1AC mining 1NC T-Appropriation REM PIC dualism K case 1AR all 2NR PIC case 2AR case PIC
CPS
6
Opponent: San Mateo YR | Judge: Vanessa Nguyen
1AC PTD 1NC T-Appropriation water wars DA debris CP case 1AR condo all 2NR condo case 2AR DA case
Cal
2
Opponent: Denver East SB | Judge: Leah Clark-Villanueva
1AC space weapons Mars col 1NC dip cap DA Starlink PIC case 1AR all 2NR DA case 2AR case DA
Cal
4
Opponent: Harker RM | Judge: Jacob Nails
1AC mining 1NC EIA CP debris adv CP Xi lashout DA plans bad case 1AR condo bad PICs bad multiple CPs bad RVI case CPs DA 2NR DA theory case 2AR case DA
Cal
5
Opponent: Marlborough AK | Judge: Akshay Manglik
1AC commons 1NC T-Extra Iran PIC Starlink DA EIA CP case 1AR condo bad consult bad all 2NR DA theory case 2AR case DA
Debate LA RR
2
Opponent: Harvard Westlake AL | Judge: Panel
1AC inequality 1NC REM CP Xi lashout DA case 1AR all 2NR CP case 2AR case CP
Debate LA RR
4
Opponent: Harker AR | Judge: Panel
1AC China 1NC T-Nebel Xi lashout DA relations CP spec appropration case 1AR condo bad RVI grammar DA all 2NR Xi lashout DA theory case 2AR case DA
Debate LA RR
4
Opponent: Harker AR | Judge: Panel
1AC China 1NC T-Nebel Xi lashout DA relations CP spec appropration case 1AR condo bad RVI grammar DA all 2NR Xi lashout DA theory case 2AR case DA
Debate LA RR
4
Opponent: Harker AR | Judge: Panel
1AC China 1NC T-Nebel Xi lashout DA relations CP spec appropration case 1AR condo bad RVI grammar DA all 2NR Xi lashout DA theory case 2AR case DA
Debate LA RR
5
Opponent: Prospect ST | Judge: Panel
1AC Kant with advantage 1NC EIA CP Xi lashout DA util NC case 1AR condo bad PICs bad advantage CP DA 2NR CP theory 2AR case CP
Debate LA RR
Semis
Opponent: Harker AR | Judge: Panel
1AC China 1NC T-Nebel Xi lashout DA Harker adv CP case 1AR all 2NR DA case 2AR case DA
Emory
1
Opponent: Valley RT | Judge: Chris Castillo
1AC Locke 1NC ASATs DA EIA CP ev ethics util NC comparative worlds case 1AR shell all 2NR DA util shell case 2AR shell
Emory
1
Opponent: Valley RT | Judge: Chris Castillo
1AC Locke 1NC ASATs DA EIA CP ev ethics util NC comparative worlds case 1AR shell all 2NR DA util shell case 2AR shell
Emory
3
Opponent: Strake Jesuit JW | Judge: Tyler Wood
1AC debris 1NC water wars DA Xi lashout DA EIA CP democracy DA case 1AR all 2NR Xi lashout DA case 2AR case DA
Emory
6
Opponent: Cardinal Gibbons RS | Judge: David Salazar
1AC mega-constellations 1NC EIA CP ASATs DA debris adv CP democracy DA case 1AR process CPs bad all 2NR ASATs DA case 2AR case DA
Emory
Doubles
Opponent: Harker MK | Judge: Panel
1AC whole rez 1NC REM PIC EIA CP water wars DA debris adv CP case 1AR all 2NR REM PIC case 2AR case PIC
Greenhill
1
Opponent: McNeil AR | Judge: Chris Castillo
1AC biopiracy 1NC Nebel T innovation DA consult WHO CP "3rd world" K case 1AR consult bad perfcon all 2NR innovation DA theory case 2AR consult bad perfcon
Greenhill
3
Opponent: Strath Haven AM | Judge: Eric He
1AC COVID 1NC T-Medicine innovation DA EU proposal CP consult WHO CP case 1AR consult bad all 2NR consult WHO CP theory case 2AR CP
Greenhill
6
Opponent: Presentation NR | Judge: Ishan Rereddy
1AC set col 1NC T-Framework innovation DA case 1AR all 2NR T-Framework case 2AR case T-Framework
Greenhill RR
1
Opponent: Strake Jesuit ZD | Judge: Panel
1AC Afropess 1NC cap K T-FW case 1AR condo all 2NR T-FW case 2AR case T-FW
Greenhill RR
4
Opponent: Northland Christian LB | Judge: Panel
1AC COVID 1NC innovation DA EU proposal CP consult WHO CP case 1AR condo bad consult bad all 2NR consult WHO CP theory case 2AR case consult WHO CP
Greenhill RR
5
Opponent: Harvard Westlake CC | Judge: Panel
1AC COVID vaccines 1NC innovation DA EU proposal CP consult WHO CP case 1AR consult bad all 2NR consult WHO CP case 2AR consult WHO CP
Greenhill RR
Finals
Opponent: Harker DS | Judge: Panel
1AC EU trade secrets 1NC T-WTO Nebel T (IP) neolib K case 1AR all 2NR case 2AR case
Harvard Westlake
1
Opponent: Marlborough VA | Judge: Viren Abhyankar
1AC Commons 1NC Xi lashout DA EIA CP case 1AR all 2NR DA case 2AR case DA
Harvard Westlake
4
Opponent: Portola AS | Judge: Anish Ramireddy
1AC mining 1NC REM PIC Xi lashout DA T-Nebel case 1AR condo PICs bad all 2NR PIC theory case 2AR condo PICs bad
Harvard Westlake
6
Opponent: Ayala AM | Judge: Andrew Gong
1AC Soko 1NC T-Nebel 6G CP adv CP case 1AR condo bad PICs bad grammar DA all 2NR theory case 2AR case
Loyola
2
Opponent: Sam Barlow EL | Judge: Julian Kuffour
1AC HIVAIDs 1NC T-Framework innovation DA COVID PIC util case 2NR COVID PIC case 2AR case
Loyola
3
Opponent: Orange Lutheran AZ | Judge: Asher Towner
1AC patents 1NC anti-realism NC innovation DA consult WHO CP 1AR condo bad consult bad all 2NR anti-realism NC condo bad consult bad 2AR condo
Loyola
5
Opponent: Saratoga AG | Judge: Ronak Ahuja
1AC US COVID 1NC innovation DA anti-realism NC consult WHO CP Nebel T 1AR condo bad consult bad all 2NR anti-realism NC theory 2AR AC NC
Loyola
Doubles
Opponent: Scripps Ranch AS | Judge: Panel
1AC Deleuze with util adv 1NC consult WHO CP comparative worlds util NC case 1AR consult bad ACC all 2NR theory util adv util NC case 2AR case NC
Loyola
Octas
Opponent: Carnegie Vanguard SR | Judge: Panel
1AC one and done w NCM 1NC Nebel T consult WHO adv CP case 1AR object fiat bad process CP bad all 2NR theory case 2AR case
Loyola
Quarters
Opponent: Strake Jesuit JX | Judge: Panel
1AC Korsgaard with util adv 1NC consult WHO CP util NC case 1AR consult bad condo bad all 2NR theory util NC case 2AR consult bad
Loyola
Finals
Opponent: Diamond Bar NC | Judge: Panel
1AC one and done 1NC Nebel T consult WHO neolib K case 1AR all 2NR consult CP case 2AR case CP
Meadows
1
Opponent: Millard North NL | Judge: Joel Lemuel
1AC US COVID 1NC consult WHO CP T-WTO T-Medicine case 1AR condo bad consult bad all 2NR T-WTO 2AR T-WTO
Meadows
4
Opponent: Martin Luther King JO | Judge: Gabriela Gonzalez
1AC decol 1NC T-Framework topic PIC innovation DA sui generis CP case 1AR all 2NR DA PIC case 2AR case PIC DA
Meadows
6
Opponent: Peninsula RM | Judge: Jonathan Hsu
1AC vaccine imperialism 1NC T-Medicine fisheries DA consult WHO CP distribution CP Remdesivir PIC case 1AR consult bad PICs bad all 2NR DA theory case 2AR case DA
Meadows
Octas
Opponent: Presentation NR | Judge: Panel
1AC colonial capitalism 1NC T-Framework innovation DA case 1AR all 2NR T case 2AR case T
Meadows
Quarters
Opponent: Diamond Bar NC | Judge: Panel
1AC evergreening 1NC fisheries DA epilepsy PIC consult WHO CP Nebel T case 1AR consult bad all 2NR DA theory case 2AR case DA
Meadows
Semis
Opponent: Orange Lutheran AZ | Judge: Panel
1AC vaccine imperialism 1NC T-Medicine fisheries DA consult WHO CP epilepsy PIC distribution CP case 1AR condo bad consult bad RVI all 2NR DA theory case 2AR condo
Nano Nagle
2
Opponent: Harker DV | Judge: Sam McLoughlin
1AC pandemics 1NC fisheries DA consult WHO CP anti-realism NC case 1AR all 2NR NC case 2AR case NC
Nano Nagle
3
Opponent: Los Altos BF | Judge: Michael Harris
1AC alienation with util advantage 1NC util consult WHO CP innovation DA 1AR condo all 2NR consult WHO CP condo case 2AR condo
Nano Nagle
5
Opponent: Harker AR | Judge: Lukas Krause
1AC COVID 1NC Nebel T consult WHO CP fisheries DA case 1AR condo RVI all 2NR case 2AR case
Nano Nagle
Quarters
Opponent: Southlake Carroll PK | Judge: Panel
1AC Jordan 1NC T-WTO Nebel T consult WHO CP cap K case 1AR consult bad condo bad all 2NR consult WHO CP theory 2AR CP
1AC Jordan 1NC T-WTO consult WHO CP cap K case 1AR all 2NR T 2AR T
Nano Nagle RR
Semis
Opponent: Sage MP | Judge: Panel
1AC Jordan 1NC T-WTO consult WHO CP cap K case 1AR all 2NR T 2AR T
Nano Nagle RR
4
Opponent: Marlborough WR | Judge: Akshay Manglik
1AC COVID 1NC fisheries DA consult WHO CP T-Medicine Remdesivir PIC 1AR condo bad consult bad PICs bad all 2NR consult theory case 2AR case fisheries DA consult
Palm Classic
2
Opponent: Honor VD | Judge: Emmiee Malyugina
1AC Starlink 1NC T-Appropriation ASATs DA 50 states CP dip cap DA debris adv CP case 1AR all 2NR ASATs DA case 2AR case DA
Palm Classic
4
Opponent: Mission San Jose SS | Judge: Leah Clark-Villanueva
1AC GPS 1NC T-Appropriation dip cap DA Lockheed ISR PIC states CP case 1AR condo all 2NR DA condo case 2AR case DA
1AC US tourism 1NC DIB DA adv CP T-Appropriation T-Can't Spec EIA CP case 1AR all 2NR EIA CP case 2AR all
Peninsula
3
Opponent: Midtown KT | Judge: Sam Gustavson
1AC set col 1NC REM PIC broadband DA util NC case 1AR all 2NR PIC NC case 2AR case NC
Peninsula
3
Opponent: Midtown KT | Judge: Sam Gustavson
1AC set col 1NC REM PIC broadband DA util NC case 1AR all 2NR PIC NC case 2AR case NC
Peninsula
6
Opponent: OA Independent VD | Judge: Dhruv Channa
1AC constellations 1NC T-Appropriation ASATs DA democracy DA debris adv CP case 1AR RVI all 2NR democracy DA RVI case 2AR case DA
Peninsula
Octas
Opponent: Southlake Carroll PK | Judge: Panel
1AC constellations 1NC T-Appropriation ASATs DA EIA CP debris CP democracy DA case 1AR condo alt agent fiat all 2NR DA theory case 2AR case DA
St Marks
1
Opponent: Ayala AM | Judge: Sam Larson
1AC evergreening 1NC Nebel T fisheries DA epilepsy PIC consult WHO CP case 1AR condo bad consult bad PICs bad all 2NR DA theory case 2AR case DA
St Marks
3
Opponent: Westwood AG | Judge: Kristiana Baez
1AC biocolonialism 1NC innovation DA consult WHO CP sui generis CP Nebel T case 1AR condo bad consult bad all 2NR innovation DA theory case 2AR case DA
St Marks
5
Opponent: Strake Jesuit DL | Judge: Eric He
1AC Kant with advantage 1NC consult WHO CP fisheries subsidies DA util NC case 1AR condo bad consult bad all 2NR theory case 2AR case
St Marks
Quarters
Opponent: Marlborough WR | Judge: Panel
1AC COVID 1NC fisheries DA production CP consult WHO CP T-Medicine Nebel T case 1AR condo bad all 2NR consult WHO CP theory case 2AR case CP
UT
1
Opponent: Carnegie Vanguard SR | Judge: Tej Gedela
1AC China 1NC T-Can't Spec nonviolent strikes PIC case 1AR condo bad PICs bad all 2NR theory case 2AR case
UT
3
Opponent: Strake Jesuit CB | Judge: Zara Inam
1AC democracy 1NC police PIC truckers PIC case 1AR all 2NR police PIC case 2AR all
UT
6
Opponent: Aragon ZA | Judge: Nandak Dhurjati
1AC China 1NC T-Can't Spec case 1AR all 2NR case 2AR case
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Cites
Entry
Date
0 - Contact
Tournament: - | Round: 1 | Opponent: - | Judge: - Hi! I'm Jane (she/her). Cites already aren't working, but every position is open-sourced.
Email: jane.lichtman@gmail.com
Messenger: Jane Lichtman
9/4/21
1 - K - Third World
Tournament: Greenhill | Round: 1 | Opponent: McNeil AR | Judge: Chris Castillo I endorse the whole 1AC minus their use of the phrase “1st/3rd world divide.” Pate 16 (Sabriya, Islamic studies major at Duke University) “Five things wrong with the term “Third World Countries”,” Duke Engage Cape Town, 6/23/2016 JL
The nature of the term implies entire nations are unsophisticated and alien. (Seriously, why does the term imply that certain nations are on another entirely different world?) The issue at hand is that “third world” has become an adjective used when individuals do not wish to outline what they actually mean. When in fact someone seeks to refer to how a country is specifically poverty-ridden or plagued with governmental corruption or repressive in civil liberties or struggling with high economic vulnerability, “third world” has become a convenient shorthand expression. While many of the aforementioned traits overlap in certain countries, to wholeheartedly characterize a nation as consequently “third world” can be misleading. The term is without a doubt ambiguous and hence vulnerable to usage in meaningless or unformed political rhetoric. 2. The term is simply archaic. “Third World” was coined during the Cold War to describe nations that neither supported ‘the West’ (NATO) nor ‘the East’ (the Communists). In effect, the term was created as a marker for a nation’s political ideology (perhaps often pacifism in the case of “Third World countries”) in a time of great global unrest. So why is the term still used today despite the end of the first Cold War? After all, how appropriate can a Cold War-era classification be when used as a blanket term for economic, political and social life in primarily Africa, Asia and Latin America. 3. It assumes a hierarchy between countries- and this is also true of the expressions “developed” and “developing” countries. These terms paint most definitely not homogenous Western nations as the ideal, despite the grave issues affecting so-called Western nations. Furthermore, these terms are not concrete, whereas quantitative data, such as infant mortality rates, provide a more solid basis for comparison. Additionally, referring to certain nations as of the “Third World,” presupposes the existence of a First (and Second World). But what does a “First World” country actually look like? The United States? Scandinavia? What really makes a country “first in its class?” (Yes, that is a phrase appropriated from car commercials, but when you think about it, that is an inherent meaning when a country is labeled “First World.”) 4. These artificial labels lack legitimacy. Who is one to classify another? Even in the 21st century, there’s no clear consensus on what it means to be a developed country. As written by one senior politics writer, Zeeshan Aleem, “Social democracy in Scandinavia, oil-funded theocracy in Saudi Arabia, and a one-party, partially planned, partially free market economy in China are all vastly different models for generating and harnessing prosperity.” With all these subjective perspectives on what defines a country, where lies the merit behind such universal labeling? 5. The term depicts the ‘afflicted’ countries as inaccessible In 1952 when Alfred Sauvy wrote “Three words one planet” for his article in L’Observateur, he envisioned a world entirely constructed in terms of capitalism and socialism, with a grey area denoted as the “third world.” While he may have had his problematic reasoning, in the 21st century, the term makes so-called “third world countries” sound inaccessible. Why must we refer to nations whose exports we consume, whose citizens we laud and whose culture we often derogate as on ‘another world?’ Are we that unwilling to find common ground or even admit that we all share one global economy and ‘pile of resources’ so-to-speak? Perhaps somewhere out there lies a justifiable reason to classify nations for certain attributes. But the idea of a “third world” is disconcerting. There is only one world: a world with billions of people and superficially drawn borders that have overtime come to divide and define us. In my opinion, rhetoric on nation-states should be unifying rather than divisive—the opposite of emotions evoked from the term “third world.”
Representations shape reality – they control communication and form identity Sarrica and Contarello 4 (Muro Sarrica – Department of General Psychology at the University of Padova and Alberta Contarello – PhD, Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Education and Social Psychology, Section of Applied Psychology at the University of Padova “Peace, War and Conflict: Social Representations Shared by Peace Activists and Non-Activists,” September 2004, Vol. 41, No. 5 http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/41/5/549)//PC The idea of social representations has its roots in Durkheim’s distinction between individual and collective representations, in structuralist anthropology and in Piaget’s distinction between childish operative thinking and adult formal thinking. Like collective representations, social represen- tations are shared within groups; just as in primitive cultures and in operative thinking, they are not based on logical rules. The underlying concept of the theory is that people refer to a reality that is socially con- structed, based on common agreement on what is real and what is not. Social represen- tations are thus defined, shared and used by groups and contribute to defining the environment in which the life of these groups and of their members takes place. Thus, they draw wider systems within which specific attitudes can develop (Doise, 1989). They may be defined as forms of common sense/knowledge, emotionally loaded, that allow members of a community to com- municate and understand each other (Moscovici, 1961/1976, 1998a,b). To highlight their social nature, the theory stresses the importance of the pro- cesses of communication within groups in the emergence of representations. When faced with an important but unfamiliar event, thoughts and discourse on the subject proliferate, and this set of interactions gives rise to a new social representation (Wagner, Valencia and Elejabarrieta, 1996). A social representation is, therefore, an explanation constructed by a group to cope with some- thing new. This first function, termed ‘symbolic coping’, is carried out through processes of anchoring and objectification. Anchoring consists of a series of responses that attempt to relate the content and struc- tures of the individual’s previous knowledge to the new event in order to make sense of it (Doise, 1992). Later, with objectification, ‘an icon, metaphor or trope is constructed which comes to stand for the new phenom- enon’ (Wagner et al., 1999: 99). Thanks to this process, even abstract or hazy concepts may be used by everyone and modified like real objects. Social representations have a twofold nature: they are stable concepts, since we do not redefine everything everyday, but they continue to evolve in relation to external, individual and group changes. To under- stand this twofold character, two zones – one central, the other peripheral – may be dis- tinguished in the representation. According to Flament (1987) and Flament and Moliner (1989), peripheral elements allow us to relate rapidly to the world around us. They also absorb the changes that concern the representation, by adapting to the changing situations. The central nucleus of the representation is, on the contrary, more stable and consists of ‘one or more elements, whose absence would end up destroying or giving a radically different meaning to the representation overall’ (Abric, 1989: 197; see also Abric, 1993). According to this approach, two social representations are different only if the central nuclei are different. People who share the same representation may differ, therefore, only in the peripheral elements to which they refer. It is also possible that, within the same cultural framework, different groups may take up distinct positions in the representa- tional field, by referring to different social representations. These differences are assumed to be systematic and organized on the basis of psycho-social variables (Doise, Clémence and Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1992; Doise, Spini and Clémence, 1999), among which identity plays a crucial role. The question is whether identity is a function of the representation itself (Duveen, 2001) or if the contrary is equally true (Brewer, 2001), since the two themes are inextricably linked. From this viewpoint, sharing a social represen- tation is a consequence of belonging to a group, but it is also a way of defining oneself in opposition to outgroups with different representations. Social representations thus regulate intragroup and intergroup relations, create cohesion (Breakwell, 1993) and help form social identity (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983) as well as its evolution and preservation (Breakwell, 2001; see also Chryssochoou, 2000, 2003).
9/18/21
1 - NC - Util
Tournament: Loyola | Round: 2 | Opponent: Sam Barlow EL | Judge: Julian Kuffour The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing
Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything. Moen 16 Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281 SJDI Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask a man what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.
2. Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority. Bostrom 12 Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012) These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe. 3. Independent of considerations of future happiness or life, death is the worst evil since it destroys the subject itself Paterson, 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com) Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82
9/4/21
JANFEB - CP - 50 States
Tournament: Palm Classic | Round: 2 | Opponent: Honor VD | Judge: Emmiee Malyugina CP: Megaconstellations in low-Earth Orbit by private entities, including but not limited to SpaceX’s Starlink, are unjust in all nations except the United States. In the United States, the fifty state territories and respective state and subnational legislative bodies should prohibit megaconstellations in low-Earth Orbit by private entities, including but not limited to SpaceX’s Starlink.
2/12/22
JANFEB - CP - 6G
Tournament: Harvard Westlake | Round: 6 | Opponent: Ayala AM | Judge: Andrew Gong CP: The Republic of Korea should ban the appropriation of outer space by private entities except for 6G satellites. The Republic of Korea should fund the appropriation of outer space for 6G satellites from asteroids by private entities. South Korea is looking into 6G programs now but continued private sector investment is key. Fletcher 7/1 (Bevin, editor of FierceWireless. She previously served as senior reporter for Wireless Week and CED Magazine, covering the wireless industry on a variety of topics including regulation, technology, and business. She has also worked as a journalist at biotech and finance trade publications. Bevin has a bachelor's degree in journalism from West Virginia University.) “South Korea kickstarts 6G plans,” Fierce Wireless, 7/1/21. https://www.fiercewireless.com/tech/south-korea-kickstarts-6g-plans RR South Korea’s Ministry AND faster,” he added.
A strong South Korean space sector is key to launching 6G networks. Clarke 10/24 (Carrington, he ABC's Seoul Correspondent, covering East Asia for the network. He works across digital, television and radio) “Asia is in the midst of a space race, but it's not just about exploration. It's also a military flex,” ABC Net News, 10/24/21. https://www.abc.net.au/news/carrington-clarke/8042208 RR South Korea may AND understand our universe.
1AC Clarke proves our link – inserted in green South Korea may AND that "mood" yet.
South Korea is a global leader in 6G development— encourages other countries to adopt 6G networks. Castro 20 (Caio, Journalist since eight years old, when I would read the newspaper out loud and pretend it was a radio show. Based in São Paulo, I have worked for Brazilian websites as reporter and editor before joining 6GWorld) “Korea lays out plan to become the first country to launch 6G,” 6G World, 11/5/20. https://www.6gworld.com/exclusives/korea-lays-out-plan-to-become-the-first-country-to-launch-6g/ RR Pushing for 6G AND of the process:
6G is key to cyber security – turns scenario 1 Ziegler et al. 10/14 (Volker, (Senior Member, IEEE) received the Dipl.-Ing. (M.Sc.) and Dr.-Ing. (Ph.D.) degrees from the Department of Electrical Engineering, Universität (TH) Karlsruhe, Germany.) “Security and trust in the 6G era,” Nokia Bell Labs, 10/14/21. Graphs/Figures Omitted https://d1p0gxnqcu0lvz.cloudfront.net/documents/Nokia_Security_and_trust_in_the_6G_era_White_Paper_EN.pdf RR In our 6G AND specific hardware platforms.
1/16/22
JANFEB - CP - Debris
Tournament: CPS | Round: 6 | Opponent: San Mateo YR | Judge: Vanessa Nguyen Climate change makes water shortages inevitable – that causes hydro-political conflict escalation which goes nuclear Harvey 8/17 (Fiona, the Guardian's environment correspondent, won the Foreign Press Association award for Environment Story of the Year and the British Environment and Media Awards journalist of the year) “Global water crisis will intensify with climate breakdown, says report,” The Guardian, 8/17/2021 JL Mark’s words should be a call to attention, and a call to action. The plight of farmers in Australia illustrates a larger reality: As planetary temperatures continue to increase and rainfall patterns shift due to human-caused climate disruption, our ability to grow crops and have enough drinking water will become increasingly challenged, and the outlook is only going to worsen. The most recent United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report warned of increasingly intense droughts and mass water shortages around large swaths of the globe. But even more conservative organizations have been sounding the alarm. “Water insecurity could multiply the risk of conflict,” warns one of the World Bank’s reports on the issue. “Food price spikes caused by droughts can inflame latent conflicts and drive migration. Where economic growth is impacted by rainfall, episodes of droughts and floods have generated waves of migration and spikes in violence within countries.” Meanwhile, a study published in the journal Global Environmental Change, looked at how “hydro-political issues” — including tensions and potential conflicts — could play out in countries expected to experience water shortages coupled with high populations and pre-existing geopolitical tensions. The study warned that these factors could combine to increase the likelihood of water-related tensions — potentially escalating into armed conflict in cross-boundary river basins in places around the world by 74.9 to 95 percent. This means that in some places conflict is practically guaranteed. These areas include regions situated around primary rivers in Asia and North Africa. Noted rivers include the Tigris and Euphrates, the Indus, the Nile, and the Ganges-Brahmaputra. Consider the fact that 11 countries share the Nile River basin: Egypt, Burundi, Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo. All told, more than 300 million people already live in these countries, — a number that is projected to double in the coming decades, while the amount of available water will continue to shrink due to climate change. For those in the US thinking these potential conflicts will only occur in distant lands — think again. The study also warned of a very high chance of these “hydro-political interactions” in portions of the southwestern US and northern Mexico, around the Colorado River. Potential tensions are particularly worrisome in India and Pakistan, which are already rivals when it comes to water resources. For now, these two countries have an agreement, albeit a strained one, over the Indus River and the sharing of its water, by way of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty. However, water claims have been central to their ongoing, burning dispute over the Kashmir region, a flashpoint area there for more than 60 years and counting. The aforementioned treaty is now more strained than ever, as Pakistan accuses India of limiting its water supply and violating the treaty by placing dams over various rivers that flow from Kashmir into Pakistan. In fact, a 2018 report from the International Monetary Fund ranked Pakistan third among countries facing severe water shortages. This is largely due to the rapid melting of glaciers in the Himalaya that are the source of much of the water for the Indus. To provide an idea of how quickly water resources are diminishing in both countries, statistics from Pakistan’s Islamabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry from 2018 show that water availability (per capita in cubic meters per year) shrank from 5,260 in 1951, to 940 in 2015, and are projected to shrink to 860 by just 2025. In India, the crisis is hardly better. According to that country’s Ministry of Statistics (2016) and the Indian Ministry of Water Resources (2010), the per capita available water in cubic meters per year was 5,177 in 1951, and 1,474 in 2015, and is projected to shrink to 1,341 in 2025. Both of these countries are nuclear powers. Given the dire projections of water availability as climate change progresses, nightmare scenarios of water wars that could spark nuclear exchanges are now becoming possible.
Asteroid mining solves water access – only NEOs are sufficiently proximate and hydrated – independently, storing launch fuel on asteroids reduces space debris – turns case Tillman 19 (Nola Taylor, has been published in Astronomy, Sky and Telescope, Scientific American, New Scientist, Science News (AAS), Space.com, and Astrobiology magazine, BA in Astrophysics) “Tons of Water in Asteroids Could Fuel Satellites, Space Exploration,” Space, 9/29/2019 JL When it comes to mining space for water, the best target may not be the moon: Entrepreneurs' richest options are likely to be asteroids that are larger and closer to Earth. A recent study suggested that roughly 1,000 water-rich, or hydrated, asteroids near our planet are easier to reach than the lunar surface is. While most of these space rocks are only a few feet in size, more than 25 of them should be large enough to each provide significant water. Altogether, the water locked in these asteroids should be enough to fill somewhere around 320,000 Olympics-size swimming pools — significantly more than the amount of water locked up at the lunar poles, the new research suggested. Because asteroids are small, they have less gravity than Earth or the moon do, which makes them easier destinations to land on and lift off from. If engineers can figure out how to mine water from these space rocks, they could produce a source of ready fuel in space that would allow spacecraft designers to build refuelable models for the next generation of satellites. Asteroid mining could also fuel human exploration, saving the expense of launching fuel from Earth. In both cases, would-be space-rock miners will need to figure out how to free the water trapped in hydrated minerals on these asteroids. "Most of the hydrated material in the near-Earth population is contained in the largest few hydrated objects," Andrew Rivkin, an asteroid researcher at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Research Laboratory in Maryland, told Space.com. Rivkin is the lead author on the paper, which estimated that near Earth asteroids could contain more easily accessible water than the lunar poles. According to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, more than 5,200 of the objects launched into space are still in orbit today. While some continue to function, the bulk of them buzz uselessly over our heads every day. They carry fuel on board, and when they run out, they are either lowered into destructive orbits or left to become space junk, useless debris with the potential to cause enormous problems for working satellites. Refueling satellites in space could change that model, replacing it with long-lived, productive orbiters. "It's easier to bring fuel from asteroids to geosynchronous orbit than from the surface of the Earth," Rivkin said. "If such a supply line could be established, it could make asteroid mining very profitable." Hunting for space water from the surface of the Earth is challenging because the planet's atmosphere blocks the wavelength of light where water can be observed. The asteroid warming as it draws closer to the sun can also complicate measurements. Instead, Rivkin and his colleagues turned to a class of space rocks called Ch asteroids. Although these asteroids don't directly exhibit a watery fingerprint, they carry the telltale signal of oxidized iron seen only on asteroids with signatures of water-rich minerals, which means the authors felt confident assuming that all Ch asteroids carry this rocky water. Based on meteorite falls, a previous study estimated that Ch asteroids could make up nearly 10 of the near-Earth objects (NEOs). With this information, the researchers determined that there are between 26 and 80 such objects that are hydrated and larger than 0.62 miles (1 km) across. Right now, only three NEOs have been classified as Ch asteroids, although others have been spotted in the asteroid belt. Most NEOs are discovered and observed at wavelengths too short to reveal the iron band that marks the class. Carbon-rich asteroids, which include Ch asteroids and other flavors, are also darker than the more common stony asteroids, making them more challenging to observe. Although Ch asteroids definitely contain water-rich minerals, that doesn’t necessarily mean that they will always be the best bet for space mining. It comes down to risk. Would an asteroid-mining company rather visit a smaller asteroid that definitely has a moderate amount of water, or a larger one that could yield a larger payday but could also come up dry? "Whether getting sure things with no false positives, like the Ch asteroids, is more important or if a greater range of possibilities is acceptable with the understanding that some asteroids will be duds is something the miners will have to decide," Rivkin said. In addition to estimating the number of large, water-rich asteroids might be available, the study also found that as many as 1,050 smaller objects, roughly 300 feet (100 meters) across, may also linger near Earth. Their small bulk will make them easier to mine because their low gravity will require less fuel to escape from, but they will produce less water overall, and Rivkin expects that the handful of larger space rocks will be the first targets. "It seems likely that the plan for these companies will be to find the largest accessible asteroid with mineable material with the expectation that it will be more cost-effective than chasing down a large number of smaller objects," Rivkin said. "How 'accessible' and 'mineable material' and 'cost-effective' are defined by each company is to be seen."
12/19/21
JANFEB - CP - EIA
Tournament: Debate LA RR | Round: 5 | Opponent: Prospect ST | Judge: Panel CP: The appropriation of outer space by private entities outside of the United States is unjust. The United States should submit an environmental impact assessment of the appropriation of outer space by private entities to the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs for public comment, modification, and approval. The United States federal government should implement the approved version of the submitted proposal.
Counterplan competes and creates the least environmentally damaging version of the aff. William R. Kramer, PhD Polisci/Futures Studies @ U of H Manoa, Currently HDR Inc. Extraterrestrial Environmental Analyst, ’14, “Extraterrestrial environmental impact assessments A foreseeable prerequisite for wise decisions regarding outer space exploration, research and development” Space Policy 30 (2014) 215-222 To be most AND extraterrestrial environmental impacts.
Extinction. EIA is key to preserve space resources, stop resource wars, and extra-terrestrial environmental damage. William R. Kramer, Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies @ University of Hawaii, '17, In dreams begin responsibilities – environmental impact assessment and outer space development, ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICE, VOL. 19, NO. 3, 128–138 Benefits of extraterrestrial AND this problem (Mack, 2016).”
