1ac- racialized medicine 1nc- kant case 1ar- all 2nr- all 2ar- all
Mid America Cup
4
Opponent: Harker NA | Judge: Sam Anderson
1ac- trade secrets 1nc- T-WTO theory kant case 1ar- all 2nr- kant 2ar- case
NSD
4
Opponent: Daniel Ma | Judge: Matt Moorhead
1ac- stock 1n- espec psycho case 1ar- afc case 2n- spec afc 2ar- afc
NSD
1
Opponent: David Huang | Judge: Srey Das
ac kant nc spec k case 1ar theory all 2nr all 2ar theory
Yale
1
Opponent: Unionville MG | Judge: Katy Senner
lay
Yale
6
Opponent: La Salle TP | Judge: Abishek Stanley
1ac- stock 1nc- kant innovation case 1ar- all 2nr- kant 2ar- case
Yale
3
Opponent: Princeton CB | Judge: David Herrera
1ac- evergreening 1nc- spec medicines kant case 1ar- all 2nr- kant 2ar- case
To modify or delete round reports, edit the associated round.
Cites
Entry
Date
0 - Contact Info
Tournament: na | Round: Finals | Opponent: na | Judge: na Hey, I'm Olivia! she/her
fb: Olivia Liu (pls friend request me first) email: olivialiu82@gmail.com Contact me before round if you want me to disclose in any specific way
I will try to provide any content warnings. Let me know before round if you have any specific triggers.
9/25/21
0 - Navigation
Tournament: na | Round: Quads | Opponent: na | Judge: na G - Generics NSD - camp SO - September/October ND - November/December JF - January/February
9/25/21
NSD - Theory - Espec
Tournament: NSD | Round: 1 | Opponent: David Huang | Judge: Srey Das
Interpretation: Debaters must specify how they enforce the unconditional right of workers to strike.
Violation: you didn’t’
1~ Topic lit – enforcement is the core question of the topic and there's no consensus on normal means so you must spec- also proves this specific interp isn’t infinitely regressive bc it is grounded in topic lit Weiss
to which bargaining is required over the decisions themselves have been hotly contested.
This acts as a resolvability standard. Debate has to make sense and be comparable for the judge to make a decision which means it's an independent voter and outweighs.
2~ Stable advocacy – 1AR clarification delinks neg positions that prove why enforcement in a certain instance is bad by saying it isn't their method of enforcement – wrecks neg ballot access and kills in depth clash – CX doesn't check since it kills 1NC construction pre-round since I don't know advocacy till in round, and judges do not flow cross ex so its not verifiable.
3~ Prep skew – I don't know what they will be willing to clarify until CX which means I could go 6 minutes planning to read a disad and then get screwed over in CX when they spec something else.
Fairness is a voter because a) gateway issue- the judge needs to evaluate the better debater b) controls internal link to other voters
Drop the debater to deter future abuse, dta is incoherent
No RVIs 1) its illogical you don’t win by proving that you’re fair – logic is a litmus test for args 2) encourages theory baiting where good theory debaters bait the RVI to win 3) creates a chilling effect – aff is uniquely dangerous on theory because they get to read a long counterinterp in the 1ar and then get the 2ar collapse: negs would always be disincentives from reading theory which leads to infinite abuse
Use competing interps it creates a race to the top where we set the best norms
9/26/21
SO - DA - Innovation
Tournament: Yale | Round: 6 | Opponent: La Salle TP | Judge: Abishek Stanley intellectual property protections are fundamental to motivating companies to take the risk to make new drugs. The research and development of new drugs takes billions of dollars and a huge time investment only for the smallest fraction of these drugs to make it to market. Intellectual property protection is necessary to motivate companies to endure this process. Grabowski 15 (Henry, Professor of Economics, member of the faculty for the Health Sector Management Program, and Director of the Program in Pharmaceuticals and Health Economics at Duke University) “The Roles of Patents and Research And Development Incentives In Biopharmaceutical Innovation,” Health Affairs, 2/2015 JL
The essential rationale for patent protection for biopharmaceuticals is that long-term benefits in the form of continued future innovation by pioneer or brand-name drug manufacturers outweigh the relatively short-term restrictions on imitative cost competition associated with market exclusivity. Regardless, the entry of other branded agents remains an important source of therapeutic competition during the patent term. Several economic characteristics make patents and intellectual property protection is particularly important to innovation incentives for the biopharmaceutical industry. 5 The RandD process often takes more than a decade to complete, and according to a recent analysis by Joseph DiMasi and colleagues, per new drug approval (including failed attempts), it involves more than a billion dollars in out-of-pocket costs. 6 Only approximately one in eight drug candidates survive clinical testing. As a result of the high risks of failure and the high costs, research and development must be funded by the few successful, on-market products (the top quintile of marketed products provide the dominant share of RandD returns). 7,8 Once a new drug’s patent term and any regulatory exclusivity provisions have expiresd, competing manufacturers are allowed to sell generic equivalents that require the investment of only several million dollars and that have a high likelihood of commercial success. Absent intellectual property protections that allow marketing exclusivity, innovative firms would be unlikely to make the costly and risky investments needed to bring a new drug to market. Patents confer the right to exclude competitors for a limited time within a given scope, as defined by patent claims. However, they do not guarantee demand, nor do they prevent competition from nonidentical drugs that treat the same diseases and fall outside the protection of the patents. New products may enter the same therapeutic class with common mechanisms of action but different molecular structures (for example, different statins) or with differing mechanisms of action (such as calcium channel blockers and angiotensin receptor blockers). 9 Joseph DiMasi and Laura Faden have found that the time between a first-in-class new drug and subsequent new drugs in the same therapeutic class has been dramatically reduced, from a median of 10.2 years in the 1970s to 2.5 years in the early 2000s. 10 Drugs in the same class compete through quality and price for preferred placement on drug formularies and physicians’ choices for patient treatment. Patents play an essential role in the economic “ecosystem” of discovery and investment that has developed since the 1980s. Hundreds of start-up firms, often backed by venture capital, have been launched, and a robust innovation market has emerged. 11 The value of these development-stage firms is largely determined by their proprietary technologies and the candidate drugs they have in development. As a result, the strength of intellectual property protection plays a key role in funding and partnership opportunities for such firms. b a statistical analysis of multiple studies confirms that intellectual property protections are key to productive research and development. We warrant exactly how patent rights have a direct relationship to research and development. Cory ‘19 Stephen Ezell, vice president and global innovation policy @ ITIF, BS Georgetown School of Foreign Service. Nigel Cory, associate director covering trade policy @ ITIF, MA public policy @ Georgetown. "The Way Forward for Intellectual Property Internationally," Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 4-25-2019, accessed 8-25-2021, https://itif.org/publications/2019/04/25/way-forward-intellectual-property-internationally HWIC IPRs Strengthen Innovation Intellectual property rights power innovation. For instance, analyzing the level of intellectual property protections (via the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness reports) and creative outputs (via the Global Innovation Index) shows that counties with stronger IP protection have more creative outputs (in terms of intangible assets and creative goods and services in a nation’s media, printing and publishing, and entertainment industries, including online), even at varying levels of development.46 IPR reforms also introduce strong incentives for domestic innovation. Sherwood, using case studies from 18 developing countries, concluded that poor provision of intellectual property rights deters local innovation and risk-taking.47 In contrast, IPR reform has been associated with increased innovative activity, as measured by domestic patent filings, albeit with some variation across countries and sectors.48 For example, Ryan, in a study of biomedical innovations and patent reform in Brazil, found that patents provided incentives for innovation investments and facilitated the functioning of technology markets.49 Park and Lippoldt also observed that the provision of adequate protection for IPRs can help to stimulate local innovation, in some cases building on the transfer of technologies that provide inputs and spillovers.50 In other words, local innovators are introduced to technologies first through the technology transfer that takes place in an environment wherein protection of IPRs is assured; then, they may build on those ideas to create an evolved product or develop alternate approaches (i.e., to innovate). Related research finds that trade in technology—through channels including imports, foreign direct investment, and technology licensing—improves the quality of developing-country innovation by increasing the pool of ideas and efficiency of innovation by encouraging the division of innovative labor and specialization.51 However, Maskus notes that without protection from potential abuse of their newly developed technologies, foreign enterprises may be less willing to reveal technical information associated with their innovations.52 The protection of patents and trade secrets provides necessary legal assurances for firms wishing to reveal proprietary characteristics of technologies to subsidiaries and licensees via contracts. Counties with stronger IP protection have more creative outputs (in terms of intangible assets and creative goods and services in a nation’s media, printing and publishing, and entertainment industries, including online), even at varying levels of development. The relationship between IPR rights and innovation can also be seen in studies of how the introduction of stronger IPR laws, with regard to patents, copyrights, and trademarks, affect RandD activity in an economy. Studies by Varsakelis and by Kanwar and Evenson