is, in any, the philosophical meaning of Kant's "conservatism"? To answer such a question, we need to link his ideas on authors' right to his general theory of property, as it is explained in the Metaphysics of Morals. 4. What is a thing? In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of real rights are only corporeal entities or res corporales: «Sache ist ein Ding, was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches selbst der Freiheit ermangelt, heiß daher Sache (res corporalis)». 32 Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate to incorporeal things as well. According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished from its sensible possession. Something external would be rightfully mine «only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even though I am not in possession of it» (AA.06 245:13-16). The rightful possession is an intelligible, not sensible, relation. I can claim that my bicycle is mine only if I am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the backyard. Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property as explained in his 1793 essay, according to which we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author to claim a rightful property on his work. Is it really so obvious that originality implies property? Property is a comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all the time over the use of material objects. It is so comfortable just because it is physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property when something cannot be separated from someone. I say both that my fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But these two "mine" have a different meaning: the former is the "mine" of attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property. The former can be used to identify someone, and conveys the historical circumstance that something is related exclusively to someone; the latter points only to an accidental relation with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. It is possible to lie on a historical circumstance, by plagiarizing a text, i.e. by attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no one can "steal" the historical connection between "my" writing style and me: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if Fichte's principle were the only justification of property right, it would undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations. Although he defines things as res corporales, Kant determines the rightful possession of a thing as a possession without detentio, by ignoring all its sensible facets. Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - is exerted on an object that is "merely distinct from me", regardless of its position in space and time. Space and time, indeed, are sensible determinations and should be left out of consideration. According to the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a permissive law of reason: 33 if a rightful possession were not possible, every object would be a res nullius and nobody would be Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 6 entitled to use it. Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res corporales. Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (AA.6, 249:5-7). If property is a merely intelligible relation with an object that is simply distinct from the subject, we have no reason to deny that such an object might be immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property. Why, then, does Kant refrain from using the very concept of it? According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of personal rights. A person who is speaking to the people is engaging a relationship with them; if someone else engages such a relationship in his name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with property: he is only an agent without authority. Speeches, by Kant, cannot be separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised land of intellectual property without entering it. According to Kant, before the acquired rights, everyone has a moral capacity for putting others under obligation that he calls innate right or internal meum vel tuum (AA.06, 237:24-25). The innate right is only one: freedom as independence from being constrained by another's choice, insofar it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity: in other words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the very possibility condition of law. Freedom implies innate equality, «that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone, and finally his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it - such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them.» (AA.06, 237-238) 34 In spite of his intellectual theory of property, 35 Kant does not enter in the realm of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without suppressing freedom itself. If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to mix copyright protection and censorship. 36 Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used. We cannot, however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from speeches would be like excluding them from freedom. Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the scope of copyright to publishing, or, better, to the publishing of the age of print: the Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without the author's permission and distributes its copies to the public. If someone copies a book for his personal use, or lets others do it, or translates and elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone. Kant does not stick to the Roman Law tradition because of conservatism, but because of Enlightenment.
IPP is nonuniversalizable – universalizing the act of restricting the production of a certain medicine terminates in a contradiction because it entails that you restrict your own ability to produce the medicine
Underview
~1~ The role of the ballot is to determine the desirability of the world of the affirmative's advocacy against the world of the negative's advocacy. Prefer: ~A~ Reciprocity – Comparative worlds is intrinsically reciprocal because it is the only role of the ballot that allows equal access to the advocacies of both sides while ROBs like truth testing have NIBs and a prioris and ROBs like rejecting oppression for a specific group only allow one side to have offense which creates a prep skew that comes first as it is a structural skew that controls access to the ballot. First, what the neg reads doesn't prove the resolution false, but challenges an assumption of it. Secondly, statements which make assumptions like the resolution should be read as a tacit conditional which is an if p then q statement. Thirdly, for all conditionals, if the antecedent is false, then the conditional as a whole is true. If the aff is winning, they get the ballot is a tacit ballot conditional which means denying the premise proves the conclusion that I should get the ballot. ~B~ All other ROBs don't take both substance and reps into account which makes comparative worlds a prerequisite to any other ROB as 1) reps are a prerequisite to engaging in debate because toleration of bad discourse allows racism and threatening language which decreases participation and 2) substance is the goal of debate – its why we have any post fiat offense and topics in the first place. ~2~ Presumption and permissibility affirm – a) We always default to assuming something true until proven false, or it would be almost impossible to make any claim at all because if the entire burden of proof is to show truth b) If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral ie drinking water is not morally right or wrong but if I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions and freezes action, it's a practical requirement of action.
~2~ Presumption and permissibility affirm – a) We always default to assuming something true until proven false, or it would be almost impossible to make any claim at all because if the entire burden of proof is to show truth b) If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral ie drinking water is not morally right or wrong but if I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions and freezes action, it's a practical requirement of action.
~3~ AFF theory is no RVI, Drop the debater, competing interps, under an interp that aff theory is legit regardless of voters a) infinite abuse since otherwise it would be impossible to check NC abuse b) it would justify the aff never getting to read theory which is a reciprocity issue c) Time crunched 1ar means it becomes impossible to justify paradigm issues and win the shell and this comes first because time skew. And, reject theory and Ks on spikes since it would be a contradiction since they indict each other, but prefer mine since they are lexically prior. AFF fairness issues come prior to NC arguments a) The 1ar can't engage on multiple layers if there is a skew since the speech is already time-crunched b) Sets up an invincible 2n since there are a million of unfair things you can collapse to to win every round. Fairness is a voter debate is a competitive activity wins/losses prove that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Education – the only portable thing from debate and the goal of the activity.
~4~ Affirming is harder, a time crunched 1ar makes it uniquely hard to respond to a 7 min dump but the neg has more time to develop their position and make responses – all theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard because of huge side bias – outweighs neg fairness arguments unless they prove how it uniquely outweighs the disparity since it's structural.
Shah 19 Sachin "A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIDE-BIAS ON THE 2019 JANUARY-FEBRUARY LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE TOPIC" NSD, 15 February 2019. http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/** SJCPJG To further quantify the side-bias, the proportion of negative wins when the affirmative was favored (p1) can be compared with the proportion of affirmative wins when the negative is favored (p2). Ideally the difference between the proportions would be 0; however, p1 = 34.84 while p2 = 28.77, a staggering 6.07 difference. Now the question is whether this difference is statistically significant. In order to determine the answer, a two-proportion z-test was used. The null hypothesis is p1 – p2 = 0 , because that means both sides are able to overcome the debating level skew equally. The alternative hypothesis is then p1 – p2 0, meaning the negative is able to overcome the skew more than the affirmative is able, demonstrating a side-bias. This two-proportion z-test rejected the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (p-value 0.0001). There is sufficient evidence that the negative is able to overcome the skew more often than the affirmative can. This implies there is a less than 0.01 chance that there is no side-bias because it demonstrates the higher proportion of negative wins when the affirmative is favored is significant. In short, the negative has a greater ability to win difficult rounds than the affirmative does, which indicates there exists a skew in the negative's favor. This analysis is statistically rigorous and relevant in several aspects: (A) The p-value is less than the alpha. (B) The data is on the current January-February topic, meaning it's relevant to rounds these months ~2~. (C) The data represents a diversity of debating and judging styles across the country. (D) This analysis accounts for disparities in debating skill level. (E) Type I error was reduced by choosing a small alpha level. The combination of these points validates this analysis. As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds from 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (2017 – 2019 YTD), the negative won 52.99 of ballots (p-value 0.0001) and 54.63 of upset rounds (p-value 0.0001). This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics. Therefore, this analysis confirms that affirming is in fact harder again on the 2019 January-February topic ~3~. So don't lose the flip!
~5~ The Negative may not contest the Aff Framework if it's Kant – Concession is key to check neg time skew and ability to layer the debate by forcing the debate to one layer where I can weigh–else negs can spread out affs and collapse to the layer I undercover. This controls the internal link to all education args because no clash occurs when negs can just extend dropped layers to win. Concession is best for phil ed and topic lit if it's Kant – cross apply the third point of the TJFs section. And, statistics prove that the neg is at significant advantage, meaning generic responses to timeskew aren't responsive. Timeskew is the strongest link into fairness because it's the only objective measure we have coming into the round. Any theoretical response to this shell is a defensive counter-interp at best because it merely justifies the neg can contest both layers.
~6~ The neg may not read utilitarianism or any consequentialist ethical theory as a standard – a) resolvability: 1~ Induction fails—induction assumes that things will always happen the same way in the future as they have in the past. But this begs the question of how we know what happened in the past will happen in the future. Thus, induction is logically fallacious. 2~ Moral cluelessness—consequences are wholly unknowable and any action can lead to a domino effect that has unpredictable bad consequences in the end which means it can't guide action 3~ Infinite consequences—any harm stretches on into the infinite future and makes it impossible to compare harms—results in calculative regress—you have you calculate how much time to spend calculating and so on—destroys decision-making 4~ Aggregation fails—happiness is only happy for you, but not for me, so you can't compare across people—also can't compare 10 headaches to a migraine to the value of friendship b) psychological violence: util and other consequentialist theories justify atrocities such as slavery if it benefits a marginal majority or for hypothetical benefits that might not even materialize
~7~ The neg must only defend the converse of the resolution – The res is a stasis point for both sides so if you do anything other than defending the converse there is no way to plan the 1N strategy. That is supercharged in the context of today's debate in which it is a very widespread practice for the aff to tell the negative debater what aff they are going to read while the aff goes into the round in the dark. Key to fairness because negative will be at an inherent advantage before the round begins.
9/19/21
SeptOct AC - Practical Reason v5
Tournament: Valley | Round: 2 | Opponent: DTHS HV | Judge: Chris Castillo
AC
Framing (2:20)
The meta-ethic is practical reason:
~1~ Regress – any other justification for ethics can have its authority infinitely questioned, but reason is a self-justifying source of authority which solves. Asking why use reasons intrinsically asks for a reason to use reason which concedes reason's authority.
~2~ Collapses – other sources of ethical authority presume a logical system of justification to make them coherent, which means reason functions as a side constraint on other theories and they presuppose the authority of reason.
~3~ Action Theory - any action can be divided into infinite states of affairs—only intent can unify our action into intended means and ends.
That generates an obligation to follow only universalizable laws. Only universal law can be constitutive of agency because it applies to all agents in all instances. A maxim is universalizable if it can be known by all reasoners and applied to all reasoners without causing a contradiction.
Thus the standard is consistency with principles of equal and outer freedom
~1~ Universal reason grants agents the right to freedom because acting on a maxim to coerce produces a conceptual contradiction.
Engstrom ~Stephen Engstrom, (Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Pittsburgh) "Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge" http://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal_Legislation_As_the_Form_of_Practical_Knowledge, DOA:5-5-2018 WWBW~ Given the preceding considerations, it's a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of AND a person's outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.
~2~ Inescapability – the exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.
Wood 07 ~Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 WWBW~ Kant holds that the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is AND is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.
~3~ Value theory – the existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth.
Korsgaard 83 (Christine M., "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as AND -and, in general, to make the highest good our end.
Impact calculus –
1~ Ethics are based on intent, but the state does not have intentions and cannot know the intentions of other agents. Instead, the state acts a procedural mechanism to punish those who violate rights claims. Those rights are derived from the structure of intent.
2~ The state does not have the authority to act to preempt future rights violations, because consequences of action are contingent and cannot be derived from the structure of the maxim on which one acts. Thus, the state does not have the jurisdiction to take them into account.
This means if their theory doesn't provide an account of how the state functions they have no offence on the framing debate.
Prefer additionally –
~1~ Performativity - Truth claims can only be proven by argumentation which contains the axiomatic assumption that freedom is good.
Kinsella 11 ~Stephan Kinsella, (Stephan Kinsella is an attorney in Houston, director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and editor of Libertarian Papers.) "Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide" Mises Institute, 5-27-2011, https://mises.org/library/argumentation-ethics-and-liberty-concise-guide, DOA:5-4-2020~ In setting the stage, Hoppe first observes that the standard natural-rights argument AND goods must be assumed to exist. (TSC, p. 161).
~2~ Frameworks are an evaluative filter that determines what offence is legitimate and it's a topicality interpretation of the word "ought" – thus all framing must be theoretically justified. Prefer mine –
Ought is defined as consistency with the categorical imperative.
Durand 01 Kevin K. J. Durand, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Henderson State University. The Logic of Morality: Georg Henrik von Wright, Immanuel Kant, and the "Ought/Can" Inference. Academic Forum, 2000-2001, http://www.hsu.edu/academicforum/2000-2001/2000-1AFThe20Logic20of20Morality.pdf This passage also serves to clarify Kant's assertion that the moral law depends on the AND able to will that the maxim be necessary for the perfectly rational will.
Prefer my interpretation:
~a~ Research Burdens—questions of universalizability do not require evidence dumps or statistics to access offense because they don't have to do with empirics—only analytics are necessary to access offense. That outweighs to accessibility—other frameworks are structurally inaccessible to small school debaters since they'll never have as much evidence or big enough back files to win card wars.
~b~ Strategic thinking—Kantian offense can be derived purely from reasoning, which allows more innovation from debaters and better in-round strategic thinking—debaters aren't totally reliant on their coach's prep. That outweighs since its portable—thinking on your feet is applicable in every profession.
~c~ Philosophical education—my interpretation allows contestation of the role of the state under the categorical imperative—people have argued that Kant justifies anything from libertarianism to socialism.
Advocacy
Thus I affirm resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.
I'll defend the resolution as a general principle, further specification in the doc. This means potential negative implications of reducing protections for certain drugs doesn't link as that's merely a hypothetical instance of an object protected by IP medicine laws. Counterplans and PICs affirm because they do not disprove the general thesis of my advocacy.
All hyper linked and from Merriam Webster unless otherwise noted - "Member" is defined as: part of a whole "Nations" is defined as: a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government "Of" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate origin or derivation "The" is defined as: used as a function word before a singular noun to indicate that the noun is to be understood generically "World Trade Organization" is: An international body founded in 1995 to promote international trade and economic development by reducing tariffs and other restrictions. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "To" is defined as: used to indicate that the following verb is in the infinitive form "Reduce" is defined as: to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number "Intellectual Property" is defined as: A work or invention that is the result of creativity, such as a manuscript or a design, to which one has rights and for which one may apply for a patent, copyright, trademark, etc. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "Protections" is defined as: The act of protecting : the state of being protected (Merriam Webster Legal Dictionary) "For" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate the object or recipient of a perception, desire, or activity "Medicines" is defined as: a substance or preparation used in treating disease
Offence
There is a distinction between personal rights and property rights – property rights govern material objects that can be appropriated and stolen, however personal rights concern intangible concepts such as ideas and speeches. Thus it is a contradiction to attribute property rights to ideas as an idea can be accessible by all without resource constraints. And even the most stringent property rights allow for copying and modification of a legitimate purchase as a function of the new owner's property rights so it's a freedom violation to restrict doing so. And intellectual property rights actively suppress the freedom of speech, which is necessary for agents to actualize their wills.