1/14/22
JANFEB - CP - Harker Relations
Tournament: Debate LA RR | Round: 4 | Opponent: Harker AR | Judge: Panel CP: The People's Republic of China and the United States should adopt universal technological standards for the private appropriation of outer space. Independently, they don’t solve relations – their evidence says standardization is key, but the plan goes in the opposite direction by dramatically diverging US and Chinese policies on outer space, and they don’t solve lack of information sharing Gautel 21 — (Gidon Gautel is currently an Analyst in the space industry. He was previously the Project Coordinator of China Foresight and Project Manager of the Economic Diplomacy Commission at LSE IDEAS. Gidon holds a BSc in Government and Economics with first class honours from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and an MSc in Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Management with distinction from Imperial College Business School., insert quals, “Coordination Failure: Risks of US-China competition in space“, Medium, 4-29-2021, Available Online at https://lseideas.medium.com/coordination-failure-risks-of-us-china-competition-in-space-7112ca4f4da1, accessed 1-12-2022, HKR-AR) Finally, a lack AND its full support.
1/14/22
JANFEB - CP - Iran
Tournament: Palm Classic | Round: 6 | Opponent: Strake Jesuit JW | Judge: Shahina Chatur 1NC – CP CP: The appropriation of outer space by private entities except for within the Islamic Republic of Iran is unjust. through the production of space debris by private entities is unjust.
JCPOA passes now – international unity and focus are key DeYoung 2/10 (Karen, Associate editor and senior national security correspondent for The Washington Post) “Iran nuclear talks head toward finish line, but outcome is unclear”, The Washington Post, 02/10/2022 Talks between Iran and world powers over revitalizing the Iran nuclear agreement have reached their final stage and are expected to conclude one way or the other by the end of this month, according to participants. “I don’t know if it’s one, two or three weeks,” European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said this week during a visit to Washington. But the latest round of meetings in Vienna, he said, are “certainly the last steps.” While there is general agreement that negotiations are reaching an end state, opinions differ widely on the likely outcome. Russia’s representative, Mikhail Ulyanov, who has adopted a generally optimistic tone since the talks started in April, said last week that negotiations should conclude “as soon as possible, preferably this month.” The talks, he said in an interview with the Russian news outlet Kommersant, had come “a long way” and were “very close to achieving” success. A senior U.S. official, however, noted that major issues on the table remain unresolved. Negotiations are both “closer than we have been to a deal,” in that some progress has been made, and “closer than we have been to breakdown,” as time for agreement runs out, the official said. “Both outcomes are still very possible,” said the official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to comment on the sensitive diplomacy.
Iran won’t make any more concessions – Trump axing the previous agreement zeroed US leverage Tirone, Sykes, and Motevalli 2/7 (Jonathan, Reporter)(Patrick, Breaking news editor covering Middle East issues)(Golnar, Reporter) “U.S., Iranian Overtures Create Optimism as Nuclear Talks Renew”, Bloomberg, 02/07/2022 Confidence-building gestures by the U.S. and Iran have generated new optimism that the sides are inching toward the resuscitation of a nuclear deal that could enable the Persian Gulf nation’s return to world energy markets. Talks will resume on Tuesday in Vienna, a week later than planned. Since diplomats last met in January, the U.S. has restored sanctions waivers that will allow countries to cooperate with Iran on civilian nuclear projects. The Islamic Republic has meanwhile closed down a controversial facility and consolidated production at internationally monitored sites.
The developments “should facilitate technical discussions necessary to support talks,” diplomats from France, Germany and the U.K. wrote in an emailed statement. “We have very little time left.” Iran has said the restoration of the sanctions waivers, scrapped after the Trump administration pulled out of the nuclear pact in 2018, were “good but not enough.” Even so, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh spoke positively about the return to talks, which have proceeded in fits and starts since April. “We’ve made considerable advances in different areas of the negotiations including ideas on guarantees that have been raised and written down,” Khatibzadeh said. Iranian officials were pursuing a guarantee the U.S. won’t abandon the deal again in the future, and demanding some form of sanctions-removal verification process, he said. Without Nuclear Deal, How Close Is Iran to a Bomb? Washington and its European allies have tended to be less upbeat than Tehran in their assessment of the negotiations and have expressed concern about how Iran’s nuclear program can be effectively hemmed in given its substantial advances over the past two years. After the Trump administration jettisoned the pact and reapplied U.S. penalties that crippled its vital oil exports, Iran gradually enriched uranium closer to the levels needed for nuclear weapons. The U.S. has been warning since July that time is running out to salvage the agreement, which restrained Tehran’s nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. Since the U.S. pullout, Iran has been gradually enriching uranium closer to the levels needed for nuclear weapons.
China, one of the parties to the 2015 agreement, said the negotiations are at a “critical juncture,” according to a statement by Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian on Monday.
The plan kills Iranian support for JCPOA – private space capabilities are a key focus for Raisi Larson and Lewis 21 (Jim, Senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterrey)(Jeffery, Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and a staff member at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies) “IRANIAN PRESIDENT RAISI’S RENEWED EMPHASIS ON SPACE IS LIKELY TO CREATE NEW TENSIONS”, War on the Rocks, 12/20/2021 Western press reporting on the first 100 days of Iran’s new hardline president, Ebrahim Raisi, has naturally focused on his impact on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. But in Iran, officials refer to three, not two, “power-creating” (eghtedar-saz) industries: nuclear, missiles, and space. And it is space, more so than either nuclear or missiles, where Raisi has focused his early public efforts. And it is Iran’s moves in space that will probably present President Joe Biden with the first challenge of the post-nuclear deal era. In his first 100 days, Raisi has moved to place his imprint by reinvigorating Iran’s space program, the results of which will be visible in the coming months and years. Raisi has now set in motion a process that will result in Iran launching more satellites in the coming year, unveiling new space launch vehicles, and breaking ground on a new space launch facility in southern Iran. These developments will understandably be interpreted by Western media in the context of Iran’s missile programs and the broader security situation. But it is important to understand that Iran is also deeply committed to the economic, military, and security uses of outer space. The Biden administration will have to choose how to respond to Iran’s growing presence in space. Will the United States try to balance its legitimate concerns about proliferation with Iran’s right to access space? Or will it treat Iran as a pariah, hoping that vocal opposition to Iran’s space launches will somehow produce a different result than the same approach did with North Korea? Raisi Moves to Revive Iran’s Space Programs Raisi is very publicly attempting to reinvigorate an Iranian space program that has been struggling in recent years. His new communications minister has criticized the state of the space program left by his predecessor — he called it “sorrowful” and “backwards” and sacked the head of the Iranian Space Agency. Raisi chaired a meeting of the Supreme Space Council — the country’s highest-level space policymaking organization — which had not met for more than a decade. At that meeting, Raisi committed Iran to launching more satellites into low earth orbit and reaching geostationary orbit by 2026. Iran has two space programs: a state space program and a parallel program run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The state space program is under Iran’s president, who chairs the Supreme Space Council. The council, in turn, oversees the Iranian Space Agency, which contracts with entities under the communications, defense, and science ministries — and increasingly, Iran’s private sector. We use the phrase “state” space program rather than “civilian” because Iran’s military is fully integrated into this program.
Iranian proliferation goes nuclear – causes regional war and spurs proliferation cascades across the Middle East Chilton and Hoshovsky 20 – (Kevin, led U.S. Strategic Command and has participated in the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s Generals and Admirals Program; Harry, policy analyst at JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy) "Avoiding a nuclear arms race in the Middle East," Defense News, 2-13-2020, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/02/13/avoiding-a-nuclear-arms-race-in-the-middle-east/ TDI This raises two immediate concerns. First, should Iran race for the bomb, it is almost inevitable that the United States and/or Israel will take preventative military action to stop it from crossing that fateful threshold. This could easily spiral into a regional war as Iran activates its various proxy forces against the United States and its allies. Second, an Iranian nuclear breakout attempt could spur a proliferation cascade throughout the Middle East, beginning with Saudi Arabia. Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince, openly stated in 2018 that if Iran developed nuclear weapons, Riyadh would quickly “follow suit.” One suggested approach would see Saudi Arabia purchase a nuclear power reactor from a major supplier like South Korea and then build a reprocessing plant that would yield enough weapons-grade plutonium in five years. A half-decade delay isn’t optimal, however, when the goal is achieving nuclear deterrence quickly. Thus, there is the so-called Islamabad option. This refers to Riyadh’s role in financing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and an alleged commitment from Islamabad that it would repay the favor. While Pakistani and Saudi officials have denied any such understanding, there is the possibility that the two could work out an arrangement where Islamabad could deploy some of its nuclear arsenal on Saudi soil following a successful Iranian breakout. Although this maneuver would draw sharp, international criticism, in theory, it would allow Riyadh to remain in good standing vis-a-vis the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Nevertheless, Pakistan might not be willing to play spoiler against a nuclearized Iran. If it is, Middle Eastern geopolitics would become extremely unstable. If Saudi Arabia acquires nuclear weapons, many believe Turkey would follow suit. Last September, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that he “cannot accept” the argument from Western nations that Turkey should not be allowed to attain nuclear weapons. In 1958, Charles de Gaulle proclaimed that a nation without nuclear weapons “does not command its own destiny”; two years later, France tested its first bomb. Erdogan’s comments echo those earlier remarks and raise the possibility that Ankara could become the second NATO member to leave the alliance’s nuclear umbrella in favor of its own independent arsenal.
Prolif cascades undermine deterrence and cause nuclear war – this is predictive of what a multi-nuclear Middle East would look like Krepinevich 13 – (Dr. Andrew F, the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) “Critical Mass: Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East,” 2013, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Nuclear-Proliferation-in-the-Middle-East.pdf TDI As more countries over time develop nuclear capabilities and build up their nuclear arsenals, the competition will evolve from an Israeli-Iranian affair to a multi-state rivalry. For illustrative purposes we will assume that in the 2025-2030 timeframe, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and perhaps Egypt and/or Iraq have nuclear arsenals in the low double-digit range (i.e., ten to forty weapons). What form might a nuclear competition among these powers and Israel assume? The remainder of this chapter attempts to shed some light on this issue, and its potential implications, with emphasis on those affecting regional stability. The challenge of preserving stability when confronted with military competition among five nuclear-armed states within the Middle East and with other powers external to the region engaged in a Great Game for influence is formidable. At first blush, one thing seems apparent: many Cold War-era metrics for assessing the competition and gauging where it might be headed appear to be of little utility; in fact, they may actually prove misleading and dangerous. The same can be said of those looking to apply Cold War-era arms control metrics as a way of keeping the peace in general and avoiding nuclear use in particular. During the Cold War, many nuclear strategists came to view nuclear parity (the possession of roughly equivalent arsenals capable of inflicting roughly equivalent levels of destruction) between the United States and the Soviet Union as stabilizing. The perception of these strategists is that the rough equivalence contributed to the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons, and was thus desirable. Parity enabled both sides to avoid the perception of being inferior to their rival, and perceptions are critical to deterrence and to preserving the confidence of one’s allies and security partners. If accepted by both sides, parity could enable them to avoid the cost and instability associated with “racing” toward ever-larger arsenals. Accordingly, maintaining parity was a major objective of U.S.-Soviet (and later U.S.-Russian) arms control negotiations. Yet irrespective of its merits, parity is not an option for states engaged in an n-player competition. Each competitor cannot have a nuclear force equivalent to all the others. Even if the competition should solidify into two coalitions so as to mimic the two-player Cold War competition, questions would almost certainly arise regarding the willingness of a coalition partner that has not been attacked to risk its own destruction by using its nuclear weapons in response to an attack on its ally. Indeed, these concerns were raised during the Cold War, and formed a major justification for France pursuing its own force de frappe. 93 In a Middle Eastern “n-player” competition, all nuclear powers would be challenged to establish an “assured destruction” capability against all the other regional nuclear powers, another Cold War desideratum, given their relatively modest economies. An “assured destruction” capability in an n-state competition would require that each state have weapons sufficient to survive an initial attack by all potential rivals and still be able to devastate the countries of all attackers. It would also require that the source of the attack be reliably identified. As noted earlier, this may prove difficult given likely limitations on these states’ ability to field advanced early warning systems. For example, would Israel be able to determine with confidence the owner of a ballistic missile launched from a location along the Iranian-Turkish border? The origin of any cruise missile launched from a sea-based platform? Even assuming a state could identify the source (or sources) of an attack, could its command and control systems survive the attack sufficiently intact to execute a retaliatory strike? A decapitation strike could preclude an “assured destruction” retaliatory strike even if sufficient weapons survive to execute one. This, in turn, raises the possibility of a “catalytic” war—one that is initiated between two states by a third party. Given a proliferated Middle East as described above, the chances that a regime would incorrectly attribute the source of an attack cannot be easily dismissed. To the extent cyber weapons can introduce false information into a state’s decision-making process, the risks of catalytic war only increase. Further complicating matters, the early warning requirement following a proliferation cascade could be multidirectional, and at some point perhaps 360 degrees, especially if nuclear rivals begin deploying a portion of their nuclear forces at sea. Early warning requirements would be stressed even further (and the costs of such a system increase correspondingly) if a neighboring state (e.g., Iran in the case of Turkey or Iraq; Turkey in the case of Israel; etc.) were to acquire nuclear weapons. In this case warning times would be even more compressed than in an Israeli-Iranian competition. Owing to its proximity to Iran, Saudi Arabia, for example, could have less than five minutes to react to an Iranian ballistic missile attack no matter how advanced its early warning and command and control systems are. As noted earlier in this assessment, regardless of what assumptions are made regarding a regional nuclear power’s early warning system, given the short ballistic missile flight times it seems likely that preserving command and control of the state’s nuclear forces while under attack will prove challenging. States might be tempted to adopt a launch-on-warning posture, but this requires both early warning and a highly responsive command and control system. Should a state determine that it will not be able to launch-on-warning and instead attempt to “ride-out” a nuclear first strike and retaliate, it would still need its command and control system to function effectively in the wake of the nuclear attack. Absent a highly resilient command and control system, a state’s ability to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike may require nuclear release authority to be diffused to lower-level commanders. But again, absent an effective early warning system it may not be possible to determine the attack source with confidence in a region with multiple nuclear powers.
2/13/22
JANFEB - CP - Soko Adv
Tournament: Harvard Westlake | Round: 6 | Opponent: Ayala AM | Judge: Andrew Gong CP: South Korea should outline the reforms implemented in 1AC Panda South Korea’s expanding AND against North Korea.
1/16/22
JANFEB - CP - US-Russia Adv
Tournament: Peninsula | Round: 2 | Opponent: Beckman PD | Judge: Srinidhi Yerraguntala CP: The United States should cooperate with Russia on developing the Lunar Orbital Platform-Gateway and purchase RD-180 rocket engines – 1AC Kramer
1/22/22
JANFEB - DA - ASATs
Tournament: Peninsula | Round: 6 | Opponent: OA Independent VD | Judge: Dhruv Channa China’s capitalizing on US vulnerabilities and ramping up satellite jamming capabilities – that emboldens Xi to invade Taiwan Chow and Kelley 8/21 (Brian G., policy analyst for the Institute of World Politics, Ph.D in physics from Case Western Reserve University, MBA and Ph.D in finance from the University of Michigan, and Brandon, graduate of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service ) “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons Could Conquer Taiwan—Or Start a War,” National Interest, 8/21/2021 JL If current trends hold, then China’s Strategic Support Force will be capable by the late 2020s of holding key U.S. space assets at risk. Chinese military doctrine, statements by senior officials, and past behavior all suggest that China may well believe threatening such assets to be an effective means of deterring U.S. intervention. If so, then the United States would face a type of “Sophie’s Choice”: decline to intervene, potentially leading allies to follow suit and Taiwan to succumb without a fight, thereby enabling Xi to achieve his goal of “peacefully” snuffing out Taiwanese independence; or start a war that would at best be long and bloody and might well even cross the nuclear threshold. This emerging crisis has been three decades in the making. In 1991, China watched from afar as the United States used space-enabled capabilities to obliterate the Iraqi military from a distance in the first Gulf War. The People’s Liberation Army quickly set to work developing capabilities targeted at a perceived Achilles’ heel of this new American way of war: reliance on vulnerable space systems. This project came to fruition with a direct ascent ASAT weapons test in 2007, but the test was limited in two key respects. First, it only reached low Earth orbit. Second, it generated thousands of pieces of long-lasting space junk, provoking immense international ire. This backlash appears to have taken China by surprise, driving it to seek new, more usable ASAT types with minimal debris production. Now, one such ASAT is nearing operational status: spacecraft capable of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs). Such spacecraft are inevitable and cannot realistically be limited. The United States, European Union, China, and others are developing them to provide a range of satellite services essential to the new space economy, such as in situ repairs and refueling of satellites and active removal of space debris. But RPO capabilities are dual-use: if a satellite can grapple space objects for servicing, then it might well be capable of grappling an adversary’s satellite to move it out of its servicing orbit. Perhaps it could degrade or disable it by bending or disconnecting its solar panels and antennas all while producing minimal debris. This is a serious threat, primarily because no international rules presently exist to limit close approaches in space. Left unaddressed, this lacuna in international law and space policy could enable a prospective attacker to pre-position, during peacetime, as many spacecraft as they wish as close as they wish to as many high-value targets as they wish. The result would be an ever-present possibility of sudden, bolt-from-the-blue attacks on vital space assets—and worse, on many of them at once. China has conducted at least half a dozen tests of RPO capabilities in space since 2008, two of which went on for years. Influential space experts have noted that these tests have plausible peaceful purposes and are in many cases similar to those conducted by the United States. This, however, does not make it any less important to establish effective legal, policy, and technical counters to their offensive use. Even if it were certain that these capabilities are intended purely for peaceful applications—and it is not at all clear that that is the case—China (or any other country) could at any time decide to repurpose these capabilities for ASAT use. There is still time to get out ahead of this threat, but likely not for much longer. China’s RPO capabilities have, thus far, lagged about five years behind those of the United States. There are reasons to believe this gap may close, but even assuming that it holds, we should expect to see China demonstrate an operational dual-use rendezvous spacecraft by around 2025. (The first instance of a U.S. commercial satellite docking with another satellite to change its orbit occurred in February 2020.) At the same time, China is expanding its capacity for rapid spacecraft manufacturing. The Global Times reported in January that China’s first intelligent mass production line is set to produce 240 small satellites per year. In April, Andrew Jones at SpaceNews reported that China is developing plans to quickly produce and loft a thirteen thousand-satellite national internet megaconstellation. It is not unreasonable to assume that China could manufacture two hundred small rendezvous ASAT spacecraft by 2029, possibly more. If this happens, and Beijing was to decide in 2029 to launch these two hundred small RPO spacecraft and position them in close proximity to strategically vital assets, then China would be able to simultaneously threaten disablement of the entire constellations of U.S. satellites for missile early warning (about a dozen satellites with spares included); communications in a nuclear-disrupted environment (about a dozen); and positioning, navigation, and timing (about three dozen); along with several dozen key communications, imagery, and meteorology satellites. Losing these assets would severely degrade U.S. deterrence and warfighting capabilities, yet once close pre-positioning has occurred such losses become almost impossible to prevent. For this reason, such pre-positioning could conceivably deter the United States from coming to Taiwan’s aid due to the prospect that intervention would spur China to disable these critical space systems. Without their support, the war would be much bloodier and costlier—a daunting proposition for any president. Should the United States fail to intervene, the consequences would be disastrous for both Washington and its allies in East Asia, and potentially the credibility of U.S. defense commitments around the globe. Worse yet, however, might be what could happen if China believes that such a threat will succeed but proves to be wrong. History is rife with examples of major wars arising from miscalculations such as this, and there are many pathways by which such a situation could easily escalate out of control to a full-scale conventional conflict or even to nuclear use.
Starlink development solves – mega-constellations are unjammable and accurate Harris 20 (Mark, Knight Science Journalism Fellow at MIT in 2013, writes about technology, science, business, the environment, and travel, internally cites Todd Humphreys, Professor of Aerospace Engineering at UT Austin, and Peter Iannucci Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Mechanics at UT Austin) “SpaceX’s Starlink satellites could make US Army navigation hard to jam,” MIT Technology Review, 9/28/2020 JL Now, research funded by the US Army has concluded that the growing mega-constellation could have a secondary purpose: doubling as a low-cost, highly accurate, and almost unjammable alternative to GPS. The new method would use existing Starlink satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) to provide near-global navigation services. In a non-peer-reviewed paper, Todd Humphreys and Peter Iannucci of the Radionavigation Laboratory at the University of Texas at Austin claim to have devised a system that uses the same satellites, piggybacking on traditional GPS signals, to deliver location precision up to 10 times as good as GPS, in a system much less prone to interference. The Global Positioning System consists of a constellation of around 30 satellites orbiting 20,000 kilometers above Earth. Each satellite continuously broadcasts a radio signal containing its position and the exact time from a very precise atomic clock on board. Receivers on the ground can then compare how long signals from multiple satellites take to arrive and calculate their position, typically to within a few meters. The problem with GPS is that those signals are extremely weak by the time they reach Earth, and are easily overwhelmed by either accidental interference or electronic warfare. In China, mysterious GPS attacks have successfully “spoofed” ships in fake locations, while GPS signals are regularly jammed in the eastern Mediterranean. The US military relies heavily on GPS. Last year, the US Army Futures Command, a new unit dedicated to modernizing its forces, visited Humphreys’s lab to talk about a startup called Coherent Navigation he had cofounded in 2008. Coherent, which aimed to use signals from Iridium satellites as a rough alternative to GPS, was acquired by Apple in 2015. “They told me the Army has a relationship with SpaceX it signed an agreement to test Starlink to move data across military networks in May and would I be interested in talking to SpaceX about using their Starlink satellites the same way that I used these old Iridium satellites?” Humphreys says. “That got us an audience with people at SpaceX, who liked it, and the Army gave us a year to look into the problem.” Futures Command also provided several million dollars in funding. The concept of using LEO satellites for navigation isn't new. In fact, some of the first US spacecraft launched in the 1960s were Transit satellites orbiting at 1,100 kilometers, providing location information for Navy ships and submarines. The advantage of an LEO constellation is that the signals can be a thousand times stronger than GPS. The disadvantage is that each satellite can serve only a small area beneath it, so that reliable global coverage requires hundreds or even thousands of satellites. Building a whole new network of LEO satellites with ultra-accurate clocks would be an expensive undertaking. Bay Area startup Xona Space Systems plans to do just that, aiming to launch a constellation of at least 300 Pulsar satellites over the next six years. Humphreys and Iannucci’s idea is different: they would use a simple software upgrade to modify Starlink’s satellites so their communications abilities and existing GPS signals could provide position and navigation services . They claim their new system can even, counterintuitively, deliver better accuracy for most users than the GPS technology it relies upon. That is because the GPS receiver on each Starlink satellite uses algorithms that are rarely found in consumer products, to pinpoint its location within just a few centimeters. These technologies exploit physical properties of the GPS radio signal, and its encoding, to improve the accuracy of location calculations. Essentially, the Starlink satellites can do the heavy computational lifting for their users below. The Starlink satellites are also essentially internet routers in space, capable of achieving 100 megabits per second. GPS satellites, on the other hand, communicate at fewer than 100 bits per second. “There are so few bits per second available for GPS transmissions that they can’t afford to include fresh, highly accurate data about where the satellites actually are,” says Iannucci. “If you have a million times more opportunity to send information down from your satellite, the data can be much closer to the truth.” The new system, which Humphreys calls fused LEO navigation, will use instant orbit and clock calculations to locate users to within 70 centimeters, he estimates. Most GPS systems in smartphones, watches, and cars, for comparison, are only accurate to a few meters. But the key advantage for the Pentagon is that fused LEO navigation should be significantly more difficult to jam or spoof. Not only are its signals much stronger at ground level, but the antennas for its microwave frequencies are about 10 times more directional than GPS antennas. That means it should be easier to pick up the true satellite signals rather than those from a jammer. “At least that’s the hope,” says Humphreys. According to Humphreys and Iannucci’s calculations, their fused LEO navigation system could provide continuous navigation service to 99.8 of the world’s population, using less than 1 of Starlink’s downlink capacity and less than 0.5 of its energy capacity. “I do think this could lead to a more robust and accurate solution than GPS alone,” says Todd Walter of Stanford University’s GPS Lab, who was not involved with the research. “And if you don’t have to modify Starlink’s satellites, it certainly is a fast, simple way to go.”
1AC Zenko says Chinese ASAT tests create debris and cause miscalc – proves it’s try or die for Starlink deterrence – inserted in green A January 2007 direct ascent ASAT test carried out by China against its defunct Fengyun-1C weather satellite instantly increased the amount of space debris in low earth orbit (LEO) by 40 percent. Debris is especially problematic in LEO, where half of the world's 1,100 active satellites operate. Space objects—even flecks of paint—travel as fast as eighteen thousand miles per hour and can cause catastrophic damage to manned and unmanned spacecraft—creating even more debris in the process. The U.S. National Research Council estimates that portions of LEO have reached a "tipping point," with hundreds of thousands of space debris larger than one centimeter stuck in orbit that will collide with other pieces of debris or spacecraft, thus creating exponentially more debris. Significant growth in the quantity or density of space debris could render certain high-demand portions of outer space unnavigable and inutile. Currently, there are no legal or internationally accepted means for removing existing debris. China could also test co-orbital antisatellite systems in which an interceptor spacecraft destroys its target by exploding in close proximity, creating even more debris. For several years, Beijing has conducted a series of close proximity maneuvers with its satellites in LEO; the most recent occurred after a July 20, 2013, launch of three satellites on the same rocket, which have since conducted sudden maneuvers toward other Chinese satellites. Human or operating errors during these maneuvers could inadvertently result in a collision that produces harmful debris. While these maneuvers could eventually be used for civilian purposes, most U.S. officials believe these experiments are primarily intended to demonstrate latent ASAT capabilities. An ASAT test that causes unintended damage to U.S. and ally satellites or an accident in space caused by debris could trigger a major international crisis between the United States and China. The risk is heightened by the fact that both countries have no pre–space-launch notification arrangements, similar to the U.S.-Russia agreement on notifications of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launches. Management of such a crisis could also be hindered by a lack of direct communication between U.S. authorities and the PLA agency that oversees Chinese military space launches.
Taiwan goes nuclear – the US gets drawn in The Week 1/4 (The Week Staff, weekly news magazine with editions in the United Kingdom and United States) “What would happen if China tried to invade Taiwan?” The Week Staff, 1/4/2022 JL If a conflict were to break out between the two neighbours it would be “a catastrophe”, reported The Economist. This is first because of “the bloodshed in Taiwan” but also because of the risk of “escalation between two nuclear powers”, namely the US and China. Beijing massively outguns Taiwan, with estimates from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute showing that China spends about 25 times more on its military. However, Taiwan has a defence pact with the US dating back to the 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty, meaning the US could, in theory, be drawn into the conflict. “Beijing’s optimistic version of events” after the decision to invade would see “cyber and electronic warfare units target Taiwan’s financial system and key infrastructure, as well as US satellites to reduce notice of impending ballistic missiles”, Bloomberg said. “Chinese vessels could also harass ships around Taiwan, restricting vital supplies of fuel and food,” the news site continued, while “airstrikes would quickly aim to kill Taiwan’s top political and military leaders, while also immobilising local defences”. This would be followed by “warships and submarines traversing some 130 kilometres 80 miles across the Taiwan Strait”, before “thousands of paratroopers would appear above Taiwan’s coastlines, looking to penetrate defences and capture strategic buildings”. According to satellite imagery seen by military news site The Drive, China has also begun “beefing up its combat aviation infrastructure across from Taiwan as invasion fears grow”. Beijing “is upgrading three air bases located opposite” the island, “boosting its air power capability in an already tense region that is flush with air combat capabilities.” “Construction of the new infrastructure began in early 2020 and continued uninterrupted through the pandemic, underlining its priority,” the site added. Taiwan would be reliant on “natural defences” – its rugged coastline and rough sea – with plans to “throw a thousand tanks at the beachhead” in the event of a Chinese invasion that could result in “brutal tank battles” that “decide the outcome”, according to Forbes. The island’s top military leadership has also “warned China that the closer its aircraft and ships get to the island the harder Taipei will respond”, Bloomberg reported, with “a multi-pronged approach that utilises aircraft, ships and its air defence systems to counter Chinese military incursions” in the works. “Chinese state media has dismissed the idea of Taiwan retaliating,” the news agency added. But a report by the island’s defence ministry sent to legislators shows the island is preparing to “take tougher measures” should they be necessary. This would all be complicated by the US pledge to defend its ally in what The Economist called a “test of America’s military might and its diplomatic and political resolve”. Asked last week during a CNN town hall meeting whether the US would mount a military response if Beijing attempted to take the island by force, Biden responded: “Yes, we have a commitment to do that.” The Guardian said that Biden “made a similar pledge in August”, when he told ABC News that the US has a “sacred commitment” to defend its Nato allies in Canada and Europe and it was the “same with Japan, same with South Korea, same with Taiwan”. If the US had decided against intervention, “China would overnight become the dominant power in Asia” and “America’s allies around the world would know that they could not count on it”, the paper added. In other words, “Pax Americana would collapse”. That would be unacceptable in Washington, especially as “Joe Biden pivots US foreign policy towards a focus on the Indo-Pacific as the main arena for 21st-century superpower competition”, The Guardian said. Biden’s comments during the CNN event were “at odds with the long-held US policy” of “strategic ambiguity”, The Telegraph said. Historically, Washington has helped “build Taiwan’s defences” but has “not explicitly promised to come to the island’s aid”. US manoeuvres have so far consisted of building up “large amounts of lethal military hardware”, The Guardian added, with “the steady buildup of troops and equipment and the proliferation of war games” meaning there is “more of a chance of conflict triggered by miscalculation or accident”. The primary danger that comes with US involvement lies in the fact that both Washington and Beijing possess nuclear weapons. Leaked documents published by The New York Times earlier this year revealed the extent of Washington’s discussions about using nuclear weapons to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the 1950s. Provided to the paper by Daniel Ellsberg, the whistleblower behind the 1971 Pentagon Papers, the documents appeared to show an “acceptance by some US military leaders of possible retaliatory nuclear strikes on US bases”, CNN noted, raising the spectre of how the nuclear powers would square off in a 21st-century conflict.
1/23/22
JANFEB - DA - Broadband
Tournament: Peninsula | Round: 3 | Opponent: Midtown KT | Judge: Sam Gustavson Starlink is key to rural broadband expansion Weinschenk 2/25 (Carl, IT and telecom journalist for Telecompetitor, Teleco Transformation, and IT Business Edge) “Report: Starlink Looks Very Promising for Rural Broadband,” Telecompetitor, 2/25/2021 JL SpaceX’s Starlink satellite broadband service has the potential to be a game changer for rural broadband, according to an analysis by PCMag of Starlink speeds. The analysis is based on beta tester data exclusively provided to it by Ookla Speedtest. The site looked at data from rural, suburban and urban areas. Among its more than 10,000 users in its semi-public beta were “a perplexing” number in urban and suburban areas where a variety of high-speed options already are available. The story cites Chicago, Seattle and Minneapolis as places where there were testers, despite readily available alternatives. The site compared download speeds against other fixed service providers in 30 counties with at least 30 samples in any month from December 30 to February 24. The counties in which the fixed providers had the biggest speed advantage over Spacelink were urban or suburban: Los Angeles and Santa Clara counties, CA; Cook County, IL; King County, WA and Washington County, MN. It is in rural areas that Starlink shines, according to the research. The five counties in which Starlink had the biggest download speed advantage over the fixed group were rural: Vilas County, WI; Ravali County, MT; Waldo County, ME; Okanogan County, WA and Lamoile County, VT. The number of counties in which Starlink beat the fixed providers and those in which the fixed providers beat Starlink appeared to be about equal, as was the speed differential. “Our own analysis shows that Starlink will make the biggest difference in rural, low-density, low-population counties with few options other than lower-quality satellite services,” wrote Sascha Segan, author of the PCMag article about Startlink rural speeds.
