Kenston Jewell Aff
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| Grapevine Classic | 3 | Westlake Boppuri | Self |
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| Greenhill | 2 | Cabot JB | Yardley |
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| Greenhill | 5 | Presentation AB | Berdugo |
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| Holy Cross | 2 | Isidore Newman SW | Stephan |
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| Loyola Invitational | 2 | Ayala AM | Sathu |
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| Tournament | Round | Report |
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| Grapevine Classic | 3 | Opponent: Westlake Boppuri | Judge: Self definitions |
| Greenhill | 2 | Opponent: Cabot JB | Judge: Yardley Definitions |
| Greenhill | 5 | Opponent: Presentation AB | Judge: Berdugo Framing |
| Holy Cross | 2 | Opponent: Isidore Newman SW | Judge: Stephan framing |
| Loyola Invitational | 2 | Opponent: Ayala AM | Judge: Sathu Aff round report |
To modify or delete round reports, edit the associated round.
Cites
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Aff cites GreenhillTournament: Greenhill | Round: 2 | Opponent: Cabot JB | Judge: Yardley Framing
Prefer the value of negative utilitarianismAny idea of morality is fundamentally utilitarian:Sanchez 11 (editor of Mises.org, the world center of the Austrian School of economics and libertarian political and social theory, and director of the Mises The utility of social cooperation is the foundation of morality. The notion of right and wrong is … a utilitarian precept designed to make social cooperation possible. As the foundation of morality, the utility of social cooperation is ~ultimate~ end of all questions of justice and property. The ultimate yardstick of justice is conduciveness to social cooperation. Conduct suited to preserve social cooperation is just, conduct detrimental to that is unjust. Thus, the value criterion must be achieving the greatest good for the greatest number.In this view, the greatest number may still be a minority, but that minority is still better off than they would be in the NEG world.
Offense
Contention 1 – Patent AbusesEvergreeningFeldman 18- Rather than creating new medicines, pharmaceutical companies are largely recycling old drugs. 78 of the drugs associated with new patents were not new drugs, but existing ones, and extending protection is particularly pronounced among blockbuster drugs. Once companies start down the road of extending protection, they show a tendency to return to the well, with the majority adding more than one extension and 50 become serial offenders.
Repatenting old drugs kills competition and births monopoliesGurgula 20 ~Olga Gurgula, lecturer of intellectual property law at Brunel University London, 10-28- 2020, "Strategic Patenting by Pharmaceutical Companies – Should Competition Law Intervene?," IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-020-00985-0 ~/KankeeWith extensive patenting, the incentive to innovate diminishes as the inventor enjoys monopoly due to secondary patents that shield from generic competition. Monopolists want to keep their monopolies by resorting to any measures that can keep new entrants out.In its absence the dominant undertaking will lack adequate incentives to continue to create and pass on efficiency gains." Evidence from the pharmaceutical industry confirms that strategic patenting reduce incentives to engage in genuine innovation.Secondary secondary patents are of marginal quality and are typically the result of routine research activities. Their main aim is to increase uncertainty for generics as to the possibility of their market entryA slow transition from new medicinesfrom the protected status of a proprietary medicine to the status of generics manufactured and distributed in open competition does not simply mean a loss of static efficiency, namely ~means~ a loss of consumer well-being ~as~to a slowdown in the reduction of process. Rather, such a slowdown also involves the risk of a loss of dynamic efficiency in that it extends the duration of a monopoly rent situation, thus reducing the pressure to innovate more quickly. Following the rationale of the General Court's statement in AstraZeneca, the practice of the originator that extending monopoly ~via~ patents "potentially reduces the incentive to engage in innovation, since it enables the company to maintain its exclusivity". Such practices act "contrary to the public interest".Therefore, the practice of strategic patenting that protects originators' monopolies from competitive pressures and significantly reduces their incentives to engage in genuine innovation is contrary to the rationale of the patent system, has a significant negative effect on competition and should raise competition law concerns. Strategic Patenting Impairs Follow-on Innovation of Generic CompaniesStrategic patenting also has a chilling effect on follow-on innovation by generic competitors in the form of developing alternative versions of an off patent compound. As was discussed earlier, the expiry of a basic patent that protects an active compound facilitates generic competition. This is because even if the product is still protected by process, specific form or formulation patents, generic companies may develop alternative ways of producing or formulating the product and start competing with the originator. In the absence of strategically accumulated patents by the originator, generic companies are typically open to innovating to launch alternative generic products as soon as the basic patent expires. However, by pursuing strategic patenting discourages generics from innovating because of the uncertainty about the patent protection and a fear of infringing on numerous patents. Consequently, the