Pievatolo 10 Pievatolo, Maria. "Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?" Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?, 7 Feb. 2010, bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html. WWEY, altered for glang In the Metaphysik der Sitten, we can find a clear distinction between ius reale and ius personale. The ius reale or ius in re is a right on things. 14 The ius personale is defined as the «possession of another's choice ~Willkür~, in the sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed». 15 In other words, it is a right entitling someone to obtain acts from other persons. As moral subjectivity involves freedom, personal rights cannot be established without the concerned persons' consent. According to Kant, the ius reale cannot be applied to ideas, or, better, to thoughts, because they can be conceived by everyone at the same time, without depriving their authors. Surprising as it may seem, the ius reale protects the freedom to copy, if it is taken seriously. If a thing has been purchased in a legal transaction and the purchasers copy it by their own means, they are simply working on their legitimate private property. For the very principle of private property, it is not fair to restrain the ways in which its legitimate purchaser may use it. For this reason, no ius reale can be opposed to the reprinter. If we see the book as a material thing, whoever buys it has the right to reproduce it: after all, it is his book. Furthermore, in Kant's opinion, we cannot derive any affirmative personal obligation from a ius reale: 16 a ius personale on someone cannot be claimed by simply purchasing some related things without obtaining his or her expressed consent. Kant, by conceiving the book as an action, adopts a strategy based on the ius personale only. By using such a strategy, he concludes that the unauthorized printer has to be compared to an unauthorized spokesperson rather than to a thief. Therefore, it is not necessary to go beyond the Roman law tradition, by inventing a new ius reale on immaterial things. Kant's argument goes as follows: when I speak to a public, I engage a relationship with them. The book may be viewed as a medium through which authors can transmit their speeches to a wider public. In the age of printing, such a medium used to be provided by publishers. Thus publishers can be considered as spokespersons who speak in the name of the authors. But, as such, they need the authors' authorization. 17 Why? Because to speak in the name of another without his authorization is like engaging him in a relationship without his consent. As personal rights, according to Kant, concern relations among free beings, they can arise only from expressed agreements. Hence, the unauthorized printer is like an unauthorized spokesperson, who produces a relation of the author with the public without being entitled to do it. However, the scope of Kant's justification of copyright is very narrow: it applies only to the publishing of texts, it does not touch th so-called derivative works, and it is justified only as far as it helps the public to get the texts. Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 3 Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke or opera, i.e. things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or operae, i.e. actions. As the works of art are simply physical objects, we can derive from Kant's assumption that every legitimate purchaser may reproduce them and may donate or sell the copies to others. 18 Every time an object can be treated only as a product, its legitimate owner may do what he wants with it, because of his ius reale, which has to be taken seriously on both sides. Moreover, as the injustice of reprinting books depends on their communication to the public, we can deduce that their reproduction for personal use is not to be forbidden. As regards as the derivative works, Kant states that, if one shortens, augments, retouches or translates the book of another, ~they~ produces a new speech, although the thoughts can be the same Therefore, such works cannot be seen as Nachdruck and are perfectly lawful. 19 In other words,in a Kantian environment, everyone may become a "wreader" - a reader and writer at the same time - without being hindered by copyright restrictions The goal of the transaction between the author and the publisher is conveying his text to the public. The public has a right to interact with the author, if the latter has chosen to do it. According to Kant, the publisher may neither refuse to publish – or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it himself – a text of a dead author, nor release mutilated 20 or spurious works, nor print only a limited impression that does not meet the demand. If the publisher does not comply, the public has the right to force him to publish. 21 In a Kantian environment the publisher's rights are justified only when they help authors to reach the public. Copyright should be neither censorship nor monopoly. In the 1785 essay Kant stated that the mandate of an author to a publisher should be exclusive 22 because the publisher becomes willing to publish a book only if he is certain to earn something from it; therefore, he is interested in avoiding competition. But later, in the Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant does not mention the exclusivity requirement at all, perhaps because he has realized that it was based on an empirical contamination, depending on the current state of technology. In Kant's world the press used to be the medium that provided for the widest distribution of ideas. Printing required both specific tools and skills, and specialized and centralized organizations. And as long as the publishers of printed texts provided the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, Kant was inclined to bow to their interest. However, from a conceptual perspective, there is no reason to deny that an author should be entitled to authorize everyone to distribute his work to everyone else, just like a person may hire more than one spokesperson. Such a practice is now fairly usual on the Internet, when authors choose a Creative Commons License and grant the right to publish their works to everyone, because they are interested in the widest possible spreading of their ideas. In Kant's times such a strategy would hardly be paying because the major publication technology, the press, was not cheap and easy like the digital reproduction of texts, but difficult and expensive. Kant's thesis is based on the technical assumption that publishing requires an intermediation - just as it used to be in the age of print -, which is lawful only it has the author's consent. Where the intermediation is not necessary any longer, where no one is speaking in the name of another, copyright makes no sense. 23 3. A term of comparison: Fichte's theory of intellectual property In 1793 the Berlinische Monatschrift published a short essay, Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable, 24 written by Fichte two years ago. The essay connects originality to intellectual property and advocates the enforcing of the latter by means of criminal sanctions. It is worth mentioning the Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 4 final parable by means of which Fichte illustrates his thesis, because it contains in itself all our commonplaces on intellectual property. In the time of the Caliph Harun al Rashid, an alchemist used to prepare a beneficial drug and to entrust the commercial side of the business to a merchant who was the sole distributor throughout the land and who earned a goodly profit by his monopoly. Another medicine merchant stole the drug from the monopolist and started to sell it at a cheaper price. The latter brought him before the Caliph. The former pleaded for his case by arguing that his selling the drug for a cheaper price was useful to the sick persons and to the society at large. What was the judgment of the Caliph? «He had the useful man hanged». 25 To be accurate, the medicine merchant of the parable had not copied the drug, but had materially stolen it. Fichte suggested that copying is like stealing. In the 18th century, however, Fichte had to demonstrate the commonplace of today. According to Fichte, we can distinguish two aspects of a book: 1. its physical aspect (das körperliche), i.e. the printed paper 2. its ideational aspect (das geistige) The ideational aspect of a book is in turn divisible into: a. a material aspect, i.e. the ideas the book presents; b. the form of these ideas, i. e. the way in which they are presented. All the aspects of a book, except one, can be appropriated by anybody: we can buy the printed paper and assimilate the ideas it conveys. We cannot, however, appropriate its form, because it is strictly personal. And, according to Fichte, it is self-evident that «we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible». 26 As the form can be only mine, the author is the proprietor of his text and his authorized publisher is its usufructuary. However sophistical this shift from originality to property may seem, it is not the only seminal element of our commonplaces on copyright contained in Fichte's essay. It is also worth remarking that in the Harun al Rashid parable the alchemist - the author - transfer his rights and disappears from the scene; the most powerful interests are these of a monopolist - the publisher -; only the other medicine merchant - the pirate - pleads for the interests of the public, but his arguments are rejected as criminal; as regards as the Caliph - the government -, he bows to the monopolist's interests without saying a word; and, last but not least, the criminal sanction for piracy - capital punishment - is out of all proportion. The young Fichte believed that his ideas on authors' right were similar to the ones of Kant. 27 However, there are at least three outstanding differences between Kant and Fichte: Fichte bases copyright on the individual originality in the form of expression; 28 Kant does not mention originality at all; 1. Fichte equates copyright with private property; 29 Kant rejects the very possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale; 2. Fichte thinks that copyright violators deserve the same harsh punishment of thieves. 30 According to Kant, the unauthorized printer should simply compensate all the damages he caused to the author or to his authorized publisher. 31 3. While Fichte is an intellectual property endorser, Kant is an "enlightened" conservative who supports the Roman law tradition, against the propertization trend. He accepts the copyright principle, according to which Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 5 authors are entitled to decide how to publish their works. The rights of the publishers, however, are justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public, while the personal use of the texts and the so-called "wreading" should remain free. And, above all, all that can be viewed as a product is, in his opinion, outside the scope of copyright and may be copied without restrictions. What is, in any, the philosophical meaning of Kant's "conservatism"? To answer such a question, we need to link his ideas on authors' right to his general theory of property, as it is explained in the Metaphysics of Morals. 4. What is a thing? In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of real rights are only corporeal entities or res corporales: «Sache ist ein Ding, was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches selbst der Freiheit ermangelt, heiß daher Sache (res corporalis)». 32 Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate to incorporeal things as well. According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished from its sensible possession. Something external would be rightfully mine «only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even though I am not in possession of it» (AA.06 245:13-16). The rightful possession is an intelligible, not sensible, relation. I can claim that my bicycle is mine only if I am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the backyard. Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property as explained in his 1793 essay, according to which we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author to claim a rightful property on his work. Is it really so obvious that originality implies property? Property is a comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all the time over the use of material objects. It is so comfortable just because it is physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property when something cannot be separated from someone. I say both that my fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But these two "mine" have a different meaning: the former is the "mine" of attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property. The former can be used to identify someone, and conveys the historical circumstance that something is related exclusively to someone; the latter points only to an accidental relation with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. It is possible to lie on a historical circumstance, by plagiarizing a text, i.e. by attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no one can "steal" the historical connection between "my" writing style and me: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if Fichte's principle were the only justification of property right, it would undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations. Although he defines things as res corporales, Kant determines the rightful possession of a thing as a possession without detentio, by ignoring all its sensible facets. Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - is exerted on an object that is "merely distinct from me", regardless of its position in space and time. Space and time, indeed, are sensible determinations and should be left out of consideration. According to the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a permissive law of reason: 33 if a rightful possession were not possible, every object would be a res nullius and nobody would be Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 6 entitled to use it. Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res corporales. Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (AA.6, 249:5-7). If property is a merely intelligible relation with an object that is simply distinct from the subject, we have no reason to deny that such an object might be immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property. Why, then, does Kant refrain from using the very concept of it? According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of personal rights. A person who is speaking to the people is engaging a relationship with them; if someone else engages such a relationship in his name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with property: he is only an agent without authority. Speeches, by Kant, cannot be separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised land of intellectual property without entering it. According to Kant, before the acquired rights, everyone has a moral capacity for putting others under obligation that he calls innate right or internal meum vel tuum (AA.06, 237:24-25). The innate right is only one: freedom as independence from being constrained by another's choice, insofar it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity: in other words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the very possibility condition of law. Freedom implies innate equality, «that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone, and finally his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it - such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them.» (AA.06, 237-238) 34 In spite of his intellectual theory of property, 35 Kant does not enter in the realm of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without suppressing freedom itself. If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to mix copyright protection and censorship. 36 Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used. We cannot, however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from speeches would be like excluding them from freedom. Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the scope of copyright to publishing, or, better, to the publishing of the age of print: the Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without the author's permission and distributes its copies to the public. If someone copies a book for his personal use, or lets others do it, or translates and elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone. Kant does not stick to the Roman Law tradition because of conservatism, but because of Enlightenment.
IPP is nonuniversalizable – universalizing the act of restricting the production of a certain medicine terminates in a contradiction because it entails that you restrict your own ability to produce the medicine
Underview
~1~ The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the Resolution; the aff must prove it true and the neg must prove it false.
Prefer: ~A~ Text: Five dictionaries define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm as to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution's truth or falsity. This outweighs on common usage – it is abundantly clear that our roles are verified. Any other role of the ballot enforces an external norm on debate, but only truth testing is intrinsic to the process of debate i.e. proving statements true or false through argumentation. Constitutivism outweighs because you don't have the jurisdiction not to truth test – a practice only makes sense based on its intrinsic rules. Jurisdiction is also an independent voter and a meta constraint since every argument you make concedes the authority of the judge fulfilling their jurisdiction to vote aff if they affirm better and neg the contrary – otherwise they could just hack against you so it also controls the internal link to fairness since that's definitionally unfair. ~B~ Logic: Any counter role of the ballot collapses to truth testing because every property assumes truth of the property i.e. if I say, "I am awake" it is the same as "it is true that I am awake" which means they are also a question of truth claims because it's inherent. It also means their ROB warrants aren't mutually exclusive with mine. ~C~ Inclusion: Any offense can function under truth testing whereas your specific role of the ballot excludes all strategies but yours. This is bad for inclusive debates because people without every technical skill or comprehensive debate knowledge are shut out of your scholarship which turns your ROB- truth testing solves because you can do what you're good at and so can I. This is also better for education because me engaging in a debate I know nothing about doesn't help anyone. o/w since it is a real-world implication in round ~D~ Isomorphism: ROBs that aren't phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms mean that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it's solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn't a closest estimate.
~2~ 1ar theory – the aff gets it otherwise infinite abuse as it would be impossible to check NC abuse and it's a reciprocity issue.
Competing Interps: Reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention – collapses to CI because it becomes a debate about brightlines. Drop the Debater: Time crunched 1ar makes this uniquely key otherwise the neg can just outspread me and collapse to a different layer making this the only real way to check abuse. No neg RVIs: Illogical shouldn't win for meeting basic burdens, incentivizes a 2n dump which makes it impossible for me to win on theory. No time skew bc I had to initiate the shell in a time crunched 1ar. Reject theory and Ks on spikes since it would be a contradiction since they indict each other, but prefer mine since they are lexically prior. Inclusion first is the fallacy of origin – don't apply it. Fairness is a voter debate is a competitive activity wins/losses prove that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Education – the only portable thing from debate and the goal of the activity.
~3~ Rejecting humanism is ontologically bankrupt – it creates reliance on the oppressor's epistemic claims and can't explain general theories of oppression.
Harfouch 19 ~Ali S. Harfouch, (Lecturer at the American University of Beirut where he also received his Master of Arts (2017) in Political Studies.) "Hegel, Fanon, And The Problem Of Recognition" In: Frantz Fanon And Emancipatory Social Theory, 9-13-2019, https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004409200/BP000008.xml?language=en, DOA:9-19-2020 WWBW~ Explains oppression generally – i.e. prior to start of k's theory of power Reliance on colonizer for identity absent general theory Something can only be oppressive if it transcends correct order – that requires a moral fw K makes specific ontological/metaphysical presumptions but can't warrant them absent general theory K can't explain distinction between good and bad power There are several reasons why we must take the Hegelian dialectic seriously. First and foremost, the dialectic provides the basis for a general theory of oppression as opposed to the post-colonial theorization of one mode-of-oppression (colonization). That is to say, we can conceptualize the origins and modalities of oppression reducing oppression to colonial oppression. Paradoxically, this reduction of oppression to a singular moment (the colonial trauma) – this inter-subjective relationship (the colonized and the colonizer) becomes the constitutive element in the colonized's self-recognition, one in which the very identity of the colonized is based on a negation (that is to say, a negation of the colonizers' negation).2 Thus, the slave/colonized attains self-recognition vis-à-vis a negation of the master/the colonizer. Otherwise, the "new" man who emerges from the colonial trauma could not have been without the colonizer. To be is to negate, and to negate is to recognize (the colonizer); the "Other" remains "the theme of his action ~the colonized~." As McClintock explains: "post-colonial," despite its critical deconstruction of post-Enlightenment binaries, "re-orients the globe once more around a single, binary opposition: colonial/post-colonial."3 This new colonial/post-colonial and/or colonizer/colonized binary becomes, paradoxically, universalized and comes to serve as the new "master-narrative." At the level of praxis, the colonized/slave is left in a quandary; Post-colonial discourse tells us little of what those occupying Tahrir Square or Wall Street ought to do, or how to proceed? To speak of "strategic essentialism" is to oscillate a thin line between liberational-emancipatory politics on one hand, and pragmatic self-essentialization on another; between liberating the colonized from the confines of identity-politics to recreating an equally problematic identity-politics based fundamentally on a negation. If, as the post-colonialist bemoans; the hegemonic colonial matrices of power are rooted in an exclusionary and racist logic of exploitative capitalism, and that this logic is sustained through the State's omnipresent and all-pervading machinations of power, what is to be done vis-à-vis the State? Perhaps, this is why the reception of the work of Edward Said in the Arab-Muslim world was less prophetic than its reception in Western academia. Furthermore, the post-colonial reading of the Master-Slave dialectic reduces reality to that which is created through the reified inter-subjective relations between the Master and the Slave. It does not, however, tell us about the world outside of this dialectic. It displaces ontology through an elusive latent ontology (the ontology of no ontologies), which replaces questions of metaphysics and ontology with questions relating to power. This is fallacious in that (1) it is blind to its own metaphysics and ontology assumptions; (2) it negates the very same epistemic grounds according to which it can make such assumptions, and (3) it displaces any form of emancipatory praxis-politics by failing to recognize that power, "as a quantum in which less of it is good and more of it is bad: the issue is not the concentration of power, but its accountability."4 As Jason Schulman aptly notes, "a movement that rejects seeking power is ultimately rejecting the possibility of lasting radical change."5 Power can corrupt, it is not intrinsically corrupt – it is merely a capacity that can be used to mediate between the oppressed and the emergence of a "new order," or a capacity that can sustain a subversive order. Power, from this perspective, becomes an instrument for liberation rather than a philosophy of fatalism (à la Foucault). To return to the first two points made above; any normative proposition on what ought-to be is predicated on a consciousness of what-is, i.e. the "natural" order of things, and the extent to which an oppressive reality is not in accordance with what-is.6 To speak of oppression is to speak of the transgression of certain boundaries, and such boundaries cannot escape ontological considerations. In other words, how is it possible for the slave to attain self-recognition, or as Paulo Freire would put it, a critical consciousness, when the consciousness of the slave is determined positively or negatively by the ontological consciousness of the Master? To what extent can the slave step out of the Master-Slave dialectic in his engagement with nature and objects? Otherwise, we must claim that beyond the ontology of the colonizer-master (that is, the imputation of an epistemic perspective onto the world and conflating it with ontology) there is nothingness. The Arabs have a name for such blindness: al-Jahl (ignorance). For the Arabs, Jahl is not only the absence of knowledge, but rather knowledge which is not in accord with reality. But they went a step further: to be ignorant of one's ignorance is Jahl Murakab (compound ignorance/double-ignorance). However, I am not sure the Arabs have a word for a "philosophy" that makes truth-claims on the basis of professed ignorance (the "incredulity with meta-narratives"). We will have more to say about this later on.
~4~ Methodological pluralism is necessary to any sustainable critique – we impact turn your notion of "severance" or "exclusivity".
Bleiker 14 – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, "International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique," International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327) Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a "constellation": an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate "multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing" (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be "checked at the source" and this is how a "critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable" (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to "balance foundationalisms against one another" (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.
~5~ The neg may not mislabel arguments as turns or independent voters. If I prove that a given "independent voter" is dependent on some external standard, then it violates. A) Strat skew: makes the 1AR impossible by labelling any number of arguments independent voters even if they're not, forcing me to go through each one otherwise they get an automatic ballot B) Engagement: if they can read a ton of random impacts to various kinds of oppression or exclusion, then there's no way for the aff to engage those issues if they're just blitzed off as strategic independent voters
~6~ The neg must only defend the converse of the resolution – The res is a stasis point for both sides so if you do anything other than defending the converse there is no way to plan the 1ar strategy. That is supercharged in today's meta where it's a very widespread practice for the aff to tell the neg what aff they are going to read while the aff goes into the round in the dark. Key to fairness because negative will be at an inherent advantage before the round begins.
~7~ Affirming is harder, a time crunched 1ar makes it uniquely hard to respond to a 7 min dump but the neg has more time to develop their position and make responses – all theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard because of huge side bias – outweighs neg fairness arguments unless they prove how it uniquely outweighs the disparity since it's structural.
Shah 19 Sachin "A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIDE-BIAS ON THE 2019 JANUARY-FEBRUARY LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE TOPIC" NSD, 15 February 2019. http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/** SJCPJG To further quantify the side-bias, the proportion of negative wins when the affirmative was favored (p1) can be compared with the proportion of affirmative wins when the negative is favored (p2). Ideally the difference between the proportions would be 0; however, p1 = 34.84 while p2 = 28.77, a staggering 6.07 difference. Now the question is whether this difference is statistically significant. In order to determine the answer, a two-proportion z-test was used. The null hypothesis is p1 – p2 = 0 , because that means both sides are able to overcome the debating level skew equally. The alternative hypothesis is then p1 – p2 0, meaning the negative is able to overcome the skew more than the affirmative is able, demonstrating a side-bias. This two-proportion z-test rejected the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (p-value 0.0001). There is sufficient evidence that the negative is able to overcome the skew more often than the affirmative can. This implies there is a less than 0.01 chance that there is no side-bias because it demonstrates the higher proportion of negative wins when the affirmative is favored is significant. In short, the negative has a greater ability to win difficult rounds than the affirmative does, which indicates there exists a skew in the negative's favor. This analysis is statistically rigorous and relevant in several aspects: (A) The p-value is less than the alpha. (B) The data is on the current January-February topic, meaning it's relevant to rounds these months ~2~. (C) The data represents a diversity of debating and judging styles across the country. (D) This analysis accounts for disparities in debating skill level. (E) Type I error was reduced by choosing a small alpha level. The combination of these points validates this analysis. As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds from 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (2017 – 2019 YTD), the negative won 52.99 of ballots (p-value 0.0001) and 54.63 of upset rounds (p-value 0.0001). This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics. Therefore, this analysis confirms that affirming is in fact harder again on the 2019 January-February topic ~3~. So don't lose the flip!
1ar
Fwk
Extend the metaethic – ethics must begin from practical reason because it's the only way to solve infinite regress as reason is self justifying, in order to be coherent all other theories presuppose reason as a side constraint, and reasons and intent are the only way to make actions normatively intelligible.
Extend that any maxim must be universalizable as there are no apriori distinctions between agents and reasons aren't agent specific.
Extend Engstrom – willing a freedom violation is a contradiction if it were universalized you would will both the extension and violation of your freedom to be good.
Extend Wood – For any end to be good freedom and therefore rationality must be good in the first place as it was necessary to achieve the end and freedom stems from the ability to make autonomous decisions.
Extend Korsgaard – absent the subject external objects can have no normative value as their worth is contingent on agents conferring it to them. Therefore humanity must be what is unconditionally valued.
Extend Kinsella – the only way we can come to the truth is freedom of argumentation as otherwise we wouldn't truly believe what we are being told. Performativity out weighs and comes prior – it concerns our roles as debaters in the first place.
Extend the impact calc – States have no unified intent so they can only retroactively punish rights violations.
AT Berardi
If info is dissuasive and meaning is impossible, vote aff – they shouldn't have communicated at all
~1~ We're aware of differences between real life and media images. Just imagine how horrified you would be if you were watching a horror movie and found out that the actors were really being killed.
~2~ If info is dissuasive and meaning is impossible, vote aff – they shouldn't have communicated at all that is a perf con which ow on pre meditated murder because they knew what they were doing was wrong and still did it
~3~ A priori Truth: Ideas such as agency and universalizability are true independent of human experience, which means they are a priori truth. This means I solve better and de-link out of the K because our ethic is not based on a simulated reality but on ideas independent of it that are key to breaking down this false reality.
~3~ Permutation do-both: The affirmative is a way we get rid of intellectual property laws that try to produce meaning which is a pre req to the alt because otherwise its is ivory tower that allows violence to fester and become worse. That solves the link to the k because the state no longer exists to commit violence and try and cumulate value
~4~ Induction fails takes out their theory of power – induction assumes that things will always happen the same way in the future as they have in the past. But this begs the question of how we know what happened in the past will happen in the future.