Broadband enables precision agriculture transition ABI 19 (American Broadband Initiative, a leading force in driving changes across Federal Agencies to identify and remove barriers to broadband access and leverage public assets and resources to expand our Nation’s broadband infrastructure capacity.) “A Case for Rural Broadband,” The United States Department of Agriculture, 4/2019 BC HOW E-CONNECTIVITY WILL TRANSFORM THE BUSINESS OF AGRICULTURE Across the agricultural production cycle, farmers and ranchers can implement digital technologies as other modern businesses are doing, enhancing agriculture by driving decision-making based on integrated data, automating processes to increase operational efficiency, improving productivity with tasks driven by real-time insights, augmenting the role of management in the business of farming, and creating new markets with extended geographic reach. These patterns of digital transformation create fundamental shifts in agricultural production, developing new ways of working that make the industry more productive, attractive, and financially sustainable for farmers and ranchers. Tech companies which stand to benefit from industry transformation continue to capitalize on these shifts by developing new technologies, which according to one recent study, may help position themselves to capture a portion of an estimated $254 billion to $340 billion in global addressable digital agriculture market.13 BUSINESS MANAGEMENT shifts decisionmaking from instinct to integrated data Precision Agriculture is transforming the way producers collect, organize, and rely on information to make key decisions. Traditionally, producers’ long-term experiences have created a competitive advantage: years of experiments have produced insights and instincts about the land they have farmed and the animals they have raised. But the volume of data that is possible to collect today can accelerate that learning curve, helping producers learn faster and more rapidly adapt to market shifts—particularly on new fields and with new animals—and creating more nuanced insights, enabling them to act on leading indicators. This creates a disparity between producers who can utilize high-speed Internet service and those who cannot. Examples include the ability to do the following: create decision tools to help farmers and ranchers estimate the potential profit and economic risks associated with growing one particular crop over another • decide which fertilizer is best for current soil conditions • apply pesticides in targeted areas of the field, to control pests rather than applying pesticides over the entire field • use limited water resources more effectively • respond to findings of sensors that monitor animal health and nutrition Better choices about what, where, and when to plant, fertilize, and harvest—or breed, feed, and slaughter—can drive above-average returns by removing unrecognized inefficiencies and scaling insights. DIGITIZATION shifts supply chain management and resource allocation from generic to precise Precision Agriculture helps make the business of farming more efficient by minimizing inputs— such as raw materials and labor—and maximizing outputs. For example, previous research has found that 40 percent of fields are over-fertilized, which not only inflates the cost of inputs but also results in 15 percent–20 percent yield loss suffered from improper fertilizer application.14 Precise application of inputs, such as fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides, allows farmers to adjust inputs to location-based characteristics and use exact amounts needed, which saves money and increases sustainability due to more efficient resource stewardship. Improved fertilizer, soil, and water use can significantly improve water quality with less runoff and reduce climate gas emissions, which is important since agriculture accounts for 10-15 percent of worldwide emissions.15 Despite reductions in necessary inputs, Next Generation Precision Agriculture helps maintain or increase yields, leading to significant gains in efficiency14. Real-time insights also improve logistics. When growing melons, for instance, real-time data can help farmers overcome challenges in storing and shipping their products. Melons should be stored in an optimal refrigeration environment to minimize spoilage, and real-time precision sensors can reduce spoilage by alerting staff to suboptimal variations in temperature and humidity, allowing the execution of remedies before major losses occur. When refrigerated storage is full or the market price is at a peak, the “Internet of Things” can provide real-time information about where trucks are located and locating customers to market products to help make the sale. LABOR EFFICIENCY boosts productivity by automating routine processes and enabling real-time response Connected devices equip farmers with a clear picture of their operations at any moment, making it possible to prioritize tasks more effectively and triage the most pressing issues. While routine inspection and scouting has typically been a regular part of farm management and has increased farm profitability14, connected technologies can track, sense, and flag where a producer should focus their time and attention that day. Similarly, e-connectivity has allowed rural farms to access new training resources and high-skilled labor that has not been previously available.
Food insecurity causes state collapse, nuclear war, and terror – extinction DeFeo 17 (Michael, Regional Organizing Director at Arizona Democratic Party who graduated in 2019 with a bachelor’s degree in political science from Gettysburg College) “Food Insecurity and the Threat to Global Stability and Security in the 21st Century” Inquires Journal, 2017 BC Poor Institutional Capacity Although the developed world experiences food insecurity, it is the lack of infrastructure and government institutions in developing countries that contribute to civil wars and state fragility. Foreign exchange shortages can provoke food and fuel scarcities that force governments to spend less on essential services and public goods. Accordingly, citizens see their medical and educational entitlements melt away. Such circumstances create breeding grounds for internal conflict. All violent conflicts destroy land, water, and social resources for food production. Developing countries do not have massive industrial machines that can remedy such losses, therefore, the population will suffer. Food insecurity is a recruitment tool for violent extremist groups. Promising food and water to a starving population, especially in urban areas, makes recruiting young and disgruntled youth easier (Messer and Cohen, 2015). Syria had limited institutional capacity to deal with the mass displacement, and that lead to a civilian revolt and recruitment into the Islamic State. Countries that fail to provide their people with basic services often experience gross economic inequality, and even human-rights violations, as was the case in both Syria and Sudan. Both countries are classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs). LDCs are distinguished not just by their widespread poverty, but also by their structural weaknesses in economic, institutional, and human resources that make them unable to maintain stability during a drought. The combination of drought and political instability or violence led to famine in Somalia (another LDC) in 2011. Even with urgent humanitarian action, the country still plunged into chaos and violence (Messer and Cohen, 2015). Severe drought, like Somalia's, may result in crop failure in major food producing areas, which in turn is a significant threat to social stability and peace (Wischnath, 2014). Sometimes droughts of exceptional severity (and the civil unrest that follows) are attributed to climate change, especially in particularly arid regions. Scholars are divided on whether climate change actually impacts civil conflict. That is why African countries like Somalia and Sudan are prime case studies. Africa has the lowest percentage of irrigated land in the world. Agriculture is the most important sector of most African countries. Very high percentages of civilians in African countries live in rural areas. Those characteristics combined with low economic and state capacity make African, particularly sub-Saharan African countries the most vulnerable to climate change and civil instability. Africa experiences more civil conflict than other parts of the world, therefore, it is possible to argue that a lack of climate variability effect on civil conflict in Africa would make it unlikely to cause civil conflict in other parts of the world (Koubi et al., 2012). Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon attributed the conflict in Darfur to an ecological crisis arising “at least in part from climate change” (Ki-moon, 2007). The Fourth Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessed that climate change will continue to worsen. As it does, it will increase food shortages, which may lead to conflict (AR4, 2007). The report also stated that forced displacement and rising social instability is the most likely result of food insecurity. This is almost exactly what happened in Syria. The first step towards conflict might be food riots, which often occur during a food shortage or when there is an unequal distribution of food. These are usually caused by food price increases, food speculation, transport problems, or extreme weather. In 1977, Egyptians became so desperate for food that they attacked shops, markets, and government buildings just to obtain bread and grain (Paveliuc-Olariu, 2013). Moreover, civil war can create economic opportunities for certain groups, so they try to avoid resolving the conflict. Urban elites in Somalia profited tremendously off of internal conflict because of the absurd amount of foreign aid that was pumped into the country and then largely stolen (Shortland, Christopoulou, and Makatsoris, 2013). Once a country experiences a food shortage, it may lead to protests, riots, and violence. This all contributes to state instability, but it is not the state alone that suffers. If one country fails, it creates a crisis that could destabilize an entire region. State Failure and the Threat to Regional Stability Although fragile governments in developing countries are at a heightened risk for internal conflict that could topple them, that risk also threatens the country’s neighbors. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Afghanistan found itself alone in regional trade. Without a guaranteed source of cereal, the government had to turn to Iran and Pakistan for support in order to avoid its own collapse (Clarke, 2000). Unlike Afghanistan, many other developing countries have been unable to work together on food and water security. Thirteen of the twenty-two members of the Arab League rank among the most water-scarce nations on the planet. Food cannot be grown without water. The majority of the world is engaged in some sort of agreement with neighboring countries to share water supplies, but thirty-seven countries still do not share their water resources (El Hassan, 2014). Lack of cooperation can cause civil as well as interstate conflict. South Sudan legally has no share of the Nile River and the effects of that lack of water access have been mass starvation and violence. The effects of climate change, water shortages, and mass migrations have resulted in acute food insecurity not just in Syria, but across the region (El Hassan, 2014). Food insecurity, plus an increase in the prices of staple foods have destabilized much of the area. The Arab Spring was the beginning of multiple conflicts that have affected countries like Syria, Egypt, and Libya. In Syria, food insecurity resulted in mass violence and has now created an international crisis involving multiple world powers. Food insecurity is such a threat to entire regions because people cannot live without food and people want to live. When a region experiences food scarcity and that population feels threatened by hunger, it will relinquish dependency on any political authority and take up arms in order to ensure its well-being (Paveliuc-Olariu, 2013). This is human survivalism. It is important for developing countries in areas that are at risk for food insecurity to formulate policy that ensures aid goes to the food insecurity hotspots so as to maintain stability. South Sudan experienced what happens when countries do not work together to feed their people. After gaining its independence from Sudan in 2011, 360,000 South Sudanese refugees returned to the country. This influx of human beings, coupled with drought conditions exacerbated economic strain and drove food prices up. The increases were the result of trade restrictions between Sudan and South Sudan. The overall reason for the food crisis, however, was the government's preoccupation with fighting a political and quasi-ethnic civil war rather than negotiating fair access to the Nile River (Tappis et al., 2013). Because of South Sudan’s weak institutions, it has done little to address the food shortage. That inability to solve the problem fuels insurgent recruitment that continues the bloodshed in South Sudan. The conflict is keeping regional rivalries alive with Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan; all of whom have attempted to intervene in South Sudan militarily to bring about stability (Council on Foreign Affairs 2016). Aside from South Sudan, multiple conflicts across Africa are consuming massive amounts of diplomatic, political, and humanitarian resources in a region that faces a multitude of threats. South Sudan, Somalia, and Syria are all failing states that are experiencing huge food shortages, humanitarian crises, and most importantly, extreme civil violence. South Sudan is mired in a civil war. Somalia is controlled by warlords and terror organizations. Syria has both of those problems. Conflict has turned these countries into “breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder” rather than sovereign states with a monopoly on violence and control over their borders (Rotberg, 2002). To be sure, failing states are a concern because of their ability to destabilize entire regions, but states at risk for failure are also very important. Countries like Pakistan that are politically unstable and have food and water shortages could result in uncontrollable civil upheaval (The Fund for Peace, 2016). Global Consequences of State Failure Failing states and destabilized regions are not just a problem for the developing world. They are a very real concern for the United States and other developed countries as well. The Islamic State fed off of the Syrian Civil War and helped destabilize Iraq, Syria, Libya, and even Afghanistan and the Philippines. They have at also inspired terror attacks in Europe and the United States. They are a threat to both the developed and developing world. State instability allows them to recruit and train without government interference, which in turn allows them to plan attacks outside the region. An important source of income for the Islamic State has been agriculture from Iraq and Syria. While this revenue has received less media attention than oil extraction, it is still an important part of their economy (Jaafar and Woertz, 2016). It is also a key aspect of their political legitimacy because it allows them to feed their soldiers and those they control. Controlling some of the most fertile regions of the two countries has also helped the Islamic State starve off areas that have resisted them (Jaafar and Woertz, 2016). If Syria or Iraq are ever going to stabilize, those breadbaskets must be retaken and the food must reach the civilians in the cut off areas. In the 20th century, state failure had few implications for international peace and security. Thanks to globalization, that is no longer the case. Failed states pose a threat to themselves, their neighbors, and the entire international community (Rotberg, 2002). Islamic State - inspired terror attacks in Belgium and France are a direct result of state collapse in Syria and Iraq. Preventing states from failing, rather than having to intervene militarily when they do, ought to be a top priority in the foreign policy of rich nations. Although the situations in Syria, Somalia, and South Sudan seem beyond repair, nation-building projects have had success in the past. Tajikistan, Lebanon, Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor are all examples of relatively successful attempts to put failing states back on the right track (Rotberg, 2002). Developed countries must have the political will to ensure that people in developing countries are fed so that they remain pacified. It is often severe food insecurity that precedes ethnic or religious violence, as has been the case in South Sudan, therefore, adequate food is paramount to avoiding humanitarian crises that accompany ethnic and sectarian conflict (The Economist, 2016). While it is true that many developed countries, especially the United States, are weary of providing so much financial aid and intervening militarily in war-torn, developing countries, it is imperative that the rich do not abandon the poor to a fate of internal destruction. Money must not be thrown blindly towards humanitarian crises and military intervention must be the last resort. Developed countries provided $1.4 billion for humanitarian aid in South Sudan in its first year of independence, but without specific conditions, that money went to kleptocrats rather than infrastructure projects or public services (The Economist, 2016). Paying to help developing nations is expensive and will continue to be so. Afghanistan and Iraq are proof of that. But the war on terror, repeated military intervention, and humanitarian aid are expensive as well. In 2002, Robert Rotberg suggested that a new Marshall Plan was required for places like Afghanistan, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. If it is true that food and water security are the keys to keeping relative peace in new and developing countries and their collapse threatens the safety of the developed world, it seems logical that assisting those countries is wise. In 1999, Susan L. Woodward argued that military leaders focus too much on force versus force combat rather than the issues of insurgency and terrorism in failed states. In 2017, military leaders have adjusted their strategies accordingly. Woodward believed that globalization made states less important, but their failure would still be felt around the world. Failed states cannot exercise their monopoly on violence and they cannot control their borders, thus threatening more than just the failed state (Woodward, 1999). Because state failure is so consequential, the United States military must continue to look into measures it can take to prevent it. The Threat of the Future Finally, the threats from food shortages in South Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria are important to the United States and the international community at large, but there is one country that, while it is not a failing state right now, could easily become one if the wealthy nations of the world do not ensure its stability. That country is Pakistan. The Fund for Peace ranked Pakistan as the 14th most fragile state in the world in 2016, giving it a “High Alert” designation for state failure (The Fund for Peace, 2016). Its Demographic Pressure Indicator was an 8.9 - 10.2 Although it improved by one-tenth of a point last year, its decade trend is worse by seven-tenths of a point and its five-year trend is worse by four-tenths of a point, suggesting that the food situation is actually worsening overall (The Fund for Peace, 2016). If internal conflict and potential state failure at its most basic level begins with food and water insecurity, then Pakistan could become a real problem very soon. Considering the risk of state failure, Pakistan poses the greatest threat to the rest of the world because of the existence of nuclear weapons within the country. Pakistan is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, yet it has about 120 nuclear weapons. It also has a Shaheen 1A ballistic missile that can reach targets 550 miles away (Pakistan Defence, 2015). Should a food crisis arise in Pakistan that results in civil war and governmental collapse, those weapons could end up in the hands of a group that intends to use them maliciously as an act of terror. That prospect should be incentive enough for the developed countries to realize that they cannot and must not leave food insecure countries to devour themselves. While it is difficult to argue that food insecurity immediately and directly causes civil conflict, there is no denying that people need food and water and will fight to survive. In South Sudan, ethnic and political armies fight one another. In Syria, rebels and government forces fight each other while also fighting the Islamic State. And in Somalia, warlords and their armies fight. The Syrian Civil War began six years ago after a water shortage forced thousands of migrants into urban centers. Developing countries tend to be most affected by climate change, poor governance, and food price increases. Therefore, they are the most prone to instability that may lead to outright violence. Without the wherewithal to handle civil conflict, these countries may become fragile or even failing states. Once that happens, they represent a threat not just in their region of influence, but the whole world. That is why the developed Western nations must pay attention and provide aid to the developing world in order to maintain stability. There will be more food crises in developing countries in the future, but if the North has the strength to continue aiding the South, perhaps it will be able to curb mass starvation and avoid the horrendous violence that consumes starving countries.
1/22/22
JANFEB - DA - Broadband
Tournament: Peninsula | Round: 3 | Opponent: Midtown KT | Judge: Sam Gustavson Starlink is key to rural broadband expansion Weinschenk 2/25 (Carl, IT and telecom journalist for Telecompetitor, Teleco Transformation, and IT Business Edge) “Report: Starlink Looks Very Promising for Rural Broadband,” Telecompetitor, 2/25/2021 JL SpaceX’s Starlink satellite broadband service has the potential to be a game changer for rural broadband, according to an analysis by PCMag of Starlink speeds. The analysis is based on beta tester data exclusively provided to it by Ookla Speedtest. The site looked at data from rural, suburban and urban areas. Among its more than 10,000 users in its semi-public beta were “a perplexing” number in urban and suburban areas where a variety of high-speed options already are available. The story cites Chicago, Seattle and Minneapolis as places where there were testers, despite readily available alternatives. The site compared download speeds against other fixed service providers in 30 counties with at least 30 samples in any month from December 30 to February 24. The counties in which the fixed providers had the biggest speed advantage over Spacelink were urban or suburban: Los Angeles and Santa Clara counties, CA; Cook County, IL; King County, WA and Washington County, MN. It is in rural areas that Starlink shines, according to the research. The five counties in which Starlink had the biggest download speed advantage over the fixed group were rural: Vilas County, WI; Ravali County, MT; Waldo County, ME; Okanogan County, WA and Lamoile County, VT. The number of counties in which Starlink beat the fixed providers and those in which the fixed providers beat Starlink appeared to be about equal, as was the speed differential. “Our own analysis shows that Starlink will make the biggest difference in rural, low-density, low-population counties with few options other than lower-quality satellite services,” wrote Sascha Segan, author of the PCMag article about Startlink rural speeds.
Broadband enables precision agriculture transition ABI 19 (American Broadband Initiative, a leading force in driving changes across Federal Agencies to identify and remove barriers to broadband access and leverage public assets and resources to expand our Nation’s broadband infrastructure capacity.) “A Case for Rural Broadband,” The United States Department of Agriculture, 4/2019 BC HOW E-CONNECTIVITY WILL TRANSFORM THE BUSINESS OF AGRICULTURE Across the agricultural production cycle, farmers and ranchers can implement digital technologies as other modern businesses are doing, enhancing agriculture by driving decision-making based on integrated data, automating processes to increase operational efficiency, improving productivity with tasks driven by real-time insights, augmenting the role of management in the business of farming, and creating new markets with extended geographic reach. These patterns of digital transformation create fundamental shifts in agricultural production, developing new ways of working that make the industry more productive, attractive, and financially sustainable for farmers and ranchers. Tech companies which stand to benefit from industry transformation continue to capitalize on these shifts by developing new technologies, which according to one recent study, may help position themselves to capture a portion of an estimated $254 billion to $340 billion in global addressable digital agriculture market.13 BUSINESS MANAGEMENT shifts decisionmaking from instinct to integrated data Precision Agriculture is transforming the way producers collect, organize, and rely on information to make key decisions. Traditionally, producers’ long-term experiences have created a competitive advantage: years of experiments have produced insights and instincts about the land they have farmed and the animals they have raised. But the volume of data that is possible to collect today can accelerate that learning curve, helping producers learn faster and more rapidly adapt to market shifts—particularly on new fields and with new animals—and creating more nuanced insights, enabling them to act on leading indicators. This creates a disparity between producers who can utilize high-speed Internet service and those who cannot. Examples include the ability to do the following: create decision tools to help farmers and ranchers estimate the potential profit and economic risks associated with growing one particular crop over another • decide which fertilizer is best for current soil conditions • apply pesticides in targeted areas of the field, to control pests rather than applying pesticides over the entire field • use limited water resources more effectively • respond to findings of sensors that monitor animal health and nutrition Better choices about what, where, and when to plant, fertilize, and harvest—or breed, feed, and slaughter—can drive above-average returns by removing unrecognized inefficiencies and scaling insights. DIGITIZATION shifts supply chain management and resource allocation from generic to precise Precision Agriculture helps make the business of farming more efficient by minimizing inputs— such as raw materials and labor—and maximizing outputs. For example, previous research has found that 40 percent of fields are over-fertilized, which not only inflates the cost of inputs but also results in 15 percent–20 percent yield loss suffered from improper fertilizer application.14 Precise application of inputs, such as fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides, allows farmers to adjust inputs to location-based characteristics and use exact amounts needed, which saves money and increases sustainability due to more efficient resource stewardship. Improved fertilizer, soil, and water use can significantly improve water quality with less runoff and reduce climate gas emissions, which is important since agriculture accounts for 10-15 percent of worldwide emissions.15 Despite reductions in necessary inputs, Next Generation Precision Agriculture helps maintain or increase yields, leading to significant gains in efficiency14. Real-time insights also improve logistics. When growing melons, for instance, real-time data can help farmers overcome challenges in storing and shipping their products. Melons should be stored in an optimal refrigeration environment to minimize spoilage, and real-time precision sensors can reduce spoilage by alerting staff to suboptimal variations in temperature and humidity, allowing the execution of remedies before major losses occur. When refrigerated storage is full or the market price is at a peak, the “Internet of Things” can provide real-time information about where trucks are located and locating customers to market products to help make the sale. LABOR EFFICIENCY boosts productivity by automating routine processes and enabling real-time response Connected devices equip farmers with a clear picture of their operations at any moment, making it possible to prioritize tasks more effectively and triage the most pressing issues. While routine inspection and scouting has typically been a regular part of farm management and has increased farm profitability14, connected technologies can track, sense, and flag where a producer should focus their time and attention that day. Similarly, e-connectivity has allowed rural farms to access new training resources and high-skilled labor that has not been previously available.
Food insecurity causes state collapse, nuclear war, and terror – extinction DeFeo 17 (Michael, Regional Organizing Director at Arizona Democratic Party who graduated in 2019 with a bachelor’s degree in political science from Gettysburg College) “Food Insecurity and the Threat to Global Stability and Security in the 21st Century” Inquires Journal, 2017 BC Poor Institutional Capacity Although the developed world experiences food insecurity, it is the lack of infrastructure and government institutions in developing countries that contribute to civil wars and state fragility. Foreign exchange shortages can provoke food and fuel scarcities that force governments to spend less on essential services and public goods. Accordingly, citizens see their medical and educational entitlements melt away. Such circumstances create breeding grounds for internal conflict. All violent conflicts destroy land, water, and social resources for food production. Developing countries do not have massive industrial machines that can remedy such losses, therefore, the population will suffer. Food insecurity is a recruitment tool for violent extremist groups. Promising food and water to a starving population, especially in urban areas, makes recruiting young and disgruntled youth easier (Messer and Cohen, 2015). Syria had limited institutional capacity to deal with the mass displacement, and that lead to a civilian revolt and recruitment into the Islamic State. Countries that fail to provide their people with basic services often experience gross economic inequality, and even human-rights violations, as was the case in both Syria and Sudan. Both countries are classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs). LDCs are distinguished not just by their widespread poverty, but also by their structural weaknesses in economic, institutional, and human resources that make them unable to maintain stability during a drought. The combination of drought and political instability or violence led to famine in Somalia (another LDC) in 2011. Even with urgent humanitarian action, the country still plunged into chaos and violence (Messer and Cohen, 2015). Severe drought, like Somalia's, may result in crop failure in major food producing areas, which in turn is a significant threat to social stability and peace (Wischnath, 2014). Sometimes droughts of exceptional severity (and the civil unrest that follows) are attributed to climate change, especially in particularly arid regions. Scholars are divided on whether climate change actually impacts civil conflict. That is why African countries like Somalia and Sudan are prime case studies. Africa has the lowest percentage of irrigated land in the world. Agriculture is the most important sector of most African countries. Very high percentages of civilians in African countries live in rural areas. Those characteristics combined with low economic and state capacity make African, particularly sub-Saharan African countries the most vulnerable to climate change and civil instability. Africa experiences more civil conflict than other parts of the world, therefore, it is possible to argue that a lack of climate variability effect on civil conflict in Africa would make it unlikely to cause civil conflict in other parts of the world (Koubi et al., 2012). Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon attributed the conflict in Darfur to an ecological crisis arising “at least in part from climate change” (Ki-moon, 2007). The Fourth Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessed that climate change will continue to worsen. As it does, it will increase food shortages, which may lead to conflict (AR4, 2007). The report also stated that forced displacement and rising social instability is the most likely result of food insecurity. This is almost exactly what happened in Syria. The first step towards conflict might be food riots, which often occur during a food shortage or when there is an unequal distribution of food. These are usually caused by food price increases, food speculation, transport problems, or extreme weather. In 1977, Egyptians became so desperate for food that they attacked shops, markets, and government buildings just to obtain bread and grain (Paveliuc-Olariu, 2013). Moreover, civil war can create economic opportunities for certain groups, so they try to avoid resolving the conflict. Urban elites in Somalia profited tremendously off of internal conflict because of the absurd amount of foreign aid that was pumped into the country and then largely stolen (Shortland, Christopoulou, and Makatsoris, 2013). Once a country experiences a food shortage, it may lead to protests, riots, and violence. This all contributes to state instability, but it is not the state alone that suffers. If one country fails, it creates a crisis that could destabilize an entire region. State Failure and the Threat to Regional Stability Although fragile governments in developing countries are at a heightened risk for internal conflict that could topple them, that risk also threatens the country’s neighbors. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Afghanistan found itself alone in regional trade. Without a guaranteed source of cereal, the government had to turn to Iran and Pakistan for support in order to avoid its own collapse (Clarke, 2000). Unlike Afghanistan, many other developing countries have been unable to work together on food and water security. Thirteen of the twenty-two members of the Arab League rank among the most water-scarce nations on the planet. Food cannot be grown without water. The majority of the world is engaged in some sort of agreement with neighboring countries to share water supplies, but thirty-seven countries still do not share their water resources (El Hassan, 2014). Lack of cooperation can cause civil as well as interstate conflict. South Sudan legally has no share of the Nile River and the effects of that lack of water access have been mass starvation and violence. The effects of climate change, water shortages, and mass migrations have resulted in acute food insecurity not just in Syria, but across the region (El Hassan, 2014). Food insecurity, plus an increase in the prices of staple foods have destabilized much of the area. The Arab Spring was the beginning of multiple conflicts that have affected countries like Syria, Egypt, and Libya. In Syria, food insecurity resulted in mass violence and has now created an international crisis involving multiple world powers. Food insecurity is such a threat to entire regions because people cannot live without food and people want to live. When a region experiences food scarcity and that population feels threatened by hunger, it will relinquish dependency on any political authority and take up arms in order to ensure its well-being (Paveliuc-Olariu, 2013). This is human survivalism. It is important for developing countries in areas that are at risk for food insecurity to formulate policy that ensures aid goes to the food insecurity hotspots so as to maintain stability. South Sudan experienced what happens when countries do not work together to feed their people. After gaining its independence from Sudan in 2011, 360,000 South Sudanese refugees returned to the country. This influx of human beings, coupled with drought conditions exacerbated economic strain and drove food prices up. The increases were the result of trade restrictions between Sudan and South Sudan. The overall reason for the food crisis, however, was the government's preoccupation with fighting a political and quasi-ethnic civil war rather than negotiating fair access to the Nile River (Tappis et al., 2013). Because of South Sudan’s weak institutions, it has done little to address the food shortage. That inability to solve the problem fuels insurgent recruitment that continues the bloodshed in South Sudan. The conflict is keeping regional rivalries alive with Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan; all of whom have attempted to intervene in South Sudan militarily to bring about stability (Council on Foreign Affairs 2016). Aside from South Sudan, multiple conflicts across Africa are consuming massive amounts of diplomatic, political, and humanitarian resources in a region that faces a multitude of threats. South Sudan, Somalia, and Syria are all failing states that are experiencing huge food shortages, humanitarian crises, and most importantly, extreme civil violence. South Sudan is mired in a civil war. Somalia is controlled by warlords and terror organizations. Syria has both of those problems. Conflict has turned these countries into “breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder” rather than sovereign states with a monopoly on violence and control over their borders (Rotberg, 2002). To be sure, failing states are a concern because of their ability to destabilize entire regions, but states at risk for failure are also very important. Countries like Pakistan that are politically unstable and have food and water shortages could result in uncontrollable civil upheaval (The Fund for Peace, 2016). Global Consequences of State Failure Failing states and destabilized regions are not just a problem for the developing world. They are a very real concern for the United States and other developed countries as well. The Islamic State fed off of the Syrian Civil War and helped destabilize Iraq, Syria, Libya, and even Afghanistan and the Philippines. They have at also inspired terror attacks in Europe and the United States. They are a threat to both the developed and developing world. State instability allows them to recruit and train without government interference, which in turn allows them to plan attacks outside the region. An important source of income for the Islamic State has been agriculture from Iraq and Syria. While this revenue has received less media attention than oil extraction, it is still an important part of their economy (Jaafar and Woertz, 2016). It is also a key aspect of their political legitimacy because it allows them to feed their soldiers and those they control. Controlling some of the most fertile regions of the two countries has also helped the Islamic State starve off areas that have resisted them (Jaafar and Woertz, 2016). If Syria or Iraq are ever going to stabilize, those breadbaskets must be retaken and the food must reach the civilians in the cut off areas. In the 20th century, state failure had few implications for international peace and security. Thanks to globalization, that is no longer the case. Failed states pose a threat to themselves, their neighbors, and the entire international community (Rotberg, 2002). Islamic State - inspired terror attacks in Belgium and France are a direct result of state collapse in Syria and Iraq. Preventing states from failing, rather than having to intervene militarily when they do, ought to be a top priority in the foreign policy of rich nations. Although the situations in Syria, Somalia, and South Sudan seem beyond repair, nation-building projects have had success in the past. Tajikistan, Lebanon, Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor are all examples of relatively successful attempts to put failing states back on the right track (Rotberg, 2002). Developed countries must have the political will to ensure that people in developing countries are fed so that they remain pacified. It is often severe food insecurity that precedes ethnic or religious violence, as has been the case in South Sudan, therefore, adequate food is paramount to avoiding humanitarian crises that accompany ethnic and sectarian conflict (The Economist, 2016). While it is true that many developed countries, especially the United States, are weary of providing so much financial aid and intervening militarily in war-torn, developing countries, it is imperative that the rich do not abandon the poor to a fate of internal destruction. Money must not be thrown blindly towards humanitarian crises and military intervention must be the last resort. Developed countries provided $1.4 billion for humanitarian aid in South Sudan in its first year of independence, but without specific conditions, that money went to kleptocrats rather than infrastructure projects or public services (The Economist, 2016). Paying to help developing nations is expensive and will continue to be so. Afghanistan and Iraq are proof of that. But the war on terror, repeated military intervention, and humanitarian aid are expensive as well. In 2002, Robert Rotberg suggested that a new Marshall Plan was required for places like Afghanistan, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. If it is true that food and water security are the keys to keeping relative peace in new and developing countries and their collapse threatens the safety of the developed world, it seems logical that assisting those countries is wise. In 1999, Susan L. Woodward argued that military leaders focus too much on force versus force combat rather than the issues of insurgency and terrorism in failed states. In 2017, military leaders have adjusted their strategies accordingly. Woodward believed that globalization made states less important, but their failure would still be felt around the world. Failed states cannot exercise their monopoly on violence and they cannot control their borders, thus threatening more than just the failed state (Woodward, 1999). Because state failure is so consequential, the United States military must continue to look into measures it can take to prevent it. The Threat of the Future Finally, the threats from food shortages in South Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria are important to the United States and the international community at large, but there is one country that, while it is not a failing state right now, could easily become one if the wealthy nations of the world do not ensure its stability. That country is Pakistan. The Fund for Peace ranked Pakistan as the 14th most fragile state in the world in 2016, giving it a “High Alert” designation for state failure (The Fund for Peace, 2016). Its Demographic Pressure Indicator was an 8.9 - 10.2 Although it improved by one-tenth of a point last year, its decade trend is worse by seven-tenths of a point and its five-year trend is worse by four-tenths of a point, suggesting that the food situation is actually worsening overall (The Fund for Peace, 2016). If internal conflict and potential state failure at its most basic level begins with food and water insecurity, then Pakistan could become a real problem very soon. Considering the risk of state failure, Pakistan poses the greatest threat to the rest of the world because of the existence of nuclear weapons within the country. Pakistan is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, yet it has about 120 nuclear weapons. It also has a Shaheen 1A ballistic missile that can reach targets 550 miles away (Pakistan Defence, 2015). Should a food crisis arise in Pakistan that results in civil war and governmental collapse, those weapons could end up in the hands of a group that intends to use them maliciously as an act of terror. That prospect should be incentive enough for the developed countries to realize that they cannot and must not leave food insecure countries to devour themselves. While it is difficult to argue that food insecurity immediately and directly causes civil conflict, there is no denying that people need food and water and will fight to survive. In South Sudan, ethnic and political armies fight one another. In Syria, rebels and government forces fight each other while also fighting the Islamic State. And in Somalia, warlords and their armies fight. The Syrian Civil War began six years ago after a water shortage forced thousands of migrants into urban centers. Developing countries tend to be most affected by climate change, poor governance, and food price increases. Therefore, they are the most prone to instability that may lead to outright violence. Without the wherewithal to handle civil conflict, these countries may become fragile or even failing states. Once that happens, they represent a threat not just in their region of influence, but the whole world. That is why the developed Western nations must pay attention and provide aid to the developing world in order to maintain stability. There will be more food crises in developing countries in the future, but if the North has the strength to continue aiding the South, perhaps it will be able to curb mass starvation and avoid the horrendous violence that consumes starving countries.