fact that competitors of originators ~not developing~ generic products results in weakening competition and strengthening monopolies.As Maggiolino put it- … ~all while lowering~ consumer welfare by charging over-competitive prices" Approving drugs from name brand to generic can take only 6 monthsFDA 21 ~https://www.fda.gov/drugs/news-events-human-drugs/generic-drug-approval-process~~ It depends on the complexity of the drug product and the completeness of the application. Some generic versions of priority drugs – drugs that CDER has determined to potentially provide a significant advance in medical care — have been approved in six months or less. Other times it may take years before FDA's scientific and medical team is 100 percent confident in an approval decision. It often takes several rounds of communication between FDA and the generic drug company before the product is shown to be safe, effective, high quality, and substitutable for the brand name counterpart. Some generic drugs are never approved, because the company is unable to meet FDA's rigorous standards for approval.Bansal 09Patent evergreening promotes development of unfair means of competition and related abuse. Enhanced IP scrutiny may remove the curse of these unfair practices which are widely followed by the innovator companies to create a roadblock for generic companies that are trying hard to provide safe and efficacious medicines to the masses at cost effective prices. Landmark case decisions may serve as an aid to understand the complex domain of 'Evergreening'. There is a need for developing countries to develop and foster effective mechanisms to counter evergreening practices. It is important to promote efforts of the generic companies so that cost effective products are launched in the market, thereby benefiting the masses. Subpoint B: Orphan drugsOrphan drugs are a major expenseFeldman 18 again: The cost of drugs for small patient groups, orphan drugs, is particularly high. These are known as orphan drugs, and drug companies are rushing into the field. In fact, orphan drugs account for 40 of the actually new drugs approved in the United States. As one commentator has noted, in today's pharmaceutical market, everyone seems to be an orphan.25A 2017 study found that the median price of orphan drugs was annually $140,000 per patient.26 The price of ordinary drugs was nothing to sniff at, either. The median price for drugs outside the orphan category had climbed to almost $28,000 per patient, per year.27National Organization for Rare Disorders 21: With 552 drugs on the market having an orphan designation, 394 products enjoyed some form of patent or orphan exclusivity protection. Of the remaining 158 products, which had no protection generics are on the market for only 81 products.According to the National Institute of Health (NIH), 30 million Americans have a rare disease. A disease is defined as a rare or orphan disease when it affects fewer than 200,000 people in the United States.Those afflicted have poor financial stability. Yang et al 20Total non-medical costs associated with rare diseases are $548 billion. Combining cost of absenteeism, early retirement, lost productivity, and other costs to patients and caregivers. The cost of absenteeism to both persons with RD and their caregivers is nearly $149 billion and losses due to forced retirement are $136 billion, among other costs. Significant productivity losses associated include $135 billion from adults whose disease progression and diagnoses require time away from the workplace and $152 billion from their caregivers. Contention 2 – PovertySubpoint A- Poor countriesMore IPR equals less medicine access in poor countriesJung 15====, , strengthening IPR led to lower access to medicines in developing countries, and particularly lower access for the poorest of the poor. medicine prices increased and ~citizens~ suffer from a deficiency of pharmaceutical supply and limited access to medicines, since they ~{could not~} produce them There is growing evidence that stronger protection of IPR for pharmaceuticals may adversely impact medicine prices. Duggan and Goyal4 found a significant increase in the market share of patented drugs and an increase in average prices after the introduction of stronger product patents by exploring the effects of introducing product patents for central nervous system drugs. patents increased drug prices,~as seen in price data concerning~ (HIV)/ (AIDS) drug costs in 34 developing countries between 95 and 2000. ~the impact of~ patent protection for pharmaceuticals in poor countries is delaying the import of generic medicines. As a result==== Regulation, not patents, leads to better medication qualityMoszynski 11 ~Peter Moszynski- researcher for Globewise Communications, Feb 2011, "New Patent Rules Boost Profits While Safe Drugs Elude the World's Poor, Says Oxfam," BMJ, vol. 342, p. d815. www.bmj.com, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.d815 ~/ Triumph Debate Specifically, the TRIPS agreement uniquely harms developing countries: Management Sciences for Health 12
TRIPS makes prices higher for new medicines in countries with no previous patent protection. Generic competition will be delayed in countries with the previous patent term less than 20 years. local pharmaceutical industries are weakened and dependence on developed countries increases. Standards required by TRIPS resulted in developing countries losing capacity to regulate patents and cost of Medicine; however the agreement left some flexibility for them to take measures to protect public health. Because of Provisions relating to patents and pharmaceutical regulation or confusing and contentious Regulators must acquire relevant technical expertise To use these flexibilities within trips to improve access to Medicine.