~5~ Everything is a reterritorialization of people constructing their own social practices of value – Bifo misses a step in justifying why there is an objective value but everything is socially created
~6~ Total rejection of ethics is worse for fascism because it collapses to ethical egoism in which people act only in there self-interest instead of having some restriction of an action provided by the framework
~7~ debate solves over communication
Turner 4 – Bryan S. Turner, Dean of Social Sciences at Deakin University, Australia, "Baudrillard for Sociologists," in Forget Baudrillard?, 2004 edition, p. 80-83 While, as far as one can tell, Baudrillard was not influenced by Bell's vision of the role of technology and the media in shaping postindustrialism, he was influenced by Marshall McLuhan's analysis (Gane 1991b:48) of the impact of new media on the transformation of modern culture, especially in The Gutenberg Galaxy (McLuhan 1967). McLuhan was particularly sensitive to the idea that we live in a processed social world where human beings live in a complete technostructure. This technological environment is carried with us as extensions of our own bodies, but McLuhan did not adopt a pessimistic view of the age of anxiety, because his 'technological humanism' (Kroker et al. 1984) and Catholic values committed him to the idea of the immanence of reason and the hope of an escape from the labyrinth. Indeed, a global technological system could become the basis of a universalistic culture. Although he was fully aware of the sensory deprivation which he associated with the impact of the mass media, he none the less remained committed to the hope that these negative effects were not fatal. Baudrillard, who as we have noted was deeply influenced by McLuhan's idea that the content of messages was relatively unimportant in relation to their form, has embraced a very nihilistic position with respect to our processed environment. Baudrillard's pessimistic view of the fissure in the historical development of the modern is based on his view of the masses. Baudrillard's analysis of the masses is a product of the Situationist responses to the May events of 1968, when it became increasingly obvious that the critical social movements of modern society would not be dominated by Marxist theory or directed by a vanguard of the working class. The crisis of May 1968 had not been predicted by Marxism or by mainstream sociology, but they did validate the claims of Situationists like Guy Debord in the journal Internationale Situationiste. However, if the crisis had been unanticipated by conventional political analysis, then the sudden collapse of the students' and workers' movements of 1968 found no easy explanation in the framework of mainstream social sciences. Baudrillard's concept of the inexplicable nature of the mass depend a great deal on the unusual circumstances surrounding the May events. By 1973 with the publication of The Mirror of Production (Baudrillard 1975), Baudrillard was already moving away from an orthodox Marxist view of production, arguing that Marxism, far from being an external critique of capitalism, was merely a reflection or mirror of the principal economistic values of capitalism. Instead of engaging in the production of meaning, a subversive, oppositional movement would have to challenge the system from the point of view of meaninglessness. Subversion would have to rob the social system of significance. In taking this stand, Baudrillard followed the Situationist claim that whatever can be represented can be controlled (Plant 1992:137). The mass events of 1968 offered a promise of the nonrepresentational moment, the pure event of authenticity, which could not be explained, and therefore could not be manipulated. Baudrillard, in dismissing Marxist theory as a means of representing events, sought to replace the idea of a mode of production with a mode of disappearance. In taking this attitude towards modern social movements, Baudrillard's argument also rests on the various meanings of the word 'mass'. Baudrillard is thus able to make allusions to the idea of physical substance, matter, the majority and the electrical meaning of earth. The translator's note to In the Shadow of the Silent Majority points out that faire masse can mean to form a majority and to form an earth. Baudrillard argues by allusion that the mass absorbs the electrical charges of social and political movements; the mass thus neutralizes the electrical charge of society. This use of allusion, parody and irony is typical of Baudrillard's mode of analysis, which is a type of sociological poetics, a style which is likely to make sociologists feel uncomfortable (Gane 199la:193). There is here also a continuity with the style of Dada and the Situationists. The poetic and striking character of Baudrillard's style has no counterpart in professional social science, least of all in the British context. Baudrillard's 'sociological fictions' (1990a:15) are striking and challenging, but they are not ultimately convincing. Arguments which depend on allusion, allegory and similar rhetorical devices are decorative but they are not necessarily powerful. The notion of 'mass society' already has a clearly worked out sociological critique. The idea of 'mass society' might have been relevant in describing the new markets which were created in the post-war period with the advent of innovative technologies, which had the immediate effect of lowering prices and making commodities available to a mass audience. However, the trend of sociological analysis in the last two decades has been to assert that mass audiences have been broken down into more selectively constructed niches for more individualized products. It is controversial to argue that industrialization necessarily produces a mass society, characterized by a common culture, uniform sentiments or an integrated outlook. The idea of a mass society was often associated with the notion that the decline of individualism would produce a directionless mass as the modern equivalent of the eighteenthcentury mob. Critical theorists like Adorno and Marcuse associated the massification of society with authoritarianism and a potential for fascism. Of course, Baudrillard's version of mass society is based on a particular view of the mass media creating a hyperreality in which the real has been absorbed by the hyperreal; meaning has imploded on itself. Although Baudrillard's analysis of hyperreality is postcritical (Chen 1987), he does adopt in practice a critical position towards American civilization, which is the extreme example of massification. Rather like critical theorists, Baudrillard believes that the (bourgeois) individual has been sucked into the negative electrical mass of the media age. However, sociological research on mass audiences shows that there is no ground for believing that media messages are received, consumed or used in any standardized manner, and the majority of social scientists working on culture have attempted to argue that cultural objects in the age of the mass media are appropriated, transformed and consumed in diverse forms and according to various practices (de Certeau 1984). In fact, sociologists, largely inspired by the Situationists, have argued that everyday life is resistant to massification and that the concrete reality of everyday life-situations is the principal arena within which opposition to massification can be expected. Everyday life was regarded by both Guy Debord and Henri Lefebvre (1991) as the foundation of authenticity. Baudrillard, by arguing that criticism belongs to the period of modernism and not to the age of hyperreality, has ruled out opposition to the system, at least at the level of public debate and formal politics.
~8~ Perfcon, your spreading is bad, discourages listening to your position, and only reinforces biopolitical power. Outweighs bc there's many different axes of oppression we could interrogate, so I couldn't have known what you were going to focus on, but you went into the round knowing that your practice is bad.
Bifo 09 Berardi, Franco. ~Italian philosopher who's quite cool.~ "Precarious Rhapsody." AK Press. 2009. WHS-AL In 'Learner based listening and technological authenticity,' Richard Robin, a researcher from George Washington University, studies the effect of the acceleration of speech on listening comprehension. Robin's research is based on a calculation of the number of syllables spoken each second. A faster rate, and more syllables per second decrease the level of the listener's comprehension of meaning: the faster the flow of syllables per second, the less the time for the listener to critically process the message. The speed of emission and the amount of semiotic impulses sent in a given time unit are functional to the time available to a conscious processing. Fast speech intimidates listeners. Evidence suggests that globalization has produced faster speech emission rates in areas of the world where the Western mode of transmission of signs has come to replace traditional and authoritarian ones. For instance, in the ex-Soviet Union the speed of transmission measured in syllables per second has almost doubled since the fall of the communist regime: from three to almost six syllables per second; similar findings reached the same conclusions in the Middle East and China (1991: 403). The implications of Robin's study are extremely interesting for our understanding of the transition from a form of authoritarian biopolitical power that is persuasive (like the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century) to a form of biopolitical power that is pervasive (like contemporary infocracy). Persuasive power is founded on consensus: citizens must understand the reasons of the President, General, Secretary or Duce. Only one source of information is authorized. Dissident voices are subjected to censorship. Instead, the infocratic regime of semio-capital grounds its power on overload, the acceleration of semiotic flows and the proliferation of sources of information to the point of the producing the white noise of indistinctiveness, irrelevance and indecipherability. Twentieth century art was conceived as flows of desire and liberating expressions; Surrealism celebrated the expressive power of the subconscious as liberating social and psychic energies. Today, art is also the flow of therapy for mind ecology. Art has replaced the police in the universal dispositif of mind control, but at the same time it looks for inroads into therapy.
~9~ Bifo cherry picks examples and ignores broader social progress occurring in the status quo – dooms his analysis.
Sayarer 15 ~Julian, "Cheer up 'Bifo'—history hasn't ended yet"~ Indeed, were it not that Berardi's logic were so selective and its perspective so narrow, the book would be all the more disheartening. Fortunately, also conspicuous is an author who is himself struggling with the present, soothing his concerns with an easy, leftist lament that envisages no greater role for humans than that of the happy worker. He raises objections to algorithms (rather than—more helpfully—arguing that these tools might serve human ends), and wishes for a time when humans made 'real objects.' The book also advances an elementary critique of monetary systems that rightly illustrates the economy of faith that is currency, but seems only to conclude that some finite resource (such as gold and the gold standard it once underpinned) might in some way be an improvement. All of this is profoundly unfortunate, for few would deny that modern work patterns must be made fairer and more human. Early on, Berardi writes: "History has been replaced by the endless flowing recombination of fragmentary images… frantic precarious activity has taken the place of political awareness and strategy." The ironic missed opportunity of Heroes is that in it, the author has produced only one further recombination: a pastiche of graphic events, mass shootings and assorted corporate abuses that fall victim to the same shallow lust for spectacle that Berardi devotes such worthy efforts to decry. Anders Breivik, Virginia Tech, the Aurora Killings, Japanese suicide patterns and much else besides—modern capitalism has had an enormously detrimental effect on the lives of billions, and yet a statistically irrelevant number of these sorrows and grievances culminate in either mass shootings or suicides. Berardi identifies the existence of an iceberg, and yet contents himself with describing only its very tip. He eschews the banal and the human to focus on the fast-sell of the sensational, prophesising some coming end rather than taking on the more trying but rewarding task of explaining how things persist when so much suggests they might fall apart. He explains exceptions delightfully, while seldom troubling himself with the rule itself, or the norm he condemns. It is this very tendency that must be redressed, as Berardi probably would agree. He affords no attention to peer to-peer lending, fossil fuel divestment, credit unions, ethical banking growth, worker co-ops, fair tax certification, communication expansion through cell phones and the internet, or innovations in mobile currency. All of these changes are potentially problematic developments that are of course vulnerable to the replication of old injustices. No less certainly, however, they offer evidence that the status quo Berardi describes is neither static nor condemned only to change the world for the worse.
~10~ Alt can't solve the links and simple exhaustion means nothing – prefer the perm.
Pursley 10 ~Mike, "From Alienation to Autonomy by Franco "Bifo" Berardi"~ Here's a taste of some of the most abstract: "The infinite capacity of replication of the recombining simulator device erases the originality of the event." Or how about: "The productive finalization of technology ends up subjugating the thinking process from the standpoint of its own epistemological structures." Indeed. Capitalism, and his absolute distaste for it, is where Bifo makes himself absolutely clear. It's the catch-all cause for all modern strife, a "pathogenic mechanism" that is the ruin of everything. Preaching "liberation from capitalism" is where the author will most likely loose all but the most radical of readers. The capitalist system is clearly not without faults, but presenting it as scapegoat for every ill we face may be too simple. At times Bifo seems a cranky old curmudgeon madly shaking his fist at the present. This is the Bifo that bemoans "collective mental pollution" and says of the world: "too many signs, too fast, too chaotic." His qualms with hyperreal society are at times a good diagnosis of our problems, but the prescribed anti-capitalist panacea remains questionable. For all the theory involved to make his case, Bifo's solution is strangely and kind of awesomely underwhelming. We are urged to reconsider how wealth is defined, to focus more on friendships and an easygoing life rather than profits. Who but Henry Ford himself could argue with that? The volume ends with a few thoughts on the current Great Recession, where the collapse of the economy "can be read as the return of the soul." For that, we will have to see.
~11~ Bifo's apolitical understanding of semiocap ensures the continued existence of capitalism – political engagement is key
Lear 12 ~Ben Lear is an underemployed researcher living in Manchester, UK. He recently co-authored an article in Occupy Everything! Reflections on Why it's Kicking off Everywhere, and is a member of Plan C. "Lifeboat Communism – A Review of Franco "Bifo" Berardi's After the Future"~ What does the end of the future mean for radical politics? It is at this point that Bifo's argument becomes problematic. In an argument that intersects with groups such as Tiqqun, Bifo argues that we must see "Communism as a necessity in the collapse of capital." Distant from the voluntarism of previous forms of Communist politics, this "post-growth Communism" will be best understood as a necessary response to capital's refusal of labour. Cut adrift from the "opportunity" to work, with welfare systems dismantled, Bifo argues that we will witness the proliferation of zones of autonomy responding to the needs of an increasingly precarious and superfluous social body. Communist politics will emerge from an exodus, both voluntary and compulsory, from a stagnating and increasingly predatory state-capital nexus. This exodus is both social, in the development of an alternative infrastructure, and personal, in the withdrawal from the hyper-stimulation of the semiotic economy. Bifo abandons hope in collective contestation at the level of the political. Bifo's politics could be described as a kind of "lifeboat communism." As the crisis ripples, mutates, and deepens, Bifo sees the role of communism as the creation of spaces of solidarity to blunt the worst effects of the crisis of social reproduction. Gone is the demand for a better world for all, the liberation of our collective social wealth, or the unlocking of the social potentials of technology. Rather, Bifo's politics are based around insulating a necessarily small portion of society from the dictates of capital. By withdrawing from the political sphere, we accept the likelihood of losing the final scraps of the welfare state and concede the terrain of the political to zombie politics and predatory capital. Rather than seeking new forms of organization to re-enter the political stage, Bifo seems to suggest that we seek shelter beneath it as best we can. This shying away from the political stage is the weakness at the heart of the book. Recent eruptions of political struggle have captured the collectiveimagination because they demonstrate that political contestation is still possible today, in spite of the obstacles Bifo has described. The Occupy movement and the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa have resonated with all those who still have hope in collective struggle. Although these movements have encountered varying problems, to which we must develop solutions, they dispel the idea of an unchangeable present. The current blockages to successful organising have been shown to be strategic and tactical, not terminal. Misdiagnosing the current inertia of post-political public life as a terminal condition leads the left towards an evacuation of the political, while we should instead reassert its primacy. If we abandon any hope of fighting in, against, and beyond the existing architecture of the state and capital, and instead seek refuge in small communes, and go-slow practices, we abandon all real hope of a generalized, or generalizable, emancipatory politics. Although Bifo's analysis of the difficulties of collective action resonates with all of us who have attempted to organize struggles in the past few decades, the proposal for a simple withdrawal from capitalism is a bleak politics indeed – which, at its most optimistic, calls for an orderly default by portions of the proletariat. The horizons of communist politics appear much narrower when capitalism is no longer seen as the repository of a vast store of social wealth awaiting collective redistribution, but rather redefined as an unassailable site of universal and permanent austerity combined with widening social redundancy. It is hard to imagine a network of self-organized projects and systems supporting the majority of the population in the context of an increasingly predatory capitalism. Emerging from the and isolated leftist scenes, this lifeboat communism will by its very nature have a limited carrying capacity, as the anarchist experience in post-Katrina New Orleans attests. The lifeboats that Bifo calls for will undoubtedly be too small and makeshift to harbor us all. The crisis is twofold. It is a crisis of capitalist profitability, and of an increasingly precarious and surplus global proletariat whose reproduction (as both labour and body) is under threat. It is unlikely that the proliferation of communes, squats, food co-ops, file sharers, urban gardeners, and voluntary health services will bring forth a new, better world. But while the current seemingly post-political situation throws up massive obstacles to organizing, there is still a potential for collective contestation. The capitalist state, racked by its own legitimacy crisis and weekly political scandals, is more vulnerable than it appears. We need only recall the period of unexpected hope built by students in Britain, occupiers in Oakland, and vast swathes of North Africa and the Middle East during the past two years. These movements were mobilised through the betrayal of a vision of the future – but alongside their rage, they put forth a hope which can guide our politics. The task at hand is to unlearn old behaviour and to forge new tactical and organisational weapons for struggle. Bifo's contribution is a timely and challenging one, but it ultimately leads us back towards a DIY culture and "outreach" politics. As our movements come to terms with these limits, we must also hold onto the belief that luxury for all is possible. The social potential of unfilled blocks of flats, emerging technologies like 3D-printing, and the desires of the millions of underemployed, should remind us of this. This will not be possible without a collective struggle against the state and the demands of capital, one which simultaneously defends what we have and attempts to move beyond it. A retreat to lifeboat politics is both premature and a self-fulfilling prophecy. While Bifo correctly analyses the current conjuncture – clearly identifying the post-political state, the weakness of the Left, the crisis of profitability and new forms of labour, and their impact on the subject – his political prescriptions lead us in the wrong direction. Just as Bifo does, we place the struggle against work at the center; but we can also seek to liberate social wealth, rather than insulate a lucky few from the ravages of capital. Rather than "No Future," we must raise a different banner: "The future's here, it just needs reorganizing."
~1~ Regress – any other justification for ethics can have its authority infinitely questioned, but reason is a self-justifying source of authority which solves. Asking why use reasons intrinsically asks for a reason to use reason which concedes reason's authority.
~2~ Collapses – other sources of ethical authority presume a logical system of justification to make them coherent, which means reason functions as a side constraint on other theories and they presuppose the authority of reason.
~3~ Action Theory - any action can be divided into infinite states of affairs—only intent can unify our action into intended means and ends.
That generates an obligation to follow only universalizable laws. Only universal law can be constitutive of agency because it applies to all agents in all instances. A maxim is universalizable if it can be known by all reasoners and applied to all reasoners without causing a contradiction.
Thus the standard is consistency with principles of equal and outer freedom
~1~ Universal reason grants agents the right to freedom because acting on a maxim to coerce produces a conceptual contradiction.
Engstrom ~Stephen Engstrom, (Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Pittsburgh) "Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge" http://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal_Legislation_As_the_Form_of_Practical_Knowledge, DOA:5-5-2018 WWBW~ Given the preceding considerations, it's a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of AND a person's outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.
~2~ Inescapability – the exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.
Wood 07 ~Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 WWBW~ Kant holds that the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is AND is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.
~3~ Value theory – the existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth.
Korsgaard 83 (Christine M., "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as AND -and, in general, to make the highest good our end.
Impact calculus –
1~ Ethics are based on intent, but the state does not have intentions and cannot know the intentions of other agents. Instead, the state acts a procedural mechanism to punish those who violate rights claims. Those rights are derived from the structure of intent.
2~ The state does not have the authority to act to preempt future rights violations, because consequences of action are contingent and cannot be derived from the structure of the maxim on which one acts. Thus, the state does not have the jurisdiction to take them into account.
This means if their theory doesn't provide an account of how the state functions they have no offence on the framing debate.
Prefer additionally –
~1~ Performativity - Truth claims can only be proven by argumentation which contains the axiomatic assumption that freedom is good.
Kinsella 11 ~Stephan Kinsella, (Stephan Kinsella is an attorney in Houston, director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and editor of Libertarian Papers.) "Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide" Mises Institute, 5-27-2011, https://mises.org/library/argumentation-ethics-and-liberty-concise-guide, DOA:5-4-2020~ In setting the stage, Hoppe first observes that the standard natural-rights argument AND goods must be assumed to exist. (TSC, p. 161).
~2~ Frameworks are an evaluative filter that determines what offence is legitimate and it's a topicality interpretation of the word "ought" – thus all framing must be theoretically justified. Prefer mine –
Ought is defined as consistency with the categorical imperative.
Durand 01 Kevin K. J. Durand, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Henderson State University. The Logic of Morality: Georg Henrik von Wright, Immanuel Kant, and the "Ought/Can" Inference. Academic Forum, 2000-2001, http://www.hsu.edu/academicforum/2000-2001/2000-1AFThe20Logic20of20Morality.pdf This passage also serves to clarify Kant's assertion that the moral law depends on the AND able to will that the maxim be necessary for the perfectly rational will.
Prefer my interpretation:
~a~ Research Burdens—questions of universalizability do not require evidence dumps or statistics to access offense because they don't have to do with empirics—only analytics are necessary to access offense. That outweighs to accessibility—other frameworks are structurally inaccessible to small school debaters since they'll never have as much evidence or big enough back files to win card wars.
~b~ Strategic thinking—Kantian offense can be derived purely from reasoning, which allows more innovation from debaters and better in-round strategic thinking—debaters aren't totally reliant on their coach's prep. That outweighs since its portable—thinking on your feet is applicable in every profession.
~c~ Philosophical education—my interpretation allows contestation of the role of the state under the categorical imperative—people have argued that Kant justifies anything from libertarianism to socialism.
Advocacy
Thus I affirm resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.
I'll defend the resolution as a general principle, further specification in the doc. This means potential negative implications of reducing protections for certain drugs doesn't link as that's merely a hypothetical instance of an object protected by IP medicine laws. Counterplans and PICs affirm because they do not disprove the general thesis of my advocacy. To resolve means settle or find a solution to (a problem, dispute, or contentious matter). Since it is in the past tense, the resolution is already the solution so you vote aff since it is already true (definition is hyper linked)
All hyper linked and from Merriam Webster unless otherwise noted - "Member" is defined as: part of a whole "Nations" is defined as: a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government "Of" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate origin or derivation "The" is defined as: used as a function word before a singular noun to indicate that the noun is to be understood generically "World Trade Organization" is: An international body founded in 1995 to promote international trade and economic development by reducing tariffs and other restrictions. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "To" is defined as: used to indicate that the following verb is in the infinitive form "Reduce" is defined as: to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number "Intellectual Property" is defined as: A work or invention that is the result of creativity, such as a manuscript or a design, to which one has rights and for which one may apply for a patent, copyright, trademark, etc. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "Protections" is defined as: The act of protecting : the state of being protected (Merriam Webster Legal Dictionary) "For" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate the object or recipient of a perception, desire, or activity "Medicines" is defined as: a substance or preparation used in treating disease
Offence
There is a distinction between personal rights and property rights – property rights govern material objects that can be appropriated and stolen, however personal rights concern intangible concepts such as ideas and speeches. Thus it is a contradiction to attribute property rights to ideas as an idea can be accessible by all without resource constraints. And even the most stringent property rights allow for copying and modification of a legitimate purchase as a function of the new owner's property rights so it's a freedom violation to restrict doing so. And intellectual property rights actively suppress the freedom of speech, which is necessary for agents to actualize their wills.
