Opponent: Woodrow Wilson SR | Judge: Mike Girouard
1ac - china 1nc - framing nasa collaboration da asteroid mining da case 1ar - all 2nr - case nasa collaboration da 2ar - all
Barkley Forum
4
Opponent: Academy of Classical Christian Studies JM | Judge: Rishi Mukherjee
1ac - china 1nc - spec meta ethic levinas K baudrillard k counter solvency advocate must not defend policy action case 1ar - all condo msb 2nr - condo msb levinas K 2ar - case K
Barkley Forum
5
Opponent: Harker AR | Judge: Derek Ying
1ac - seti 1nc - xi cp bbb cp case 1ar - all condo pics bad 2nr - bbb cp case condo pics bad 2ar - case xi cp bbb cp
Berkeley
2
Opponent: Harker DS | Judge: Claudia Ribera
1ac - ukraine 1nc - buddhism k crypto cp t-cant spec adv cp north korea econ da case 1ar - all condo 2nr - k condo case 2ar - case k
Berkeley
3
Opponent: Leland MN | Judge: Andrew Qin
1ac - ukraine 1nc - nebel t ilaw cp case 1ar - all condo 2nr - t condo 2ar - case t
1ac - whole res 1nc - tourism da xi pic jcpoa da case 1ar - spreading K case 2nr - pic case K 2ar - K
CPS
1
Opponent: Harker AV | Judge: Leah Villanueva
1ac - china 1nc - biz con da innovation da case 1ar - all 2nr - all 2ar - all
CPS
3
Opponent: Harker AS | Judge: Parth Shah
1ac - China 1nc - xi DA set col K case 1ar - all condo private actor fiat 2nr - k case condo private actor fiat 2ar - case k
CPS
5
Opponent: Archbishop Mitty AA | Judge: Arya Goel
1ac - china v2 1nc - adv cp xi da case 1ar - all condo 2nr - xi da adv cp case condo 2ar - case cp da
Damus
2
Opponent: Marlborough ZG | Judge: Sam Larson
1ac - Labor AC 1nc - Violent strikes CP work K case 1ar - all 2nr - K case 2ar - case K
Damus
3
Opponent: Marlborough VA | Judge: Rebecca Steiner
1ac - Labor 1ar - democracy adv cp postwork K pro act CP police pic case 1ar - all condo pics bad 2nr - condo pics bad police pic case 2ar - case police pic
Damus
Octas
Opponent: Harker AA | Judge: panel
1ac - labor 1nc - t-a adv cp econ da case 1ar - all condo 2nr - condo DA case 2ar - all
Damus
6
Opponent: Harker NA | Judge: Anish Ramireddy
1ac - Labor 1nc - CLS K Infra DA case 1ar - all condo piks bad 2nr - infra DA case condo piks bad 2ar - case da
Damus
Quarters
Opponent: Harker RM | Judge: Panel
1ac - Labor v2 1nc - t - a t - just nlrb cp infra da econ da case 1ar - all condo 2nr - condo nlrb cp 2ar - case cp
Glenbrooks
2
Opponent: Sam Barlow EL | Judge: Claudia Ribera
1ac - labor 1nc - cap k case turns 1ar - all private actor fiat 2nr - k case 2ar - private actor fiat cap good
Glenbrooks
4
Opponent: Harker AR | Judge: Julian Kuffor
1ac - brazil 1nc - new affs bad can't spec dedev case 1ar - all 2nr - dedev case 2ar - case dedev
Glenbrooks
5
Opponent: McNeil AG | Judge: Jacob Palmer
1ac - brazil v1 1nc - spark case 1ar - all 2nc - all 2ar - all
Glenbrooks
7
Opponent: Lake Highland Prep YA | Judge: Sreyaash Das
1ac - brazil v2 1nc - t-just brazil ptx DA presumption case 1ar - all 2nr - case presumption 2ar - all
Greenhill
1
Opponent: West HS SLC OW | Judge: Varad Agarwala
1ac - CRISPR 1nc - Locke NC 1ar - All 2nr - All 2ar - All
1ac - china 1nc - case 1ar - case 2nr - case 2ar - case
Harvard Westlake
3
Opponent: Peninsula KN | Judge: Elmer Yang
1ac - china 1nc - xi da china mod DA asat CP case 1ar - all condo 2nr - all 2ar - all condo
Harvard Westlake
6
Opponent: Harker AS | Judge: Tej Gedela
1ac - china 1nc - warming cp xi da econ DA log con NC case 1ar - all condo 2nr - warming cp condo case 2ar - case xi da cp
Longhorn Classic
2
Opponent: Strake Jesuit VC | Judge: Ishan Rereddy
1ac - brazil v3 1nc - kant t-a util voter case 1ar - all piks bad 2nr - util voter t-a 2ar - all
Longhorn Classic
4
Opponent: Plano East JN | Judge: Tej Gedela
1ac - Brazil v4 1nc - ptx DA truckers pic adv cp case 1ar - all condo 2nr - condo da case 2ar - case da
Longhorn Classic
5
Opponent: Westwood EG | Judge: Joseph Wofford
1ac - Brazil v4 1nc - t-a truckers da econ da case 1ar - all 2nr - econ da truckers da case 2ar - truckers da case econ da
Loyola
4
Opponent: Marlborough ML | Judge: Lucas Hunter
1ac - Crispr 1nc - WHO CP Innovation DA case 1ar - all 2nr - all 2ar - all
Loyola
5
Opponent: Peninsula BD | Judge: Tej Gedela
1ac - CRISPR 1nc - Neolib K PROC CP Licensing Policy CP Saudi DA Biotech DA Orphan Drugs CP case 1ar - All 2nr - PROC CP Licensing Policy CP Biotech DA Case 2ar - Condo
1ac - Crispr 1nc - New Affs Bad Nebel T Psychoanalysis K 1ar - all 2nr - K 2ar - all
Meadows
1
Opponent: Martin Luther King JO | Judge: Sam Larson
1ac - Crispr v5 1nc - t-medicine wto cred turn hauntology k case 1ar - condo all 2nr - condo k case 2ar - case k
Meadows
4
Opponent: Solebury LN | Judge: Taisei Summerhays
1ac - Malaria 1nc - nebel t hauntology k case 1ar - all condo 2nr - t 2ar - t
Meadows
6
Opponent: Northern Valley HS Independent JS | Judge: Jacob Smith
1ac - Malaria v2 1nc - t kant nc case 1ar - all 2nr - kant case 2ar - kant
Nano Nagle
2
Opponent: Marlborough HH | Judge: Gordon Krauss
1ac - crispr 1nc - who cp innovation da case 1ar - all 2nr - all 2ar - all
Nano Nagle
4
Opponent: BASIS Independent Silicon Valley Independent SK | Judge: Quentin Clark
1ac - crispr 1nc - t medicine consult who advantage cp case 1ar - all condo consult bad 2nr - advantage cp case 2ar - all
Nano Nagle
6
Opponent: Harker DV | Judge: Lukas Krause
1ac - crispr 1nc - t - medicine nebel t ghana DA dedev case 1ar - all 2nr - dedev 2ar - all
Palm Classic
1
Opponent: Lexington JB | Judge: Claudia Ribera
1ac - mars 1nc - semiocap k new affs bad case 1ar - all 2nr - k case 2ar - case k
Palm Classic
4
Opponent: Harker KB | Judge: Daniel Luo
1ac - mars 1nc - ptx da bizcon da russian econ da case 1ar - all 2nr - bizcon da case 2ar - case russian econ da bizcon
Palm Classic
5
Opponent: Lake Highland Prep AB | Judge: John Boals
1ac - mars 1nc - t-outerspace anarchism K case 1ar - all 2nr - K case 2ar - case K
Peninsula
1
Opponent: Lynbrook SY | Judge: Joseph Barquin
1ac - china 1nc - xi da case 1ar - all 2nr - all 2ar - all
Peninsula
4
Opponent: Iowa City West FZ | Judge: Kavin Kumaravel
1ac - china v3 1nc - orientalism K asteroids DA case 1ar - all condo 2nr - K condo 2ar - case K
Peninsula
5
Opponent: Millard North NL | Judge: Tarun Ratnasabapathy
1ac - China v3 1nc - nebel t xi da arms control da case 1ar - all 2nr - xi da case 2ar - all
Peninsula
Doubles
Opponent: St Agnes EH | Judge: Panel
1ac - china v3 1nc - t - cant spec asteroid mining DA ppwt cp case 1ar - all condo 2nr - cp da case 2ar - all
Peninsula
Quarters
Opponent: Sequoia AS | Judge: Panel
1ac - SETI 1ar - new affs bad t - appropriation (spec) t - appropriation consult nato cp nuke aliens cp xi cp case 1ar - all condo pics bad msb 2nr - xi cp nuke aliens cp msb condo pics bad 2ar - condo
St Marks
2
Opponent: Westwood AG | Judge: Elijah Smith
1ac - crispr 1nc - set col k case 1ar - all 2nr - set col k 2ar - case set col k
St Marks
4
Opponent: Westwood AR | Judge: Emmiee Malyugina
1ac - crispr 1nc - t medicine kant nc dedev case 1ar - all 2nr - dedev case 2ar - all
St Marks
5
Opponent: Dulles NJ | Judge: Vishan Chaudhary
1ac - crispr 1nc - t medicines kant nc case 2ar - all 2nr - kant nc case 2ar - all
UNLV
2
Opponent: Sequoia AS | Judge: Vanessa Nguyen
1ac - ukraine 1nc - bri da lunar bases pic adv cp alliances da china aggression da case 1ar - all 2nr - alliance da case 2ar - case lunar bases pic da
UNLV
4
Opponent: Marlborough ML | Judge: Gordon Krauss
1ac - ukraine 1nc - nebel t trust cp space col da case 1ar - all 2nr - da case 2ar - case da
UNLV
6
Opponent: Mission San Jose SR | Judge: Joseph Barquin
1ac - ukraine 1nc - nebel spec appropriation definition no policy affs kant security K advantage cps bri da 1ar - all condo msb 2nr - condo msb da case 2ar - case da
UNLV
Doubles
Opponent: Appleton North MU | Judge: Panel
1ac - Ukraine 1nc - kant nebel disclosure case 1ar - all 2nr - disclosure case 2ar - case disclosure
USC
2
Opponent: Marlborough ML | Judge: Noah Christansen
1ac - brazil v4 1nc - t -a post work k cp case 1ar - all condo 2nr - k condo case 2ar - k
USC
4
Opponent: Harvard Westlake AL | Judge: Diana Alvarez
1ac - brazil v4 1nc - stateism cp t-a co2 ag case 1ar - all pics bad 2nr - cp co2 ag case pics bad 2ar - cp co2 ag case
USC
6
Opponent: Harvard Westlake ML | Judge: Reece Aguilar
1ac - brazil 1nc - t-a cap k case 1ar - all private actor fiat bad 2nr - t 2ar - t
USC
Octas
Opponent: Marlborough JH | Judge: Panel
1ac - brazil 1nc - t-a econ da self directed enterprises cp adv cp case 1ar - all condo private actor fiat 2nr - adv cp econ da shells case 2ar - case da cp
x
1
Opponent: x | Judge: x
x
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Tournament: CPS | Round: 1 | Opponent: Harker AV | Judge: Leah Villanueva China AC AC 1AC – Plan Plan: The appropriation of outer space by private entities in the People’s Republic of China is unjust. Chinese space industrial base is set to surpass the US Patel 21 (Neel, space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and I also write The Airlock newsletter, your number one source for everything happening off this planet. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where I grew and led the website’s space coverage.) “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US” MIT Technology Review, 1/21/2021. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/ BC How did China get here—and why? Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle. That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called Document 60 that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry. “Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.” As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a 2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses. More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services. For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another. Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it released the first images taken by the satellite, Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost. To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence. Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding. And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “These companies are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities. There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike. A strong space industrial base makes government sponsored operations in space economically feasible Patel 21 (Neel, space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and I also write The Airlock newsletter, your number one source for everything happening off this planet. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where I grew and led the website’s space coverage.) “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US” MIT Technology Review, 1/21/2021. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/ BC China’s space program might have been slowed by the pandemic in 2020, but it certainly didn’t stop. The year’s highlights included sending a rover to Mars, bringing moon rocks back to Earth, and testing out the next-generation crewed vehicle that should take taikonauts into orbit—and possibly to the moon—one day. But there were a few achievements the rest of the world might not have noticed. One was the November 7 launch of Ceres-1, a new type of rocket that, at just 62 feet in height, is capable of taking 770 pounds of payload into low Earth orbit. The launch sent the Tianqi 11 communications satellite into space. At first glance, the Ceres-1 launch might seem unremarkable. Ceres-1, however, wasn’t built and launched by China’s national program. It was a commercial rocket—only the second from a Chinese company ever to go into space. And the launch happened less than three years after the company was founded. The achievement is a milestone for China’s fledgling—but rapidly growing—private space industry, an increasingly critical part of the country’s quest to dethrone the US as the world’s preeminent space power. The rivalry between the US and China, whose space program has surged over the last two decades, is what most people mean when they refer to the 21st-century's space race. China is set to build a new space station later this year and will likely attempt to send its taikonauts to the moon before the decade ends. But these big-picture projects represent just one aspect of the country’s space ambitions. Increasingly, the focus is now on the commercial space industry as well. The nation's growing private space business is less focused on bringing prestige and glory to the nation and more concerned with reducing the cost of spaceflight, increasing its international influence—and making money. “The state is really great at large, ambitious projects like going to the moon or developing a large reconnaissance satellite,” says Lincoln Hines, a Cornell University researcher who focuses on Chinese foreign policy. “But it’s not responsive to meeting market needs”—one big way to encourage rapid technological growth and innovation. “I think the government thinks its commercial space sector can be complementary to the state,” he says. What are the market needs that Hines is referring to? Satellites, and rockets that can launch them into orbit. The space industry is undergoing a renaissance thanks to two big trends spurred by the commercial industry: we can make satellites for less money by making them smaller and using off-the-shelf hardware; and we can also make rockets for less money, by using less costly materials or reusing boosters after they’ve already flown (which SpaceX pioneered with its Falcon 9). These trends mean it is now cheaper to send stuff into space, and the services and data that satellites can offer have come down in price accordingly. China has seen an opportunity. A 2017 report by Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimates that the space industry could be worth up to $2.7 trillion by 2030. Setting foot on the moon and establishing a lunar colony might be a statement of national power, but securing a share of such a highly lucrative business is perhaps even more important to the country’s future. “In the future, there will be tens of thousands of satellites waiting to launch, which is a major opportunity for Galactic Energy” says Wu Yue, a company spokesperson. The problem is, China has to make up decades’ worth of ground lost to the West. The PRC uses the private sector to develop military assets and pursue counterbalancing with Russia Curcio 8/24 (Blaine, an Affiliate Senior Consultant for Euroconsult, based in Hong Kong. Since joining Euroconsult in 2018, he has contributed to a wide range of consulting missions and research reports, primarily covering the satcom sector globally, and broader space industry in China.) “Developments in China's Commercial Space Sector” The National Bureau of Asian Research, 8/24/2021. https://www.nbr.org/publication/developments-in-chinas-commercial-space-sector/ BC There has been discussion that China and Russia might partner to develop a lunar space station. How is this affecting China-Russia space cooperation as well as China’s commercial space sector? The Russian and U.S. space industries are the two oldest. They have a lot of space programs, experts, and related intellectual property and have been integrated into the space ecosystem. The Chinese space sector has developed primarily independently from the U.S.-Russia system. There has been some collaboration between China and Europe since the Wolf Amendment, but the absence of any kind of commercial space companies until recently, combined with the sensitivity around the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (a U.S. export-control regime), has forced the Chinese space ecosystem to develop pretty much independently. Russia, though a nation in decline, still likes projects involving space to bolster national pride. As a result, there has been a broader trend over the last five to ten years of a gradual realignment of the Russian space sector toward China in terms of both the government and the industrial base. More Russian companies are looking to China to buy products. Historically these companies have bought material from Europe, but they have recently turned more to China because of how weak the Russian ruble is, making imports more expensive. At the same time, Chinese companies are looking to Russia as an export market as well as to Russia and former Soviet states as investment opportunities. There is synergy, for example, between a Chinese rocket company that sees a relatively cheap Ukrainian rocket company with specific technology that it wants and a Ukrainian company that has all the technology, intellectual property, and “know-how,” but does not have that much money. The international lunar research station is beneficial to the commercial space sector to the extent that the national team would be occupied with the space station. As the national team gets bigger and takes on more sophisticated projects, this may help free up the kind of lower-end work companies were doing before and create more room for commercial competition. Moving forward, if there are massive lunar projects and a large Chinese space station, these developments are all things that will occupy a lot of top engineers and SOEs. There will be a need for a bigger commercial sector to contribute to emerging projects and complete the technological development of the more commercial, as opposed to institutional or national-level, projects in the space sector. What is the relationship between China’s space industry development and its Military-Civil Fusion strategy, and how is this affecting the commercial space sector? There are two main types of impact: the technological impact and the broader policy impact. As part of the Military-Civil Fusion strategy, the Chinese government wants to develop specific capabilities and emphasize specific technologies, which produce the technological impact. From that perspective, this strategy dictates what the commercial space sector does in terms of RandD, and the technological direction it takes. Zhuhai satellite is an example of this strategy. Since Zhuhai satellite was a spinoff from the Harbin Institute of Technology, which has a military link, there is a possibility that it is pursuing more space technologies that are related to Military-Civil Fusion. The second type is the broader policy impact. Because the central government makes Military-Civil Fusion a significant policy objective, there will be industrial bases that are built to support related technologies. More money and resources will be available for a startup that will support China’s strategic and tech ambitions. Because of the money and resources that are available, the development of the space industry will change as companies adapt their activities to what the government is emphasizing and to what kind of support they can get from different stakeholders in order to survive. China does not currently have a huge commercial space sector. The only real way that these companies can grow is either by selling products to the existing space sector—which is not particularly easy at this stage—or by raising money from existing shareholders and trying to guess where the market is moving. Scenario one is space militarization: Sino-Russian space alliance undermines existing treaties and greenlights space militarization Bowman and Thompson 3/31 (Bradley Bowman, the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) (Jared Thompson, a U.S. Air Force major and visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.) “Russia and China Seek to Tie America’s Hands in Space” Foreign Policy 3/31/2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/russia-china-space-war-treaty-demilitarization-satellites/ BC Consider the actions of the United States’ two great-power adversaries when it comes to anti-satellite weapons. China and Russia have sprinted to develop and deploy both ground-based and space-based weapons targeting satellites while simultaneously pushing the United States to sign a treaty banning such weapons. To protect its vital space-based military capabilities—including communications, intelligence, and missile defense satellites—and effectively deter authoritarian aggression, Washington should avoid being drawn into suspect international treaties on space that China and Russia have no intention of honoring. The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which Beijing and Moscow have submitted at the United Nations, is a perfect example. PPWT signatories commit “not to place any weapons in outer space.” It also says parties to the treaty may not “resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects” or engage in activities “inconsistent” with the purpose of the treaty. On the surface, that sounds innocuous. Who, after all, wants an arms race in space? The reality, however, is that China and Russia are already racing to field anti-satellite weapons and have been for quite some time. “The space domain is competitive, congested, and contested,” Gen. James Dickinson, the head of U.S. Space Command, said in January. “Our competitors, most notably China and Russia, have militarized this domain.” Beijing already has an operational ground-based anti-satellite missile capability. People’s Liberation Army units are training with the missiles, and the U.S. Defense Department believes Beijing “probably intends to pursue additional anti-satellite weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.” That is where America’s most sensitive nuclear communication and missile defense satellites orbit and keep watch. Similarly, Moscow tested a ground-based anti-satellite weapon in December that could destroy U.S. or allied satellites in orbit. That attack capability augments a ground-based laser weapon that Russian President Vladimir Putin heralded in 2018. In a moment of candor, Russia’s defense ministry admitted the system was designed to “fight satellites.” To make matters worse, both countries are also working to deploy space-based—or so-called “on-orbit”—capabilities to attack satellites. Meanwhile, at the United Nations and other international forums, China and Russia are pushing the PPWT and advocating for a “no first placement” resolution—saying all governments should commit not to be the first to put weapons in space. Yet more than two years ago, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency noted that both China and Russia were already putting in space capabilities that could be used as weapons. The PPWT would thus protect their weapons while tying Washington’s hands. In a thinly veiled attempt to mask their intentions, the two countries claim that their on-orbit capabilities are simply for peaceful purposes—for assessing the condition of broken satellites and conducting repairs as needed. This “dual-use” disguise permits Beijing and Moscow to put into orbit ostensibly peaceful or commercial capabilities that those countries can actually use to disable or destroy U.S. military and intelligence satellites. China, for example, has tested several so-called scavenger satellites, which use grappling arms to capture other satellites. China has also demonstrated the capability to maneuver a satellite around the geosynchronous belt, allowing its satellites to sidle up to other satellites in space. Not to be outdone, Russia deployed a pair of “nesting doll” satellites that shadowed a U.S. satellite in space. One Russian satellite birthed another, with Russia’s defense ministry claiming its purpose was to assess the “technical condition of domestic satellites.” But later, the second satellite conducted a weapons test, firing what appeared to be a space torpedo. The Kremlin never explained how a fast-moving one-time projectile provided superior inspection benefits compared with the other Russian satellite flying persistently nearby. Instead of falling prey to China and Russia’s treaty trap, Washington must urgently work with allies to improve spaced-based military and intelligence capabilities. A well-crafted treaty that clearly defines acceptable and unacceptable actions in space and includes tough and realistic inspection and verification mechanisms could promote security and stability. But the PPWT is decidedly not that kind of treaty. For starters, the proposed treaty does not explicitly prohibit the ground-based anti-satellite weapons that China and Russia have already fielded. Nor does the proposed treaty prevent the deployment of space-based weapons under the cloak of civilian or commercial capabilities. The PPWT also does not prohibit the development, testing, or stockpiling of weapons on Earth that could be quickly put into orbit. Even if these deficiencies were addressed, the PPWT lacks any verification plan to ensure compliance. Instead, the treaty calls for “transparency and confidence-building measures” implemented on a “voluntary basis.” In other words, Beijing and Moscow want the United States to trust but never verify. But then again, Americans should not be surprised by the PPWT. Moscow habitually seeks to use international arms control treaties to constrain the United States while viewing treaty strictures as optional when they become inconvenient or when the Kremlin sees an opportunity to seize a military advantage. For more than a decade before its demise in 2019, Moscow used the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty to constrain the United States while the Kremlin produced, flight-tested, and fielded a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile in direct contravention of the treaty. Beijing, for its part, often exhibits an allergy to serious international arms control treaties. The willingness of the Chinese Communist Party to support the PPWT is, therefore, cause for some additional reflection in Washington. So instead of falling prey to China and Russia’s PPWT trap, the United States must urgently work with allies to improve the resilience and redundancy of spaced-based military and intelligence capabilities. Washington should also advance nascent efforts to establish rules of the road in space. “There are really no norms of behavior in space,” Gen. John Raymond, the chief of space operations at U.S. Space Force, said this month. “It’s the wild, wild West.” In a notable and positive step, the U.N. General Assembly passed a British-introduced resolution in December that seeks to establish “norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” in space, which could reduce the chances for dangerous miscalculation. The vote was 164 in favor, including the United States—and a mere 12 opposed. Any guesses regarding who voted no? You guessed it: China and Russia. They were joined by their friends Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Cuba. So much for a Chinese and Russian desire to pursue constructive and peaceful policies in space. Their duplicity continues. Extinction – destruction of satellites, diminished future use of near space, and terrestrial war Gilliard 19 (Alexandra, a Senior Editor and interviewer of international relations experts for the International Affairs Forum. She holds an M.S. in Global Studies and International Relations from Northeastern University, and a B.A. in International Relations from Boston University, with expertise in conflict resolution, arms control, human rights issues, and the MENA region.) “What Are The Consequences Of Militarizing Outer Space?” Global Security Review, 6/10/2019. https://globalsecurityreview.com/consequences-militarization-space/ BC Consequences of Armament and Aggression in Space The consequences of weapons testing and aggression in space could span generations, and current technological advances only increase the urgency for policymakers to pursue a limitations treaty. As it stands, there are three major ramifications of a potential arms race in space: The destruction of satellites As both financial and technological barriers to the space services industry have decreased, the number of governmental and private investors with assets in space has inevitably increased. There is now an abundance of satellites in space owned by multiple states and corporations. These satellites are used to not only coordinate military actions, but to perform more mundane tasks, like obtaining weather reports, or managing on-ground communications, and navigation. Should states begin weapons testing in space, debris could cloud the orbit and make positioning new satellites impossible, disrupting our current way of life. More pressing, however, is that if a country’s satellites are successfully destroyed by an enemy state, military capabilities can be severely hindered or destroyed, leaving the country vulnerable to attack and unable to coordinate its military forces on the ground. Diminished future use of near space Whether caused by weapons testing or actual aggression, the subsequent proliferation of debris around the planet would damage our future ability to access space. Not only would debris act as shrapnel to preexisting assets in space, but it would also become much more difficult to launch satellites or rockets, hindering scientific research, space exploration, and commercial operations. From the past fifty-odd years of activity in space alone, the debris left behind in Earth’s orbital field has already become hazardous to spacecraft — a main reason why the U.S. and the Soviet Union did not continue with ASAT testing during the Cold War. If greater pollution were to occur, space itself could be become unusable, resulting in the collapse of the global economic system, air travel, and various communications. Power imbalances and proliferation on the ground Only so many states currently have access to space—which means any militarization be by the few, while other states would be left to fend for themselves. This would establish a clear power imbalance that could breed distrust among nations, resulting in a more insecure world and a veritable power keg primed for war. Additionally, deterrence measures taken by states with access to space would escalate, attempting to build up weapons caches not dissimilar to the nuclear weapons stockpiling activities of the Cold War. In any arms race, it is inevitable that more advanced weaponry is created. Yet, this does not only pose a risk to assets in space. Should a terrestrial war break out, this weaponry may eventually be deployed on the ground, and space-faring states would be able to capitalize on the power imbalance by using these new developments against states that have not yet broken into the space industry or developed equally-advanced weaponry. Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change Starr 15 (Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction,” Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015 DD
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs. Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts. The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70 of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences. Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?