B: Poor / minority communitiesACRE 20 ~Action Center on Race and the Economy, August 2020, "Poi$on: How Big Pharma's Racist Price Gouging Kills Black and Brown Folks," Action Center on Race and the Economy, https://acrecampaigns.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/new-poison-final.pdf~~/Under the U.S. model of monopoly drug patents, Black and Brown people are exposed to more price gouging by pharmaceutical companies. Across insurance status, age, and disease type, Black and Latinx patients report higher rates of medication rationing—delaying filling a prescription, and reducing doses due to cost. Even before the current pandemic,. Price gouging excludes Black and Brown communities from access to medications for the chronic diseases that put patients at higher risk of death; medication rationing due to high cost leads to unconscionable levels of preventable disease and death in POC Majority communities.
Contention 3 – Public Health EmergenciesLindsey 21intellectual property protections ~oppose~ the policy requirements of effective pandemic response. Although patent law, properly restrained, constitutes one important element of a well-designed national innovation system, the way patents ~stimulate~ technology is not suited to public health crises. Securing a TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines and treatments would establish precedent that, in emergencies, governments should employ more direct means to incentivize the development of new drugs.For public health emergencies, giving drug companies the power to block competitors and raise prices is the completely wrong direction.
Garrett 21Consider what happened in the years after 1996, when a consortium of pharmaceutical companies took the unprecedented step of shared their HIV/AIDS treatment data and manufacturing, resulting in a collaboration that was the turning point for what had been a catastrophically grim pandemic. By working together, the companies demonstrating that any one anti-HIV/AIDS drug, taken as monotherapy, would fail, possibly even hasten the pace of the disease process. But when taken in combinations of three or four drugs, made by usually rival companies, the antiviral assault were so powerful that people bounced back from the edge of death like the Biblical Lazarus who was resurrected by Jesus. | 9/18/21 |
Holy Cross CitesTournament: Holy Cross | Round: 2 | Opponent: Isidore Newman SW | Judge: Stephan Sanchez 11 (editor of Mises.org, the world center of the Austrian School of economics and libertarian political and social theory, and director of the Mises The utility of social cooperation is the foundation of morality. The notion of right and wrong is … a utilitarian precept designed to make social cooperation possible. As the foundation of morality, the utility of social cooperation is ~ultimate~ end of all questions of justice and property. The ultimate yardstick of justice is conduciveness to social cooperation. Conduct suited to preserve social cooperation is just, conduct detrimental to that is unjust. Thus, the value criterion must be achieving the greatest good for the greatest number.In this view, the greatest number may still be a minority, but that minority is still better off than they would be in the NEG world.AdvocacyBan patent renewal and extension on existing drugs. 1 20 year patent is sufficient.Remove TRIPs regulations on developing countries to increase generic drug importRemove patent protection on drugs to treat epidemic or pandemic status diseases
Offense
Contention 1 – Patent AbusesEvergreeningFeldman 18- Rather than creating new medicines, pharmaceutical companies are largely recycling old drugs. 78 of the drugs associated with new patents were not new drugs, but existing ones, and extending protection is particularly pronounced among blockbuster drugs. Once companies start down the road of extending protection, they show a tendency to return to the well, with the majority adding more than one extension and 50 become serial offenders.