Pievatolo 10 Pievatolo, Maria. "Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?" Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?, 7 Feb. 2010, bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html. WWEY, altered for glang In the Metaphysik der Sitten, we can find a clear distinction between ius reale and ius personale. The ius reale or ius in re is a right on things. 14 The ius personale is defined as the «possession of another's choice ~Willkür~, in the sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed». 15 In other words, it is a right entitling someone to obtain acts from other persons. As moral subjectivity involves freedom, personal rights cannot be established without the concerned persons' consent. According to Kant, the ius reale cannot be applied to ideas, or, better, to thoughts, because they can be conceived by everyone at the same time, without depriving their authors. Surprising as it may seem, the ius reale protects the freedom to copy, if it is taken seriously. If a thing has been purchased in a legal transaction and the purchasers copy it by their own means, they are simply working on their legitimate private property. For the very principle of private property, it is not fair to restrain the ways in which its legitimate purchaser may use it. For this reason, no ius reale can be opposed to the reprinter. If we see the book as a material thing, whoever buys it has the right to reproduce it: after all, it is his book. Furthermore, in Kant's opinion, we cannot derive any affirmative personal obligation from a ius reale: 16 a ius personale on someone cannot be claimed by simply purchasing some related things without obtaining his or her expressed consent. Kant, by conceiving the book as an action, adopts a strategy based on the ius personale only. By using such a strategy, he concludes that the unauthorized printer has to be compared to an unauthorized spokesperson rather than to a thief. Therefore, it is not necessary to go beyond the Roman law tradition, by inventing a new ius reale on immaterial things. Kant's argument goes as follows: when I speak to a public, I engage a relationship with them. The book may be viewed as a medium through which authors can transmit their speeches to a wider public. In the age of printing, such a medium used to be provided by publishers. Thus publishers can be considered as spokespersons who speak in the name of the authors. But, as such, they need the authors' authorization. 17 Why? Because to speak in the name of another without his authorization is like engaging him in a relationship without his consent. As personal rights, according to Kant, concern relations among free beings, they can arise only from expressed agreements. Hence, the unauthorized printer is like an unauthorized spokesperson, who produces a relation of the author with the public without being entitled to do it. However, the scope of Kant's justification of copyright is very narrow: it applies only to the publishing of texts, it does not touch th so-called derivative works, and it is justified only as far as it helps the public to get the texts. Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 3 Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke or opera, i.e. things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or operae, i.e. actions. As the works of art are simply physical objects, we can derive from Kant's assumption that every legitimate purchaser may reproduce them and may donate or sell the copies to others. 18 Every time an object can be treated only as a product, its legitimate owner may do what he wants with it, because of his ius reale, which has to be taken seriously on both sides. Moreover, as the injustice of reprinting books depends on their communication to the public, we can deduce that their reproduction for personal use is not to be forbidden. As regards as the derivative works, Kant states that, if one shortens, augments, retouches or translates the book of another, ~they~ produces a new speech, although the thoughts can be the same Therefore, such works cannot be seen as Nachdruck and are perfectly lawful. 19 In other words,in a Kantian environment, everyone may become a "wreader" - a reader and writer at the same time - without being hindered by copyright restrictions The goal of the transaction between the author and the publisher is conveying his text to the public. The public has a right to interact with the author, if the latter has chosen to do it. According to Kant, the publisher may neither refuse to publish – or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it himself – a text of a dead author, nor release mutilated 20 or spurious works, nor print only a limited impression that does not meet the demand. If the publisher does not comply, the public has the right to force him to publish. 21 In a Kantian environment the publisher's rights are justified only when they help authors to reach the public. Copyright should be neither censorship nor monopoly. In the 1785 essay Kant stated that the mandate of an author to a publisher should be exclusive 22 because the publisher becomes willing to publish a book only if he is certain to earn something from it; therefore, he is interested in avoiding competition. But later, in the Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant does not mention the exclusivity requirement at all, perhaps because he has realized that it was based on an empirical contamination, depending on the current state of technology. In Kant's world the press used to be the medium that provided for the widest distribution of ideas. Printing required both specific tools and skills, and specialized and centralized organizations. And as long as the publishers of printed texts provided the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, Kant was inclined to bow to their interest. However, from a conceptual perspective, there is no reason to deny that an author should be entitled to authorize everyone to distribute his work to everyone else, just like a person may hire more than one spokesperson. Such a practice is now fairly usual on the Internet, when authors choose a Creative Commons License and grant the right to publish their works to everyone, because they are interested in the widest possible spreading of their ideas. In Kant's times such a strategy would hardly be paying because the major publication technology, the press, was not cheap and easy like the digital reproduction of texts, but difficult and expensive. Kant's thesis is based on the technical assumption that publishing requires an intermediation - just as it used to be in the age of print -, which is lawful only it has the author's consent. Where the intermediation is not necessary any longer, where no one is speaking in the name of another, copyright makes no sense. 23 3. A term of comparison: Fichte's theory of intellectual property In 1793 the Berlinische Monatschrift published a short essay, Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable, 24 written by Fichte two years ago. The essay connects originality to intellectual property and advocates the enforcing of the latter by means of criminal sanctions. It is worth mentioning the Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 4 final parable by means of which Fichte illustrates his thesis, because it contains in itself all our commonplaces on intellectual property. In the time of the Caliph Harun al Rashid, an alchemist used to prepare a beneficial drug and to entrust the commercial side of the business to a merchant who was the sole distributor throughout the land and who earned a goodly profit by his monopoly. Another medicine merchant stole the drug from the monopolist and started to sell it at a cheaper price. The latter brought him before the Caliph. The former pleaded for his case by arguing that his selling the drug for a cheaper price was useful to the sick persons and to the society at large. What was the judgment of the Caliph? «He had the useful man hanged». 25 To be accurate, the medicine merchant of the parable had not copied the drug, but had materially stolen it. Fichte suggested that copying is like stealing. In the 18th century, however, Fichte had to demonstrate the commonplace of today. According to Fichte, we can distinguish two aspects of a book: 1. its physical aspect (das körperliche), i.e. the printed paper 2. its ideational aspect (das geistige) The ideational aspect of a book is in turn divisible into: a. a material aspect, i.e. the ideas the book presents; b. the form of these ideas, i. e. the way in which they are presented. All the aspects of a book, except one, can be appropriated by anybody: we can buy the printed paper and assimilate the ideas it conveys. We cannot, however, appropriate its form, because it is strictly personal. And, according to Fichte, it is self-evident that «we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible». 26 As the form can be only mine, the author is the proprietor of his text and his authorized publisher is its usufructuary. However sophistical this shift from originality to property may seem, it is not the only seminal element of our commonplaces on copyright contained in Fichte's essay. It is also worth remarking that in the Harun al Rashid parable the alchemist - the author - transfer his rights and disappears from the scene; the most powerful interests are these of a monopolist - the publisher -; only the other medicine merchant - the pirate - pleads for the interests of the public, but his arguments are rejected as criminal; as regards as the Caliph - the government -, he bows to the monopolist's interests without saying a word; and, last but not least, the criminal sanction for piracy - capital punishment - is out of all proportion. The young Fichte believed that his ideas on authors' right were similar to the ones of Kant. 27 However, there are at least three outstanding differences between Kant and Fichte: Fichte bases copyright on the individual originality in the form of expression; 28 Kant does not mention originality at all; 1. Fichte equates copyright with private property; 29 Kant rejects the very possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale; 2. Fichte thinks that copyright violators deserve the same harsh punishment of thieves. 30 According to Kant, the unauthorized printer should simply compensate all the damages he caused to the author or to his authorized publisher. 31 3. While Fichte is an intellectual property endorser, Kant is an "enlightened" conservative who supports the Roman law tradition, against the propertization trend. He accepts the copyright principle, according to which Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 5 authors are entitled to decide how to publish their works. The rights of the publishers, however, are justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public, while the personal use of the texts and the so-called "wreading" should remain free. And, above all, all that can be viewed as a product is, in his opinion, outside the scope of copyright and may be copied without restrictions. What is, in any, the philosophical meaning of Kant's "conservatism"? To answer such a question, we need to link his ideas on authors' right to his general theory of property, as it is explained in the Metaphysics of Morals. 4. What is a thing? In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of real rights are only corporeal entities or res corporales: «Sache ist ein Ding, was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches selbst der Freiheit ermangelt, heiß daher Sache (res corporalis)». 32 Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate to incorporeal things as well. According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished from its sensible possession. Something external would be rightfully mine «only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even though I am not in possession of it» (AA.06 245:13-16). The rightful possession is an intelligible, not sensible, relation. I can claim that my bicycle is mine only if I am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the backyard. Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property as explained in his 1793 essay, according to which we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author to claim a rightful property on his work. Is it really so obvious that originality implies property? Property is a comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all the time over the use of material objects. It is so comfortable just because it is physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property when something cannot be separated from someone. I say both that my fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But these two "mine" have a different meaning: the former is the "mine" of attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property. The former can be used to identify someone, and conveys the historical circumstance that something is related exclusively to someone; the latter points only to an accidental relation with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. It is possible to lie on a historical circumstance, by plagiarizing a text, i.e. by attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no one can "steal" the historical connection between "my" writing style and me: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if Fichte's principle were the only justification of property right, it would undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations. Although he defines things as res corporales, Kant determines the rightful possession of a thing as a possession without detentio, by ignoring all its sensible facets. Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - is exerted on an object that is "merely distinct from me", regardless of its position in space and time. Space and time, indeed, are sensible determinations and should be left out of consideration. According to the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a permissive law of reason: 33 if a rightful possession were not possible, every object would be a res nullius and nobody would be Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 6 entitled to use it. Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res corporales. Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (AA.6, 249:5-7). If property is a merely intelligible relation with an object that is simply distinct from the subject, we have no reason to deny that such an object might be immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property. Why, then, does Kant refrain from using the very concept of it? According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of personal rights. A person who is speaking to the people is engaging a relationship with them; if someone else engages such a relationship in his name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with property: he is only an agent without authority. Speeches, by Kant, cannot be separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised land of intellectual property without entering it. According to Kant, before the acquired rights, everyone has a moral capacity for putting others under obligation that he calls innate right or internal meum vel tuum (AA.06, 237:24-25). The innate right is only one: freedom as independence from being constrained by another's choice, insofar it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity: in other words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the very possibility condition of law. Freedom implies innate equality, «that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone, and finally his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it - such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them.» (AA.06, 237-238) 34 In spite of his intellectual theory of property, 35 Kant does not enter in the realm of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without suppressing freedom itself. If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to mix copyright protection and censorship. 36 Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used. We cannot, however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from speeches would be like excluding them from freedom. Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the scope of copyright to publishing, or, better, to the publishing of the age of print: the Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without the author's permission and distributes its copies to the public. If someone copies a book for his personal use, or lets others do it, or translates and elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone. Kant does not stick to the Roman Law tradition because of conservatism, but because of Enlightenment.
IPP is nonuniversalizable – universalizing the act of restricting the production of a certain medicine terminates in a contradiction because it entails that you restrict your own ability to produce the medicine
Underview
~1~ Presumption and permissibility affirm – a) We always default to assuming something true until proven false, or it would be almost impossible to make any claim at all b) If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral. If I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions which lead to action freeze, it's a practical requirement of action c) Negating an obligation means proving a prohibition of that act, means permissibility affirms because negating is prohibiting the aff action. If theory T is simpler than theory T*, then it is rational to believe T rather than T*. Vote aff because it's simple – evaluating responses to this is complicated so don't.
~2~ AFF theory is no RVI, Drop the debater, competing interps, under an interp that aff theory is legit regardless of voters a) infinite abuse since otherwise it would be impossible to check NC abuse b) it would justify the aff never getting to read theory which is a reciprocity issue c) Time crunched 1ar means it becomes impossible to justify paradigm issues and win the shell and this comes first because time skew means I couldn't respond to all neg args so they're false. And, reject theory and Ks on spikes since it would be a contradiction since they indict each other, but prefer mine since they are lexically prior. This means all contradiction flow aff since I spoke first which makes any contradictions their fault. AFF fairness issues come prior to NC arguments a) The 1ar can't engage on multiple layers if there is a skew since the speech is already time-crunched b) Sets up an invincible 2n since there are a million of unfair things you can collapse to to win every round. Treat each of the spikes as separate offensive theory arguments, which if the neg contests is drop the debater – key to normsetting since it provides strong incentive to set paradigm norms. Fairness is a voter debate is a competitive activity wins/losses prove that requires fairness for objective evaluation.
~4~ The existence of an obligation doesn't mean that there can't be another obligation to do something else, as an obligation is just a locus of duty which means proving the resolution true under a specific index is sufficient to affirm regardless of any other type of index that negates. As a model becomes complete it becomes less understandable as it becomes just as difficult to understand complex models that have too many parameters leading to insoluble equations, means expanding debate's parameters to the 1NC and onward makes the round irresolvable due to a lack of understanding so just vote aff.
~5~ Neg can't read framing issues against aff spikes or use embedded clash – they must line by line. 1AR can't tell the implication of their arguments so negs can outspread me with them in the 2NR – 2AR has no chance to recover because 6-3 time skew and no new 2AR args. Accept aff interpretations since aff speaks first which means they constitutively define the terms of the round, any abuse is solved for you next round which makes fairness a question of your ability to engage in the same practice, any other conception is incoherent since the rules are clearly defined before entering. And, allow new 2ar responses to neg analytics – 1ar too short to answer a blip storm of aprioris and since the implication wasn't articulated completely they aren't full arguments anyways so new responses is implied. Negating affirms because it assumes that the 1ac is a statement that is worthy of contestation which means are arguments are legitimate.
~6~ Affirming is harder, a time crunched 1ar makes it uniquely hard to respond to a 7 min dump but the neg has more time to develop their position and make responses – all theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard because of huge side bias – outweighs neg fairness arguments unless they prove how it uniquely outweighs the disparity since it's structural.
Shah 19 Sachin "A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIDE-BIAS ON THE 2019 JANUARY-FEBRUARY LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE TOPIC" NSD, 15 February 2019. http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/** SJCPJG To further quantify the side-bias, the proportion of negative wins when the affirmative was favored (p1) can be compared with the proportion of affirmative wins when the negative is favored (p2). Ideally the difference between the proportions would be 0; however, p1 = 34.84 while p2 = 28.77, a staggering 6.07 difference. Now the question is whether this difference is statistically significant. In order to determine the answer, a two-proportion z-test was used. The null hypothesis is p1 – p2 = 0 , because that means both sides are able to overcome the debating level skew equally. The alternative hypothesis is then p1 – p2 0, meaning the negative is able to overcome the skew more than the affirmative is able, demonstrating a side-bias. This two-proportion z-test rejected the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (p-value 0.0001). There is sufficient evidence that the negative is able to overcome the skew more often than the affirmative can. This implies there is a less than 0.01 chance that there is no side-bias because it demonstrates the higher proportion of negative wins when the affirmative is favored is significant. In short, the negative has a greater ability to win difficult rounds than the affirmative does, which indicates there exists a skew in the negative's favor. This analysis is statistically rigorous and relevant in several aspects: (A) The p-value is less than the alpha. (B) The data is on the current January-February topic, meaning it's relevant to rounds these months ~2~. (C) The data represents a diversity of debating and judging styles across the country. (D) This analysis accounts for disparities in debating skill level. (E) Type I error was reduced by choosing a small alpha level. The combination of these points validates this analysis. As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds from 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (2017 – 2019 YTD), the negative won 52.99 of ballots (p-value 0.0001) and 54.63 of upset rounds (p-value 0.0001). This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics. Therefore, this analysis confirms that affirming is in fact harder again on the 2019 January-February topic ~3~. So don't lose the flip!
~7~ The Negative may not contest the Aff Framework if it's Kant – Concession is key to check neg time skew and ability to layer the debate by forcing the debate to one layer where I can weigh–else negs can spread out affs and collapse to the layer I undercover. This controls the internal link to all education args because no clash occurs when negs can just extend dropped layers to win. Concession is best for phil ed and topic lit if it's Kant – cross apply the third point of the TJFs section. And, statistics prove that the neg is at significant advantage, meaning generic responses to timeskew aren't responsive. Timeskew is the strongest link into fairness because it's the only objective measure we have coming into the round. Any theoretical response to this shell is a defensive counter-interp at best because it merely justifies the neg can contest it.
~8~ The role of the ballot is to determine the desirability of the world of the affirmative's advocacy against the world of the negative's advocacy. Prefer: ~A~ Reciprocity – Comparative worlds is intrinsically reciprocal because it is the only role of the ballot that allows equal access to the advocacies of both sides while ROBs like truth testing have NIBs and a prioris and ROBs like rejecting oppression for a specific group only allow one side to have offense which creates a prep skew that comes first as it is a structural skew that controls access to the ballot. First, what the neg reads doesn't prove the resolution false, but challenges an assumption of it. Secondly, statements which make assumptions like the resolution should be read as a tacit conditional which is an if p then q statement. Thirdly, for all conditionals, if the antecedent is false, then the conditional as a whole is true. If the aff is winning, they get the ballot is a tacit ballot conditional which means denying the premise proves the conclusion that I should get the ballot. ~B~ All other ROBs don't take both substance and reps into account which makes comparative worlds a prerequisite to any other ROB as 1) reps are a prerequisite to engaging in debate because toleration of bad discourse allows racism and threatening language which decreases participation and 2) substance is the goal of debate – its why we have any post fiat offense and topics in the first place.
~9~ Neg theory is incoherent: ~a~ The ballot is always determined off abuse and inequalities, otherwise it would be impossible to evaluate the round. ~b~ You can't evaluate theory because it's evaluating off the flow rather than making the decision of which is actually a better norm, so you can't actually be consistent with the voters. ~c~ Theory doesn't produce the best rule since it allows the better theory debater to produce rules that will benefit them. ~d~ Things get proven true in debate rounds all the time that aren't true in the real world, so theory doesn't actually achieve its purpose because it doesn't prove better norms. ~e~ It's a contradiction because you say your voter is either constitutive of or beneficial for a competitive activity, but no competitive activity would establish rules in the middle of a competition. ~f~ Theory sets bad norms because we vote for interps that are marginally better than other interps, rather the best version of the interp, so it doesn't achieve the voter. ~g~ Theory is paradoxical because it attempts to limit arguments but uses arguments to do that, which concedes the validity of arguments in the first place. ~h~ Not jurisdictional because the judge can only vote for someone proving their side of the resolution. The resolution doesn't care about whether we can debate, it just says prove your side, so theory isn't a voter.
9/26/21
SeptOct AC - Practical Reason v7
Tournament: Valley | Round: 6 | Opponent: BASIS Independent Silicon Valley SK | Judge: Breigh Plat
Framing
The meta-ethic is practical reason:
~1~ Regress – any other justification for ethics can have its authority infinitely questioned, but reason is a self-justifying source of authority which solves. Asking why use reasons intrinsically asks for a reason to use reason which concedes reason's authority.
~2~ Collapses – other sources of ethical authority presume a logical system of justification to make them coherent, which means reason functions as a side constraint on other theories and they presuppose the authority of reason.