Scenario two is hegemony Chinese space leadership encourages ASAT proliferation – only the plan solves China will not honor international commitments Rajagopalan 5/12 (Dr Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Dr Rajagopalan was the Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019). She was also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre from April-December 2020. As a senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat, she writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues. Dr Rajagopalan joined ORF after a five-year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (2003-2007), Government of India, where she was an Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan in 2012. Dr Rajagopalan has authored or edited nine books including Global Nuclear Security: Moving Beyond the NSS (2018), Space Policy 2.0 (2017), Nuclear Security in India (2015), Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity among Asian Great Powers (2012), The Dragon's Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Its Implications for Asia (2009). She has published research essays in edited volumes, and in peer reviewed journals such as India Review, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air and Space Power Journal, International Journal of Nuclear Law and Strategic Analysis. She has also contributed essays to newspapers such as The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Times of India, and The Economic Times. She has been invited to speak at international fora including the United Nations Disarmament Forum (New York), the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) (Vienna), Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the European Union.) “China’s irresponsible behaviour: A threat to space security” Observer Research Foundation, 5/12/2021. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinas-irresponsible-behaviour-a-threat-to-space-security/ BC With China planning an ambitious space programme that includes its own space station, it is likely that there will be more such risky incidents in the future as well. It is somewhat disturbing because China’s space programme has advanced to a degree that it undertakes missions including landing on the South Pole-Aitken Basin (on the far side of the Moon), returning rocks from the moon, and an interplanetary mission to Mars, which clearly demonstrates China has the technical capability to design and launch rockets whose spent stages can land without putting others at risk. That it has not done so is odd. It is not exactly what can be characterised as responsible behaviour in space. Another example of China breaking norms and engaging in irresponsible behaviour in space is its ASAT test. China’s first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007, at an altitude of 850 kilometres, resulted in creating around 3,000 pieces of space debris. More significantly, it broke the unwritten moratorium that was in place for two decades. Beijing also started developing various counterspace capabilities with the goal of competing with the US. Nevertheless, each of China’s actions have led to a spiral effect, with others seeking to match China’s actions, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, given the contested nature of Asian and global geopolitics. For example, China’s repeated ASAT tests have led to the US’ own ASAT test (Operation Burnt Frost in 2008), and India’s ASAT test (Mission Shakti in 2019). India had no plans to go down this path until China’s first ASAT test, which became a gamechanging moment for India. Even so, India did not react to it for more than a decade, but the final decision was a carefully calibrated and a direct response to China’s growing military space capabilities and its less-than responsible behaviour. Other countries like Japan and France are also contemplating moves in this direction. Australia may not be far behind either. Even though it may not be linked to the uncontrolled re-entry of the Chinese rocket, Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist at the Astrophysics Center at Harvard University noted that “about six minutes after Tianhe and the CZ-5B separated, they both came close to the ISS—under 300 km, which given uncertainties in trajectory is a tad alarming.” Making this point, he added “it’s *possible* that this ISS/Tianhe close encounter was one of those unlikely coincidences. I’m open to that possibility, but they should still have spotted the closeness and warned NASA (or better, called a collision avoidance hold in the count).” Rocket re-entries are not uncommon, but space powers have tried to avoid the freefalls by usually conducting controlled re-entries so that they may fall in the ocean, or they may be directed towards the so-called “graveyard” orbits that may lie there for decades. But Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist at the Astrophysics Center at Harvard University argues that the Chinese rocket was designed in a manner that “leaves these big stages in low orbit.” And even in the case of controlled re-entries, there are failures sometimes and they can be dangerous too. SpaceX’s rocket debris landing on a farm in Washington in March this year is a case in point. Moriba Jah, an Associate Professor at The University of Texas at Austin argues in a media interview that such events are going to become more common, and will happen more frequently and, therefore, humanity should come together to “jointly manage near earth space as a commons in need of coordination, protocols, and practices to maximise safety, security, and sustainability.” On the NASA Administrator’s statement, Jah said this should not be “singling out China.” Certainly, this is not about apportioning blame, but China’s actions cannot be condoned either. What can be done? Given that usable orbits in space are finite in nature, there will need to be steps taken by all the space players to ensure that their actions do not contribute to further pollution of space and make it unusable in the near term. States have to invest in technologies that would aid in cleaning up and getting rid of some of the debris. States also need to come together in developing norms, rules of the road, and legally binding and political instruments on large rocket body re-entries. The Long March 5B episode has yet again rekindled the debate on the need for rules for rocket and large body re-entries. Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation, for instance, questioned why, despite all ranting about China’s rocket re-entry issues, the US State Department has “consistently opposed anything stronger than voluntary guidelines.” Weeden has provided a useful Twitter thread on the US hesitancy to get on board with legal agreements on outer space. One problem is that while the US abides by international obligations, other do not. This is a concern that Weeden notes “has a grain of truth” but adds the caveat that “reality is not that definitive”. While he is correct to note that the issue is complicated, it is also true that countries like China have a terrible track record when it comes to meeting their treaty commitments. China’s violation of its own commitments with respect to nuclear non-proliferation, or in the South China Sea and East China Sea are well-known. Given this history, it is difficult to believe that China will allow itself to be bound by any restraints on its space programme, even if it signs any of these agreements. But given the US’ almost allergic reaction to signing legal agreements that others like China may violate, it doesn’t hurt China to keep bringing up PPWT-like (Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects) measures every now and then. This puts the whole international community in a bind. If we have to ensure safe and uninterrupted access to space, creating a secure, sustainable, and predictable outer space framework is essential. But unless all states demonstrate a commitment to living up to existing rules and norms, creating new ones will be difficult. Chinese ASAT development emboldens Taiwan invasion – either US doesn’t follow through on its defense commitments, which kills alliances, or it defends Taiwan, which goes nuclear Chow and Kelley 8/21 (Brian G., policy analyst for the Institute of World Politics, Ph.D in physics from Case Western Reserve University, MBA and Ph.D in finance from the University of Michigan, and Brandon, graduate of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service ) “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons Could Conquer Taiwan—Or Start a War,” National Review, 8/21/2021 JL If current trends hold, then China’s Strategic Support Force will be capable by the late 2020s of holding key U.S. space assets at risk. Chinese military doctrine, statements by senior officials, and past behavior all suggest that China may well believe threatening such assets to be an effective means of deterring U.S. intervention. If so, then the United States would face a type of “Sophie’s Choice”: decline to intervene, potentially leading allies to follow suit and Taiwan to succumb without a fight, thereby enabling Xi to achieve his goal of “peacefully” snuffing out Taiwanese independence; or start a war that would at best be long and bloody and might well even cross the nuclear threshold. This emerging crisis has been three decades in the making. In 1991, China watched from afar as the United States used space-enabled capabilities to obliterate the Iraqi military from a distance in the first Gulf War. The People’s Liberation Army quickly set to work developing capabilities targeted at a perceived Achilles’ heel of this new American way of war: reliance on vulnerable space systems. This project came to fruition with a direct ascent ASAT weapons test in 2007, but the test was limited in two key respects. First, it only reached low Earth orbit. Second, it generated thousands of pieces of long-lasting space junk, provoking immense international ire. This backlash appears to have taken China by surprise, driving it to seek new, more usable ASAT types with minimal debris production. Now, one such ASAT is nearing operational status: spacecraft capable of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs). Such spacecraft are inevitable and cannot realistically be limited. The United States, European Union, China, and others are developing them to provide a range of satellite services essential to the new space economy, such as in situ repairs and refueling of satellites and active removal of space debris. But RPO capabilities are dual-use: if a satellite can grapple space objects for servicing, then it might well be capable of grappling an adversary’s satellite to move it out of its servicing orbit. Perhaps it could degrade or disable it by bending or disconnecting its solar panels and antennas all while producing minimal debris. This is a serious threat, primarily because no international rules presently exist to limit close approaches in space. Left unaddressed, this lacuna in international law and space policy could enable a prospective attacker to pre-position, during peacetime, as many spacecraft as they wish as close as they wish to as many high-value targets as they wish. The result would be an ever-present possibility of sudden, bolt-from-the-blue attacks on vital space assets—and worse, on many of them at once. China has conducted at least half a dozen tests of RPO capabilities in space since 2008, two of which went on for years. Influential space experts have noted that these tests have plausible peaceful purposes and are in many cases similar to those conducted by the United States. This, however, does not make it any less important to establish effective legal, policy, and technical counters to their offensive use. Even if it were certain that these capabilities are intended purely for peaceful applications—and it is not at all clear that that is the case—China (or any other country) could at any time decide to repurpose these capabilities for ASAT use. There is still time to get out ahead of this threat, but likely not for much longer. China’s RPO capabilities have, thus far, lagged about five years behind those of the United States. There are reasons to believe this gap may close, but even assuming that it holds, we should expect to see China demonstrate an operational dual-use rendezvous spacecraft by around 2025. (The first instance of a U.S. commercial satellite docking with another satellite to change its orbit occurred in February 2020.) At the same time, China is expanding its capacity for rapid spacecraft manufacturing. The Global Times reported in January that China’s first intelligent mass production line is set to produce 240 small satellites per year. In April, Andrew Jones at SpaceNews reported that China is developing plans to quickly produce and loft a thirteen thousand-satellite national internet megaconstellation. It is not unreasonable to assume that China could manufacture two hundred small rendezvous ASAT spacecraft by 2029, possibly more. If this happens, and Beijing was to decide in 2029 to launch these two hundred small RPO spacecraft and position them in close proximity to strategically vital assets, then China would be able to simultaneously threaten disablement of the entire constellations of U.S. satellites for missile early warning (about a dozen satellites with spares included); communications in a nuclear-disrupted environment (about a dozen); and positioning, navigation, and timing (about three dozen); along with several dozen key communications, imagery, and meteorology satellites. Losing these assets would severely degrade U.S. deterrence and warfighting capabilities, yet once close pre-positioning has occurred such losses become almost impossible to prevent. For this reason, such pre-positioning could conceivably deter the United States from coming to Taiwan’s aid due to the prospect that intervention would spur China to disable these critical space systems. Without their support, the war would be much bloodier and costlier—a daunting proposition for any president. Should the United States fail to intervene, the consequences would be disastrous for both Washington and its allies in East Asia, and potentially the credibility of U.S. defense commitments around the globe. Worse yet, however, might be what could happen if China believes that such a threat will succeed but proves to be wrong. History is rife with examples of major wars arising from miscalculations such as this, and there are many pathways by which such a situation could easily escalate out of control to a full-scale conventional conflict or even to nuclear use. Space dominance is key to US hegemony Weichert 17 (Brandon J., a former Congressional staff member who holds a Master of Arts in Statecraft and National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. He is the founder of The Weichert Report: An Online Journal of Geopolitics, and is currently completing a book on national security space policy.) “The High Ground: The Case for U.S. Space Dominance,” Science Direct, 2017. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0030438717300108 RR The global order is currently disordered. New states with completely different values from the United States are rising to prominence. Many of those states possess strategic cultures opposed to the American hegemony that has defined the post-Cold War order. Yet, the United States still maintains greater power, wealth, and capabilities than the other states seeking to displace her. For the United States to maintain its hegemonic position, it must also maintain a dominant position in space. As has been noted before, space is the ultimate high ground from which a state can dominate all of the other strategic domains (land, air, sea, and cyberspace). The United States has enjoyed the benefits from dominating this region. Yet, states like China and Russia are moving forward with their own plans not only to deny America access to space, but also to dominate this realm. These states would then benefit from commanding the high ground of space at America’s expense. Since at least the Nixon Administration, space has come to be viewed in a militarized light. By the end of the Cold War, space had not only been militarized, but many were searching for a way to weaponize it. Just as the drift toward militarization of space was inexorable, so too is the desire for weaponization. As rival states begin to hone their space skills, the United States should seek to obtain the first move advantage by capitalizing on its already sizable lead in space by weaponizing it first. The placing of weapons in orbit would not only increase the costs of attacking existing U.S. space architecture, but it would also lend itself to increasing global stability by raising the costs of aggressive behavior on belligerents. Whatever negatives the weaponization of space may have, nothing is more negative for America than to find itself losing its dominance of space to a state that has placed weapons in orbit first. To be passive and allow temporary budgetary constraints to dictate longterm space strategy will damage irrevocably the U.S. position in orbit. Our enemies are aware of our shortsighted preference for space superiority over dominance and are moving toward degrading the American advantage in space.23 Space dominance will not only rebuff rising states from challenging the United States, but it will also lend stability to the world order. This proactive stance was the goal of Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. It must be the goal of U.S. policymakers today.24 US leadership in this decade solves global war and results in a peaceful end to Chinese revisionism Erickson and Collins 10/21 (Andrew, A professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute)(Gabriel, Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy) “A Dangerous Decade of Chinese Power Is Here,” Foreign Policy, 10/18/2021 U.S. and allied policymakers are facing the most important foreign-policy challenge of the 21st century. China’s power is peaking; so is the political position of Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic strength. In the long term, China’s likely decline after this peak is a good thing. But right now, it creates a decade of danger from a system that increasingly realizes it only has a short time to fulfill some of its most critical, long-held goals. Within the next five years, China’s leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, structural economic problems, and technological estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives. As Xi internalizes these challenges, his foreign policy is likely to become even more accepting of risk, feeding on his nearly decadelong track record of successful revisionist action against the rules-based order. Notable examples include China occupying and militarizing sub-tidal features in the South China Sea, ramping up air and maritime incursions against Japan and Taiwan, pushing border challenges against India, occupying Bhutanese and Tibetan lands, perpetrating crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, and coercively enveloping Hong Kong. The relatively low-hanging fruit is plucked, but Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist prize: Taiwan. Beijing’s actions over the last decade have triggered backlash, such as with the so-called AUKUS deal, but concrete constraints on China’s strategic freedom of action may not fully manifest until after 2030. It’s remarkable and dangerous that China has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown. Beijing will likely conclude that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures for both “gray zone” and high-end scenarios, the 2021 to late 2020s timeframe still favors China—and is attractive for its 68-year-old leader, who seeks a historical achievement at the zenith of his career. U.S. planners must mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and thereby deter Chinese aggression in the coming decade—literally starting now—and innovatively employ assets that currently exist or can be operationally assembled and scaled within the next several years. That will be the first step to pushing back against China during the 2020s—a decade of danger—before what will likely be a waning of Chinese power. As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of inevitable Chinese strategic domination in Asia and beyond, it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals and its medium-term capacity to achieve them. China is, in fact, likely nearing the apogee of its relative power; and by 2030 to 2035, it will cross a tipping point from which it may never recover strategically. Growing headwinds constraining Chinese growth, while not publicly acknowledged by Beijing, help explain Xi’s high and apparently increasing risk tolerance. Beijing’s window of strategic opportunity is sliding shut. China’s skyrocketing household debt levels exemplify structural economic constraints that are emerging much earlier than they did for the United States when it had similar per capita GDP and income levels. Debt is often a wet blanket on consumption growth. A 2017 analysis published by the Bank for International Settlements found that once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60 percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds. As debt levels continue to rise at an absolute level that has accelerated almost continuously for the past decade, China also faces a hollowing out of its working-age population. This critical segment peaked in 2010 and has since declined, with the rate from 2015 to 2020 nearing 0.6 percent annually—nearly twice the respective pace in the United States. While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor. Moreover, the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do. Atop surging debt and worsening demographics, China also faces resource insecurity. China’s dependence on imported food and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections from Tsinghua University make a compelling case that China’s oil and gas imports will peak between 2030 and 2035. As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls equal to even a few percentage points of total demand can have outsized negative impacts. Domestic resource insufficiency by itself does not hinder economic growth—as the Four Asian Tigers’ multi-decade boom attests. But China is in a different position. Japan and South Korea never had to worry about the U.S. Navy interdicting inbound tankers or grain ships. In fact, the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries. Each of these dynamics—demographic downshifts, rising debts, resource supply insecurity—either imminently threatens or is already actively interfering with the CCP’s long-cherished goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society.” Electricity blackouts, real estate sector travails (like those of Evergrande) that show just how many Chinese investors’ financial eggs now sit in an unstable $52 trillion basket, and a solidifying alignment of countries abroad concerned by aggressive Chinese behavior all raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver. With this confluence of adverse events only a year before the next party congress, where personal ambition and survival imperatives will almost drive him to seek anointment as the only Chinese “leader for life” aside from former leader Mao Zedong, the timing only fuels his sense of insecurity. Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns and ruthless removal of potential rivals and their supporters solidified his power but likely also created a quiet corps of opponents who may prove willing to move against him if events create the perception he’s lost the “mandate of heaven.” Accordingly, the baseline assumption should be that Xi’s crown sits heavy and the insecurity induced is thereby intense enough to drive high-stake, high-consequence posturing and action. While Xi is under pressure to act, the external risks are magnified because so far, he has suffered few consequences from taking actions on issues his predecessors would likely never have gambled on. Reactions to party predations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong have been restricted to diplomatic-signaling pinpricks, such as sanctioning responsible Chinese officials and entities, most of whom lack substantial economic ties to the United States. Whether U.S. restraint results from a fear of losing market access or a belief that China’s goals are ultimately limited is not clear at this time. While the CCP issues retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and proclaims a triumphant outcome to its hostage diplomacy, these tactical public actions mask a growing private awareness that China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite—but knowing that when Beijing sees the tipping point in its rearview mirror, major rivals will recognize it too—amplifies Xi and the party’s anxiety to act on a shorter timeline. Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years. Just as China is mustering its own strategic actions, so the United States must also intensify its focus and deployment of resources. The United States has taken too long to warm up and confront the central challenge, but it retains formidable advantages, agility, and the ability to prevail—provided it goes all-in now. Conversely, if Washington fails to marshal its forces promptly, its achievements after 2030 or 2035 will matter little. Seizing the 2020s would enable Beijing to cripple destroy the free and open rules-based order and entrench its position by economically subjugating regional neighbors (including key U.S. treaty allies) to a degree that could offset the strategic headwinds China now increasingly grapples with. Deterrence is never certain. But it offers the highest probability of avoiding the certainty that an Indo-Pacific region dominated by a CCP-led China would doom treaty allies, threaten the U.S. homeland, and likely set the stage for worse to come. Accordingly, U.S. planners should immediately mobilize resources and effort as well as accept greater risks to deter Chinese action over the critical next decade. The greatest threat is armed conflict over Taiwan, where U.S. and allied success or failure will be fundamental and reverberate for the remainder of the century. There is a high chance of a major move against Taiwan by the late 2020s—following an extraordinary ramp-up in People’s Liberation Army capabilities and before Xi or the party state’s power grasp has ebbed or Washington and its allies have fully regrouped and rallied to the challenge. So how should policymakers assess the potential risk of Chinese action against Taiwan reaching dangerous levels by 2027 or possibly even earlier—as emphasized in the testimonies of Adms. Philip Davidson and John Aquilino? In June, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley testified to the House of Representatives that Xi had “challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027,” although China does not currently have the capabilities or intentions to conduct an all-out invasion of mainland Taiwan. U.S. military leaders’ assessments are informed by some of the world’s most extensive and sophisticated internal information. But what’s striking is open-source information available to everyone suggests similar things. Moving forward, a number of open-source indicators offer valuable “early warning lights” that can help policymakers more accurately calibrate both potential timetables and risk readings as the riskiest period of relations—from 2027 onward—approaches. Semiconductors supply self-sufficiency. Taiwan is the “OPEC+” of semiconductors, accounting for approximately two-thirds of global chip foundry capacity. A kinetic crisis would almost certainly disrupt—and potentially even completely curtail—semiconductor supplies. China presently spends even more each year on semiconductor imports (around $380 billion) than it does on oil, but much of the final products are destined for markets abroad. Taiwan is producing cutting-edge 5-nanometer and 7-nanometer chips, but China produces around 80 percent of the rest of the chips in the world. The closer China comes to being able to secure “good enough” chips for “inside China-only” needs, the less of a constraint this becomes. Crude oil, grain, strategic metals stockpiles—the commercial community (Planet Labs, Ursa Space Systems, etc.) has developed substantial expertise in cost-effectively tracking inventory changes for key input commodities needed to prepare for war. Electric vehicle fleet size—the amount of oil demand displaced by electric vehicles varies depending on miles driven, but the more of China’s car fleet that can be connected to the grid (and thus powered by blockade-resistant coal), the less political burden Beijing will face if it has to weather a maritime oil blockade imposed in response to actions it took against Taiwan or other major revisionist adventures. China’s passenger vehicle fleet, now approximately 225 million units strong, counts nearly 6.5 million electric vehicles among its ranks, the lion’s share of which are full-battery electrics. China’s State Council seeks to have 20 percent of new vehicles sold in China be electric vehicles by 2025. This target has already basically been achieved over the last few months, meaning at least 3.5 to 4 million (and eventually many more) new elective vehicles will enter China’s car fleet each year from now on. Local concentration of maritime vessels—snap exercises with warships, circumnavigations, and midline tests with swarms of aircraft highlight the growing scale of China’s threat to Taiwan. But these assets alone cannot invade the island. To capture and garrison, Beijing would need not only air, missile, naval, and special operations forces but also the ability to move lots of equipment and—at the very least—tens of thousands of personnel across the Taiwan Strait. As such, Beijing would have to amass maritime transport assets. And given the scale required, this would alter ship patterns elsewhere along China’s coast in ways detectable with artificial intelligence-facilitated imagery analysis from firms like Planet Labs (or national assets). Only the most formidable, agile American and allied deterrence can kick the can down the road long enough for China’s slowdown to shut the window of vulnerability. Holding the line is likely to require frequent and sustained proactive enforcement actions to disincentivize full-frontal Chinese assaults on the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese probing behavior and provocations must be met with a range of symmetric and asymmetric responses that impose real costs, such as publishing assets owned by Chinese officials abroad, cyber interference with China’s technological social control apparatus, “hands on” U.S. Navy and Coast Guard enforcement measures against Maritime Militia-affiliated vessels in the South China Sea, intensified air and maritime surveillance of Chinese naval bases, and visas and resettlement options to Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other threatened Chinese citizens—including CCP officials (and their families) who seek to defect and/or leave China. U.S. policymakers must make crystal clear to their Chinese counterparts that the engagement-above-all policies that dominated much of the past 25 years are over and the risks and costs of ongoing—and future—adventurism will fall heaviest on China. Bombastic Chinese reactions to emerging cohesive actions verify the approach’s effectiveness and potential for halting—and perhaps even reversing—the revisionist tide China has unleashed across the Asian region. Consider the recent nuclear submarine deal among Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Beijing’s strong public reaction (including toleration of nuclear threats made by the state-affiliated Global Times) highlights the gap between its global information war touting China’s irresistible power and deeply insecure internal self-perception. Eight nuclear submarines will ultimately represent formidable military capacity, but for a bona fide superpower that believes in its own capabilities, they would not be a game-changer. Consider the U.S.-NATO reaction to the Soviet Union’s commissioning of eight Oscar I/II-class cruise missile subs during the late Cold War. These formidable boats each carried 24 SS-N-19 Granit missiles specifically designed to kill U.S. carrier battle groups, yet NATO never stooped to public threats. With diplomatic proofs of concepts like the so-called AUKUS deal, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and hard security actions like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative now falling into place, it is time to comprehensively peak the non-authoritarian world’s protective action to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific. During this decade, U.S. policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate Chinese behavior. Xi’s recreation of a “one-man” system is a one-way, high-leverage bet that decisions he drives will succeed. If Xi miscalculates, a significant risk given his suppression of dissenting voices while China raises the stakes in its confrontation with the United States, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left him with outsized returns on a successful bet would instead amplify the downside, all of which he personally and exclusively signed for. Resulting tensions could very realistically undermine his status and authority, embolden internal challengers, and weaken the party. They could also foreseeably drive him to double down on mistakes, especially if those led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict. Personal survival measures could thus rapidly transmute into regional or even global threats. If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the U.S. electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure as well as that of allies and partners abroad for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that actual conflict is a concrete possibility. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“if you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a variety of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with China. Given these unforgiving dynamics and stakes, implications for U.S. planners are stark: Do whatever remains possible to “peak” for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s, and accept whatever trade-offs are available for doing so. Nothing we might theoretically achieve in 2035 and beyond is worth pursuing at the expense of China-credible capabilities we can realistically achieve no later than the mid-to-late 2020s. Be highly skeptical of heg bad arguments – their evidence is epistemologically suspect Gilsinan 20 (Kathy, a St. Louis-based contributing writer at The Atlantic. Her book, The Helpers: Profiles From the Front Lines of the Pandemic, comes out in March 2022. She was previously an editor at World Politics Review.) “How China Is Planning to Win Back the World” The Atlantic, 5/28/2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/05/china-disinformation-propaganda-united-states-xi-jinping/612085/ BC This was a bizarre salvo in China’s propaganda war with the United States over the coronavirus, and it showcased Beijing’s latest information weaponry. Misleading spin, obfuscation, concealment, and hyperbole have been hallmarks of the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda campaign, before and during the coronavirus era. But the pandemic appears to have given rise to more forceful attacks on foreign governments, as well as a new level of flirtation with outright disinformation. The party has never waged a global struggle quite like this one—and its battle with the U.S. over where the virus came from and whose failures made the pandemic worse have marked a serious deterioration in the two countries’ ties. Just months ago, Trump was praising Xi Jinping for how he handled the outbreak; now Trump is toying with cutting off relations with the Chinese government altogether. Seven decades ago, Mao Zedong publicly embraced a benevolent view of propaganda, as if he were a latter-day prophet spreading the communist gospel: “We should carry on constant propaganda among the people on the facts of world progress and the bright future ahead so that they will build their confidence in victory,” he mused in 1945. Just a few months ago, Xi Jinping urged state journalists to spread “positive propaganda” for the “correct guidance of public opinion.” Indeed, Beijing’s global propaganda efforts in recent years have been more about promoting China’s virtues than about spreading acrimony and confusion, à la Russian information ops and election meddling. Moscow wants a weakened and divided West, one that leaves Russia free to dominate its self-appointed sphere of influence—but Russia in 2016 was also an economically sluggish, oil-dependent nation with an economy a tenth the size of America’s, and lacked the resources to remake the world in its image. Beijing has a much bigger prize in mind and a much longer-term plan to get it: The contest isn’t about who gets to run the U.S. It’s about who deserves to run the world. And China, with its economy poised to overtake that of the United States, has already plowed billions into crafting an image as a responsible global leader, and billions more into cultivating global dependence on Chinese investments and Chinese markets. “While the Chinese Communist Party has long sought to be a global influencer, their efforts today are aggressive and sophisticated,” Bill Evanina, the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, wrote in an email. “In short, they’re looking to reshape the history of coronavirus and protect their reputation at home and around the world.” Before the coronavirus hit, the party was becoming bolder in its propaganda efforts overseas as China grew richer and more powerful, trying to promote around the world the orthodoxy it enforced at home, about the beneficence and goodness of the CCP. This involved publicizing Chinese investments in the developing world, arm-twisting diplomats to toe a pro-China line, ruthlessly trying to stifle even other countries’ freedom to dissent—to the point of sanctioning Norway in 2010 when the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded its peace prize to the imprisoned democracy activist Liu Xiaobo, who died in 2017. Xi has elevated the role of propaganda even further as he has vowed to build China’s power and prosperity, declaring, “The superiority of our system will be fully demonstrated through a brighter future.” The coronavirus outbreak and the global outcry against China’s failures of transparency and containment were not part of the plan. They sparked an international backlash that, by Beijing’s reported reckoning, was worse than anything it had faced since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. So Beijing leaped to seize, or at least confuse, the global story of the virus and its cast of heroes and villains. This has involved unleashing techniques Russia perfected during the U.S. presidential election in 2016. “We’ve seen China adopt Russian-style social media manipulation tactics like using bots and trolls to amplify disinformation on COVID-19,” Lea Gabrielle, the special envoy and coordinator for the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, wrote to me in an email. “Both countries repress information within their countries while taking advantage of the open and free information environments in democracies to push conspiracy theories that seek to undermine those environments.” As the world realized the virus was spreading out of control, Chinese diplomats, official media, and Twitter influencers launched an aggressive frenzy of defense, scrambling to preserve the Chinese Communist Party’s cratering reputation at home and overseas. And then they went on offense, with an assist from perhaps thousands of fake or hacked Twitter accounts, according to the investigative site ProPublica. The result was a coordinated campaign of attacks on the United States, and the spread of disinformation and confusion about where the virus really came from and whose screwup it was, really, that led to so much death. Other countries’ faltering responses to the virus have only bolstered this narrative, and the CCP has gleefully trumpeted America’s failures in particular. “Loose political system in the US allows more than 4000 people to die of pandemic every day,” Hu Xijin, the editor in chief of the Global Times newspaper, tweeted in April. “Americans are so good tempered.” Beyond the immediate crisis, this kind of narrative also serves the longer-term goal. In the words of Matt Schrader, a former China analyst with the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshall Fund: “Ultimately it’s about the Chinese Communist Party being the most powerful political entity on the planet.” The CCP has evolved in its themes and tactics over the course of the coronavirus information war so far, as it battles to bolster its own reputation and degrade that of the United States. The campaign has been widespread and highly focused at the same time. And the party has grown even more emboldened in the belief that it’s too big to fail, and that the reeling world may condemn it but still depends on it. Framing The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything. Moen 16 Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281 SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask a man what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable. Moen 16 Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281 SJDI I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “it is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27 Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012) These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe. Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one. Bostrom 12 Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford., Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1 chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential risk—positive or negative—is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.
12/18/21
JF - China AC v2
Tournament: CPS | Round: 5 | Opponent: Archbishop Mitty AA | Judge: Arya Goel China AC AC 1AC – Plan Plan: Plan: The People’s Republic of China should ban the appropriation of outer space by private entities. Chinese space industrial base is set to surpass the US Patel 21 (Neel, space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and I also write The Airlock newsletter, your number one source for everything happening off this planet. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where I grew and led the website’s space coverage.) “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US” MIT Technology Review, 1/21/2021. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/ BC How did China get here—and why? Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle. That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called Document 60 that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry. “Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.” As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a 2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses. More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services. For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another. Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it released the first images taken by the satellite, Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost. To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence. Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding. And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “These companies are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities. There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike. A strong space industrial base makes government sponsored operations in space economically feasible Patel 21 (Neel, space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and I also write The Airlock newsletter, your number one source for everything happening off this planet. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where I grew and led the website’s space coverage.) “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US” MIT Technology Review, 1/21/2021. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/ BC China’s space program might have been slowed by the pandemic in 2020, but it certainly didn’t stop. The year’s highlights included sending a rover to Mars, bringing moon rocks back to Earth, and testing out the next-generation crewed vehicle that should take taikonauts into orbit—and possibly to the moon—one day. But there were a few achievements the rest of the world might not have noticed. One was the November 7 launch of Ceres-1, a new type of rocket that, at just 62 feet in height, is capable of taking 770 pounds of payload into low Earth orbit. The launch sent the Tianqi 11 communications satellite into space. At first glance, the Ceres-1 launch might seem unremarkable. Ceres-1, however, wasn’t built and launched by China’s national program. It was a commercial rocket—only the second from a Chinese company ever to go into space. And the launch happened less than three years after the company was founded. The achievement is a milestone for China’s fledgling—but rapidly growing—private space industry, an increasingly critical part of the country’s quest to dethrone the US as the world’s preeminent space power. The rivalry between the US and China, whose space program has surged over the last two decades, is what most people mean when they refer to the 21st-century's space race. China is set to build a new space station later this year and will likely attempt to send its taikonauts to the moon before the decade ends. But these big-picture projects represent just one aspect of the country’s space ambitions. Increasingly, the focus is now on the commercial space industry as well. The nation's growing private space business is less focused on bringing prestige and glory to the nation and more concerned with reducing the cost of spaceflight, increasing its international influence—and making money. “The state is really great at large, ambitious projects like going to the moon or developing a large reconnaissance satellite,” says Lincoln Hines, a Cornell University researcher who focuses on Chinese foreign policy. “But it’s not responsive to meeting market needs”—one big way to encourage rapid technological growth and innovation. “I think the government thinks its commercial space sector can be complementary to the state,” he says. What are the market needs that Hines is referring to? Satellites, and rockets that can launch them into orbit. The space industry is undergoing a renaissance thanks to two big trends spurred by the commercial industry: we can make satellites for less money by making them smaller and using off-the-shelf hardware; and we can also make rockets for less money, by using less costly materials or reusing boosters after they’ve already flown (which SpaceX pioneered with its Falcon 9). These trends mean it is now cheaper to send stuff into space, and the services and data that satellites can offer have come down in price accordingly. China has seen an opportunity. A 2017 report by Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimates that the space industry could be worth up to $2.7 trillion by 2030. Setting foot on the moon and establishing a lunar colony might be a statement of national power, but securing a share of such a highly lucrative business is perhaps even more important to the country’s future. “In the future, there will be tens of thousands of satellites waiting to launch, which is a major opportunity for Galactic Energy” says Wu Yue, a company spokesperson. The problem is, China has to make up decades’ worth of ground lost to the West. The PRC uses the private sector to develop military assets and pursue counterbalancing with Russia Curcio 8/24 (Blaine, an Affiliate Senior Consultant for Euroconsult, based in Hong Kong. Since joining Euroconsult in 2018, he has contributed to a wide range of consulting missions and research reports, primarily covering the satcom sector globally, and broader space industry in China.) “Developments in China's Commercial Space Sector” The National Bureau of Asian Research, 8/24/2021. https://www.nbr.org/publication/developments-in-chinas-commercial-space-sector/ BC There has been discussion that China and Russia might partner to develop a lunar space station. How is this affecting China-Russia space cooperation as well as China’s commercial space sector? The Russian and U.S. space industries are the two oldest. They have a lot of space programs, experts, and related intellectual property and have been integrated into the space ecosystem. The Chinese space sector has developed primarily independently from the U.S.-Russia system. There has been some collaboration between China and Europe since the Wolf Amendment, but the absence of any kind of commercial space companies until recently, combined with the sensitivity around the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (a U.S. export-control regime), has forced the Chinese space ecosystem to develop pretty much independently. Russia, though a nation in decline, still likes projects involving space to bolster national pride. As a result, there has been a broader trend over the last five to ten years of a gradual realignment of the Russian space sector toward China in terms of both the government and the industrial base. More Russian companies are looking to China to buy products. Historically these companies have bought material from Europe, but they have recently turned more to China because of how weak the Russian ruble is, making imports more expensive. At the same time, Chinese companies are looking to Russia as an export market as well as to Russia and former Soviet states as investment opportunities. There is synergy, for example, between a Chinese rocket company that sees a relatively cheap Ukrainian rocket company with specific technology that it wants and a Ukrainian company that has all the technology, intellectual property, and “know-how,” but does not have that much money. The international lunar research station is beneficial to the commercial space sector to the extent that the national team would be occupied with the space station. As the national team gets bigger and takes on more sophisticated projects, this may help free up the kind of lower-end work companies were doing before and create more room for commercial competition. Moving forward, if there are massive lunar projects and a large Chinese space station, these developments are all things that will occupy a lot of top engineers and SOEs. There will be a need for a bigger commercial sector to contribute to emerging projects and complete the technological development of the more commercial, as opposed to institutional or national-level, projects in the space sector. What is the relationship between China’s space industry development and its Military-Civil Fusion strategy, and how is this affecting the commercial space sector? There are two main types of impact: the technological impact and the broader policy impact. As part of the Military-Civil Fusion strategy, the Chinese government wants to develop specific capabilities and emphasize specific technologies, which produce the technological impact. From that perspective, this strategy dictates what the commercial space sector does in terms of RandD, and the technological direction it takes. Zhuhai satellite is an example of this strategy. Since Zhuhai satellite was a spinoff from the Harbin Institute of Technology, which has a military link, there is a possibility that it is pursuing more space technologies that are related to Military-Civil Fusion. The second type is the broader policy impact. Because the central government makes Military-Civil Fusion a significant policy objective, there will be industrial bases that are built to support related technologies. More money and resources will be available for a startup that will support China’s strategic and tech ambitions. Because of the money and resources that are available, the development of the space industry will change as companies adapt their activities to what the government is emphasizing and to what kind of support they can get from different stakeholders in order to survive. China does not currently have a huge commercial space sector. The only real way that these companies can grow is either by selling products to the existing space sector—which is not particularly easy at this stage—or by raising money from existing shareholders and trying to guess where the market is moving. Scenario one is space militarization: Sino-Russian space alliance undermines existing treaties and greenlights space militarization Bowman and Thompson 3/31 (Bradley Bowman, the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) (Jared Thompson, a U.S. Air Force major and visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.) “Russia and China Seek to Tie America’s Hands in Space” Foreign Policy 3/31/2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/russia-china-space-war-treaty-demilitarization-satellites/ BC Consider the actions of the United States’ two great-power adversaries when it comes to anti-satellite weapons. China and Russia have sprinted to develop and deploy both ground-based and space-based weapons targeting satellites while simultaneously pushing the United States to sign a treaty banning such weapons. To protect its vital space-based military capabilities—including communications, intelligence, and missile defense satellites—and effectively deter authoritarian aggression, Washington should avoid being drawn into suspect international treaties on space that China and Russia have no intention of honoring. The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which Beijing and Moscow have submitted at the United Nations, is a perfect example. PPWT signatories commit “not to place any weapons in outer space.” It also says parties to the treaty may not “resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects” or engage in activities “inconsistent” with the purpose of the treaty. On the surface, that sounds innocuous. Who, after all, wants an arms race in space? The reality, however, is that China and Russia are already racing to field anti-satellite weapons and have been for quite some time. “The space domain is competitive, congested, and contested,” Gen. James Dickinson, the head of U.S. Space Command, said in January. “Our competitors, most notably China and Russia, have militarized this domain.” Beijing already has an operational ground-based anti-satellite missile capability. People’s Liberation Army units are training with the missiles, and the U.S. Defense Department believes Beijing “probably intends to pursue additional anti-satellite weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.” That is where America’s most sensitive nuclear communication and missile defense satellites orbit and keep watch. Similarly, Moscow tested a ground-based anti-satellite weapon in December that could destroy U.S. or allied satellites in orbit. That attack capability augments a ground-based laser weapon that Russian President Vladimir Putin heralded in 2018. In a moment of candor, Russia’s defense ministry admitted the system was designed to “fight satellites.” To make matters worse, both countries are also working to deploy space-based—or so-called “on-orbit”—capabilities to attack satellites. Meanwhile, at the United Nations and other international forums, China and Russia are pushing the PPWT and advocating for a “no first placement” resolution—saying all governments should commit not to be the first to put weapons in space. Yet more than two years ago, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency noted that both China and Russia were already putting in space capabilities that could be used as weapons. The PPWT would thus protect their weapons while tying Washington’s hands. In a thinly veiled attempt to mask their intentions, the two countries claim that their on-orbit capabilities are simply for peaceful purposes—for assessing the condition of broken satellites and conducting repairs as needed. This “dual-use” disguise permits Beijing and Moscow to put into orbit ostensibly peaceful or commercial capabilities that those countries can actually use to disable or destroy U.S. military and intelligence satellites. China, for example, has tested several so-called scavenger satellites, which use grappling arms to capture other satellites. China has also demonstrated the capability to maneuver a satellite around the geosynchronous belt, allowing its satellites to sidle up to other satellites in space. Not to be outdone, Russia deployed a pair of “nesting doll” satellites that shadowed a U.S. satellite in space. One Russian satellite birthed another, with Russia’s defense ministry claiming its purpose was to assess the “technical condition of domestic satellites.” But later, the second satellite conducted a weapons test, firing what appeared to be a space torpedo. The Kremlin never explained how a fast-moving one-time projectile provided superior inspection benefits compared with the other Russian satellite flying persistently nearby. Instead of falling prey to China and Russia’s treaty trap, Washington must urgently work with allies to improve spaced-based military and intelligence capabilities. A well-crafted treaty that clearly defines acceptable and unacceptable actions in space and includes tough and realistic inspection and verification mechanisms could promote security and stability. But the PPWT is decidedly not that kind of treaty. For starters, the proposed treaty does not explicitly prohibit the ground-based anti-satellite weapons that China and Russia have already fielded. Nor does the proposed treaty prevent the deployment of space-based weapons under the cloak of civilian or commercial capabilities. The PPWT also does not prohibit the development, testing, or stockpiling of weapons on Earth that could be quickly put into orbit. Even if these deficiencies were addressed, the PPWT lacks any verification plan to ensure compliance. Instead, the treaty calls for “transparency and confidence-building measures” implemented on a “voluntary basis.” In other words, Beijing and Moscow want the United States to trust but never verify. But then again, Americans should not be surprised by the PPWT. Moscow habitually seeks to use international arms control treaties to constrain the United States while viewing treaty strictures as optional when they become inconvenient or when the Kremlin sees an opportunity to seize a military advantage. For more than a decade before its demise in 2019, Moscow used the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty to constrain the United States while the Kremlin produced, flight-tested, and fielded a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile in direct contravention of the treaty. Beijing, for its part, often exhibits an allergy to serious international arms control treaties. The willingness of the Chinese Communist Party to support the PPWT is, therefore, cause for some additional reflection in Washington. So instead of falling prey to China and Russia’s PPWT trap, the United States must urgently work with allies to improve the resilience and redundancy of spaced-based military and intelligence capabilities. Washington should also advance nascent efforts to establish rules of the road in space. “There are really no norms of behavior in space,” Gen. John Raymond, the chief of space operations at U.S. Space Force, said this month. “It’s the wild, wild West.” In a notable and positive step, the U.N. General Assembly passed a British-introduced resolution in December that seeks to establish “norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” in space, which could reduce the chances for dangerous miscalculation. The vote was 164 in favor, including the United States—and a mere 12 opposed. Any guesses regarding who voted no? You guessed it: China and Russia. They were joined by their friends Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Cuba. So much for a Chinese and Russian desire to pursue constructive and peaceful policies in space. Their duplicity continues. Extinction – destruction of satellites, diminished future use of near space, and terrestrial war Gilliard 19 (Alexandra, a Senior Editor and interviewer of international relations experts for the International Affairs Forum. She holds an M.S. in Global Studies and International Relations from Northeastern University, and a B.A. in International Relations from Boston University, with expertise in conflict resolution, arms control, human rights issues, and the MENA region.) “What Are The Consequences Of Militarizing Outer Space?” Global Security Review, 6/10/2019. https://globalsecurityreview.com/consequences-militarization-space/ BC Consequences of Armament and Aggression in Space The consequences of weapons testing and aggression in space could span generations, and current technological advances only increase the urgency for policymakers to pursue a limitations treaty. As it stands, there are three major ramifications of a potential arms race in space: The destruction of satellites As both financial and technological barriers to the space services industry have decreased, the number of governmental and private investors with assets in space has inevitably increased. There is now an abundance of satellites in space owned by multiple states and corporations. These satellites are used to not only coordinate military actions, but to perform more mundane tasks, like obtaining weather reports, or managing on-ground communications, and navigation. Should states begin weapons testing in space, debris could cloud the orbit and make positioning new satellites impossible, disrupting our current way of life. More pressing, however, is that if a country’s satellites are successfully destroyed by an enemy state, military capabilities can be severely hindered or destroyed, leaving the country vulnerable to attack and unable to coordinate its military forces on the ground. Diminished future use of near space Whether caused by weapons testing or actual aggression, the subsequent proliferation of debris around the planet would damage our future ability to access space. Not only would debris act as shrapnel to preexisting assets in space, but it would also become much more difficult to launch satellites or rockets, hindering scientific research, space exploration, and commercial operations. From the past fifty-odd years of activity in space alone, the debris left behind in Earth’s orbital field has already become hazardous to spacecraft — a main reason why the U.S. and the Soviet Union did not continue with ASAT testing during the Cold War. If greater pollution were to occur, space itself could be become unusable, resulting in the collapse of the global economic system, air travel, and various communications. Power imbalances and proliferation on the ground Only so many states currently have access to space—which means any militarization be by the few, while other states would be left to fend for themselves. This would establish a clear power imbalance that could breed distrust among nations, resulting in a more insecure world and a veritable power keg primed for war. Additionally, deterrence measures taken by states with access to space would escalate, attempting to build up weapons caches not dissimilar to the nuclear weapons stockpiling activities of the Cold War. In any arms race, it is inevitable that more advanced weaponry is created. Yet, this does not only pose a risk to assets in space. Should a terrestrial war break out, this weaponry may eventually be deployed on the ground, and space-faring states would be able to capitalize on the power imbalance by using these new developments against states that have not yet broken into the space industry or developed equally-advanced weaponry. Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change Starr 15 (Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction,” Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015 DD
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs. Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts. The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70 of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences. Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?