found that RandD to GDP ratios are positively related to the strength of patent rights, and are conditional on other factors.53 Cavazos Cepeda et al. found a positive influence of IPRs on the level of RandD in an economy, with each 1 percent increase in the level of protection of IPRs in an economy (as measured by improvements to a country’s score in the Patent Rights Index) equating to, on average, a 0.7 percent increase in the domestic level of RandD.54 Likewise, a 1 percent increase in copyright protection was associated with a 3.3 percent increase in domestic RandD. Similarly, when trademark protection increased by 1 percent, there was an associated RandD increase of 1.4 percent. As the authors concluded, “Increases in the protection of the IPRs carried economic benefits in the form of higher inflows of FDI, and increases in the levels of both domestically conducted RandD and service imports as measured by licensing fees.”55 As Jackson summarized, regarding the relationship between IPR reform and both innovation and RandD, and FDI, “In addition to spurring domestic innovation, strong intellectual property rights can increase incentives for foreign direct investment which in turn also leads to economic growth.”56 Innovation is crucial 1. Increasing accessibility of medicines around the world and increase their effectiveness 2. to respond to future health crises 3. increasing life expectancy for diseases without treatments yet ow on timeframe, scope and magnitude Jenner ’16 Jenner, Andrew. “Value of Innovation.” IFPMA, IFPMA, 23 Feb. 2016, www.ifpma.org/subtopics/value-of-innovation/. Many lower and middle-income countries are making important investment in developing their healthcare infrastructure as part of their commitment to achieving Universal Health Coverage. Increasing access to new medicines and vaccines can help sustain such investment by reducing the need for costly surgical interventions and hospitalization. In many cases, the use of innovative medicines by health systems can pay for themselves several times over. One study found that a reduction in the age of drugs used reduces non-drug spending 7.2 times as much as it increases drug expediture, with most of the savings coming from reduced hospitalization and physician office-visit expenditures. Vaccines, for instance, have proven to be one of the most effective preventative technologies in the fight against infectious diseases with an almost unparalleled impact on public health, saving the lives of over 2.5 million children each year. Estimates show that increasing access to six vaccines (including new vaccines for rotavirus and malaria) could save USD 6.2 billion in treatment costs globally. Increased productivity due to averted illness could gain the world an additional $145bn. The upfront cost of procuring vaccines is dwarfed by these benefits. In addition to these economic benefits, the innovation we bring along has transformed the lives of millions of patients all over the world. For instance, improvements in existing cancer treatments have cut annual death rates by half in the United States. High cholesterol and other heart diseases, which required extensive treatment in the 1970s, can now be easily managed with oral therapy. Our industry has played a crucial role in researching and developing the medicines that have contributed to this. The mission of the life sciences industry – in New Jersey, across the United States and around the world – is as ambitious as it is straightforward: to research and develop new medicines, therapies, medical devices, technologies and diagnostics to detect, treat and cure disease and improve the quality of life for patients. Driven to improve global human health, for more than 100 years, the life sciences industry – which includes biopharmaceutical, biotechnology and medical technology, device and diagnostics companies – has helped people live longer, more productive and fulfilling lives. Medical innovation has consistently responded to the challenge in times of crisis and is currently at the forefront of the battle against the COVID-19 pandemic as it has been through so many other health emergencies. Discovering and developing new medicines, therapies, medical devices and technologies is a complex, time-consuming, expensive and risk-laden process that life sciences companies willingly undertake, spending more than $100 billion annually in search of alleviating human suffering. The societal value of new medical innovation lies not only in improving human health, but in doing so in a cost-effective manner that brings efficiency to the delivery of health care. When medical breakthroughs can cure a disease rather than requiring an organ transplant, or when chemotherapy can be administered orally rather than by infusion, the patient, the health care system and the economy all benefit. MEDICAL INNOVATION: EXTENDING LIFE – SAVING LIVES Collectively, new therapies have been among the greatest contributors to increased life expectancy over the past century. U.S. life expectancy at birth has risen from 47 years at the turn of the 20th century to 78 years today. New therapies accounted for 73 percent of the increased life expectancy in 30 developing and high-income countries between 2000-09. U.S. cancer survivorship alone has more than tripled since 1970, with nearly 16.9 million cancer survivors alive in the country as of January 1, 2019. This number is expected to increase to 22.2 million by 2030. As of 2018, the cancer death rate for men and women combined had fallen 31 percent from its peak in 1991. This decline translates to 3.2 million deaths avoided. Biopharmaceutical innovation, through improvements in treatment, has contributed to 76 percent of the improvements in mortality rates for HIV/AIDS patients and 60 percent of improvements in life expectancy for breast cancer patients. Heart disease mortality has been improved by 52 percent due to advancements in medicines. MEDICAL INNOVATION’S ADDED VALUE – COST SAVINGS AND ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY In addition to improving patient outcomes, medical innovation offers other, often underappreciated benefits – reducing costs in the health care system and increasing economic productivity. With new technologies and therapies that can detect and treat a disease earlier in its onset, and medicines to manage chronic disease, the cost of health care can be significantly reduced. Less than 10 cents of the U.S. health care dollar was spent on prescription medicines in 2019. This percentage has remained unchanged since the 1960’s. In 2013, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) started to incorporate the savings from prescription medicines into the cost of Medicare policies. For every 1 percent increase in the number of prescriptions, the CBO incorporates a 0.2 percent decrease in spending on medical services. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, improved medication adherence can save $100-$300 billion annually in direct health care costs. Between 1980 and 2010, advanced medical technology helped cut the number of days patients spent in hospitals by 58 percent. Treating people with chronic disease (e.g., heart disease, stroke, cancer, diabetes, obesity, arthritis) (about half of all U.S. adults) accounts for 86 percent of our nation’s health care costs. By investing in prevention and treatment of the most common chronic diseases, the cost of treatment in the U.S. could decrease by $218 billion per year, and the impact of disease on the economy would be reduced by $1.1 trillion annually. MEDICATION ADHERENCE – KEY TO IMPROVED OUTCOMES AND REDUCING HEALTH CARE COSTS Medication adherence is a critical factor in improving patient outcomes and bringing efficiency and cost savings to the health care system. Of the approximately 187 million Americans who take one or more prescription medications, it is estimated that up to one-half do not take their medications as prescribed, with more than 1 in 5 new prescriptions not being filled. Non-adherence in the U.S. is estimated to result in approximately 125,000 deaths and at least 10 percent of hospitalizations. Medication non-adherence costs the U.S. roughly $330 billion annually in unnecessary medical expenses, as estimated by Express Scripts in 2015. An extra $1 spent on medicines for adherent patients with congestive heart failure, high blood pressure, diabetes and high cholesterol can generate $3-$10 in savings on emergency room visits and inpatient hospitalizations. Adherence to medications for congestive heart failure could result in $22.4 billion saved in the U.S. over a 10-year period. Nearly 1 million hospitalizations could be avoided with better adherence to, and treatment with, hypertensive medicines. LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT – RESOURCES AND RISK IN SEARCH OF THE NEXT TREATMENT Thousands of scientists go to their labs every day in search of the next treatment, therapy or technology to improve human health and alleviate the suffering of patients. With the odds heavily against success, life sciences companies invest billions of dollars annually to support the work of these dedicated scientists in their quest to discover the next medical breakthrough. America’s biopharmaceutical industry in total invested $102 billion in U.S. research and development in 2018. The biopharmaceutical industry is responsible for 17 percent of RandD spending by U.S. businesses, the single largest share of any industry. 91 percent of drugs are developed by the private sector with no direct government role. On average, it costs $2.6 billion and takes 10-15 years to discover, develop and bring a new medicine to market. Only 5 of 5,000 compounds that enter preclinical testing will enter a clinical trial, and only one will be commercialized. Only 12 percent of new molecular entities that enter clinical trials eventually receive FDA approval. Only 2 of 10 new medicines that come to market will be deemed a commercial success – meaning they will produce revenues that exceed the average RandD cost. More than 7,000 medicines currently are in development around the world for cancer, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, HIV/AIDS, immunological disorders, infectious disease and other disease states. Of these 7,000 treatments, 70 percent are potential first-in-class therapies, meaning they use a completely new approach to fighting disease.
9/25/21
SO - Kant
Tournament: Yale | Round: 3 | Opponent: Princeton CB | Judge: David Herrera Permissibility and presumption negate – a the resolution indicates the aff has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation b Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false.