~3~ Action Theory - any action can be divided into infinite states of affairs—only intent can unify our action into intended means and ends.
That generates an obligation to follow only universalizable laws. Only universal law can be constitutive of agency because it applies to all agents in all instances. A maxim is universalizable if it can be known by all reasoners and applied to all reasoners without causing a contradiction.
Thus the standard is consistency with principles of equal and outer freedom
~1~ Universal reason grants agents the right to freedom because acting on a maxim to coerce produces a conceptual contradiction.
Engstrom ~Stephen Engstrom, (Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Pittsburgh) "Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge" http://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal_Legislation_As_the_Form_of_Practical_Knowledge, DOA:5-5-2018 WWBW~ Given the preceding considerations, it's a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of AND a person's outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.
~2~ Inescapability – the exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.
Wood 07 ~Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 WWBW~ Kant holds that the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is AND is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.
~3~ Value theory – the existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth.
Korsgaard 83 (Christine M., "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as AND -and, in general, to make the highest good our end.
Impact calculus –
1~ Ethics are based on intent, but the state does not have intentions and cannot know the intentions of other agents. Instead, the state acts a procedural mechanism to punish those who violate rights claims. Those rights are derived from the structure of intent.
2~ The state does not have the authority to act to preempt future rights violations, because consequences of action are contingent and cannot be derived from the structure of the maxim on which one acts. Thus, the state does not have the jurisdiction to take them into account.
This means if their theory doesn't provide an account of how the state functions they have no offence on the framing debate.
Prefer additionally –
~1~ Performativity - Truth claims can only be proven by argumentation which contains the axiomatic assumption that freedom is good.
Kinsella 11 ~Stephan Kinsella, (Stephan Kinsella is an attorney in Houston, director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and editor of Libertarian Papers.) "Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide" Mises Institute, 5-27-2011, https://mises.org/library/argumentation-ethics-and-liberty-concise-guide, DOA:5-4-2020~ In setting the stage, Hoppe first observes that the standard natural-rights argument AND goods must be assumed to exist. (TSC, p. 161).
~2~ Frameworks are an evaluative filter that determines what offence is legitimate and it's a topicality interpretation of the word "ought" – thus all framing must be theoretically justified. Prefer mine –
Ought is defined as consistency with the categorical imperative.
Durand 01 Kevin K. J. Durand, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Henderson State University. The Logic of Morality: Georg Henrik von Wright, Immanuel Kant, and the "Ought/Can" Inference. Academic Forum, 2000-2001, http://www.hsu.edu/academicforum/2000-2001/2000-1AFThe20Logic20of20Morality.pdf This passage also serves to clarify Kant's assertion that the moral law depends on the AND able to will that the maxim be necessary for the perfectly rational will.
Prefer my interpretation:
~a~ Research Burdens—questions of universalizability do not require evidence dumps or statistics to access offense because they don't have to do with empirics—only analytics are necessary to access offense. That outweighs to accessibility—other frameworks are structurally inaccessible to small school debaters since they'll never have as much evidence or big enough back files to win card wars.
~b~ Strategic thinking—Kantian offense can be derived purely from reasoning, which allows more innovation from debaters and better in-round strategic thinking—debaters aren't totally reliant on their coach's prep. That outweighs since its portable—thinking on your feet is applicable in every profession.
~c~ Philosophical education—my interpretation allows contestation of the role of the state under the categorical imperative—people have argued that Kant justifies anything from libertarianism to socialism.
Advocacy
Thus I affirm resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.
I'll defend the resolution as a general principle, further specification in the doc. This means potential negative implications of reducing protections for certain drugs doesn't link as that's merely a hypothetical instance of an object protected by IP medicine laws. Counterplans and PICs affirm because they do not disprove the general thesis of my advocacy.
All hyper linked and from Merriam Webster unless otherwise noted - "Member" is defined as: part of a whole "Nations" is defined as: a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government "Of" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate origin or derivation "The" is defined as: used as a function word before a singular noun to indicate that the noun is to be understood generically "World Trade Organization" is: An international body founded in 1995 to promote international trade and economic development by reducing tariffs and other restrictions. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "To" is defined as: used to indicate that the following verb is in the infinitive form "Reduce" is defined as: to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number "Intellectual Property" is defined as: A work or invention that is the result of creativity, such as a manuscript or a design, to which one has rights and for which one may apply for a patent, copyright, trademark, etc. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "Protections" is defined as: The act of protecting : the state of being protected (Merriam Webster Legal Dictionary) "For" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate the object or recipient of a perception, desire, or activity "Medicines" is defined as: a substance or preparation used in treating disease Oceans contain water. I am the flying spaghetti monster and I have Shreyas under my control, to demonstrate this I have cast a spell on these words that will cause him to claim he is the flying spaghetti monster in the 1nc, and claim that I am his puppet.
Enforcement is to eliminate all IPR for medicines
Baker 16 Brook Baker (Professor of Law, Northeastern University. He is a senior policy analyst for Health GAP (Global Access Project) and is actively engaged in campaigns for universal access to treatment, prevention, and care for people living with HIV/AIDS, especially expanded and improved medical treatment. He has written and consulted extensively on intellectual property rights, trade, access to medicines and medicines regulatory policy, including with the African Union, NEPAD, Uganda, ASEAN, Thailand, Indonesia, Venezuela, CARICOM, UK DfID, the World Health Organization, the Millennium Development Goals Project, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Open Society Institute, UNDP, UNITAID, the Medicines Patent Pool, the Global Commission on HIV and the Law, and others). and Health GAP, Contribution to the United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines, February 26, 2016, http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/inbox/2016/2/26/z73kpodxk4jw96mhqe2tivq0sdl g3v/ This contribution explicitly supports and is supplemental to the RandD Agreement contribution submitted by MSF, KEI, and others that focuses on rationalizing and strengthening incentives, and legal frameworks for RandD, that promote innovation and access to health technologies. However, this contribution focuses primarily on access and calls for the dismantling of global, regional, bilateral, and national IP regimes that negatively impact the global community's access needs. It focuses on patents, the most obvious and important source of exclusivity for right holders, but also on data and regulatory market exclusivities and linkages, trade secret law, and trademark and copyright protections, which are increasingly embedded in operating systems of diagnostics and other health technologies. At present, the vast majority of countries are members of the World Trade Organization. As members, they are subject to the minimum standards of IP protections set forth in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Although there are transition periods that still apply to least developed country members, most WTO members are now subject to the whole panoply of IPRs and IP enforcement mechanisms set forth in TRIPS. As such, for IP barriers to be dismantled on health technologies, it will be necessary to amend or otherwise supersede TRIPS's application to those technologies. The proposed non-application of TRIPS to medical technologies could be accomplished as follows: Article 6bis: Exhaustion and Non-Application to Medical Technologies 1. For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions in Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of exhaustion of intellectual property rights. 2. Nothing in this Agreement shall apply to medical technologies as defined. Definition of medical technologies: pharmaceutical and biologic products, vaccines, diagnostics, and related health technologies. Article 7bis Right to health and other objectives The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare and to the fulfillment of the human right to health, and to a balance of rights and obligations. Members shall not implement the Agreement in a manner that weakens the promotion or protection of the right to health and of access to health technologies. Article 13 bis Exemptions, limitations and exceptions Members shall confine limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the interests of the right holder. This section shall not apply to copyrights, trademarks and related rights embedded in health technologies, including the systems of internet or other transmission of health-related information from a health technology elsewhere. Article 27(1) bis Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, 3, 6, and 7, patents shall be available, whether for products or processes, in all fields of technology, except health technologies, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are industrially applicable. Article 27(4) bis Members shall exclude health technologies. Article 39.3bis 3. Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which involves considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall need not protect such data against disclosure, except where such disclosure is necessary to protect the public in the public interest, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected from unfair commercial use. In addition to amending the TRIPS Agreement, it will be necessary to formally amend multiple regional and bilateral trade and economic partnership agreements and investment treaties/provisions. Many regional and bilateral trade agreements contain IPR provisions similar to those in the TRIPS Agreement and/or provisions that are TRIPS-plus. These agreements are binding on parties, so to achieve the desired IPR reform, such agreements need to be amended to remove IPR protections on health technologies. There are far too many such agreements to list or discuss, but reform must be undertaken. Similarly, it will be necessary to reform the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty to exempt health technologies from patent filings and to do the same with respect to the Harare Protocol (relating to the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization), the Bangui Agreement (relating to the African Intellectual Property Organization), the Eurasian Patent Convention (affecting the Eurasian Patent Organization), and any other relevant regional patent processing entities. Addressing agreements on IPRs is not enough unless investment agreements are also amended to remove investor protections on health technologies. Just as there was a carve-out for Tobacco in the recently negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (however imperfect), there could be a new and stronger carve out for health technologies. At present, more and more investment agreements directly cover IPRs and give foreign investor rights to bring private investor-state-dispute-settlement (ISDS) claims directly to private arbiters. These new IPR enforcement rights are particularly dangerous as they give right holders powers to directly challenge government IP policy and decisions that adversely impact their expectation of unbridled profits, as is currently claimed in the US$500 million Eli Lilly v. Canada ISDS case. To complete the reform process, it will be necessary to revise IP laws at the national level to incorporate the health technology exclusion. This will be an enormous undertaking technically and politically, even more so where IP is constitutionally protected. Even in these circumstances, if the interests of inventors and creators are adequately protected under a new RandD incentive system, then constitutional requirements may well be satisfied. Similarly, protecting the interests of creators and sometimes inventors under international human rights regimes does not require resort to IPRs. The economic and attributional interests of inventors and creators can be met through other means.
Offence
There is a distinction between personal rights and property rights – property rights govern material objects that can be appropriated and stolen, however personal rights concern intangible concepts such as ideas and speeches. Thus it is a contradiction to attribute property rights to ideas as an idea can be accessible by all without resource constraints. And even the most stringent property rights allow for copying and modification of a legitimate purchase as a function of the new owner's property rights so it's a freedom violation to restrict doing so. And intellectual property rights actively suppress the freedom of speech, which is necessary for agents to actualize their wills.
Pievatolo 10 Pievatolo, Maria. "Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?" Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?, 7 Feb. 2010, bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html. WWEY, altered for glang In the Metaphysik der Sitten, we can find a clear distinction between ius reale and ius personale. The ius reale or ius in re is a right on things. 14 The ius personale is defined as the «possession of another's choice ~Willkür~, in the sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed». 15 In other words, it is a right entitling someone to obtain acts from other persons. As moral subjectivity involves freedom, personal rights cannot be established without the concerned persons' consent. According to Kant, the ius reale cannot be applied to ideas, or, better, to thoughts, because they can be conceived by everyone at the same time, without depriving their authors. Surprising as it may seem, the ius reale protects the freedom to copy, if it is taken seriously. If a thing has been purchased in a legal transaction and the purchasers copy it by their own means, they are simply working on their legitimate private property. For the very principle of private property, it is not fair to restrain the ways in which its legitimate purchaser may use it. For this reason, no ius reale can be opposed to the reprinter. If we see the book as a material thing, whoever buys it has the right to reproduce it: after all, it is his book. Furthermore, in Kant's opinion, we cannot derive any affirmative personal obligation from a ius reale: 16 a ius personale on someone cannot be claimed by simply purchasing some related things without obtaining his or her expressed consent. Kant, by conceiving the book as an action, adopts a strategy based on the ius personale only. By using such a strategy, he concludes that the unauthorized printer has to be compared to an unauthorized spokesperson rather than to a thief. Therefore, it is not necessary to go beyond the Roman law tradition, by inventing a new ius reale on immaterial things. Kant's argument goes as follows: when I speak to a public, I engage a relationship with them. The book may be viewed as a medium through which authors can transmit their speeches to a wider public. In the age of printing, such a medium used to be provided by publishers. Thus publishers can be considered as spokespersons who speak in the name of the authors. But, as such, they need the authors' authorization. 17 Why? Because to speak in the name of another without his authorization is like engaging him in a relationship without his consent. As personal rights, according to Kant, concern relations among free beings, they can arise only from expressed agreements. Hence, the unauthorized printer is like an unauthorized spokesperson, who produces a relation of the author with the public without being entitled to do it. However, the scope of Kant's justification of copyright is very narrow: it applies only to the publishing of texts, it does not touch th so-called derivative works, and it is justified only as far as it helps the public to get the texts. Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 3 Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke or opera, i.e. things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or operae, i.e. actions. As the works of art are simply physical objects, we can derive from Kant's assumption that every legitimate purchaser may reproduce them and may donate or sell the copies to others. 18 Every time an object can be treated only as a product, its legitimate owner may do what he wants with it, because of his ius reale, which has to be taken seriously on both sides. Moreover, as the injustice of reprinting books depends on their communication to the public, we can deduce that their reproduction for personal use is not to be forbidden. As regards as the derivative works, Kant states that, if one shortens, augments, retouches or translates the book of another, ~they~ produces a new speech, although the thoughts can be the same Therefore, such works cannot be seen as Nachdruck and are perfectly lawful. 19 In other words,in a Kantian environment, everyone may become a "wreader" - a reader and writer at the same time - without being hindered by copyright restrictions The goal of the transaction between the author and the publisher is conveying his text to the public. The public has a right to interact with the author, if the latter has chosen to do it. According to Kant, the publisher may neither refuse to publish – or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it himself – a text of a dead author, nor release mutilated 20 or spurious works, nor print only a limited impression that does not meet the demand. If the publisher does not comply, the public has the right to force him to publish. 21 In a Kantian environment the publisher's rights are justified only when they help authors to reach the public. Copyright should be neither censorship nor monopoly. In the 1785 essay Kant stated that the mandate of an author to a publisher should be exclusive 22 because the publisher becomes willing to publish a book only if he is certain to earn something from it; therefore, he is interested in avoiding competition. But later, in the Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant does not mention the exclusivity requirement at all, perhaps because he has realized that it was based on an empirical contamination, depending on the current state of technology. In Kant's world the press used to be the medium that provided for the widest distribution of ideas. Printing required both specific tools and skills, and specialized and centralized organizations. And as long as the publishers of printed texts provided the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, Kant was inclined to bow to their interest. However, from a conceptual perspective, there is no reason to deny that an author should be entitled to authorize everyone to distribute his work to everyone else, just like a person may hire more than one spokesperson. Such a practice is now fairly usual on the Internet, when authors choose a Creative Commons License and grant the right to publish their works to everyone, because they are interested in the widest possible spreading of their ideas. In Kant's times such a strategy would hardly be paying because the major publication technology, the press, was not cheap and easy like the digital reproduction of texts, but difficult and expensive. Kant's thesis is based on the technical assumption that publishing requires an intermediation - just as it used to be in the age of print -, which is lawful only it has the author's consent. Where the intermediation is not necessary any longer, where no one is speaking in the name of another, copyright makes no sense. 23 3. A term of comparison: Fichte's theory of intellectual property In 1793 the Berlinische Monatschrift published a short essay, Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable, 24 written by Fichte two years ago. The essay connects originality to intellectual property and advocates the enforcing of the latter by means of criminal sanctions. It is worth mentioning the Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 4 final parable by means of which Fichte illustrates his thesis, because it contains in itself all our commonplaces on intellectual property. In the time of the Caliph Harun al Rashid, an alchemist used to prepare a beneficial drug and to entrust the commercial side of the business to a merchant who was the sole distributor throughout the land and who earned a goodly profit by his monopoly. Another medicine merchant stole the drug from the monopolist and started to sell it at a cheaper price. The latter brought him before the Caliph. The former pleaded for his case by arguing that his selling the drug for a cheaper price was useful to the sick persons and to the society at large. What was the judgment of the Caliph? «He had the useful man hanged». 25 To be accurate, the medicine merchant of the parable had not copied the drug, but had materially stolen it. Fichte suggested that copying is like stealing. In the 18th century, however, Fichte had to demonstrate the commonplace of today. According to Fichte, we can distinguish two aspects of a book: 1. its physical aspect (das körperliche), i.e. the printed paper 2. its ideational aspect (das geistige) The ideational aspect of a book is in turn divisible into: a. a material aspect, i.e. the ideas the book presents; b. the form of these ideas, i. e. the way in which they are presented. All the aspects of a book, except one, can be appropriated by anybody: we can buy the printed paper and assimilate the ideas it conveys. We cannot, however, appropriate its form, because it is strictly personal. And, according to Fichte, it is self-evident that «we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible». 26 As the form can be only mine, the author is the proprietor of his text and his authorized publisher is its usufructuary. However sophistical this shift from originality to property may seem, it is not the only seminal element of our commonplaces on copyright contained in Fichte's essay. It is also worth remarking that in the Harun al Rashid parable the alchemist - the author - transfer his rights and disappears from the scene; the most powerful interests are these of a monopolist - the publisher -; only the other medicine merchant - the pirate - pleads for the interests of the public, but his arguments are rejected as criminal; as regards as the Caliph - the government -, he bows to the monopolist's interests without saying a word; and, last but not least, the criminal sanction for piracy - capital punishment - is out of all proportion. The young Fichte believed that his ideas on authors' right were similar to the ones of Kant. 27 However, there are at least three outstanding differences between Kant and Fichte: Fichte bases copyright on the individual originality in the form of expression; 28 Kant does not mention originality at all; 1. Fichte equates copyright with private property; 29 Kant rejects the very possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale; 2. Fichte thinks that copyright violators deserve the same harsh punishment of thieves. 30 According to Kant, the unauthorized printer should simply compensate all the damages he caused to the author or to his authorized publisher. 31 3. While Fichte is an intellectual property endorser, Kant is an "enlightened" conservative who supports the Roman law tradition, against the propertization trend. He accepts the copyright principle, according to which Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 5 authors are entitled to decide how to publish their works. The rights of the publishers, however, are justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public, while the personal use of the texts and the so-called "wreading" should remain free. And, above all, all that can be viewed as a product is, in his opinion, outside the scope of copyright and may be copied without restrictions. What is, in any, the philosophical meaning of Kant's "conservatism"? To answer such a question, we need to link his ideas on authors' right to his general theory of property, as it is explained in the Metaphysics of Morals. 4. What is a thing? In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of real rights are only corporeal entities or res corporales: «Sache ist ein Ding, was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches selbst der Freiheit ermangelt, heiß daher Sache (res corporalis)». 32 Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate to incorporeal things as well. According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished from its sensible possession. Something external would be rightfully mine «only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even though I am not in possession of it» (AA.06 245:13-16). The rightful possession is an intelligible, not sensible, relation. I can claim that my bicycle is mine only if I am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the backyard. Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property as explained in his 1793 essay, according to which we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author to claim a rightful property on his work. Is it really so obvious that originality implies property? Property is a comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all the time over the use of material objects. It is so comfortable just because it is physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property when something cannot be separated from someone. I say both that my fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But these two "mine" have a different meaning: the former is the "mine" of attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property. The former can be used to identify someone, and conveys the historical circumstance that something is related exclusively to someone; the latter points only to an accidental relation with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. It is possible to lie on a historical circumstance, by plagiarizing a text, i.e. by attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no one can "steal" the historical connection between "my" writing style and me: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if Fichte's principle were the only justification of property right, it would undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations. Although he defines things as res corporales, Kant determines the rightful possession of a thing as a possession without detentio, by ignoring all its sensible facets. Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - is exerted on an object that is "merely distinct from me", regardless of its position in space and time. Space and time, indeed, are sensible determinations and should be left out of consideration. According to the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a permissive law of reason: 33 if a rightful possession were not possible, every object would be a res nullius and nobody would be Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 6 entitled to use it. Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res corporales. Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (AA.6, 249:5-7). If property is a merely intelligible relation with an object that is simply distinct from the subject, we have no reason to deny that such an object might be immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property. Why, then, does Kant refrain from using the very concept of it? According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of personal rights. A person who is speaking to the people is engaging a relationship with them; if someone else engages such a relationship in his name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with property: he is only an agent without authority. Speeches, by Kant, cannot be separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised land of intellectual property without entering it. According to Kant, before the acquired rights, everyone has a moral capacity for putting others under obligation that he calls innate right or internal meum vel tuum (AA.06, 237:24-25). The innate right is only one: freedom as independence from being constrained by another's choice, insofar it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity: in other words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the very possibility condition of law. Freedom implies innate equality, «that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone, and finally his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it - such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them.» (AA.06, 237-238) 34 In spite of his intellectual theory of property, 35 Kant does not enter in the realm of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without suppressing freedom itself. If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to mix copyright protection and censorship. 36 Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used. We cannot, however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from speeches would be like excluding them from freedom. Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the scope of copyright to publishing, or, better, to the publishing of the age of print: the Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without the author's permission and distributes its copies to the public. If someone copies a book for his personal use, or lets others do it, or translates and elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone. Kant does not stick to the Roman Law tradition because of conservatism, but because of Enlightenment.