Scenario two is hegemony Chinese space leadership encourages ASAT proliferation – only the plan solves China will not honor international commitments Rajagopalan 5/12 (Dr Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Dr Rajagopalan was the Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019). She was also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre from April-December 2020. As a senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat, she writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues. Dr Rajagopalan joined ORF after a five-year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (2003-2007), Government of India, where she was an Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan in 2012. Dr Rajagopalan has authored or edited nine books including Global Nuclear Security: Moving Beyond the NSS (2018), Space Policy 2.0 (2017), Nuclear Security in India (2015), Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity among Asian Great Powers (2012), The Dragon's Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Its Implications for Asia (2009). She has published research essays in edited volumes, and in peer reviewed journals such as India Review, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air and Space Power Journal, International Journal of Nuclear Law and Strategic Analysis. She has also contributed essays to newspapers such as The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Times of India, and The Economic Times. She has been invited to speak at international fora including the United Nations Disarmament Forum (New York), the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) (Vienna), Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the European Union.) “China’s irresponsible behaviour: A threat to space security” Observer Research Foundation, 5/12/2021. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinas-irresponsible-behaviour-a-threat-to-space-security/ BC With China planning an ambitious space programme that includes its own space station, it is likely that there will be more such risky incidents in the future as well. It is somewhat disturbing because China’s space programme has advanced to a degree that it undertakes missions including landing on the South Pole-Aitken Basin (on the far side of the Moon), returning rocks from the moon, and an interplanetary mission to Mars, which clearly demonstrates China has the technical capability to design and launch rockets whose spent stages can land without putting others at risk. That it has not done so is odd. It is not exactly what can be characterised as responsible behaviour in space. Another example of China breaking norms and engaging in irresponsible behaviour in space is its ASAT test. China’s first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007, at an altitude of 850 kilometres, resulted in creating around 3,000 pieces of space debris. More significantly, it broke the unwritten moratorium that was in place for two decades. Beijing also started developing various counterspace capabilities with the goal of competing with the US. Nevertheless, each of China’s actions have led to a spiral effect, with others seeking to match China’s actions, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, given the contested nature of Asian and global geopolitics. For example, China’s repeated ASAT tests have led to the US’ own ASAT test (Operation Burnt Frost in 2008), and India’s ASAT test (Mission Shakti in 2019). India had no plans to go down this path until China’s first ASAT test, which became a gamechanging moment for India. Even so, India did not react to it for more than a decade, but the final decision was a carefully calibrated and a direct response to China’s growing military space capabilities and its less-than responsible behaviour. Other countries like Japan and France are also contemplating moves in this direction. Australia may not be far behind either. Even though it may not be linked to the uncontrolled re-entry of the Chinese rocket, Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist at the Astrophysics Center at Harvard University noted that “about six minutes after Tianhe and the CZ-5B separated, they both came close to the ISS—under 300 km, which given uncertainties in trajectory is a tad alarming.” Making this point, he added “it’s *possible* that this ISS/Tianhe close encounter was one of those unlikely coincidences. I’m open to that possibility, but they should still have spotted the closeness and warned NASA (or better, called a collision avoidance hold in the count).” Rocket re-entries are not uncommon, but space powers have tried to avoid the freefalls by usually conducting controlled re-entries so that they may fall in the ocean, or they may be directed towards the so-called “graveyard” orbits that may lie there for decades. But Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist at the Astrophysics Center at Harvard University argues that the Chinese rocket was designed in a manner that “leaves these big stages in low orbit.” And even in the case of controlled re-entries, there are failures sometimes and they can be dangerous too. SpaceX’s rocket debris landing on a farm in Washington in March this year is a case in point. Moriba Jah, an Associate Professor at The University of Texas at Austin argues in a media interview that such events are going to become more common, and will happen more frequently and, therefore, humanity should come together to “jointly manage near earth space as a commons in need of coordination, protocols, and practices to maximise safety, security, and sustainability.” On the NASA Administrator’s statement, Jah said this should not be “singling out China.” Certainly, this is not about apportioning blame, but China’s actions cannot be condoned either. What can be done? Given that usable orbits in space are finite in nature, there will need to be steps taken by all the space players to ensure that their actions do not contribute to further pollution of space and make it unusable in the near term. States have to invest in technologies that would aid in cleaning up and getting rid of some of the debris. States also need to come together in developing norms, rules of the road, and legally binding and political instruments on large rocket body re-entries. The Long March 5B episode has yet again rekindled the debate on the need for rules for rocket and large body re-entries. Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation, for instance, questioned why, despite all ranting about China’s rocket re-entry issues, the US State Department has “consistently opposed anything stronger than voluntary guidelines.” Weeden has provided a useful Twitter thread on the US hesitancy to get on board with legal agreements on outer space. One problem is that while the US abides by international obligations, other do not. This is a concern that Weeden notes “has a grain of truth” but adds the caveat that “reality is not that definitive”. While he is correct to note that the issue is complicated, it is also true that countries like China have a terrible track record when it comes to meeting their treaty commitments. China’s violation of its own commitments with respect to nuclear non-proliferation, or in the South China Sea and East China Sea are well-known. Given this history, it is difficult to believe that China will allow itself to be bound by any restraints on its space programme, even if it signs any of these agreements. But given the US’ almost allergic reaction to signing legal agreements that others like China may violate, it doesn’t hurt China to keep bringing up PPWT-like (Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects) measures every now and then. This puts the whole international community in a bind. If we have to ensure safe and uninterrupted access to space, creating a secure, sustainable, and predictable outer space framework is essential. But unless all states demonstrate a commitment to living up to existing rules and norms, creating new ones will be difficult. Chinese ASAT development emboldens Taiwan invasion – either US doesn’t follow through on its defense commitments, which kills alliances, or it defends Taiwan, which goes nuclear Chow and Kelley 8/21 (Brian G., policy analyst for the Institute of World Politics, Ph.D in physics from Case Western Reserve University, MBA and Ph.D in finance from the University of Michigan, and Brandon, graduate of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service ) “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons Could Conquer Taiwan—Or Start a War,” National Interest, 8/21/2021 JL If current trends hold, then China’s Strategic Support Force will be capable by the late 2020s of holding key U.S. space assets at risk. Chinese military doctrine, statements by senior officials, and past behavior all suggest that China may well believe threatening such assets to be an effective means of deterring U.S. intervention. If so, then the United States would face a type of “Sophie’s Choice”: decline to intervene, potentially leading allies to follow suit and Taiwan to succumb without a fight, thereby enabling Xi to achieve his goal of “peacefully” snuffing out Taiwanese independence; or start a war that would at best be long and bloody and might well even cross the nuclear threshold. This emerging crisis has been three decades in the making. In 1991, China watched from afar as the United States used space-enabled capabilities to obliterate the Iraqi military from a distance in the first Gulf War. The People’s Liberation Army quickly set to work developing capabilities targeted at a perceived Achilles’ heel of this new American way of war: reliance on vulnerable space systems. This project came to fruition with a direct ascent ASAT weapons test in 2007, but the test was limited in two key respects. First, it only reached low Earth orbit. Second, it generated thousands of pieces of long-lasting space junk, provoking immense international ire. This backlash appears to have taken China by surprise, driving it to seek new, more usable ASAT types with minimal debris production. Now, one such ASAT is nearing operational status: spacecraft capable of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs). Such spacecraft are inevitable and cannot realistically be limited. The United States, European Union, China, and others are developing them to provide a range of satellite services essential to the new space economy, such as in situ repairs and refueling of satellites and active removal of space debris. But RPO capabilities are dual-use: if a satellite can grapple space objects for servicing, then it might well be capable of grappling an adversary’s satellite to move it out of its servicing orbit. Perhaps it could degrade or disable it by bending or disconnecting its solar panels and antennas all while producing minimal debris. This is a serious threat, primarily because no international rules presently exist to limit close approaches in space. Left unaddressed, this lacuna in international law and space policy could enable a prospective attacker to pre-position, during peacetime, as many spacecraft as they wish as close as they wish to as many high-value targets as they wish. The result would be an ever-present possibility of sudden, bolt-from-the-blue attacks on vital space assets—and worse, on many of them at once. China has conducted at least half a dozen tests of RPO capabilities in space since 2008, two of which went on for years. Influential space experts have noted that these tests have plausible peaceful purposes and are in many cases similar to those conducted by the United States. This, however, does not make it any less important to establish effective legal, policy, and technical counters to their offensive use. Even if it were certain that these capabilities are intended purely for peaceful applications—and it is not at all clear that that is the case—China (or any other country) could at any time decide to repurpose these capabilities for ASAT use. There is still time to get out ahead of this threat, but likely not for much longer. China’s RPO capabilities have, thus far, lagged about five years behind those of the United States. There are reasons to believe this gap may close, but even assuming that it holds, we should expect to see China demonstrate an operational dual-use rendezvous spacecraft by around 2025. (The first instance of a U.S. commercial satellite docking with another satellite to change its orbit occurred in February 2020.) At the same time, China is expanding its capacity for rapid spacecraft manufacturing. The Global Times reported in January that China’s first intelligent mass production line is set to produce 240 small satellites per year. In April, Andrew Jones at SpaceNews reported that China is developing plans to quickly produce and loft a thirteen thousand-satellite national internet megaconstellation. It is not unreasonable to assume that China could manufacture two hundred small rendezvous ASAT spacecraft by 2029, possibly more. If this happens, and Beijing was to decide in 2029 to launch these two hundred small RPO spacecraft and position them in close proximity to strategically vital assets, then China would be able to simultaneously threaten disablement of the entire constellations of U.S. satellites for missile early warning (about a dozen satellites with spares included); communications in a nuclear-disrupted environment (about a dozen); and positioning, navigation, and timing (about three dozen); along with several dozen key communications, imagery, and meteorology satellites. Losing these assets would severely degrade U.S. deterrence and warfighting capabilities, yet once close pre-positioning has occurred such losses become almost impossible to prevent. For this reason, such pre-positioning could conceivably deter the United States from coming to Taiwan’s aid due to the prospect that intervention would spur China to disable these critical space systems. Without their support, the war would be much bloodier and costlier—a daunting proposition for any president. Should the United States fail to intervene, the consequences would be disastrous for both Washington and its allies in East Asia, and potentially the credibility of U.S. defense commitments around the globe. Worse yet, however, might be what could happen if China believes that such a threat will succeed but proves to be wrong. History is rife with examples of major wars arising from miscalculations such as this, and there are many pathways by which such a situation could easily escalate out of control to a full-scale conventional conflict or even to nuclear use. Space dominance is key to US hegemony Weichert 17 (Brandon J., a former Congressional staff member who holds a Master of Arts in Statecraft and National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. He is the founder of The Weichert Report: An Online Journal of Geopolitics, and is currently completing a book on national security space policy.) “The High Ground: The Case for U.S. Space Dominance,” Science Direct, 2017. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0030438717300108 RR The global order is currently disordered. New states with completely different values from the United States are rising to prominence. Many of those states possess strategic cultures opposed to the American hegemony that has defined the post-Cold War order. Yet, the United States still maintains greater power, wealth, and capabilities than the other states seeking to displace her. For the United States to maintain its hegemonic position, it must also maintain a dominant position in space. As has been noted before, space is the ultimate high ground from which a state can dominate all of the other strategic domains (land, air, sea, and cyberspace). The United States has enjoyed the benefits from dominating this region. Yet, states like China and Russia are moving forward with their own plans not only to deny America access to space, but also to dominate this realm. These states would then benefit from commanding the high ground of space at America’s expense. Since at least the Nixon Administration, space has come to be viewed in a militarized light. By the end of the Cold War, space had not only been militarized, but many were searching for a way to weaponize it. Just as the drift toward militarization of space was inexorable, so too is the desire for weaponization. As rival states begin to hone their space skills, the United States should seek to obtain the first move advantage by capitalizing on its already sizable lead in space by weaponizing it first. The placing of weapons in orbit would not only increase the costs of attacking existing U.S. space architecture, but it would also lend itself to increasing global stability by raising the costs of aggressive behavior on belligerents. Whatever negatives the weaponization of space may have, nothing is more negative for America than to find itself losing its dominance of space to a state that has placed weapons in orbit first. To be passive and allow temporary budgetary constraints to dictate longterm space strategy will damage irrevocably the U.S. position in orbit. Our enemies are aware of our shortsighted preference for space superiority over dominance and are moving toward degrading the American advantage in space.23 Space dominance will not only rebuff rising states from challenging the United States, but it will also lend stability to the world order. This proactive stance was the goal of Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. It must be the goal of U.S. policymakers today.24 US leadership in this decade solves global war and results in a peaceful end to Chinese revisionism Erickson and Collins 10/21 (Andrew, A professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute)(Gabriel, Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy) “A Dangerous Decade of Chinese Power Is Here,” Foreign Policy, 10/18/2021 U.S. and allied policymakers are facing the most important foreign-policy challenge of the 21st century. China’s power is peaking; so is the political position of Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic strength. In the long term, China’s likely decline after this peak is a good thing. But right now, it creates a decade of danger from a system that increasingly realizes it only has a short time to fulfill some of its most critical, long-held goals. Within the next five years, China’s leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, structural economic problems, and technological estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives. As Xi internalizes these challenges, his foreign policy is likely to become even more accepting of risk, feeding on his nearly decadelong track record of successful revisionist action against the rules-based order. Notable examples include China occupying and militarizing sub-tidal features in the South China Sea, ramping up air and maritime incursions against Japan and Taiwan, pushing border challenges against India, occupying Bhutanese and Tibetan lands, perpetrating crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, and coercively enveloping Hong Kong. The relatively low-hanging fruit is plucked, but Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist prize: Taiwan. Beijing’s actions over the last decade have triggered backlash, such as with the so-called AUKUS deal, but concrete constraints on China’s strategic freedom of action may not fully manifest until after 2030. It’s remarkable and dangerous that China has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown. Beijing will likely conclude that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures for both “gray zone” and high-end scenarios, the 2021 to late 2020s timeframe still favors China—and is attractive for its 68-year-old leader, who seeks a historical achievement at the zenith of his career. U.S. planners must mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and thereby deter Chinese aggression in the coming decade—literally starting now—and innovatively employ assets that currently exist or can be operationally assembled and scaled within the next several years. That will be the first step to pushing back against China during the 2020s—a decade of danger—before what will likely be a waning of Chinese power. As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of inevitable Chinese strategic domination in Asia and beyond, it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals and its medium-term capacity to achieve them. China is, in fact, likely nearing the apogee of its relative power; and by 2030 to 2035, it will cross a tipping point from which it may never recover strategically. Growing headwinds constraining Chinese growth, while not publicly acknowledged by Beijing, help explain Xi’s high and apparently increasing risk tolerance. Beijing’s window of strategic opportunity is sliding shut. China’s skyrocketing household debt levels exemplify structural economic constraints that are emerging much earlier than they did for the United States when it had similar per capita GDP and income levels. Debt is often a wet blanket on consumption growth. A 2017 analysis published by the Bank for International Settlements found that once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60 percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds. As debt levels continue to rise at an absolute level that has accelerated almost continuously for the past decade, China also faces a hollowing out of its working-age population. This critical segment peaked in 2010 and has since declined, with the rate from 2015 to 2020 nearing 0.6 percent annually—nearly twice the respective pace in the United States. While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor. Moreover, the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do. Atop surging debt and worsening demographics, China also faces resource insecurity. China’s dependence on imported food and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections from Tsinghua University make a compelling case that China’s oil and gas imports will peak between 2030 and 2035. As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls equal to even a few percentage points of total demand can have outsized negative impacts. Domestic resource insufficiency by itself does not hinder economic growth—as the Four Asian Tigers’ multi-decade boom attests. But China is in a different position. Japan and South Korea never had to worry about the U.S. Navy interdicting inbound tankers or grain ships. In fact, the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries. Each of these dynamics—demographic downshifts, rising debts, resource supply insecurity—either imminently threatens or is already actively interfering with the CCP’s long-cherished goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society.” Electricity blackouts, real estate sector travails (like those of Evergrande) that show just how many Chinese investors’ financial eggs now sit in an unstable $52 trillion basket, and a solidifying alignment of countries abroad concerned by aggressive Chinese behavior all raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver. With this confluence of adverse events only a year before the next party congress, where personal ambition and survival imperatives will almost drive him to seek anointment as the only Chinese “leader for life” aside from former leader Mao Zedong, the timing only fuels his sense of insecurity. Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns and ruthless removal of potential rivals and their supporters solidified his power but likely also created a quiet corps of opponents who may prove willing to move against him if events create the perception he’s lost the “mandate of heaven.” Accordingly, the baseline assumption should be that Xi’s crown sits heavy and the insecurity induced is thereby intense enough to drive high-stake, high-consequence posturing and action. While Xi is under pressure to act, the external risks are magnified because so far, he has suffered few consequences from taking actions on issues his predecessors would likely never have gambled on. Reactions to party predations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong have been restricted to diplomatic-signaling pinpricks, such as sanctioning responsible Chinese officials and entities, most of whom lack substantial economic ties to the United States. Whether U.S. restraint results from a fear of losing market access or a belief that China’s goals are ultimately limited is not clear at this time. While the CCP issues retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and proclaims a triumphant outcome to its hostage diplomacy, these tactical public actions mask a growing private awareness that China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite—but knowing that when Beijing sees the tipping point in its rearview mirror, major rivals will recognize it too—amplifies Xi and the party’s anxiety to act on a shorter timeline. Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years. Just as China is mustering its own strategic actions, so the United States must also intensify its focus and deployment of resources. The United States has taken too long to warm up and confront the central challenge, but it retains formidable advantages, agility, and the ability to prevail—provided it goes all-in now. Conversely, if Washington fails to marshal its forces promptly, its achievements after 2030 or 2035 will matter little. Seizing the 2020s would enable Beijing to cripple destroy the free and open rules-based order and entrench its position by economically subjugating regional neighbors (including key U.S. treaty allies) to a degree that could offset the strategic headwinds China now increasingly grapples with. Deterrence is never certain. But it offers the highest probability of avoiding the certainty that an Indo-Pacific region dominated by a CCP-led China would doom treaty allies, threaten the U.S. homeland, and likely set the stage for worse to come. Accordingly, U.S. planners should immediately mobilize resources and effort as well as accept greater risks to deter Chinese action over the critical next decade. The greatest threat is armed conflict over Taiwan, where U.S. and allied success or failure will be fundamental and reverberate for the remainder of the century. There is a high chance of a major move against Taiwan by the late 2020s—following an extraordinary ramp-up in People’s Liberation Army capabilities and before Xi or the party state’s power grasp has ebbed or Washington and its allies have fully regrouped and rallied to the challenge. So how should policymakers assess the potential risk of Chinese action against Taiwan reaching dangerous levels by 2027 or possibly even earlier—as emphasized in the testimonies of Adms. Philip Davidson and John Aquilino? In June, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley testified to the House of Representatives that Xi had “challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027,” although China does not currently have the capabilities or intentions to conduct an all-out invasion of mainland Taiwan. U.S. military leaders’ assessments are informed by some of the world’s most extensive and sophisticated internal information. But what’s striking is open-source information available to everyone suggests similar things. Moving forward, a number of open-source indicators offer valuable “early warning lights” that can help policymakers more accurately calibrate both potential timetables and risk readings as the riskiest period of relations—from 2027 onward—approaches. Semiconductors supply self-sufficiency. Taiwan is the “OPEC+” of semiconductors, accounting for approximately two-thirds of global chip foundry capacity. A kinetic crisis would almost certainly disrupt—and potentially even completely curtail—semiconductor supplies. China presently spends even more each year on semiconductor imports (around $380 billion) than it does on oil, but much of the final products are destined for markets abroad. Taiwan is producing cutting-edge 5-nanometer and 7-nanometer chips, but China produces around 80 percent of the rest of the chips in the world. The closer China comes to being able to secure “good enough” chips for “inside China-only” needs, the less of a constraint this becomes. Crude oil, grain, strategic metals stockpiles—the commercial community (Planet Labs, Ursa Space Systems, etc.) has developed substantial expertise in cost-effectively tracking inventory changes for key input commodities needed to prepare for war. Electric vehicle fleet size—the amount of oil demand displaced by electric vehicles varies depending on miles driven, but the more of China’s car fleet that can be connected to the grid (and thus powered by blockade-resistant coal), the less political burden Beijing will face if it has to weather a maritime oil blockade imposed in response to actions it took against Taiwan or other major revisionist adventures. China’s passenger vehicle fleet, now approximately 225 million units strong, counts nearly 6.5 million electric vehicles among its ranks, the lion’s share of which are full-battery electrics. China’s State Council seeks to have 20 percent of new vehicles sold in China be electric vehicles by 2025. This target has already basically been achieved over the last few months, meaning at least 3.5 to 4 million (and eventually many more) new elective vehicles will enter China’s car fleet each year from now on. Local concentration of maritime vessels—snap exercises with warships, circumnavigations, and midline tests with swarms of aircraft highlight the growing scale of China’s threat to Taiwan. But these assets alone cannot invade the island. To capture and garrison, Beijing would need not only air, missile, naval, and special operations forces but also the ability to move lots of equipment and—at the very least—tens of thousands of personnel across the Taiwan Strait. As such, Beijing would have to amass maritime transport assets. And given the scale required, this would alter ship patterns elsewhere along China’s coast in ways detectable with artificial intelligence-facilitated imagery analysis from firms like Planet Labs (or national assets). Only the most formidable, agile American and allied deterrence can kick the can down the road long enough for China’s slowdown to shut the window of vulnerability. Holding the line is likely to require frequent and sustained proactive enforcement actions to disincentivize full-frontal Chinese assaults on the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese probing behavior and provocations must be met with a range of symmetric and asymmetric responses that impose real costs, such as publishing assets owned by Chinese officials abroad, cyber interference with China’s technological social control apparatus, “hands on” U.S. Navy and Coast Guard enforcement measures against Maritime Militia-affiliated vessels in the South China Sea, intensified air and maritime surveillance of Chinese naval bases, and visas and resettlement options to Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other threatened Chinese citizens—including CCP officials (and their families) who seek to defect and/or leave China. U.S. policymakers must make crystal clear to their Chinese counterparts that the engagement-above-all policies that dominated much of the past 25 years are over and the risks and costs of ongoing—and future—adventurism will fall heaviest on China. Bombastic Chinese reactions to emerging cohesive actions verify the approach’s effectiveness and potential for halting—and perhaps even reversing—the revisionist tide China has unleashed across the Asian region. Consider the recent nuclear submarine deal among Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Beijing’s strong public reaction (including toleration of nuclear threats made by the state-affiliated Global Times) highlights the gap between its global information war touting China’s irresistible power and deeply insecure internal self-perception. Eight nuclear submarines will ultimately represent formidable military capacity, but for a bona fide superpower that believes in its own capabilities, they would not be a game-changer. Consider the U.S.-NATO reaction to the Soviet Union’s commissioning of eight Oscar I/II-class cruise missile subs during the late Cold War. These formidable boats each carried 24 SS-N-19 Granit missiles specifically designed to kill U.S. carrier battle groups, yet NATO never stooped to public threats. With diplomatic proofs of concepts like the so-called AUKUS deal, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and hard security actions like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative now falling into place, it is time to comprehensively peak the non-authoritarian world’s protective action to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific. During this decade, U.S. policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate Chinese behavior. Xi’s recreation of a “one-man” system is a one-way, high-leverage bet that decisions he drives will succeed. If Xi miscalculates, a significant risk given his suppression of dissenting voices while China raises the stakes in its confrontation with the United States, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left him with outsized returns on a successful bet would instead amplify the downside, all of which he personally and exclusively signed for. Resulting tensions could very realistically undermine his status and authority, embolden internal challengers, and weaken the party. They could also foreseeably drive him to double down on mistakes, especially if those led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict. Personal survival measures could thus rapidly transmute into regional or even global threats. If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the U.S. electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure as well as that of allies and partners abroad for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that actual conflict is a concrete possibility. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“if you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a variety of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with China. Given these unforgiving dynamics and stakes, implications for U.S. planners are stark: Do whatever remains possible to “peak” for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s, and accept whatever trade-offs are available for doing so. Nothing we might theoretically achieve in 2035 and beyond is worth pursuing at the expense of China-credible capabilities we can realistically achieve no later than the mid-to-late 2020s. Be highly skeptical of heg bad arguments – their evidence is epistemologically suspect Gilsinan 20 (Kathy, a St. Louis-based contributing writer at The Atlantic. Her book, The Helpers: Profiles From the Front Lines of the Pandemic, comes out in March 2022. She was previously an editor at World Politics Review.) “How China Is Planning to Win Back the World” The Atlantic, 5/28/2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/05/china-disinformation-propaganda-united-states-xi-jinping/612085/ BC This was a bizarre salvo in China’s propaganda war with the United States over the coronavirus, and it showcased Beijing’s latest information weaponry. Misleading spin, obfuscation, concealment, and hyperbole have been hallmarks of the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda campaign, before and during the coronavirus era. But the pandemic appears to have given rise to more forceful attacks on foreign governments, as well as a new level of flirtation with outright disinformation. The party has never waged a global struggle quite like this one—and its battle with the U.S. over where the virus came from and whose failures made the pandemic worse have marked a serious deterioration in the two countries’ ties. Just months ago, Trump was praising Xi Jinping for how he handled the outbreak; now Trump is toying with cutting off relations with the Chinese government altogether. Seven decades ago, Mao Zedong publicly embraced a benevolent view of propaganda, as if he were a latter-day prophet spreading the communist gospel: “We should carry on constant propaganda among the people on the facts of world progress and the bright future ahead so that they will build their confidence in victory,” he mused in 1945. Just a few months ago, Xi Jinping urged state journalists to spread “positive propaganda” for the “correct guidance of public opinion.” Indeed, Beijing’s global propaganda efforts in recent years have been more about promoting China’s virtues than about spreading acrimony and confusion, à la Russian information ops and election meddling. Moscow wants a weakened and divided West, one that leaves Russia free to dominate its self-appointed sphere of influence—but Russia in 2016 was also an economically sluggish, oil-dependent nation with an economy a tenth the size of America’s, and lacked the resources to remake the world in its image. Beijing has a much bigger prize in mind and a much longer-term plan to get it: The contest isn’t about who gets to run the U.S. It’s about who deserves to run the world. And China, with its economy poised to overtake that of the United States, has already plowed billions into crafting an image as a responsible global leader, and billions more into cultivating global dependence on Chinese investments and Chinese markets. “While the Chinese Communist Party has long sought to be a global influencer, their efforts today are aggressive and sophisticated,” Bill Evanina, the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, wrote in an email. “In short, they’re looking to reshape the history of coronavirus and protect their reputation at home and around the world.” Before the coronavirus hit, the party was becoming bolder in its propaganda efforts overseas as China grew richer and more powerful, trying to promote around the world the orthodoxy it enforced at home, about the beneficence and goodness of the CCP. This involved publicizing Chinese investments in the developing world, arm-twisting diplomats to toe a pro-China line, ruthlessly trying to stifle even other countries’ freedom to dissent—to the point of sanctioning Norway in 2010 when the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded its peace prize to the imprisoned democracy activist Liu Xiaobo, who died in 2017. Xi has elevated the role of propaganda even further as he has vowed to build China’s power and prosperity, declaring, “The superiority of our system will be fully demonstrated through a brighter future.” The coronavirus outbreak and the global outcry against China’s failures of transparency and containment were not part of the plan. They sparked an international backlash that, by Beijing’s reported reckoning, was worse than anything it had faced since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. So Beijing leaped to seize, or at least confuse, the global story of the virus and its cast of heroes and villains. This has involved unleashing techniques Russia perfected during the U.S. presidential election in 2016. “We’ve seen China adopt Russian-style social media manipulation tactics like using bots and trolls to amplify disinformation on COVID-19,” Lea Gabrielle, the special envoy and coordinator for the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, wrote to me in an email. “Both countries repress information within their countries while taking advantage of the open and free information environments in democracies to push conspiracy theories that seek to undermine those environments.” As the world realized the virus was spreading out of control, Chinese diplomats, official media, and Twitter influencers launched an aggressive frenzy of defense, scrambling to preserve the Chinese Communist Party’s cratering reputation at home and overseas. And then they went on offense, with an assist from perhaps thousands of fake or hacked Twitter accounts, according to the investigative site ProPublica. The result was a coordinated campaign of attacks on the United States, and the spread of disinformation and confusion about where the virus really came from and whose screwup it was, really, that led to so much death. Other countries’ faltering responses to the virus have only bolstered this narrative, and the CCP has gleefully trumpeted America’s failures in particular. “Loose political system in the US allows more than 4000 people to die of pandemic every day,” Hu Xijin, the editor in chief of the Global Times newspaper, tweeted in April. “Americans are so good tempered.” Beyond the immediate crisis, this kind of narrative also serves the longer-term goal. In the words of Matt Schrader, a former China analyst with the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshall Fund: “Ultimately it’s about the Chinese Communist Party being the most powerful political entity on the planet.” The CCP has evolved in its themes and tactics over the course of the coronavirus information war so far, as it battles to bolster its own reputation and degrade that of the United States. The campaign has been widespread and highly focused at the same time. And the party has grown even more emboldened in the belief that it’s too big to fail, and that the reeling world may condemn it but still depends on it. Framing The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything. Moen 16 Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281 SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask a man what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable. Moen 16 Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281 SJDI I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “it is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27 Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012) These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe. Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one. Bostrom 12 Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford., Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1 chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential risk—positive or negative—is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.