Ethics must be derived from the constitutive features of agents – ethics based internally fail because they can’t generate universal obligations and ethics based externally fail because they are nonbinding as agents could opt-out which means they fail to guide action. 1)Empiricism could also change, meaning external fw are arbitrary. 2)past experiences have no effect on causality or internal link to continuity, i.e. raining yesterday doesn’t mean rain today. 3)Is/Ought Gap – experience just describes how the world is but doesn’t indicate how it ought to be which means there must be an a priori conception of good 4)Transcendental idealism – what we see is not what is, but our representations of reality – only a priori knowledge is a lane to truth as perception is the lane to truth insofar as a lack of the subject removes material constitution and abstracts sensibility as it is then unknown.
Constitutivism solves – it allows for universal obligations among all agents but they are binding and cannot be opted out of.
Next, only practical reason is constitutive: 1 Regress – to question why one should reason concedes its authority since it is an act of reasoning itself which proves it’s binding and inescapable That means we must universally will maxims— any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends. Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative. Prefer additionally: 1 Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place 2 Consequentialism fails - a induction fails: the logic of looking into the past to predict the future is predicated on past experiences, meaning it’s circular, b butterfly effect: every consequence is infinitely cascading so we don’t know the true extent of our actions, meaning we cannot predict consequences 3 A posteriori ethics fail: a Problem of induction Vickers 14, John Vickers, 2014, The Problem of Induction, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/ The original problem of induction can be simply put. It concerns the support or justification of inductive methods; methods that predict or infer, in Hume's words, that “instances of which we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience” (THN, 89). Such methods are clearly essential in scientific reasoning as well as in the conduct of our everyday affairs. The problem is how to support or justify them and it leads to a dilemma: the principle cannot be proved deductively, for it is contingent, and only necessary truths can be proved deductively. Nor can it be supported inductively—by arguing that it has always or usually been reliable in the past—for that would beg the question by assuming just what is to be proved. b Is/Ought Gap – experience just describes how the world is but doesn’t indicate how it ought to be which means there must be an a priori conception of good c Inability to know each other’s experience makes it an unreliable basis for ethics because different experiences bring different concepts of truth – only a priori ethics solve since a priori truths are accessible to all agents
negate 1 Intellectual property is an inalienable personal right of economic use Pozzo 6 Pozzo, Riccardo. “Immanuel Kant on Intellectual Property.” Trans/Form/Ação, vol. 29, no. 2, 2006, pp. 11–18., doi:10.1590/s0101-31732006000200002. SJDA recut SJKS recut Cookie JX Corpus mysticum, opus mysticum, propriété incorporelle, proprietà letteraria, geistiges Eigentum. All these terms mean intellectual property, the existence of which is intuitively clear because of the unbreakable bond that ties the work to its creator. The book belongs to whomever has written it, the picture to whomever has painted it, the sculpture to whomever has sculpted it; and this independently from the number of exemplars of the book or of the work of art in their passages from owner to owner. The initial bond cannot change and it ensures the author authority on the work. Kant writes in section 31/II of the Metaphysics of Morals: “Why does unauthorized publishing, which strikes one even at first glance as unjust, still have an appearance of being rightful? Because on the one hand a book is a corporeal artifact (opus mechanicum) that can be reproduced (by someone in legitimate possession of a copy of it), so that there is a right to a thing with regard to it. On the other hand a book is also a mere discourse of the publisher to the public, which the publisher may not repeat publicly without having a mandate from the author to do so (praestatio operae), and this is a right against a person. The error consists in mistaking one of these rights for the other” (Kant, 1902, t.6, p.290). The corpus mysticum, the work considered as an immaterial good, remains property of the author on behalf of the original right of its creation. The corpus mechanicum consists of the exemplars of the book or of the work of art. It becomes the property of whoever has bought the material object in which the work has been reproduced or expressed. Seneca points out in De beneficiis (VII, 6) the difference between owning a thing and owning its use. He tells us that the bookseller Dorus had the habit of calling Cicero’s books his own, while there are people who claim books their own because they have written them and other people that do the same because they have bought them. Seneca concludes that the books can be correctly said to belong to both, for it is true they belong to both, but in a different way The peculiarity of intellectual property consists thus first in being indeed a property, but property of an action; and second in being indeed inalienable, but also transferable in commission and license to a publisher. The bond the author has on his work confers him a moral right that is indeed a personal right. It is also a right to exploit economically his work in all possible ways, a right of economic use, which is a patrimonial right. Kant and Fichte argued that moral right and the right of economic use are strictly connected, and that the offense to one implies inevitably offense to the other. In eighteenth-century Germany, the free use came into discussion among the presuppositions of a democratic renewal of state and society. In his Supplement to the Consideration of Publishing and Its Rights, Reimarus asked writers “instead of writing for the aristocracy, to write for the tiers état of the reader’s world.” (Reimarus, 1791b, p.595). He saluted with enthusiasm the claim of disenfranchising from the monopoly of English publishers expressed in the American Act for the Encouragement of Learning of May 31, 1790. Kant, however, was firm in embracing intellectual property. Referring himself to Roman Law, he asked for its legislative formulation not only as patrimonial right, but also as a personal right. In Of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing, he considered the moral faculties related to intellectual property as an “inalienable right (ius personalissimum) always himself to speak through anyone else, the right, that is, that no one may deliver the same speech to the public other than in his (the author’s) name” (Kant, 1902, t.8, p.85). Fichte went farther in the Demonstration of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing. He saw intellectual property as a part of his metaphysical construction of intellectual activity, which was based on the principle that thoughts “are not transmitted hand to hand, they are not paid with shining cash, neither are they transmitted to us if we take home the book that contains them and put it into our library. In order to make those thoughts our own an action is still missing: we must read the book, meditate – provided it is not completely trivial – on its content, consider it under different aspects and eventually accept it within our connections of ideas” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). At the center of the discussion was the practice of reprinting books in a pirate edition after having them reset word after words after an exemplar of the original edition. Given Germany’s division in a myriad of small states, the imperial privilege was ineffective against pirate publishing. Kant and Fichte spoke for the acceptance of the right to defend the work of an author by the usurpations of others so that he may receive a patrimonial advantage from those who utilize the work acquiring new knowledge and/or an aesthetic experience. In particular, Fichte declared the absolute primacy of the moral faculties within the corpus mysticum. He divided the latter into a formal and a material part. “This intellectual element must be divided anew into what is material, the content of the book, the thoughts it presents; and the form of these thoughts, the manner in which, the connection in which, the formulations and the words by means of which the book presents them” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). Fichte’s underlining the author’s exclusive right to the intellectual content of his book – “the appropriation of which through another is physically impossible” (ibid.) – brought him to the extreme of prohibiting any form of copy that is not meant for personal use. In Publishing Considered anew, Reimarus considered on the contrary copyright in its patrimonial aspects as a limitation to free trade: “What would not happen were a universal protection against pirate publishing guaranteed? Monopoly and safer sales certainly do not procure convenient price; on the contrary, they are at the origin of great abuses. The only condition for convenient price is free-trade, and one cannot help noticing that upon the appearance of a private edition, publishers are forced to substantially lower the price of a book” (Reimarus, 1791a, pp.402-3). Reimarus admitted of being unable to argue in terms of justice. Justice was of no bearing, he said, for whom, like himself, considered undemonstrated the author’s permanent property of his work (herein supported by the legislative vacuum of those years). What mattered, he said, was equity. In sum, Reimarus anticipated today’s stance on free use by referring to the principle that public interest on knowledge ought to prevail on the author’s interest and to balance the copyright. Moreover, Reimarus extended his argument beyond the realm of literary production to embrace, among others, the today vital issue of pharmaceutical production on patented receipts. “Let us suppose that at some place a detailed description for the preparation of a good medicine or of any other useful thing be published, why may not somebody who lives in places that are far away from that one copy it to use it for his own profit and but must instead ask the original publisher for the issue of each exemplar?” (Reimarus, 1791b, t.2, pp.584). To sum up, Reimarus’s stance does not seem respondent to rule of law. For in all dubious case the general rule ought to prevail, fighting intellectual property with anti-monopolistic arguments in favor of free trade brings with itself consequences that are not tranquilizing also for the ones that are expected to apply the law. By resetting literary texts, one could obviously expurgate some errors. More frequently, however, some were added, given the exclusively commercial objectives of the reprints. The valid principle was, thus, that reprints were less precise than original editions, but they were much cheaper for the simple reason that the pirate publisher had a merely moral obligation against the author and the original publisher. In fact, he was not held to pay any honorarium to the author upon handling over the manuscript, nor to paying him royalties, nor to pay anything to the original publisher. The only expense in charge of the pirate publisher was buying the exemplar of the original edition out of which he was to make, as we say today, a free use.