IPP is nonuniversalizable – universalizing the act of restricting the production of a certain medicine terminates in a contradiction because it entails that you restrict your own ability to produce the medicine
Underview
I AM WILLING TO DROP ALL OF THE FOLLOWING THEORETICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE APRIORIS IF THE NEG DOESN'T READ THEIR OWN OR ANY EVALUATE AFTER X SPEECH ARGS – this is terminal defense to your shell.
~1~ Presumption and permissibility affirm – a) We always default to assuming something true until proven false, or it would be almost impossible to make any claim at all b) If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral. If I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions which lead to action freeze, it's a practical requirement of action c) Negating an obligation means proving a prohibition of that act, means permissibility affirms because negating is prohibiting the aff action. If theory T is simpler than theory T*, then it is rational to believe T rather than T*. Vote aff because it's simple – evaluating responses to this is complicated so don't.
~2~ AFF theory is no RVI, Drop the debater, competing interps, under an interp that aff theory is legit regardless of voters a) infinite abuse since otherwise it would be impossible to check NC abuse b) it would justify the aff never getting to read theory which is a reciprocity issue c) Time crunched 1ar means it becomes impossible to justify paradigm issues and win the shell and this comes first because time skew means I couldn't respond to all neg args so they're false. And, reject theory and Ks on spikes since it would be a contradiction since they indict each other, but prefer mine since they are lexically prior. This means all contradiction flow aff since I spoke first which makes any contradictions their fault. AFF fairness issues come prior to NC arguments a) The 1ar can't engage on multiple layers if there is a skew since the speech is already time-crunched b) Sets up an invincible 2n since there are a million of unfair things you can collapse to to win every round. No neg RVIs: Illogical shouldn't win for meeting basic burdens logic outweighs since it's a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices, incentivizes a 2n dump which makes it impossible for me to win on theory. They can run theory on me too if I'm unfair so 1) theory is reciprocal because we're both able to check abuse and 2) also cures time skew because they can collapse in the 2nr to their shell
~3~ The neg may not read utilitarianism or any consequentialist ethical theory as a standard – a) resolvability: 1~ Induction fails—induction assumes that things will always happen the same way in the future as they have in the past. But this begs the question of how we know what happened in the past will happen in the future. Thus, induction is logically fallacious. 2~ Moral cluelessness—consequences are wholly unknowable and any action can lead to a domino effect that has unpredictable bad consequences in the end which means it can't guide action 3~ Infinite consequences—any harm stretches on into the infinite future and makes it impossible to compare harms—results in calculative regress—you have you calculate how much time to spend calculating and so on—destroys decision-making 4~ Aggregation fails—happiness is only happy for you, but not for me, so you can't compare across people—also can't compare 10 headaches to a migraine to the value of friendship b) psychological violence: util and other consequentialist theories justify atrocities such as slavery if it benefits a marginal majority or for hypothetical benefits that might not even materialize
~4~ Affirming is harder, a time crunched 1ar makes it uniquely hard to respond to a 7 min dump but the neg has more time to develop their position and make responses – all theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard because of huge side bias – outweighs neg fairness arguments unless they prove how it uniquely outweighs the disparity since it's structural.
Shah 19 Sachin "A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIDE-BIAS ON THE 2019 JANUARY-FEBRUARY LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE TOPIC" NSD, 15 February 2019. http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/** SJCPJG To further quantify the side-bias, the proportion of negative wins when the affirmative was favored (p1) can be compared with the proportion of affirmative wins when the negative is favored (p2). Ideally the difference between the proportions would be 0; however, p1 = 34.84 while p2 = 28.77, a staggering 6.07 difference. Now the question is whether this difference is statistically significant. In order to determine the answer, a two-proportion z-test was used. The null hypothesis is p1 – p2 = 0 , because that means both sides are able to overcome the debating level skew equally. The alternative hypothesis is then p1 – p2 0, meaning the negative is able to overcome the skew more than the affirmative is able, demonstrating a side-bias. This two-proportion z-test rejected the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (p-value 0.0001). There is sufficient evidence that the negative is able to overcome the skew more often than the affirmative can. This implies there is a less than 0.01 chance that there is no side-bias because it demonstrates the higher proportion of negative wins when the affirmative is favored is significant. In short, the negative has a greater ability to win difficult rounds than the affirmative does, which indicates there exists a skew in the negative's favor. This analysis is statistically rigorous and relevant in several aspects: (A) The p-value is less than the alpha. (B) The data is on the current January-February topic, meaning it's relevant to rounds these months ~2~. (C) The data represents a diversity of debating and judging styles across the country. (D) This analysis accounts for disparities in debating skill level. (E) Type I error was reduced by choosing a small alpha level. The combination of these points validates this analysis. As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds from 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (2017 – 2019 YTD), the negative won 52.99 of ballots (p-value 0.0001) and 54.63 of upset rounds (p-value 0.0001). This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics. Therefore, this analysis confirms that affirming is in fact harder again on the 2019 January-February topic ~3~. So don't lose the flip!
~5~ The role of the ballot is to determine the desirability of the world of the affirmative's advocacy against the world of the negative's advocacy. Prefer: ~A~ Reciprocity – Comparative worlds is intrinsically reciprocal because it is the only role of the ballot that allows equal access to the advocacies of both sides while ROBs like truth testing have NIBs and a prioris and ROBs like rejecting oppression for a specific group only allow one side to have offense which creates a prep skew that comes first as it is a structural skew that controls access to the ballot. First, what the neg reads doesn't prove the resolution false, but challenges an assumption of it. Secondly, statements which make assumptions like the resolution should be read as a tacit conditional which is an if p then q statement. Thirdly, for all conditionals, if the antecedent is false, then the conditional as a whole is true. If the aff is winning, they get the ballot is a tacit ballot conditional which means denying the premise proves the conclusion that I should get the ballot. ~B~ All other ROBs don't take both substance and reps into account which makes comparative worlds a prerequisite to any other ROB as 1) reps are a prerequisite to engaging in debate because toleration of bad discourse allows racism and threatening language which decreases participation and 2) substance is the goal of debate – its why we have any post fiat offense and topics in the first place.
~6~ Neg theory is incoherent: ~a~ The ballot is always determined off abuse and inequalities, otherwise it would be impossible to evaluate the round. ~b~ You can't evaluate theory because it's evaluating off the flow rather than making the decision of which is actually a better norm, so you can't actually be consistent with the voters. ~c~ Theory doesn't produce the best rule since it allows the better theory debater to produce rules that will benefit them. ~d~ Things get proven true in debate rounds all the time that aren't true in the real world, so theory doesn't actually achieve its purpose because it doesn't prove better norms. ~e~ It's a contradiction because you say your voter is either constitutive of or beneficial for a competitive activity, but no competitive activity would establish rules in the middle of a competition. ~f~ Theory sets bad norms because we vote for interps that are marginally better than other interps, rather the best version of the interp, so it doesn't achieve the voter. ~g~ Theory is paradoxical because it attempts to limit arguments but uses arguments to do that, which concedes the validity of arguments in the first place. ~h~ Not jurisdictional because the judge can only vote for someone proving their side of the resolution. The resolution doesn't care about whether we can debate, it just says prove your side, so theory isn't a voter.
~7~ No fairness voter A~ Fairness is relative and impossible to calculate or prove. B~ There is no brightline for how much fairness is enough, so judge intervention is necessary to determine when to pull the trigger. C~ Fairness is impossible. Complete fairness would give both sides the same number of speeches and minutes per speech. So fairness is impossible to achieve. D~ Even if possible, we never know when we have fairness. Fairness is not a tangible concept and cannot be calculated. E~ Fairness is uncontrollable because it's influenced by external factors like coaching staff or money for books, so there's no point in discussing fairness because we don't have a fair playing field to begin with.
~8~ The existence of an obligation doesn't mean that there can't be another obligation to do something else, as an obligation is just a locus of duty which means proving the resolution true under a specific index is sufficient to affirm regardless of any other type of index that negates. As a model becomes complete it becomes less understandable as it becomes just as difficult to understand complex models that have too many parameters leading to insoluble equations, means expanding debate's parameters to the 1NC and onward makes the round irresolvable due to a lack of understanding so just vote aff.
~1~ Regress – any other justification for ethics can have its authority infinitely questioned, but reason is a self-justifying source of authority which solves. Asking why use reasons intrinsically asks for a reason to use reason which concedes reason's authority.
~2~ Collapses – other sources of ethical authority presume a logical system of justification to make them coherent, which means reason functions as a side constraint on other theories and they presuppose the authority of reason.
~3~ Action Theory - any action can be divided into infinite states of affairs—only intent can unify our action into intended means and ends.
That generates an obligation to follow only universalizable laws. Only universal law can be constitutive of agency because it applies to all agents in all instances. A maxim is universalizable if it can be known by all reasoners and applied to all reasoners without causing a contradiction.
Thus the standard is consistency with principles of equal and outer freedom
~1~ Universal reason grants agents the right to freedom because acting on a maxim to coerce produces a conceptual contradiction.
Engstrom ~Stephen Engstrom, (Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Pittsburgh) "Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge" http://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal_Legislation_As_the_Form_of_Practical_Knowledge, DOA:5-5-2018 WWBW~ Given the preceding considerations, it's a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of AND a person's outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.
~2~ Inescapability – the exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.
Wood 07 ~Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 WWBW~ Kant holds that the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is AND is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.
~3~ Value theory – the existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth.
Korsgaard 83 (Christine M., "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as AND -and, in general, to make the highest good our end.
Impact calculus –
1~ Ethics are based on intent, but the state does not have intentions and cannot know the intentions of other agents. Instead, the state acts a procedural mechanism to punish those who violate rights claims. Those rights are derived from the structure of intent.
2~ The state does not have the authority to act to preempt future rights violations, because consequences of action are contingent and cannot be derived from the structure of the maxim on which one acts. Thus, the state does not have the jurisdiction to take them into account.
This means if their theory doesn't provide an account of how the state functions they have no offence on the framing debate.
Prefer additionally –
~1~ Performativity - Truth claims can only be proven by argumentation which contains the axiomatic assumption that freedom is good.
Kinsella 11 ~Stephan Kinsella, (Stephan Kinsella is an attorney in Houston, director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and editor of Libertarian Papers.) "Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide" Mises Institute, 5-27-2011, https://mises.org/library/argumentation-ethics-and-liberty-concise-guide, DOA:5-4-2020~ In setting the stage, Hoppe first observes that the standard natural-rights argument AND goods must be assumed to exist. (TSC, p. 161).
~2~ Frameworks are an evaluative filter that determines what offence is legitimate and it's a topicality interpretation of the word "ought" – thus all framing must be theoretically justified. Prefer mine –
Ought is defined as consistency with the categorical imperative.
Durand 01 Kevin K. J. Durand, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Henderson State University. The Logic of Morality: Georg Henrik von Wright, Immanuel Kant, and the "Ought/Can" Inference. Academic Forum, 2000-2001, http://www.hsu.edu/academicforum/2000-2001/2000-1AFThe20Logic20of20Morality.pdf This passage also serves to clarify Kant's assertion that the moral law depends on the AND able to will that the maxim be necessary for the perfectly rational will.
Prefer my interpretation:
~a~ Research Burdens—questions of universalizability do not require evidence dumps or statistics to access offense because they don't have to do with empirics—only analytics are necessary to access offense. That outweighs to accessibility—other frameworks are structurally inaccessible to small school debaters since they'll never have as much evidence or big enough back files to win card wars.
~b~ Strategic thinking—Kantian offense can be derived purely from reasoning, which allows more innovation from debaters and better in-round strategic thinking—debaters aren't totally reliant on their coach's prep. That outweighs since its portable—thinking on your feet is applicable in every profession.
~c~ Philosophical education—my interpretation allows contestation of the role of the state under the categorical imperative—people have argued that Kant justifies anything from libertarianism to socialism.
Advocacy
Thus I affirm resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.
I'll defend the resolution as a general principle, further specification in the doc. This means potential negative implications of reducing protections for certain drugs doesn't link as that's merely a hypothetical instance of an object protected by IP medicine laws. Counterplans and PICs affirm because they do not disprove the general thesis of my advocacy.
All hyper linked and from Merriam Webster unless otherwise noted - "Member" is defined as: part of a whole "Nations" is defined as: a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government "Of" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate origin or derivation "The" is defined as: used as a function word before a singular noun to indicate that the noun is to be understood generically "World Trade Organization" is: An international body founded in 1995 to promote international trade and economic development by reducing tariffs and other restrictions. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "To" is defined as: used to indicate that the following verb is in the infinitive form "Reduce" is defined as: to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number "Intellectual Property" is defined as: A work or invention that is the result of creativity, such as a manuscript or a design, to which one has rights and for which one may apply for a patent, copyright, trademark, etc. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "Protections" is defined as: The act of protecting : the state of being protected (Merriam Webster Legal Dictionary) "For" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate the object or recipient of a perception, desire, or activity "Medicines" is defined as: a substance or preparation used in treating disease
Offence
There is a distinction between personal rights and property rights – property rights govern material objects that can be appropriated and stolen, however personal rights concern intangible concepts such as ideas and speeches. Thus it is a contradiction to attribute property rights to ideas as an idea can be accessible by all without resource constraints. And even the most stringent property rights allow for copying and modification of a legitimate purchase as a function of the new owner's property rights so it's a freedom violation to restrict doing so. And intellectual property rights actively suppress the freedom of speech, which is necessary for agents to actualize their wills.
Pievatolo 10 Pievatolo, Maria. "Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?" Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?, 7 Feb. 2010, bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html. WWEY, altered for glang In the Metaphysik der Sitten, we can find a clear distinction between ius reale and ius personale. The ius reale or ius in re is a right on things. 14 The ius personale is defined as the «possession of another's choice ~Willkür~, in the sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed». 15 In other words, it is a right entitling someone to obtain acts from other persons. As moral subjectivity involves freedom, personal rights cannot be established without the concerned persons' consent. According to Kant, the ius reale cannot be applied to ideas, or, better, to thoughts, because they can be conceived by everyone at the same time, without depriving their authors. Surprising as it may seem, the ius reale protects the freedom to copy, if it is taken seriously. If a thing has been purchased in a legal transaction and the purchasers copy it by their own means, they are simply working on their legitimate private property. For the very principle of private property, it is not fair to restrain the ways in which its legitimate purchaser may use it. For this reason, no ius reale can be opposed to the reprinter. If we see the book as a material thing, whoever buys it has the right to reproduce it: after all, it is his book. Furthermore, in Kant's opinion, we cannot derive any affirmative personal obligation from a ius reale: 16 a ius personale on someone cannot be claimed by simply purchasing some related things without obtaining his or her expressed consent. Kant, by conceiving the book as an action, adopts a strategy based on the ius personale only. By using such a strategy, he concludes that the unauthorized printer has to be compared to an unauthorized spokesperson rather than to a thief. Therefore, it is not necessary to go beyond the Roman law tradition, by inventing a new ius reale on immaterial things. Kant's argument goes as follows: when I speak to a public, I engage a relationship with them. The book may be viewed as a medium through which authors can transmit their speeches to a wider public. In the age of printing, such a medium used to be provided by publishers. Thus publishers can be considered as spokespersons who speak in the name of the authors. But, as such, they need the authors' authorization. 17 Why? Because to speak in the name of another without his authorization is like engaging him in a relationship without his consent. As personal rights, according to Kant, concern relations among free beings, they can arise only from expressed agreements. Hence, the unauthorized printer is like an unauthorized spokesperson, who produces a relation of the author with the public without being entitled to do it. However, the scope of Kant's justification of copyright is very narrow: it applies only to the publishing of texts, it does not touch th so-called derivative works, and it is justified only as far as it helps the public to get the texts. Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 3 Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke or opera, i.e. things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or operae, i.e. actions. As the works of art are simply physical objects, we can derive from Kant's assumption that every legitimate purchaser may reproduce them and may donate or sell the copies to others. 18 Every time an object can be treated only as a product, its legitimate owner may do what he wants with it, because of his ius reale, which has to be taken seriously on both sides. Moreover, as the injustice of reprinting books depends on their communication to the public, we can deduce that their reproduction for personal use is not to be forbidden. As regards as the derivative works, Kant states that, if one shortens, augments, retouches or translates the book of another, ~they~ produces a new speech, although the thoughts can be the same Therefore, such works cannot be seen as Nachdruck and are perfectly lawful. 19 In other words,in a Kantian environment, everyone may become a "wreader" - a reader and writer at the same time - without being hindered by copyright restrictions The goal of the transaction between the author and the publisher is conveying his text to the public. The public has a right to interact with the author, if the latter has chosen to do it. According to Kant, the publisher may neither refuse to publish – or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it himself – a text of a dead author, nor release mutilated 20 or spurious works, nor print only a limited impression that does not meet the demand. If the publisher does not comply, the public has the right to force him to publish. 21 In a Kantian environment the publisher's rights are justified only when they help authors to reach the public. Copyright should be neither censorship nor monopoly. In the 1785 essay Kant stated that the mandate of an author to a publisher should be exclusive 22 because the publisher becomes willing to publish a book only if he is certain to earn something from it; therefore, he is interested in avoiding competition. But later, in the Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant does not mention the exclusivity requirement at all, perhaps because he has realized that it was based on an empirical contamination, depending on the current state of technology. In Kant's world the press used to be the medium that provided for the widest distribution of ideas. Printing required both specific tools and skills, and specialized and centralized organizations. And as long as the publishers of printed texts provided the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, Kant was inclined to bow to their interest. However, from a conceptual perspective, there is no reason to deny that an author should be entitled to authorize everyone to distribute his work to everyone else, just like a person may hire more than one spokesperson. Such a practice is now fairly usual on the Internet, when authors choose a Creative Commons License and grant the right to publish their works to everyone, because they are interested in the widest possible spreading of their ideas. In Kant's times such a strategy would hardly be paying because the major publication technology, the press, was not cheap and easy like the digital reproduction of texts, but difficult and expensive. Kant's thesis is based on the technical assumption that publishing requires an intermediation - just as it used to be in the age of print -, which is lawful only it has the author's consent. Where the intermediation is not necessary any longer, where no one is speaking in the name of another, copyright makes no sense. 23 3. A term of comparison: Fichte's theory of intellectual property In 1793 the Berlinische Monatschrift published a short essay, Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable, 24 written by Fichte two years ago. The essay connects originality to intellectual property and advocates the enforcing of the latter by means of criminal sanctions. It is worth mentioning the Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 4 final parable by means of which Fichte illustrates his thesis, because it contains in itself all our commonplaces on intellectual property. In the time of the Caliph Harun al Rashid, an alchemist used to prepare a beneficial drug and to entrust the commercial side of the business to a merchant who was the sole distributor throughout the land and who earned a goodly profit by his monopoly. Another medicine merchant stole the drug from the monopolist and started to sell it at a cheaper price. The latter brought him before the Caliph. The former pleaded for his case by arguing that his selling the drug for a cheaper price was useful to the sick persons and to the society at large. What was the judgment of the Caliph? «He had the useful man hanged». 25 To be accurate, the medicine merchant of the parable had not copied the drug, but had materially stolen it. Fichte suggested that copying is like stealing. In the 18th century, however, Fichte had to demonstrate the commonplace of today. According to Fichte, we can distinguish two aspects of a book: 1. its physical aspect (das körperliche), i.e. the printed paper 2. its ideational aspect (das geistige) The ideational aspect of a book is in turn divisible into: a. a material aspect, i.e. the ideas the book presents; b. the form of these ideas, i. e. the way in which they are presented. All the aspects of a book, except one, can be appropriated by anybody: we can buy the printed paper and assimilate the ideas it conveys. We cannot, however, appropriate its form, because it is strictly personal. And, according to Fichte, it is self-evident that «we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible». 26 As the form can be only mine, the author is the proprietor of his text and his authorized publisher is its usufructuary. However sophistical this shift from originality to property may seem, it is not the only seminal element of our commonplaces on copyright contained in Fichte's essay. It is also worth remarking that in the Harun al Rashid parable the alchemist - the author - transfer his rights and disappears from the scene; the most powerful interests are these of a monopolist - the publisher -; only the other medicine merchant - the pirate - pleads for the interests of the public, but his arguments are rejected as criminal; as regards as the Caliph - the government -, he bows to the monopolist's interests without saying a word; and, last but not least, the criminal sanction for piracy - capital punishment - is out of all proportion. The young Fichte believed that his ideas on authors' right were similar to the ones of Kant. 27 However, there are at least three outstanding differences between Kant and Fichte: Fichte bases copyright on the individual originality in the form of expression; 28 Kant does not mention originality at all; 1. Fichte equates copyright with private property; 29 Kant rejects the very possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale; 2. Fichte thinks that copyright violators deserve the same harsh punishment of thieves. 30 According to Kant, the unauthorized printer should simply compensate all the damages he caused to the author or to his authorized publisher. 31 3. While Fichte is an intellectual property endorser, Kant is an "enlightened" conservative who supports the Roman law tradition, against the propertization trend. He accepts the copyright principle, according to which Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 5 authors are entitled to decide how to publish their works. The rights of the publishers, however, are justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public, while the personal use of the texts and the so-called "wreading" should remain free. And, above all, all that can be viewed as a product is, in his opinion, outside the scope of copyright and may be copied without restrictions. What is, in any, the philosophical meaning of Kant's "conservatism"? To answer such a question, we need to link his ideas on authors' right to his general theory of property, as it is explained in the Metaphysics of Morals. 4. What is a thing? In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of real rights are only corporeal entities or res corporales: «Sache ist ein Ding, was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches selbst der Freiheit ermangelt, heiß daher Sache (res corporalis)». 32 Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate to incorporeal things as well. According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished from its sensible possession. Something external would be rightfully mine «only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even though I am not in possession of it» (AA.06 245:13-16). The rightful possession is an intelligible, not sensible, relation. I can claim that my bicycle is mine only if I am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the backyard. Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property as explained in his 1793 essay, according to which we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author to claim a rightful property on his work. Is it really so obvious that originality implies property? Property is a comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all the time over the use of material objects. It is so comfortable just because it is physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property when something cannot be separated from someone. I say both that my fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But these two "mine" have a different meaning: the former is the "mine" of attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property. The former can be used to identify someone, and conveys the historical circumstance that something is related exclusively to someone; the latter points only to an accidental relation with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. It is possible to lie on a historical circumstance, by plagiarizing a text, i.e. by attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no one can "steal" the historical connection between "my" writing style and me: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if Fichte's principle were the only justification of property right, it would undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations. Although he defines things as res corporales, Kant determines the rightful possession of a thing as a possession without detentio, by ignoring all its sensible facets. Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - is exerted on an object that is "merely distinct from me", regardless of its position in space and time. Space and time, indeed, are sensible determinations and should be left out of consideration. According to the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a permissive law of reason: 33 if a rightful possession were not possible, every object would be a res nullius and nobody would be Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 6 entitled to use it. Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res corporales. Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (AA.6, 249:5-7). If property is a merely intelligible relation with an object that is simply distinct from the subject, we have no reason to deny that such an object might be immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property. Why, then, does Kant refrain from using the very concept of it? According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of personal rights. A person who is speaking to the people is engaging a relationship with them; if someone else engages such a relationship in his name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with property: he is only an agent without authority. Speeches, by Kant, cannot be separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised land of intellectual property without entering it. According to Kant, before the acquired rights, everyone has a moral capacity for putting others under obligation that he calls innate right or internal meum vel tuum (AA.06, 237:24-25). The innate right is only one: freedom as independence from being constrained by another's choice, insofar it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity: in other words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the very possibility condition of law. Freedom implies innate equality, «that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone, and finally his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it - such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them.» (AA.06, 237-238) 34 In spite of his intellectual theory of property, 35 Kant does not enter in the realm of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without suppressing freedom itself. If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to mix copyright protection and censorship. 36 Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used. We cannot, however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from speeches would be like excluding them from freedom. Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the scope of copyright to publishing, or, better, to the publishing of the age of print: the Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without the author's permission and distributes its copies to the public. If someone copies a book for his personal use, or lets others do it, or translates and elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone. Kant does not stick to the Roman Law tradition because of conservatism, but because of Enlightenment.