12/18/21
JF - China AC v3
Tournament: Peninsula | Round: 4 | Opponent: Iowa City West FZ | Judge: Kavin Kumaravel China AC AC 1AC – Plan Plan: The People’s Republic of China should ban the appropriation of outer space by private entities. Chinese space industrial base is set to surpass the US Patel 21 (Neel, space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and I also write The Airlock newsletter, your number one source for everything happening off this planet. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where I grew and led the website’s space coverage.) “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US” MIT Technology Review, 1/21/2021. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/ BC How did China get here—and why? Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle. That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called Document 60 that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry. “Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.” As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a 2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses. More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services. For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another. Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it released the first images taken by the satellite, Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost. To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence. Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding. And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “These companies are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities. There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike. A strong space industrial base makes government sponsored operations in space economically feasible Patel 21 (Neel, space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and I also write The Airlock newsletter, your number one source for everything happening off this planet. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where I grew and led the website’s space coverage.) “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US” MIT Technology Review, 1/21/2021. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/ BC China’s space program might have been slowed by the pandemic in 2020, but it certainly didn’t stop. The year’s highlights included sending a rover to Mars, bringing moon rocks back to Earth, and testing out the next-generation crewed vehicle that should take taikonauts into orbit—and possibly to the moon—one day. But there were a few achievements the rest of the world might not have noticed. One was the November 7 launch of Ceres-1, a new type of rocket that, at just 62 feet in height, is capable of taking 770 pounds of payload into low Earth orbit. The launch sent the Tianqi 11 communications satellite into space. At first glance, the Ceres-1 launch might seem unremarkable. Ceres-1, however, wasn’t built and launched by China’s national program. It was a commercial rocket—only the second from a Chinese company ever to go into space. And the launch happened less than three years after the company was founded. The achievement is a milestone for China’s fledgling—but rapidly growing—private space industry, an increasingly critical part of the country’s quest to dethrone the US as the world’s preeminent space power. The rivalry between the US and China, whose space program has surged over the last two decades, is what most people mean when they refer to the 21st-century's space race. China is set to build a new space station later this year and will likely attempt to send its taikonauts to the moon before the decade ends. But these big-picture projects represent just one aspect of the country’s space ambitions. Increasingly, the focus is now on the commercial space industry as well. The nation's growing private space business is less focused on bringing prestige and glory to the nation and more concerned with reducing the cost of spaceflight, increasing its international influence—and making money. “The state is really great at large, ambitious projects like going to the moon or developing a large reconnaissance satellite,” says Lincoln Hines, a Cornell University researcher who focuses on Chinese foreign policy. “But it’s not responsive to meeting market needs”—one big way to encourage rapid technological growth and innovation. “I think the government thinks its commercial space sector can be complementary to the state,” he says. What are the market needs that Hines is referring to? Satellites, and rockets that can launch them into orbit. The space industry is undergoing a renaissance thanks to two big trends spurred by the commercial industry: we can make satellites for less money by making them smaller and using off-the-shelf hardware; and we can also make rockets for less money, by using less costly materials or reusing boosters after they’ve already flown (which SpaceX pioneered with its Falcon 9). These trends mean it is now cheaper to send stuff into space, and the services and data that satellites can offer have come down in price accordingly. China has seen an opportunity. A 2017 report by Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimates that the space industry could be worth up to $2.7 trillion by 2030. Setting foot on the moon and establishing a lunar colony might be a statement of national power, but securing a share of such a highly lucrative business is perhaps even more important to the country’s future. “In the future, there will be tens of thousands of satellites waiting to launch, which is a major opportunity for Galactic Energy” says Wu Yue, a company spokesperson. The problem is, China has to make up decades’ worth of ground lost to the West. The PRC uses the private sector to develop military assets and pursue counterbalancing with Russia Curcio 8/24 (Blaine, an Affiliate Senior Consultant for Euroconsult, based in Hong Kong. Since joining Euroconsult in 2018, he has contributed to a wide range of consulting missions and research reports, primarily covering the satcom sector globally, and broader space industry in China.) “Developments in China's Commercial Space Sector” The National Bureau of Asian Research, 8/24/2021. https://www.nbr.org/publication/developments-in-chinas-commercial-space-sector/ BC There has been discussion that China and Russia might partner to develop a lunar space station. How is this affecting China-Russia space cooperation as well as China’s commercial space sector? The Russian and U.S. space industries are the two oldest. They have a lot of space programs, experts, and related intellectual property and have been integrated into the space ecosystem. The Chinese space sector has developed primarily independently from the U.S.-Russia system. There has been some collaboration between China and Europe since the Wolf Amendment, but the absence of any kind of commercial space companies until recently, combined with the sensitivity around the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (a U.S. export-control regime), has forced the Chinese space ecosystem to develop pretty much independently. Russia, though a nation in decline, still likes projects involving space to bolster national pride. As a result, there has been a broader trend over the last five to ten years of a gradual realignment of the Russian space sector toward China in terms of both the government and the industrial base. More Russian companies are looking to China to buy products. Historically these companies have bought material from Europe, but they have recently turned more to China because of how weak the Russian ruble is, making imports more expensive. At the same time, Chinese companies are looking to Russia as an export market as well as to Russia and former Soviet states as investment opportunities. There is synergy, for example, between a Chinese rocket company that sees a relatively cheap Ukrainian rocket company with specific technology that it wants and a Ukrainian company that has all the technology, intellectual property, and “know-how,” but does not have that much money. The international lunar research station is beneficial to the commercial space sector to the extent that the national team would be occupied with the space station. As the national team gets bigger and takes on more sophisticated projects, this may help free up the kind of lower-end work companies were doing before and create more room for commercial competition. Moving forward, if there are massive lunar projects and a large Chinese space station, these developments are all things that will occupy a lot of top engineers and SOEs. There will be a need for a bigger commercial sector to contribute to emerging projects and complete the technological development of the more commercial, as opposed to institutional or national-level, projects in the space sector. What is the relationship between China’s space industry development and its Military-Civil Fusion strategy, and how is this affecting the commercial space sector? There are two main types of impact: the technological impact and the broader policy impact. As part of the Military-Civil Fusion strategy, the Chinese government wants to develop specific capabilities and emphasize specific technologies, which produce the technological impact. From that perspective, this strategy dictates what the commercial space sector does in terms of RandD, and the technological direction it takes. Zhuhai satellite is an example of this strategy. Since Zhuhai satellite was a spinoff from the Harbin Institute of Technology, which has a military link, there is a possibility that it is pursuing more space technologies that are related to Military-Civil Fusion. The second type is the broader policy impact. Because the central government makes Military-Civil Fusion a significant policy objective, there will be industrial bases that are built to support related technologies. More money and resources will be available for a startup that will support China’s strategic and tech ambitions. Because of the money and resources that are available, the development of the space industry will change as companies adapt their activities to what the government is emphasizing and to what kind of support they can get from different stakeholders in order to survive. China does not currently have a huge commercial space sector. The only real way that these companies can grow is either by selling products to the existing space sector—which is not particularly easy at this stage—or by raising money from existing shareholders and trying to guess where the market is moving. Scenario one is space militarization: Sino-Russian space alliance undermines existing treaties and greenlights space militarization Bowman and Thompson 3/31 (Bradley Bowman, the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) (Jared Thompson, a U.S. Air Force major and visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.) “Russia and China Seek to Tie America’s Hands in Space” Foreign Policy 3/31/2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/russia-china-space-war-treaty-demilitarization-satellites/ BC Consider the actions of the United States’ two great-power adversaries when it comes to anti-satellite weapons. China and Russia have sprinted to develop and deploy both ground-based and space-based weapons targeting satellites while simultaneously pushing the United States to sign a treaty banning such weapons. To protect its vital space-based military capabilities—including communications, intelligence, and missile defense satellites—and effectively deter authoritarian aggression, Washington should avoid being drawn into suspect international treaties on space that China and Russia have no intention of honoring. The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which Beijing and Moscow have submitted at the United Nations, is a perfect example. PPWT signatories commit “not to place any weapons in outer space.” It also says parties to the treaty may not “resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects” or engage in activities “inconsistent” with the purpose of the treaty. On the surface, that sounds innocuous. Who, after all, wants an arms race in space? The reality, however, is that China and Russia are already racing to field anti-satellite weapons and have been for quite some time. “The space domain is competitive, congested, and contested,” Gen. James Dickinson, the head of U.S. Space Command, said in January. “Our competitors, most notably China and Russia, have militarized this domain.” Beijing already has an operational ground-based anti-satellite missile capability. People’s Liberation Army units are training with the missiles, and the U.S. Defense Department believes Beijing “probably intends to pursue additional anti-satellite weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.” That is where America’s most sensitive nuclear communication and missile defense satellites orbit and keep watch. Similarly, Moscow tested a ground-based anti-satellite weapon in December that could destroy U.S. or allied satellites in orbit. That attack capability augments a ground-based laser weapon that Russian President Vladimir Putin heralded in 2018. In a moment of candor, Russia’s defense ministry admitted the system was designed to “fight satellites.” To make matters worse, both countries are also working to deploy space-based—or so-called “on-orbit”—capabilities to attack satellites. Meanwhile, at the United Nations and other international forums, China and Russia are pushing the PPWT and advocating for a “no first placement” resolution—saying all governments should commit not to be the first to put weapons in space. Yet more than two years ago, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency noted that both China and Russia were already putting in space capabilities that could be used as weapons. The PPWT would thus protect their weapons while tying Washington’s hands. In a thinly veiled attempt to mask their intentions, the two countries claim that their on-orbit capabilities are simply for peaceful purposes—for assessing the condition of broken satellites and conducting repairs as needed. This “dual-use” disguise permits Beijing and Moscow to put into orbit ostensibly peaceful or commercial capabilities that those countries can actually use to disable or destroy U.S. military and intelligence satellites. China, for example, has tested several so-called scavenger satellites, which use grappling arms to capture other satellites. China has also demonstrated the capability to maneuver a satellite around the geosynchronous belt, allowing its satellites to sidle up to other satellites in space. Not to be outdone, Russia deployed a pair of “nesting doll” satellites that shadowed a U.S. satellite in space. One Russian satellite birthed another, with Russia’s defense ministry claiming its purpose was to assess the “technical condition of domestic satellites.” But later, the second satellite conducted a weapons test, firing what appeared to be a space torpedo. The Kremlin never explained how a fast-moving one-time projectile provided superior inspection benefits compared with the other Russian satellite flying persistently nearby. Instead of falling prey to China and Russia’s treaty trap, Washington must urgently work with allies to improve spaced-based military and intelligence capabilities. A well-crafted treaty that clearly defines acceptable and unacceptable actions in space and includes tough and realistic inspection and verification mechanisms could promote security and stability. But the PPWT is decidedly not that kind of treaty. For starters, the proposed treaty does not explicitly prohibit the ground-based anti-satellite weapons that China and Russia have already fielded. Nor does the proposed treaty prevent the deployment of space-based weapons under the cloak of civilian or commercial capabilities. The PPWT also does not prohibit the development, testing, or stockpiling of weapons on Earth that could be quickly put into orbit. Even if these deficiencies were addressed, the PPWT lacks any verification plan to ensure compliance. Instead, the treaty calls for “transparency and confidence-building measures” implemented on a “voluntary basis.” In other words, Beijing and Moscow want the United States to trust but never verify. But then again, Americans should not be surprised by the PPWT. Moscow habitually seeks to use international arms control treaties to constrain the United States while viewing treaty strictures as optional when they become inconvenient or when the Kremlin sees an opportunity to seize a military advantage. For more than a decade before its demise in 2019, Moscow used the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty to constrain the United States while the Kremlin produced, flight-tested, and fielded a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile in direct contravention of the treaty. Beijing, for its part, often exhibits an allergy to serious international arms control treaties. The willingness of the Chinese Communist Party to support the PPWT is, therefore, cause for some additional reflection in Washington. So instead of falling prey to China and Russia’s PPWT trap, the United States must urgently work with allies to improve the resilience and redundancy of spaced-based military and intelligence capabilities. Washington should also advance nascent efforts to establish rules of the road in space. “There are really no norms of behavior in space,” Gen. John Raymond, the chief of space operations at U.S. Space Force, said this month. “It’s the wild, wild West.” In a notable and positive step, the U.N. General Assembly passed a British-introduced resolution in December that seeks to establish “norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” in space, which could reduce the chances for dangerous miscalculation. The vote was 164 in favor, including the United States—and a mere 12 opposed. Any guesses regarding who voted no? You guessed it: China and Russia. They were joined by their friends Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Cuba. So much for a Chinese and Russian desire to pursue constructive and peaceful policies in space. Their duplicity continues. Sino-Russian space militarization causes space war – Rogin 11/30 (Josh, a columnist for the Global Opinions section of The Washington Post. He writes about foreign policy and national security. Rogin is also a political analyst for CNN. He previously worked for Bloomberg View, the Daily Beast, Foreign Policy, Congressional Quarterly, Federal Computer Week and Japan's Asahi Shimbun newspaper.) “Opinion: A shadow war in space is heating up fast” Washington Post, 11/30/2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/11/30/space-race-china-david-thompson/ BC When Russia blows up a satellite in space with a missile (as it did this month), or when China tests a new hypersonic missile (as it did last month), the ongoing arms race in space leaps into the news. But in between these “Sputnik”-like moments, outside the public’s view, the United States and its adversaries are battling in space every day. While Washington officials and experts warn of the risks of an arms race in space, the United States’ adversaries are constantly conducting operations against U.S. satellites that skirt the line between intelligence operations and acts of war. The pace of conflict is intensifying, according to a top Space Force general, who told me that China could overtake the United States to become the number one power in space by the end of the decade. “The threats are really growing and expanding every single day. And it’s really an evolution of activity that’s been happening for a long time,” Gen. David Thompson, the Space Force’s first vice chief of space operations, told me in an interview on the sidelines of the recent Halifax International Security Forum. “We’re really at a point now where there’s a whole host of ways that our space systems can be threatened.” Right now, Space Force is dealing with what Thompson calls “reversible attacks” on U.S. government satellites (meaning attacks that don’t permanently damage the satellites) “every single day.” Both China and Russia are regularly attacking U.S. satellites with non-kinetic means, including lasers, radio frequency jammers and cyber attacks, he said. Thompson repeatedly declined to comment on whether China or Russia has attacked a U.S. military satellite in a way that did permanent or significant damage, telling me that would be classified if it had happened. The Chinese military is quickly deploying ground-based systems for doing battle in space, such as lasers that can damage nosy U.S. intelligence community satellites, which could be considered an act of war. “The Chinese are actually well ahead of Russia,” Thompson said. “They're fielding operational systems at an incredible rate.” Both the Russians and the Chinese are working on satellites that can attack other satellites, he said. For some time now there have been reports that China was developing a satellite that could claw another satellite or grab one with a robotic arm or a grappling hook. The Chinese government has several reasons to want to disable U.S. satellites, which have been useful in revealing concentration camps built to intern Uyghur Muslims and new Chinese nuclear missile silo fields. In 2019, Russia deployed a small satellite into an orbit so close to a U.S. “national security satellite” that the U.S. government didn’t know whether it was attacking or not, Thompson said. Then, the Russian satellite backed away and conducted a weapons test. It released a small target and then shot it with a projectile. “It maneuvered close, it maneuvered dangerously, it maneuvered threateningly so that they were coming close enough that there was a concern of collision,” he said. “So clearly, the Russians were sending us a message.” China is building its own version of satellite-based global positioning systems, said Thompson. That’s in addition to the “couple of hundred” intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance satellites China has now deployed to watch over any part of the globe. China is also putting satellites into space at twice the rate of the United States, meaning that if nothing changes on our end, China will surpass the United States in capability in space in a few years, he estimated. “We are still the best in the world, clearly in terms of capability. They're catching up quickly,” he said. “We should be concerned by the end of this decade if we don't adapt.” While China is quickly weaponizing space, its government points fingers at United States, claiming that Washington is the diplomatic stumbling black. There are reports that the Biden administration is reaching out to Beijing to establish new negotiations for a nuclear arms control, as well as international norms for cyberspace and space, but U.S. officials say that China won’t meaningfully engage. The U.S. military is trying to speed up the procurement and deployment of space assets by creating structures like the Space Rapid Capabilities Office and the Space Development Agency, he said. Thompson’s idea is to deploy a large number of relatively low-cost satellites in constellations that increase the resiliency of U.S. space assets if they come under attack. Conventional thinking about how to deter an enemy from attacking on the ground, by sea or in the air doesn’t really apply to space. New doctrines and norms for space need to be established, mostly by diplomats. That work will take years. Meanwhile, the arms race in space is heating up, and the United States risks losing it if it doesn’t recognize this reality. Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change Starr 15 (Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction,” Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015 DD
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs. Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts. The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70 of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences. Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?
Scenario two is hegemony Chinese space leadership encourages ASAT proliferation – only the plan solves China will not honor international commitments Rajagopalan 5/12 (Dr Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Dr Rajagopalan was the Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019). She was also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre from April-December 2020. As a senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat, she writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues. Dr Rajagopalan joined ORF after a five-year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (2003-2007), Government of India, where she was an Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan in 2012. Dr Rajagopalan has authored or edited nine books including Global Nuclear Security: Moving Beyond the NSS (2018), Space Policy 2.0 (2017), Nuclear Security in India (2015), Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity among Asian Great Powers (2012), The Dragon's Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Its Implications for Asia (2009). She has published research essays in edited volumes, and in peer reviewed journals such as India Review, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air and Space Power Journal, International Journal of Nuclear Law and Strategic Analysis. She has also contributed essays to newspapers such as The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Times of India, and The Economic Times. She has been invited to speak at international fora including the United Nations Disarmament Forum (New York), the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) (Vienna), Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the European Union.) “China’s irresponsible behaviour: A threat to space security” Observer Research Foundation, 5/12/2021. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinas-irresponsible-behaviour-a-threat-to-space-security/ BC With China planning an ambitious space programme that includes its own space station, it is likely that there will be more such risky incidents in the future as well. It is somewhat disturbing because China’s space programme has advanced to a degree that it undertakes missions including landing on the South Pole-Aitken Basin (on the far side of the Moon), returning rocks from the moon, and an interplanetary mission to Mars, which clearly demonstrates China has the technical capability to design and launch rockets whose spent stages can land without putting others at risk. That it has not done so is odd. It is not exactly what can be characterised as responsible behaviour in space. Another example of China breaking norms and engaging in irresponsible behaviour in space is its ASAT test. China’s first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007, at an altitude of 850 kilometres, resulted in creating around 3,000 pieces of space debris. More significantly, it broke the unwritten moratorium that was in place for two decades. Beijing also started developing various counterspace capabilities with the goal of competing with the US. Nevertheless, each of China’s actions have led to a spiral effect, with others seeking to match China’s actions, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, given the contested nature of Asian and global geopolitics. For example, China’s repeated ASAT tests have led to the US’ own ASAT test (Operation Burnt Frost in 2008), and India’s ASAT test (Mission Shakti in 2019). India had no plans to go down this path until China’s first ASAT test, which became a gamechanging moment for India. Even so, India did not react to it for more than a decade, but the final decision was a carefully calibrated and a direct response to China’s growing military space capabilities and its less-than responsible behaviour. Other countries like Japan and France are also contemplating moves in this direction. Australia may not be far behind either. Even though it may not be linked to the uncontrolled re-entry of the Chinese rocket, Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist at the Astrophysics Center at Harvard University noted that “about six minutes after Tianhe and the CZ-5B separated, they both came close to the ISS—under 300 km, which given uncertainties in trajectory is a tad alarming.” Making this point, he added “it’s *possible* that this ISS/Tianhe close encounter was one of those unlikely coincidences. I’m open to that possibility, but they should still have spotted the closeness and warned NASA (or better, called a collision avoidance hold in the count).” Rocket re-entries are not uncommon, but space powers have tried to avoid the freefalls by usually conducting controlled re-entries so that they may fall in the ocean, or they may be directed towards the so-called “graveyard” orbits that may lie there for decades. But Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist at the Astrophysics Center at Harvard University argues that the Chinese rocket was designed in a manner that “leaves these big stages in low orbit.” And even in the case of controlled re-entries, there are failures sometimes and they can be dangerous too. SpaceX’s rocket debris landing on a farm in Washington in March this year is a case in point. Moriba Jah, an Associate Professor at The University of Texas at Austin argues in a media interview that such events are going to become more common, and will happen more frequently and, therefore, humanity should come together to “jointly manage near earth space as a commons in need of coordination, protocols, and practices to maximise safety, security, and sustainability.” On the NASA Administrator’s statement, Jah said this should not be “singling out China.” Certainly, this is not about apportioning blame, but China’s actions cannot be condoned either. What can be done? Given that usable orbits in space are finite in nature, there will need to be steps taken by all the space players to ensure that their actions do not contribute to further pollution of space and make it unusable in the near term. States have to invest in technologies that would aid in cleaning up and getting rid of some of the debris. States also need to come together in developing norms, rules of the road, and legally binding and political instruments on large rocket body re-entries. The Long March 5B episode has yet again rekindled the debate on the need for rules for rocket and large body re-entries. Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation, for instance, questioned why, despite all ranting about China’s rocket re-entry issues, the US State Department has “consistently opposed anything stronger than voluntary guidelines.” Weeden has provided a useful Twitter thread on the US hesitancy to get on board with legal agreements on outer space. One problem is that while the US abides by international obligations, other do not. This is a concern that Weeden notes “has a grain of truth” but adds the caveat that “reality is not that definitive”. While he is correct to note that the issue is complicated, it is also true that countries like China have a terrible track record when it comes to meeting their treaty commitments. China’s violation of its own commitments with respect to nuclear non-proliferation, or in the South China Sea and East China Sea are well-known. Given this history, it is difficult to believe that China will allow itself to be bound by any restraints on its space programme, even if it signs any of these agreements. But given the US’ almost allergic reaction to signing legal agreements that others like China may violate, it doesn’t hurt China to keep bringing up PPWT-like (Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects) measures every now and then. This puts the whole international community in a bind. If we have to ensure safe and uninterrupted access to space, creating a secure, sustainable, and predictable outer space framework is essential. But unless all states demonstrate a commitment to living up to existing rules and norms, creating new ones will be difficult. Chinese ASAT development emboldens Taiwan invasion – either US doesn’t follow through on its defense commitments, which kills alliances, or it defends Taiwan, which goes nuclear Chow and Kelley 8/21 (Brian G., policy analyst for the Institute of World Politics, Ph.D in physics from Case Western Reserve University, MBA and Ph.D in finance from the University of Michigan, and Brandon, graduate of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service ) “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons Could Conquer Taiwan—Or Start a War,” National Interest, 8/21/2021 JL If current trends hold, then China’s Strategic Support Force will be capable by the late 2020s of holding key U.S. space assets at risk. Chinese military doctrine, statements by senior officials, and past behavior all suggest that China may well believe threatening such assets to be an effective means of deterring U.S. intervention. If so, then the United States would face a type of “Sophie’s Choice”: decline to intervene, potentially leading allies to follow suit and Taiwan to succumb without a fight, thereby enabling Xi to achieve his goal of “peacefully” snuffing out Taiwanese independence; or start a war that would at best be long and bloody and might well even cross the nuclear threshold. This emerging crisis has been three decades in the making. In 1991, China watched from afar as the United States used space-enabled capabilities to obliterate the Iraqi military from a distance in the first Gulf War. The People’s Liberation Army quickly set to work developing capabilities targeted at a perceived Achilles’ heel of this new American way of war: reliance on vulnerable space systems. This project came to fruition with a direct ascent ASAT weapons test in 2007, but the test was limited in two key respects. First, it only reached low Earth orbit. Second, it generated thousands of pieces of long-lasting space junk, provoking immense international ire. This backlash appears to have taken China by surprise, driving it to seek new, more usable ASAT types with minimal debris production. Now, one such ASAT is nearing operational status: spacecraft capable of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs). Such spacecraft are inevitable and cannot realistically be limited. The United States, European Union, China, and others are developing them to provide a range of satellite services essential to the new space economy, such as in situ repairs and refueling of satellites and active removal of space debris. But RPO capabilities are dual-use: if a satellite can grapple space objects for servicing, then it might well be capable of grappling an adversary’s satellite to move it out of its servicing orbit. Perhaps it could degrade or disable it by bending or disconnecting its solar panels and antennas all while producing minimal debris. This is a serious threat, primarily because no international rules presently exist to limit close approaches in space. Left unaddressed, this lacuna in international law and space policy could enable a prospective attacker to pre-position, during peacetime, as many spacecraft as they wish as close as they wish to as many high-value targets as they wish. The result would be an ever-present possibility of sudden, bolt-from-the-blue attacks on vital space assets—and worse, on many of them at once. China has conducted at least half a dozen tests of RPO capabilities in space since 2008, two of which went on for years. Influential space experts have noted that these tests have plausible peaceful purposes and are in many cases similar to those conducted by the United States. This, however, does not make it any less important to establish effective legal, policy, and technical counters to their offensive use. Even if it were certain that these capabilities are intended purely for peaceful applications—and it is not at all clear that that is the case—China (or any other country) could at any time decide to repurpose these capabilities for ASAT use. There is still time to get out ahead of this threat, but likely not for much longer. China’s RPO capabilities have, thus far, lagged about five years behind those of the United States. There are reasons to believe this gap may close, but even assuming that it holds, we should expect to see China demonstrate an operational dual-use rendezvous spacecraft by around 2025. (The first instance of a U.S. commercial satellite docking with another satellite to change its orbit occurred in February 2020.) At the same time, China is expanding its capacity for rapid spacecraft manufacturing. The Global Times reported in January that China’s first intelligent mass production line is set to produce 240 small satellites per year. In April, Andrew Jones at SpaceNews reported that China is developing plans to quickly produce and loft a thirteen thousand-satellite national internet megaconstellation. It is not unreasonable to assume that China could manufacture two hundred small rendezvous ASAT spacecraft by 2029, possibly more. If this happens, and Beijing was to decide in 2029 to launch these two hundred small RPO spacecraft and position them in close proximity to strategically vital assets, then China would be able to simultaneously threaten disablement of the entire constellations of U.S. satellites for missile early warning (about a dozen satellites with spares included); communications in a nuclear-disrupted environment (about a dozen); and positioning, navigation, and timing (about three dozen); along with several dozen key communications, imagery, and meteorology satellites. Losing these assets would severely degrade U.S. deterrence and warfighting capabilities, yet once close pre-positioning has occurred such losses become almost impossible to prevent. For this reason, such pre-positioning could conceivably deter the United States from coming to Taiwan’s aid due to the prospect that intervention would spur China to disable these critical space systems. Without their support, the war would be much bloodier and costlier—a daunting proposition for any president. Should the United States fail to intervene, the consequences would be disastrous for both Washington and its allies in East Asia, and potentially the credibility of U.S. defense commitments around the globe. Worse yet, however, might be what could happen if China believes that such a threat will succeed but proves to be wrong. History is rife with examples of major wars arising from miscalculations such as this, and there are many pathways by which such a situation could easily escalate out of control to a full-scale conventional conflict or even to nuclear use. Cementing America’s lead in the commercial space industry is key to preserve hegemony Autry and Kwast 19 (Greg, a clinical professor of space leadership, policy, and business at Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management. He served on the 2016 NASA transition team and as the White House liaison at NASA in 2017. He is the chair of the Safety Working Group for the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee.) (Steve, a Lieutenant General and commander of Recruiting, Training, Educating and Development for the Air Force. He is an astronautical engineer and Harvard Fellow in Public Policy.) “America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China” Foreign Policy, 8/22/2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/22/america-is-losing-the-second-space-race-to-china/ BC The private sector can give the United States a much-needed rocket boost. The current U.S. space defense strategy is inadequate and on a path to failure. President Donald Trump’s vision for a Space Force is big enough. As he said on June 18, “It is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space.” But the Air Force is not matching this vision. Instead, the leadership is currently focused on incremental improvements to existing equipment and organizational structures. Dominating the vast and dynamic environment of space will require revolutionary capabilities and resources far deeper than traditional Department of Defense thinking can fund, manage, or even conceive of. Success depends on a much more active partnership with the commercial space industry— and its disruptive capabilities. U.S. military space planners are preparing to repeat a conflict they imagined back in the 1980s, which never actually occurred, against a vanished Soviet empire. Meanwhile, China is executing a winning strategy in the world of today. It is burning hard toward domination of the future space markets that will define the next century. They are planning infrastructure in space that will control 21st-century telecommunications, energy, transportation, and manufacturing. In doing so, they will acquire trillion-dollar revenues as well as the deep capabilities that come from continuous operational experience in space. This will deliver space dominance and global hegemony to China’s authoritarian rulers. Despite the fact that many in the policy and intelligence communities understand exactly what China is doing and have been trying to alert leadership, Air Force leadership has convinced the White House to fund only a slightly better satellite command with the same leadership, while sticking a new label onto their outmoded thinking. A U.S. Space Force or Corps with a satellite command will never fulfill Trump’s call to dominate space. Air Force leadership is demonstrating the same hubris that Gen. George Custer used in convincing Congress, over President Ulysses S. Grant’s better experience intuition, that he could overtake the Black Hills with repeating rifles and artillery. That strategy of technological overconfidence inflamed conflict rather than subduing it, and the 7th Cavalry were wiped out at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. The West was actually won by the settlers, ranchers, miners, and railroad barons who were able to convert the wealth of the territory itself into the means of holding it. They laid the groundwork that made the 20th century the American Century and delivered freedom to millions of people in Europe and Asia. Of course, they also trampled the indigenous people of the American West in their wake—but empty space comes with no such bloody cost. The very emptiness and wealth of this new, if not quite final, frontier, however, means that competition for resources and strategic locations in cislunar space (between the Earth and moon) will be intense over the next two decades. The outcome of this competition will determine the fate of humanity in the next century. China’s impending dominance will neutralize U.S. geopolitical power by allowing Beijing to control global information flows from the high ground of space. Imagine a school in Bolivia or a farmer in Kenya choosing between paying for a U.S. satellite internet or image provider or receiving those services for free as a “gift of the Chinese people.” It will be of little concern to global consumers that the news they receive is slanted or that searches for “free speech” link to articles about corruption in Western democracies. Nor will they care if concentration camps in Tibet and the Uighur areas of western China are obscured, or if U.S. military action is presented as tyranny and Chinese expansion is described as peacekeeping or liberation. China’s aggressive investment in space solar power will allow it to provide cheap, clean power to the world, displacing U.S. energy firms while placing a second yoke around the developing world. Significantly, such orbital power stations have dual use potential and, if properly designed, could serve as powerful offensive weapons platforms. China’s first step in this process is to conquer the growing small space launch market. Beijing is providing nominally commercial firms with government-manufactured, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles they can use to dump launch services on the market below cost. These start-ups are already undercutting U.S. pricing by 80 percent. Based on its previous success in using dumping to take out U.S. developed industries such as solar power modules and drones, China will quickly move upstream to attack the leading U.S. launch providers and secure a global commercial monopoly. Owning the launch market will give them an unsurmountable advantage against U.S. competitors in satellite internet, imaging, and power. The United States can still build a strategy to win. At this moment, it holds the competitive advantage in every critical space technology and has the finest set of commercial space firms in the world. It has pockets of innovative military thinkers within groups like the Defense Innovation Unit, under Mike Griffin, the Pentagon’s top research and development official. If the United States simply protects the intellectual property its creative minds unleash and defend its truly free markets from strategic mercantilist attack, it will not lose this new space race. The United States has done this before. It beat Germany to the nuclear bomb, it beat the Soviet Union to the nuclear triad, and it won the first space race. None of those victories was achieved by embracing the existing bureaucracy. Each of them depended on the president of the day following the only proven path to victory in a technological domain: establish a small team with a positively disruptive mindset and empower that team to investigate a wide range of new concepts, work with emerging technologies, and test innovative strategies. Today that means giving a dedicated Space Force the freedom to easily partner with commercial firms and leverage the private capital in building sustainable infrastructure that actually reduces the likelihood of conflict while securing a better economic future for the nation and the world.