1/22/22
JANFEB - DA - Democracy
Tournament: Peninsula | Round: 6 | Opponent: OA Independent VD | Judge: Dhruv Channa Democracy’s on the brink – control of information will determine its fate Nye 18 (Joseph, Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, University Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus and former dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, PhD in political science from Harvard) “Protecting Democracy in an Era of Cyber Information War,” Hoover Institution, 11/13/2018 JL Today, in the face of successful Chinese control of what citizens can see and say on the Internet and Russian use of the Internet to interfere in the 2016 American election, the United States (and allied democracies) find themselves on the defensive. The expected asymmetries seem to have been reversed. Autocracies are able to protect themselves by controlling information flows, while the openness of democracies creates vulnerabilities that autocracies can exploit via information warfare. Ironically, one cause of the vulnerabilities has been the rise of social media and mobile devices in which American companies have been the global leaders. Citizens voluntarily carry Big Brother and his relatives in their pockets. Along with big data and artificial intelligence, technology has made the problem of defending democracy from information warfare far more complicated than foreseen two decades ago. And while rule of law, trust, truth, and openness make democracies asymmetrically vulnerable, they are also critical values to defend. Any policy to defend against cyber information war must start with the Hippocratic oath: first, do no harm. The use of information as an instrument of conflict and manipulation in international politics has a long history. Britain manipulated information to move American opinion in the direction of war with Germany both in 1917 and 1941. The United States and the Soviet Union both used broadcasts, covert organizations, and funds to interfere in foreign elections during the Cold War.3 And more narrowly, in battlefield situations in Iraq or in the campaign against ISIS, information was an important tool. In recent years, Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine has encompassed both cyber attacks and manipulation of information. Information operations are a critical component of modern warfare.4 Russia has used propaganda to express preferences for candidates in American elections since at least 1964, but new technologies have amplified their impact enormously.5 According to former CIA Director Michael Hayden, Russian interference in the 2016 election was “the most successful covert influence campaign in recorded history.”6 For example, Russian operatives used Facebook to publicize 129 staged events, drawing attention of 340,000 users; 10 million people saw ads paid for by Russian accounts; and 126 million Americans saw posts by 470 accounts affiliated with the Russian Internet Research Agency.7 A study by Twitter reported that 50,000 Russia-linked accounts were automated and tweeted election related content.8 Reports released by the Senate Intelligence Committee estimate that the Russian campaign reached not only the 126 million people on Facebook but another 20 million more on Instagram.9 Some Russian messages were crafted to support particular candidates while others were designed to create a general sense of chaos. Still others were micro-targeted to suppress voting by particular demographic groups such as African-Americans or younger voters. While skeptics argue that Russian efforts were a small percentage of the total content on the Internet, “for sub-groups of targeted Americans, the messaging was perhaps ubiquitous.”10 Before the Internet, such operations involved costly training and movement of spies across borders, establishment of foreign bank accounts, and transfers of cash. Now similar effects can be accomplished remotely at much lower cost. It is much easier to send electrons across borders than human agents. Ransoming a failed spy can be costly, but if no one clicks on a phishing e mail, it is simple, deniable, and virtually free to send another. In 1983, when the KGB seeded the rumor that AIDS was the product of U.S. government experiments with biological weapons, the rumor started with an anonymous letter to a small New Delhi newspaper and then was propagated globally but slowly over several years by widespread reproduction and constant repetition in conventional media. It took four years to reach full fruition. 11 In 2016, an updated version of the same technique was used to create “Pizzagate,” the bizarre rumor that Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager ran a child sex ring in a Washington restaurant. It spread instantly on the Internet. What’s new is not the basic model; it’s the speed with which such disinformation can spread and the low cost of spreading it. With its armies of paid trolls and botnets, along with outlets such as Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, Russian intelligence, after hacking into the e-mails of the Democratic National Committee and senior Clinton campaign officials, could distract and disrupt news cycles week after week without setting foot in the United States. And it could also count on the witting and unwitting help of organizations like Wikileaks. Russian messages aimed at priming, framing, agenda setting, and contagion were accelerated by U.S. media that were too quick and unreflective in using the Russian phrasing and frames.12 American voters are subject to many influences, and there were many potential causes of the narrow outcome of the 2016 election. It is far too simple just to blame manipulation of social media. As social scientists say, the outcome was “overdetermined.” But whatever its effects on the particular election outcome, Russia was able to accomplish its deeper goal of sowing disruption and discrediting the democratic model. It successfully undercut American soft power.
Constellations are key to democracy promotion – they put authoritarian leaders on the defensive – it’s perceptual and proven by opposition to satellites Schwille 4/12 (Michael, senior policy analyst at RAND, research interest focuses on the integration of information into combined arms warfare, M.A. in international development studies from George Washington University) “Satellite Internet Services—Fostering the Dictator's Dilemma?” RAND Corporation, 4/12/2021 JL Constellations of low-altitude, low-latency satellites providing broadband internet access to wide swathes of the earth are an impending challenge to the information dominance enjoyed by the world's authoritarian states. Whether Amazon's proposed Project Kuiper, Elon Musk's Starlink (already functional in some areas of North America), or the United Kingdom funded OneWeb, the ability to provide relatively low cost internet access outside of government control is both a challenge for authoritarian states and an opportunity for democracies. In Russia, the Duma is already considering a law to criminalize access to such satellite services. China is not only planning to launch a competing service, it has Starlink's Musk concerned about having his satellites “blown up.” North Korea, which bans its citizens from accessing the internet and (in)famously attacks leaflets with machine guns, shells loudspeakers with artillery, and punishes citizens for accessing Chinese cellphone towers, has yet to comment publicly on such services. Given this history though, Pyongyang's reaction is unlikely to be very positive. What are low-altitude, low-latency satellites and why are authoritarian states so concerned? The problem (for authoritarians) and promise (for democracies) are the services' ability to provide broadband internet access almost anywhere on earth, with nothing new required on the ground aside from a small terminal. Because these satellites orbit at several hundred kilometers (low Earth orbit), versus 35,000km for telecommunication satellites in geostationary orbit, their terminals can be smaller, portable, and easier to conceal, smuggle, and infiltrate. With one of these terminals, users can cheaply and quickly bypass national controls on the internet and information access, plus place phone (e.g. Voice over Internet Protocol, Skype, or Zoom) calls outside of government-controlled systems. It is this freedom of information access and communication that has Russia and China so concerned, and that provides an opportunity for democratic states to rebalance their current information disadvantage. In what some scholars have termed democracy's dilemma, nations that rely on relatively free and open information flows are vulnerable to having that openness turned against them by adversaries. Think Russian influence on Brexit, the 2016 U.S. elections and the COVID-19 infodemic. What these new satellite systems offer is an opportunity to reinvigorate the dictator's dilemma (PDF)—the fear authoritarian leaders have of nonregime narratives reaching their people, or their people communicating outside of government-approved channels. Just how powerful is this fear? Moscow reacts more negatively to criticisms and threats to its information control than it does to (far more expensive) NATO exercises. For years, Russian state media have even coordinated to deflect these criticisms of Russia's censorship onto countries with which Moscow is in conflict, successively targeting Georgia, the United States, and Ukraine. China's rulers have a similar view, more fearful of “American ideals of freedom, democracy, and human rights infecting the people of China and Hong Kong,” than they are of U.S. military or economic challenges. This is not a new concern for Beijing; the term Great Firewall of China was discussed in a Wired article back in 1997. Beijing's controls have expanded since, with hundreds of thousands of censors and billions of dollars spent on informational and societal control, including the uniquely intrusive social credit systems (PDF). North Korea is an even clearer example, with years of North Korea specialists (see Lankov, Baek, Cha, Myers, and others) highlighting Pyongyang's reliance on domestic information control to keep the Kim family in power. Impressive control, but a weakness masquerading as a strength. This desire for information control represents both the dictator's dilemma and democracy's opportunity. Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang (as well as Tehran and others) are clearly concerned about the threat posed by unsupervised information access. Washington (or Brussels, London, Tokyo…whomever) publicly advocating for more open internet access, coupled with a clear mention of the new satellite services, would quickly command attention and establish a compelling narrative (and underlying threat). Coupling this message with a reminder of the West's ability to challenge information controls by, for example, smuggling bulky typewriters, printing presses, and Xerox machines into Eastern Europe in the 80s, which increased the flow of uncensored information, would add credibility to the threat—if authoritarian states thought typewriters were a problem, infiltrating an “internet in a box” (or thousands of them) looms as an even more compelling danger. The physical threat of infiltrated devices combined with a narrative advocating freedom of information access provide the West with a new, information-based tool for foreign policy leverage. A tool, or active measure, based not on fear, deception, or disinformation, but simply on information access. By offering an information-based response to an information-based attack, this tool offers a fresh, calibrated response option. Chinese cyber espionage or recent attacks on Hong Kong's civil liberties, Russian attempts to influence Brexit or U.S. elections (or the more recent SolarWinds hack), North Korean attacks on Sony or South Korea's ATM network, are all activities ripe for response. Once this tool is effectively demonstrated in terms of fostering the dictator's dilemma, democracy's response and deterrence toolkits, for both cyber and influence activities, commensurately expands. Importantly, the utility of this information tool is not confined simply to allowing outside information in; it also allows information to flow out (especially important with North Korea). Perhaps most importantly, it provides another tool to avoid government monitoring inside an authoritarian state. When paired with mesh networks of the type used, for example, during demonstrations in Hong Kong, it further increases the opportunity for the free flow of information dictators perceive as so threatening. This tool (or its threatened use) does not replace other foreign policy tools—diplomatic, economic, and military tools remain options; this proposal simply adds a new information-based capability. The tool fits within a historical context of Western information activities and offers a compelling public narrative—fighting censorship. The hardware costs are relatively low, largely borne by the companies launching the satellites, and coming into existence whether governments wish them to or not. Finally, by rebalancing democracy's dilemma through a reinforcement of the dictator's dilemma, this tool offers an information response to information/cyber/influence attacks, using a method that clearly targets the vulnerabilities and sensitivities of authoritarian adversaries.
Democracy is key to US primacy – independently, democratic peace solves war Kendall-Taylor 16 (Andrea, a deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council and a nonresident senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.) Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/15/2016 BC Although the number of democracies in the world is at an all-time high, there are a number of key trends that are working to undermine democracy. The rollback of democracy in a few influential states or even in a number of less consequential ones would almost certainly accelerate meaningful changes in today’s global order. Democratic decline would weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation for U.S. cooperation abroad. Research demonstrates that domestic politics are a key determinant of the international behavior of states. In particular, democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate more fully with other democracies than with autocracies. Similarly, authoritarian countries have established mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.” An increase in authoritarian countries, then, would provide a broader platform for coordination that could enable these countries to overcome their divergent histories, values, and interests—factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the formation of a cohesive challenge to the U.S.-led international system. Recent examples support the empirical data. Democratic backsliding in Hungary and the hardening of Egypt’s autocracy under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have led to enhanced relations between these countries and Russia. Likewise, democratic decline in Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations with China and Russia, in part to mitigate Western pressure and bolster the regime’s domestic standing. Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently, further democratic decline could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required to confront today’s increasingly complex challenges. Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with other democratic nations. A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions, including the United Nations , the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet. Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests. Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World Bank all together. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become fragmented and less effective. Violence and instability would also likely increase if more democracies give way to autocracy. International relations literature tells us that democracies are less likely to fight wars against other democracies, suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines. Moreover, within countries that are already autocratic, additional movement away from democracy, or an “authoritarian hardening,” would increase global instability. Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely to experience state failure, as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In this way, democratic decline would significantly strain the international order because rising levels of instability would exceed the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows. Finally, widespread democratic decline would contribute to rising anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a global order that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States and its values. Most autocracies are highly suspicious of U.S. intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as an effective means for boosting their own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, and Bolivian president Evo Morales regularly accuse the United States of fomenting instability and supporting regime change. This vilification of the United States is a convenient way of distracting their publics from regime shortcomings and fostering public support for strongman tactics. US leadership in this decade solves global war and results in a peaceful end to Chinese revisionism Erickson and Collins 10/21 (Andrew, A professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute)(Gabriel, Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy) “A Dangerous Decade of Chinese Power Is Here,” Foreign Policy, 10/18/2021 U.S. and allied policymakers are facing the most important foreign-policy challenge of the 21st century. China’s power is peaking; so is the political position of Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic strength. In the long term, China’s likely decline after this peak is a good thing. But right now, it creates a decade of danger from a system that increasingly realizes it only has a short time to fulfill some of its most critical, long-held goals. Within the next five years, China’s leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, structural economic problems, and technological estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives. As Xi internalizes these challenges, his foreign policy is likely to become even more accepting of risk, feeding on his nearly decadelong track record of successful revisionist action against the rules-based order. Notable examples include China occupying and militarizing sub-tidal features in the South China Sea, ramping up air and maritime incursions against Japan and Taiwan, pushing border challenges against India, occupying Bhutanese and Tibetan lands, perpetrating crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, and coercively enveloping Hong Kong. The relatively low-hanging fruit is plucked, but Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist prize: Taiwan. Beijing’s actions over the last decade have triggered backlash, such as with the so-called AUKUS deal, but concrete constraints on China’s strategic freedom of action may not fully manifest until after 2030. It’s remarkable and dangerous that China has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown. Beijing will likely conclude that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures for both “gray zone” and high-end scenarios, the 2021 to late 2020s timeframe still favors China—and is attractive for its 68-year-old leader, who seeks a historical achievement at the zenith of his career. U.S. planners must mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and thereby deter Chinese aggression in the coming decade—literally starting now—and innovatively employ assets that currently exist or can be operationally assembled and scaled within the next several years. That will be the first step to pushing back against China during the 2020s—a decade of danger—before what will likely be a waning of Chinese power. As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of inevitable Chinese strategic domination in Asia and beyond, it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals and its medium-term capacity to achieve them. China is, in fact, likely nearing the apogee of its relative power; and by 2030 to 2035, it will cross a tipping point from which it may never recover strategically. Growing headwinds constraining Chinese growth, while not publicly acknowledged by Beijing, help explain Xi’s high and apparently increasing risk tolerance. Beijing’s window of strategic opportunity is sliding shut. China’s skyrocketing household debt levels exemplify structural economic constraints that are emerging much earlier than they did for the United States when it had similar per capita GDP and income levels. Debt is often a wet blanket on consumption growth. A 2017 analysis published by the Bank for International Settlements found that once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60 percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds. As debt levels continue to rise at an absolute level that has accelerated almost continuously for the past decade, China also faces a hollowing out of its working-age population. This critical segment peaked in 2010 and has since declined, with the rate from 2015 to 2020 nearing 0.6 percent annually—nearly twice the respective pace in the United States. While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor. Moreover, the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do. Atop surging debt and worsening demographics, China also faces resource insecurity. China’s dependence on imported food and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections from Tsinghua University make a compelling case that China’s oil and gas imports will peak between 2030 and 2035. As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls equal to even a few percentage points of total demand can have outsized negative impacts. Domestic resource insufficiency by itself does not hinder economic growth—as the Four Asian Tigers’ multi-decade boom attests. But China is in a different position. Japan and South Korea never had to worry about the U.S. Navy interdicting inbound tankers or grain ships. In fact, the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries. Each of these dynamics—demographic downshifts, rising debts, resource supply insecurity—either imminently threatens or is already actively interfering with the CCP’s long-cherished goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society.” Electricity blackouts, real estate sector travails (like those of Evergrande) that show just how many Chinese investors’ financial eggs now sit in an unstable $52 trillion basket, and a solidifying alignment of countries abroad concerned by aggressive Chinese behavior all raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver. With this confluence of adverse events only a year before the next party congress, where personal ambition and survival imperatives will almost drive him to seek anointment as the only Chinese “leader for life” aside from former leader Mao Zedong, the timing only fuels his sense of insecurity. Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns and ruthless removal of potential rivals and their supporters solidified his power but likely also created a quiet corps of opponents who may prove willing to move against him if events create the perception he’s lost the “mandate of heaven.” Accordingly, the baseline assumption should be that Xi’s crown sits heavy and the insecurity induced is thereby intense enough to drive high-stake, high-consequence posturing and action. While Xi is under pressure to act, the external risks are magnified because so far, he has suffered few consequences from taking actions on issues his predecessors would likely never have gambled on. Reactions to party predations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong have been restricted to diplomatic-signaling pinpricks, such as sanctioning responsible Chinese officials and entities, most of whom lack substantial economic ties to the United States. Whether U.S. restraint results from a fear of losing market access or a belief that China’s goals are ultimately limited is not clear at this time. While the CCP issues retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and proclaims a triumphant outcome to its hostage diplomacy, these tactical public actions mask a growing private awareness that China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite—but knowing that when Beijing sees the tipping point in its rearview mirror, major rivals will recognize it too—amplifies Xi and the party’s anxiety to act on a shorter timeline. Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years. Just as China is mustering its own strategic actions, so the United States must also intensify its focus and deployment of resources. The United States has taken too long to warm up and confront the central challenge, but it retains formidable advantages, agility, and the ability to prevail—provided it goes all-in now. Conversely, if Washington fails to marshal its forces promptly, its achievements after 2030 or 2035 will matter little. Seizing the 2020s would enable Beijing to cripple destroy the free and open rules-based order and entrench its position by economically subjugating regional neighbors (including key U.S. treaty allies) to a degree that could offset the strategic headwinds China now increasingly grapples with. Deterrence is never certain. But it offers the highest probability of avoiding the certainty that an Indo-Pacific region dominated by a CCP-led China would doom treaty allies, threaten the U.S. homeland, and likely set the stage for worse to come. Accordingly, U.S. planners should immediately mobilize resources and effort as well as accept greater risks to deter Chinese action over the critical next decade. The greatest threat is armed conflict over Taiwan, where U.S. and allied success or failure will be fundamental and reverberate for the remainder of the century. There is a high chance of a major move against Taiwan by the late 2020s—following an extraordinary ramp-up in People’s Liberation Army capabilities and before Xi or the party state’s power grasp has ebbed or Washington and its allies have fully regrouped and rallied to the challenge. So how should policymakers assess the potential risk of Chinese action against Taiwan reaching dangerous levels by 2027 or possibly even earlier—as emphasized in the testimonies of Adms. Philip Davidson and John Aquilino? In June, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley testified to the House of Representatives that Xi had “challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027,” although China does not currently have the capabilities or intentions to conduct an all-out invasion of mainland Taiwan. U.S. military leaders’ assessments are informed by some of the world’s most extensive and sophisticated internal information. But what’s striking is open-source information available to everyone suggests similar things. Moving forward, a number of open-source indicators offer valuable “early warning lights” that can help policymakers more accurately calibrate both potential timetables and risk readings as the riskiest period of relations—from 2027 onward—approaches. Semiconductors supply self-sufficiency. Taiwan is the “OPEC+” of semiconductors, accounting for approximately two-thirds of global chip foundry capacity. A kinetic crisis would almost certainly disrupt—and potentially even completely curtail—semiconductor supplies. China presently spends even more each year on semiconductor imports (around $380 billion) than it does on oil, but much of the final products are destined for markets abroad. Taiwan is producing cutting-edge 5-nanometer and 7-nanometer chips, but China produces around 80 percent of the rest of the chips in the world. The closer China comes to being able to secure “good enough” chips for “inside China-only” needs, the less of a constraint this becomes. Crude oil, grain, strategic metals stockpiles—the commercial community (Planet Labs, Ursa Space Systems, etc.) has developed substantial expertise in cost-effectively tracking inventory changes for key input commodities needed to prepare for war. Electric vehicle fleet size—the amount of oil demand displaced by electric vehicles varies depending on miles driven, but the more of China’s car fleet that can be connected to the grid (and thus powered by blockade-resistant coal), the less political burden Beijing will face if it has to weather a maritime oil blockade imposed in response to actions it took against Taiwan or other major revisionist adventures. China’s passenger vehicle fleet, now approximately 225 million units strong, counts nearly 6.5 million electric vehicles among its ranks, the lion’s share of which are full-battery electrics. China’s State Council seeks to have 20 percent of new vehicles sold in China be electric vehicles by 2025. This target has already basically been achieved over the last few months, meaning at least 3.5 to 4 million (and eventually many more) new elective vehicles will enter China’s car fleet each year from now on. Local concentration of maritime vessels—snap exercises with warships, circumnavigations, and midline tests with swarms of aircraft highlight the growing scale of China’s threat to Taiwan. But these assets alone cannot invade the island. To capture and garrison, Beijing would need not only air, missile, naval, and special operations forces but also the ability to move lots of equipment and—at the very least—tens of thousands of personnel across the Taiwan Strait. As such, Beijing would have to amass maritime transport assets. And given the scale required, this would alter ship patterns elsewhere along China’s coast in ways detectable with artificial intelligence-facilitated imagery analysis from firms like Planet Labs (or national assets). Only the most formidable, agile American and allied deterrence can kick the can down the road long enough for China’s slowdown to shut the window of vulnerability. Holding the line is likely to require frequent and sustained proactive enforcement actions to disincentivize full-frontal Chinese assaults on the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese probing behavior and provocations must be met with a range of symmetric and asymmetric responses that impose real costs, such as publishing assets owned by Chinese officials abroad, cyber interference with China’s technological social control apparatus, “hands on” U.S. Navy and Coast Guard enforcement measures against Maritime Militia-affiliated vessels in the South China Sea, intensified air and maritime surveillance of Chinese naval bases, and visas and resettlement options to Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other threatened Chinese citizens—including CCP officials (and their families) who seek to defect and/or leave China. U.S. policymakers must make crystal clear to their Chinese counterparts that the engagement-above-all policies that dominated much of the past 25 years are over and the risks and costs of ongoing—and future—adventurism will fall heaviest on China. Bombastic Chinese reactions to emerging cohesive actions verify the approach’s effectiveness and potential for halting—and perhaps even reversing—the revisionist tide China has unleashed across the Asian region. Consider the recent nuclear submarine deal among Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Beijing’s strong public reaction (including toleration of nuclear threats made by the state-affiliated Global Times) highlights the gap between its global information war touting China’s irresistible power and deeply insecure internal self-perception. Eight nuclear submarines will ultimately represent formidable military capacity, but for a bona fide superpower that believes in its own capabilities, they would not be a game-changer. Consider the U.S.-NATO reaction to the Soviet Union’s commissioning of eight Oscar I/II-class cruise missile subs during the late Cold War. These formidable boats each carried 24 SS-N-19 Granit missiles specifically designed to kill U.S. carrier battle groups, yet NATO never stooped to public threats. With diplomatic proofs of concepts like the so-called AUKUS deal, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and hard security actions like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative now falling into place, it is time to comprehensively peak the non-authoritarian world’s protective action to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific. During this decade, U.S. policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate Chinese behavior. Xi’s recreation of a “one-man” system is a one-way, high-leverage bet that decisions he drives will succeed. If Xi miscalculates, a significant risk given his suppression of dissenting voices while China raises the stakes in its confrontation with the United States, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left him with outsized returns on a successful bet would instead amplify the downside, all of which he personally and exclusively signed for. Resulting tensions could very realistically undermine his status and authority, embolden internal challengers, and weaken the party. They could also foreseeably drive him to double down on mistakes, especially if those led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict. Personal survival measures could thus rapidly transmute into regional or even global threats. If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the U.S. electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure as well as that of allies and partners abroad for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that actual conflict is a concrete possibility. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“if you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a variety of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with China. Given these unforgiving dynamics and stakes, implications for U.S. planners are stark: Do whatever remains possible to “peak” for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s, and accept whatever trade-offs are available for doing so. Nothing we might theoretically achieve in 2035 and beyond is worth pursuing at the expense of China-credible capabilities we can realistically achieve no later than the mid-to-late 2020s.
1/23/22
JANFEB - DA - Dip Cap
Tournament: Palm Classic | Round: 2 | Opponent: Honor VD | Judge: Emmiee Malyugina JCPOA passes now – international unity and focus are key DeYoung 2/10 (Karen, Associate editor and senior national security correspondent for The Washington Post) “Iran nuclear talks head toward finish line, but outcome is unclear”, The Washington Post, 02/10/2022 Talks between Iran and world powers over revitalizing the Iran nuclear agreement have reached their final stage and are expected to conclude one way or the other by the end of this month, according to participants. “I don’t know if it’s one, two or three weeks,” European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said this week during a visit to Washington. But the latest round of meetings in Vienna, he said, are “certainly the last steps.” While there is general agreement that negotiations are reaching an end state, opinions differ widely on the likely outcome. Russia’s representative, Mikhail Ulyanov, who has adopted a generally optimistic tone since the talks started in April, said last week that negotiations should conclude “as soon as possible, preferably this month.” The talks, he said in an interview with the Russian news outlet Kommersant, had come “a long way” and were “very close to achieving” success. A senior U.S. official, however, noted that major issues on the table remain unresolved. Negotiations are both “closer than we have been to a deal,” in that some progress has been made, and “closer than we have been to breakdown,” as time for agreement runs out, the official said. “Both outcomes are still very possible,” said the official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to comment on the sensitive diplomacy. Space diplomacy directly trades off with nonproliferation agreements – finite manpower, money, and political will within the AVC Johnson-Freeze 16 (Joan, Professor and former Chair of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island) “Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens,” Cass Military Studies, 11/8/2016 JL *The plan is legislated in the AVC (same bureau of the State Department that’s concerned with the JCPOA) Proactive policymaking takes commitment, manpower, and money. A quick look at the money and manpower devoted to diplomacy in the US State and Defense departments compared to the resources available for the hardwareproducing military–industrial complex efforts described in Chapter 5 is enlightening. The Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance (AVC) leads space-related diplomacy in the State Department. The AVC Bureau is responsible for “all matters related to the implementation of certain international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments; this includes staffing and managing treaty implementation commissions.”34 The AVC arms control portfolio includes nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and all related issues. The AVC section charged with space issues is the Office of Emerging Security Challenges; this office also handles missile defense issues and the promotion of transparency, cooperation, and building confidence regarding cybersecurity. As of financial year 2013, AVC had a budget of $31.2 million and 141 employees35 to be active participants and leaders in all of these issues. By way of comparison, the Space Security and Defense Program, a joint program of the DoD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was programmed for a similar budget amount in financial year 2015: $32.3 million. That program is described as a “center of excellence for options and strategies (materiel, non-materiel, cross-Title, cross-domain) leading to a more resilient and enduring National Security Space (NSS) Enterprise.”36 A majority of SSDP funding is allocated to the development of offensive space control strategies. So basically, the same budget is allocated for all US global space diplomacy efforts as for an in-house Pentagon think tank to devise counterspace strategies. Within the Pentagon, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy is charged with all issues related to space policy, including diplomacy. The responsibilities of the Space Policy office are to: • Develop policy and strategy for a domain that is increasingly congested, competitive, and contested • Implement across DoD — plans, programs, doctrine, operations — and with the IC and other agencies • Engage with allies and other space-faring countries in establishing norms and augmenting our capabilities.37 The breadth of those responsibilities, which includes reviewing space acquisitions, means that there may be only a handful of individuals actually engaged in multilateral diplomatic efforts, acting, for example, as advisors to diplomatic discussions such as those through the United Nations. Additionally, the expanse of the Pentagon results in a chain of command that makes organizational competition for attention to subject matter challenging at best. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy reports to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, who then reports to the Principle Deputy Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, who then reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Defense Policy. There are also a multitude of space players in other governmental organizations to coordinate and contend with, particularly within the Air Force and intelligence communities. Personnel are spread thin. US government-wide space diplomacy needs a mandate, manpower, and a supporting budget. Diplomacy, especially multilateral diplomacy, can be timeconsuming, manpower-intensive, and frustrating; and patience is not a strong American virtue. The recent experience in the UN LTS Working Group is emblematic of everything that causes the United States to shun multilateralism. Under the auspices of this group, countries had worked in good faith over the past five years to develop technical guidelines as reciprocal constraints, as insisted upon by the developing countries when they rejected the ICOC. Yet group success appeared thwarted at the February 2016 meeting of the LTS Working Group by one country, Russia.
Iranian proliferation goes nuclear – causes regional war and spurs proliferation cascades across the Middle East Chilton and Hoshovsky 20 – (Kevin, led U.S. Strategic Command and has participated in the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s Generals and Admirals Program; Harry, policy analyst at JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy) "Avoiding a nuclear arms race in the Middle East," Defense News, 2-13-2020, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/02/13/avoiding-a-nuclear-arms-race-in-the-middle-east/ TDI This raises two immediate concerns. First, should Iran race for the bomb, it is almost inevitable that the United States and/or Israel will take preventative military action to stop it from crossing that fateful threshold. This could easily spiral into a regional war as Iran activates its various proxy forces against the United States and its allies. Second, an Iranian nuclear breakout attempt could spur a proliferation cascade throughout the Middle East, beginning with Saudi Arabia. Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince, openly stated in 2018 that if Iran developed nuclear weapons, Riyadh would quickly “follow suit.” One suggested approach would see Saudi Arabia purchase a nuclear power reactor from a major supplier like South Korea and then build a reprocessing plant that would yield enough weapons-grade plutonium in five years. A half-decade delay isn’t optimal, however, when the goal is achieving nuclear deterrence quickly. Thus, there is the so-called Islamabad option. This refers to Riyadh’s role in financing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and an alleged commitment from Islamabad that it would repay the favor. While Pakistani and Saudi officials have denied any such understanding, there is the possibility that the two could work out an arrangement where Islamabad could deploy some of its nuclear arsenal on Saudi soil following a successful Iranian breakout. Although this maneuver would draw sharp, international criticism, in theory, it would allow Riyadh to remain in good standing vis-a-vis the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Nevertheless, Pakistan might not be willing to play spoiler against a nuclearized Iran. If it is, Middle Eastern geopolitics would become extremely unstable. If Saudi Arabia acquires nuclear weapons, many believe Turkey would follow suit. Last September, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that he “cannot accept” the argument from Western nations that Turkey should not be allowed to attain nuclear weapons. In 1958, Charles de Gaulle proclaimed that a nation without nuclear weapons “does not command its own destiny”; two years later, France tested its first bomb. Erdogan’s comments echo those earlier remarks and raise the possibility that Ankara could become the second NATO member to leave the alliance’s nuclear umbrella in favor of its own independent arsenal.
Prolif cascades undermine deterrence and cause nuclear war – this is predictive of what a multi-nuclear Middle East would look like Krepinevich 13 – (Dr. Andrew F, the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) “Critical Mass: Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East,” 2013, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Nuclear-Proliferation-in-the-Middle-East.pdf TDI As more countries over time develop nuclear capabilities and build up their nuclear arsenals, the competition will evolve from an Israeli-Iranian affair to a multi-state rivalry. For illustrative purposes we will assume that in the 2025-2030 timeframe, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and perhaps Egypt and/or Iraq have nuclear arsenals in the low double-digit range (i.e., ten to forty weapons). What form might a nuclear competition among these powers and Israel assume? The remainder of this chapter attempts to shed some light on this issue, and its potential implications, with emphasis on those affecting regional stability. The challenge of preserving stability when confronted with military competition among five nuclear-armed states within the Middle East and with other powers external to the region engaged in a Great Game for influence is formidable. At first blush, one thing seems apparent: many Cold War-era metrics for assessing the competition and gauging where it might be headed appear to be of little utility; in fact, they may actually prove misleading and dangerous. The same can be said of those looking to apply Cold War-era arms control metrics as a way of keeping the peace in general and avoiding nuclear use in particular. During the Cold War, many nuclear strategists came to view nuclear parity (the possession of roughly equivalent arsenals capable of inflicting roughly equivalent levels of destruction) between the United States and the Soviet Union as stabilizing. The perception of these strategists is that the rough equivalence contributed to the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons, and was thus desirable. Parity enabled both sides to avoid the perception of being inferior to their rival, and perceptions are critical to deterrence and to preserving the confidence of one’s allies and security partners. If accepted by both sides, parity could enable them to avoid the cost and instability associated with “racing” toward ever-larger arsenals. Accordingly, maintaining parity was a major objective of U.S.-Soviet (and later U.S.-Russian) arms control negotiations. Yet irrespective of its merits, parity is not an option for states engaged in an n-player competition. Each competitor cannot have a nuclear force equivalent to all the others. Even if the competition should solidify into two coalitions so as to mimic the two-player Cold War competition, questions would almost certainly arise regarding the willingness of a coalition partner that has not been attacked to risk its own destruction by using its nuclear weapons in response to an attack on its ally. Indeed, these concerns were raised during the Cold War, and formed a major justification for France pursuing its own force de frappe. 93 In a Middle Eastern “n-player” competition, all nuclear powers would be challenged to establish an “assured destruction” capability against all the other regional nuclear powers, another Cold War desideratum, given their relatively modest economies. An “assured destruction” capability in an n-state competition would require that each state have weapons sufficient to survive an initial attack by all potential rivals and still be able to devastate the countries of all attackers. It would also require that the source of the attack be reliably identified. As noted earlier, this may prove difficult given likely limitations on these states’ ability to field advanced early warning systems. For example, would Israel be able to determine with confidence the owner of a ballistic missile launched from a location along the Iranian-Turkish border? The origin of any cruise missile launched from a sea-based platform? Even assuming a state could identify the source (or sources) of an attack, could its command and control systems survive the attack sufficiently intact to execute a retaliatory strike? A decapitation strike could preclude an “assured destruction” retaliatory strike even if sufficient weapons survive to execute one. This, in turn, raises the possibility of a “catalytic” war—one that is initiated between two states by a third party. Given a proliferated Middle East as described above, the chances that a regime would incorrectly attribute the source of an attack cannot be easily dismissed. To the extent cyber weapons can introduce false information into a state’s decision-making process, the risks of catalytic war only increase. Further complicating matters, the early warning requirement following a proliferation cascade could be multidirectional, and at some point perhaps 360 degrees, especially if nuclear rivals begin deploying a portion of their nuclear forces at sea. Early warning requirements would be stressed even further (and the costs of such a system increase correspondingly) if a neighboring state (e.g., Iran in the case of Turkey or Iraq; Turkey in the case of Israel; etc.) were to acquire nuclear weapons. In this case warning times would be even more compressed than in an Israeli-Iranian competition. Owing to its proximity to Iran, Saudi Arabia, for example, could have less than five minutes to react to an Iranian ballistic missile attack no matter how advanced its early warning and command and control systems are. As noted earlier in this assessment, regardless of what assumptions are made regarding a regional nuclear power’s early warning system, given the short ballistic missile flight times it seems likely that preserving command and control of the state’s nuclear forces while under attack will prove challenging. States might be tempted to adopt a launch-on-warning posture, but this requires both early warning and a highly responsive command and control system. Should a state determine that it will not be able to launch-on-warning and instead attempt to “ride-out” a nuclear first strike and retaliate, it would still need its command and control system to function effectively in the wake of the nuclear attack. Absent a highly resilient command and control system, a state’s ability to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike may require nuclear release authority to be diffused to lower-level commanders. But again, absent an effective early warning system it may not be possible to determine the attack source with confidence in a region with multiple nuclear powers.