IPP is nonuniversalizable – universalizing the act of restricting the production of a certain medicine terminates in a contradiction because it entails that you restrict your own ability to produce the medicine
Underview
~1~ The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the Resolution; the aff must prove it true and the neg must prove it false.
Prefer: ~A~ Text: Five dictionaries define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm as to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution's truth or falsity. This outweighs on common usage – it is abundantly clear that our roles are verified. Any other role of the ballot enforces an external norm on debate, but only truth testing is intrinsic to the process of debate i.e. proving statements true or false through argumentation. Constitutivism outweighs because you don't have the jurisdiction not to truth test – a practice only makes sense based on its intrinsic rules. Jurisdiction is also an independent voter and a meta constraint since every argument you make concedes the authority of the judge fulfilling their jurisdiction to vote aff if they affirm better and neg the contrary – otherwise they could just hack against you so it also controls the internal link to fairness since that's definitionally unfair. ~B~ Logic: Any counter role of the ballot collapses to truth testing because every property assumes truth of the property i.e. if I say, "I am awake" it is the same as "it is true that I am awake" which means they are also a question of truth claims because it's inherent. It also means their ROB warrants aren't mutually exclusive with mine. ~C~ Inclusion: Any offense can function under truth testing whereas your specific role of the ballot excludes all strategies but yours. This is bad for inclusive debates because people without every technical skill or comprehensive debate knowledge are shut out of your scholarship which turns your ROB- truth testing solves because you can do what you're good at and so can I. This is also better for education because me engaging in a debate I know nothing about doesn't help anyone. o/w since it is a real-world implication in round ~D~ Isomorphism: ROBs that aren't phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms mean that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it's solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn't a closest estimate.
~2~ 1ar theory – the aff gets it otherwise infinite abuse as it would be impossible to check NC abuse and it's a reciprocity issue.
Competing Interps: Reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention – collapses to CI because it becomes a debate about brightlines. Drop the Debater: Time crunched 1ar makes this uniquely key otherwise the neg can just outspread me and collapse to a different layer making this the only real way to check abuse. No neg RVIs: Illogical shouldn't win for meeting basic burdens, incentivizes a 2n dump which makes it impossible for me to win on theory. No time skew bc I had to initiate the shell in a time crunched 1ar. Reject theory and Ks on spikes since it would be a contradiction since they indict each other, but prefer mine since they are lexically prior. Inclusion first is the fallacy of origin – don't apply it. Fairness is a voter debate is a competitive activity wins/losses prove that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Education – the only portable thing from debate and the goal of the activity.
~3~ Affirming is harder – all theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard because of huge side bias – outweighs neg fairness arguments unless they prove how it uniquely outweighs the disparity since it's structural. Put away your evidence ethics claims, this is from 2021 and the author does endorse substantive compensation for the aff
Sachin Shah 21 (Former debater and statistician) "A Statistical Study of Side Bias on the 2021 January-February Lincoln-Douglas Debate Topic by Sachin Shah" NSD Update, 2021, http://nsdupdate.com/2021/a-statistical-study-of-side-bias-on-the-2021-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic-by-sachin-shah/?fbclid=IwAR0xUs8IfbaV31bR1Vv66o6yxa8m0buAGnWNoSrTdtphVinz3YI-UtXmQ1Q. Accessed 10-15-2021, WWEY It is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. Of the 243 bid distributing tournaments from August 2015 to present, the negative won 52.30 of rounds (p-value 10^-34, 99 confidence interval ~51.82, 52.78~). Of elimination rounds, the negative won 55.85 of rounds (p-value 10^-18, 99 confidence interval ~54.16, 57.54~). Additionally, after fitting logistical regression to the entire dataset, the offset was found to be 12.57. That translates to 9 of rounds for the negative where the debater predicted to win changed as a result of the bias. This continues to suggest the negative side bias might be structural and not topic specific as this analysis now includes 18 topics. Although debaters commonly use theoretical arguments that negating is harder in rounds i.e., judge psychology, affirmatives speak first and last, etc., these arguments are superseded by the empirical evidence. Even if these arguments correctly point out an advantage for the affirmative, the data shows that after accounting for all advantages and disadvantages (for both sides), negating is still easier. Given a structural advantage for the negative, the affirmative may be justified in being granted a substantive advantage to compensate for the structural skew. This could take various forms such as granting the affirmative presumption ground, tiny plans, or framework choice. Whatever form chosen should be tested to ensure the skew is not unintentionally reversed.
~4~ The Haitian Revolution proves that enlightenment philosophy is liberatory – reclaiming humanism is the best way to ground radical action which justifies the perm.
Buck-Morss 09 ~Susan Buck-Morss, (Susan Buck-Morss is professor of political philosophy and social the- ory in the department of government, Cornell University, and Visit- ing Distinguished Professor in the Public Intellectuals Program, Florida Atlantic University.) "Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History" 2009, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7zwbgz, DOA:9-19-2020 WWBW~ If vèvès and altar arrangements in Haitian Vodou temples replicate in miniature the cosmograms paced out by Lemba members on African meadows, if the names of the Dahomean divinities reappears in the dominant Rada cult of Vodou loa, in short, if the words and the structure of cultural language remained, what was said in this language in response to historical events was totally new.127 This is nowhere more obvious than in the case of the secret societies of warriors that are said to have played a part in the Haitian Revolution.128 Warrior societies existed in Kongo, in Dahomey, and elsewhere in Africa, but their purpose was never to initiate an event of slave insurrection. On the contrary: "The slave trade intensi0ed the Dahomean warrior way of life," because prisoners of war were sold to the traders.129 None of Vodou's precedents in Africa ever conceived of eliminating the institutional arrangement of master and slave altogether. No European nation did either. The radical antislavery articulated in Saint-Domingue was politically unprecedented. The de0nition of universal history that begins to emerge here is this: rather than giving multiple, distinct cultures equal due, whereby people are recognized as part of humanity indirectly through the mediation of collective cultural identities, human universality emerges in the historical event at the point of rupture. It is in the discontinuities of history that people whose culture has been strained to the breaking point give expression to a humanity that goes beyond cultural limits. And it is in our empathic identification with this raw, free, and vulnerable state, that we have a chance of understanding what they say. Common humanity exists in spite of culture and its diferences. A person's nonidentity with the collective allows for subterranean solidarities that have a chance of appealing to universal, moral sentiment, the source today of enthusiasm and hope. It is not through culture, but through the threat of culture's betrayal that consciousness of a common humanity comes to be. The rightful source of Haitian religious practice is the experience of slavery, leading to the insurrection of 1791. The rightful source of universal history, however, is not in the specifically Haitian articulation of that event—even less in its absorption by narratives of the French Revolution. Universality is in the moment of the slaves' self-awareness that the situation was not humanly tolerable, that it marked the betrayal of civilization and the limits of cultural understanding, the nonrational, and nonrationalizable course of human history that outstrips in its inhumanity anything that a cultural outlaw could devise.130 At the same time, we are pushed to the point where Hegel's dialectic of master and slave falls silent. Self-awareness must lead to action, and yet action endangers precisely what is at stake in the idea of universal humanity. The dilemma of the insurgent, then as now, is that violent resistance, apparently justi0ed by moral sentiment, sets the stage for new brutalities that are repugnant to that sentiment, because against the enemy of humanity, every barbarism is allowed. What dialectical understanding, what political struggle will provide liberation from this contradiction?
~5~ The neg may not read utilitarianism or any consequentialist ethical theory as a standard – a) resolvability: 1~ Induction fails—induction assumes that things will always happen the same way in the future as they have in the past. But this begs the question of how we know what happened in the past will happen in the future. Thus, induction is logically fallacious. 2~ Moral cluelessness—consequences are wholly unknowable and any action can lead to a domino effect that has unpredictable bad consequences in the end which means it can't guide action 3~ Infinite consequences—any harm stretches on into the infinite future and makes it impossible to compare harms—results in calculative regress—you have you calculate how much time to spend calculating and so on—destroys decision-making 4~ Aggregation fails—happiness is only happy for you, but not for me, so you can't compare across people—also can't compare 10 headaches to a migraine to the value of friendship b) psychological violence: util and other consequentialist theories justify atrocities such as slavery if it benefits a marginal majority or for hypothetical benefits that might not even materialize
~6~ Presumption and permissibility affirm – a) We always default to assuming something true until proven false, or it would be almost impossible to make any claim at all b) If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral. If I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions which lead to action freeze, it's a practical requirement of action c) Negating an obligation means proving a prohibition of that act, means permissibility affirms because negating is prohibiting the aff action.
~7~ Rejecting humanism is ontologically bankrupt – it creates reliance on the oppressor's epistemic claims and can't explain general theories of oppression.
Harfouch 19 ~Ali S. Harfouch, (Lecturer at the American University of Beirut where he also received his Master of Arts (2017) in Political Studies.) "Hegel, Fanon, And The Problem Of Recognition" In: Frantz Fanon And Emancipatory Social Theory, 9-13-2019, https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004409200/BP000008.xml?language=en, DOA:9-19-2020 WWBW~ Explains oppression generally – i.e. prior to start of k's theory of power Reliance on colonizer for identity absent general theory Something can only be oppressive if it transcends correct order – that requires a moral fw K makes specific ontological/metaphysical presumptions but can't warrant them absent general theory K can't explain distinction between good and bad power There are several reasons why we must take the Hegelian dialectic seriously. First and foremost, the dialectic provides the basis for a general theory of oppression as opposed to the post-colonial theorization of one mode-of-oppression (colonization). That is to say, we can conceptualize the origins and modalities of oppression reducing oppression to colonial oppression. Paradoxically, this reduction of oppression to a singular moment (the colonial trauma) – this inter-subjective relationship (the colonized and the colonizer) becomes the constitutive element in the colonized's self-recognition, one in which the very identity of the colonized is based on a negation (that is to say, a negation of the colonizers' negation).2 Thus, the slave/colonized attains self-recognition vis-à-vis a negation of the master/the colonizer. Otherwise, the "new" man who emerges from the colonial trauma could not have been without the colonizer. To be is to negate, and to negate is to recognize (the colonizer); the "Other" remains "the theme of his action ~the colonized~." As McClintock explains: "post-colonial," despite its critical deconstruction of post-Enlightenment binaries, "re-orients the globe once more around a single, binary opposition: colonial/post-colonial."3 This new colonial/post-colonial and/or colonizer/colonized binary becomes, paradoxically, universalized and comes to serve as the new "master-narrative." At the level of praxis, the colonized/slave is left in a quandary; Post-colonial discourse tells us little of what those occupying Tahrir Square or Wall Street ought to do, or how to proceed? To speak of "strategic essentialism" is to oscillate a thin line between liberational-emancipatory politics on one hand, and pragmatic self-essentialization on another; between liberating the colonized from the confines of identity-politics to recreating an equally problematic identity-politics based fundamentally on a negation. If, as the post-colonialist bemoans; the hegemonic colonial matrices of power are rooted in an exclusionary and racist logic of exploitative capitalism, and that this logic is sustained through the State's omnipresent and all-pervading machinations of power, what is to be done vis-à-vis the State? Perhaps, this is why the reception of the work of Edward Said in the Arab-Muslim world was less prophetic than its reception in Western academia. Furthermore, the post-colonial reading of the Master-Slave dialectic reduces reality to that which is created through the reified inter-subjective relations between the Master and the Slave. It does not, however, tell us about the world outside of this dialectic. It displaces ontology through an elusive latent ontology (the ontology of no ontologies), which replaces questions of metaphysics and ontology with questions relating to power. This is fallacious in that (1) it is blind to its own metaphysics and ontology assumptions; (2) it negates the very same epistemic grounds according to which it can make such assumptions, and (3) it displaces any form of emancipatory praxis-politics by failing to recognize that power, "as a quantum in which less of it is good and more of it is bad: the issue is not the concentration of power, but its accountability."4 As Jason Schulman aptly notes, "a movement that rejects seeking power is ultimately rejecting the possibility of lasting radical change."5 Power can corrupt, it is not intrinsically corrupt – it is merely a capacity that can be used to mediate between the oppressed and the emergence of a "new order," or a capacity that can sustain a subversive order. Power, from this perspective, becomes an instrument for liberation rather than a philosophy of fatalism (à la Foucault). To return to the first two points made above; any normative proposition on what ought-to be is predicated on a consciousness of what-is, i.e. the "natural" order of things, and the extent to which an oppressive reality is not in accordance with what-is.6 To speak of oppression is to speak of the transgression of certain boundaries, and such boundaries cannot escape ontological considerations. In other words, how is it possible for the slave to attain self-recognition, or as Paulo Freire would put it, a critical consciousness, when the consciousness of the slave is determined positively or negatively by the ontological consciousness of the Master? To what extent can the slave step out of the Master-Slave dialectic in his engagement with nature and objects? Otherwise, we must claim that beyond the ontology of the colonizer-master (that is, the imputation of an epistemic perspective onto the world and conflating it with ontology) there is nothingness. The Arabs have a name for such blindness: al-Jahl (ignorance). For the Arabs, Jahl is not only the absence of knowledge, but rather knowledge which is not in accord with reality. But they went a step further: to be ignorant of one's ignorance is Jahl Murakab (compound ignorance/double-ignorance). However, I am not sure the Arabs have a word for a "philosophy" that makes truth-claims on the basis of professed ignorance (the "incredulity with meta-narratives"). We will have more to say about this later on.
~8~ Methodological pluralism is necessary to any sustainable critique – we impact turn your notion of "severance" or "exclusivity".
Bleiker 14 – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, "International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique," International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327) Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a "constellation": an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate "multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing" (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be "checked at the source" and this is how a "critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable" (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to "balance foundationalisms against one another" (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.
~1~ The role of the ballot is to evaluate the truth or falsity of the resolution through a normatively justified framework via fair, safe, and educational arguments. No skep, no tricks, yes phil. Prefer it –
1~ Reciprocity – normative frameworks provide a reciprocal burden of justifying an obligation with the ability to turn them – other frameworks are arbitrarily impact exclusive and don't articulate a 1-1 burden
2~ Philosophy – only our role of the ballot incentivizes nuanced discussions over the interactions of different ethical theories. That comes first –
A~ constitutivism – LD debate is a values debate which means the intrinsic purpose of the activity is philosophical discussion
B~ hijacks any voter – the question of why those are good relies on philosophical justification, ie constitutivism or something.
3~ Collapses – A~ any framing presupposes a motivation to vote one way or another which means all framings concede the validity of normativity B~ Ethics comes prior to logical truth, Peirce 02:
~2~ 1ar theory – if theory is coherent the aff gets it otherwise infinite abuse as it would be impossible to check NC abuse and it's a reciprocity issue.
Competing Interps: Reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention – collapses to CI because it becomes a debate about brightlines. Only applies to aff theory bc time skew. Drop the Debater: Time crunched 1ar makes this uniquely key otherwise the neg can AND prior. Inclusion first is the fallacy of origin – don't apply it.