US leadership in this decade solves global war and results in a peaceful end to Chinese revisionism Erickson and Collins 10/21 (Andrew, A professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute)(Gabriel, Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy) “A Dangerous Decade of Chinese Power Is Here,” Foreign Policy, 10/18/2021 U.S. and allied policymakers are facing the most important foreign-policy challenge of the 21st century. China’s power is peaking; so is the political position of Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic strength. In the long term, China’s likely decline after this peak is a good thing. But right now, it creates a decade of danger from a system that increasingly realizes it only has a short time to fulfill some of its most critical, long-held goals. Within the next five years, China’s leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, structural economic problems, and technological estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives. As Xi internalizes these challenges, his foreign policy is likely to become even more accepting of risk, feeding on his nearly decadelong track record of successful revisionist action against the rules-based order. Notable examples include China occupying and militarizing sub-tidal features in the South China Sea, ramping up air and maritime incursions against Japan and Taiwan, pushing border challenges against India, occupying Bhutanese and Tibetan lands, perpetrating crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, and coercively enveloping Hong Kong. The relatively low-hanging fruit is plucked, but Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist prize: Taiwan. Beijing’s actions over the last decade have triggered backlash, such as with the so-called AUKUS deal, but concrete constraints on China’s strategic freedom of action may not fully manifest until after 2030. It’s remarkable and dangerous that China has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown. Beijing will likely conclude that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures for both “gray zone” and high-end scenarios, the 2021 to late 2020s timeframe still favors China—and is attractive for its 68-year-old leader, who seeks a historical achievement at the zenith of his career. U.S. planners must mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and thereby deter Chinese aggression in the coming decade—literally starting now—and innovatively employ assets that currently exist or can be operationally assembled and scaled within the next several years. That will be the first step to pushing back against China during the 2020s—a decade of danger—before what will likely be a waning of Chinese power. As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of inevitable Chinese strategic domination in Asia and beyond, it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals and its medium-term capacity to achieve them. China is, in fact, likely nearing the apogee of its relative power; and by 2030 to 2035, it will cross a tipping point from which it may never recover strategically. Growing headwinds constraining Chinese growth, while not publicly acknowledged by Beijing, help explain Xi’s high and apparently increasing risk tolerance. Beijing’s window of strategic opportunity is sliding shut. China’s skyrocketing household debt levels exemplify structural economic constraints that are emerging much earlier than they did for the United States when it had similar per capita GDP and income levels. Debt is often a wet blanket on consumption growth. A 2017 analysis published by the Bank for International Settlements found that once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60 percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds. As debt levels continue to rise at an absolute level that has accelerated almost continuously for the past decade, China also faces a hollowing out of its working-age population. This critical segment peaked in 2010 and has since declined, with the rate from 2015 to 2020 nearing 0.6 percent annually—nearly twice the respective pace in the United States. While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor. Moreover, the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do. Atop surging debt and worsening demographics, China also faces resource insecurity. China’s dependence on imported food and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections from Tsinghua University make a compelling case that China’s oil and gas imports will peak between 2030 and 2035. As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls equal to even a few percentage points of total demand can have outsized negative impacts. Domestic resource insufficiency by itself does not hinder economic growth—as the Four Asian Tigers’ multi-decade boom attests. But China is in a different position. Japan and South Korea never had to worry about the U.S. Navy interdicting inbound tankers or grain ships. In fact, the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries. Each of these dynamics—demographic downshifts, rising debts, resource supply insecurity—either imminently threatens or is already actively interfering with the CCP’s long-cherished goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society.” Electricity blackouts, real estate sector travails (like those of Evergrande) that show just how many Chinese investors’ financial eggs now sit in an unstable $52 trillion basket, and a solidifying alignment of countries abroad concerned by aggressive Chinese behavior all raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver. With this confluence of adverse events only a year before the next party congress, where personal ambition and survival imperatives will almost drive him to seek anointment as the only Chinese “leader for life” aside from former leader Mao Zedong, the timing only fuels his sense of insecurity. Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns and ruthless removal of potential rivals and their supporters solidified his power but likely also created a quiet corps of opponents who may prove willing to move against him if events create the perception he’s lost the “mandate of heaven.” Accordingly, the baseline assumption should be that Xi’s crown sits heavy and the insecurity induced is thereby intense enough to drive high-stake, high-consequence posturing and action. While Xi is under pressure to act, the external risks are magnified because so far, he has suffered few consequences from taking actions on issues his predecessors would likely never have gambled on. Reactions to party predations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong have been restricted to diplomatic-signaling pinpricks, such as sanctioning responsible Chinese officials and entities, most of whom lack substantial economic ties to the United States. Whether U.S. restraint results from a fear of losing market access or a belief that China’s goals are ultimately limited is not clear at this time. While the CCP issues retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and proclaims a triumphant outcome to its hostage diplomacy, these tactical public actions mask a growing private awareness that China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite—but knowing that when Beijing sees the tipping point in its rearview mirror, major rivals will recognize it too—amplifies Xi and the party’s anxiety to act on a shorter timeline. Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years. Just as China is mustering its own strategic actions, so the United States must also intensify its focus and deployment of resources. The United States has taken too long to warm up and confront the central challenge, but it retains formidable advantages, agility, and the ability to prevail—provided it goes all-in now. Conversely, if Washington fails to marshal its forces promptly, its achievements after 2030 or 2035 will matter little. Seizing the 2020s would enable Beijing to cripple destroy the free and open rules-based order and entrench its position by economically subjugating regional neighbors (including key U.S. treaty allies) to a degree that could offset the strategic headwinds China now increasingly grapples with. Deterrence is never certain. But it offers the highest probability of avoiding the certainty that an Indo-Pacific region dominated by a CCP-led China would doom treaty allies, threaten the U.S. homeland, and likely set the stage for worse to come. Accordingly, U.S. planners should immediately mobilize resources and effort as well as accept greater risks to deter Chinese action over the critical next decade. The greatest threat is armed conflict over Taiwan, where U.S. and allied success or failure will be fundamental and reverberate for the remainder of the century. There is a high chance of a major move against Taiwan by the late 2020s—following an extraordinary ramp-up in People’s Liberation Army capabilities and before Xi or the party state’s power grasp has ebbed or Washington and its allies have fully regrouped and rallied to the challenge. So how should policymakers assess the potential risk of Chinese action against Taiwan reaching dangerous levels by 2027 or possibly even earlier—as emphasized in the testimonies of Adms. Philip Davidson and John Aquilino? In June, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley testified to the House of Representatives that Xi had “challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027,” although China does not currently have the capabilities or intentions to conduct an all-out invasion of mainland Taiwan. U.S. military leaders’ assessments are informed by some of the world’s most extensive and sophisticated internal information. But what’s striking is open-source information available to everyone suggests similar things. Moving forward, a number of open-source indicators offer valuable “early warning lights” that can help policymakers more accurately calibrate both potential timetables and risk readings as the riskiest period of relations—from 2027 onward—approaches. Semiconductors supply self-sufficiency. Taiwan is the “OPEC+” of semiconductors, accounting for approximately two-thirds of global chip foundry capacity. A kinetic crisis would almost certainly disrupt—and potentially even completely curtail—semiconductor supplies. China presently spends even more each year on semiconductor imports (around $380 billion) than it does on oil, but much of the final products are destined for markets abroad. Taiwan is producing cutting-edge 5-nanometer and 7-nanometer chips, but China produces around 80 percent of the rest of the chips in the world. The closer China comes to being able to secure “good enough” chips for “inside China-only” needs, the less of a constraint this becomes. Crude oil, grain, strategic metals stockpiles—the commercial community (Planet Labs, Ursa Space Systems, etc.) has developed substantial expertise in cost-effectively tracking inventory changes for key input commodities needed to prepare for war. Electric vehicle fleet size—the amount of oil demand displaced by electric vehicles varies depending on miles driven, but the more of China’s car fleet that can be connected to the grid (and thus powered by blockade-resistant coal), the less political burden Beijing will face if it has to weather a maritime oil blockade imposed in response to actions it took against Taiwan or other major revisionist adventures. China’s passenger vehicle fleet, now approximately 225 million units strong, counts nearly 6.5 million electric vehicles among its ranks, the lion’s share of which are full-battery electrics. China’s State Council seeks to have 20 percent of new vehicles sold in China be electric vehicles by 2025. This target has already basically been achieved over the last few months, meaning at least 3.5 to 4 million (and eventually many more) new elective vehicles will enter China’s car fleet each year from now on. Local concentration of maritime vessels—snap exercises with warships, circumnavigations, and midline tests with swarms of aircraft highlight the growing scale of China’s threat to Taiwan. But these assets alone cannot invade the island. To capture and garrison, Beijing would need not only air, missile, naval, and special operations forces but also the ability to move lots of equipment and—at the very least—tens of thousands of personnel across the Taiwan Strait. As such, Beijing would have to amass maritime transport assets. And given the scale required, this would alter ship patterns elsewhere along China’s coast in ways detectable with artificial intelligence-facilitated imagery analysis from firms like Planet Labs (or national assets). Only the most formidable, agile American and allied deterrence can kick the can down the road long enough for China’s slowdown to shut the window of vulnerability. Holding the line is likely to require frequent and sustained proactive enforcement actions to disincentivize full-frontal Chinese assaults on the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese probing behavior and provocations must be met with a range of symmetric and asymmetric responses that impose real costs, such as publishing assets owned by Chinese officials abroad, cyber interference with China’s technological social control apparatus, “hands on” U.S. Navy and Coast Guard enforcement measures against Maritime Militia-affiliated vessels in the South China Sea, intensified air and maritime surveillance of Chinese naval bases, and visas and resettlement options to Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other threatened Chinese citizens—including CCP officials (and their families) who seek to defect and/or leave China. U.S. policymakers must make crystal clear to their Chinese counterparts that the engagement-above-all policies that dominated much of the past 25 years are over and the risks and costs of ongoing—and future—adventurism will fall heaviest on China. Bombastic Chinese reactions to emerging cohesive actions verify the approach’s effectiveness and potential for halting—and perhaps even reversing—the revisionist tide China has unleashed across the Asian region. Consider the recent nuclear submarine deal among Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Beijing’s strong public reaction (including toleration of nuclear threats made by the state-affiliated Global Times) highlights the gap between its global information war touting China’s irresistible power and deeply insecure internal self-perception. Eight nuclear submarines will ultimately represent formidable military capacity, but for a bona fide superpower that believes in its own capabilities, they would not be a game-changer. Consider the U.S.-NATO reaction to the Soviet Union’s commissioning of eight Oscar I/II-class cruise missile subs during the late Cold War. These formidable boats each carried 24 SS-N-19 Granit missiles specifically designed to kill U.S. carrier battle groups, yet NATO never stooped to public threats. With diplomatic proofs of concepts like the so-called AUKUS deal, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and hard security actions like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative now falling into place, it is time to comprehensively peak the non-authoritarian world’s protective action to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific. During this decade, U.S. policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate Chinese behavior. Xi’s recreation of a “one-man” system is a one-way, high-leverage bet that decisions he drives will succeed. If Xi miscalculates, a significant risk given his suppression of dissenting voices while China raises the stakes in its confrontation with the United States, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left him with outsized returns on a successful bet would instead amplify the downside, all of which he personally and exclusively signed for. Resulting tensions could very realistically undermine his status and authority, embolden internal challengers, and weaken the party. They could also foreseeably drive him to double down on mistakes, especially if those led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict. Personal survival measures could thus rapidly transmute into regional or even global threats. If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the U.S. electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure as well as that of allies and partners abroad for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that actual conflict is a concrete possibility. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“if you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a variety of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with China. Given these unforgiving dynamics and stakes, implications for U.S. planners are stark: Do whatever remains possible to “peak” for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s, and accept whatever trade-offs are available for doing so. Nothing we might theoretically achieve in 2035 and beyond is worth pursuing at the expense of China-credible capabilities we can realistically achieve no later than the mid-to-late 2020s. Be highly skeptical of heg bad arguments – their evidence is epistemologically suspect Gilsinan 20 (Kathy, a St. Louis-based contributing writer at The Atlantic. Her book, The Helpers: Profiles From the Front Lines of the Pandemic, comes out in March 2022. She was previously an editor at World Politics Review.) “How China Is Planning to Win Back the World” The Atlantic, 5/28/2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/05/china-disinformation-propaganda-united-states-xi-jinping/612085/ BC This was a bizarre salvo in China’s propaganda war with the United States over the coronavirus, and it showcased Beijing’s latest information weaponry. Misleading spin, obfuscation, concealment, and hyperbole have been hallmarks of the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda campaign, before and during the coronavirus era. But the pandemic appears to have given rise to more forceful attacks on foreign governments, as well as a new level of flirtation with outright disinformation. The party has never waged a global struggle quite like this one—and its battle with the U.S. over where the virus came from and whose failures made the pandemic worse have marked a serious deterioration in the two countries’ ties. Just months ago, Trump was praising Xi Jinping for how he handled the outbreak; now Trump is toying with cutting off relations with the Chinese government altogether. Seven decades ago, Mao Zedong publicly embraced a benevolent view of propaganda, as if he were a latter-day prophet spreading the communist gospel: “We should carry on constant propaganda among the people on the facts of world progress and the bright future ahead so that they will build their confidence in victory,” he mused in 1945. Just a few months ago, Xi Jinping urged state journalists to spread “positive propaganda” for the “correct guidance of public opinion.” Indeed, Beijing’s global propaganda efforts in recent years have been more about promoting China’s virtues than about spreading acrimony and confusion, à la Russian information ops and election meddling. Moscow wants a weakened and divided West, one that leaves Russia free to dominate its self-appointed sphere of influence—but Russia in 2016 was also an economically sluggish, oil-dependent nation with an economy a tenth the size of America’s, and lacked the resources to remake the world in its image. Beijing has a much bigger prize in mind and a much longer-term plan to get it: The contest isn’t about who gets to run the U.S. It’s about who deserves to run the world. And China, with its economy poised to overtake that of the United States, has already plowed billions into crafting an image as a responsible global leader, and billions more into cultivating global dependence on Chinese investments and Chinese markets. “While the Chinese Communist Party has long sought to be a global influencer, their efforts today are aggressive and sophisticated,” Bill Evanina, the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, wrote in an email. “In short, they’re looking to reshape the history of coronavirus and protect their reputation at home and around the world.” Before the coronavirus hit, the party was becoming bolder in its propaganda efforts overseas as China grew richer and more powerful, trying to promote around the world the orthodoxy it enforced at home, about the beneficence and goodness of the CCP. This involved publicizing Chinese investments in the developing world, arm-twisting diplomats to toe a pro-China line, ruthlessly trying to stifle even other countries’ freedom to dissent—to the point of sanctioning Norway in 2010 when the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded its peace prize to the imprisoned democracy activist Liu Xiaobo, who died in 2017. Xi has elevated the role of propaganda even further as he has vowed to build China’s power and prosperity, declaring, “The superiority of our system will be fully demonstrated through a brighter future.” The coronavirus outbreak and the global outcry against China’s failures of transparency and containment were not part of the plan. They sparked an international backlash that, by Beijing’s reported reckoning, was worse than anything it had faced since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. So Beijing leaped to seize, or at least confuse, the global story of the virus and its cast of heroes and villains. This has involved unleashing techniques Russia perfected during the U.S. presidential election in 2016. “We’ve seen China adopt Russian-style social media manipulation tactics like using bots and trolls to amplify disinformation on COVID-19,” Lea Gabrielle, the special envoy and coordinator for the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, wrote to me in an email. “Both countries repress information within their countries while taking advantage of the open and free information environments in democracies to push conspiracy theories that seek to undermine those environments.” As the world realized the virus was spreading out of control, Chinese diplomats, official media, and Twitter influencers launched an aggressive frenzy of defense, scrambling to preserve the Chinese Communist Party’s cratering reputation at home and overseas. And then they went on offense, with an assist from perhaps thousands of fake or hacked Twitter accounts, according to the investigative site ProPublica. The result was a coordinated campaign of attacks on the United States, and the spread of disinformation and confusion about where the virus really came from and whose screwup it was, really, that led to so much death. Other countries’ faltering responses to the virus have only bolstered this narrative, and the CCP has gleefully trumpeted America’s failures in particular. “Loose political system in the US allows more than 4000 people to die of pandemic every day,” Hu Xijin, the editor in chief of the Global Times newspaper, tweeted in April. “Americans are so good tempered.” Beyond the immediate crisis, this kind of narrative also serves the longer-term goal. In the words of Matt Schrader, a former China analyst with the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshall Fund: “Ultimately it’s about the Chinese Communist Party being the most powerful political entity on the planet.” The CCP has evolved in its themes and tactics over the course of the coronavirus information war so far, as it battles to bolster its own reputation and degrade that of the United States. The campaign has been widespread and highly focused at the same time. And the party has grown even more emboldened in the belief that it’s too big to fail, and that the reeling world may condemn it but still depends on it. Framing The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything. Moen 16 Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281 SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask a man what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable. Moen 16 Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281 SJDI I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “it is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27 Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012) These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe. Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one. Bostrom 12 Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford., Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1 chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential risk—positive or negative—is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.