2/12/22
JANFEB - DA - Water Wars
Tournament: CPS | Round: 6 | Opponent: San Mateo YR | Judge: Vanessa Nguyen Climate change makes water shortages inevitable – that causes hydro-political conflict escalation which goes nuclear Harvey 8/17 (Fiona, the Guardian's environment correspondent, won the Foreign Press Association award for Environment Story of the Year and the British Environment and Media Awards journalist of the year) “Global water crisis will intensify with climate breakdown, says report,” The Guardian, 8/17/2021 JL Mark’s words should be a call to attention, and a call to action. The plight of farmers in Australia illustrates a larger reality: As planetary temperatures continue to increase and rainfall patterns shift due to human-caused climate disruption, our ability to grow crops and have enough drinking water will become increasingly challenged, and the outlook is only going to worsen. The most recent United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report warned of increasingly intense droughts and mass water shortages around large swaths of the globe. But even more conservative organizations have been sounding the alarm. “Water insecurity could multiply the risk of conflict,” warns one of the World Bank’s reports on the issue. “Food price spikes caused by droughts can inflame latent conflicts and drive migration. Where economic growth is impacted by rainfall, episodes of droughts and floods have generated waves of migration and spikes in violence within countries.” Meanwhile, a study published in the journal Global Environmental Change, looked at how “hydro-political issues” — including tensions and potential conflicts — could play out in countries expected to experience water shortages coupled with high populations and pre-existing geopolitical tensions. The study warned that these factors could combine to increase the likelihood of water-related tensions — potentially escalating into armed conflict in cross-boundary river basins in places around the world by 74.9 to 95 percent. This means that in some places conflict is practically guaranteed. These areas include regions situated around primary rivers in Asia and North Africa. Noted rivers include the Tigris and Euphrates, the Indus, the Nile, and the Ganges-Brahmaputra. Consider the fact that 11 countries share the Nile River basin: Egypt, Burundi, Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo. All told, more than 300 million people already live in these countries, — a number that is projected to double in the coming decades, while the amount of available water will continue to shrink due to climate change. For those in the US thinking these potential conflicts will only occur in distant lands — think again. The study also warned of a very high chance of these “hydro-political interactions” in portions of the southwestern US and northern Mexico, around the Colorado River. Potential tensions are particularly worrisome in India and Pakistan, which are already rivals when it comes to water resources. For now, these two countries have an agreement, albeit a strained one, over the Indus River and the sharing of its water, by way of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty. However, water claims have been central to their ongoing, burning dispute over the Kashmir region, a flashpoint area there for more than 60 years and counting. The aforementioned treaty is now more strained than ever, as Pakistan accuses India of limiting its water supply and violating the treaty by placing dams over various rivers that flow from Kashmir into Pakistan. In fact, a 2018 report from the International Monetary Fund ranked Pakistan third among countries facing severe water shortages. This is largely due to the rapid melting of glaciers in the Himalaya that are the source of much of the water for the Indus. To provide an idea of how quickly water resources are diminishing in both countries, statistics from Pakistan’s Islamabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry from 2018 show that water availability (per capita in cubic meters per year) shrank from 5,260 in 1951, to 940 in 2015, and are projected to shrink to 860 by just 2025. In India, the crisis is hardly better. According to that country’s Ministry of Statistics (2016) and the Indian Ministry of Water Resources (2010), the per capita available water in cubic meters per year was 5,177 in 1951, and 1,474 in 2015, and is projected to shrink to 1,341 in 2025. Both of these countries are nuclear powers. Given the dire projections of water availability as climate change progresses, nightmare scenarios of water wars that could spark nuclear exchanges are now becoming possible.
Asteroid mining solves water access – only NEOs are sufficiently proximate and hydrated – independently, storing launch fuel on asteroids reduces space debris – turns case Tillman 19 (Nola Taylor, has been published in Astronomy, Sky and Telescope, Scientific American, New Scientist, Science News (AAS), Space.com, and Astrobiology magazine, BA in Astrophysics) “Tons of Water in Asteroids Could Fuel Satellites, Space Exploration,” Space, 9/29/2019 JL When it comes to mining space for water, the best target may not be the moon: Entrepreneurs' richest options are likely to be asteroids that are larger and closer to Earth. A recent study suggested that roughly 1,000 water-rich, or hydrated, asteroids near our planet are easier to reach than the lunar surface is. While most of these space rocks are only a few feet in size, more than 25 of them should be large enough to each provide significant water. Altogether, the water locked in these asteroids should be enough to fill somewhere around 320,000 Olympics-size swimming pools — significantly more than the amount of water locked up at the lunar poles, the new research suggested. Because asteroids are small, they have less gravity than Earth or the moon do, which makes them easier destinations to land on and lift off from. If engineers can figure out how to mine water from these space rocks, they could produce a source of ready fuel in space that would allow spacecraft designers to build refuelable models for the next generation of satellites. Asteroid mining could also fuel human exploration, saving the expense of launching fuel from Earth. In both cases, would-be space-rock miners will need to figure out how to free the water trapped in hydrated minerals on these asteroids. "Most of the hydrated material in the near-Earth population is contained in the largest few hydrated objects," Andrew Rivkin, an asteroid researcher at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Research Laboratory in Maryland, told Space.com. Rivkin is the lead author on the paper, which estimated that near Earth asteroids could contain more easily accessible water than the lunar poles. According to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, more than 5,200 of the objects launched into space are still in orbit today. While some continue to function, the bulk of them buzz uselessly over our heads every day. They carry fuel on board, and when they run out, they are either lowered into destructive orbits or left to become space junk, useless debris with the potential to cause enormous problems for working satellites. Refueling satellites in space could change that model, replacing it with long-lived, productive orbiters. "It's easier to bring fuel from asteroids to geosynchronous orbit than from the surface of the Earth," Rivkin said. "If such a supply line could be established, it could make asteroid mining very profitable." Hunting for space water from the surface of the Earth is challenging because the planet's atmosphere blocks the wavelength of light where water can be observed. The asteroid warming as it draws closer to the sun can also complicate measurements. Instead, Rivkin and his colleagues turned to a class of space rocks called Ch asteroids. Although these asteroids don't directly exhibit a watery fingerprint, they carry the telltale signal of oxidized iron seen only on asteroids with signatures of water-rich minerals, which means the authors felt confident assuming that all Ch asteroids carry this rocky water. Based on meteorite falls, a previous study estimated that Ch asteroids could make up nearly 10 of the near-Earth objects (NEOs). With this information, the researchers determined that there are between 26 and 80 such objects that are hydrated and larger than 0.62 miles (1 km) across. Right now, only three NEOs have been classified as Ch asteroids, although others have been spotted in the asteroid belt. Most NEOs are discovered and observed at wavelengths too short to reveal the iron band that marks the class. Carbon-rich asteroids, which include Ch asteroids and other flavors, are also darker than the more common stony asteroids, making them more challenging to observe. Although Ch asteroids definitely contain water-rich minerals, that doesn’t necessarily mean that they will always be the best bet for space mining. It comes down to risk. Would an asteroid-mining company rather visit a smaller asteroid that definitely has a moderate amount of water, or a larger one that could yield a larger payday but could also come up dry? "Whether getting sure things with no false positives, like the Ch asteroids, is more important or if a greater range of possibilities is acceptable with the understanding that some asteroids will be duds is something the miners will have to decide," Rivkin said. In addition to estimating the number of large, water-rich asteroids might be available, the study also found that as many as 1,050 smaller objects, roughly 300 feet (100 meters) across, may also linger near Earth. Their small bulk will make them easier to mine because their low gravity will require less fuel to escape from, but they will produce less water overall, and Rivkin expects that the handful of larger space rocks will be the first targets. "It seems likely that the plan for these companies will be to find the largest accessible asteroid with mineable material with the expectation that it will be more cost-effective than chasing down a large number of smaller objects," Rivkin said. "How 'accessible' and 'mineable material' and 'cost-effective' are defined by each company is to be seen."
12/19/21
JANFEB - DA - Xi Lashout
Tournament: Debate LA RR | Round: 2 | Opponent: Harvard Westlake AL | Judge: Panel Xi is consolidating unprecedented political power – that’s only possible with strong PLA support Chang 21 (Gordon, columnist, author and lawyer, has given briefings at the National Intelligence Council, the CIA, and the State Department, JD from Cornell Law School) “China Is Becoming a Military State,” Newsweek, 1/14/2021 JL At this moment AND a military state."
The plan alienates the PLA – they view space dominance as the linchpin of China’s legitimacy – specifically, public-private tech development is key Economic Times 20 (Economic Times, Indian daily newspaper, internally cites Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation and the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, former analyst in the International Security and Space Program at the Office of Technology Assessment, BA in Politics from Princeton University) “China attempting to militarize space as it seeks to modernize its military power,” 8/31/2020 JL The Jamestown Foundation AND satellite jamming operations.
That factionalizes the CCP and emboldens challenges to Xi – the PLA is increasingly powerful and not unconditionally subservient Simpson 16 (Kurtis, Centre Director with Defence Research and Development Canada, has been conducting research on China’s leadership, Communist Party politics, the People’s Liberation Army and foreign policy for over 30 years,Master’s Degree and a Ph.D from York University, previously served as an intelligence analyst at the Privy Council Office and leader of the Asia Research Section at the Department of National Defence’s Chief Defence Intelligence (CDI) organization) “China’s Re-Emergence: Assessing Civilian-Military Relations In Contemporary Era – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, 12/21/2016 JL Paralleling divided loyalties AND erode very quickly.29
Xi will lash out to preserve cred in the SCS – US draw-in ensures extinction Mastro 20 (Oriana Skylar, Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute) “Military Confrontation in the South China Sea,” Council on Foreign Relations, 5/21/2020 JL The risk of AND or its aftermath.
1/13/22
JANFEB - DA - Xi Lashout v2
Tournament: Cal | Round: 4 | Opponent: Harker RM | Judge: Jacob Nails 1NC – DA Xi is consolidating unprecedented political power – that’s only possible with strong PLA support Chang 21 (Gordon, columnist, author and lawyer, has given briefings at the National Intelligence Council, the CIA, and the State Department, JD from Cornell Law School) “China Is Becoming a Military State,” Newsweek, 1/14/2021 JL At this moment, the Communist Party is taking back power from all others in society, including the State Council, and the military is gaining influence inside Party circles. Why is the People's Liberation Army making a comeback? The answer lies in succession politics. Xi Jinping was selected the top leader because he was not identified with any of the main factional groupings—like the Communist Youth League of Hu Jintao or the Shanghai Gang of Jiang—that dominated Party politics. Xi, in short, was the least unacceptable choice to the Party's squabbling factional elders. Xi, once chosen, apparently decided that in order to rule, he needed a base, so he made certain officers the core of his support. As longtime China watcher Willy Lam told Reuters in 2013, Xi Jinping's faction is the military. And with the help of the military, Xi has accumulated almost unprecedented political power, ending the Party's two-decade-old consensus-driven system and replacing it with one-man rule. As Wang, a professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology, notes, Xi, with the amendments to the National Defense Law, is demonstrating his power of "leading everything and everyone." He is wrapping that effort in a "rule by law" move that is formalizing his perch at the top of the Chinese political system. How is Xi using his newfound power? There is a hint in the National Defense Law amendments. These changes, Fisher tells us, "increase the powers of the CMC to mobilize the civilian sector for wartime and to better authorize the CMC to engage in foreign military exercises to defend China's 'development interests.'" As such, the changes "point to China's ambition to achieve 'whole nation' levels of military mobilization to fight wars, and give the CMC formal power to control the future Chinese capabilities for global military intervention." "The revised National Defense Law also embodies the concept that everyone should be involved in national defense," reports the Communist Party's Global Times, summarizing the words of an unnamed CMC official. "All national organizations, armed forces, political parties, civil groups, enterprises, social organizations and other organizations should support and take part in the development of national defense, fulfill national defense duties and carry out national defense missions according to the law." That sounds like Xi is getting ready to pick even more fights with neighbors—and perhaps the United States. On January 5, he ordered People's Liberation Army generals and admirals to be prepared to "act at any second." Why would Xi want to start a war? "This is really indicative of there being instability in China, and Mr. Xi seeking to consolidate power around himself. ...The new National Defense Law essentially removes the alternative power base of the premier of the State Council, in this case Li Keqiang, from interfering with Mr. Xi's own power ambitions," said Charles Burton of the Ottawa-based Macdonald-Laurier Institute to John Batchelor, the radio host, earlier this month. As Burton noted, the amendments to the National Defense Law undermine Premier Li Keqiang, the head of the State Council and long-standing rival to Xi. "I think this really gives the green light for him to dispatch the military on any pretext that he feels is necessary to defend his power," Burton says. "China is becoming a military state."
The plan alienates the PLA – they perceive space dominance as key to military strength – independently, space cooperation forces fights Dean Cheng 19, Senior Research Fellow graduated from Princeton with a BA in politics and MIT, Asian Studies Center, 4/9/19, “Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation”, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/prospects-us-china-space-cooperation Moreover, in keeping with the Chinese memory of the “Century of Humiliation,” Beijing will want any cooperative venture to be, at a minimum, on a co-equal basis. For the PRC to be treated as anything other than a full member in any program or effort would smack of the “unequal treaties” that marked China’s interactions with the rest of the world between 1839 and 1949. For the same reason, China has generally been reluctant to join any organization or regime in which it was not party to negotiating. For the CCP, whose political legitimacy rests, in part, on the idea that it has restored Chinese pride and greatness, this is likely to be a significant part of any calculation. At the same time, space is now a sector that enjoys significant political support within the Chinese political system. Based on their writings, the PLA is clearly intent upon developing the ability to establish “space dominance,” in order to fight and win “local wars under informationized conditions.”8 The two SOEs are seen as key parts of the larger military-industrial complex, providing the opportunities to expose a large workforce to such areas as systems engineering and systems integration. It is no accident that China’s commercial airliner development effort tapped the top leadership of China’s aerospace corporations for managerial and design talent.9 From a bureaucratic perspective, this is a powerful lobby, intent on preserving its interests.¶ China’s space efforts should therefore be seen as political, as much as military or economic, statements, directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Insofar as the PRC has scored major achievements in space, these reflect positively on both China’s growing power and respect (internationally) and the CCP’s legitimacy (internally). Efforts at inducing Chinese cooperation in space, then, are likely to be viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both objectives. As China has progressed to the point of being the world’s second-largest economy (in gross domestic product terms), it becomes less clear as to why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on anything other than its own terms.¶ Prospects for Cooperation Within this context, then, the prospects for meaningful cooperation with the PRC in the area of space would seem to be extremely limited. China’s past experience of major high-technology cooperative ventures (Sino–Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, U.S.–China cooperation in the 1980s until Tiananmen, and Sino–European space cooperation on the Galileo satellite program) is an unhappy one, at best. The failure of the joint Russian–Chinese Phobos–Grunt mission is likely seen in Beijing as further evidence that a “go-it-alone” approach is preferable. Nor is it clear that, bureaucratically, there is significant interest from key players such as the PLA or the military industrial complex in expanding cooperation.10 Moreover, as long as China’s economy continues to expand, and the top political leadership values space efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space expenditures—making international cooperation far less urgent for the PRC than most other spacefaring states. If there is likely to be limited enthusiasm for cooperation in Chinese circles, there should also be skepticism in American ones. China’s space program is arguably one of the most opaque in the world. Even such basic data as China’s annual space expenditures is lacking—with little prospect of Beijing being forthcoming. As important, China’s decision-making processes are little understood, especially in the context of space. Seven years after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, exactly which organizations were party to that decision, and why it was undertaken, remains unclear. Consequently, any effort at cooperation would raise questions about the identity of the partners and ultimate beneficiaries—with a real likelihood that the PLA would be one of them.
China views resources in space as key to foreign policy initiatives Blair, Yali, 19, 03/2019, “The Space Security Dilemma”, Bruce G. Blair is the President of the World Security Institute. He was a project director at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution from 1987-2000. Mr. Blair is the author of numerous articles and books on security issues including the Logic of Accidental Nuclear War and Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces. He is presently completing a new book on U.S. nuclear policy.sChen Yali is the editor-in-chief of Washington Observer. She is also a Program Manager of Chen Shi China Research Group based in Beijing. Chen worked for China Daily as a reporter and opinion writer on politics and international affairs between 1994 and 2000, URL: https://www.globalzero.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BB_Editors-Notes-Space-Security-Dilemma_2006.pdf, KR A zero-sum mindset toward space is hardening in China as a result of this apprehension, as amply illustrated in the public media. Space is eyed in China as an area of resources and possibilities to be acquired before it’s too late. ShuXing, whose book is reviewed later in this journal, likens the grabbing of satellite orbits to the “Enclosure Movement” in late 18th Century England in which the more capability one has, the more resources one can seize. Another reviewed author argued that countries scramble into space to fight for the tremendous resources found there and “once this fight for resources causes irreconcilable conflicts, it may lead to radical space confrontations.” A space war seems to many Chinese to be another form of resource war. Such urgency in seeking control over resources is not unique to space, but also applies to energy and other areas. Given China’s population and rapid economic growth, controlling resources is understandably a paramount concern. Regarding space, however, a zero-sum (‘win-lose’) attitude is narrow-minded and misguided. If feverish competition for resources in space causes Sino-American relations to deteriorate or leads to the outbreak of war between them, then both parties lose. Maj. Gen. Chang Xianqi and Sui Junqin of the PLA Institute of Command and Technology (aka. Armament Command and Technology Academy) offer a straightforward description of the aims of China’s space activities over the next five to 20 years, and explain why perceptions or accusations of hidden military aims in China’s manned space flight program (which sent two astronauts into space in October 2005) do not withstand logical scrutiny. They characterize the country’s space mission as dedicated to advancing science and to supporting China’s economic modernization. They dismiss two key allegations concerning the manned space program that the Shenzhou spacecraft’s ability for mid-course orbital maneuvering indicates a Chinese military effort to apply the technology to Chinese strategic missiles in order to give these missiles the ability to avoid U.S. missile defenses, and that China envisions its manned spacecraft as platforms for conducting real-time reconnaissance and intelligence collection for military ends. China’s orbital maneuver technology, they note, is decades old and evolved independently of the U.S. missile defense program, while the inefficiencies of conducting surveillance from manned platforms compared to satellites are widely appreciated and have led other space-faring nations to choose satellites for this mission.
The private sector is key Patel 21 (Neel, space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and I also write The Airlock newsletter, your number one source for everything happening off this planet. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where I grew and led the website’s space coverage.) “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US” MIT Technology Review, 1/21/2021. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/ BC At first glance, the Ceres-1 launch might seem unremarkable. Ceres-1, however, wasn’t built and launched by China’s national program. It was a commercial rocket—only the second from a Chinese company ever to go into space. And the launch happened less than three years after the company was founded. The achievement is a milestone for China’s fledgling—but rapidly growing—private space industry, an increasingly critical part of the country’s quest to dethrone the US as the world’s preeminent space power. The rivalry between the US and China, whose space program has surged over the last two decades, is what most people mean when they refer to the 21st-century's space race. China is set to build a new space station later this year and will likely attempt to send its taikonauts to the moon before the decade ends. But these big-picture projects represent just one aspect of the country’s space ambitions. Increasingly, the focus is now on the commercial space industry as well. The nation's growing private space business is less focused on bringing prestige and glory to the nation and more concerned with reducing the cost of spaceflight, increasing its international influence—and making money. “The state is really great at large, ambitious projects like going to the moon or developing a large reconnaissance satellite,” says Lincoln Hines, a Cornell University researcher who focuses on Chinese foreign policy. “But it’s not responsive to meeting market needs”—one big way to encourage rapid technological growth and innovation. “I think the government thinks its commercial space sector can be complementary to the state,” he says. What are the market needs that Hines is referring to? Satellites, and rockets that can launch them into orbit. The space industry is undergoing a renaissance thanks to two big trends spurred by the commercial industry: we can make satellites for less money by making them smaller and using off-the-shelf hardware; and we can also make rockets for less money, by using less costly materials or reusing boosters after they’ve already flown (which SpaceX pioneered with its Falcon 9). These trends mean it is now cheaper to send stuff into space, and the services and data that satellites can offer have come down in price accordingly. China has seen an opportunity. A 2017 report by Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimates that the space industry could be worth up to $2.7 trillion by 2030. Setting foot on the moon and establishing a lunar colony might be a statement of national power, but securing a share of such a highly lucrative business is perhaps even more important to the country’s future. “In the future, there will be tens of thousands of satellites waiting to launch, which is a major opportunity for Galactic Energy” says Wu Yue, a company spokesperson. The problem is, China has to make up decades’ worth of ground lost to the West.
That factionalizes the CCP and emboldens challenges to Xi – the PLA is increasingly powerful and not unconditionally subservient Simpson 16 (Kurtis, Centre Director with Defence Research and Development Canada, has been conducting research on China’s leadership, Communist Party politics, the People’s Liberation Army and foreign policy for over 30 years,Master’s Degree and a Ph.D from York University, previously served as an intelligence analyst at the Privy Council Office and leader of the Asia Research Section at the Department of National Defence’s Chief Defence Intelligence (CDI) organization) “China’s Re-Emergence: Assessing Civilian-Military Relations In Contemporary Era – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, 12/21/2016 JL Paralleling divided loyalties between Chinese Party, military and government bodies, one must also recognize that within each, factions exist, based upon generational, personal, professional, geographic, or institutional allegiances.19 These minor fault lines are most pronounced during crises, and they continue independent of professionalization.20 As was demonstrated by the civil-military dynamics of the Chinese government’s suppression of student demonstrators, both divisions and allegiances of interests emerged with respect to how to contain this situation and factional interests largely determined which troops would carry out the orders, who commanded them, what civilian Party leaders supported the actions, and who would be sanctioned following the mêlée. A consequence of factionalism within the PLA is that the Party’s control mechanisms (particularly because rule of law and constitutional restraints on the military are weak) needs to be robust to control not only a single military chain of command but (particularly during crises) perhaps more than one. This is not likely the case. A review of the evidence indicates the military’s influence, on the whole, is increasing, and the Party’s control decreasing. On one level, the Party clearly controls the military as the Central Military Commission or CMC (the highest military oversight body in the PRC) is chaired by a civilian, President Xi Jinping. Moreover, the PLAs representation on formal political decision-making bodies (such as the Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the NPC) has decreased over the years, but this does not necessary equate to a reduced level of influence. For example, the two Vice-Chairman of the CMC are now military generals, as are the remaining other eight members. Irrespective of institutional membership, military leaders retain considerable say. Personal interactions and informal meetings with senior party elites provide venues to sway decisions. They do, also, hold important places on leading small groups dedicated to issues like Taiwan and other security questions, such as the South China Seas.21 In a similar vein, other methods of Party influence, as exercised through political commissars, party committees, and discipline inspection commissions are no longer empowered to enforce the ideological dictates of a paramount leader. In the face of diffuse reporting chains, competing allegiances, and often effective socialization by the military units they are supposed to be watching over, most do not provide the Party guardian and guidance function once so pervasive. While perhaps overstated, Paltiel’s observation that “…China’s energies over the past century and half have given the military a prominent and even dominant role in the state, preempting civilian control and inhibiting the exercise of constitutional authority” is likely now truer than ever before in history.22 While still loyal to the party as an institution, the PLA is not unconditionally subservient to a particular leader and retains the resources to enter the political arena if (at the highest levels) a decision is made to do so. The civilian-military trend lines evident in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution affirm that the symbiotic nature of the Party-PLA relationship has morphed in important respects since the late 1960s. The promotion of professionalism, a reduced role for ideological indoctrination, an increasing bifurcation of civil-military elites, and growing state powers (complete with divided loyalties and continued factionalism) has complicated the political landscape informing how the CCP interacts with the PLA. If, as postulated, we have moved from a fused, ‘dual role elite’ model to one of ‘conditional compliance’ in which the military actually holds a preponderance of the power capabilities and where its interests are satisfied through concessions, bargaining, and pay-offs, empirical evidence should reflect this. A review of China’s three major leadership changes since the transition from the revolutionary ‘Old Guard’ to the modern technocrats confirms this. Formally anointed and legitimized by Deng in 1989, Jiang assumed leadership without military credentials and few allies, viewed by many as a ‘caretaker’ Party Secretary in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre. Despite his limitations, Jiang was well versed in the vicissitudes of palace politics. Informed by a high political acumen, he immediately promoted an image as an involved Commander-in-Chief, personally visiting all seven military regions, a sign of commitment not made by either the likes of Mao or Deng. Symbolic gestures like this were bolstered by his providing incentives to the PLA, such as: consistent raises in the defence budget; funds for military modernization; as well as equipment, logistics, and augmented RandD.23 Referred to as the ‘silk-wrapped needle,’ Jiang marshalled Party resources to not only reward, but to punish.24 His institutional authority over appointments enabled him to manipulate factions, dismiss those who opposed him, enforce new rigid retirement standards, and promote loyalists. A delicate equilibrium was established during the early-1990s until his semi-retirement in 2004,25 where Jiang guaranteed military priorities such as supporting ‘mechanization’ and an ‘information-based military’ (promoting the concept of RMA with Chinese characteristics) in exchange for the PLA backing of his legacy contributions to Marxist Leninist Mao Zedong thought with the enshrinement of his “Three Represents” doctrine. Like Jiang, Hu Jintao’s succession was the product of negotiation, compromise, and concessions. While neither opposed by the PLA, nor supported by the military ‘brass,’ Hu was a known commodity, having served as Vice-President (1998) and CMC Vice-Chairman since 1999. He was deemed acceptable until proven otherwise. In the shadow of Jiang (who retained the position of CMC Chair until 2004), Hu did not exert the same kind of influence in, nor engender the same kind of deference from, China’s military, but equally proved capable of fostering a pragmatic relationship with the army which ensured its interests, and in so doing, legitimized his leadership position. Ceding much of the military planning and operational decisions to the PLA directly, Hu played to his strengths and focused upon national security issues (such as the successful resolution of SARs in China), which bolstered his credibility as a populist leader among the masses, indirectly increasing his power within both the military and the Party. Additionally, he focused upon foreign military security affairs (most notably, North Korea-US negotiations), which enabled him to link his personal political agenda with the military’s latest ambitions. In according the military a distinct place in China’s national development plan, supporting China’s rise, and ensuring its vital interests, Hu recognized the military’s evolving requirement to ‘go global’ and its worldwide interests in non-combat operations, such as peacekeeping and disaster relief, as well as stakes in the open seas, outer space, and cyberspace as interest frontiers with no geographic boundaries.26 Under the slogan of ‘China’s historical mission in the new phase of the new century’ and his acquiescence to the PLA’s stated requirements ‘to win local wars under modern conditions’ by funding new technology acquisition, Hu received the army’s formal recognition for his contributions to military thought based upon “scientific development” which informed a “strategic guiding theory,” resulting in a new operational orientation for China’s military. Emulating his predecessor, Hu won ‘conditional compliance’ from the PLA by successfully bartering military needs and wants for the army’s support and endorsement of his political tenure. This was not done outside of self-interest. Hu, as did Jiang, skillfully coopted, fired, and promoted select Generals to serve his greater ends, and he did this through varied means. Ultimately, however, it was done in a manner acceptable to the military. Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, while replicating the ‘horse-trading’ of Jiang and Hu, marks a fundamental departure in leadership style. Often described as a transformative leader, Xi is openly critical of his predecessors and rails against earlier periods where reform stalled and corruption grew.27 An advocate of ‘top-level design,’ incrementalism is being supplanted by a massive attempt to centralize all aspects of the CCP’s power, which includes a major restructuring of the economy, government, administration, and military. Nicknamed “the gun and the knife” as a slight for his attempts to simultaneously control the army, police, spies, and the ‘graft busters,’ Xi’s power appears uncontested at present. Nevertheless, he is also viewed as ‘pushing the envelope too far’ and endangering the equilibrium which has been established between the Party and PLA over the past 25 years. For example, only two years into his mandate, he fostered a Cult of Personality, “the Spirit of Xi Jinping” which was officially elevated to the same standing as that of Mao and Deng, by comparison, foundational figures in Chinese history. His open attacks of political ‘enemies’ (most notably Zhou Yongkang, a Politburo Standing Committee member and former security czar) breeds fear among almost every senior official, all of whom are vulnerable on some point. Equally true, an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign is inciting comrades to turn on comrades, not unlike a massive game of prisoner’s dilemma. Nowhere is the pressure for reform greater than in the PLA. Xi advocates administering the army with strictness and austerity, promoting frugality and obedience. At his direction, “mass-line educational campaigns” designed to “rectify work style” through criticism and self-criticism are being implemented.28 Ideological and political building is now equated with army building, as a means of ensuring the Party’s uncontested grip over the troops ideologically, politically, and organizationally. Select military regions (those opposite Taiwan and adjacent to the South China Seas) and commanders from those regions are witnessing favoritism and promotion at the expense of others. Moreover, a new “CMC Chairmanship Responsibility System” has been instituted, which directly calls into question the support of some of Xi’s senior-most generals. A ‘hardliner’ by nature, Xi recognizes that he must earn the support of the PLA. New military priorities he supports include: accelerating modernization; Joint Command and C4ISR; training; talent management, as well as equipment and force modernization. That said, his goal of achieving the Chinese dream of building a “wealthy, powerful, democratic, civilized, and harmonious socialist modernized nation” by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, is exceptionally ambitious. It will require endless commitments to competing interests in a period of economic stagnation and global economic downturn. Should the PLA come to believe they are not first in line for government largess, support for Xi could erode very quickly.29 CCP instability collapses the international order – extinction Perkinson 12 (Jessica, MA in international affairs from American University) “The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University School of International Service, 2012 JL Should the CCP undergo some sort of dramatic transformation – whether that be significant reform or complete collapse, as some radical China scholars predict2 – the implications for international and US national security are vast. Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asian region, but China is also relied upon by many members of the international community for foreign direct investment, economic stability and trade. China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula as one of North Korea’s only allies, and it is argued that instability within the Chinese government could also lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait. For the United States, the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic. As the United States’ largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US. In addition, China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US. It is with this in mind that China scholars within the United States and around the world should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for reform, instability or even collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the international order as a whole. For the United States specifically, the potential - or lack thereof - forreform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability, particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US. Independently, Xi will lash out to preserve cred in the SCS – US draw-in ensures extinction Mastro 20 (Oriana Skylar, Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute) “Military Confrontation in the South China Sea,” Council on Foreign Relations, 5/21/2020 JL The risk of a military confrontation in the South China Sea involving the United States and China could rise significantly in the next eighteen months, particularly if their relationship continues to deteriorate as a result of ongoing trade frictions and recriminations over the novel coronavirus pandemic. Since 2009, China has advanced its territorial claims in this region through a variety of tactics—such as reclaiming land, militarizing islands it controls, and using legal arguments and diplomatic influence—without triggering a serious confrontation with the United States or causing a regional backlash. Most recently, China announced the creation of two new municipal districts that govern the Paracel and Spratly Islands, an attempt to strengthen its claims in the South China Sea by projecting an image of administrative control. It would be wrong to assume that China is satisfied with the gains it has made or that it would refrain from using more aggressive tactics in the future. Plausible changes to China’s domestic situation or to the international environment could create incentives for China’s leadership to adopt a more provocative strategy in the South China Sea that would increase the risk of a military confrontation. The United States has a strong interest in preventing China from asserting control over the South China Sea. Maintaining free and open access to this waterway is not only important for economic reasons, but also to uphold the global norm of freedom of navigation. The United States is also at risk of being drawn into a military conflict with China in this region as a result of U.S. defense treaty obligations to at least one of the claimants to the contested territory, the Philippines. China’s ability to control this waterway would be a significant step toward displacing the United States from the Indo-Pacific region, expanding its economic influence, and generally reordering the region in its favor. Preventing China from doing so is the central objective of the U.S. National Security Strategy and the reason the Indo-Pacific is the U.S. military’s main theater of operations. For these reasons, the United States should seek ways to prevent Chinese expansion, ideally while avoiding a dangerous confrontation and being prepared to deftly manage any crises should they arise. China considers the majority of the South China Sea to be an inalienable part of its territory. Exercising full sovereignty over this area is a core component of President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.” China does not accept or respect the sovereignty claims of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, or Vietnam in this region. Although China has been cautious in pressing its claims thus far, three developments could convince Xi that China should be more assertive. Xi could feel compelled to accelerate his timeline in the South China Sea to maintain his consolidated position within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly if the political situation in Hong Kong worsens, peaceful reunification with Taiwan becomes less likely, or domestic criticism of his management of the novel coronavirus outbreak increases. With China’s economic growth for 2020 projected to hit only 1.2 percent—the lowest since the mid-1970s—Xi could find it necessary to demonstrate strength while Beijing deals with internal fallout from the pandemic. China has already declared two new administrative districts in the South China Sea in April 2020 and has escalated its criticism of U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the area. Moreover, with expectations that the first stage of China’s military modernization efforts will be completed in 2020, Xi could become more confident that China would succeed in pressing its claims militarily, especially if the United States is distracted internally with managing the coronavirus pandemic or its aftermath.
