Tournament: Loyola | Round: 1 | Opponent: Silver Creek KZ | Judge: Joey Georges
Presumption and permissibility negates -
Derrida, Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority" Massa But justice, however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It is that which must not wait. To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: a just decision is always required immediately, "right away." It cannot furnish itself with infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could justify it. And even if it did have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, the moment of decision, as such, always remains a finite moment of urgency and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effect of this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, since it always marks the interruption of the juridico- or ethico- or politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. Even if time and prudence, the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions were hypothetically unlimited, the decision would be structurally finite, however late it came, decision of urgency and precipitation, acting in the night of non-knowledge and non-rule
Paraphrasing Mcnamara '06, Paul, 2-7-2006, "Deontic Logic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic/index.html~~#4.3 Massa
Neta, Ram. "External World Skepticism." The Problem of The External World, 2014, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-the-External-World.pdf. Massa
You take yourself to know that you have hands. But notice that, if
AND
not such a brain, then you cannot know that you have hands.