1/23/22
JF - Ukraine AC
Tournament: UNLV | Round: 2 | Opponent: Sequoia AS | Judge: Vanessa Nguyen 1AC v Sequoia AS 1AC Advantage Plan: Ukraine should ban the appropriation of outer space by private entities. The Ukrainian space sector is weak now, but newly legal private investments could revitalize it Zoria 7/26 (Yuri, author at Euromaidan Press and a former a journalist in a Luhansk online media) “How Ukraine wants to make its space industry great again” Euromaidan Press, 7/26/2021. https://euromaidanpress.com/2021/07/26/how-ukraine-wants-to-make-its-space-industry-great-again/ BC Despite all the challenges faced by the Ukrainian space program, Volodymyr Taftay, head of the State Space Agency of Ukraine, remains optimistic: “Ukraine’s space activities are now in a difficult situation, because over the past 5-7 years (following the Russian occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea and the Donbas, – editor), domestic space companies lost multiple customers. Among the large customers was the Russian Federation. Ukraine has lost a lot from the termination of contracts with it, but at the same time, it gives an opportunity to establish cooperation with other foreign partners,” he said in his interview with Ukrinform. At the end of 2021, SpaceX is going to launch the Ukrainian satellite Sich-2-30 previously known as Sich-2-1 on the Falcon 9 rocket. In total, Ukraine is going to create a constellation of seven Ukrainian satellites in the upcoming years. Sich-2-30 is the first Ukraine satellite of this kind to be launched in 10 years. Currently, Yuzhnoye has been developing the rocket Cyclone-4M, which is going to be launched from Nova Scotia by Canadian company Maritime Launch Services. The rocket’s maiden flight is set for 2022. Another rocket-launcher project of Yuzhnoye, which however hasn’t left the drawing boards yet, is the new rocket family Mayak. The family is going to include a number of rockets, including light, medium, and heavy-lift vehicles. In 2019, the Ukrainian parliament amended the law “On space activities” to allow private space companies space activities which potentially may boost Ukraine space capabilities, though the new legislation didn’t yield any results so far. The Ukrainian space startups are at their very early stages now and it is too early to make any predictions about them. For example, Promin Aerospace that raised $500,000 of investment in a pre-seed round for developing the smallest orbital rocket in history was founded only in January 2021. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Government’s space program for 2021-2025 envisages full-scale cooperation of the state with the private sector and expanding international space cooperation. Also, Ukraine has plans on creating a domestic cosmodrome, according to Taftay, however, it remains unclear whether it would be a land-based launch site or a mobile sea platform similar to Sea Launch. Volodymyr Taftay hopes that the national space agency would join the European Space Agency (ESA) in 2-3 years from now. “In the near future, Ukraine will take part in NASA’s Moon exploration program Artemis. We have recently signed a memorandum of cooperation. In addition, we plan to participate in programs that involve the study of Mars,” says Taftay It is also noteworthy that two private UK and US-based space companies have Ukrainian connections: UK-based Skyrora has an RandD facility in Dnipro, Ukraine, while the American Firefly Airspace company founder Max Polyakov is originally from the Ukrainian city of Zaporizhia. Both companies are still preparing their first launches: Skyrora is going to finish the development of its three-stage orbital launch vehicle Skyrora XL by late 2022, while Firefly Airspace prepares its Alpha rocket for its debut launch later this year. The space industry collapses without private companies Antonink 8/7 (Daryna, studied journalism and communications at Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv. Antoniuk worked as a news editor, social media manager, and freelance journalist before she joined the Kyiv Post staff in February 2020.) “Ukraine’s space industry goes after private money” KyivPost, 8/7/2021. https://www.kyivpost.com/business/ukraines-space-industry-goes-after-private-money.html BC Lucrative industry If space was once a political tool for world’s superpowers, today it is also a business opportunity for a new generation of entrepreneurs all over the world, including Ukraine. Last year international private space companies attracted a record $9.1 billion to launch Earth monitoring or communications satellites into orbit or to build spacecraft that deliver people and cargo to space. Investments in space are long-term and risky, Taftay said, but they pay off in the future. “The space industry brings in seven times more money than it receives. For every dollar invested in the space industry, the country’s economy receives $6–7 in taxes and investment,” according to him. As of today, Ukraine has 10 private space companies, Taftay said. Most of them — like Firefly Aerospace, Skyrora and Dragonfly — have become international stars and are now based in the U.S. or U.K., working with NASA and SpaceX. But many Ukrainian space businesses export their products abroad because there is no money or work for them in Ukraine. “You can create your own space company here, but it is unclear what to do with it next. Who will be the customer?” Usov said. In the U.S., nearly 80 of orders for space businesses come from the State Department or the Department of Defense, according to Usov. NASA astronauts even flew to the International Space Station on the Crew Dragon spacecraft manufactured by SpaceX. For many decades Ukraine has only worked with state-owned enterprises like Pivdenmash and Pivdenne on its space projects. “This business model discouraged the development of new private companies,” Usov said. To change this, the government passed a law in 2019 that allows private companies to build spacecraft in Ukraine and compete for contracts with state-owned enterprises or work together with them. In 2019, for example, Ukrainian-American aerospace company Firefly Aerospace ordered $15 million worth of missile parts from Ukrainian Pivdenmash. But these agreements are rare. Ukraine’s main customer — the government — hasn’t yet signed any big contracts with private space companies. “There are no orders because we haven’t had financing or even a space program since 2018,” Taftay said. $1 billion space program Without a governmental space program, the Ukrainian space industry is frozen: “It hasn’t had any priorities, nor the conditions to develop,” said Oleg Uruskyi, the minister of strategic industries. As a result, state-owned space enterprises have become less productive over the years. In 2018, state-owned space enterprises brought Ukraine $42 million in taxes, in 2019 — $34 million, in 2020 — $32 million. Last year was the most unfortunate for the Ukrainian space industry, according to Taftay. Out of the country’s 15 state-owned space enterprises, five were loss-makers last year, four went bankrupt and one fired all of its employees. Together, they lost $30 million in 2020 compared to $16 million in 2019 and $2.7 million in 2018. The space program submitted by Taftay will cost Ukraine over $1 billion — only half of this money will be covered by state funds, the other half — by export contracts. Last year Ukrainian state-owned space companies produced $103 million worth of space-tech products and exported almost half of them — $64 million. Export usually takes up nearly 60–70 of the industry’s financing, according to Taftay. Many European countries and the U.S. order Ukrainian-made rocket engines, navigation technology and rocket stages because they are cheap and reliable. In the last 30 years, Ukrainian state-owned enterprises manufactured the components for 169 carrier rockets, including Cyclone, Zenith, Antares, Vega. These rockets launched 449 international spacecraft into orbit. As of today, Ukraine only has two big international projects to rely on — the assembly of the first stage cores for NASA’s rocket Antares and the production of cruise propulsion engines for the European Space Agency’s rocket project Vega. But they will not last forever, Usov said. Ukraine will need to secure more contracts with international partners but without a space program, it is impossible to do, according to Usov. “Ukraine is still enjoying the perks it has gained in Soviet times — but it isn’t evolving. Other countries, in turn, invest in innovations and are catching up with Ukraine,” he said. Future changes To regain its power on the global market, Ukraine has to boost competition inside the country — between state-owned behemoths and private companies, according to Usov. Today, the country’s space enterprises like Pivdenmash and Pivdenne in Dnipro, Kommunar and Hartron in Kharkiv or Kyivpribor in Kyiv cannot control their own assets or attract investment. They are also burdened by outdated infrastructure and a bloated workforce. The giant Pivdenmash spaceship factory, which in the 20th century manufactured the most powerful rockets in the world, suffered $25 million losses in 2020. As the number of orders for its products has been decreasing, the factory descended into crisis: it didn’t have water for weeks, its sewage system didn’t work and employees weren’t paid properly. To save state enterprises from the crisis, Ukraine plans to turn them into joint-stock companies, Taftay said. “It will make them more flexible and attractive for investors.” Within the new space program, state enterprises will compete with private companies for the right to build six satellites — two each year starting in 2023, Taftay said. But first, Ukraine plans to send up the Sich 2–30 satellite in December using the U.S. launch vehicle Falcon 9 that belongs to SpaceX. Even exported products would still be under Ukrainian jurisdiction SpaceWatch 19 (SpaceWatch, ) “Ukraine Passes Commercial Space Law Allowing Private Space Activities in 2020” SpaceWatch 11/2019. https://spacewatch.global/2019/11/ukraine-passes-commercial-space-law-allowing-private-space-activities-in-2020/ BC The new Ukrainian commercial space law will allow private Ukrainian citizens and companies to commercially exploit and explore Earth orbit and beyond from Ukraine and under Ukrainian jurisdiction. A parallel aim, apparently, is to also reduce the role in the supervision of Ukrainian space activities by traditional state operators. Under the new law, private companies seeking to conduct commercial space activities in and from Ukraine will have to submit a declaration to government authorities. Commercial space activities that will involve rocket engine testing, satellite launch, and the control of satellites from Ukrainian territory will require a state permit. Scenario 1 is Korean war Advancements in North Korean ballistic missile capabilities are dependent on the Ukrainian space industry Fuhrman 6/30 (Eli, a contributing writer for The National Interest.) “Ukraine Gave Up Its Nukes — And Some of Its Secrets to North Korea” National Interest, 6/30/2021. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/ukraine-gave-its-nukes-E28094-and-some-its-secrets-north-korea-188945 BC North Korea’s ability to make such substantial progress in the development of its ballistic missile capabilities – particularly with regards to its long-range missiles – is likely the result of a number of factors, including simply the progress that can be expected to emerge from sustained and dedicated efforts. Since coming to power in 2011, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has presided over a significant increase in North Korean ballistic missile tests. This increased effort has borne fruit, producing breakthroughs that have themselves resulted in additional breakthroughs; North Korea’s development of its Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that is capable of hitting the island of Guam, for example, proved to be the foundation upon which the Hwasong-14 was built. But North Korea’s progress in the development of its ballistic missiles has also most assuredly been the result of new technology becoming available to the DPRK, and one important source of this technology has likely been Ukraine. Scientists have been a favorable group within North Korea for much of the country’s existence, and Kim Il Sung is believed to have sent North Korean scientists to study in various parts of the Soviet Union and the socialist world, which may well have included Ukraine. The country is also believed to have attempted to recruit suddenly out of work Soviet scientists and missile engineers after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which is again likely to have included efforts to woo Ukrainian experts. But scientific exchanges and rogue scientists and engineers likely do not form the entirety – or even the most important aspect – of the connection between Ukraine and the North Korean ballistic missile program. Instead, the more significant connection likely revolves around a particular rocket factory near the Ukrainian city of Dnipro known as Yuzhmash. The factory was once a major production site for advanced Soviet ballistic missiles, but has now shifted its focus to the production of such things as rockets designed to launch satellites into space; the site did, however, remain a common storage site for space ballistic missile components, including engines. North Korea has for many years had an interest in the site, with one former employee of the factory recalling a tour he gave to North Koreans posing as tourists in the early 2000s. They were almost certainly not tourists, however, and the United Nations Panel of Experts has confirmed that in 2011-2012 North Korean operatives attempted to steal missile designs from the factory before they were apprehended by the Ukrainian Security Services. Despite the failure of that operation, North Korea does appear to have successfully acquired Soviet missile technology that has proven essential in the development of its own ballistic missile capabilities. Analysis of the Hwasong-14 has revealed that the missile looks to be powered by several Soviet RD-250 engines, which may have come from the Yuzhmash facility. It is not entirely clear how North Korea acquired the engines though the most likely explanation involves a DPRK black market purchase. Regardless, the connection between Ukraine and the North Korean ballistic missile program reveals both how North Korea was able to so quickly advance its long-range missile capabilities and the lengths to which the country will go in order to do so, as well as the degree of difficulty associated with preventing advances in North Korea’s missile program. Future ballistic missile capabilities are used in a nuclear attack Bennett et al. 21 (Bruce W. Bennett is an adjunct international/defense researcher at the RAND Corporation. He works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation within the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center. Bennett's work applies wargaming, risk management, deterrence-based strategy, competitive strategies, and military simulation and analysis. He specializes in “asymmetric threats” such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and how to counter those threats with new strategies, operational concepts, and technologies. He is an expert in Northeast Asian military issues, having visited the region over 120 times and written much about Korean security issues. He has also done work on the Persian/Arab Gulf region. His Northeast Asian research has addressed issues such as future ROK military force requirements, understanding and shaping the ongoing Korean nuclear weapon crisis, Korean unification, the Korean military balance, counters to North Korean chemical and biological weapon threats in Korea and Japan, potential Chinese intervention in Korean contingencies, changes in the Northeast Asia security environment, and deterrence of nuclear threats (including strengthening the U.S. nuclear umbrella). He has worked with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Forces Korea and Japan, the U.S. Pacific Command and Central Command, the ROK and Japanese militaries, and the ROK National Assembly.) “Countering the Risks of North Korean Nuclear Weapons” RAND, 4/2021. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1015-1.html BC North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities have been for many years and continue to be top policy challenges for the United States and one of its key allies, the ROK. Not only are these two issues extremely important because of the threat that they present in the region, but now, with North Korea’s demonstrated ICBM capability, these two issues (nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as a platform to carry them) clearly present a real threat to the security of North Korea’s neighbors, to the United States, and to its other allies around the world (through proliferation). But because it takes time (usually years) to develop counters, we focus on the threat that North Korea could likely pose in the late 2020s. (We use 2027 as our target date.) This chapter addresses North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that likely would be used for nuclear weapon delivery in the 2027 time frame. North Korea has used both plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) to build nuclear weapons. We address North Korea’s efforts to produce these critical nuclear materials and how this production provides us with a means for estimating the actual number of North Korean nuclear weapons. We also address what North Korea’s nuclear weapon tests tell us about the explosive power (yield) of these weapons. In addition, although there has never been definitive proof of nuclear warheads in Pyongyang’s missile payloads, most analysts project (and the evidence strongly suggests) that North Korea produces nuclear warheads for delivery via its ballistic missiles. Evidence shows that the most-likely warheads are HEU. Ballistic missiles in the inventory include Scud B, C, D, and ER; the No Dong; the Musudan; and the Hwasong-12, -14, and -15. All of these missiles are assessed to be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead (depending on its size and weight), and we will address their capabilities as we analyze them in the missile section of this chapter. Finally, we will address the stockpile of nuclear weapons—both North Korea’s present stockpile of nuclear weapons and how we expect them to develop, based on disclosed evidence. The US and South Korea have a military advantage now but continued ballistic missile development gives North Korea the leverage it needs to achieve dominance in the region Bennett et al. 21 (Bruce W. Bennett is an adjunct international/defense researcher at the RAND Corporation. He works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation within the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center. Bennett's work applies wargaming, risk management, deterrence-based strategy, competitive strategies, and military simulation and analysis. He specializes in “asymmetric threats” such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and how to counter those threats with new strategies, operational concepts, and technologies. He is an expert in Northeast Asian military issues, having visited the region over 120 times and written much about Korean security issues. He has also done work on the Persian/Arab Gulf region. His Northeast Asian research has addressed issues such as future ROK military force requirements, understanding and shaping the ongoing Korean nuclear weapon crisis, Korean unification, the Korean military balance, counters to North Korean chemical and biological weapon threats in Korea and Japan, potential Chinese intervention in Korean contingencies, changes in the Northeast Asia security environment, and deterrence of nuclear threats (including strengthening the U.S. nuclear umbrella). He has worked with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Forces Korea and Japan, the U.S. Pacific Command and Central Command, the ROK and Japanese militaries, and the ROK National Assembly.) “Countering the Risks of North Korean Nuclear Weapons” RAND, 4/2021. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1015-1.html BC Since failing to conquer and control the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the 1950–1953 Korean War, the leaders of North Korea have sought dominance of the Korean Peninsula. However, they have lacked the economic, political, and conventional military means to achieve that dominance. Instead, their nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs have become their means for empowering their regime and working toward dominance. Today, even a few of the likely dozens of North Korean nuclear weapons could cause millions of fatalities and serious casualties if detonated on ROK or U.S. cities.1 Unfortunately, the major ROK and U.S. strategy to moderate the growing North Korean nuclear weapon threat has been negotiating with North Korea to achieve denuclearization, and this effort has failed and seems likely to continue failing.2 Despite some ROK and U.S. efforts to enhance defense and deterrence, there is a growing gap between the North Korean nuclear weapon threat and ROK and U.S. capabilities to defeat it. Because these capabilities will take years to develop, the ROK and the United States must turn their attention to where the threat could be in the mid to late 2020s and identify strategy options that can be employed in the coming years to counter it. To simplify doing so, we estimate (in Chapter Three of this Perspective) that, by 2027, North Korea could have 200 nuclear weapons and several dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and hundreds of theater missiles for delivering the nuclear weapons. The ROK and the United States are not prepared, and do not plan to be prepared, to deal with the coercive and warfighting leverage that these weapons would give North Korea. Continued development causes nuclear war, Chinese entanglement, and destruction of the US-ROK alliance -- ballistic missiles are key to North Korea’s second-strike capability which is the only factor that makes it a credible threat Garlauskas 12/23 (Markus, a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Asia Security Initiative. He is an independent author and consultant, specializing in Northeast Asian security issues and strategic analysis. Garlauskas served in the US government for nearly twenty years. He was appointed to the Senior National Intelligence Service as the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for North Korea on the National Intelligence Council from July 2014 to June 2020. As NIO, he led the US intelligence community’s strategic analysis on North Korea issues and expanded analytic outreach to non-government experts. He also provided direct analytic support to top-level policy deliberations, including the presidential transition, as well as the Singapore and Hanoi summits with North Korea. Garlauskas served for nearly twelve years overseas at the headquarters of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and US Forces Korea in Seoul. His staff assignments there included chief of the Intelligence Estimates Branch and director of the Strategy Division. For his service in Korea, he received the Joint Civilian Distinguished Service Award, the highest civilian award from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.) “Proactively countering North Korea’s advancing nuclear threat” Atlantic Council, 12/23/2021. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/proactively-countering-north-koreas-advancing-nuclear-threat/ BC SHIFT FROM SURVIVAL TO COERCION— EVEN WARFIGHTING Given how much of a deterrent North Korea has garnered from its longstanding ability to hold Seoul at risk with conventional artillery and chemical weapons, it is an open question how much additional nuclear capability—if any— North Korea actually needs to deter even a limited attack.35 As a result, the plans for expanded capabilities that Kim outlined at the party congress strongly suggest purposes beyond a simple regime-preserving deterrent. Former National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster, among others, argues that Kim’s pursuit of greater nuclear capabilities is intended to give him the leverage to break the US-South Korea alliance and reunify the Korean peninsula under his regime.36 Though reunification figures into North Korea’s propaganda, and its efforts to coerce South Korea are likely to continue, a full-scale invasion-and-occupation scenario is probably impractical for the foreseeable future.37 Regardless of the reasons why Kim has ordered the development of these systems, once fielded, they would change the dynamics of confrontation and conflict on the Korean peninsula. Once Kim has at his disposal a robust and diverse nuclear arsenal—with numerous small tactical nuclear weapons alongside many larger nuclear-armed missiles that can strike bases in the region and threaten the US homeland—it would vastly increase the scope of options and freedom of action he would have available for coercion and warfighting. Given the past behavior of Kim and his predecessors, it would require a triumph of hope over experience to believe that Kim would not assume calculated risks to take full advantage of these new capabilities. Were Kim to overreach and begin a major conflict, he might even believe that limited use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield could be just the tool to impose a military stalemate and to convince Washington not to escalate further because US cities would be the next nuclear targets. RISK OF ALLIANCE DECOUPLING AND THE CHINA FACTOR Continued unchecked growth in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities could be particularly destabilizing and problematic due to the consequences of North Korea demonstrating a reliable, credible second-strike capability to reach the US homeland with thermonuclear warheads. It is not difficult to imagine that North Korea’s Kim regime would be willing to use nuclear weapons if backed into a corner and pushed to the brink of destruction. Academic experts on escalation theory have laid out a range of scenarios where limited first use of nuclear weapons followed by threats of further nuclear escalation could make sense to Pyongyang as a means to end a conflict on terms that would allow the regime to survive.38 If anything, Kim seems to have a harder time convincing some in the United States that North Korea will make rational calculations about use of nuclear weapons to the point that it can be treated like other nuclear-armed states.39 What has primarily been in question to date, instead, is how much capability North Korea has to retaliate with nuclear weapons if pushed to the brink of destruction. North Korea’s limited number of ICBM tests and its small, cumbersome, liquid-fueled mobile ICBM force—combined with high confidence in US NMD—lend little credibility to a potential North Korean retaliatory second strike against the US homeland today.40 This could quickly change, for example, if North Korea were to test and field solid-propellant mobile ICBMs carrying multiple RVs, which is exactly the sort of capability Kim publicly ordered for the years ahead in January 2021. The as-yet untested “monster” ICBM that North Korea first displayed in October 2020, for example, looks likely to be able to carry multiple RVs.41 Similarly, though a more faroff threat, North Korea could field capabilities that allow its ICBMs to evade defenses rather than overwhelm them, such as hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) for its ICBMs, or even a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS).42 Though the fielding of such systems capable of reaching the United States now appears to be well in the future, Kim has publicly announced the development of HGVs, and North Korea conducted an initial test of such a HGV design on a shorter-range missile in September 2021.43 If North Korea is able to field this level of capability—presuming it is unchecked by improved US NMD—a North Korean second strike against the US homeland would be much more credible. In this event, Washington would have a tough case to make that it is willing to push a conflict with Pyongyang to the point that North Korea could retaliate by killing tens of millions of American civilians in a thermonuclear attack on the continental United States. In turn, this development would call into question Washington’s willingness to back Seoul if it faces renewed threats or aggression from Pyongyang. The erosion of the credibility of US commitment to the defense of South Korea as North Korea’s nuclear capabilities advance is further exacerbated by North Korea’s close geographic and political connections with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). If a military conflict with North Korea threatens to go nuclear, Beijing would face increasing incentives to engage in political and military intervention to protect its interests in the context of the US-PRC strategic rivalry. Questions about US resolve to escalate during a conflict would only grow alongside North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Could the United States credibly threaten full-scale nuclear retaliation if North Korea made limited tactical use of nuclear weapons and it was able to hold the US homeland at risk for a second strike? Would Washington really be willing to use nuclear weapons against targets near North Korea’s border with China? Would Washington even be willing to press for an end to the Kim regime—as the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) 2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for, should North Korea employ a nuclear weapon—while Beijing opposed it and Pyongyang was ready to fight on with nuclear weapons?44 These questions are not easily answered. However, unchecked advancement of North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities would bring them to the forefront—straining Washington’s alliance with Seoul possibly to the breaking point, potentially emboldening Pyongyang, and introducing new risks into US-PRC strategic competition. Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change Starr 15 (Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction,” Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015 DD
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs. Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts. The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70 of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences. Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment? Scenario 2 is Russian invasion A strong commercial space industry incentivizes Chinese investment – alienates the US by going against encouraged defense sector reforms Detsch 6/16 (Jack, Foreign Policy’s Pentagon and national security reporter.) “Biden’s Worried About Ukraine’s China Fling” Foreign Policy, 6/16/2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/16/biden-ukraine-china-russia-defense-policy-weapons-spending/ BC Since former U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, U.S. officials have urged their Ukrainian counterparts to halt sales of defense companies to China, including Motor Sich, an aerospace engineering company that designs engines for helicopters and larger aircraft, and Trident Defense, a manufacturer of .50-caliber machine guns. The acquisition of Motor Sich is currently being challenged in Ukrainian courts. “The Ukrainians have a world-class military and security apparatus,” said one former U.S. defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity. “It’s a ripe target for the Chinese to try and go in and garner control of.” China is also looking into purchasing a handful of lower-level Ukrainian defense logistics companies, U.S. officials said. “It’s more malleable; they have more leverage in that area,” the former defense official said of Chinese efforts in Ukraine. “Establishing a beachhead there is important to them.” Since the Obama administration, the Motor Sich purchase has been challenged on the U.S. side, one former official said, and the Biden administration has continued high-level warnings also sounded during the Trump years. But the issue is again coming into focus as top Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, used the NATO summit in Brussels this week to push for their inclusion into the 30-nation bloc, sending a tweet indicating the alliance’s leaders “confirmed” Ukraine would join. Biden and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg downplayed those remarks, saying there was an “open door” for Ukrainian membership but not until it completes defense sector reforms. And the Chinese purchases are likely to raise eyebrows within the alliance as it begins to take a harder tack on Beijing’s assertive foreign policy that presents “systemic challenges to the rules-based international order,” NATO leaders said in a joint communique this week. Even as the alliance has locked its sights on the tectonic movements of great powers after two decades of war in the Middle East, members of the bloc have still courted Chinese and Russian weapons purchases, mostly notably Turkey’s $2.5 billion purchase of Moscow’s S-400 air defense system. In particular, Motor Sich is seen as a developer of advanced engine capabilities that worry Western officials if they end up in the hands of the Chinese. “There’s nothing to say that the Chinese couldn’t convert these engines into fighter or bomber capability as well,” said Alexander Gray, chief of staff on the National Security Council until January. A State Department spokesperson told Foreign Policy the United States is encouraging Ukraine to protect “sensitive technologies and strategically vital enterprises” like Motor Sich. “PRC state-owned and controlled enterprises are not interested in Ukraine’s defense industry to create commercial opportunities or job growth in Ukraine,” the spokesperson said. “They use these acquisitions to gain control over strategic supply chains and access to foreign technology in support of their strategic and military-industrial objectives, which are contrary to U.S. national security interests and those of our allies and partners.” The State Department spokesperson added the United States “welcomed” Ukrainian sanctions in January against Skyrizon, a Chinese company trying to consolidate shares to gain majority control over Motor Sich. The Biden administration has also been encouraging the Ukrainians to set up a mechanism to review foreign investments for national security risks. “A review mechanism would allow Ukraine to identify and resolve national security risks arising from foreign investment transactions, including those involving companies holding sensitive technology and know-how that would affect our collective national security,” the spokesperson said. Chinese interest in the Ukrainian defense industry is also part of a delicate dance Beijing is playing in its relationship with Russia, experts said. Ukraine was at the heart of the Soviet Union’s defense industry during the Cold War, designing tanks, heavy rocket motors, and space technology. Today, Ukraine has become an end-around for China to get spare parts and upgrades for Soviet-era equipment without leaning on the Russians, since the relationship between those two powers has become more tense with China’s rise. “There’s enough commonality to make it worthwhile for the Chinese to get their talons into the defense industry there and get around the Russians,” said Jim Townsend, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy during the Obama administration. But the marriage is also one of convenience for Ukraine and China: The Ukrainians need investment to keep their defense factories running, and that money isn’t coming from the West. Beyond getting a secondary market for Russian equipment, China is also buying up seasoned and relatively cheap Ukrainian engineering talent and expanding their influence further into Eastern Europe, U.S. and European officials said. Biden’s support for-Ukraine is key to deter Russian invasion Grady 12/24 (John, a former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army. His reporting on national defense and national security has appeared on Breaking Defense, GovExec.com, NextGov.com, DefenseOne.com, Government Executive and USNI News.) “Panel: West Must be Prepared to Send More Military Aid to Ukraine to Deter Russia” USNI, 12/24/2021. https://news.usni.org/2021/12/24/panel-west-must-be-prepared-to-send-more-military-aid-to-ukraine-to-deter-russia BC The West must be ready to send air defense systems and anti-ship missiles to Kyiv while preparing to slap harsher sanctions on Moscow to deter the Kremlin’s bullying of Ukraine, five experts in European security said this week. Alexander Vershbow, a former NATO deputy secretary general, said, to Russian President Vladimir Putin reining in a Ukraine is “a matter of survival,” during a Wednesday Atlantic Council discussion. The panel warned against rewarding Putin with a summit meeting this winter with President Joseph Biden “without any pullback of troops” from the Ukrainian border. “Russia escalates, gets a summit,” said Heather Conley, director of the Europe, Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for International Study. But Putin “set a bar so high” that talks likely would be fruitless. Conley was referring to Putin’s demand in recent days that Ukraine remain a buffer between NATO and Russia, and the alliance stop supplying military aid to former Soviet republics. “We’re seeing he’s quite serious about his paranoia about NATO” if Kyiv joined the alliance, Vershbow added. “He really believes if he doesn’t act now” he will lose Ukraine forever and put his regime’s survival at risk. News reports put Russian troop strength close to the border at 120,000. As Putin demanded recognition of clearly divided “spheres of influence,” Kremlin military officials were ‘fabricating stories that the U.S. was putting Tomahawk missiles and deploying chemical weapons units to Ukraine, Andriy Zagorodynuk, a former Ukrainian defense minister said. The false claims were designed to build a case for a possible invasion. Now at the Atlantic Council, John Herbst, a former ambassador to Ukraine, said to deter a military move “major, major sanctions” need to be in place, more arms, especially integrating air defense systems and coastal defense, also should be rushed to Kyiv and NATO bolster forces in Poland and the Balkans. “It should be done now,” he said. Other panelists suggested possibly moving anti-ship cruise missiles into NATO countries bordering the Black Sea as a signal to Russia its naval forces at Sebastopol would be vulnerable to attack if Ukraine were invaded. Herbst said, “the Kremlin has been provoking us” through cyber attacks since July despite Biden’s warning to Putin to back off. “Putin learned in cyber he could push Biden around” and also use it repeatedly as a weapon to destabilize Ukraine. “The game with Putin is show strength” and he will back off, Herbst added. “We have a position of strength.” One of those positions of strength in NATO is the experience of the Baltic states in standing up to Russia military threats and cyber attacks. Retired Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, a former top commander in Europe, said, “gray zone attacks on Ukraine has only intensified in the last few weeks.” He added “I like to use the word ‘resistance’” like Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia developed to assert their independence from Moscow, “as a model” Ukraine could use. Picking up on that Zagorodynuk said while Russian military forces “can do a lot of damage” to Ukraine in an all-out air, naval, land and cyber invasion. “These actions will not bring any support to Putin” from Ukrainians who would resist any takeover even if more sections of the country as it did in 2014. “Where is Putin going to find people to administer” any conquered territory in Ukraine. He added Ukrainian military and security officials firmly back President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government. “Ukraine will be defending itself” vigorously if invaded. “The only thing we ask of the West is not to show weakness.” Extinction -- Russian invasion of Ukraine sparks catastrophic nuclear reactor failure, causing an unprecedented nuclear emergency Hooper 12/28 (Craig, Founder and CEO of the Themistocles Advisory Group, he focus on communications and government relations as well as maritime, homeland defense and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) challenges. Previously, he served as an executive for naval shipbuilder Austal USA, helping deliver Littoral Combat Ships and Expeditionary Fast Transports to the U.S. Navy. With a Ph.D. in Immunology and Infectious Diseases from Harvard University, I have taught at the University of California, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Monterey Institute of International Studies. In my spare time, he supports think-tank studies, discuss naval matters at NextNavy.com or write about the Navy, publishing op-eds and papers in places like the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, the Naval War College Review, theU.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and beyond.) “A Ukraine Invasion Could Go Nuclear: 15 Reactors Would Be In War Zone” Forbes, 12/28/2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2021/12/28/a-ukraine-invasion-will-go-nuclear-15-reactors-are-in-the-war-zone/?sh=1bf80db427aa BC As Russia’s buildup on the Ukrainian border continues, few observers note that an invasion of Ukraine could put nuclear reactors on the front line of military conflict. The world is underestimating the risk that full-scale, no-holds-barred conventional warfare could spark a catastrophic reactor failure, causing an unprecedented regional nuclear emergency. The threat is real. Ukraine is heavily dependent upon nuclear power, maintaining four nuclear power plants and stewardship of the shattered nuclear site at Chernobyl. In a major war, all 15 reactors at Ukraine’s nuclear power facilities would be at risk, but even a desultory Russian incursion into eastern Ukraine is likely to expose at least six active reactors to the uncertainty of a ground combat environment. The world has little experience with reactors in a war zone. Since humanity first harnessed the atom, the world has only experienced two “major” accidents—Chernobyl and Japan’s Fukushima disaster. A Russian invasion, coupled with an extended conventional war throughout Ukraine, could generate multiple International Atomic Energy Agency “Level 7” accidents in a matter of days. Such a contingency would induce a massive refugee exodus and could render much of Ukraine uninhabitable for decades. Turning the Ukraine into a dystopian landscape, pockmarked by radioactive exclusion zones, would be an extreme method to obtain the defensive zone Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to want. Managing a massive Western-focused migratory crisis and environmental cleanup would absorb Europe for years. The work would distract European leaders and empower nativist governments that tend to be aligned with Russia’s baser interests, giving an overextended Russia breathing room as the country teeters on the brink of technological, demographic, and financial exhaustion. Put bluntly, the integrity of Ukrainian nuclear reactors is a strategic matter, critical for both NATO and non-NATO countries alike. Causing a severe radiological accident for strategic purposes is unacceptable. A deliberate aggravation of an emerging nuclear catastrophe—preventing mitigation measures or allowing reactors to deliberately melt down and potentially contaminate wide portions of Europe—would simply be nuclear warfare without bombs. Such a scenario can’t be ruled out. Russia has repeatedly used Ukraine to test out concepts for “Gray Zone” warfare, where an attacker dances just beyond the threshold of open conflict. Given Russia’s apparent interest in radiation-spewing nuclear-powered cruise missiles, robotic undersea bombs with a radiological fallout-oriented payload, destructive anti-satellite tests and other nihilistic, world-harming weapons, Russia’s ongoing dalliance with “Gray Zone” warfare in Ukraine may, for the rest of Europe, become a real matter of estimating radiological “grays,” or, in other words, estimating the amount of ionizing radiation absorbed by humans.
Framing The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything. Moen 16 Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281 SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask a man what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable. Moen 16 Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281 SJDI I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “it is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27 Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012) These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe. Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one. Bostrom 12 Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford., Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1 chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential risk—positive or negative—is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.
2/5/22
ND - Brazil v3
Tournament: Longhorn Classic | Round: 2 | Opponent: Strake Jesuit VC | Judge: Ishan Rereddy cites not working check os
12/4/21
ND - Brazil v4
Tournament: Longhorn Classic | Round: 4 | Opponent: Plano East JN | Judge: Tej Gedela cites not working check os
Plan: The United States should recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.
Advantage 1 — Workforce
Advantage one is the workforce
Labor unrest is increasing and there is momentum to strike, but current laws leave workers powerless.
Semuels 10/8 ~(Alana, Journalist and currently senior economics correspondent at TIME magazine, previously The Atlantic, The Los Angeles Times, The Boston Globe.) "U.S. Workers Are Realizing It’s the Perfect Time to Go on Strike," TIME, 10/8/21. https://time.com/6105109/workers-strike-unemployment/~~ RR Thousands of workers have gone on strike across the country, showing their growing power
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she finally feels respected. But she makes $13 less an hour.
Strikes are key to revitalizing labor unions.
Bahn 19 ~(Kate, the director of labor market policy and interim chief economist at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth) "The once and future role of strikes in ensuring U.S. worker power" Washington Center for Equitable Growth, 8/29/19. https://equitablegrowth.org/the-once-and-future-role-of-strikes-in-ensuring-u-s-worker-power/~~ RR At the same time, there is an increasing consensus today that unions are a
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efforts when the labor market lacks competition that would increase worker bargaining power.
Labor shortages now are because of low wages— unions reverse that by allowing for bargaining.
Lopezlira and Jacobs 9/3 ~(Enrique, is the director of the Low-Wage Work program at the UC Berkeley Labor Center. He is a labor economist, directing and conducting research on how policies affect working families, with a particular focus on how these policies impact racial and gender equity. Doctorate in Economics from Howard University) (Ken, the chair of the University of California, Berkeley Center for Labor Research and Education, where he has been a labor specialist since 2002.) "Don’t Mistake the Disappointing Jobs Numbers for a Labor Shortage," Barron’s, 9/3/21. https://www.barrons.com/articles/dont-mistake-the-disappointing-jobs-numbers-for-a-labor-shortage-51630698151~~ RR Today’s jobs report shows a complicated picture for workers. The economy added only 235
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majority of workers continue depends on the decisions we make as a society.
Industrial workforce shortages are happening now— Covid and inability to compete.
Scull and Stone 8/28 ~(John, an associate in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office of Jackson Lewis P.C. His practice focuses on representing employers in workplace law matters, including preventive advice and counseling.) (James, a principal of the Cleveland, Ohio, office of Jackson Lewis P.C. From the opening of the office in 2006 until early 2020, Jim served as office managing principal in Cleveland. At that time, he stepped down to focus on his busy practice and increased task force activities within practice groups and serving as co-leader of the firm’s Manufacturing industry group.) "Manufacturing Labor Shortage: Cultivating Skilled Labor By Engaging Local Communities," JDSupra, 8/28/21. https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/manufacturing-labor-shortage-1463687/~~ RR The worker shortage in manufacturing has been exacerbated by the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic
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old, and older workers are retiring faster than they are being replaced.
A strong industrial workforce is key to US military primacy
Bloomberg Editorial Board 4/7 ~(Members of the editorial board will write and edit in other capacities within Bloomberg Opinion. Because our columnists have always spoken for themselves, they will continue as before — though columnists will still refrain from endorsing candidates, a policy we have had in place since we started in 2011.) "America’s Depleted Industrial Base Is a National Security Crisis," Bloomberg, 4/7/21. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-04-07/america-s-depleted-industrial-base-is-a-national-security-crisis~~ RR President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s farewell address is most famous for its warning against the
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national security, but also for the preservation of peace around the world.
US primacy prevents great-power conflict — multipolar revisionism fragments the global order and causes nuclear war
Brands and Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. ("The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;" Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by Yale University Press; GrRv) Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and naval exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. "Our cooperation can isolate America," supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post-Cold War era. The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has
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with an eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements.
Retrenchment causes nationalism, war, and protectionism – optimists falsely assume current cooperative trends will continue without the US security guarantee
Matthew Fay 17, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ The Niskanen Center, 11/16/17, "America Unrestrained?: Engagement, Retrenchment, and Libertarian Foreign Policy," https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/America-Unrestrained.pdf A number of the arguments libertarians make in favor of retrenchment have merit, but
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might choose to obtain a nuclear arsenal once responsible for their own security.
Pursuit is inevitable
Wright 20 ~(Thomas, director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution, former lecturer at the University of Chicago's Harris School for Public Policy, PhD from Georgetown University and M.Phil. from Cambridge University) "The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can’t Withdraw From the World," Foreign Affairs, 4/2020~ JL A fifth problem with retrenchment is that it lacks domestic support. The American people
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the risk of miscalculation by Washington, its allies, or its rivals.
====Heg is sustainable – America has strong bones==== Ikenberry 18 ~(John, Professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University) reviewing book by Beckley (Michael, Fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs) "Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2018~ It has become conventional wisdom that the United States is in decline, the uni
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but he does think that it will long remain the world’s leading power.
Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change
Starr 15 ~(Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015~ DD
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result
AND
few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?
Advantage 2 — Democracy
Advantage two is democracy
The US is instigating a global democratic crisis – any lapse in US policy spills over
that characterizes the global economy, which is often the more consequential division.
A right to strike solves 3 warrants—
Worker strikes withhold labor from wealthy elites to make way for new progressive legislature.
Pope 18 ~(James Gray, a distinguished professor of law at Rutgers Law School and serves on the executive council of the Rutgers Council of AAUP/AFT Chapters, AFL-CIO.) "Labor’s right to strike is essential," PSC Cuny, September 2018. https://www.psc-cuny.org/clarion/september-2018/laborE28099s-right-strike-essential~~ RR POLITICAL CLIMATE What provoked Cuomo and de Blasio to close ranks and launch a
AND
clear the way for progressive legislation just as they did in the 1930s.
Strikes are key political tools— they incentivize being active in political institutions and transform conditions.
part of engaging a broad swath of the public in reconceptualizing political economy.
Strikes are key to take decisive action if democracy is threatened.
Madeloni 20 ~(Barbara, is the education coordinator at Labor Notes and a former president of the Massachusetts Teachers Association.) "Unions Are Beginning to Talk About Staving Off a Possible Coup," LaborNotes, 10/15/20. https://labornotes.org/2020/10/unions-are-beginning-talk-about-staving-possible-coup~~ RR UNIONS ARE THE BEDROCK If these resolutions represent a growing realization that labor must
AND
should be prepared to take decisive action if our democratic traditions are threatened."
Democracies are key to solve climate change— US democratic leadership is key.