2/20/22
JANFEB - T - Appropriation
Tournament: CPS | Round: 2 | Opponent: Canyon Crest ED | Judge: John Boals 1NC – T Interpretation: “Appropriation of outer space” by private entities refers to the exercise of exclusive control of space. TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW Vol. 2013 No. 4 The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 Start Footnote 217Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR and SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). End Footnote 217The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219
Private appropriation of extracted space resources is distinct from appropriation “of” outer space. Despite longstanding permission of appropriation of extracted resources, sovereign claims are still universally prohibited. Abigail D. Pershing, J.D. Candidate @ Yale, B.A. UChicago,’19, "Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty's Non-Appropriation Principle: Customary International Law from 1967 to Today," Yale Journal of International Law 44, no. 1 II. THE FIRST SHIFT IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW’S INTERPRETATION OF THE NON-APPROPRIATION PRINCIPLE Since the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty, several States have chosen to reinterpret the non-appropriation principle as narrower in scope than its drafters originally intended. This reinterpretation has gone largely unchallenged and has in fact been widely adopted by space-faring nations. In turn, this has had the effect of changing customary international law relating to the non-appropriation principle. Shifting away from its original blanket application in 1967, States have carved out an exception to the non-appropriation principle, allowing appropriation of extracted space resources.53 This Part examines this shift in the context of the two branches of the United Nation’s customary international law standard: State practice and opinio juris. A. State Practice The earliest hint of a change in customary international law relating to the interpretation of the non-appropriation clause came in 1969, when the United States first sent astronauts to the moon. As part of his historic journey, astronaut Neil Armstrong collected moonrocks that he brought back with him to Earth and promptly handed off to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as U.S. property.54 Later, the USSR similarly claimed lunar material as government property, some of which was eventually sold to private citizens. 55 These first instances of space resource appropriation did not draw much attention, but they presented a distinct shift marking the beginning of a new period in State practice. Having previously been limited by their technological capabilities, States could now establish new practices with respect to celestial bodies. This was the beginning of a pattern of appropriation that slowly unfolded over the next few decades and has since solidified into the general and consistent State practice necessary to establish the existence of customary international law. Currently, the U.S. government owns 842 pounds of lunar material.56 There is little question that NASA and the U.S. government consider this material, as well as other space materials collected by American astronauts, to be government property.57 In fact, NASA explicitly endorses U.S. property rights over these moon rocks, stating that “lunar material retrieved from the Moon during the Apollo Program is U.S. government property.”5 The U.S. delegation’s reaction to the language of the 1979 Moon Agreement further cemented this interpretation that appropriation of extracted resources is a permissible exception to the non-appropriation clause of Article II. Although the United States is not a party to the Moon Agreement, it did participate in the negotiations.59 The Moon Agreement states in relevant part: Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of any State, international intergovernmental or nongovernmental organization, national organization or nongovernmental entity or of any natural person.60 In response to this language, the U.S. delegation made a statement laying out the American view that the words “in place” imply that private property rights apply to extracted resources61—a comment that went completely unchallenged. That all States seemed to accept this point, even those bound by the Moon Agreement, is further evidence of a shift in customary international law.62 B. Opinio Juris: Domestic Legislation Domestic law, both in the United States and abroad, provides further evidence of the shift in customary international law surrounding the issue of nonappropriation as it relates to extracted space resources. Domestic U.S. space law is codified at Section 51 of the U.S. Code and has been regularly modified to expand private actors’ rights in space.63 Beginning in 1984, the Commercial Space Launch Act provided that “the United States should encourage private sector launches and associated services.”64 The goal of the 1984 Act was to support commercial space launches by private companies and individuals.65 It did not, however, specifically discuss commercial exploitation of space. The first such mention of commercial use of space appeared in 2004, with the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act.66 This Act specifically aimed at regulating space tourism but did not explicitly guarantee any private rights in space.67 The most significant change in U.S. space law came with the passage of the Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship (SPACE) Act in 2015. As incorporated into Section 51 of the Code, this Act provides: A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the international obligations of the United States.68 Whereas the idea that private corporations might go into space may have seemed far-fetched to the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty, the SPACE Act of 2015 was the first instance of a government recognizing such a trend and officially supporting private companies’ commercial rights to space resources under law. With the new 2015 amendment to Section 51 in place, U.S. companies can now rest assured that any profits they reap from space mining are firmly legal—at least within U.S. jurisdictions. Although the United States was the first country to officially reinterpret the non-appropriation principle, other countries are following suit. On July 20, 2017, Luxembourg passed a law entitled On the Exploration and Utilization of Space Resources with a vote of fifty-five to two.69 The law took effect on August 1, 2017.70 Article 1 of the new law states simply that “space resources can be appropriated,” and Article 3 expressly grants private companies permission to explore and use space resources for commercial purposes.71 Official commentary on the law establishes that its goal is to provide companies with legal certainty regarding ownership over space materials—a goal that the commentators regard as legal under the Outer Space Treaty despite the non-appropriation principle.72 The next country to enact similar legislation may be the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to the UAE Space Agency director general, Mohammed Al Ahbabi, the UAE is currently in the process of drafting a space law covering both human space exploration and commercial activities such as mining.73 To further this goal, in 2017 the UAE set up the Space Agency Working Group on Space Policy and Law to specify the procedures, mechanisms, and other standards of the space sector, including an appropriate legal framework.74 C. Opinio Juris: Legal Scholarship Other major space powers are also considering similar laws in the future, including Japan, China, and Australia. 75 Senior officials within China’s space program have explicitly stated that the country’s goal is to explore outer space and to take advantage of outer space resources.76 The general international trend clearly points in this direction in anticipation of a potential “space gold rush.” 7 Mirroring the shift in State practice and domestic laws, the legal community has also changed its approach to the interpretation of the nonappropriation principle. Whereas at the time of the ratification of the Outer Space Treaty the majority of legal scholars tended to apply the non-appropriation principle broadly, most legal scholars now view appropriation of extracted materials as permissible.78 Brandon Gruner underscores that this new view is historically distinct from prior legal interpretation, noting that modern interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty’s non-appropriation principle differ from those of the Treaty’s authors.79 In contrast to earlier legal theory that denied the possibility of appropriation of any space resources, scholars now widely accept that extracting space resources from celestial bodies is a “use” permitted by the Outer Space Treaty and that extracted materials become the property of the entity that performed the extraction.80 Stressing the fact that the Treaty does not explicitly prohibit appropriating resources from outer space, other authors conclude that the use of extracted space resources is permitted, meaning that the new SPACE Act is a plausible interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty.81 However, scholars have been careful to cabin the extent to which they accept the legality of appropriation. For instance, although Thomas Gangale and Marilyn Dudley-Rowley acknowledge the legality of private appropriation of extracted space resources, they nonetheless emphasize that “ownership of and the right to use extraterrestrial resources is distinct from ownership of real property” and that any such claim to real property is illegal.82 Lawrence Cooper is also careful to point out this distinction: “the Outer Space Treaties recognize sovereignty over property placed into space, property produced in space, and resources removed from their place in space, but ban sovereignty claims by states; international law extends this ban to individuals.”83 Although there remain some scholars who still insist on the illegality of the 2015 U.S. law and State appropriation of space resources generally,84 their dominance has waned since the 1960s. These scholars are now a minority in the face of general acceptance among the legal community that minerals and other space resources, once extracted, may be legally claimed as property. 85 Taken together, the elements described above—statements made in the international arena, de facto appropriation of space resources in the form of moon rocks, the adoption of new national policies permitting appropriation of extracted space resources, and the weight of the international legal community’s opinion— indicate a fundamental shift in customary international law. The Outer Space Treaty’s non-appropriation clause has been redefined via customary international law norms from its broad application to now include a carve-out allowing appropriation of space resources once such resources have been extracted.
Violation: the aff only ends asteroid mining – that’s distinct from broadly banning sovereignty of outer space
Standards: 1) Limits – their interpretation means that affs about any outer space activity would be topical: mining, photography, sending rovers, collecting ice cores, launching satellites, deflecting debris, can’t sell rocks on EBAY, etc. This explodes neg prep burdens since outer space activity is so vague – no generics exist to answer both the photography and the rovers aff, so affs would just win with a tiny impact every round 2) Ground – allowing debates about extracting any space resource denies the neg links to core generics like space democracy bad, space colonization good, the moon pic, the property rights NC, etc. – that kills clash by forcing negatives to the fringes of argumentation that disagree with everything and kills fairness by giving the aff a major prep advantage since they only need to frontline the few negative arguments that link to their aff.
Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game, and fairness is necessary to determine the winner of the game, and education is the reason why schools fund debate. Drop the debater – dropping the argument doesn’t rectify abuse since winning T proves why we don’t have the burden of rejoinder against their aff. Use competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since there’s no consensus as to what’s reasonable. No RVIs – fairness and education are logical litmus tests and they incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which turns substance crowdout
12/18/21
JANFEB - T - Appropriation v2
Tournament: Peninsula | Round: 6 | Opponent: OA Independent VD | Judge: Dhruv Channa Interpretation: “Appropriation of outer space” by private entities refers to the exercise of exclusive control of space. TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW Vol. 2013 No. 4 The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 Start Footnote 217Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR and SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). End Footnote 217The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219 Violation: constellations’ use of LEO does not exclusively occupy or preclude other orbits Johnson 20 (Christopher, Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, Adjunct Faculty at the International Space University in Strasbourg, France, the Legal Advisor for the Moon Village Association, Core Expert and Rule Drafter in the Manual on International Law Applicable to Military Activities in Outer Space project, Juris Doctor from New York Law School and an Advanced Masters in Law in Air and Space Law from Leiden University’s International Institute of Air and Space Law) “The Legal Status of MegaLEO Constellations and Concerns About Appropriation of Large Swaths of Earth Orbit,” Handbook of Small Satellites, 2020 JL The use of LEO by satellite constellations is substantially similar to the use of GSO, and therefore permissible. In each region, individual actors are given permission - either from a national administrator or from an international governing body (the ITU) via a national administer–to use precoordinated subsections of space. In a way that is overwhelmingly similar to the use of orbital slots in GSO, the placement of spacecraft into orbits in LEO or higher orbits does not constitute possession, ownership, or occupation of those orbits. This is because States (and their companies) have been occupying orbital slots in GSO for decades, and these uses of GSO have never been accused of “appropriating” GSO. The users have never claimed to be appropriating GSO, and their exercising of rights to use GSO is respected by other actors in the space domain. This is the same situation for other orbits, including LEO and other non-Geostationary orbits. And while GSO locations are relatively stable (subject to space weather and other perturbations, and require stationkeeping), spacecraft in LEO are actually moving through space and are not stationary, so it is even more difficult to see this use by constellations as occupation, much less appropriation. Moreover, Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Traffic Management (STM) will allow other uses to use these orbits, and nothing about the use of any one user necessarily precludes others. Lastly, there is no intention by operators of constellations to exclusively occupy, must less possess or appropriate, these orbits. Would not the appropriation of outer space be an intentional, volutional act? No such intention can be found in the operators of global constellations. Net benefits:
Precision – their interp justifies jettisoning any word in the rez, like private actors and outer space which zeroes neg prep ¬– proven by the absence of “appropriation” in the plan text 2. Limits – literally anything that takes place in space becomes topical under their interp – 2 physical entities can never occupy space at the same time – tourism, mining, constellations, rockets, skydiving, lunar bases, exploration, radio waves, photography – limits explosion precludes nuanced clash and privileges the aff by stretching pre-tournament neg prep too thin Drop the debater – indicts the whole aff and deters abuse Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom No RVIs – fairness and education are logical litmus tests and incentivizes baiting abuse to win on prepped out counterinterps
1/23/22
JANFEB - T - Cant Spec
Tournament: Peninsula | Round: 2 | Opponent: Beckman PD | Judge: Srinidhi Yerraguntala Interpretation: the aff may not defend that the US end a subset of outer space appropriation Violation: they only defend ending commercial space exploration – other forms of appropriating space exist like solar power, and satellite placement Vote neg for limits and ground – they can spec any form of appropriation – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on which destroys reciprocity – plus guts core generics like space privatization good because you only restrict one form of it C/a paradigm issues
1/22/22
JANFEB - T - Extra vs Commons
Tournament: Cal | Round: 5 | Opponent: Marlborough AK | Judge: Akshay Manglik 1NC – T Interpretation: the affirmative may only defend a plan that affects “private entities” – that excludes governments UpCounsel n.d. (UpCounsel, interactive online service that makes it faster and easier for businesses to find and hire legal help solely based on their preferences) “Private Entity: Everything You Need to Know” JL A private entity can be a partnership, corporation, individual, nonprofit organization, company, or any other organized group that is not government-affiliated. Indian tribes and foreign public entities are not considered private entities.
Violation – they advocate for “global commons” regime which requires states to pursue space resources more sustainably and adapt to polluted orbits
Global commons is implemented for governments and public entities – 1AC Vollmer – inserted absolute liability mechanisms.175 As such, shared global liability will consider the responsibility of nation-states and private entities in isolation.176 This will coerce cooperation among all agencies, nations, and private entities because the equitable share of responsibility will drive collective resolution. ¶ V. CONCLUSION¶ In light of the emerging global sentiments regarding environmental conservation and sustainability, instituting a regime that clearly defines a legal consequence in the event of environmental ruin boasts greater coercive force than non-binding resolutions. 9 This international agreement aligns with the universal value that the international community places on the utility of geospace.
1AC Silverstein – inserted Debris in higher orbits can persist for a century or more. The costs of adapting to increasingly polluted orbits would be immense, and the opportunity costs would be even higher. For instance, all else being equal, hardening satellites against collisions increases their mass and volume, in turn raising launch costs per satellite. These costs, rooted in a failure to govern space as a commons, will be borne by all space actors, including emerging states and commercial entities.¶ EXISTING FORMS OF SPACE GOVERNANCE¶ A well-designed governance system, founded on a widespread understanding of Earth orbits as a great commons, could temper these risks. Currently, space is not wholly unregulated, but existing regulations are limited both in scope and implementation.
Vote neg for limits – their interpretation skirts the core topic controversies of private property rights and reinterpretation of the OST and kills uniqueness – national appropriation is already prohibited – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on, which kills clash and neg flex – extra T creates a slippery slope that incentivizes Frankenstein affs with infinite additional planks to circumvent neg links
TVA solves –defend the appropriation of private entities as unjust
No plan text in a vacuum – kills 1NC strategy and makes extra T a no risk issue Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary ji and a race to the bottom No RVIs – litmus test for substance and incentivizes abuse to win prepped-out counterinterps
2/20/22
JANFEB - T - FW
Tournament: Palm Classic | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Stockdale GS | Judge: Panel Our interpretation is that the resolution should define the division of affirmative and negative ground and offense. It was negotiated and announced in advance, providing both sides with a reasonable opportunity to prepare to engage one another’s arguments. ‘Resolved’ preceding a colon indicates a legislative forum. Blanche Ellsworth 81, English professor at SFSU and M.A. in English from UC Berkeley, 1/1/1981, English Simplified, 4th Edition, cc A colon is also used to separate 3. THE SALUTATION OF A BUSINESS LETTER FROM THE BODY, Dear Sir Dear Ms. Weiner NOTE: In an informal letter, a comma follows the salutation: Dear Mary, Dear Uncle Jack 4. PARTS OF TITLES, REFERENCES, AND NUMERALS. TITLE: Principles of Mathematics: An Introduction REFERENCE: Luke 3:4—13 NUMERALS: 8:15 PM 5. PLACE OF PUBLICATION FROM PUBLISHER Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 6. THE WORD RESOLVED FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION. Resolved: That this committee go on record as favoring new legislation. Justice implies a desirable departure from the status quo – that means the aff must rectify an unjust social interaction IHS n.d. (Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University, non-profit organization that engages with students and professors) “What is Justice?” JL One of the most influential accounts of the origin and nature of justice comes from Plato’s Republic. According to Plato’s account, we can think of the principles of justice as mutually agreed to principles for the coordination and structure of social interaction that would benefit all who are subject to them. What those principles are will depend on the society. In addition, there’s a second theory of justice that Plato offers that’s more general. According to this second theory, justice is “each getting what is rightfully theirs and no one getting what is rightfully another’s.” In other words, questions of justice always ask, “Who has a right to what?” Justice is a policy question Merriam Webster ND (Mesrriam Webster) “Justice” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/justice BC Essential Meaning of justice 1: the process or result of using laws to fairly judge and punish crimes and criminals “Appropriation of outer space” by private entities refers to the exercise of exclusive control of space. TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW Vol. 2013 No. 4 The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 Start Footnote 217Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR and SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). End Footnote 217The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219
Vote negative to preserve limits and equitable division of ground – the resolution is the most predictable stasis point for debates, anything outside of that ruins prep and clash by allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for debate. That greenlights a race away from the core topic controversies that allow for robust contestation, which favors the aff by making neg ground inapplicable, susceptible to the perm, and concessionary. Two additional impacts:
Accessibility – Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution 2. Link turns their education offense – getting to the third and fourth level of tactical engagement is only possible with refined and well-researched positions connected to the resolutional mechanism. Repeated debates over core issues incentivize innovative argument production and improved advocacy based on feedback and nuanced responses from opponents. Prefer our impact: they’ve skewed the game which necessarily comes first because it makes evaluating the aff impossible. The role of individual debate rounds on broader subject formation is white noise – can you remember what happened in doubles of the Loyola tournament your junior year? – individual rounds don’t affect our subjectivity, so fairness is the only impact your ballot can resolve. You should presume all their truth claims false because they have not been properly tested
Defend a topical version of the aff – end private appropriation to solve NewSpace’s neoliberal accumulation – i.e. Peninsula’s cosmocapitalism aff – solvency deficits are neg ground and any reason the TVA is bad proves that being negative solves your offense Their argument about statecraft’s grounding in capitalism doesn’t matter – TVA is negative state action that gets rid of things like the 2015 Space Act They can’t get offense: we don’t exclude them, only persuade you that our methodology is best. Every debate requires a winner and loser, so voting negative doesn’t reject them from debate, it just says they should make a better argument next time. At best, they are extra topical – they defend counter-operations in addition to prohibiting space appropriation OR they garner methodological offense about how voting aff can change debate – links to all of our offense because Frankenstein planks circumvent neg ground and explode limits
2/14/22
JANFEB - T - Nebel
Tournament: Debate LA RR | Round: 4 | Opponent: Harker AR | Judge: Panel Interpretation: appropriation is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that a subset of appropriation is unjust. Nebel 19 Jake Nebel Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. , 8-12-2019, "Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution," Briefly, https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/ SM Both distinctions are AND tend to mean.
It applies to appropriation:
Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying that appropriating space for mining is unjust doesn’t entail that appropriating space for colonization is unjust 2. Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because appropriation is universal and lasting
Violation: they defend appropriation in the PRC – host of other actors like the US, India, Russia, plus individual companies and permutations Vote neg:
Semantics outweigh: a. T is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden – they agreed to debate the topic when they came here b. Jurisdiction – you can’t vote aff if they haven’t affirmed the resolution c. It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement – there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it
2. Limits – there are countless affs accounting for every subset of space actors, like nations and companies – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs 3. Ground – spec guts core generics like space col good, the heg DA, and the NewSpace econ DA, because the link is premised on reducing space privatization across the board – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs
4. TVA solves – read as an advantage to whole rez
Paradigm issues:
Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start 2. Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical 3. Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation 4. No RVIs – fairness and education are a priori burdens – and encourages baiting – outweighs because if T is frivolous, they can beat it quickly 5. Fairness is a voter ¬– necessary to determine the better debater 6. Education is a voter – why schools fund debate
1/14/22
JANFEB - T - Nebel
Tournament: Debate LA RR | Round: 4 | Opponent: Harker AR | Judge: Panel Interpretation: appropriation is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that a subset of appropriation is unjust. Nebel 19 Jake Nebel Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. , 8-12-2019, "Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution," Briefly, https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/ SM Both distinctions are AND tend to mean.
It applies to appropriation:
Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying that appropriating space for mining is unjust doesn’t entail that appropriating space for colonization is unjust 2. Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because appropriation is universal and lasting
Violation: they defend appropriation in the PRC – host of other actors like the US, India, Russia, plus individual companies and permutations Vote neg:
Semantics outweigh: a. T is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden – they agreed to debate the topic when they came here b. Jurisdiction – you can’t vote aff if they haven’t affirmed the resolution c. It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement – there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it
2. Limits – there are countless affs accounting for every subset of space actors, like nations and companies – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs 3. Ground – spec guts core generics like space col good, the heg DA, and the NewSpace econ DA, because the link is premised on reducing space privatization across the board – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs
4. TVA solves – read as an advantage to whole rez
Paradigm issues:
Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start 2. Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical 3. Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation 4. No RVIs – fairness and education are a priori burdens – and encourages baiting – outweighs because if T is frivolous, they can beat it quickly 5. Fairness is a voter ¬– necessary to determine the better debater 6. Education is a voter – why schools fund debate
1/14/22
JANFEB - T - Nebel
Tournament: Debate LA RR | Round: 4 | Opponent: Harker AR | Judge: Panel Interpretation: appropriation is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that a subset of appropriation is unjust. Nebel 19 Jake Nebel Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. , 8-12-2019, "Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution," Briefly, https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/ SM Both distinctions are AND tend to mean.
It applies to appropriation:
Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying that appropriating space for mining is unjust doesn’t entail that appropriating space for colonization is unjust 2. Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because appropriation is universal and lasting
Violation: they defend appropriation in the PRC – host of other actors like the US, India, Russia, plus individual companies and permutations Vote neg:
Semantics outweigh: a. T is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden – they agreed to debate the topic when they came here b. Jurisdiction – you can’t vote aff if they haven’t affirmed the resolution c. It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement – there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it
2. Limits – there are countless affs accounting for every subset of space actors, like nations and companies – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs 3. Ground – spec guts core generics like space col good, the heg DA, and the NewSpace econ DA, because the link is premised on reducing space privatization across the board – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs
4. TVA solves – read as an advantage to whole rez
Paradigm issues:
Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start 2. Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical 3. Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation 4. No RVIs – fairness and education are a priori burdens – and encourages baiting – outweighs because if T is frivolous, they can beat it quickly 5. Fairness is a voter ¬– necessary to determine the better debater 6. Education is a voter – why schools fund debate
1/14/22
JANFEB - T - Plans Bad
Tournament: Cal | Round: 4 | Opponent: Harker RM | Judge: Jacob Nails Interpretation: the aff may not defend that a subset of appropriation is unjust. Violation: they only defend mining Net benefits:
Limits – there are countless affs accounting for every subset of space actors, like nations and companies – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs 2. Ground – spec guts core generics like space col good, the heg DA, and the NewSpace econ DA, because the link is premised on reducing space privatization across the board – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs 3. TVA – read as an advantage Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game, and fairness is necessary to determine the winner of the game, and education is the reason why schools fund debate. Drop the debater – dropping the argument doesn’t rectify abuse since winning T proves why we don’t have the burden of rejoinder against their aff. Use competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since there’s no consensus as to what’s reasonable.
2/20/22
JANFEB - Th - Ev Ethics
Tournament: Emory | Round: 1 | Opponent: Valley RT | Judge: Chris Castillo 1NC – Theory Interp: Full paragraphs must be cut properly and not conceal information, regardless of perceived relevancy.
Cutting cards in the middle of a paragraph allows debaters to manipulate evidence and strategically leave out what contradicts with their arguments – putting rest of the uncut paragraph in the doc solves all your offense unless your intent was to cheat which is even worse.
Violation---it happens twice---Insert SS And adherence to the proviso is fundamental to ethical interaction. Ronit Kedar brackets for clarity and gendered language:
“A human is fundamentally, then, the homo contractus is essentially a self-interested ‘I,’ who has internalized the contractualist ethos and is genuinely interested in forming a decent, peaceful mechanism to interact with others. He They therefore wishes to be licensed to act in accordance to their his own ends by forming an agreed upon regulative set of rules for cooperating with everyone. Given that the homo contractus has refined his basic self-interestedness and sincerely values decency, the governing ideal in his interpersonal relations is fair reciprocity. He therefore believes that others have an equal right to common resources (and in the moral world, one’s willingness to be moral is a primary asset) insofar as they contribute to the production of these common resources (acknowledging the reasons to be moral.) Under the moral scheme, then, other persons who are basically potential adversaries become parties to the contract. Thought of as parties to the moral agreement, they are measured by their ability to contribute to it, that is, to the cooperative system (agreeing on the principles for regulation.)” Kedar, Ronit. “Reciprocity in morality and law.” Law and Ethics of Human Rights, vol. 6. issue 2, 2012. https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/10.1515/1938-2545.1073
heres the other
Steiner 1: Gains and losses are most acceptably shifted when they’re primarily the results of circumstance, and least acceptably shifted when they’re principally the products of choices made by those who incur them. And what counts as circumstance, I suggest, is pretty adequately captured by what we would include under the heading of “nature.” “Nature” covers a lot: there are places where it rains all the time and places where it never rains; places with oil deposits and places with serious geological faults; crowded and less crowded cyberspace locations; and genes that code for Kentucky blue grass, poison ivy, viruses, koala bears, cystic fibro- sis, schizophrenia, Pavarotti-type vocal chords, some elements of human intelligence, and so forth. Rights to natural resources - to nature, compendiously construed - are rights to bits of all these various, and variously valued, things. So if we follow Locke and a number of other thinkers in that tradition, if we hold that anyone claiming ownership over some bits of nature must leave “enough and as good for others”, we’re led by a series of plausible steps to the conclusion that, in a fully appropriated world, each person is entitled to an equal portion of the value of these bits of nature. That is, all owners of natural resources must pool the value of what they own in a fund - ultimately a global fund - to an equal portion of which everyone everywhere has a moral right. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267690152_Left_Libertarianism_and_the_Ownership_of_Natural_Resources/link/566193ab08ae192bbf8a1423/download This is a reason to reject the team—miscutting evidence is academic misconduct that should disqualify any other argument they make in the debate from counting on the record—a brilliant, plagiarized paper or speech would still get a zero----voter for edu and fairness---it’s the only portable skill we take from debate and ev ethics obscures the ability the engage with the aff insofar as they have cheated and all their args are epistemologically suspect---ow any other layer of debate or any of their theory arguments---key to reciprocity---anyone caught cheating would be dropped regardless of anything else even---least arbitrary form of intervention---it’s a sequencing question and a prereq to engaging in the debate or allowing the aff to finish this round---im willing to stake the round on it.
1/28/22
JANFEB - Th - Ev Ethics
Tournament: Emory | Round: 1 | Opponent: Valley RT | Judge: Chris Castillo 1NC – Theory Interp: Full paragraphs must be cut properly and not conceal information, regardless of perceived relevancy.
Cutting cards in the middle of a paragraph allows debaters to manipulate evidence and strategically leave out what contradicts with their arguments – putting rest of the uncut paragraph in the doc solves all your offense unless your intent was to cheat which is even worse.
Violation---it happens twice---Insert SS And adherence to the proviso is fundamental to ethical interaction. Ronit Kedar brackets for clarity and gendered language:
“A human is fundamentally, then, the homo contractus is essentially a self-interested ‘I,’ who has internalized the contractualist ethos and is genuinely interested in forming a decent, peaceful mechanism to interact with others. He They therefore wishes to be licensed to act in accordance to their his own ends by forming an agreed upon regulative set of rules for cooperating with everyone. Given that the homo contractus has refined his basic self-interestedness and sincerely values decency, the governing ideal in his interpersonal relations is fair reciprocity. He therefore believes that others have an equal right to common resources (and in the moral world, one’s willingness to be moral is a primary asset) insofar as they contribute to the production of these common resources (acknowledging the reasons to be moral.) Under the moral scheme, then, other persons who are basically potential adversaries become parties to the contract. Thought of as parties to the moral agreement, they are measured by their ability to contribute to it, that is, to the cooperative system (agreeing on the principles for regulation.)” Kedar, Ronit. “Reciprocity in morality and law.” Law and Ethics of Human Rights, vol. 6. issue 2, 2012. https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/10.1515/1938-2545.1073
heres the other
Steiner 1: Gains and losses are most acceptably shifted when they’re primarily the results of circumstance, and least acceptably shifted when they’re principally the products of choices made by those who incur them. And what counts as circumstance, I suggest, is pretty adequately captured by what we would include under the heading of “nature.” “Nature” covers a lot: there are places where it rains all the time and places where it never rains; places with oil deposits and places with serious geological faults; crowded and less crowded cyberspace locations; and genes that code for Kentucky blue grass, poison ivy, viruses, koala bears, cystic fibro- sis, schizophrenia, Pavarotti-type vocal chords, some elements of human intelligence, and so forth. Rights to natural resources - to nature, compendiously construed - are rights to bits of all these various, and variously valued, things. So if we follow Locke and a number of other thinkers in that tradition, if we hold that anyone claiming ownership over some bits of nature must leave “enough and as good for others”, we’re led by a series of plausible steps to the conclusion that, in a fully appropriated world, each person is entitled to an equal portion of the value of these bits of nature. That is, all owners of natural resources must pool the value of what they own in a fund - ultimately a global fund - to an equal portion of which everyone everywhere has a moral right. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267690152_Left_Libertarianism_and_the_Ownership_of_Natural_Resources/link/566193ab08ae192bbf8a1423/download This is a reason to reject the team—miscutting evidence is academic misconduct that should disqualify any other argument they make in the debate from counting on the record—a brilliant, plagiarized paper or speech would still get a zero----voter for edu and fairness---it’s the only portable skill we take from debate and ev ethics obscures the ability the engage with the aff insofar as they have cheated and all their args are epistemologically suspect---ow any other layer of debate or any of their theory arguments---key to reciprocity---anyone caught cheating would be dropped regardless of anything else even---least arbitrary form of intervention---it’s a sequencing question and a prereq to engaging in the debate or allowing the aff to finish this round---im willing to stake the round on it.
1/28/22
JANFEB - Theory - Spec Appropriation
Tournament: Debate LA RR | Round: 4 | Opponent: Harker AR | Judge: Panel Interpretation – the aff must specify what type of Private Actor Appropriation they affect. Appropriation is extremely vague – no legal precedent means no normal means Pershing 19, Abigail D. "Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty's Non-Appropriation Principle: Customary International Law from 1967 to Today." Yale J. Int'l L. 44 (2019): 149. (Robina Fellow at European Court of Human Rights. European Court of Human Rights Yale Law School)Elmer Though the Outer AND prohibited or rejected.