2 The aff violates the categorical imperative and is non-universalizable- governments have a binding obligation to protect creations Van Dyke 18 Raymond Van Dyke, 7-17-2018, "The Categorical Imperative for Innovation and Patenting," IPWatchdog, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/17/categorical-imperative-innovation-patenting/id=99178/ SJDA recut SJKS As we shall see, applying Kantian logic entails first acknowledging some basic principles; that the people have a right to express themselves, that that expression (the fruits of their labor) has value and is theirs (unless consent is given otherwise), and that government is obligated to protect people and their property. Thus, an inventor or creator has a right in their own creation, which cannot be taken from them without their consent. So, employing this canon, a proposed Categorical Imperative (CI) is the following Statement: creators should be protected against the unlawful taking of their creation by others. Applying this Statement to everyone, i.e., does the Statement hold water if everyone does this, leads to a yes determination. Whether a child, a book or a prototype, creations of all sorts should be protected, and this CI stands. This result also dovetails with the purpose of government: to protect the people and their possessions by providing laws to that effect, whether for the protection of tangible or intangible things. However, a contrary proposal can be postulated: everyone should be able to use the creations of another without charge. Can this Statement rise to the level of a CI? This proposal, upon analysis would also lead to chaos. Hollywood, for example, unable to protect their films, television shows or any content, would either be out of business or have robust encryption and other trade secret protections, which would seriously undermine content distribution and consumer enjoyment. Likewise, inventors, unable to license or sell their innovations or make any money to cover RandD, would not bother to invent or also resort to strong trade secret. Why even create? This approach thus undermines and greatly hinders the distribution of ideas in a free society, which is contrary to the paradigm of the U.S. patent and copyright systems, which promotes dissemination. By allowing freeriding, innovation and creativity would be thwarted (or at least not encouraged) and trade secret protection would become the mainstay for society with the heightened distrust.
9/26/21
SO - Kant v2
Tournament: Mid America Cup | Round: 1 | Opponent: Boise WS | Judge: Spencer Orlowski I value morality. Ethics must be derived from the constitutive features of agents – ethics based internally fail because they can’t generate universal obligations and ethics based externally fail because they are nonbinding as agents could opt-out and have no motivation to follow them which means they fail to guide action. Constitutivism solves – it allows for universal obligations among all agents but they are binding and cannot be opted out of. Thus, the meta ethic is constitutivism.
Next, only practical reason is constitutive: 1 Regress – practical reason is inescapable because when you question why you should use practical reason, you are using reason itself. Anything else is infinitely regressive and nonbinding because you can always ask “why should I do that” continuously without any terminal justification. Bindingness is required in morality; otherwise people could opt out of it and have no moral guidance. 2 Action Theory – Every action can be broken down to infinite amounts of movements, i.e. me moving my arm can be broken down to the infinite moments of every state my arm is in. Only reason can unify these movements because we use practical reason to achieve our goals, means all actions collapse to reason
Morality must be grounded in a priori truth to guide action, otherwise everyone would have different ethical codes and different rules. And, truth exists independent of human experience since certain things can be self-proving, i.e. a triangle has three sides. This is the difference between a priori and a posteriori. Reject a posteriori truth since they are just arbitrary states of being, not constitutive of ethics. Next, practical reason means we all have a unified perspective: What can be justified to me can be justified to everyone who is a practical reasoner. If I can conclude that 2+2 is 4, then I understand not only that I know 2+2 is 4, but that everyone around me can arrive at the same conclusion A priori truth has to apply to everyone: A) absent universal ethics, morality becomes arbitrary and fails to guide action, which means that ethics is rendered useless, B) otherwise it creates a contradiction in which you justify your freedom while limiting others’ Thus the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.
Prefer additionally: 1 Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place
2 Consequentialism fails -, a Problem of induction Vickers 14, John Vickers, 2014, The Problem of Induction, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/ The original problem of induction can be simply put. It concerns the support or justification of inductive methods; methods that predict or infer, in Hume's words, that “instances of which we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience” (THN, 89). Such methods are clearly essential in scientific reasoning as well as in the conduct of our everyday affairs. The problem is how to support or justify them and it leads to a dilemma: the principle cannot be proved deductively, for it is contingent, and only necessary truths can be proved deductively. Nor can it be supported inductively—by arguing that it has always or usually been reliable in the past—for that would beg the question by assuming just what is to be proved. b butterfly effect: every consequence is infinitely cascading so we don’t know the true extent of our actions, meaning we cannot predict consequences c Inability to know each other’s experience makes it an unreliable basis for ethics because different experiences bring different concepts of truth – only a priori ethics solve since a priori truths are accessible to all agents
3 Frameworks are an interpretation of the word “ought” in the resolution, which means they are a topicality interpretation and thus should be theoretically justified. Prefer my framework bc of Resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge files. A Kantian debate can easily be won without any prep since only analytics are required. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity
1NC – Offense 1 Intellectual property is an inalienable personal right of economic use Pozzo 6 Pozzo, Riccardo. “Immanuel Kant on Intellectual Property.” Trans/Form/Ação, vol. 29, no. 2, 2006, pp. 11–18., doi:10.1590/s0101-31732006000200002. SJDA recut SJKS recut Cookie JX recut OL Corpus mysticum, opus mysticum, propriété incorporelle, proprietà letteraria, geistiges Eigentum. All these terms mean intellectual property, the existence of which is intuitively clear because of the unbreakable bond that ties the work to its creator. The book belongs to whomever has written it, the picture to whomever has painted it, the sculpture to whomever has sculpted it; and this independently from the number of exemplars of the book or of the work of art in their passages from owner to owner. The initial bond cannot change and it ensures the author authority on the work. Kant writes in section 31/II of the Metaphysics of Morals: “Why does unauthorized publishing, which strikes one even at first glance as unjust, still have an appearance of being rightful? Because on the one hand a book is a corporeal artifact (opus mechanicum) that can be reproduced (by someone in legitimate possession of a copy of it), so that there is a right to a thing with regard to it. On the other hand a book is also a mere discourse of the publisher to the public, which the publisher may not repeat publicly without having a mandate from the author to do so (praestatio operae), and this is a right against a person. The error consists in mistaking one of these rights for the other” (Kant, 1902, t.6, p.290). The corpus mysticum, the work considered as an immaterial good, remains property of the author on behalf of the original right of its creation. The corpus mechanicum consists of the exemplars of the book or of the work of art. It becomes the property of whoever has bought the material object in which the work has been reproduced or expressed. Seneca points out in De beneficiis (VII, 6) the difference between owning a thing and owning its use. He tells us that the bookseller Dorus had the habit of calling Cicero’s books his own, while there are people who claim books their own because they have written them and other people that do the same because they have bought them. Seneca concludes that the books can be correctly said to belong to both, for it is true they belong to both, but in a different way The peculiarity of intellectual property consists thus first in being indeed a property, but property of an action; and second in being indeed inalienable, but also transferable in commission and license to a publisher. The bond the author has on his work confers him a moral right that is indeed a personal right. It is also a right to exploit economically his work in all possible ways, a right of economic use, which is a patrimonial right. Kant and Fichte argued that moral right and the right of economic use are strictly connected, and that the offense to one implies inevitably offense to the other. In eighteenth-century Germany, the free use came into discussion among the presuppositions of a democratic renewal of state and society. In his Supplement to the Consideration of Publishing and Its Rights, Reimarus asked writers “instead of writing for the aristocracy, to write for the tiers état of the reader’s world.” (Reimarus, 1791b, p.595). He saluted with enthusiasm the claim of disenfranchising from the monopoly of English publishers expressed in the American Act for the Encouragement of Learning of May 31, 1790. Kant, however, was firm in embracing intellectual property. Referring himself to Roman Law, he asked for its legislative formulation not only as patrimonial right, but also as a personal right. In Of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing, he considered the moral faculties related to intellectual property as an “inalienable right (ius personalissimum) always himself to speak through anyone else, the right, that is, that no one may deliver the same speech to the public other than in his (the author’s) name” (Kant, 1902, t.8, p.85). Fichte went farther in the Demonstration of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing. He saw intellectual property as a part of his metaphysical construction of intellectual activity, which was based on the principle that thoughts “are not transmitted hand to hand, they are not paid with shining cash, neither are they transmitted to us if we take home the book that contains them and put it into our library. In order to make those thoughts our own an action is still missing: we must read the book, meditate – provided it is not completely trivial – on its content, consider it under different aspects and eventually accept it within our connections of ideas” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). At the center of the discussion was the practice of reprinting books in a pirate edition after having them reset word after words after an exemplar of the original edition. Given Germany’s division in a myriad of small states, the imperial privilege was ineffective against pirate publishing. Kant and Fichte spoke for the acceptance of the right to defend the work of an author by the usurpations of others so that he may receive a patrimonial advantage from those who utilize the work acquiring new knowledge and/or an aesthetic experience. In particular, Fichte declared the absolute primacy of the moral faculties within the corpus mysticum. He divided the latter into a formal and a material part. “This intellectual element must be divided anew into what is material, the content of the book, the thoughts it presents; and the form of these thoughts, the manner in which, the connection in which, the formulations and the words by means of which the book presents them” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). Fichte’s underlining the author’s exclusive right to the intellectual content of his book – “the appropriation of which through another is physically impossible” (ibid.) – brought him to the extreme of prohibiting any form of copy that is not meant for personal use. In Publishing Considered anew, Reimarus considered on the contrary copyright in its patrimonial aspects as a limitation to free trade: “What would not happen were a universal protection against pirate