Fiorino 9/22 ~(Daniel J, is the Director of the Center for Environmental Policy at American University in Washington DC. He his author of Can Democracy Handle Climate Change? (Polity, 2018). ) "Democracy is suited to tackle climate change," Democracy Without Borders, 9/22/21. https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/20869/democracy-is-suited-to-tackle-climate-change/~~ RR Comparing democratic and authoritarian systems Climate change is a complex challenge, the largest
AND
on the shelf and revive when a crisis passes, if it does.
Warming causes extinction – any reduction should be prioritized above every other impact
Ramanathan et al. 17 ~Veerabhadran Ramanathan is Victor Alderson Professor of Applied Ocean Sciences and director of the Center for Atmospheric Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, Dr. William Collins is an internationally recognized expert in climate modeling and climate change science. He is the Director of the Climate and Ecosystem Sciences Division (CESD) for the Earth and Environmental Sciences Area (EESA) at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Prof. Dr Mark Lawrence, Ph.D. is scientific director at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam, Örjan Gustafsson is a Professor in the Department of Environmental Science and Analytic Chemistry at Stockholm University, Shichang Kang is Professor, Cold and Arid Regions Environmental and Engineering Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS); CAS Center for Excellence in Tibetan Plateau Earth Sciences, and Molina, M.J., Zaelke, D., Borgford-Parnell, N., Xu, Y., Alex, K., Auffhammer, M., Bledsoe, P., Croes, B., Forman, F., Haines, A., Harnish, R., Jacobson, M.Z., Lawrence, M., Leloup, D., Lenton, T., Morehouse, T., Munk, W., Picolotti, R., Prather, K., Raga, G., Rignot, E., Shindell, D., Singh, A.K., Steiner, A., Thiemens, M., Titley, D.W., Tucker, M.E., Tripathi, S., and Victor, D., authors come from the following 9 countries - US, Switzerland, Sweden, UK, China, Germany, Australia, Mexico, India, "Well Under 2 Degrees Celsius: Fast Action Policies to Protect People and the Planet from Extreme Climate Change," Report of the Committee to Prevent Extreme Climate Change, September 2017, http://www.igsd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Well-Under-2-Degrees-Celsius-Report-2017.pdf~~ TDI Climate change is becoming an existential threat with warming in excess of 2°C
AND
more warming acting as a force multiplier (Schuur et al., 2015).
Framing
The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing
First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic
AND
places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.
Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists.
AND
why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27
Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 ~Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority." Global Policy (2012)~ These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.
Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one. Bostrom 12 ~Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.~, Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1 chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€"positive or negativeâ€"is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.
11/6/21
ND - Labor AC v2
Tournament: Damus | Round: 6 | Opponent: Harker NA | Judge: Anish Ramireddy Labor AC AC Plan Plan: The United States should recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. Advantage 1 — Workforce Advantage one is the workforce Labor unrest is increasing and there is momentum to strike, but current laws leave workers powerless. Semuels 10/8 (Alana, Journalist and currently senior economics correspondent at TIME magazine, previously The Atlantic, The Los Angeles Times, The Boston Globe.) "U.S. Workers Are Realizing It’s the Perfect Time to Go on Strike," TIME, 10/8/21. https://time.com/6105109/workers-strike-unemployment/~~ RR Thousands of workers have gone on strike across the country, showing their growing power
AND
she finally feels respected. But she makes $13 less an hour.
Strikes are key to revitalizing labor unions. Bahn 19 (Kate, the director of labor market policy and interim chief economist at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth) "The once and future role of strikes in ensuring U.S. worker power" Washington Center for Equitable Growth, 8/29/19. https://equitablegrowth.org/the-once-and-future-role-of-strikes-in-ensuring-u-s-worker-power/~~ RR At the same time, there is an increasing consensus today that unions are a
AND
efforts when the labor market lacks competition that would increase worker bargaining power.
Labor shortages now are because of low wages— unions reverse that by allowing for bargaining. Lopezlira and Jacobs 9/3 (Enrique, is the director of the Low-Wage Work program at the UC Berkeley Labor Center. He is a labor economist, directing and conducting research on how policies affect working families, with a particular focus on how these policies impact racial and gender equity. Doctorate in Economics from Howard University) (Ken, the chair of the University of California, Berkeley Center for Labor Research and Education, where he has been a labor specialist since 2002.) "Don’t Mistake the Disappointing Jobs Numbers for a Labor Shortage," Barron’s, 9/3/21. https://www.barrons.com/articles/dont-mistake-the-disappointing-jobs-numbers-for-a-labor-shortage-51630698151~~ RR Today’s jobs report shows a complicated picture for workers. The economy added only 235
AND
majority of workers continue depends on the decisions we make as a society.
Industrial workforce shortages are happening now— Covid and inability to compete. Scull and Stone 8/28 (John, an associate in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office of Jackson Lewis P.C. His practice focuses on representing employers in workplace law matters, including preventive advice and counseling.) (James, a principal of the Cleveland, Ohio, office of Jackson Lewis P.C. From the opening of the office in 2006 until early 2020, Jim served as office managing principal in Cleveland. At that time, he stepped down to focus on his busy practice and increased task force activities within practice groups and serving as co-leader of the firm’s Manufacturing industry group.) "Manufacturing Labor Shortage: Cultivating Skilled Labor By Engaging Local Communities," JDSupra, 8/28/21. https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/manufacturing-labor-shortage-1463687/~~ RR The worker shortage in manufacturing has been exacerbated by the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic
AND
old, and older workers are retiring faster than they are being replaced.
A strong industrial workforce is key to US military primacy Bloomberg Editorial Board 4/7 (Members of the editorial board will write and edit in other capacities within Bloomberg Opinion. Because our columnists have always spoken for themselves, they will continue as before — though columnists will still refrain from endorsing candidates, a policy we have had in place since we started in 2011.) "America’s Depleted Industrial Base Is a National Security Crisis," Bloomberg, 4/7/21. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-04-07/america-s-depleted-industrial-base-is-a-national-security-crisis~~ RR President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s farewell address is most famous for its warning against the
AND
national security, but also for the preservation of peace around the world.
US primacy prevents great-power conflict — multipolar revisionism fragments the global order and causes nuclear war Brands and Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. ("The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;" Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by Yale University Press; GrRv) Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and naval exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. "Our cooperation can isolate America," supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post-Cold War era. The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has
AND
with an eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements.
Retrenchment causes nationalism, war, and protectionism – optimists falsely assume current cooperative trends will continue without the US security guarantee Matthew Fay 17, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ The Niskanen Center, 11/16/17, "America Unrestrained?: Engagement, Retrenchment, and Libertarian Foreign Policy," https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/America-Unrestrained.pdf A number of the arguments libertarians make in favor of retrenchment have merit, but
AND
might choose to obtain a nuclear arsenal once responsible for their own security.
Pursuit is inevitable Wright 20 (Thomas, director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution, former lecturer at the University of Chicago's Harris School for Public Policy, PhD from Georgetown University and M.Phil. from Cambridge University) "The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can’t Withdraw From the World," Foreign Affairs, 4/2020 JL A fifth problem with retrenchment is that it lacks domestic support. The American people
AND
the risk of miscalculation by Washington, its allies, or its rivals.
Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change Starr 15 (Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015 DD
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result
AND
few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?
Advantage 2 — Democracy Advantage two is democracy The US is instigating a global democratic crisis – any lapse in US policy spills over Werner 7/9 (Jake, a Postdoctoral Global China Research Fellow at the Boston University Global Development Policy Center.) "Does America Really Support Democracy—or Just Other Rich Democracies?" Foreign Affairs, 7/9/2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-07-09/does-america-really-support-democracy-or-just-other-rich~~ BC In a speech he delivered in February, U.S. President Joe Biden
AND
that characterizes the global economy, which is often the more consequential division.
A right to strike solves 3 warrants— Worker strikes withhold labor from wealthy elites to make way for new progressive legislature. Pope 18 (James Gray, a distinguished professor of law at Rutgers Law School and serves on the executive council of the Rutgers Council of AAUP/AFT Chapters, AFL-CIO.) "Labor’s right to strike is essential," PSC Cuny, September 2018. https://www.psc-cuny.org/clarion/september-2018/laborE28099s-right-strike-essential~~ RR POLITICAL CLIMATE What provoked Cuomo and de Blasio to close ranks and launch a
AND
clear the way for progressive legislation just as they did in the 1930s.
Strikes are key political tools— they incentivize being active in political institutions and transform conditions. Reddy 1/6 (Diana S., a Doctoral Fellow at the Law, Economics, and Politics Center at UC Berkeley Law, and a PhD candidate in UCB's Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program.) ""There Is No Such Thing as an Illegal Strike": Reconceptualizing the Strike in Law and Political Economy," The Yale Law Journal, 1/6/21. https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy~~ RR B. Striking as Political For those who believe that a stronger labor movement
AND
part of engaging a broad swath of the public in reconceptualizing political economy.
Strikes are key to take decisive action if democracy is threatened. Madeloni 20 (Barbara, is the education coordinator at Labor Notes and a former president of the Massachusetts Teachers Association.) "Unions Are Beginning to Talk About Staving Off a Possible Coup," LaborNotes, 10/15/20. https://labornotes.org/2020/10/unions-are-beginning-talk-about-staving-possible-coup~~ RR UNIONS ARE THE BEDROCK If these resolutions represent a growing realization that labor must
AND
should be prepared to take decisive action if our democratic traditions are threatened."
Democracies are key to solve climate change— US democratic leadership is key. Fiorino 9/22 (Daniel J, is the Director of the Center for Environmental Policy at American University in Washington DC. He his author of Can Democracy Handle Climate Change? (Polity, 2018). ) "Democracy is suited to tackle climate change," Democracy Without Borders, 9/22/21. https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/20869/democracy-is-suited-to-tackle-climate-change/~~ RR Comparing democratic and authoritarian systems Climate change is a complex challenge, the largest
AND
on the shelf and revive when a crisis passes, if it does.
Warming causes extinction – any reduction should be prioritized above every other impact Ramanathan et al. 17 Veerabhadran Ramanathan is Victor Alderson Professor of Applied Ocean Sciences and director of the Center for Atmospheric Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, Dr. William Collins is an internationally recognized expert in climate modeling and climate change science. He is the Director of the Climate and Ecosystem Sciences Division (CESD) for the Earth and Environmental Sciences Area (EESA) at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Prof. Dr Mark Lawrence, Ph.D. is scientific director at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam, Örjan Gustafsson is a Professor in the Department of Environmental Science and Analytic Chemistry at Stockholm University, Shichang Kang is Professor, Cold and Arid Regions Environmental and Engineering Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS); CAS Center for Excellence in Tibetan Plateau Earth Sciences, and Molina, M.J., Zaelke, D., Borgford-Parnell, N., Xu, Y., Alex, K., Auffhammer, M., Bledsoe, P., Croes, B., Forman, F., Haines, A., Harnish, R., Jacobson, M.Z., Lawrence, M., Leloup, D., Lenton, T., Morehouse, T., Munk, W., Picolotti, R., Prather, K., Raga, G., Rignot, E., Shindell, D., Singh, A.K., Steiner, A., Thiemens, M., Titley, D.W., Tucker, M.E., Tripathi, S., and Victor, D., authors come from the following 9 countries - US, Switzerland, Sweden, UK, China, Germany, Australia, Mexico, India, "Well Under 2 Degrees Celsius: Fast Action Policies to Protect People and the Planet from Extreme Climate Change," Report of the Committee to Prevent Extreme Climate Change, September 2017, http://www.igsd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Well-Under-2-Degrees-Celsius-Report-2017.pdf~~ TDI Climate change is becoming an existential threat with warming in excess of 2°C
AND
more warming acting as a force multiplier (Schuur et al., 2015).
Framing The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything. Moen 16 Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281 SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic
AND
places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.
Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable. Moen 16 Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281 SJDI I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists.
AND
why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27
Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority." Global Policy (2012) These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe. Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one. Bostrom 12 Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford., Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1 chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€"positive or negativeâ€"is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action. 11/6/21 SaveDeleteEdit
11/8/21
SO - CRISPR AC v2
Tournament: Greenhill | Round: 1 | Opponent: West HS SLC OW | Judge: Varad Agarwala
Genomic Medicines AC
AC
Advantage 1 – Innovation
Advantage 1 is innovation:
A huge influx of patents is coming – most recent data and trends from this year
Mischel 4/27 ~(Fiona Mischel, Editor-in-Chief of SynBioBeta. She frequently covers sustainability, CRISPR research, food and agriculture technology, and biotech for space travel) "Who Owns CRISPR in 2021? It’s Even More Complicated Than You Think" SynBioBeta, 4/27/2021. https://synbiobeta.com/who-owns-crispr-in-2021-its-even-more-complicated-than-you-think/~~ BC Still Want To Patent CRISPR? Here’s What You Need To Know The biggest
AND
future, we cannot leave the fundamental promise of science in the dust.
Makes development of genomic medicine impossible – 3 warrants:
Patent disputes are imminent — new entities and foreign governments getting involved ensures conflict
China, patents are subject to invalidation proceedings after they are issued."25
IP disputes foreclose research collaboration between universities, which has historically enabled critical scientific breakthroughs
Sherkow 17 ~(Jacob, Professor of Law at the College of Law and Affiliate of the Carl R. Woese Institute for Genomic Biology at the University of Illinois, where his research focuses on the legal and ethical implications of advanced biotechnologies, especially as related to intellectual property. He is a leading expert on IP protection for genome-editing technologies, including CRISPR. He is the author of over 60 articles published in both scientific journals and traditional law reviews, including Science, Nature, the Yale Law Journal, and the Stanford Law Review. Since 2018, Sherkow has also been a Permanent Visiting Professor at the Center for Advanced Studies in Biomedical Innovation Law ("CeBIL") at the University of Copenhagen Faculty of Law) "Patent protection for CRISPR: an ELSI review" Journal of Law and the Biosciences 12/7/2017 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5965580/~~ BC One notable aspect of the CRISPR patent dispute is that it is, by and
AND
hope that the CRISPR patent dispute teaches others that such myopia isn’t warranted.
Patent disputes create fears of litigation that deter genome research and investment
million and signed a deal with pharmaceutical company Biogen to implement its technology.
Uncertainty about licensing ensures technology is not distributed or developed - smaller firms don’t know where they need to seek approval from
Sterlin 20 ~(Ian, JD from the University of Michigan Law School, Executive Editor of the Michigan Technology Law Review) "The CRISPR War Drags On: How the Fight to Patent CRISPR-Cas9 Creates Uncertainty in the Biotechnology Sphere," Michigan Technology Law Review, 3/2020~ JL On September 10, 2018, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals ("Federal Circuit
AND
order to make researchers feel secure in developing further technological innovations using CRISPR-.
CRISPR solves disease, but continued innovation is key
Thorne 20 ~(Lucy, PhD, received a BSc. in Biochemistry from University of Leeds and a Ph.D. in Biological Sciences from University of Liverpool in the UK. She is currently working as a freelance consultant in Cambridge, UK writing CRISPR-related content for Biocompare.) "CRISPR-Cas Gene Editing: A New Weapon against Infectious Disease" Biocompare, 1/14/2020. https://www.biocompare.com/Editorial-Articles/559757-CRISPR-Cas-Gene-Editing-A-New-Weapon-against-Infectious-Disease/~~ BC Infectious disease is a common cause of death worldwide, but the rise of antibiotic
AND
clinic and help combat the growing specter of antimicrobial resistance and infectious disease.
Extinction – defense is wrong
Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, "Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity", Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028 Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity.
AND
, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2
Advantage 2 – WTO credibility
Advantage 2 is WTO cred:
New EU trade restrictions on genome editing contradicts WTO agreements which makes future disputes inevitable
Menz et al. 20 ~(Dr. Jochen Menz, of Julius Kühn-Institut, Federal Research Centre for Cultivated Plants) Modrzejewski (Dominik PhD, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Hartung (Frank, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Wilhelm (Ralf, Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Sprink (Thorben, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) "Genome Edited Crops Touch the Market: A View on the Global Development and Regulatory Environment" Front Plant Sci, 10/9/2020. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7581933/~~ BC WTO: Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures In November 2018, the delegations
AND
agricultural activities. Without any changes in European legislation the issue stays unresolved.
EU-WTO conflict causes WTO collapse – it’s the glue that holds the organization together in an international arena characterized by US and China trade disputes
Horton and Hopewell 8/3 ~(Ben, Communications Manager; Project Lead, Common Futures Conversations) (Dr Kristen, Associate Professor, and Canada Research Chair in Global Policy, University of British Columbia) "Lessons from Trump’s assault on the World Trade Organization", Chatham House 8/3/2021 https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/08/lessons-trumps-assault-world-trade-organization~~ BC The main reason behind the EU’s success in taking a leadership role is its willingness
AND
could unravel, throwing us back into economic chaos and potentially political disorder.
Economic decline causes global nuclear war
Tønnesson 15 ~(Stein, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University) "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace," International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311, 2015~ SJDI Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to
AND
each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.
Independently, protectionism causes great power competition and militarized regionalism.
Lake 18. ~(David Lake is a Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. "Economic Openness and Great Power Competition: Lessons for China and the United States," April 30, 2018. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract'id=3171196/~~ TDI I develop two central arguments. First, historically, great power competition has been
AND
politics and grand strategy,14 and systemic theories of international relations.15
Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change
Starr 15 ~(Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015~ DD
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result
AND
few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?
Solvency
Plan: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should reduce IP protections for Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats.
Harmonized approaches to CRISPR solve misapplication – answers any impact turn
Wachowicz 19 ~(Jessica, a third-year student at the University of Washington School of Law whose primary area of study is emerging technologies and the legal issues associated therewith.) "The Patentability of Gene Editing Technologies such as CRISPR and the Harmonization of Laws Relating to Germline Editing, " Intellectual Property Breif, 2019 https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief/vol10/iss1/2/~~ RR At present, countries take different approaches in applying the ordre public doctrine to cases
AND
that promote progress in this area while maintaining consistency with concepts of morality.
Framing
The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing
First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic
AND
places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.
Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists.
AND
why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27
Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 ~Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority." Global Policy (2012)~ These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.
Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one. Bostrom 12 ~Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.~, Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1 chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€"positive or negativeâ€"is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.
A huge influx of patents is coming – most recent data and trends from this year
Mischel 4/27 ~(Fiona Mischel, Editor-in-Chief of SynBioBeta. She frequently covers sustainability, CRISPR research, food and agriculture technology, and biotech for space travel) "Who Owns CRISPR in 2021? It’s Even More Complicated Than You Think" SynBioBeta, 4/27/2021. https://synbiobeta.com/who-owns-crispr-in-2021-its-even-more-complicated-than-you-think/~~ BC Still Want To Patent CRISPR? Here’s What You Need To Know The biggest
AND
future, we cannot leave the fundamental promise of science in the dust.
Makes development of genomic medicine impossible – 3 warrants:
Patent disputes are imminent — new entities and foreign governments getting involved ensures conflict
China, patents are subject to invalidation proceedings after they are issued."25
IP disputes foreclose research collaboration between universities, which has historically enabled critical scientific breakthroughs
Sherkow 17 ~(Jacob, Professor of Law at the College of Law and Affiliate of the Carl R. Woese Institute for Genomic Biology at the University of Illinois, where his research focuses on the legal and ethical implications of advanced biotechnologies, especially as related to intellectual property. He is a leading expert on IP protection for genome-editing technologies, including CRISPR. He is the author of over 60 articles published in both scientific journals and traditional law reviews, including Science, Nature, the Yale Law Journal, and the Stanford Law Review. Since 2018, Sherkow has also been a Permanent Visiting Professor at the Center for Advanced Studies in Biomedical Innovation Law ("CeBIL") at the University of Copenhagen Faculty of Law) "Patent protection for CRISPR: an ELSI review" Journal of Law and the Biosciences 12/7/2017 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5965580/~~ BC One notable aspect of the CRISPR patent dispute is that it is, by and
AND
hope that the CRISPR patent dispute teaches others that such myopia isn’t warranted.
Patent disputes create fears of litigation that deter genome research and investment
million and signed a deal with pharmaceutical company Biogen to implement its technology.
Uncertainty about licensing ensures technology is not distributed or developed - smaller firms don’t know where they need to seek approval from
Sterlin 20 ~(Ian, JD from the University of Michigan Law School, Executive Editor of the Michigan Technology Law Review) "The CRISPR War Drags On: How the Fight to Patent CRISPR-Cas9 Creates Uncertainty in the Biotechnology Sphere," Michigan Technology Law Review, 3/2020~ JL On September 10, 2018, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals ("Federal Circuit
AND
order to make researchers feel secure in developing further technological innovations using CRISPR-.
CRISPR solves disease, but continued innovation is key
Thorne 20 ~(Lucy, PhD, received a BSc. in Biochemistry from University of Leeds and a Ph.D. in Biological Sciences from University of Liverpool in the UK. She is currently working as a freelance consultant in Cambridge, UK writing CRISPR-related content for Biocompare.) "CRISPR-Cas Gene Editing: A New Weapon against Infectious Disease" Biocompare, 1/14/2020. https://www.biocompare.com/Editorial-Articles/559757-CRISPR-Cas-Gene-Editing-A-New-Weapon-against-Infectious-Disease/~~ BC Infectious disease is a common cause of death worldwide, but the rise of antibiotic
AND
clinic and help combat the growing specter of antimicrobial resistance and infectious disease.
Extinction – defense is wrong
Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, "Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity", Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028 Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity.
AND
, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2
Harmonized approaches to CRISPR solve misapplication – answers any impact turn
Wachowicz 19 ~(Jessica, a third-year student at the University of Washington School of Law whose primary area of study is emerging technologies and the legal issues associated therewith.) "The Patentability of Gene Editing Technologies such as CRISPR and the Harmonization of Laws Relating to Germline Editing, " Intellectual Property Breif, 2019 https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief/vol10/iss1/2/~~ RR At present, countries take different approaches in applying the ordre public doctrine to cases
AND
that promote progress in this area while maintaining consistency with concepts of morality.
Advantage 2 – WTO credibility
Advantage 2 is WTO cred:
New EU trade restrictions on CRISPR contradicts WTO agreements which makes future disputes inevitable
Menz et al. 20 ~(Dr. Jochen Menz, of Julius Kühn-Institut, Federal Research Centre for Cultivated Plants) Modrzejewski (Dominik PhD, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Hartung (Frank, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Wilhelm (Ralf, Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Sprink (Thorben, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) "Genome Edited Crops Touch the Market: A View on the Global Development and Regulatory Environment" Front Plant Sci, 10/9/2020. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7581933/~~ BC WTO: Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures In November 2018, the delegations
AND
agricultural activities. Without any changes in European legislation the issue stays unresolved.
EU-WTO conflict causes WTO collapse – it’s the glue that holds the organization together in an international arena characterized by US and China trade disputes
Horton and Hopewell 8/3 ~(Ben, Communications Manager; Project Lead, Common Futures Conversations) (Dr Kristen, Associate Professor, and Canada Research Chair in Global Policy, University of British Columbia) "Lessons from Trump’s assault on the World Trade Organization", Chatham House 8/3/2021 https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/08/lessons-trumps-assault-world-trade-organization~~ BC The main reason behind the EU’s success in taking a leadership role is its willingness
AND
could unravel, throwing us back into economic chaos and potentially political disorder.
Economic decline causes global nuclear war
Tønnesson 15 ~(Stein, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University) "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace," International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311, 2015~ SJDI Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to
AND
each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.
Independently, protectionism causes great power competition and militarized regionalism.
Lake 18. ~(David Lake is a Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. "Economic Openness and Great Power Competition: Lessons for China and the United States," April 30, 2018. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract'id=3171196/~~ TDI I develop two central arguments. First, historically, great power competition has been
AND
politics and grand strategy,14 and systemic theories of international relations.15
Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change
Starr 15 ~(Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015~ DD
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result
AND
few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?
Solvency
Plan: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should reduce IP protections for Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats.
CRISPR is segemnt of DNA that uses proteins to modify other strands of DNA
, while Vertex obtained the rights to market the treatments to be developed.
Framing
The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing
First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic
AND
places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.
Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists.
AND
why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27
Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 ~Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority." Global Policy (2012)~ These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.
Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one. Bostrom 12 ~Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.~, Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1 chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€"positive or negativeâ€"is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.
9/18/21
SO - CRISPR AC v4
Tournament: St Marks | Round: 2 | Opponent: Westwood AG | Judge: Elijah Smith
Genomic Medicines AC
AC
Advantage 1 – Innovation
Advantage 1 is innovation:
A huge influx of patents is coming – most recent data and trends from this year
Mischel 4/27 ~(Fiona Mischel, Editor-in-Chief of SynBioBeta. She frequently covers sustainability, CRISPR research, food and agriculture technology, and biotech for space travel) "Who Owns CRISPR in 2021? It’s Even More Complicated Than You Think" SynBioBeta, 4/27/2021. https://synbiobeta.com/who-owns-crispr-in-2021-its-even-more-complicated-than-you-think/~~ BC Still Want To Patent CRISPR? Here’s What You Need To Know The biggest
AND
future, we cannot leave the fundamental promise of science in the dust.
Makes development of genomic medicine impossible – 3 warrants:
Patent disputes are imminent — new entities and foreign governments getting involved ensures conflict
China, patents are subject to invalidation proceedings after they are issued."25
IP disputes foreclose research collaboration between universities, which has historically enabled critical scientific breakthroughs
Sherkow 17 ~(Jacob, Professor of Law at the College of Law and Affiliate of the Carl R. Woese Institute for Genomic Biology at the University of Illinois, where his research focuses on the legal and ethical implications of advanced biotechnologies, especially as related to intellectual property. He is a leading expert on IP protection for genome-editing technologies, including CRISPR. He is the author of over 60 articles published in both scientific journals and traditional law reviews, including Science, Nature, the Yale Law Journal, and the Stanford Law Review. Since 2018, Sherkow has also been a Permanent Visiting Professor at the Center for Advanced Studies in Biomedical Innovation Law ("CeBIL") at the University of Copenhagen Faculty of Law) "Patent protection for CRISPR: an ELSI review" Journal of Law and the Biosciences 12/7/2017 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5965580/~~ BC One notable aspect of the CRISPR patent dispute is that it is, by and
AND
hope that the CRISPR patent dispute teaches others that such myopia isn’t warranted.
Patent disputes create fears of litigation that deter genome research and investment
million and signed a deal with pharmaceutical company Biogen to implement its technology.
Uncertainty about licensing ensures technology is not distributed or developed - smaller firms don’t know where they need to seek approval from
Sterlin 20 ~(Ian, JD from the University of Michigan Law School, Executive Editor of the Michigan Technology Law Review) "The CRISPR War Drags On: How the Fight to Patent CRISPR-Cas9 Creates Uncertainty in the Biotechnology Sphere," Michigan Technology Law Review, 3/2020~ JL On September 10, 2018, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals ("Federal Circuit
AND
order to make researchers feel secure in developing further technological innovations using CRISPR-.
CRISPR solves disease, but continued innovation is key
Thorne 20 ~(Lucy, PhD, received a BSc. in Biochemistry from University of Leeds and a Ph.D. in Biological Sciences from University of Liverpool in the UK. She is currently working as a freelance consultant in Cambridge, UK writing CRISPR-related content for Biocompare.) "CRISPR-Cas Gene Editing: A New Weapon against Infectious Disease" Biocompare, 1/14/2020. https://www.biocompare.com/Editorial-Articles/559757-CRISPR-Cas-Gene-Editing-A-New-Weapon-against-Infectious-Disease/~~ BC Infectious disease is a common cause of death worldwide, but the rise of antibiotic
AND
clinic and help combat the growing specter of antimicrobial resistance and infectious disease.
Disease causes extinction — climate change and genomic mutation irreversibly alter ecosystem equilibrium which leads to the emergence of new pathogens
Supriya 4/19 ~(Lakshmi Ph.D., worked as part of the RandD group in diverse industries starting with semiconductor packaging at Intel, Arizona, where she developed a new elastomeric thermal solution, which has now been commercialized and is used in the core i3 and i5 processors. From there she went on to work at two startups, one managing the microfluidics chip manufacturing lab at a biotechnology company and the other developing polymer formulations for oil extraction from oil sands. She also worked at Saint Gobain North America, developing various material solutions for photovoltaics and processing techniques and new applications for fluoropolymers. Most recently, she managed the Indian RandD team of Enthone (now part of MacDermid) developing electroplating technologies for precious metals. She has been a freelance science journalist and science writer since 2016 and has written for publications such as The Wire, Science, and New Scientist.) "Humans versus viruses - Can we avoid extinction in near future?" News Medical, 4/19/2021. https://www.news-medical.net/news/20210419/Humans-versus-viruses-Can-we-avoid-extinction-in-near-future.aspx~~ BC Expert argues that human-caused changes to the environment can lead to the emergence
AND
the consequences may be and the next pandemic could lead us to extinction.
Harmonized approaches to CRISPR solve misapplication – answers any impact turn
Wachowicz 19 ~(Jessica, a third-year student at the University of Washington School of Law whose primary area of study is emerging technologies and the legal issues associated therewith.) "The Patentability of Gene Editing Technologies such as CRISPR and the Harmonization of Laws Relating to Germline Editing, " Intellectual Property Breif, 2019 https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief/vol10/iss1/2/~~ RR At present, countries take different approaches in applying the ordre public doctrine to cases
AND
that promote progress in this area while maintaining consistency with concepts of morality.
Advantage 2 – WTO credibility
Advantage 2 is WTO cred:
New EU trade restrictions on CRISPR contradicts WTO agreements which makes future disputes inevitable
Menz et al. 20 ~(Dr. Jochen Menz, of Julius Kühn-Institut, Federal Research Centre for Cultivated Plants) Modrzejewski (Dominik PhD, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Hartung (Frank, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Wilhelm (Ralf, Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Sprink (Thorben, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) "Genome Edited Crops Touch the Market: A View on the Global Development and Regulatory Environment" Front Plant Sci, 10/9/2020. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7581933/~~ BC WTO: Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures In November 2018, the delegations
AND
agricultural activities. Without any changes in European legislation the issue stays unresolved.
EU-WTO conflict causes WTO collapse – it’s the glue that holds the organization together in an international arena characterized by US and China trade disputes
Horton and Hopewell 8/3 ~(Ben, Communications Manager; Project Lead, Common Futures Conversations) (Dr Kristen, Associate Professor, and Canada Research Chair in Global Policy, University of British Columbia) "Lessons from Trump’s assault on the World Trade Organization", Chatham House 8/3/2021 https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/08/lessons-trumps-assault-world-trade-organization~~ BC The main reason behind the EU’s success in taking a leadership role is its willingness
AND
could unravel, throwing us back into economic chaos and potentially political disorder.
Economic decline causes global nuclear war
Tønnesson 15 ~(Stein, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University) "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace," International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311, 2015~ SJDI Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to
AND
each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.
Independently, protectionism causes great power competition and militarized regionalism.
Lake 18. ~(David Lake is a Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. "Economic Openness and Great Power Competition: Lessons for China and the United States," April 30, 2018. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract'id=3171196/~~ TDI I develop two central arguments. First, historically, great power competition has been
AND
politics and grand strategy,14 and systemic theories of international relations.15
Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change
Starr 15 ~(Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015~ DD
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result
AND
few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?
Solvency
Plan: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should reduce IP protections for Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats.
CRISPR is segemnt of DNA that uses proteins to modify other strands of DNA
, while Vertex obtained the rights to market the treatments to be developed.
Framing
The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing
First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic
AND
places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.
Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists.
AND
why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27
Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 ~Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority." Global Policy (2012)~ These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.
Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one. Bostrom 12 ~Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.~, Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1 chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€"positive or negativeâ€"is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.