Violation: they don’t
The net benefit is shiftiness – vague plan wording wrecks Neg Ground since it’s impossible to know which arguments link given different types of appropriation like mining, space col, satellites, and tourism – the 1AR dodges links by saying they don’t affect particular types of appropriation, or they don’t reduce private appropriation enough to trigger the link
1/14/22
NOVDEC - CP - Police
Tournament: UT | Round: 3 | Opponent: Strake Jesuit CB | Judge: Zara Inam CP: Just governments, except for the United States, should recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. The United States should recognize an unconditional right to strike for worker with the exception of law enforcement Current criminal justice reform depletes police unions influence. Willis 20 (Jay Willis, senior contributor at The Appeal.) ,” POLICE UNIONS ARE LOSING THE WAR ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM” ,The Appeal , https://theappeal.org/police-unions-are-losing-the-war-on-criminal-justice-reform/, Nov 10, 2020 SS Law enforcement organizations have long treated mass incarceration as a job creation program. In 2020, the tide began turning against them. This commentary is part of The Appeal’s collection of opinion and analysis. Law enforcement unions are maybe the most powerful force in politics that most voters never think twice about. By quietly dumping millions of dollars in key prosecutor elections and ballot initiative fights, these organizations manage to affect everything in the criminal legal system’s orbit, usually while flying well beneath the political radar. Police unions are sort of like gravity, if gravity played a significant role in enabling agents of the state to systematically terrorize communities of color without facing meaningful consequences. In races that take place outside the quadrennial spending bonanzas for control of the White House, these strategic allocations of time and outlays of resources can be decisive in elections, especially since no cohesive pro-reform interest group exists to counteract their influence. (Tight-knit, well-organized police unions can coordinate in ways that the larger but more heterogenous and dispersed coalition of people who favor criminal justice reform cannot.) One recent study found that law enforcement groups have spent about $87 million in local and state elections over the past 20 years, including almost $65 million in Los Angeles alone. At the federal level, their recent campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures approach $50 million, according to The Guardian. Such expenditures are savvy investments for police unions, who keenly understand the value of having sympathetic friends in high places. Because prosecutors work so closely with police, they have a strong incentive to develop a friendly relationship with rank-and-file officers, even if earning that trust comes at the price of turning a blind eye to abuse: It is not a coincidence that researchers have tracked the rise of police unions to an increase in on-the-job police killings. In a country where law-and-order rhetoric is deeply embedded in the cultural zeitgeist, if you’re a prosecutor intent on keeping your job, filing charges against the badge-wearing hand that feeds might not feel worth the retaliatory smear campaign that will inevitably follow. In recent years, however—and especially as a result of the sustained protests of police violence in the aftermath of George Floyd’s killing in Minneapolis—people have grown more attuned to how these organizations bend the criminal legal system to their will and stymie efforts to reform it. A growing number of elected officials have pledged to refuse the support of law enforcement organizations; in California, a coalition of reform-minded prosecutors has been lobbying for a state bar ethics rule that would prohibit DAs from accepting donations from these sources altogether, arguing that prosecutors cannot ethically prosecute police officers if they are receiving the support of their unions. “The ties that bind elected officials to police unions must be broken,” the Los Angeles Times editorial board wrote in June. “An elected official considering whether to prosecute officers should not be, in essence, on the political payroll of the agency defending the very same people.” On Election Day 2020 in California, voters delivered police unions a series of resounding defeats that threaten to flip this time-honored paradigm on its head. In the race for Los Angeles County District Attorney, reform-oriented challenger George Gascón ousted incumbent Jackie Lacey, earning control of a sprawling office that employs nearly 1,000 line prosecutors and retains jurisdiction over more than 10 million people. Lacey was the clear favorite of law enforcement organizations, who spent some $5 million boosting her candidacy and attacking her opponent’s. And for good reason: During Lacey’s eight years on the job, she reviewed more than 250 fatal shootings by on-duty law enforcement officers. She filed charges in one of them. Occasionally, Lacey’s penchant for lenience extended beyond even that of high-profile police officials. None other than then-LAPD chief Charlie Beck called on Lacey to charge one of his officers, Clifford Proctor, in the 2015 killing of Brendon Glenn, an unarmed, homeless Black man. Lacey declined. “As independent prosecutors, we’re supposed to look at the evidence and the law,” she said. “And that’s what we did.” When the time came for Lacey to seek re-election, it seems that grateful police unions did not forget her choice. Gascón’s résumé is one that might seem as if it would appeal to law enforcement types: A former LAPD patrol officer who rose to the rank of assistant chief, he also served as police chief in San Francisco and Mesa, Arizona, and as district attorney in San Francisco, before returning to run for DA in the city where he grew up. But Gascón is among the group of prosecutors who have disclaimed the support of police unions, and his campaign pledges include reducing the population of the county’s chronically overcrowded jail system, reopening investigations of high-profile police shootings that Lacey had closed, and declining to seek the death penalty altogether. For the unions, loyalty apparently extends only so far as it will allow their members to evade accountability. Their efforts echoed those of the San Francisco Police Officers Association during last year’s DA election, when it spent some $650,000 on, among other things, mailers that declared progressive DA candidate Chesa Boudin to be “the #1 choice of criminals and gang members.” These scaremongering predictions were insufficient to prevent the city’s voters from electing Boudin—also a member of the no-money-from-cop-unions coalition—as Gascón’s successor. Further down the ballot in 2020, California voters rejected Proposition 20, which would have reclassified certain misdemeanor theft offenses as felonies and reduced the availability of parole. (Incidentally, this would have rolled back the reforms of Proposition 47, a successful 2014 referendum co-authored by Gascón.) In other words, Proposition 20 would have resulted in more incarceration for more people for longer periods of time, which is why law enforcement organizations contributed roughly $2 million to the campaign to pass it. Police unions also opposed San Francisco’s Proposition E, which eliminated the city’s minimum police staffing requirement, and Los Angeles’s Measure J, which earmarked hundreds of millions of dollars in public resources for non-police community investment. The Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association, which represents sheriff’s deputies, claimed that Measure J would “cripple public safety,” and local law enforcement organizations combined to spend more than $3.5 million fighting it. Both measures nonetheless passed with overwhelming support. Law enforcement unions reliably oppose criminal justice reform for the simple reason that any attempts to reduce the criminal justice system’s footprint will make police less relevant. (Over the years, they have opposed everything from body camera mandates to the simple requirement that officers wear nametags.) For them, mass incarceration is the world’s most lucrative job creation machine. To justify their lavish spending habits and the generous rules that apply to their conduct, police always frame themselves as a mere half-step ahead of staving off mass chaos, warning that any abrogation of their authority by naive do-gooders will put everyone in danger. What this year’s election results demonstrate is that people understand the lies that infuse this narrative, which conspicuously omits from the ledger the staggering human costs that policing imposes on the communities it purports to keep safe. These losses won’t put an end to incidents of police brutality, or any other strain of rot that pervades the American criminal justice system. But they do signal that police unions are likelier to have to answer for their myriad failures, instead of relying on beneficiaries of their largesse to pretend that these failures do not exist. But the plan reverses that— giving them the right to collectively bargain. Lopez 20 (Laura Barrón-López, is a White House Correspondent for POLITICO.), “Democrats’ Coming Civil War Over Police Unions” , POLITICO , https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/14/police-reform-police-unions-qualified-immunity-democratic-party-420122, 10/14/2020 SS Earlier this year, House Democrats were close to pushing through a bill that would have cemented the power of police unions across the country. For a pro-labor party, the bill, which gave police officers the federal right to collectively bargain on working conditions, appeared to be a no-brainer. Nearly every Democrat in the House co-signed the legislation, including members of the Squad, a group of progressive superstars that includes Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib. The Democrats have supported public-sector unions for generations — often fighting with Republican state officials who’ve worked to gut the memberships of public employee unions and limit bargaining abilities. The bill would have granted the right to form a union and bargain contracts to firefighters, emergency medical personnel and police, including in states that currently prohibit some in public safety from negotiating collectively for wages and working conditions. As talk of moving the bill increased in March, Rep. Joaquin Castro of Texas was a rare voice raising alarms. He warned his colleagues on the Education and Labor Committee that the bill would formalize the authority of police unions to determine misconduct standards in their contracts, which are increasingly viewed as a barrier to holding police accountable for wrongdoing. Castro, a Democrat, fought it, asking racial justice groups like Campaign Zero and Color of Change to talk to his Democratic colleagues. He suggested new language limiting how much police could negotiate over accountability provisions with cities. But labor organizations weren’t pleased with the idea of singling out police affiliates by restricting their ability to bargain over disciplinary standards in the bill. Then the coronavirus pandemic exploded, and negotiations stalled. Two months later, a video of a white police officer using his knee to pin George Floyd’s neck to the pavement for nine minutes rocketed around the country. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets across the nation in response to Floyd’s killing, calling for a full re-imagining of policing and thrusting police unions into the center of the national argument. Activists, multiple legal experts and even some conservative think tanks, say police unions are one of the biggest impediments to reform, pushing hard to weaken accountability rules, and preventing new ones from being passed. In the wake of Floyd’s killing, the bill expanding bargaining rights for police unions is all but dead as currently written, and not because of the pandemic. House Democrats rushed to pass a first of its kind police reform bill that would, among other measures, ban choke holds, establish a national database tracking misconduct and end the doctrine of qualified immunity, which shields police officers from civil lawsuits. More quietly, they quickly backed away from the collective-bargaining bill. In the span of three months, the party had changed its calculus, now viewing a labor bill that was endorsed by nearly every House Democrat as recently as March as untouchable in its current form. Rep. Dan Kildee (D-Mich.), co-author of the measure, said in a statement that he asked House leadership to not move the bill unless the right for police to negotiate on accountability standards is addressed. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York, who also signed on to the bill, is “withdrawing her support” from it “as long as it remains in its current form,” said Lauren Hitt, a spokesperson for the New York Democrat. Rep. Matt Cartwright of Pennsylvania, author of a separate broader bill to expand collective bargaining rights of public-sector workers, is also deciding “whether any changes need to be made to his bill to hold officers with problematic records accountable” and will consider changes Kildee makes to his legislation, said Cartwright spokesman Matt Slavoski. All Democrats POLITICO spoke to said they support police’s right to unionize and bargain over wages and working conditions; it’s police’s ability to negotiate misconduct standards through union contracts that some are now questioning or flat out opposing. Police unions are the root cause of police brutality Greenhouse 20 (Steven Greenhouse, reporter at the New York Times for thirty-one years; he covered labor and workplace matters there for nineteen. He is the author of “Beaten Down, Worked Up: The Past, Present, and Future of American Labor”), “How Police Unions Enable and Conceal Abuses of Power”, The New Yorker , https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-police-union-power-helped-increase-abuses, June 18, 2020 SS Police unions have long had a singular—and divisive—place in American labor. What is different at this fraught moment, however, is that these unions, long considered untouchable, due to their extraordinary power on the streets and among politicians, face a potential reckoning, as their conduct roils not just one city but the entire nation. Since the nineteen-sixties, when police unions first became like traditional unions and won the right to bargain collectively, they have had a controversial history. And recent studies suggest that their political and bargaining power has enabled them to win disciplinary systems so lax that they have helped increase police abuses in the United States. A 2018 University of Oxford study of the hundred largest American cities found that the extent of protections in police contracts was directly and positively correlated with police violence and other abuses against citizens. A 2019 University of Chicago study found that extending collective-bargaining rights to Florida sheriffs’ deputies led to a forty per cent statewide increase in cases of violent misconduct—translating to nearly twelve additional such incidents annually. In a forthcoming study, Rob Gillezeau, a professor and researcher, concluded that, from the nineteen-fifties to the nineteen-eighties, the ability of police to collectively bargain led to a substantial rise in police killings of civilians, with a greater impact on people of color. “With the caveat that this is very early work,” Gillezeau wrote on Twitter, on May 30th, “it looks like collective bargaining rights are being used to protect the ability of officers to discriminate in the disproportionate use of force against the non-white population.” Other studies revealed that many existing mechanisms for disciplining police are toothless. WBEZ, a Chicago radio station, found that, between 2007 and 2015, Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority investigated four hundred shootings by police and deemed the officers justified in all but two incidents. Since 2012, when Minneapolis replaced its civilian review board with an Office of Police Conduct Review, the public has filed more than twenty-six hundred misconduct complaints, yet only twelve resulted in a police officer being punished. The most severe penalty: a forty-hour suspension. When the St. Paul Pioneer Press reviewed appeals involving terminations from 2014 to 2019, it discovered that arbitrators ruled in favor of the discharged police and corrections officers and ordered them reinstated forty-six per cent of the time. (Non-law-enforcement workers were reinstated at a similar rate.) For those demanding more accountability, a large obstacle is that disciplinary actions are often overturned if an arbitrator finds that the penalty the department meted out is tougher than it was in a similar, previous case—no matter if the penalty in the previous case seemed far too lenient. To critics, all of this highlights that the disciplinary process for law enforcement is woefully broken, and that police unions have far too much power. They contend that robust protections, including qualified immunity, give many police officers a sense of impunity—an attitude exemplified by Derek Chauvin keeping his knee on George Floyd’s neck for nearly nine minutes, even as onlookers pleaded with him to stop. “We’re at a place where something has to change, so that police collective bargaining no longer contributes to police violence,” Benjamin Sachs, a labor-law professor at Harvard, told me. Sachs said that bargaining on “matters of discipline, especially related to the use of force, has insulated police officers from accountability, and that predictably can increase the problem.” For decades, members of the public have complained about police violence and police unions, and a relatively recent development—mobile-phone videos—has sparked even more public anger. These complaints grew with the killings of Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, Walter Scott, Tamir Rice, Philando Castile, and many others. Each time, there were protests and urgent calls for police reform, but the matter blew over. Until the horrific killing of George Floyd. Historians often talk of two distinct genealogies for policing in the North and in the South, and both help to explain the crisis that the police and its unions find themselves in today. Northern cities began to establish police departments in the eighteen-thirties; by the end of the century, many had become best known for using ruthless force to crush labor agitation and strikes, an aim to which they were pushed by the industrial and financial élite. In 1886, the Chicago police killed four strikers and injured dozens more at the McCormick Reaper Works. In the South, policing has very different roots: slave patrols, in which white men brutally enforced slave codes, checking to see whether black people had proper passes whenever they were off their masters’ estates and often beating them if they did something the patrols didn’t like. Khalil Gibran Muhammad, a historian at Harvard, said that the patrols “were explicit in their design to empower the entire white population” to control “the movements of black people.” At the turn of the twentieth century, many police officers—frustrated, like other workers, with low pay and long hours—formed fraternal associations, rather than unions, to seek better conditions—mayors and police commissioners insisted that the police had no more right to join a union than did soldiers and sailors. In 1897, a group of Cleveland police officers sought to form a union and petitioned the American Federation of Labor—founded in 1886, with Samuel Gompers as its first president—to grant them a union charter. The A.F.L. rejected them, saying, “It is not within the province of the trade union movement to especially organize policemen, no more than to organize militiamen, as both policemen and militiamen are often controlled by forces inimical to the labor movement.” Police brutality is racialized structural violence that has an inter-generational impact on communities of color Ang 20 (Desmond, Assistant Professor at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government) “Wider Effects of Police Killings in Minority Neighborhoods,” The Econofact Network, 06/24/20 High-profile officer-involved killings of unarmed minorities have sparked nationwide protests and raised important questions about the appropriate role of law enforcement in local communities. These events comprise just a handful of the roughly one thousand officer-involved killings that occur each year in the United States. There is growing evidence that acts of police violence may have widespread impacts that go well beyond the individuals involved and their immediate families, negatively affecting academic achievement, school attendance and crime reporting in the neighborhoods where they occur. Negative effects on educational performance are driven by the impact on Black and Hispanic students following the killing of an individual who is also part of a minority group. The Facts: Roughly 1,000 people are killed by American law enforcement officers each year. While whites make up the majority of those killed, these incidents disproportionately involve African-Americans and Hispanics relative to their share of the U.S. population. The number of fatal shootings by the police has been remarkably stable at close to a thousand per year, as tracked by the Washington Post since 2015. Nearly half of the people killed by police in 2019 were Black or Hispanic and about 40 were not armed with a gun. Recent research suggests that roughly one in 1,000 Black men and one in 2,000 Hispanic men will be killed by police. Black men are nearly 2.5 times more likely than white men to die at the hands of law enforcement. Young Black men face particularly high risks with police violence representing their sixth leading cause of death (behind accidents, suicides, other homicides, heart disease and cancer). At the same time, lethal shootings comprise a tiny fraction of all use of force incidents. Nearly a million people experienced nonfatal threats or use of force during contacts with police in 2015 for instance, according to a 2018 report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (see Table 18). Officers involved in police killings went unprosecuted in nearly all cases. Judicial precedence grants law enforcement officers wide latitude in employing force against civilians and department procedures for handling and reporting these incidents are often far from comprehensive. In one large urban county I studied just one out of over 600 incidents resulted in criminal charges against police. Nationally, researchers found 31 cases in which police officers were arrested for murder or nonnegligent manslaughter between 2005 and 2011. This amounts to one-half of one-percent of all officer-involved killings during that period. The impacts of police violence can extend beyond the direct victims to nearby high school students. Students who live close to a police killing during high school are estimated to be 2.5 less likely to graduate from high school and 2 less likely to enroll in college than students from the same neighborhood who live farther from the shooting. To estimate these effects, I analyzed detailed data for over 600 officer-involved killings and more than 700,000 public high school students in a large, urban county. Because the data includes home addresses and tracks student performance over time, I am able to compare how achievement changes after a killing for students who lived close to the incident relative to students in the same neighborhood who lived slightly farther away. I find that students living within a half a mile of a killing are more likely to miss school the following day and experience significant decreases in GPA lasting several semesters. The highly localized effect may be due to the fact that more than 80 percent of incidents went unreported in area newspapers. Nearby students are estimated to be 15 more likely to be diagnosed with emotional disturbance - a chronic learning disability associated with PTSD and depression - and twice as likely to report feeling unsafe in their neighborhood. The effects of police killings on academic performance in my analysis are driven entirely by effects on Black and Hispanic students in response to police killings of other underrepresented minorities. I find no significant impact on white or Asian students, nor do I find a significant impact for police killings of white or Asian individuals. These racial differences cannot be explained by other factors like the neighborhoods where killings occur, media coverage or socioeconomic background. Even taking all of these factors into account, I continue to find significant differences in effects based on the race of the student and of the person killed. The chart shows the estimated effects on educational attainment by student race. For Black and Hispanic students, I find large, negative impacts on cumulative GPA, high school completion and college enrollment with very little margin of error, whereas for white and Asian students all the estimated effects are near zero. The adverse effects on academic performance are largest for police killings of unarmed minorities. I find that police killings of individuals that were completely unarmed (as described in District Attorney incident reports) lead to decreases in GPA that are about twice as large as police killings of individuals that were armed with a gun. This suggests that students are not responding to those events with the most gunfire or the largest shootouts but instead to those incidents in which the use of lethal force may have been least warranted. In a similar fashion, I find that the effects of gun-related criminal homicides on GPA are only half as large as those for police killings and do not vary with the race of the person killed. The pattern of effects is consistent with longstanding concerns expressed by minorities about how their neighborhoods are policed. The Kerner Commission, established by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968, reported the “widespread belief among Negroes in the existence of police brutality and in a ‘double standard’ of justice and protection.” More recent national surveys, such as this one from 2015, find that a vast majority of Black and Hispanic individuals believe that police “deal more roughly with members of minority groups” and that these individuals are far more likely than white counterparts to believe that police violence is a serious issue. As national protests following the deaths of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor continue to demonstrate, police killings of unarmed minorities may have negative consequences for social cohesion and institutional trust, with much of the costs borne by underrepresented groups.
12/4/21
NOVDEC - CP - Truckers
Tournament: UT | Round: 3 | Opponent: Strake Jesuit CB | Judge: Zara Inam CP: Just governments, except for the Federative Republic of Brazil, should recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. The Federative Republic of Brazil should: - recognize an unconditional right of non-Trucker workers to strike. - make striking by all Trucker workers a federal crime and implement penalties modelled after New York City Taylor Law including two-for-one fines, lifetime bans from federal jobs, and jail time. Trucker Strikes obliterate Food Security and turns the Economy. Woody 18 Katherine Woody 7-3-2018 "Economic Impact of the Brazilian Trucker Strike" https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filename=Economic20Impact20of20the20Brazilian20Trucker20Strike_Brasilia_Brazil_7-3-2018.pdf (Agricultural Attaché at US Foreign Agriculture Service)Elmer Report Highlights: On May 21, 2018, hundreds of thousands of Brazil’s nearly 2 million truck drivers began an 11-day strike to protest high diesel prices, a move that slowed Brazil’s economy, crippled transportation-dependent industries, and caused estimated losses of US$ 1.75 billion to Brazil’s agricultural sector. A month after Brazil’s longest trucker strike (and one of the country’s most effective strikes in history), transportation and logistics challenges still persist for Brazil’s exporters, as shipments of Brazilian commodities are still delayed, supply chains are still experiencing bottlenecks, and debate and uncertainty about Brazil’s transportation policies and prices continue to plague the agricultural sector Background On May 21, 2018, hundreds of thousands of Brazil’s nearly 2 million truck drivers began an 11-day strike to protest high diesel prices, a move that slowed Brazil’s economy, crippled transportation-dependent industries, and caused estimated losses of US$ 1.75 billion to Brazil’s agricultural sector. Truck drivers parked their rigs along roads across the country, refusing to make deliveries of cargo and creating roadblocks on more than half of Brazil’s 500 busiest highways. Within a few days, the effects of the strike were widespread and painful, as gas stations ran out of fuel, drivers waited for hours in lines for what small fuel supplies remained, supermarket shelves began to empty and some stores rationed perishable products, and airports began cancelling flights as fuel supplies dwindled. Virtually all segments of Brazil’s agricultural sector were affected in some way, but livestock and poultry operations were particularly hard hit by feed delivery disruptions, idled slaughterhouses, export stoppages, and ultimately the culling of tens of millions of animals. A month after Brazil’s longest trucker strike (and one of the country’s most effective strikes in history), transportation and logistics challenges still persist for Brazil’s exporters, as shipments of Brazilian commodities are still delayed, supply chains are still experiencing bottlenecks, and debate and uncertainty about Brazil’s transportation policies and prices continue to plague the agricultural sector. The truckers’ rebellion was particularly painful for Brazil because the country lacks extensive rail and waterway infrastructure to transport goods, instead relying on trucks to carry more than 90 percent of all freight (excluding crude oil and iron ore). Additionally, Brazil’s limited road infrastructure meant that it was easy for striking truckers to create massive bottlenecks by setting up roadblocks along major roads, many of which are only one lane in each direction. Unlike the United States, where many agricultural goods are transported to export terminals by railways or river barges, Brazil’s farmers are dependent on trucks to move their goods within the domestic market and to ports for sale to the international market. The effects of the strike were wide-ranging, especially as gas stations ran out of fuel, supermarket shelves began to empty of fresh foods, and ports ran low on commodities to load for export. At the Port of Paranagua in the state of Paraná, one of the main soybean routes was interrupted. At the beginning of the strike, authorities warned that the blockage obstructed the arrival of a thousand soybean trucks per day in the terminal. According to the Sao Paulo State Supermarket Association (APAS), Brazilian retailers lost R$1.3 billion due to shortages of perishable items. In Sao Paulo alone, supermarkets losses were estimated at R$400 million. Causes The strike was spurred by rapidly rising fuel prices (diesel prices were up 43 percent since July 2017), combined with the effects of the Brazil real continuing to weaken against the U.S. dollar. Last year, Brazil’s state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, changed its pricing policies allow daily fluctuations of fuel prices pegged to the international oil market and scrapped subsidies that had kept domestic fuel prices lower. Most Brazilian truck drivers are largely self-employed and daily increases in fuel costs had begun to cut deeply into their incomes. Brazilian citizens of all economic classes supported the truck drivers, and by the eighth day of the strike, 87 percent of the population approved of the strike and sympathized with what many saw as another example of the injustice of government taxes, according to one public opinion poll by Brazilian firm Datafolha. However, the same firm on June 11 published results of a separate opinion poll that showed that 69 percent of Brazilians thought the trucker strike was harmful for the Brazilian economy. The survey also showed that Brazilians want more control of gas and fuel prices. Even before the strike, high fuel prices were affecting the competitiveness of Brazilian agricultural exports. Brazil’s transportation lobby, the National Confederation of Transport, estimated that before the strike Brazilian diesel prices were about 15 higher than in the United States, and argued that diesel fuel in Brazil was more expensive than in similarly developed countries such as Mexico and Russia. Roughly half of the Brazilian fuel price paid by consumers goes to government taxes. A study by the College of Agriculture at the University of Sao Paulo (ESALQ) found that farmers were paying an average of 9.05 reals (US$ 2.42) more per ton than early 2017 to transport oilseeds and grains from Mato Grosso to the Port of Santos in Sao Paulo. ESALQ estimated that in 2017, the cost to move Brazilian agricultural goods around the country reached 120 billion reals, with 87.5 percent going to transportation costs. Diesel prices at the pump in the major agriculture-producing states of Mato Grosso, Sao Paulo, and Paraná increased by 13-15 percent between January 2017 and May 2018, according to the ESALQ study. Resolution As the strike dragged on Brazilian President Michel Temer authorized intervention by military and federal police to clear roadblocks and begin escorting some trucks to their destinations, especially rigs carrying fuel to airports and other strategic locations. Desperate to jumpstart the country’s economy, Brazilian officials met with the leaders of several trucker unions, but a deal with union leaders to temporarily cut fuel prices was rejected by large numbers of independent truckers, who used social media apps to coordinate their response and garner public support for the continued strike. On the ninth day of the strike, the Brazilian government agreed to reduce diesel prices by 0.46 reals per liter, hold prices stable for 60 days, reduce tolls for large trucks, and suspend or eliminate some taxes in an effort to coax drivers back to the roads. The measures largely worked, with most truckers returning to the road and deliveries of food, fuel, and medicine beginning to flow again, albeit at a slower, more unreliable pace. Still, the concessions reportedly cost the Brazilian government 9.5 billion reals (US$ 2.48 billion) and contributed to the resignation of the Petrobras CEO. Market analysts have revised upward Brazil’s budget deficit for the year, now estimated at R$151 billion (US$ 40 billion), up more than R$12.5 billion (US$ 3.3 billion) from the previous month’s estimate due to the increased cost of fuel subsidies agreed to under negotiations to end the strike. Effects Although goods of all kinds, including agricultural products, started flowing again by the beginning of June, the strike left lasting scars on the Brazilian economy. Forecasters are estimating total losses of between US$ 25-30 billion to Brazil’s economy as a result of the strike. Brazil’s National Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock (CNA) estimated losses to the agricultural sector due to the trucker strike at 6.6 billion reals (about US$ 1.75 billion). CNA also estimated that it could take Brazilian agricultural producers 6 months to a year to recover fully from the effects of the strike. Brazil’s central bank released its June report and cut projected 2018 GDP growth to 1.6 percent. One of the Brazilian government’s concessions to end the strike, a minimum freight rate guaranteed to truckers, is continuing to wreak havoc on the agricultural industry. The policy, which was implemented by presidential decree on May 30, was immediately criticized by a number of transportation-dependent industries, chief among them agriculture. CNA argued that the policy is unconstitutional and completely upends logistics for agricultural producers, many of whom have already concluded marketing contracts for 2018 crops. CNA reports that soy and corn producers and traders are already paying an additional R$ 500 million (US$ 132 million) for transportation every day, for a total of more than R$ 10 billion (US$ 2.65 billion) so far. Analysis by CNA forecasts that the policy is increasing freight rates by approximately 50-150 percent throughout the country, with Brazil’s powerhouse agricultural region in the interior of the country being hit the hardest. CNA and other players in the agricultural sector have challenged the measure in court through more than 50 lawsuits. Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Luiz Fux has been trying to mediate a solution satisfactory to both the transportation sector and the agricultural and industrial sectors dependent on those services. In the meantime, he suspended the pending lawsuits and left in effect the minimum freight rate table published on May 30 by the National Agency for Terrestrial Transportation (ANTT). President Temer has said he will abide by the court’s decision, truck drivers have threatened to strike again if the minimum price policy is invalidated. ANTT has publically estimated that judicial proceedings will continue through at least early August. Count Justice Fux confirmed that a new round of negotiations on this topic is scheduled for August 27, after the Supreme Court recess. The Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) has warned that the lack of certainty over truck freight rates has hindered transportation of commodities to the ports and subsequently caused shipping delays. Nearly two weeks after the end of the strike, MAPA Minister Blairo Maggi told reporters, “There are a lot of products waiting for transportation. We should be moving 450,000 tons of goods to ports every day, but we are not.” He also noted that the situation has affected forward sales of agricultural commodities since traders cannot accurate price the contracts without knowing how much will need to be spent on transportation. CNA argues that since the policy went into effect, productivity of Brazil’s agricultural sector has slowed by half, as producers have slowed the volume of shipments they are sending to ports while they wait for a resolution. Meanwhile, the number of ships waiting to load at Brazilian ports has continued to grow. According to shipping agency Williams, the number of ships berthed and loading in mid-June was about 40 percent lower than the same period last year, while the ship line-ups had grown to be about 60 percent larger than 2017, with as many as 70 ships waiting, according to some industry sources. CNA estimated that the shipping delays have cost about R$ 135 million (US$ 36 million) in demurrage charges for ships that have been delayed in loading at Brazilian ports. Moreover, the problems created by continued uncertainty about the policy are expected to worsen as Brazil’s second-crop corn harvest progresses. Brazil’s second-crop corn is currently less than 10 percent harvested, but limited silo capacity in the country means that commodities must generally start flowing to the ports as it comes out of the ground. With a record soybean crop this year and slow delivery to the ports in June, Brazilian corn will be forced to compete with soy for transportation and storage capacity, and freight rates are expected to rise as more Brazilian corn comes onto the market. Impact on the Agricultural Sector Livestock Swine and Poultry: The most significant losses from the strike were born by the chicken and pork production sector. Shortages of fuel and animal feed affected farms and feedlots, while slaughterhouses idled their production lines when transportation to the ports was cut off and refrigerated warehouses filled to capacity. Analysts estimated a loss of R$4 billion (US$ 1.05 billion) in exports, with 120,000 metric tons of chicken and pork meat not exported because of the strike. The Brazilian Association of Animal Protein reported that the strike caused the closure of 137 poultry plants and 30 swine slaughterhouses, forcing 220,000 industry workers to go on temporary leave. As feed rations ran low, some poultry operations were only feeding birds once every 48 hours, considered starvation rations, according to MAPA Minister Maggi. Particularly worrisome for the world’s largest exporter of chicken was the fact that poultry operations were forced to cull an estimated 70 million birds (about 7 percent of Brazil’s flock of 1 billion birds), bringing the level of chicks on breeder farms down to their lowest levels in a decade. Minister Maggi called on President Temer during the strike to ensure security forces were escorting trucks of feed rations to poultry farms. By mid-June, all affected processing plants had resumed operations, according to the Brazilian Association of Animal Protein. However, the disruption in supply was expected to cause a spike in Brazilian chicken prices as the sector could take more than 2 months to fully recover. Wholesale prices for frozen chicken in Brazil were up more than 40 percent. Moreover, Rabobank revised downward their forecast of the Brazilian poultry sector to an estimated 3 percent decline for the year (down from a forecasted 2-percent expansion). Cattle: The trucker strike came at a very unfortunate time for the beef sector. With the beginning of winter in Brazil, cattle on pasture begin to lose weight and needed to be sent to slaughter, but the strike forced the closure of virtually all of Brazil’s more than 100 cattle slaughterhouses. Most of the losses in the beef industry occurred not through the mortality of animals on farm, but rather through estimated lost exports of R$ 620 million (US$ 164 million). More than 40,000 metric tons of beef were unable to reach ports, and the domestic market saw an uncalculated amount of beef spoiled on the road as an estimated 3,750 refrigerated trucks sat idle during the strike, according to meatpacking trade association ABIEC. The industry calculates total losses to the sector could reach R$ 8 billion (US$ 2.1 billion). ABIEC noted that 90 percent of animal protein production was interrupted. On a positive note for beef producers, some analysts expect beef prices to rise in response to lower chicken meat volumes. Dairy Dairy producers across Brazil were severely affected by the transportation paralysis, with news media depicting dire scenes of the disposal of hundreds of millions of liters of milk by farmers who could not store their perishable products. The discarded milk alone was valued at more than R$ 1 billion (US$ 260 million). Milk supply in Brazil is expected to decline 9 percent year over year in the second quarter of 2018 as a consequence of the strike. Moreover, production will take a while to recover and will likely drop 6 percent year-over-year in the third quarter. Market analysts evaluate that milk prices paid to producers are expected to peak in the third quarter of 2018. Following 12 months of low profitability, farmers and processors were forced at a particularly difficult time to absorb the losses caused by the May strike. Grains and Oilseeds When the strike began in late May, Brazil’s soybean harvest was nearly finished and the harvest for second-crop “safrinha” corn was just beginning. The largest producing area for both of these crops is Brazil’s center-west region in the interior of the country, located very far from points of export in Brazil’s southeast and north arc regions. Loading at some of Brazil’s largest soybean-exporting ports, including Santos, Paranagua, Rio Grande, and Santarem, ground to a halt during the strike, as on-port stocks emptied and roadblocks kept trucks from delivering commodities for export. Most export terminals ran out of soybeans for shipment about 8 days into the strike, with soybeans reportedly arriving to the Port of Paranagua in Paraná state on the afternoon of the tenth day when trucks were able to reach the port complex for the first time since the strike had begun. Trucks reportedly unloaded more than 40,000 tons of soybeans at the port in the first 24 hours after the strike concluded. The Port of Santos, Latin America’s largest port, was also idled when trucks could no longer make deliveries. Cargo transported by rail were unaffected by the strike, but this makes up only a small portion of exports from the Port of Santos. Brazil’s soybean crushers association, ABIOVE, reported that all 63 of Brazil’s soy-crushing facilities came to a standstill during the strike due to a lack of supplies. The Mato Grosso Institute for Agricultural Economics (IMEA) reported that the corn harvest stalled out as fuel supplies in the state ran low. The aftermath of the strike and uncertainty about the minimum freight rate have stifled forward sales for soybeans, with traders complaining that they are unable to accurately set prices for futures contracts without a reliable estimate of transportation costs. As of late June, some of the country’s largest grain traders have virtually stopped buying soybeans and corn for export, even though IMEA reported that about one-third of Mato Grosso’s safrinha corn is still unsold. Grain and oilseed traders are also reportedly delaying picking up commodities from farmers’ storage facilities while they angle to avoid paying rapidly rising freight rates and wait to see what happens to the government’s minimum transportation price policy. This could be a major problem for a country whose agricultural producers have a lack of on-farm storage and will be faced with tough decisions of where to place safrinha corn. Brazil’s National Association of Cereal Exporters estimated that as of mid-June, about 10 million tons of soybeans were paralyzed in the interior of the country while more than 50 vessels were waiting to be loaded at ports. CNA reported that exports of at least 6.8 million tons of soybeans and soybean meal have been delayed due to surging freight prices under the government’s minimum price policy. Meanwhile, the number of trucks arriving at the Port of Santos was down more than 20 percent from a month earlier, despite abundant soybean supplies in the country ready for export. At the Port of Paranagua, truck volume was down more than 10 percent and while the port has been receiving enough soybean volume to load waiting vessels, it has not been able to begin rebuilding its 1.5 million metric tons of on-port stocks, which were completely depleted during the 11-day strike. This makes the port particularly vulnerable if there is a second truck driver strike if the government’s minimum freight rate policy is rescinded. The backlog of ships at Brazil’s ports are not merely waiting to load commodities for export; they are waiting to unload cargoes of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizer needed by Brazil’s farmers for the wheat planting currently underway, as well as preparing fields for soybean planting, which will commence in a few months. CNA estimated that about 35 ships are currently lined up and waiting to unload fertilizer at Brazilian ports, more than half at the Port of Paranagua in the state of Paraná in southern Brazil. According to Brazil’s Fertilizer Blenders Association, 60 percent of fertilizer deliveries have been delayed as a result of the backlog. Sugarcane and Ethanol The strike began just as the harvest kicked off in the world’s largest sugarcane-growing regions, Brazil’s center-south. Progress on the sugarcane harvest slowed as fuel supplies dwindled and at least 220 sugar mills were forced to close, according to trade group Forum National Sucroenergetico. Meanwhile, UNICA, Brazil’s Sugar Growers Association, reported that 150 sugar mills closed in the state of Sao Paulo alone, where 60 percent of Brazil’s sugar and ethanol production occurs. The state of Sao Paulo produces about 150,000 tons of sugar and 100 million liters of ethanol daily, and the sugar industry in that state suffered losses in revenue of about US$ 48 million daily during the strike. The disruption caused international sugar futures to rise as sugar exports were unable to reach the ports. Once fuel supplies began flowing again, harvest and crushing operations were able to quickly get back up to speed. Losses in the sector are calculated at R$ 740 million (US$ 196 million). However, this calculation does not include lost/delayed sales of ethanol stored at the mills for exports or use in the domestic market, as no data of this type has been released. Brazil is the world’s largest exporter of sugar, with more than 20 million tons exported in the previous season. Coffee Brazil is the world’s largest coffee grower and exporter, and the trucker strike hit just as the country’s main Arabica harvest was commencing, which caused international Arabica futures prices to increase by about 2 percent. According to Brazil’s Coffee Exporters Council (CeCafe), the strike affected issuance of export certificates and delayed shipments, but CeCafe noted that most sales were already concluded and overall exports for the season are expected to remain at roughly the same levels estimated before the strike. According to the Brazilian Coffee Industry Association, coffee producers lost an estimated R$ 70 million (US$ 18.5 million) per day during the protests, while CeCafe estimated export losses and extra port costs of R$ 560 million (US$ 148 million). Seafood Brazil’s seafood industry was affected by a disruption of deliveries between producers and processing centers, according to trade group Peixe BR. The state of Paraná is Brazil’s largest producer of fish, raising more than 100,000 tons of tilapia last year, while the state of Sao Paulo has seen rapid growth of the industry, producing more than 65,000 tons of tilapia last year. These two states’ aquaculture sectors were the hardest hit, according to Peixe BR. At one point during the strike, a large, multi-commodity agricultural cooperative in southern Brazil, was forced to halt tilapia processing operations when truck drivers blocked roadways and cut off supplies for processing, as well as the route for distributing the final product. Fruits and Vegetables As a result of the strike, many of Brazil’s wholesale markets saw supplies of fresh products dwindle and spoilage of other products in cases where usual customers were unable to make routine purchases. The Sao Paulo Warehouse Company (CEAGESP), Latin America’s largest and the world’s third-largest wholesale market, reported losses of nearly R$ 100 million (US$ 26 million) of fruits, vegetables, and nuts, including imported products. During a normal day, CEAGESP would normally see about 1,800- 2,000 trucks come and go from the market with fresh and perishable products. However, during the strike this was reduced to less than 100 trucks per day. In addition to losses of perishable products, the prices of remaining products sored because CEAGESP prices serve as a reference for states in Brazil. Supermarkets The Brazilian Supermarket Association (ABRAS) reported total losses of R$ 2.7 billion (US$ 712 million) due to the truckers strike. In addition to losses with fresh, frozen, and perishable products, ABRAS reported shortages of other consumer goods that could not be delivered to stores. According to the Sao Paulo State Supermarket Association, in Sao Paulo alone supermarkets losses reached R$ 400 million (US$ 105 million). The Counterplan shuts down Trucker Strikes. Bauernschuster et Al 17, Stefan, Timo Hener, and Helmut Rainer. "When labor disputes bring cities to a standstill: The impact of public transit strikes on traffic, accidents, air pollution, and health." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9.1 (2017): 1-37. (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, University of Passau, Innstra)Elmer New York City's Taylor Law, which was put into effect in response to a transit strike in 1966, represents an example of a particularly draconian measure. Under Section 210, the law prohibits any strike or other concerted stoppage 01 worn or slowdown by public employees (Division of Local Government Services 2009). Instead, it prescribes binding arbitration by a state agency to resolve bargaining deadlocks between unions and employers. Violations against the prohibition on strikes are punishable with hefty penalties. The fine for an individual worker is twice the striking employee's salary for each day the strike lasts. In addition, union leaders face imprisonment. Since its inception in 1967, the Taylor Law has generated a lot of controversy. To proponents, it was successful in averting several potential transit strikes that would have imposed significant costs on the city and its inhabitants (OECD 2007). Indeed, New York City has only seen two transit strikes over the past four decades—in 1980 and in 2005. In both cases, harsh monetary penalties were imposed on workers and unions. The 2005 transit strike additionally led to the imprisonment of a union leader, and saw the Transport Workers Union (TWU) filing a formal complaint with the ILO. Since then, the ILO has urged the United States government to restore the right of transit workers to strike, arguing that they do not provide essential services justifying a strike ban (Committee on Freedom of Association 2011, 775). So far, the Taylor Law has not been amended in this direction. Brazil key to global food supply Moreira 21 Assis Moreira 7-5-2021 "Brazil to remain world leader in food supply, OECD and FAO say" https://valorinternational.globo.com/agribusiness/news/2021/07/05/brazil-to-remain-world-leader-in-food-supply-oecd-and-fao-say.ghtml (Geneva Correspondent on Agribusiness)Elmer Brazil will continue to increase its role as a major global food supplier, including in products such as beef and even with a slower pace of growth in demand from China. These projections are in the report on agricultural outlook 2021-2030 released Monday by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). China will continue to have enormous influence on agricultural markets. The Chinese deficit in agricultural trade has grown to $86 billion in 2020 from $2.6 billion in 2000. For the next ten years, Beijing will continue to expand imports, but at a slower pace due to lower population growth, saturation in consumption of some commodities, and efficiency gains in its own production. In addition, the Chinese market will pose tougher competition as trade tensions with the United States ease. The report predicts that China could once again become the main market for U.S. agricultural exports. In this scenario, abundant land and water will make Brazil the dominant producer, and Latin America as a whole will see its agricultural production grow by 14 over the next ten years. The net value of the region’s exports is expected to expand by 31 — just over half the rate achieved between 2011 and 2020. By 2030, the region will continue to grow its share of global markets for key commodities. It may have 63 of world soybean exports, 56 of sugar exports, 44 of fish, 42 of beef exports, and 33 of chicken shipments. Food insecurity causes war – goes nuclear FDI 12 (Future Directions International, a Research institute providing strategic analysis of Australia’s global interests; citing Lindsay Falvery, PhD in Agricultural Science and former Professor at the University of Melbourne’s Institute of Land and Environment, “Food and Water Insecurity: International Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points,” http://www.futuredirections.org.au/workshop-papers/537-international-conflict-triggers-and-potential-conflict-points-resulting-from-food-and-water-insecurity.html)//Elmer There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of resources.¶ Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world.¶ In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. .¶ He writes (p.36), “…if people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.”¶ “Hunger feeds anarchy.”¶ This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow.” ¶ He continues: “An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts.” He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources.”¶ As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves.¶ Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry.¶ A study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon.¶ The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war.
