Tournament: Harvard | Round: 3 | Opponent: Appleton North MU | Judge: Zachary Reshovsky
The value for this debate is justice as stated in the resolution. Justice, even on the most general and expansive definitions, is a subset of ethical consideration concerning what is owed to others as such. Miller explains in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Justice.
Miller 17 – Miller, David, 6-26-2017, "Justice (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice/#JustMappConc
If justice is set apart by being owed to or toward another, then justice is distinguished by its bipolar form of normativity. To have a duty of justice is to have a dikaiological duty, grounded in a right of another person. Thus, the standard is consistency with dikaiological duty.
Thompson 04 - Michael Thompson (PhD, UCLA, 1992) has been an assistant professor at UCLA and a visiting professor at the University of Leipzig; he has held a Laurance Rockefeller fellowship at the University Center for Human Values, Princeton, and a Burkhardt fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Study. His current interests are ethics, political theory, philosophy of mind, and theory of action. The philosophers who most interest him are Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Frege, and Wittgenstein.
Thompson, Michael (2004). What is it to wrong someone? A puzzle about justice. In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler and Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Clarendon Press. pp. 333-384. EY
Topicality – the resolution states unjust, thus the value ought to be justice. Util is not a framing of justice but of morality, as it deals with aggregation not individual responsibilities to one another. Topicality comes first because it is a constitutive aim of debate –
Terry Nardin , “International Ethics and International Law”. Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), pp. 19-30, published by Cambridge University Press . JStor, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097279 . RP 2/6/13
The naturalistic fallacy – examples of goodness fail to define the ultimate good. Moore 03,
Moore, G. E. “Principia Ethica” http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/. Published 1903 SHS ZS
Resources start out as unowned – the CHM principle is anthropocentric and indeterminate
Feser 05 – Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. He has been a Visiting Assistant Professor at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles and a Visiting Scholar at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green State University in Bowling Green, Ohio. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California at Santa Barbara, an M.A. in religion from the Claremont Graduate School, and a B.A. in philosophy and religious studies from the California State University at Fullerton.
Feser, E. (2005). THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION. Social Philosophy and Policy, 22(1), 56-80. doi:10.1017/S0265052505041038 EY
Original appropriation can’t be unjust – no ownership therefore no rights to violate
Feser 05 – Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. He has been a Visiting Assistant Professor at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles and a Visiting Scholar at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green State University in Bowling Green, Ohio. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California at Santa Barbara, an M.A. in religion from the Claremont Graduate School, and a B.A. in philosophy and religious studies from the California State University at Fullerton.
Feser, E. (2005). THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION. Social Philosophy and Policy, 22(1), 56-80. doi:10.1017/S0265052505041038 EY
There is nothing unjust about the rich acquiring property, what’s unjust is hoarding it rather than using it to fight poverty and injustice.
Feser 05 – Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. He has been a Visiting Assistant Professor at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles and a Visiting Scholar at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green State University in Bowling Green, Ohio. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California at Santa Barbara, an M.A. in religion from the Claremont Graduate School, and a B.A. in philosophy and religious studies from the California State University at Fullerton.
Feser, E. (2005). THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION. Social Philosophy and Policy, 22(1), 56-80. doi:10.1017/S0265052505041038 EY