Repatenting old drugs kills competition and births monopoliesGurgula 20 ~Olga Gurgula, lecturer of intellectual property law at Brunel University London, 10-28- 2020, "Strategic Patenting by Pharmaceutical Companies – Should Competition Law Intervene?," IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-020-00985-0 ~/KankeeWith extensive patenting, the incentive to innovate diminishes as the inventor enjoys monopoly due to secondary patents that shield from generic competition. Monopolists want to keep their monopolies by resorting to any measures that can keep new entrants out.In its absence the dominant undertaking will lack adequate incentives to continue to create and pass on efficiency gains." Evidence from the pharmaceutical industry confirms that strategic patenting reduce incentives to engage in genuine innovation.Secondary secondary patents are of marginal quality and are typically the result of routine research activities. Their main aim is to increase uncertainty for generics as to the possibility of their market entryA slow transition from new medicinesfrom the protected status of a proprietary medicine to the status of generics manufactured and distributed in open competition does not simply mean a loss of static efficiency, namely ~means~ a loss of consumer well-being ~as~to a slowdown in the reduction of process. Rather, such a slowdown also involves the risk of a loss of dynamic efficiency in that it extends the duration of a monopoly rent situation, thus reducing the pressure to innovate more quickly. Following the rationale of the General Court's statement in AstraZeneca, the practice of the originator that extending monopoly ~via~ patents "potentially reduces the incentive to engage in innovation, since it enables the company to maintain its exclusivity". Such practices act "contrary to the public interest".Therefore, the practice of strategic patenting that protects originators' monopolies from competitive pressures and significantly reduces their incentives to engage in genuine innovation is contrary to the rationale of the patent system, has a significant negative effect on competition and should raise competition law concerns. Strategic Patenting Impairs Follow-on Innovation of Generic CompaniesStrategic patenting also has a chilling effect on follow-on innovation by generic competitors in the form of developing alternative versions of an off patent compound. As was discussed earlier, the expiry of a basic patent that protects an active compound facilitates generic competition. This is because even if the product is still protected by process, specific form or formulation patents, generic companies may develop alternative ways of producing or formulating the product and start competing with the originator. In the absence of strategically accumulated patents by the originator, generic companies are typically open to innovating to launch alternative generic products as soon as the basic patent expires. However, by pursuing strategic patenting discourages generics from innovating because of the uncertainty about the patent protection and a fear of infringing on numerous patents. Consequently, the fact that competitors of originators ~not developing~ generic products results in weakening competition and strengthening monopolies.As Maggiolino put it- … ~all while lowering~ consumer welfare by charging over-competitive prices"
Approving drugs from name brand to generic can take only 6 monthsFDA 21 ~https://www.fda.gov/drugs/news-events-human-drugs/generic-drug-approval-process~~ It depends on the complexity of the drug product and the completeness of the application. Some generic versions of priority drugs – drugs that CDER has determined to potentially provide a significant advance in medical care — have been approved in six months or less. Other times it may take years before FDA's scientific and medical team is 100 percent confident in an approval decision. It often takes several rounds of communication between FDA and the generic drug company before the product is shown to be safe, effective, high quality, and substitutable for the brand name counterpart. Some generic drugs are never approved, because the company is unable to meet FDA's rigorous standards for approval.Bansal 09Patent evergreening promotes development of unfair means of competition and related abuse. Enhanced IP scrutiny may remove the curse of these unfair practices which are widely followed by the innovator companies to create a roadblock for generic companies that are trying hard to provide safe and efficacious medicines to the masses at cost effective prices. Landmark case decisions may serve as an aid to understand the complex domain of 'Evergreening'. There is a need for developing countries to develop and foster effective mechanisms to counter evergreening practices. It is important to promote efforts of the generic companies so that cost effective products are launched in the market, thereby benefiting the masses. Subpoint B: Orphan drugsOrphan drugs are a major expenseFeldman 18 again: The cost of drugs for small patient groups, orphan drugs, is particularly high. These are known as orphan drugs, and drug companies are rushing into the field. In fact, orphan drugs account for 40 of the actually new drugs approved in the United States. As one commentator has noted, in today's pharmaceutical market, everyone seems to be an orphan.25A 2017 study found that the median price of orphan drugs was annually $140,000 per patient.26 The price of ordinary drugs was nothing to sniff at, either. The median price for drugs outside the orphan category had climbed to almost $28,000 per patient, per year.27National Organization for Rare Disorders 21: With 552 drugs on the market having an orphan designation, 394 products enjoyed some form of patent or orphan exclusivity protection. Of the remaining 158 products, which had no protection generics are on the market for only 81 products.According to the National Institute of Health (NIH), 30 million Americans have a rare