10/16/21
SO - CRISPR AC v5
Tournament: St Marks | Round: 4 | Opponent: Westwood AR | Judge: Emmiee Malyugina Genomic Medicines AC AC Advantage 1 – Innovation Advantage 1 is innovation: A huge influx of patents is coming – most recent data and trends from this year Mischel 4/27 (Fiona Mischel, Editor-in-Chief of SynBioBeta. She frequently covers sustainability, CRISPR research, food and agriculture technology, and biotech for space travel) "Who Owns CRISPR in 2021? It’s Even More Complicated Than You Think" SynBioBeta, 4/27/2021. https://synbiobeta.com/who-owns-crispr-in-2021-its-even-more-complicated-than-you-think/~~ BC Still Want To Patent CRISPR? Here’s What You Need To Know The biggest
AND
future, we cannot leave the fundamental promise of science in the dust.
China, patents are subject to invalidation proceedings after they are issued."25
IP disputes foreclose research collaboration between universities, which has historically enabled critical scientific breakthroughs Sherkow 17 (Jacob, Professor of Law at the College of Law and Affiliate of the Carl R. Woese Institute for Genomic Biology at the University of Illinois, where his research focuses on the legal and ethical implications of advanced biotechnologies, especially as related to intellectual property. He is a leading expert on IP protection for genome-editing technologies, including CRISPR. He is the author of over 60 articles published in both scientific journals and traditional law reviews, including Science, Nature, the Yale Law Journal, and the Stanford Law Review. Since 2018, Sherkow has also been a Permanent Visiting Professor at the Center for Advanced Studies in Biomedical Innovation Law ("CeBIL") at the University of Copenhagen Faculty of Law) "Patent protection for CRISPR: an ELSI review" Journal of Law and the Biosciences 12/7/2017 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5965580/~~ BC One notable aspect of the CRISPR patent dispute is that it is, by and
AND
hope that the CRISPR patent dispute teaches others that such myopia isn’t warranted.
Patent disputes create fears of litigation that deter genome research and investment Reader 10/10 (Ruth, writer for Fast Company, covers the intersection of health and technology) "2 women won the Nobel for CRISPR, but the battle for its patent rages on" Fast Company, 10/10/2020 https://www.fastcompany.com/90561762/nobel-prize-jennifer-doudna-emmanuelle-charpentier-crispr-patent-lawsuit~~ BC CRISPR’S UNCERTAIN FUTURE While the Nobel award certainly affixes Doudna and Charpentier’s place in
AND
million and signed a deal with pharmaceutical company Biogen to implement its technology.
Uncertainty about licensing ensures technology is not distributed or developed - smaller firms don’t know where they need to seek approval from Sterlin 20 (Ian, JD from the University of Michigan Law School, Executive Editor of the Michigan Technology Law Review) "The CRISPR War Drags On: How the Fight to Patent CRISPR-Cas9 Creates Uncertainty in the Biotechnology Sphere," Michigan Technology Law Review, 3/2020 JL On September 10, 2018, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals ("Federal Circuit
AND
order to make researchers feel secure in developing further technological innovations using CRISPR-.
CRISPR solves disease, but continued innovation is key Thorne 20 (Lucy, PhD, received a BSc. in Biochemistry from University of Leeds and a Ph.D. in Biological Sciences from University of Liverpool in the UK. She is currently working as a freelance consultant in Cambridge, UK writing CRISPR-related content for Biocompare.) "CRISPR-Cas Gene Editing: A New Weapon against Infectious Disease" Biocompare, 1/14/2020. https://www.biocompare.com/Editorial-Articles/559757-CRISPR-Cas-Gene-Editing-A-New-Weapon-against-Infectious-Disease/~~ BC Infectious disease is a common cause of death worldwide, but the rise of antibiotic
AND
clinic and help combat the growing specter of antimicrobial resistance and infectious disease.
Disease causes extinction — climate change and genomic mutation irreversibly alter ecosystem equilibrium which leads to the emergence of new pathogens Supriya 4/19 (Lakshmi Ph.D., worked as part of the RandD group in diverse industries starting with semiconductor packaging at Intel, Arizona, where she developed a new elastomeric thermal solution, which has now been commercialized and is used in the core i3 and i5 processors. From there she went on to work at two startups, one managing the microfluidics chip manufacturing lab at a biotechnology company and the other developing polymer formulations for oil extraction from oil sands. She also worked at Saint Gobain North America, developing various material solutions for photovoltaics and processing techniques and new applications for fluoropolymers. Most recently, she managed the Indian RandD team of Enthone (now part of MacDermid) developing electroplating technologies for precious metals. She has been a freelance science journalist and science writer since 2016 and has written for publications such as The Wire, Science, and New Scientist.) "Humans versus viruses - Can we avoid extinction in near future?" News Medical, 4/19/2021. https://www.news-medical.net/news/20210419/Humans-versus-viruses-Can-we-avoid-extinction-in-near-future.aspx~~ BC Expert argues that human-caused changes to the environment can lead to the emergence
AND
the consequences may be and the next pandemic could lead us to extinction.
Harmonized approaches to CRISPR solve misapplication – answers any impact turn Wachowicz 19 (Jessica, a third-year student at the University of Washington School of Law whose primary area of study is emerging technologies and the legal issues associated therewith.) "The Patentability of Gene Editing Technologies such as CRISPR and the Harmonization of Laws Relating to Germline Editing, " Intellectual Property Breif, 2019 https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief/vol10/iss1/2/~~ RR At present, countries take different approaches in applying the ordre public doctrine to cases
AND
that promote progress in this area while maintaining consistency with concepts of morality.
Advantage 2 – WTO credibility Advantage 2 is WTO cred: New EU trade restrictions on CRISPR contradicts WTO agreements which makes future disputes inevitable Menz et al. 20 (Dr. Jochen Menz, of Julius Kühn-Institut, Federal Research Centre for Cultivated Plants) Modrzejewski (Dominik PhD, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Hartung (Frank, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Wilhelm (Ralf, Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Sprink (Thorben, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) "Genome Edited Crops Touch the Market: A View on the Global Development and Regulatory Environment" Front Plant Sci, 10/9/2020. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7581933/~~ BC WTO: Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures In November 2018, the delegations
AND
agricultural activities. Without any changes in European legislation the issue stays unresolved.
EU-WTO conflict causes WTO collapse – it’s the glue that holds the organization together in an international arena characterized by US and China trade disputes Horton and Hopewell 8/3 (Ben, Communications Manager; Project Lead, Common Futures Conversations) (Dr Kristen, Associate Professor, and Canada Research Chair in Global Policy, University of British Columbia) "Lessons from Trump’s assault on the World Trade Organization", Chatham House 8/3/2021 https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/08/lessons-trumps-assault-world-trade-organization~~ BC The main reason behind the EU’s success in taking a leadership role is its willingness
AND
could unravel, throwing us back into economic chaos and potentially political disorder.
Economic decline causes global nuclear war Tønnesson 15 (Stein, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University) "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace," International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311, 2015 SJDI Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to
AND
each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.
Independently, protectionism causes great power competition and militarized regionalism. Lake 18. (David Lake is a Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. "Economic Openness and Great Power Competition: Lessons for China and the United States," April 30, 2018. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract'id=3171196/~~ TDI I develop two central arguments. First, historically, great power competition has been
AND
politics and grand strategy,14 and systemic theories of international relations.15
Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change Starr 15 (Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015 DD
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result
AND
few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?
Solvency Plan: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should reduce intellectual property protections for Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats. CRISPR is segemnt of DNA that uses proteins to modify other strands of DNA Lexico ND (Lexico dictionary) https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/crispr~~ BC CRISPR NOUN 1 Biochemistry A segment of DNA containing short repetitions of base sequences
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DNA and its associated protein to edit the base pairs of a gene.
, while Vertex obtained the rights to market the treatments to be developed.
Framing The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything. Moen 16 Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281 SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic
AND
places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.
Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable. Moen 16 Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281 SJDI I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists.
AND
why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27
Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority." Global Policy (2012) These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe. Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one. Bostrom 12 Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford., Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1 chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€"positive or negativeâ€"is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action. 10/16/21 SaveDeleteEdit
A huge influx of patents is coming – most recent data and trends from this year
Mischel 4/27 ~(Fiona Mischel, Editor-in-Chief of SynBioBeta. She frequently covers sustainability, CRISPR research, food and agriculture technology, and biotech for space travel) "Who Owns CRISPR in 2021? It’s Even More Complicated Than You Think" SynBioBeta, 4/27/2021. https://synbiobeta.com/who-owns-crispr-in-2021-its-even-more-complicated-than-you-think/~~ BC Still Want To Patent CRISPR? Here’s What You Need To Know The biggest
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future, we cannot leave the fundamental promise of science in the dust.
Makes development of genomic medicine impossible – 3 warrants:
Patent disputes are imminent — new entities and foreign governments getting involved ensures conflict
China, patents are subject to invalidation proceedings after they are issued."25
IP disputes foreclose research collaboration between universities, which has historically enabled critical scientific breakthroughs
Sherkow 17 ~(Jacob, Professor of Law at the College of Law and Affiliate of the Carl R. Woese Institute for Genomic Biology at the University of Illinois, where his research focuses on the legal and ethical implications of advanced biotechnologies, especially as related to intellectual property. He is a leading expert on IP protection for genome-editing technologies, including CRISPR. He is the author of over 60 articles published in both scientific journals and traditional law reviews, including Science, Nature, the Yale Law Journal, and the Stanford Law Review. Since 2018, Sherkow has also been a Permanent Visiting Professor at the Center for Advanced Studies in Biomedical Innovation Law ("CeBIL") at the University of Copenhagen Faculty of Law) "Patent protection for CRISPR: an ELSI review" Journal of Law and the Biosciences 12/7/2017 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5965580/~~ BC One notable aspect of the CRISPR patent dispute is that it is, by and
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hope that the CRISPR patent dispute teaches others that such myopia isn’t warranted.
Patent disputes create fears of litigation that deter genome research and investment
million and signed a deal with pharmaceutical company Biogen to implement its technology.
Uncertainty about licensing ensures technology is not distributed or developed - smaller firms don’t know where they need to seek approval from
Sterlin 20 ~(Ian, JD from the University of Michigan Law School, Executive Editor of the Michigan Technology Law Review) "The CRISPR War Drags On: How the Fight to Patent CRISPR-Cas9 Creates Uncertainty in the Biotechnology Sphere," Michigan Technology Law Review, 3/2020~ JL On September 10, 2018, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals ("Federal Circuit
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order to make researchers feel secure in developing further technological innovations using CRISPR-.
CRISPR solves disease, but continued innovation is key
Thorne 20 ~(Lucy, PhD, received a BSc. in Biochemistry from University of Leeds and a Ph.D. in Biological Sciences from University of Liverpool in the UK. She is currently working as a freelance consultant in Cambridge, UK writing CRISPR-related content for Biocompare.) "CRISPR-Cas Gene Editing: A New Weapon against Infectious Disease" Biocompare, 1/14/2020. https://www.biocompare.com/Editorial-Articles/559757-CRISPR-Cas-Gene-Editing-A-New-Weapon-against-Infectious-Disease/~~ BC Infectious disease is a common cause of death worldwide, but the rise of antibiotic
AND
clinic and help combat the growing specter of antimicrobial resistance and infectious disease.
Extinction – defense is wrong
Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, "Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity", Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028 Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity.
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, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2
Advantage 2 – WTO credibility
Advantage 2 is WTO cred:
New EU trade restrictions on genome editing contradicts WTO agreements which makes future disputes inevitable
Menz et al. 20 ~(Dr. Jochen Menz, of Julius Kühn-Institut, Federal Research Centre for Cultivated Plants) Modrzejewski (Dominik PhD, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Hartung (Frank, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Wilhelm (Ralf, Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) Sprink (Thorben, Julius Kühn-Institut, Institute for Biosafety in Plant Biotechnology) "Genome Edited Crops Touch the Market: A View on the Global Development and Regulatory Environment" Front Plant Sci, 10/9/2020. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7581933/~~ BC WTO: Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures In November 2018, the delegations
AND
agricultural activities. Without any changes in European legislation the issue stays unresolved.
EU-WTO conflict causes WTO collapse – it’s the glue that holds the organization together in an international arena characterized by US and China trade disputes
Horton and Hopewell 8/3 ~(Ben, Communications Manager; Project Lead, Common Futures Conversations) (Dr Kristen, Associate Professor, and Canada Research Chair in Global Policy, University of British Columbia) "Lessons from Trump’s assault on the World Trade Organization", Chatham House 8/3/2021 https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/08/lessons-trumps-assault-world-trade-organization~~ BC The main reason behind the EU’s success in taking a leadership role is its willingness
AND
could unravel, throwing us back into economic chaos and potentially political disorder.
Economic decline causes global nuclear war
Tønnesson 15 ~(Stein, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University) "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace," International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311, 2015~ SJDI Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to
AND
each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.
Independently, protectionism causes great power competition and militarized regionalism.
Lake 18. ~(David Lake is a Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. "Economic Openness and Great Power Competition: Lessons for China and the United States," April 30, 2018. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract'id=3171196/~~ TDI I develop two central arguments. First, historically, great power competition has been
AND
politics and grand strategy,14 and systemic theories of international relations.15
Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change
Starr 15 ~(Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015~ DD
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result
AND
few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?
Solvency
Plan: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should reduce IP protections on genomic medicines.
Harmonized approaches to CRISPR solve misapplication – answers any impact turn
Wachowicz 19 ~(Jessica, a third-year student at the University of Washington School of Law whose primary area of study is emerging technologies and the legal issues associated therewith.) "The Patentability of Gene Editing Technologies such as CRISPR and the Harmonization of Laws Relating to Germline Editing, " Intellectual Property Breif, 2019 https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief/vol10/iss1/2/~~ RR At present, countries take different approaches in applying the ordre public doctrine to cases
AND
that promote progress in this area while maintaining consistency with concepts of morality.
Framing
The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing
First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic
AND
places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.
Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists.
AND
why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27
Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 ~Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority." Global Policy (2012)~ These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.
Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one. Bostrom 12 ~Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.~, Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1 chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€"positive or negativeâ€"is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.
New vaccines have the potential to solve malaria, but will be patented
Hackett 4/17 ~(Don, serves as the publisher for the Precision Vax information network. Don first entered the news industry in 1967, when he began selling the Philadelphia Bulletin after grade school in Ardmore, PA. His focus on vaccines began with the completion of the Human Genome project in 2003, which forecasted scientific breakthroughs and the future delivery a personalized medicine and vaccines. More recently, Donald has been publishing digital health information for patients and healthcare providers. Since 1996, Don has helped launch digital companies such as Physician Computer Network, drKoop.com, 1-800-Doctors, myDNA, Mirixa, Digital Pharmacist, and Precision Vax. Donald has served on the advisory boards of the FDA Vaccine Advisory Task Force, CDC Vaccine Information Project, University of Texas College of Pharmacy, Texas eHealth Alliance, CMS Pharmacist eCare Plan, CDC's Immunization Information System, and was a founding member of the HIPAA work-group in 1995.) "Yale Researchers Patent Next-Gen Malaria Vaccine Candidate" Precision Vaccinations, 4/17/2021.https://www.precisionvaccinations.com/yale-researchers-patent-next-gen-malaria-vaccine-candidate~~ BC A Yale researcher has partnered with Novartis to develop an RNA vaccine to protect against
AND
travelers speak with a travel vaccine specialist one-month before traveling abroad.
IP prevents vaccine success:
Non-industry patents allow companies to over charge for malaria vaccines - that kills RandD and vaccine purchasing
Årdal and Røttingen 14 ~(Christine, Department of International Public Health, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway. Section for Global Health, Norwegian Knowledge Centre for the Health Services, Oslo, Norway) (John-Arne, Division of Infectious Disease Control, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway. Department of Health Management and Health Economics, Institute for Health and Society, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway. Department of Global Health and Population, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America) "An Open Source Business Model for Malaria" PLoS ONE, 2/6/2015. https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0117150~~ BC The standard protection measure for pharmaceutical RandD is the patent, used by
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similar benefits can be achieved with first-mover status on WHO prequalification.
"Patent thickets" delay the delivery of vaccines and prevent companies from experimenting with different antigen combinations which is necessary to develop the optimal vaccine
Shotwell 07 ~(Sandra, Managing Partner, Alta Biomedical Group) "Patent Consolidation and Equitable Access: PATH’s Malaria Vaccines" Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices, 2007. http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch17/p21/~~ BC 2.3 IP challenges The possibility of commercializing an effective malaria vaccine raises
AND
themselves. Assessing the availability of access to key patents becomes a priority.
IPP prevents vaccine market development - that’s key to the development of affordable generics and boosting global vaccine supply
Aars et al. 6/16 ~(Ole Kristian, Spark Street Advisors, New York) Clark (Michael, Spark Street Advisors, New York) Schwalbe (Nina, Spark Street Advisors, New York. Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg-Braamfontein, Gauteng, ZA, South Africa orresponding author at: Heilbrunn School of Population and Family Health, Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health) "Increasing efficiency in vaccine Production: A primer for change" Elsevier, 6/16/2021. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590136221000218~~#! ~ 4.4. Market development In theory, intellectual property incentivizes companies to
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potentially, support DCMVN manufacturers with skills like legal expertise and negotiation strategy.
Malaria kills 2.7 million annually – climate change increases cases by 80 million
Buck and Finnigan 8/11 ~(Emily, Madigan Army Medical Center) (Nancy, Campbell University) "Malaria" StatPearls, 8/11/2021. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK551711/~~ BC Forty percent of the total global population resides in or visits malaria-endemic regions
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is postulated to increase malaria incidence by 50 to 80 million.~1~
Independently, malaria prolongs and encourages civil war
the very resources that past scholarship suggests will allow them to resist total defeat
African civil wars escalate – they ensure US, Russia, and China draw in
Hicks et al. 3/4 ~(Marcus, a retired Air Force Major General who served as Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa, from 2017 to 2019. He previously was Chief of Staff at the U.S. Special Operations Command and a career AC-130 pilot.) Atwell (Kyle, an active-duty U.S. Army Officer, a Ph.D. student at the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, and a cohost of the Irregular Warfare Podcast.) Collini (Dan, an active-duty U.S. Army Officer and a Joint Chiefs of Staff Fellow.) "Great-Power Competition Is Coming to Africa" Foreign Affairs, 3/4/2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2021-03-04/great-power-competition-coming-africa~~ BC The shift in U.S. strategy toward Africa reflects an assumption—shared
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the political, economic, and developmental groundwork for future stability and prosperity.
Increased Chinese and Russian influence in Africa kills US primacy – they don’t have control now, but military conflict lets them assert dominance in the region
Turse 19 ~(Nick, contributing writer for The Intercept, reporting on national security and foreign policy. He is the author, most recently, of "Next Time They’ll Come to Count the Dead: War and Survival in South Sudan," as well as "Tomorrow's Battlefield: U.S. Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa," and "Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam." He has written for the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, The Nation, and Village Voice, among other publications. He has received a Ridenhour Prize for Investigative Reporting, a James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism, and a Guggenheim Fellowship. Turse is a fellow at The Nation Institute and the managing editor of TomDispatch.com.) "U.S. GENERALS WORRY ABOUT RISING RUSSIAN AND CHINESE INFLUENCE IN AFRICA, DOCUMENTS SHOW" The Intercept, 8/13/2019. https://theintercept.com/2019/08/13/russia-china-military-africa/~~ BC THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION and the Pentagon have repeatedly warned that China and Russia are expanding
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to threaten U.S. freedom of maneuver in and around Africa."
US primacy prevents great-power conflict — multipolar revisionism fragments the global order and causes nuclear war
Brands and Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. ("The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;" Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by Yale University Press; GrRv) Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and naval exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. "Our cooperation can isolate America," supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post-Cold War era. The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has
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with an eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements.
Retrenchment causes nationalism, war, and protectionism – optimists falsely assume current cooperative trends will continue without the US security guarantee
Matthew Fay 17, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ The Niskanen Center, 11/16/17, "America Unrestrained?: Engagement, Retrenchment, and Libertarian Foreign Policy," https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/America-Unrestrained.pdf A number of the arguments libertarians make in favor of retrenchment have merit, but
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might choose to obtain a nuclear arsenal once responsible for their own security.
Pursuit is inevitable
Wright 20 ~(Thomas, director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution, former lecturer at the University of Chicago's Harris School for Public Policy, PhD from Georgetown University and M.Phil. from Cambridge University) "The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can’t Withdraw From the World," Foreign Affairs, 4/2020~ JL A fifth problem with retrenchment is that it lacks domestic support. The American people
AND
the risk of miscalculation by Washington, its allies, or its rivals.
====Heg is sustainable – America has strong bones==== Ikenberry 18 ~(John, Professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University) reviewing book by Beckley (Michael, Fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs) "Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2018~ It has become conventional wisdom that the United States is in decline, the uni
AND
but he does think that it will long remain the world’s leading power.
Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change
Starr 15 ~(Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015~ DD
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result
AND
few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?
Solvency
PLAN: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should reduce intellectual property protections for anti-malarial medicines.
Todd 19 ~(Matthew, Professor of Drug Discovery, Pharma and Biochemistry at the UCL School of Pharmacy. He founded and currently leads the Open Source Malaria (OSM) and Open Source Mycetoma (MycetOS) consortia and is a founder of a broader Open Source Pharma movement. He is on the Editorial Boards of PLoS One, ChemistryOpen and Nature Scientific Reports.) "Open Source Malaria" Global Innovation Exchange, 5/24/2019. https://www.globalinnovationexchange.org/innovation/open-source-malaria~~ BC Open Source Malaria is already in progress and delivering for sustainable development. The project
AND
the structure of how we research and develop medicines will be irreversibly changed.
It ends the outbreak and overcome past challenges in combating the illness
Willman 4/29 ~(Marnie, Virology, University of Manitoba Bannatyne and National Microbiology Laboratory) "Researchers create an effective RNA vaccine for malaria" MassiveSci, 4/29/2021. https://massivesci.com/articles/malaria-mrna-vaccine-covid-biotech-patents/~~ BC Malaria remains a significant problem facing Africa. Of the 409,000 worldwide malaria
AND
us see the end of the most significant global outbreak in recent history.
Only the vaccine can eradicate the disease
Piper 4/28 ~(Kelsey is a Staff Writer for Vox's new vertical with a focus on the global poor, animal welfare, and risks affecting a stable future for our world. She previously worked as the head of the writing team at Triplebyte, and ran Stanford Effective Altruism during college.) "The new malaria vaccine is a total game changer" Vox, 4/28/2021. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/22399386/malaria-vaccine-r21mm-public-health-global-child-mortality~~ BC The big picture Malaria isn’t just one of the world’s biggest killers of children
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doses, and that provoke a strong and enduring immune response. .
1AR – Framing
The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing
First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic
AND
places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.
Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists.
AND
why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27
Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 ~Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority." Global Policy (2012)~ These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.
Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one. Bostrom 12 ~Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.~, Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1 chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€"positive or negativeâ€"is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.
10/31/21
SO - Malaria AC v2
Tournament: Meadows | Round: 6 | Opponent: Northern Valley HS Independent JS | Judge: Jacob Smith
Malaria AC
1AC
Advantage 1
New vaccines have the potential to solve malaria, but will be patented
Hackett 4/17 ~(Don, serves as the publisher for the Precision Vax information network. Don first entered the news industry in 1967, when he began selling the Philadelphia Bulletin after grade school in Ardmore, PA. His focus on vaccines began with the completion of the Human Genome project in 2003, which forecasted scientific breakthroughs and the future delivery a personalized medicine and vaccines. More recently, Donald has been publishing digital health information for patients and healthcare providers. Since 1996, Don has helped launch digital companies such as Physician Computer Network, drKoop.com, 1-800-Doctors, myDNA, Mirixa, Digital Pharmacist, and Precision Vax. Donald has served on the advisory boards of the FDA Vaccine Advisory Task Force, CDC Vaccine Information Project, University of Texas College of Pharmacy, Texas eHealth Alliance, CMS Pharmacist eCare Plan, CDC's Immunization Information System, and was a founding member of the HIPAA work-group in 1995.) "Yale Researchers Patent Next-Gen Malaria Vaccine Candidate" Precision Vaccinations, 4/17/2021.https://www.precisionvaccinations.com/yale-researchers-patent-next-gen-malaria-vaccine-candidate~~ BC A Yale researcher has partnered with Novartis to develop an RNA vaccine to protect against
AND
travelers speak with a travel vaccine specialist one-month before traveling abroad.
IP prevents vaccine success:
Non-industry patents allow companies to over charge for malaria vaccines - that kills RandD and vaccine purchasing
Årdal and Røttingen 14 ~(Christine, Department of International Public Health, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway. Section for Global Health, Norwegian Knowledge Centre for the Health Services, Oslo, Norway) (John-Arne, Division of Infectious Disease Control, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway. Department of Health Management and Health Economics, Institute for Health and Society, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway. Department of Global Health and Population, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America) "An Open Source Business Model for Malaria" PLoS ONE, 2/6/2015. https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0117150~~ BC The standard protection measure for pharmaceutical RandD is the patent, used by
AND
similar benefits can be achieved with first-mover status on WHO prequalification.
"Patent thickets" delay the delivery of vaccines and prevent companies from experimenting with different antigen combinations which is necessary to develop the optimal vaccine
Shotwell 07 ~(Sandra, Managing Partner, Alta Biomedical Group) "Patent Consolidation and Equitable Access: PATH’s Malaria Vaccines" Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices, 2007. http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch17/p21/~~ BC 2.3 IP challenges The possibility of commercializing an effective malaria vaccine raises
AND
themselves. Assessing the availability of access to key patents becomes a priority.
IPP prevents vaccine market development - that’s key to the development of affordable generics and boosting global vaccine supply
Aars et al. 6/16 ~(Ole Kristian, Spark Street Advisors, New York) Clark (Michael, Spark Street Advisors, New York) Schwalbe (Nina, Spark Street Advisors, New York. Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg-Braamfontein, Gauteng, ZA, South Africa orresponding author at: Heilbrunn School of Population and Family Health, Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health) "Increasing efficiency in vaccine Production: A primer for change" Elsevier, 6/16/2021. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590136221000218~~#! ~ 4.4. Market development In theory, intellectual property incentivizes companies to
AND
potentially, support DCMVN manufacturers with skills like legal expertise and negotiation strategy.
Malaria kills 2.7 million annually – climate change increases cases by 80 million
Buck and Finnigan 8/11 ~(Emily, Madigan Army Medical Center) (Nancy, Campbell University) "Malaria" StatPearls, 8/11/2021. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK551711/~~ BC Forty percent of the total global population resides in or visits malaria-endemic regions
AND
is postulated to increase malaria incidence by 50 to 80 million.~1~
China uses public health crisis as a means to expand soft power in the region, enhance its access to natural resources, and be owed political favors by African countries.
Lin et al. 18 ~(Shuang, researcher affiliated with the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University) "China’s health assistance to Africa: opportunism or altruism?" Globalization and Health, 2016. Last updated 10/1/2018. https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12992-016-0217-1~~#change-history~~ BC China’s approach to aid: altruism or opportunism Overall, it is estimated that
AND
could undermine its incentives and efficacy for greater international health engagement ~6~.
Increased Chinese and Russian influence in Africa kills US primacy – they don’t have control now, but military conflict lets them assert dominance in the region
Turse 19 ~(Nick, contributing writer for The Intercept, reporting on national security and foreign policy. He is the author, most recently, of "Next Time They’ll Come to Count the Dead: War and Survival in South Sudan," as well as "Tomorrow's Battlefield: U.S. Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa," and "Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam." He has written for the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, The Nation, and Village Voice, among other publications. He has received a Ridenhour Prize for Investigative Reporting, a James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism, and a Guggenheim Fellowship. Turse is a fellow at The Nation Institute and the managing editor of TomDispatch.com.) "U.S. GENERALS WORRY ABOUT RISING RUSSIAN AND CHINESE INFLUENCE IN AFRICA, DOCUMENTS SHOW" The Intercept, 8/13/2019. https://theintercept.com/2019/08/13/russia-china-military-africa/~~ BC THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION and the Pentagon have repeatedly warned that China and Russia are expanding
AND
to threaten U.S. freedom of maneuver in and around Africa."
US primacy prevents great-power conflict — multipolar revisionism fragments the global order and causes nuclear war
Brands and Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. ("The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;" Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by Yale University Press; GrRv) Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and naval exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. "Our cooperation can isolate America," supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post-Cold War era. The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has
AND
with an eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements.
Retrenchment causes nationalism, war, and protectionism – optimists falsely assume current cooperative trends will continue without the US security guarantee
Matthew Fay 17, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ The Niskanen Center, 11/16/17, "America Unrestrained?: Engagement, Retrenchment, and Libertarian Foreign Policy," https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/America-Unrestrained.pdf A number of the arguments libertarians make in favor of retrenchment have merit, but
AND
might choose to obtain a nuclear arsenal once responsible for their own security.
Pursuit is inevitable
Wright 20 ~(Thomas, director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution, former lecturer at the University of Chicago's Harris School for Public Policy, PhD from Georgetown University and M.Phil. from Cambridge University) "The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can’t Withdraw From the World," Foreign Affairs, 4/2020~ JL A fifth problem with retrenchment is that it lacks domestic support. The American people
AND
the risk of miscalculation by Washington, its allies, or its rivals.
====Heg is sustainable – America has strong bones==== Ikenberry 18 ~(John, Professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University) reviewing book by Beckley (Michael, Fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs) "Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2018~ It has become conventional wisdom that the United States is in decline, the uni
AND
but he does think that it will long remain the world’s leading power.
Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change
Starr 15 ~(Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015~ DD
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result
AND
few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?
Solvency
PLAN: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should reduce intellectual property protections for anti-malarial medicines.
Todd 19 ~(Matthew, Professor of Drug Discovery, Pharma and Biochemistry at the UCL School of Pharmacy. He founded and currently leads the Open Source Malaria (OSM) and Open Source Mycetoma (MycetOS) consortia and is a founder of a broader Open Source Pharma movement. He is on the Editorial Boards of PLoS One, ChemistryOpen and Nature Scientific Reports.) "Open Source Malaria" Global Innovation Exchange, 5/24/2019. https://www.globalinnovationexchange.org/innovation/open-source-malaria~~ BC Open Source Malaria is already in progress and delivering for sustainable development. The project
AND
the structure of how we research and develop medicines will be irreversibly changed.
It ends the outbreak and overcome past challenges in combating the illness
Willman 4/29 ~(Marnie, Virology, University of Manitoba Bannatyne and National Microbiology Laboratory) "Researchers create an effective RNA vaccine for malaria" MassiveSci, 4/29/2021. https://massivesci.com/articles/malaria-mrna-vaccine-covid-biotech-patents/~~ BC Malaria remains a significant problem facing Africa. Of the 409,000 worldwide malaria
AND
us see the end of the most significant global outbreak in recent history.
Only the vaccine can eradicate the disease
Piper 4/28 ~(Kelsey is a Staff Writer for Vox's new vertical with a focus on the global poor, animal welfare, and risks affecting a stable future for our world. She previously worked as the head of the writing team at Triplebyte, and ran Stanford Effective Altruism during college.) "The new malaria vaccine is a total game changer" Vox, 4/28/2021. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/22399386/malaria-vaccine-r21mm-public-health-global-child-mortality~~ BC The big picture Malaria isn’t just one of the world’s biggest killers of children
AND
doses, and that provoke a strong and enduring immune response. .
1AR – Framing
The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing
First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic
AND
places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.
Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.
Moen 16 ~Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281~ SJDI I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists.
AND
why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27
Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 ~Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority." Global Policy (2012)~ These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.
Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one. Bostrom 12 ~Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.~, Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1 chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€"positive or negativeâ€"is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.