publishing guaranteed? Monopoly and safer sales certainly do not procure convenient price; on the contrary, they are at the origin of great abuses. The only condition for convenient price is free-trade, and one cannot help noticing that upon the appearance of a private edition, publishers are forced to substantially lower the price of a book” (Reimarus, 1791a, pp.402-3). Reimarus admitted of being unable to argue in terms of justice. Justice was of no bearing, he said, for whom, like himself, considered undemonstrated the author’s permanent property of his work (herein supported by the legislative vacuum of those years). What mattered, he said, was equity. In sum, Reimarus anticipated today’s stance on free use by referring to the principle that public interest on knowledge ought to prevail on the author’s interest and to balance the copyright. Moreover, Reimarus extended his argument beyond the realm of literary production to embrace, among others, the today vital issue of pharmaceutical production on patented receipts. “Let us suppose that at some place a detailed description for the preparation of a good medicine or of any other useful thing be published, why may not somebody who lives in places that are far away from that one copy it to use it for his own profit and but must instead ask the original publisher for the issue of each exemplar?” (Reimarus, 1791b, t.2, pp.584). To sum up, Reimarus’s stance does not seem respondent to rule of law. For in all dubious case the general rule ought to prevail, fighting intellectual property with anti-monopolistic arguments in favor of free trade brings with itself consequences that are not tranquilizing also for the ones that are expected to apply the law. By resetting literary texts, one could obviously expurgate some errors. More frequently, however, some were added, given the exclusively commercial objectives of the reprints. The valid principle was, thus, that reprints were less precise than original editions, but they were much cheaper for the simple reason that the pirate publisher had a merely moral obligation against the author and the original publisher. In fact, he was not held to pay any honorarium to the author upon handling over the manuscript, nor to paying him royalties, nor to pay anything to the original publisher. The only expense in charge of the pirate publisher was buying the exemplar of the original edition out of which he was to make, as we say today, a free use.
Unauthorized publication and usage of text is wrongful and infringes on inalienable moral rights Barron ’11. Barron, Anne (2011) Kant, copyright and communicative freedom. Law and philosophy . pp. 1-48. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/37521/1/Kant_Copyright_and_Communicative_Freedom_28lsero29.pdf NChu My claim in this article is that a significantly different, and arguably richer, conception of what a free culture entails and how the rights of authors relate to it emerges from a direct engagement with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.15 The immediate justification for turning to Kant in this context is that he dealt very directly with the issue of authors’ rights – first in an essay published in 178516 (hereinafter ‘1785 Essay’) and again briefly in a section – entitled “What is a Book” – of his late work of political philosophy, Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals. 17 Moreover, he theorized these rights as speech rights, and not as rights of property in works considered as crystallizations of their authors’ communications.18 The most wellknown of the arguments contained in these writings can be briefly outlined. Kant’s premise is that a book considered as a material object must be distinguished from a book considered as the vehicle for an activity of authorial speech. On the one hand, an author’s manuscript, and every printed copy of it, is an ordinary object of property attracting an ordinary right of property vested in whomever is legitimately in possession of the object. This right would include the right to use the object, to sell the object and indeed to copy the object. On the other hand, a published book (considered as the vehicle of its author’s speech) is also a communication from publisher to public in the name of the author. Hence it is also an action, and as such it has its existence in a person – the person of the author. For Kant, it follows that unauthorized publication of copies of the author’s text – though not unauthorized reproduction as such – is wrongful. By selling copies of an author’s text to the public, the unauthorized publisher is not just dealing with commodities – printed books – in his own name, but is disseminating an author’s speech, thus compelling the author to speak against his will,19 to acknowledge the book as his own and be responsible for it.20 Actions “belong exclusively to the person of the author, and the author has in them an inalienable right always himself to speak through anyone else, the right, that is, that no one may deliver the same speech to the public other than in his (the author’s) name”21 or deliver a fundamentally altered speech in his name.22 However if the work is indeed so altered that it would be wrong to attribute it to the author, it can rightfully be published in the modifier’s name.23 These remarks on authors’ rights have not gone unnoticed by copyright lawyers. On the contrary, Kant’s 1785 Essay is often cited as inspiration for the theory – now institutionalized in international copyright law – that authors ought to have inalienable ‘moral’ rights in relation to their works.24 These are enforceable legal rights which are ‘moral’ in the sense that they concern authors’ non-pecuniary interests in relation to their works (such as the interest in being identified as author, and in ensuring that one’s works are published only in the form in which they were created); and they contrast with the economic rights (e.g. to control the reproduction and distribution of copies) which protect authors’ pecuniary interests in the commercial exploitation of their works. Yet moral rights in practice afford far less protection to authors than the theory would suggest, and transferable economic rights to the most commercially valuable works are more often than not held by corporate investors. And since it is economic rights which are the focus of concerns about copyright expansionism and its implications for the public domain, the formal recognition of a doctrine of moral rights has done little to allay these concerns.
2 The aff violates the categorical imperative and is non-universalizable- governments have a binding obligation to protect creations Van Dyke 18 Raymond Van Dyke, 7-17-2018, "The Categorical Imperative for Innovation and Patenting," IPWatchdog, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/17/categorical-imperative-innovation-patenting/id=99178/ SJDA recut SJKS As we shall see, applying Kantian logic entails first acknowledging some basic principles; that the people have a right to express themselves, that that expression (the fruits of their labor) has value and is theirs (unless consent is given otherwise), and that government is obligated to protect people and their property. Thus, an inventor or creator has a right in their own creation, which cannot be taken from them without their consent. So, employing this canon, a proposed Categorical Imperative (CI) is the following Statement: creators should be protected against the unlawful taking of their creation by others. Applying this Statement to everyone, i.e., does the Statement hold water if everyone does this, leads to a yes determination. Whether a child, a book or a prototype, creations of all sorts should be protected, and this CI stands. This result also dovetails with the purpose of government: to protect the people and their possessions by providing laws to that effect, whether for the protection of tangible or intangible things. However, a contrary proposal can be postulated: everyone should be able to use the creations of another without charge. Can this Statement rise to the level of a CI? This proposal, upon analysis would also lead to chaos. Hollywood, for example, unable to protect their films, television shows or any content, would either be out of business or have robust encryption and other trade secret protections, which would seriously undermine content distribution and consumer enjoyment. Likewise, inventors, unable to license or sell their innovations or make any money to cover RandD, would not bother to invent or also resort to strong trade secret. Why even create? This approach thus undermines and greatly hinders the distribution of ideas in a free society, which is contrary to the paradigm of the U.S. patent and copyright systems, which promotes dissemination. By allowing freeriding, innovation and creativity would be thwarted (or at least not encouraged) and trade secret protection would become the mainstay for society with the heightened distrust. 3 No aff offense IP is considered a form of property under the fw Pozzo 06 (POZZO, R. Immanuel Kant sobre propriedade intelectual. Trans/Form/Ação, (São Paulo), v.29(2), 2006, p.11-18.) The peculiarity of intellectual property consists thus first in being indeed a property, but property of an action; and second in being indeed inalienable, but also transferable in commission and license to a publisher. The bond the author has on his work confers him a moral right that is indeed a personal right. It is also a right to exploit economically his work in all possible ways, a right of economic use, which is a patrimonial right. Kant and Fichte argued that moral right and the right of economic use are strictly connected, and that the offense to one implies inevitably offense to the other. In eighteenth-century Germany, the free use came into discussion among the presuppositions of a democratic renewal of state and society. In his Supplement to the Consideration of Publishing and Its Rights, Reimarus asked writers “instead of writing for the aristocracy, to write for the tiers état of the reader’s world.” (Reimarus, 1791b, p.595). He saluted with enthusiasm the claim of disenfranchising from the monopoly of English publishers expressed in the American Act for the Encouragement of Learning of May 31, 1790. Kant, however, was firm in embracing intellectual property. Referring himself to Roman Law, he asked for its legislative formulation not only as patrimonial right, but also as a personal right. In Of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing, he considered the moral faculties related to intellectual property as an “inalienable right (ius personalissimum) always himself to speak through anyone else, the right, that is, that no one may deliver the same speech to the public other than in his (the author’s) name” (Kant, 1902, t.8, p.85). Fichte went farther in the Demonstration of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing. He saw intellectual property as a part of his metaphysical construction of intellectual activity, which was based on the principle that thoughts “are not transmitted hand to hand, they are not paid with shining cash, neither are they transmitted to us if we take home the book that contains them and put it into our library. In order to make those thoughts our own an action is still missing: we must read the book, meditate – provided it is not completely trivial – on its content, consider it under different aspects and eventually accept it within our connections of ideas” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). At the center of the discussion was the practice of reprinting books in a pirate edition after having them reset word after words after an exemplar of the original edition. Given Germany’s division in a myriad of small states, the imperial privilege was ineffective against pirate publishing. Kant and Fichte spoke for the acceptance of the right to defend the work of an author by the usurpations of others so that he may receive a patrimonial advantage from those who utilize the work acquiring new knowledge and/or an aesthetic experience. In particular, Fichte declared the absolute primacy of the moral faculties within the corpus mysticum. He divided the latter into a formal and a material part. “This intellectual element must be divided anew into what is material, the content of the book, the thoughts it presents; and the form of these thoughts, the manner in which, the connection in which, the formulations and the words by means of which the book presents them” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). Fichte’s underlining the author’s exclusive right to the intellectual content of his book – “the appropriation of which through another is physically impossible” (ibid.) – brought him to the extreme of prohibiting any form of copy that is not meant for personal use.