disease. A disease is defined as a rare or orphan disease when it affects fewer than 200,000 people in the United States.Those afflicted have poor financial stability. Yang et al 20Total non-medical costs associated with rare diseases are $548 billion. Combining cost of absenteeism, early retirement, lost productivity, and other costs to patients and caregivers. The cost of absenteeism to both persons with RD and their caregivers is nearly $149 billion and losses due to forced retirement are $136 billion, among other costs. Significant productivity losses associated include $135 billion from adults whose disease progression and diagnoses require time away from the workplace and $152 billion from their caregivers. Contention 2 – PovertySubpoint A- Poor countriesMore IPR equals less medicine access in poor countriesJung 15====, , strengthening IPR led to lower access to medicines in developing countries, and particularly lower access for the poorest of the poor. medicine prices increased and ~citizens~ suffer from a deficiency of pharmaceutical supply and limited access to medicines, since they ~{could not~} produce them There is growing evidence that stronger protection of IPR for pharmaceuticals may adversely impact medicine prices. Duggan and Goyal4 found a significant increase in the market share of patented drugs and an increase in average prices after the introduction of stronger product patents by exploring the effects of introducing product patents for central nervous system drugs. patents increased drug prices,~as seen in price data concerning~ (HIV)/ (AIDS) drug costs in 34 developing countries between 95 and 2000. ~the impact of~ patent protection for pharmaceuticals in poor countries is delaying the import of generic medicines. As a result==== Regulation, not patents, leads to better medication qualityMoszynski 11 ~Peter Moszynski- researcher for Globewise Communications, Feb 2011, "New Patent Rules Boost Profits While Safe Drugs Elude the World's Poor, Says Oxfam," BMJ, vol. 342, p. d815. www.bmj.com, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.d815 ~/ Triumph Debate Specifically, the TRIPS agreement uniquely harms developing countries: Management Sciences for Health 12
TRIPS makes prices higher for new medicines in countries with no previous patent protection. Generic competition will be delayed in countries with the previous patent term less than 20 years. local pharmaceutical industries are weakened and dependence on developed countries increases. Standards required by TRIPS resulted in developing countries losing capacity to regulate patents and cost of Medicine; however the agreement left some flexibility for them to take measures to protect public health. Because of Provisions relating to patents and pharmaceutical regulation or confusing and contentious Regulators must acquire relevant technical expertise To use these flexibilities within trips to improve access to Medicine.B: Poor / minority communitiesACRE 20 ~Action Center on Race and the Economy, August 2020, "Poi$on: How Big Pharma's Racist Price Gouging Kills Black and Brown Folks," Action Center on Race and the Economy, https://acrecampaigns.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/new-poison-final.pdf~~/Under the U.S. model of monopoly drug patents, Black and Brown people are exposed to more price gouging by pharmaceutical companies. Across insurance status, age, and disease type, Black and Latinx patients report higher rates of medication rationing—delaying filling a prescription, and reducing doses due to cost. Even before the current pandemic,. Price gouging excludes Black and Brown communities from access to medications for the chronic diseases that put patients at higher risk of death; medication rationing due to high cost leads to unconscionable levels of preventable disease and death in POC Majority communities.Contention 3 – Public Health EmergenciesLindsey 21intellectual property protections ~oppose~ the policy requirements of effective pandemic response. Although patent law, properly restrained, constitutes one important element of a well-designed national innovation system, the way patents ~stimulate~ technology is not suited to public health crises. Securing a TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines and treatments would establish precedent that, in emergencies, governments should employ more direct means to incentivize the development of new drugs.For public health emergencies, giving drug companies the power to block competitors and raise prices is the completely wrong direction.
Garrett 21Consider what happened in the years after 1996, when a consortium of pharmaceutical companies took the unprecedented step of shared their HIV/AIDS treatment data and manufacturing, resulting in a collaboration that was the turning point for what had been a catastrophically grim pandemic. By working together, the companies demonstrating that any one anti-HIV/AIDS drug, taken as monotherapy, would fail, possibly even hasten the pace of the disease process. But when taken in combinations of three or four drugs, made by usually rival companies, the antiviral assault were so powerful that people bounced back from the edge of death like the Biblical Lazarus who was resurrected by Jesus. | 9/24/21 |
InformationTournament: Any | Round: 1 | Opponent: any | Judge: any If you have any pre-round issues, please please please call or text me. 90 of the time, strangers' emails go to junk so I won't see a pre-round-complaint email until it's too late. Pronouns: she/her Check out my debate blog here: https://dynamicdebate93539058.wordpress.com/ | 10/1/21 |
Open Source
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9/11/21 | jewell521@outlookcom |
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9/18/21 | jewell521@outlookcom |
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9/19/21 | jewell521@outlookcom |
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9/24/21 | jewell521@outlookcom |
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