~3~ Affirming is harder – all theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard because of huge side bias – outweighs neg fairness arguments unless they prove how it uniquely outweighs the disparity since it's structural. Put away your evidence ethics claims, this is from 2021 and the author does endorse substantive compensation for the aff
~4~ The neg may not read utilitarianism or any consequentialist ethical theory as a standard – a) resolvability: 1~ Induction fails—induction assumes that things will always happen the same way in the future as they have in the past. But this begs the question of how we know what happened in the past will happen in the future. Thus, induction is logically fallacious. 2~ Moral cluelessness—consequences are wholly unknowable and any action can lead to a domino effect that has unpredictable bad consequences in the end which means it can't guide action 3~ Infinite consequences—any harm stretches on into the infinite future and makes it impossible to compare harms—results in calculative regress—you have you calculate how much time to spend calculating and so on—destroys decision-making 4~ Aggregation fails—happiness is only happy for you, but not for me, so you can't compare across people—also can't compare 10 headaches to a migraine to the value of friendship b) psychological violence: util and other consequentialist theories justify atrocities such as slavery if it benefits a marginal majority or for hypothetical benefits that might not even materialize
~5~ Presumption and permissibility affirm – a) We always default to assuming something true until proven false, or it would be almost impossible to make any claim at all b) If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral. If I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions which lead to action freeze, it's a practical requirement of action c) Negating an obligation means proving a prohibition of that act, means permissibility affirms because negating is prohibiting the aff action.
~6~ Theory is incoherent: ~a~ The ballot is always determined off abuse and inequalities, otherwise it would be impossible to evaluate the round. ~b~ You can't evaluate theory because it's evaluating off the flow rather than making the decision of which is actually a better norm, so you can't actually be consistent with the voters. ~c~ Theory doesn't produce the best rule since it allows the better theory debater to produce rules that will benefit them. ~d~ Things get proven true in debate rounds all the time that aren't true in the real world, so theory doesn't actually achieve its purpose because it doesn't prove better norms. ~e~ It's a contradiction because you say your voter is either constitutive of or beneficial for a competitive activity, but no competitive activity would establish rules in the middle of a competition. ~f~ Theory sets bad norms because we vote for interps that are marginally better than other interps, rather the best version of the interp, so it doesn't achieve the voter. ~g~ Theory is paradoxical because it attempts to limit arguments but uses arguments to do that, which concedes the validity of arguments in the first place. ~h~ Not jurisdictional because the judge can only vote for someone proving their side of the resolution. The resolution doesn't care about whether we can debate, it just says prove your side, so theory isn't a voter.
~7~ No fairness voter A~ Fairness is relative and impossible to calculate or prove. B~ There is no brightline for how much fairness is enough, so judge intervention is necessary to determine when to pull the trigger. C~ Fairness is impossible. Complete fairness would give both sides the same number of speeches and minutes per speech. So fairness is impossible to achieve. D~ Even if possible, we never know when we have fairness. Fairness is not a tangible concept and cannot be calculated E~ Fairness is uncontrollable because it's influenced by external factors like coaching staff or money for books, so there's no point in discussing fairness because we don't have a fair playing field to begin with.
~8~ No education voter A~ There's no brightline for how much education is enough to vote on B~ Even with a brightline, education is not quantifiable. It's impossible to measure how educational I've been. C~ Running any position is uneducational because I could've run a position that was more educational. Thus everything hurts education, which makes it an unusable voter. D~ Education as a voter destroys any meaning in debate. I could stand up and read 6 minutes out of a history textbook, but that's not a reason to vote me up.
Framing
The meta-ethic is practical reason:
~1~ Regress – any other justification for ethics can have its authority infinitely questioned, but reason is a self-justifying source of authority which solves. Asking why use reasons intrinsically asks for a reason to use reason which concedes reason's authority.
~2~ Collapses – other sources of ethical authority presume a logical system of justification to make them coherent, which means reason functions as a side constraint on other theories and they presuppose the authority of reason.
~3~ Action Theory - any action can be divided into infinite states of affairs—only intent can unify our action into intended means and ends.
That generates an obligation to follow only universalizable laws. Only universal law can be constitutive of agency because it applies to all agents in all instances. A maxim is universalizable if it can be known by all reasoners and applied to all reasoners without causing a contradiction.
Thus the standard is consistency with principles of equal and outer freedom
~1~ Universal reason grants agents the right to freedom because acting on a maxim to coerce produces a conceptual contradiction.
Engstrom ~Stephen Engstrom, (Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Pittsburgh) "Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge" http://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal_Legislation_As_the_Form_of_Practical_Knowledge, DOA:5-5-2018 WWBW~ Given the preceding considerations, it's a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of AND a person's outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.
~2~ Inescapability – the exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.
Wood 07 ~Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 WWBW~ Kant holds that the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is AND is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.
~3~ Value theory – the existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth.
Korsgaard 83 (Christine M., "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as AND -and, in general, to make the highest good our end.
Impact calculus –
1~ Ethics are based on intent, but the state does not have intentions and cannot know the intentions of other agents. Instead, the state acts a procedural mechanism to punish those who violate rights claims. Those rights are derived from the structure of intent.
2~ The state does not have the authority to act to preempt future rights violations, because consequences of action are contingent and cannot be derived from the structure of the maxim on which one acts. Thus, the state does not have the jurisdiction to take them into account.
This means if their theory doesn't provide an account of how the state functions they have no offence on the framing debate.
Prefer additionally –
~1~ Performativity - Truth claims can only be proven by argumentation which contains the axiomatic assumption that freedom is good.
Kinsella 11 ~Stephan Kinsella, (Stephan Kinsella is an attorney in Houston, director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and editor of Libertarian Papers.) "Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide" Mises Institute, 5-27-2011, https://mises.org/library/argumentation-ethics-and-liberty-concise-guide, DOA:5-4-2020~ In setting the stage, Hoppe first observes that the standard natural-rights argument AND goods must be assumed to exist. (TSC, p. 161).
~2~ Frameworks are an evaluative filter that determines what offence is legitimate and it's a topicality interpretation of the word "ought" – thus all framing must be theoretically justified. Prefer mine –
Ought is defined as consistency with the categorical imperative.
Durand 01 Kevin K. J. Durand, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Henderson State University. The Logic of Morality: Georg Henrik von Wright, Immanuel Kant, and the "Ought/Can" Inference. Academic Forum, 2000-2001, http://www.hsu.edu/academicforum/2000-2001/2000-1AFThe20Logic20of20Morality.pdf This passage also serves to clarify Kant's assertion that the moral law depends on the AND able to will that the maxim be necessary for the perfectly rational will.
Prefer my interpretation:
~a~ Research Burdens—questions of universalizability do not require evidence dumps or statistics to access offense because they don't have to do with empirics—only analytics are necessary to access offense. That outweighs to accessibility—other frameworks are structurally inaccessible to small school debaters since they'll never have as much evidence or big enough back files to win card wars.
~b~ Strategic thinking—Kantian offense can be derived purely from reasoning, which allows more innovation from debaters and better in-round strategic thinking—debaters aren't totally reliant on their coach's prep. That outweighs since its portable—thinking on your feet is applicable in every profession.
~c~ Philosophical education—my interpretation allows contestation of the role of the state under the categorical imperative—people have argued that Kant justifies anything from libertarianism to socialism.
Advocacy
Thus I affirm resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.
I'll defend the resolution as a general principle, further specification in the doc. This means potential negative implications of reducing protections for certain drugs doesn't link as that's merely a hypothetical instance of an object protected by IP medicine laws. Counterplans and PICs affirm because they do not disprove the general thesis of my advocacy.
All hyper linked and from Merriam Webster unless otherwise noted - "Member" is defined as: part of a whole "Nations" is defined as: a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government "Of" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate origin or derivation "The" is defined as: used as a function word before a singular noun to indicate that the noun is to be understood generically "World Trade Organization" is: An international body founded in 1995 to promote international trade and economic development by reducing tariffs and other restrictions. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "To" is defined as: used to indicate that the following verb is in the infinitive form "Reduce" is defined as: to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number "Intellectual Property" is defined as: A work or invention that is the result of creativity, such as a manuscript or a design, to which one has rights and for which one may apply for a patent, copyright, trademark, etc. (Lexico, a dictionary provided by Oxford) "Protections" is defined as: The act of protecting : the state of being protected (Merriam Webster Legal Dictionary) "For" is defined as: used as a function word to indicate the object or recipient of a perception, desire, or activity "Medicines" is defined as: a substance or preparation used in treating disease
Offence
There is a distinction between personal rights and property rights – property rights govern material objects that can be appropriated and stolen, however personal rights concern intangible concepts such as ideas and speeches. Thus it is a contradiction to attribute property rights to ideas as an idea can be accessible by all without resource constraints. And even the most stringent property rights allow for copying and modification of a legitimate purchase as a function of the new owner's property rights so it's a freedom violation to restrict doing so. And intellectual property rights actively suppress the freedom of speech, which is necessary for agents to actualize their wills.
Pievatolo 10 Pievatolo, Maria. "Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?" Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?, 7 Feb. 2010, bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html. WWEY, altered for glang In the Metaphysik der Sitten, we can find a clear distinction between ius reale and ius personale. The ius reale or ius in re is a right on things. 14 The ius personale is defined as the «possession of another's choice ~Willkür~, in the sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed». 15 In other words, it is a right entitling someone to obtain acts from other persons. As moral subjectivity involves freedom, personal rights cannot be established without the concerned persons' consent. According to Kant, the ius reale cannot be applied to ideas, or, better, to thoughts, because they can be conceived by everyone at the same time, without depriving their authors. Surprising as it may seem, the ius reale protects the freedom to copy, if it is taken seriously. If a thing has been purchased in a legal transaction and the purchasers copy it by their own means, they are simply working on their legitimate private property. For the very principle of private property, it is not fair to restrain the ways in which its legitimate purchaser may use it. For this reason, no ius reale can be opposed to the reprinter. If we see the book as a material thing, whoever buys it has the right to reproduce it: after all, it is his book. Furthermore, in Kant's opinion, we cannot derive any affirmative personal obligation from a ius reale: 16 a ius personale on someone cannot be claimed by simply purchasing some related things without obtaining his or her expressed consent. Kant, by conceiving the book as an action, adopts a strategy based on the ius personale only. By using such a strategy, he concludes that the unauthorized printer has to be compared to an unauthorized spokesperson rather than to a thief. Therefore, it is not necessary to go beyond the Roman law tradition, by inventing a new ius reale on immaterial things. Kant's argument goes as follows: when I speak to a public, I engage a relationship with them. The book may be viewed as a medium through which authors can transmit their speeches to a wider public. In the age of printing, such a medium used to be provided by publishers. Thus publishers can be considered as spokespersons who speak in the name of the authors. But, as such, they need the authors' authorization. 17 Why? Because to speak in the name of another without his authorization is like engaging him in a relationship without his consent. As personal rights, according to Kant, concern relations among free beings, they can arise only from expressed agreements. Hence, the unauthorized printer is like an unauthorized spokesperson, who produces a relation of the author with the public without being entitled to do it. However, the scope of Kant's justification of copyright is very narrow: it applies only to the publishing of texts, it does not touch th so-called derivative works, and it is justified only as far as it helps the public to get the texts. Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 3 Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke or opera, i.e. things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or operae, i.e. actions. As the works of art are simply physical objects, we can derive from Kant's assumption that every legitimate purchaser may reproduce them and may donate or sell the copies to others. 18 Every time an object can be treated only as a product, its legitimate owner may do what he wants with it, because of his ius reale, which has to be taken seriously on both sides. Moreover, as the injustice of reprinting books depends on their communication to the public, we can deduce that their reproduction for personal use is not to be forbidden. As regards as the derivative works, Kant states that, if one shortens, augments, retouches or translates the book of another, ~they~ produces a new speech, although the thoughts can be the same Therefore, such works cannot be seen as Nachdruck and are perfectly lawful. 19 In other words,in a Kantian environment, everyone may become a "wreader" - a reader and writer at the same time - without being hindered by copyright restrictions The goal of the transaction between the author and the publisher is conveying his text to the public. The public has a right to interact with the author, if the latter has chosen to do it. According to Kant, the publisher may neither refuse to publish – or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it himself – a text of a dead author, nor release mutilated 20 or spurious works, nor print only a limited impression that does not meet the demand. If the publisher does not comply, the public has the right to force him to publish. 21 In a Kantian environment the publisher's rights are justified only when they help authors to reach the public. Copyright should be neither censorship nor monopoly. In the 1785 essay Kant stated that the mandate of an author to a publisher should be exclusive 22 because the publisher becomes willing to publish a book only if he is certain to earn something from it; therefore, he is interested in avoiding competition. But later, in the Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant does not mention the exclusivity requirement at all, perhaps because he has realized that it was based on an empirical contamination, depending on the current state of technology. In Kant's world the press used to be the medium that provided for the widest distribution of ideas. Printing required both specific tools and skills, and specialized and centralized organizations. And as long as the publishers of printed texts provided the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, Kant was inclined to bow to their interest. However, from a conceptual perspective, there is no reason to deny that an author should be entitled to authorize everyone to distribute his work to everyone else, just like a person may hire more than one spokesperson. Such a practice is now fairly usual on the Internet, when authors choose a Creative Commons License and grant the right to publish their works to everyone, because they are interested in the widest possible spreading of their ideas. In Kant's times such a strategy would hardly be paying because the major publication technology, the press, was not cheap and easy like the digital reproduction of texts, but difficult and expensive. Kant's thesis is based on the technical assumption that publishing requires an intermediation - just as it used to be in the age of print -, which is lawful only it has the author's consent. Where the intermediation is not necessary any longer, where no one is speaking in the name of another, copyright makes no sense. 23 3. A term of comparison: Fichte's theory of intellectual property In 1793 the Berlinische Monatschrift published a short essay, Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable, 24 written by Fichte two years ago. The essay connects originality to intellectual property and advocates the enforcing of the latter by means of criminal sanctions. It is worth mentioning the Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 4 final parable by means of which Fichte illustrates his thesis, because it contains in itself all our commonplaces on intellectual property. In the time of the Caliph Harun al Rashid, an alchemist used to prepare a beneficial drug and to entrust the commercial side of the business to a merchant who was the sole distributor throughout the land and who earned a goodly profit by his monopoly. Another medicine merchant stole the drug from the monopolist and started to sell it at a cheaper price. The latter brought him before the Caliph. The former pleaded for his case by arguing that his selling the drug for a cheaper price was useful to the sick persons and to the society at large. What was the judgment of the Caliph? «He had the useful man hanged». 25 To be accurate, the medicine merchant of the parable had not copied the drug, but had materially stolen it. Fichte suggested that copying is like stealing. In the 18th century, however, Fichte had to demonstrate the commonplace of today. According to Fichte, we can distinguish two aspects of a book: 1. its physical aspect (das körperliche), i.e. the printed paper 2. its ideational aspect (das geistige) The ideational aspect of a book is in turn divisible into: a. a material aspect, i.e. the ideas the book presents; b. the form of these ideas, i. e. the way in which they are presented. All the aspects of a book, except one, can be appropriated by anybody: we can buy the printed paper and assimilate the ideas it conveys. We cannot, however, appropriate its form, because it is strictly personal. And, according to Fichte, it is self-evident that «we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible». 26 As the form can be only mine, the author is the proprietor of his text and his authorized publisher is its usufructuary. However sophistical this shift from originality to property may seem, it is not the only seminal element of our commonplaces on copyright contained in Fichte's essay. It is also worth remarking that in the Harun al Rashid parable the alchemist - the author - transfer his rights and disappears from the scene; the most powerful interests are these of a monopolist - the publisher -; only the other medicine merchant - the pirate - pleads for the interests of the public, but his arguments are rejected as criminal; as regards as the Caliph - the government -, he bows to the monopolist's interests without saying a word; and, last but not least, the criminal sanction for piracy - capital punishment - is out of all proportion. The young Fichte believed that his ideas on authors' right were similar to the ones of Kant. 27 However, there are at least three outstanding differences between Kant and Fichte: Fichte bases copyright on the individual originality in the form of expression; 28 Kant does not mention originality at all; 1. Fichte equates copyright with private property; 29 Kant rejects the very possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale; 2. Fichte thinks that copyright violators deserve the same harsh punishment of thieves. 30 According to Kant, the unauthorized printer should simply compensate all the damages he caused to the author or to his authorized publisher. 31 3. While Fichte is an intellectual property endorser, Kant is an "enlightened" conservative who supports the Roman law tradition, against the propertization trend. He accepts the copyright principle, according to which Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 5 authors are entitled to decide how to publish their works. The rights of the publishers, however, are justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public, while the personal use of the texts and the so-called "wreading" should remain free. And, above all, all that can be viewed as a product is, in his opinion, outside the scope of copyright and may be copied without restrictions. What is, in any, the philosophical meaning of Kant's "conservatism"? To answer such a question, we need to link his ideas on authors' right to his general theory of property, as it is explained in the Metaphysics of Morals. 4. What is a thing? In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of real rights are only corporeal entities or res corporales: «Sache ist ein Ding, was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches selbst der Freiheit ermangelt, heiß daher Sache (res corporalis)». 32 Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate to incorporeal things as well. According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished from its sensible possession. Something external would be rightfully mine «only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even though I am not in possession of it» (AA.06 245:13-16). The rightful possession is an intelligible, not sensible, relation. I can claim that my bicycle is mine only if I am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the backyard. Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property as explained in his 1793 essay, according to which we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author to claim a rightful property on his work. Is it really so obvious that originality implies property? Property is a comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all the time over the use of material objects. It is so comfortable just because it is physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property when something cannot be separated from someone. I say both that my fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But these two "mine" have a different meaning: the former is the "mine" of attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property. The former can be used to identify someone, and conveys the historical circumstance that something is related exclusively to someone; the latter points only to an accidental relation with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. It is possible to lie on a historical circumstance, by plagiarizing a text, i.e. by attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no one can "steal" the historical connection between "my" writing style and me: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if Fichte's principle were the only justification of property right, it would undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations. Although he defines things as res corporales, Kant determines the rightful possession of a thing as a possession without detentio, by ignoring all its sensible facets. Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - is exerted on an object that is "merely distinct from me", regardless of its position in space and time. Space and time, indeed, are sensible determinations and should be left out of consideration. According to the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a permissive law of reason: 33 if a rightful possession were not possible, every object would be a res nullius and nobody would be Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property? 6 entitled to use it. Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res corporales. Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (AA.6, 249:5-7). If property is a merely intelligible relation with an object that is simply distinct from the subject, we have no reason to deny that such an object might be immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property. Why, then, does Kant refrain from using the very concept of it? According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of personal rights. A person who is speaking to the people is engaging a relationship with them; if someone else engages such a relationship in his name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with property: he is only an agent without authority. Speeches, by Kant, cannot be separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised land of intellectual property without entering it. According to Kant, before the acquired rights, everyone has a moral capacity for putting others under obligation that he calls innate right or internal meum vel tuum (AA.06, 237:24-25). The innate right is only one: freedom as independence from being constrained by another's choice, insofar it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity: in other words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the very possibility condition of law. Freedom implies innate equality, «that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone, and finally his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it - such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them.» (AA.06, 237-238) 34 In spite of his intellectual theory of property, 35 Kant does not enter in the realm of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without suppressing freedom itself. If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to mix copyright protection and censorship. 36 Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used. We cannot, however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from speeches would be like excluding them from freedom. Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the scope of copyright to publishing, or, better, to the publishing of the age of print: the Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without the author's permission and distributes its copies to the public. If someone copies a book for his personal use, or lets others do it, or translates and elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone. Kant does not stick to the Roman Law tradition because of conservatism, but because of Enlightenment.
IPP is nonuniversalizable – universalizing the act of restricting the production of a certain medicine terminates in a contradiction because it entails that you restrict your own ability to produce the medicine