Kant justifies a fundamental right to property Merges 11 (Robert, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and Rosati Professor of Law and Technology, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law) “Justifying Intellectual Property,” Harvard University Press, 2011 JL recut OL Kant believed that any object onto which a person projects his or her will may come to be owned. Kant seemed to consider ownership as a primitive concept whose roots run very deep in human consciousness. This is evident from the language he uses. The origin of property, he says, is in a deep and abiding sense of “Mine and Yours.” “That is rightfully mine,” he writes, “if I am so bound to it that anyone who uses it without my consent would thereby injure me.”15 But what is the point of this? Why do people want to be bound to things? In essence, Kant says, to expand their range of freedom— their autonomy.16 People have a desire to carry out projects in the world. Sometimes, those projects require access to and control over external objects. The genesis of property is the desire of an individual to carry out personal projects in the world, for which various objects are necessary. For Kant, this desire must be given its broadest scope, to promote the widest range of human choice, and therefore human projects. Kant accordingly refuses to accept any binding legal rule that makes some objects strictly unownable, because the rationale for such a rule would conflict with the basic need for maximal freedom of action. Freedom to appropriate is so basic, so tied to matters of individual will and personal choice, that Kant finds it unthinkable to rule out large categories of things from the domain of the potentially ownable. As Kant scholar Paul Guyer says, for Kant, “The fundamental principle of morality dictates the protection of the external use of freedom or freedom of action, as a necessary expression of freedom of choice and thus as part of autonomy as a whole. . . .”17 This captures it in a nutshell: freedom of action, including the right to possess, as a necessary expression of freedom of choice, or autonomy. IP is property Schultz 14 (Mark, Chair in Intellectual Property Law and the Director of the Intellectual Property and Technology Law Program at the University of Akron School of Law and co-founder and a leader of the Center for Intellectual Property x Innovation Policy at George Mason University) “A free market perspective on intellectual property rights,” American Enterprise Institute, 2/23/2014 JL recut OL
Point 1. Intellectual property secures the same values as physical property As an institution, property secures rights in what we create through our work. In this regard, there’s no cause or need to distinguish intellectual property from any other forms of property. In all cases, a person employs his intellect and talents to impose his plan and will on his environment to bring something new into the world. This is the essence of productive labor, the fruits of which property protects. Distinguishing between physical and intellectual labor, as some would, is misguided, because both are, at heart, the same activity. Whether it is a carpenter building a house, a farmer planting a field, an author writing a book, a director filming a movie, or an inventor developing a new drug, the activity is, ultimately, productive labor.
9/25/21
SO - Kant v3
Tournament: Yale | Round: 6 | Opponent: La Salle TP | Judge: Abishek Stanley I value morality. Ethics must be derived from the constitutive features of agents – ethics based internally fail because they can’t generate universal obligations and ethics based externally fail because they are nonbinding as agents could opt-out and have no motivation to follow them which means they fail to guide action. Constitutivism solves – it allows for universal obligations among all agents but they are binding and cannot be opted out of. Thus, the meta ethic is constitutivism.
Next, only practical reason is constitutive: 1 Regress – practical reason is inescapable because when you question why you should use practical reason, you are using reason itself. Anything else is infinitely regressive and nonbinding because you can always ask “why should I do that” continuously without any terminal justification. Bindingness is required in morality; otherwise people could opt out of it and have no moral guidance. 2 Action Theory – Every action can be broken down to infinite amounts of movements, i.e. me moving my arm can be broken down to the infinite moments of every state my arm is in. Only reason can unify these movements because we use practical reason to achieve our goals, means all actions collapse to reason
Morality must be grounded in a priori truth to guide action, otherwise everyone would have different ethical codes and different rules. And, truth exists independent of human experience since certain things can be self-proving, i.e. a triangle has three sides. This is the difference between a priori and a posteriori. Reject a posteriori truth since they are just arbitrary states of being, not constitutive of ethics. Next, practical reason means we all have a unified perspective: What can be justified to me can be justified to everyone who is a practical reasoner. If I can conclude that 2+2 is 4, then I understand not only that I know 2+2 is 4, but that everyone around me can arrive at the same conclusion A priori truth has to apply to everyone: A) absent universal ethics, morality becomes arbitrary and fails to guide action, which means that ethics is rendered useless, B) otherwise it creates a contradiction in which you justify your freedom while limiting others’ Thus the standard or value criterion is consistency with the categorical imperative.
Prefer additionally: 1 Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place, ow ur perf on spec
2 Consequentialism fails - a induction fails: the logic of looking into the past to predict the future is predicated on past experiences, meaning it’s circular, b butterfly effect: every consequence is infinitely cascading so we don’t know the true extent of our actions, meaning we cannot predict consequences
3resource disparities – a lone wolf debater from Idaho can defeat a Harvard-Westlake debater in a Kant debate as it doesn’t require loads of prep that big schools inevitably have more of; analytics are all that’s required. This controls the internal link to all other voters as we can’t debate without accessibility.
1 The aff violates the categorical imperative and is non-universalizable- governments have a binding obligation to protect creations Van Dyke 18 Raymond Van Dyke, 7-17-2018, "The Categorical Imperative for Innovation and Patenting," IPWatchdog, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/17/categorical-imperative-innovation-patenting/id=99178/ SJDA recut SJKS As we shall see, applying Kantian logic entails first acknowledging some basic principles; that the people have a right to express themselves, that that expression (the fruits of their labor) has value and is theirs (unless consent is given otherwise), and that government is obligated to protect people and their property. Thus, an inventor or creator has a right in their own creation, which cannot be taken from them without their consent. So, employing this canon, a proposed Categorical Imperative (CI) is the following Statement: creators should be protected against the unlawful taking of their creation by others. Applying this Statement to everyone, i.e., does the Statement hold water if everyone does this, leads to a yes determination. Whether a child, a book or a prototype, creations of all sorts should be protected, and this CI stands. This result also dovetails with the purpose of government: to protect the people and their possessions by providing laws to that effect, whether for the protection of tangible or intangible things. However, a contrary proposal can be postulated: everyone should be able to use the creations of another without charge. Can this Statement rise to the level of a CI? This proposal, upon analysis would also lead to chaos. Hollywood, for example, unable to protect their films, television shows or any content, would either be out of business or have robust encryption and other trade secret protections, which would seriously undermine content distribution and consumer enjoyment. Likewise, inventors, unable to license or sell their innovations or make any money to cover RandD, would not bother to invent or also resort to strong trade secret. Why even create? This approach thus undermines and greatly hinders the distribution of ideas in a free society, which is contrary to the paradigm of the U.S. patent and copyright systems, which promotes dissemination. By allowing freeriding, innovation and creativity would be thwarted (or at least not encouraged) and trade secret protection would become the mainstay for society with the heightened distrust.
Kant justifies a fundamental right to property Merges 11 (Robert, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and Rosati Professor of Law and Technology, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law) “Justifying Intellectual Property,” Harvard University Press, 2011 JL Kant believed that any object onto which a person projects his or her will may come to be owned. Kant seemed to consider ownership as a primitive concept whose roots run very deep in human consciousness. This is evident from the language he uses. The origin of property, he says, is in a deep and abiding sense of “Mine and Yours.” “That is rightfully mine,” he writes, “if I am so bound to it that anyone who uses it without my consent would thereby injure me.”15 But what is the point of this? Why do people want to be bound to things? In essence, Kant says, to expand their range of freedom— their autonomy.16 People have a desire to carry out projects in the world. Sometimes, those projects require access to and control over external objects. The genesis of property is the desire of an individual to carry out personal projects in the world, for which various objects are necessary. For Kant, this desire must be given its broadest scope, to promote the widest range of human choice, and therefore human projects. Kant accordingly refuses to accept any binding legal rule that makes some objects strictly unownable, because the rationale for such a rule would conflict with the basic need for maximal freedom of action. Freedom to appropriate is so basic, so tied to matters of individual will and personal choice, that Kant finds it unthinkable to rule out large categories of things from the domain of the potentially ownable. As Kant scholar Paul Guyer says, for Kant, “The fundamental principle of morality dictates the protection of the external use of freedom or freedom of action, as a necessary expression of freedom of choice and thus as part of autonomy as a whole. . . .”17 This captures it in a nutshell: freedom of action, including the right to possess, as a necessary expression of freedom of choice, or autonomy. IP is property Schultz 14 (Mark, Chair in Intellectual Property Law and the Director of the Intellectual Property and Technology Law Program at the University of Akron School of Law and co-founder and a leader of the Center for Intellectual Property x Innovation Policy at George Mason University) “A free market perspective on intellectual property rights,” American Enterprise Institute, 2/23/2014 JL
Point 1. Intellectual property secures the same values as physical property As an institution, property secures rights in what we create through our work. In this regard, there’s no cause or need to distinguish intellectual property from any other forms of property. In all cases, a person employs his intellect and talents to impose his plan and will on his environment to bring something new into the world. This is the essence of productive labor, the fruits of which property protects. Distinguishing between physical and intellectual labor, as some would, is misguided, because both are, at heart, the same activity. Whether it is a carpenter building a house, a farmer planting a field, an author writing a book, a director filming a movie, or an inventor developing a new drug, the activity is, ultimately, productive labor.
9/25/21
SO - Kant v4
Tournament: Mid America Cup | Round: 4 | Opponent: Harker NA | Judge: Sam Anderson Ethics must be derived from the constitutive features of agents – ethics based internally fail because they can’t generate universal obligations and ethics based externally fail because they are nonbinding as agents could opt-out which means they fail to guide action. 1)Empiricism could also change, meaning external fw are arbitrary. 2)past experiences have no effect on causality or internal link to continuity, i.e. raining yesterday doesn’t mean rain today. 3)Is/Ought Gap – experience just describes how the world is but doesn’t indicate how it ought to be which means there must be an a priori conception of good
Constitutivism solves – it allows for universal obligations among all agents but they are binding and cannot be opted out of.
Next, only practical reason is constitutive: 1 Regress – to question why one should reason concedes its authority since it is an act of reasoning itself which proves it’s binding and inescapable That means we must universally will maxims— any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends. Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative. Prefer additionally: 1 Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place 2 Consequentialism fails - a induction fails: the logic of looking into the past to predict the future is predicated on past experiences, meaning it’s circular, b butterfly effect: every consequence is infinitely cascading so we don’t know the true extent of our actions, meaning we cannot predict consequences C Aggregation is impossible – pleasure and pain are subjective and qualitative 1NC – Offense 1 Intellectual property is an inalienable personal right of economic use Pozzo 6 Pozzo, Riccardo. “Immanuel Kant on Intellectual Property.” Trans/Form/Ação, vol. 29, no. 2, 2006, pp. 11–18., doi:10.1590/s0101-31732006000200002. SJDA recut SJKS recut Cookie JX Corpus mysticum, opus mysticum, propriété incorporelle, proprietà letteraria, geistiges Eigentum. All these terms mean intellectual property, the existence of which is intuitively clear because of the unbreakable bond that ties the work to its creator. The book belongs to whomever has written it, the picture to whomever has painted it, the sculpture to whomever has sculpted it; and this independently from the number of exemplars of the book or of the work of art in their passages from owner to owner. The initial bond cannot change and it ensures the author authority on the work. Kant writes in section 31/II of the Metaphysics of Morals: “Why does unauthorized publishing, which strikes one even at first glance as unjust, still have an appearance of being rightful? Because on the one hand a book is a corporeal artifact (opus mechanicum) that can be reproduced (by someone in legitimate possession of a copy of it), so that there is a right to a thing with regard to it. On the other hand a book is also a mere discourse of the publisher to the public, which the publisher may not repeat publicly without having a mandate from the author to do so (praestatio operae), and this is a right against a person. The error consists in mistaking one of these rights for the other” (Kant, 1902, t.6, p.290). The corpus mysticum, the work considered as an immaterial good, remains property of the author on behalf of the original right of its creation. The corpus mechanicum consists of the exemplars of the book or of the work of art. It becomes the property of whoever has bought the material object in which the work has been reproduced or expressed. Seneca points out in De beneficiis (VII, 6) the difference between owning a thing and owning its use. He tells us that the bookseller Dorus had the habit of calling Cicero’s books his own, while there are people who claim books their own because they have written them and other people that do the same because they have bought them. Seneca concludes that the books can be correctly said to belong to both, for it is true they belong to both, but in a different way The peculiarity of intellectual property consists thus first in being indeed a property, but property of an action; and second in being indeed inalienable, but also transferable in commission and license to a publisher. The bond the author has on his work confers him a moral right that is indeed a personal right. It is also a right to exploit economically his work in all possible ways, a right of economic use, which is a patrimonial right. Kant and Fichte argued that moral right and the right of economic use are strictly connected, and that the offense to one implies inevitably offense to the other. In eighteenth-century Germany, the free use came into discussion among the presuppositions of a democratic renewal of state and society. In his Supplement to the Consideration of Publishing and Its Rights, Reimarus asked writers “instead of writing for the aristocracy, to write for the tiers état of the reader’s world.” (Reimarus, 1791b, p.595). He saluted with enthusiasm the claim of disenfranchising from the monopoly of English publishers expressed in the American Act for the Encouragement of Learning of May 31, 1790. Kant, however, was firm in embracing intellectual property. Referring himself to Roman Law, he asked for its legislative formulation not only as patrimonial right, but also as a personal right. In Of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing, he considered the moral faculties related to intellectual property as an “inalienable right (ius personalissimum) always himself to speak through anyone else, the right, that is, that no one may deliver the same speech to the public other than in his (the author’s) name” (Kant, 1902, t.8, p.85). Fichte went farther in the Demonstration of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing. He saw intellectual property as a part of his metaphysical construction of intellectual activity, which was based on the principle that thoughts “are not transmitted hand to hand, they are not paid with shining cash, neither are they transmitted to us if we take home the book that contains them and put it into our library. In order to make those thoughts our own an action is still missing: we must read the book, meditate – provided it is not completely trivial – on its content, consider it under different aspects and eventually accept it within our connections of ideas” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). At the center of the discussion was the practice of reprinting books in a pirate edition after having them reset word after words after an exemplar of the original edition. Given Germany’s division in a myriad of small states, the imperial privilege was ineffective against pirate publishing. Kant and Fichte spoke for the acceptance of the right to defend the work of an author by the usurpations of others so that he may receive a patrimonial advantage from those who utilize the work acquiring new knowledge and/or an aesthetic experience. In particular, Fichte declared the absolute primacy of the moral faculties within the corpus mysticum. He divided the latter into a formal and a material part. “This intellectual element must be divided anew into what is material, the content of the book, the thoughts it presents; and the form of these thoughts, the manner in which, the connection in which, the formulations and the words by means of which the book presents them” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). Fichte’s underlining the author’s exclusive right to the intellectual content of his book – “the appropriation of which through another is physically impossible” (ibid.) – brought him to the extreme of prohibiting any form of copy that is not meant for personal use. In Publishing Considered anew, Reimarus considered on the contrary copyright in its patrimonial aspects as a limitation to free trade: “What would not happen were a universal protection against pirate publishing guaranteed? Monopoly and safer sales certainly do not procure convenient price; on the contrary, they are at the origin of great abuses. The only condition for convenient price is free-trade, and one cannot help noticing that upon the appearance of a private edition, publishers are forced to substantially lower the price of a book” (Reimarus, 1791a, pp.402-3). Reimarus admitted of being unable to argue in terms of justice. Justice was of no bearing, he said, for whom, like himself, considered undemonstrated the author’s permanent property of his work (herein supported by the legislative vacuum of those years). What mattered, he said, was equity. In sum, Reimarus anticipated today’s stance on free use by referring to the principle that public interest on knowledge ought to prevail on the author’s interest and to balance the copyright. Moreover, Reimarus extended his argument beyond the realm of literary production to embrace, among others, the today vital issue of pharmaceutical production on patented receipts. “Let us suppose that at some place a detailed description for the preparation of a good medicine or of any other useful thing be published, why may not somebody who lives in places that are far away from that one copy it to use it for his own profit and but must instead ask the original publisher for the issue of each exemplar?” (Reimarus, 1791b, t.2, pp.584). To sum up, Reimarus’s stance does not seem respondent to rule of law. For in all dubious case the general rule ought to prevail, fighting intellectual property with anti-monopolistic arguments in favor of free trade brings with itself consequences that are not tranquilizing also for the ones that are expected to apply the law. By resetting literary texts, one could obviously expurgate some errors. More frequently, however, some were added, given the exclusively commercial objectives of the reprints. The valid principle was, thus, that reprints were less precise than original editions, but they were much cheaper for the simple reason that the pirate publisher had a merely moral obligation against the author and the original publisher. In fact, he was not held to pay any honorarium to the author upon handling over the manuscript, nor to paying him royalties, nor to pay anything to the original publisher. The only expense in charge of the pirate publisher was buying the exemplar of the original edition out of which he was to make, as we say today, a free use.
1 The aff violates the categorical imperative and is non-universalizable- governments have a binding obligation to protect creations Van Dyke 18 Raymond Van Dyke, 7-17-2018, "The Categorical Imperative for Innovation and Patenting," IPWatchdog, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/17/categorical-imperative-innovation-patenting/id=99178/ SJDA recut SJKS As we shall see, applying Kantian logic entails first acknowledging some basic principles; that the people have a right to express themselves, that that expression (the fruits of their labor) has value and is theirs (unless consent is given otherwise), and that government is obligated to protect people and their property. Thus, an inventor or creator has a right in their own creation, which cannot be taken from them without their consent. So, employing this canon, a proposed Categorical Imperative (CI) is the following Statement: creators should be protected against the unlawful taking of their creation by others. Applying this Statement to everyone, i.e., does the Statement hold water if everyone does this, leads to a yes determination. Whether a child, a book or a prototype, creations of all sorts should be protected, and this CI stands. This result also dovetails with the purpose of government: to protect the people and their possessions by providing laws to that effect, whether for the protection of tangible or intangible things. However, a contrary proposal can be postulated: everyone should be able to use the creations of another without charge. Can this Statement rise to the level of a CI? This proposal, upon analysis would also lead to chaos. Hollywood, for example, unable to protect their films, television shows or any content, would either be out of business or have robust encryption and other trade secret protections, which would seriously undermine content distribution and consumer enjoyment. Likewise, inventors, unable to license or sell their innovations or make any money to cover RandD, would not bother to invent or also resort to strong trade secret. Why even create? This approach thus undermines and greatly hinders the distribution of ideas in a free society, which is contrary to the paradigm of the U.S. patent and copyright systems, which promotes dissemination. By allowing freeriding, innovation and creativity would be thwarted (or at least not encouraged) and trade secret protection would become the mainstay for society with the heightened distrust.
Kant justifies a fundamental right to property Merges 11 (Robert, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and Rosati Professor of Law and Technology, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law) “Justifying Intellectual Property,” Harvard University Press, 2011 JL Kant believed that any object onto which a person projects his or her will may come to be owned. Kant seemed to consider ownership as a primitive concept whose roots run very deep in human consciousness. This is evident from the language he uses. The origin of property, he says, is in a deep and abiding sense of “Mine and Yours.” “That is rightfully mine,” he writes, “if I am so bound to it that anyone who uses it without my consent would thereby injure me.”15 But what is the point of this? Why do people want to be bound to things? In essence, Kant says, to expand their range of freedom— their autonomy.16 People have a desire to carry out projects in the world. Sometimes, those projects require access to and control over external objects. The genesis of property is the desire of an individual to carry out personal projects in the world, for which various objects are necessary. For Kant, this desire must be given its broadest scope, to promote the widest range of human choice, and therefore human projects. Kant accordingly refuses to accept any binding legal rule that makes some objects strictly unownable, because the rationale for such a rule would conflict with the basic need for maximal freedom of action. Freedom to appropriate is so basic, so tied to matters of individual will and personal choice, that Kant finds it unthinkable to rule out large categories of things from the domain of the potentially ownable. As Kant scholar Paul Guyer says, for Kant, “The fundamental principle of morality dictates the protection of the external use of freedom or freedom of action, as a necessary expression of freedom of choice and thus as part of autonomy as a whole. . . .”17 This captures it in a nutshell: freedom of action, including the right to possess, as a necessary expression of freedom of choice, or autonomy. IP is property Schultz 14 (Mark, Chair in Intellectual Property Law and the Director of the Intellectual Property and Technology Law Program at the University of Akron School of Law and co-founder and a leader of the Center for Intellectual Property x Innovation Policy at George Mason University) “A free market perspective on intellectual property rights,” American Enterprise Institute, 2/23/2014 JL
Point 1. Intellectual property secures the same values as physical property As an institution, property secures rights in what we create through our work. In this regard, there’s no cause or need to distinguish intellectual property from any other forms of property. In all cases, a person employs his intellect and talents to impose his plan and will on his environment to bring something new into the world. This is the essence of productive labor, the fruits of which property protects. Distinguishing between physical and intellectual labor, as some would, is misguided, because both are, at heart, the same activity. Whether it is a carpenter building a house, a farmer planting a field, an author writing a book, a director filming a movie, or an inventor developing a new drug, the activity is, ultimately, productive labor.
9/26/21
SO - T - WTO
Tournament: Mid America Cup | Round: 4 | Opponent: Harker NA | Judge: Sam Anderson Interpretation: The aff must defend all member nations of the WTO reduce IP protections, they can’t specify
Standards: 1 Pecision – “The” indicates reference to a noun as a whole Webster’s 5 (Merriam Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary) 4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole Anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words from the resolution which means it kills the strongest link to pragmatics Semantics first – A key to predictability since the res is the only stable stasis point for pre round prep, B the only brightline for affs is topical or not and their model allows affs to be completely non-T which judges can’t vote on due to jurisdictional boundaries C pragmatics collapses to semantics cuz our interp of the res is based on the textbook definition
2 Limits and Ground – Their model allows them to defend any of 164 states and their INFINITE permutations. Kills neg prep and debatability since there are no DAs that apply to every aff, e.g. the effects of IP protections in the US differ from those in India - unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on. Generics don’t work since each has its own political situation and the aff will always be ahead. Leads to random state of the week affs which destroys reciprocal prep burden.
3 TVA Solves – read the aff as an advantage and defend whole res. PICs don’t matter cuz they have built in asymmetry solvency deficits.
Voters
9/26/21
SO - Theory - Spec Medicines
Tournament: Yale | Round: 3 | Opponent: Princeton CB | Judge: David Herrera Interp: The affirmative debater must specify and separately delineate the types of medicines the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for. Violation: they did not Distinct patents and IP protections apply for different medicines Walker, Anthony “Pharmaceutical Patents: an overview” Alacrita https://www.alacrita.com/blog/pharmaceutical-patents-an-overview There are many different types of pharmaceutical patents, depending on the drug they are protecting. The exclusivity of each patent can be extended by various lengths because drug discovery, validation, and marketing can take more than 10 years. By extending the patent exclusivity, it encourages companies to study and develop new drugs by derisking the extended time and effort expended during development. This is especially important for drugs in understudied areas, such as rare diseases, antibiotics, and pediatric populations. Because a large portion (up to 80 percent) of pharmaceutical company’s revenue comes from their patents, they want to extend their patents for as long as possible. Once a patent expires, other companies can manufacture and sell the drug, which is where generic competitors come into play. Patents for new chemical entities (drugs that contain a portion that has never been FDA-approved) can be extended for five years under the FDA and European Medicines Agency (EMA). Sponsors may also receive up to 11 years of exclusivity for new drugs (eight years of data exclusivity, two years of market exclusivity, and a one-year extension). Patents for new methods of use (a new use for a drug or drug reformulation via extended-release drug versions, reduced dosing, or increased ease of use) can be extended for three years under the FDA and ten years under the EMA. Patents for drugs with orphan designation (drugs to treat rare diseases) have an extra seven years of exclusivity on drug sales under the FDA and ten extra years under the EMA. Patents for drugs with pediatric exclusivity (ones that include pediatric data) can enjoy an additional six months of exclusivity under the FDA and EMA. Patents for certain new antibiotics can have an extra five years of exclusivity under the FDA. Standards 1 Real world ed – 2 Stable advocacy –