12/4/21
NOVDEC - CP - Violent Strikes
Tournament: UT | Round: 1 | Opponent: Carnegie Vanguard SR | Judge: Tej Gedela Counterplan: China should guarantee the right to strike except for violent strike tactics. Strikes can be violent – that’s a D rule Tenzam ’20 - Mlungisi Tenzam LLB LLM LLD Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2020, The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa, http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttextandpid=S1682-58532020000300004 The Constitution guarantees every worker the right to join a trade union, participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, and to strike.11The Constitution grants these rights to a "worker" as an individual.12However, the right to strike and any other conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike such as a picket13 can only be exercised by workers acting collectively.14¶ The right to strike and participation in the activities of a trade union were given more effect through the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 199515 (LRA). The main purpose of the LRA is to "advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace".16 The advancement of social justice means that the exercise of the right to strike must advance the interests of workers and at the same time workers must refrain from any conduct that can affect those who are not on strike as well members of society.¶ Even though the right to strike and the right to participate in the activities of a trade union that often flow from a strike 17 are guaranteed in the Constitution and specifically regulated by the LRA, it sometimes happens that the right to strike is exercised for purposes not intended by the Constitution and the LRA, generally.18 For example, it was not the intention of the Constitutional Assembly and the legislature that violence should be used during strikes or pickets. As the Constitution provides, pickets are meant to be peaceful.19 Contrary to section 17 of the Constitution, the conduct of workers participating in a strike or picket has changed in recent years with workers trying to emphasise their grievances by causing disharmony and chaos in public. A media report by the South African Institute of Race Relations pointed out that between the years 1999 and 2012 there were 181 strike-related deaths, 313 injuries and 3,058 people were arrested for public violence associated with strikes.20 The question is whether employers succumb easily to workers' demands if a strike is accompanied by violence? In response to this question, one worker remarked as follows:¶ "There is no sweet strike, there is no Christian strike ... A strike is a strike. You want to get back what belongs to you ... you won't win a strike with a Bible. You do not wear high heels and carry an umbrella and say '1992 was under apartheid, 2007 is under ANC'. You won't win a strike like that."21¶ The use of violence during industrial action affects not only the strikers or picketers, the employer and his or her business but it also affects innocent members of the public, non-striking employees, the environment and the economy at large. In addition, striking workers visit non-striking workers' homes, often at night, threaten them and in some cases, assault or even murder workers who are acting as replacement labour.22 This points to the fact that for many workers and their families' living conditions remain unsafe and vulnerable to damage due to violence. In Security Services Employers Organisation v SA Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU),23 it was reported that about 20 people were thrown out of moving trains in the Gauteng province; most of them were security guards who were not on strike and who were believed to be targeted by their striking colleagues. Two of them died, while others were admitted to hospitals with serious injuries.24In SA Chemical Catering and Allied Workers Union v Check One (Pty) Ltd,25striking employees were carrying various weapons ranging from sticks, pipes, planks and bottles. One of the strikers Mr Nqoko was alleged to have threatened to cut the throats of those employees who had been brought from other branches of the employer's business to help in the branch where employees were on strike. Such conduct was held not to be in line with good conduct of striking.26¶ These examples from case law show that South Africa is facing a problem that is affecting not only the industrial relations' sector but also the economy at large. For example, in 2012, during a strike by workers employed by Lonmin in Marikana, the then-new union Association of Mine and Construction Workers Union (AMCU) wanted to exert its presence after it appeared that many workers were not happy with the way the majority union, National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), handled negotiations with the employer (Lonmin Mine). AMCU went on an unprotected strike which was violent and resulted in the loss of lives, damage to property and negative economic consequences including a weakened currency, reduced global investment27, declining productivity, and increase unemployment in the affected sectors.27Further, the unreasonably long time it takes for strikes to get resolved in the Republic has a negative effect on the business of the employer, the economy and employment.
12/4/21
NOVDEC - T - Cant Spec
Tournament: UT | Round: 1 | Opponent: Carnegie Vanguard SR | Judge: Tej Gedela Interpretation: the affirmative may not spec a government 1 The letter “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just government” – the resolution must be proven true in all instances, not one particular instance CCC ND Capital Community College a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation, “Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles AG The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class
2 Government is an indefinite singular– the aff may not defend a specific set of governments Nebel 20 Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh. “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” Victory Briefs, 19 Sept 2020. no url AG I agree that if “a democracy” in the resolution just meant “one or more democracy,” then a country-specific affirmative could be topical. But, as I will explain in this topic analysis, that isn’t what “a democracy” means in the resolution. To see why, we first need to back up a bit and review (or learn) the idea of generic generalizations. The most common way of expressing a generic in English is through a bare plural. A bare plural is a plural noun phrase, like “dogs” and “cats,” that lacks an overt determiner. (A determiner is a word that tells us which or how many: determiners include quantifier words like “all,” “some,” and “most,” demonstratives like “this” and “those,” posses- sives like “mine” and “its,” and so on.) LD resolutions often contain bare plurals, and that is the most common clue to their genericity. We have already seen some examples of generics that are not bare plurals: “A whale is a mammal,” “A beaver builds dams,” and “The woolly mammoth is extinct.” The first two examples use indefinite singulars—singular nouns preceded by the indefinite article “a”—and the third is a definite singular since it is preceded by the definite article “the.” Generics can also be expressed with bare singulars (“Syrup is viscous”) and even verbs (as we’ll see later on). The resolution’s “a democracy” is an indefinite singular, and so it very well might be—and, as we’ll soon see, is—generic. But it is also important to keep in mind that, just as not all generics are bare plurals, not all bare plurals are generic. “Dogs are barking” is true as long as some dogs are barking. Bare plurals can be used in particular ways to express existential statements. The key question for any given debate resolution that contains a bare plural is whether that occurrence of the bare plural is generic or existential. The same is true of indefinite singulars. As debaters will be quick to point out, some uses of the indefinite singular really do mean “some” or “one or more”: “A cat is on the mat” is clearly not a generic generalization about cats; it’s true as long as some cat is on the mat. The question is whether the indefinite singular “a democracy” is existential or generic in the resolution. Now, my own view is that, if we understand the difference between existential and generic statements, and if we approach the question impartially, without any invest- ment in one side of the debate, we can almost always just tell which reading is correct just by thinking about it. It is clear that “In a democracy, voting ought to be compul- sory” doesn’t mean “There is one or more democracy in which voting ought to be com- pulsory.” I don’t think a fancy argument should be required to show this any more than a fancy argument should be required to show that “A duck doesn’t lay eggs” is a generic—a false one because ducks do lay eggs, even though some ducks (namely males) don’t. And if a debater contests this by insisting that “a democracy” is existen- tial, the judge should be willing to resolve competing claims by, well, judging—that is, by using her judgment. Contesting a claim by insisting on its negation or demanding justification doesn’t put any obligation on the judge to be neutral about it. (Otherwise the negative could make every debate irresolvable by just insisting on the negation of every statement in the affirmative speeches.) Even if the insistence is backed by some sort of argument, we can reasonably reject an argument if we know its conclusion to be false, even if we are not in a position to know exactly where the argument goes wrong. Particularly in matters of logic and language, speakers have more direct knowledge of particular cases (e.g., that some specific inference is invalid or some specific sentence is infelicitious) than of the underlying explanations. But that is just my view, and not every judge agrees with me, so it will be helpful to consider some arguments for the conclusion that we already know to be true: that, even if the United States is a democracy and ought to have compulsory voting, that doesn’t suffice to show that, in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory—in other words, that “a democracy” in the resolution is generic, not existential. Second, existential uses of the indefinite, such as “A cat is on the mat,” are upward- entailing.3 This means that if you replace the noun with a more general one, such as “An animal is on the mat,” the sentence will still be true. So let’s do that with “a democracy.” Does the resolution entail “In a society, voting ought to be compulsory”? Intuitively not, because you could think that voting ought to be compulsory in democracies but not in other sorts of societies. This suggests that “a democracy” in the resolution is not existential.
It applies to government:
Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying that China ought to have the unconditional right to strike does not entail that those governments ought to have the unconditional right to strike. 2. Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because a recognition is universal and permanent
Violation – they only defend the United States
Vote neg:
Semantics outweigh: a. T is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden – they agreed to debate the topic when they came here b. Jurisdiction – you can’t vote aff if they haven’t affirmed the resolution c. It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement – there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it Standards: 2. Limits – there are 195 affs accounting for hundreds of governments— unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs. Banerjee 4/12 (Vasabjit Banerjee, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Mississippi State University),”How many states and provinces are in the world?” , The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/how-many-states-and-provinces-are-in-the-world-157847, April 12, 2021 SS There are 195 national governments recognized by the United Nations, but there are as many as nine other places with nationlike governments, including Taiwan and Kosovo, though they are not recognized by the U.N. Most of these countries are divided into smaller sections, the way the U.S. is broken up into 50 states along with territories, like Puerto Rico and Guam, and a federal district, Washington, D.C. They are not all called “states,” though: Switzerland has cantons, Bangladesh has divisions, Cameroon has regions, Germany has lander, Jordan has governorates, Montserrat has parishes, Zambia has provinces, and Japan has prefectures – among many other names.
3. Ground – spec guts core generics like the econ DA which rely on all governments having the unconditional right to strike because individual governments don’t have an impact on the global economy as a whole – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs 4. TVA solves – read as an advantage to whole rez
Paradigm issues:
Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start 2. Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical 3. Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation 4. No RVIs – fairness and education are a priori burdens – and encourages baiting – outweighs because if T is frivolous, they can beat it quickly 5. Fairness is a voter ¬– necessary to determine the better debater 6. Education is a voter – why schools fund debate
12/4/21
SEPTOCT - CP - 1 and Done Adv
Tournament: Loyola | Round: Octas | Opponent: Carnegie Vanguard SR | Judge: Panel CP: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should: - Increase research and funding for research related to energy production, pollution, remediation, and oceanic biodiversity - Double the current yield of global crops – 1AC NAS NAS 8 National Academy of Sciences 12-3-2008 “The Role of the Life Sciences in Transforming America's Future Summary of a Workshop” Re-cut by Elmer Fostering Industries to AND sustainably on earth.
9/6/21
SEPTOCT - CP - COVID
Tournament: Loyola | Round: 2 | Opponent: Sam Barlow EL | Judge: Julian Kuffour CP: Member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines except for COVID-19 medicines. Agree WTO is bad, but reducing IP for covid medicines bolsters the WTO’s global credibility Patent waiver is necessary to revitalize WTO’s credibility as an international dispute mechanism – creates momentum for further reform. Meyer 6-18-21. (David Meyer is the Editor of CEO Daily and a senior writer on Fortune’s European team. Author of the digital rights primer, Control Shift: How Technology Affects You and Your Rights. “The WTO’s survival hinges on the COVID-19 vaccine patent debate, waiver advocates warn,” Fortune, June 18, 2021. https://fortune.com/2021/06/18/wto-covid-vaccines-patents-waiver-south-africa-trips/ TDI The World Trade Organization knows all about crises. Former U.S. President Donald Trump threw a wrench into its core function of resolving trade disputes—a blocker that President Joe Biden has not yet removed—and there is widespread dissatisfaction over the fairness of the global trade rulebook. The 164-country organization, under the fresh leadership of Nigeria's Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, has a lot to fix. However, one crisis is more pressing than the others: the battle over COVID-19 vaccines, and whether the protection of their patents and other intellectual property should be temporarily lifted to boost production and end the pandemic sooner rather than later. According to some of those pushing for the waiver—which was originally proposed last year by India and South Africa—the WTO's future rests on what happens next. "The credibility of the WTO will depend on its ability to find a meaningful outcome on this issue that truly ramps-up and diversifies production," says Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter, South Africa's ambassador to the WTO. "Final nail in the coffin" The Geneva-based WTO isn't an organization with power, as such—it's a framework within which countries make big decisions about trade, generally by consensus. It's supposed to be the forum where disputes get settled, because all its members have signed up to the same rules. And one of its most important rulebooks is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS, which sprang to life alongside the WTO in 1995. The WTO's founding agreement allows for rules to be waived in exceptional circumstances, and indeed this has happened before: its members agreed in 2003 to waive TRIPS obligations that were blocking the importation of cheap, generic drugs into developing countries that lack manufacturing capacity. (That waiver was effectively made permanent in 2017.) Consensus is the key here. Although the failure to reach consensus on a waiver could be overcome with a 75 supermajority vote by the WTO's membership, this would be an unprecedented and seismic event. In the case of the COVID-19 vaccine IP waiver, it would mean standing up to the European Union, and Germany in particular, as well as countries such as Canada and the U.K.—the U.S. recently flipped from opposing the idea of a waiver to supporting it, as did France. It's a dispute between countries, but the result will be on the WTO as a whole, say waiver advocates. "If, in the face of one of humanity's greatest challenges in a century, the WTO functionally becomes an obstacle as in contrast to part of the solution, I think it could be the final nail in the coffin" for the organization, says Lori Wallach, the founder of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, a U.S. campaigning group that focuses on the WTO and trade agreements. "If the TRIPS waiver is successful, and people see the WTO as being part of the solution—saving lives and livelihoods—it could create goodwill and momentum to address what are still daunting structural problems." Those problems are legion. Reform needs Top of the list is the WTO's Appellate Body, which hears appeals in members' trade disputes. It's a pivotal part of the international trade system, but Trump—incensed at decisions taken against the U.S. —blocked appointments to its seven-strong panel as judges retired. The body became completely paralyzed at the end of 2019, when two judges' terms ended and the panel no longer had the three-judge quorum it needs to rule on appeals. Anyone who hoped the advent of the Biden administration would change matters was disappointed earlier this year when the U.S. rejected a European proposal to fill the vacancies. "The United States continues to have systemic concerns with the appellate body," it said. "As members know, the United States has raised and explained its systemic concerns for more than 16 years and across multiple U.S. administrations." At her confirmation hearing in February, current U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai reiterated those concerns—she said the appellate body had "overstepped its authority and erred in interpreting WTO agreements in a number of cases, to the detriment of the United States and other WTO members," and accused it of dragging its heels in settling disputes. "Reforms are needed to ensure that the underlying causes of such problems do not resurface," Tai said. "While the U.S. has been engaging with the WTO it hasn't indicated it would move quickly on allowing appointments to the Appellate Body," says Bryan Mercurio, an economic-law professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who opposes the vaccine waiver. "This is not a good sign. In terms of WTO governance, it's a much more important step than supporting negotiations on an intellectual property waiver." It's not just the U.S. that wants to see reform at the WTO. In a major policy document published in February, the EU said negotiations had failed to modernize the organization's rules, the dispute-resolution system was broken, the monitoring of countries' trade policies was ineffective, and—crucially—"the trade relationship between the U.S. and China, two of the three largest WTO members, is currently largely managed outside WTO disciplines." China is one of the key problems here. It became a WTO member in 2001 but, although this entailed significant liberalization of the Chinese economy, it did not become a full market economy. As the European Commission put it in February: "The level at which China has opened its markets does not correspond to its weight in the global economy, and the state continues to exert a decisive influence on China's economic environment with consequent competitive distortions that cannot be sufficiently addressed by current WTO rules." "China is operating from what it sees as a position of strength, so it will not be bullied into agreeing to changes which it sees as not in its interests," says Mercurio. China is at loggerheads with the U.S., the EU and others over numerous trade-related issues. Its rivals don't like its policy of demanding that Chinese citizens' data is stored on Chinese soil, nor do they approve of how foreign investors often have to partner with Chinese firms to access the country's market, in a way that leads to the transfer of technological knowhow. They also oppose China's industrial subsidies. Mercurio thinks China may agree to reforms on some of these issues, particularly regarding subsidies, but "only if it is offered something in return." All these problems won't go away if the WTO manages to come up with a TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines and medical supplies, Wallach concedes. "But," she adds, "the will and the good faith to tackle these challenges is increased enormously if the WTO has the experience of being part of the solution, not just an obstacle." Wallach points to a statement released earlier this month by Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) trade ministers, which called for urgent discussions on the waiver. "The WTO must demonstrate that global trade rules can help address the human catastrophe of the COVID-19 pandemic and facilitate the recovery," the statement read in its section about WTO reform. Okonjo-Iweala's role The WTO's new director general, whose route to the top was unblocked in early 2021 with the demise of the Trump administration, is certainly keen to fix the problems that contributed to the early departure of her predecessor, Brazil's Robert Azevedo. "We must act now to get all our ambassadors to the table to negotiate a text" on the issue of an IP waiver for COVID vaccines, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, director general of the World Trade Organization, has said. Dursun Aydemir—Anadolu/Bloomberg/Getty Images Earlier this week, when the U.S. and EU agreed a five-year ceasefire in a long-running dispute over Boeing and Airbus aircraft subsidies, Okonjo-Iweala tweeted: "With political will, we can solve even the most intractable problems." However, Mercurio is skeptical about her stewardship having much of an effect on the WTO's reform process. "Upon taking over she stated it was time for delegations to speak to each other and not simply past each other, but at the recent General Counsel meeting delegations simply read prepared statements in what some have described as the worst meeting ever," he says. "On the other hand, Ngozi is very much someone who will actively seek solutions to problems, and in this way different to her predecessor. If the role of mediator is welcomed, she could have an impact not in starting discussions but in getting deals over the finish line." No alt causes – how the WTO acts now with Covid will shape its role in the international economy for decades to come. Evenett and Baldwin 20. (Simon J. Evenett is Professor of International Trade and Economic Development at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Co-Director of the CEPR Programme in International Trade and Regional Economics. Richard E. Baldwin is a professor of international economics at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. “Revitalising multilateral trade cooperation: Why? Why Now? And How?” November 10, 2020. https://voxeu.org/content/revitalising-multilateralism-pragmatic-ideas-new-wto-director-general TDI Purposeful, pragmatic steps towards noble goals Archbishop Desmond Tutu, that tireless campaigner against Apartheid, once remarked that “there is only one way to eat an elephant: one bite at a time”. After a decade of drift and backsliding, the task of revitalising multilateral trade cooperation may seem daunting. It may seem even more so after the disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic and the attendant slump in world trade. Yet, in the same emergency lies the seeds of revival – especially, if trade diplomats can demonstrate the relevance of the WTO to national governments fighting this pandemic – ideally through an accord that eases the cross-border shipment of needed medical goods and medicines. Step by pragmatic step, the WTO can regain its centrality in the world trading system. Ultimately, the pandemic affords the opportunity to reframe discussions on multilateral trade cooperation away from the stalemate, frustration of recent years between governments, and the Uruguay Round mindset that ran into diminishing returns years ago. Rather, discussions between governments need to draw lessons from the second global economic shock in 15 years so as to rebuild a system of global trade arrangements capable of better tackling systemic crises and, more importantly, better able to contribute to the growing number of first-order challenges facing societies in the 21st century. Doing so will require revisiting the very purpose of the WTO. Specifically, action now over Covid creates goodwill to establish global trade as a norm and preserve the relevance of the trading system post-Covid. González 20. (Anabel Gonzalez is a nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute and former Minister of Foreign Trade of Costa Rica “Revitalising multilateral trade cooperation: Why? Why Now? And How?” November 10, 2020. https://voxeu.org/content/revitalising-multilateralism-pragmatic-ideas-new-wto-director-general TDI EXTRAORDINARY TIMES DEMAND EXTRAORDINARY ACTION As of 2 November 2020, there are 46.9 million COVID-19 cases across all regions, with the number of deaths exceeding 1.2 million, and rising.2 The economic and social impacts of the pandemic and its containment measures are not less daunting. Global growth is estimated at -4.9 in 2020, with over 95 of countries projected to have negative per capita income growth (IMF 2020). Trade volumes are expected to decrease by between 13 and 32 from last year,3 while foreign direct investment flows could plunge by up to 40 (UNCTAD 2020). Is it estimated that the equivalent of 555 million jobs have been lost in the first half of this year (ILO 2020), which in turn could push up to 100 million more people into extreme poverty and would almost double the number of persons suffering from acute hunger (FAO 2020). While there is some evidence that goods trade may be rebounding and that the worst-case trade scenario projected in April could be averted (CPB 2020, WTO 2020a), the recovery from the deepest global recession since World War II will depend on the sustained and effective containment of the virus and the quality of government policies. The World Bank/IMF Development Committee warned that the pandemic has the potential to erase development gains for many countries (World Bank 2020a). Some consequences may also be long-lasting, such as lower investment, erosion of human capital, and a retreat from global trade and supply linkages (World Bank 2020b). It is no understatement to say these are extraordinary times. In many countries, governments are providing significant levels of fiscal support to try to stabilise their economies, sustain companies and minimise the impact on workers; in many others, limited fiscal space and informality constraint governments’ capacity to mitigate the damage. For advanced and developing economies alike, trade is a powerful, cost-effective tool to alleviate the devastating effects of COVID-19 on the health and economic fronts. And yet, protectionism is gaining an upper hand, deepening some of pre-pandemic confrontations that were already threatening the global economy. The short-term response to the virus and longer-term growth prospects depend on strong multilateral cooperation to scale back obstacles to trade and investment, increase business certainty and leverage opportunities which the pandemic has accelerated in areas like the digital economy. It is also needed to preserve stable and coordinated international relations to avoid that heavy threats implicit in the pandemic could result in catastrophic disorders or conflicts (Jean 2020). But it will not happen automatically. Unless governments accelerate their efforts to collaborate, growing protectionism and increased distortions to global value chains (GVCs) risk being a by-product of the virus, at the same time further exacerbating its negative implications. This demands extraordinary action. This chapter addresses the question of what role for trade ministers at the WTO in times of crises with a view to activating global cooperation to overcome COVID-19. In addition to the introductory section, the second section explores the need to reactivate the WTO to underpin collaboration among governments, the third section argues that trade ministers should call the shots during crisis, the fourth section suggests eight actions for ministers to rein in protectionism and mitigate further damage, the fifth section refers to the mechanics on how and when to do it, and a final section offers concluding remarks. REACTIVATE THE WTO Trade needs to be part of the response to COVID-19 and its upshots, and countries cannot afford the WTO, hobbled as it has been lately, to muddle through. Moreover, as the world confronts more frequent and severe profound shocks such as financial crises, terrorism, extreme weather and pandemics (McKinsey Global Institute 2020), the WTO needs to step up its role during systemic crises. The fact that the organisation has been faltering, that there is a leadership vacuum and that distrust runs high among major traders will not make it any easier. Exacerbated tensions related to the pandemic can only add to the feeling that WTO rules have been conceived for a very different context, increasing the risk of a loss of legitimacy (Jean 2020). This is not about a major reset of the WTO. It is about (re)activating the organisation to serve its members as they combat the devastating impact of the pandemic and the global recession. The WTO needs broader reform, in particular to address structural changes in the global economy. While extremely important, this discussion should not hamper the ability of the WTO to deliver at times of systemic crisis. Moreover, should the WTO – or more accurately, its members – demonstrate they can actually rise to the occasion in the context of COVID-19, they will also contribute to increasing trust levels on the ability of the organisation to produce results. The starting point is a shift in mindset: governments need to understand that international trade is not a problem in the crisis, but rather a core element of the solution (Baldwin and Evenett 2020). Take the shortages of medical supplies. There are three methods of assuring supply: stockpiling, investments in manufacturing capacity and trade. Of these options, relying on international trade is the most efficient and economic choice, provided the WTO can help assure security of this method of supply (Wolff 2020a). To be sure, many nations have taken unilateral steps to facilitate trade, especially in medical supplies and medicines. The Global Trade Alert reports that while 91 jurisdictions have adopted a total of 202 export controls on these goods since the beginning of 2020, 106 jurisdictions have executed 229 import policy reforms on these goods over the same period.4 After initial border closures, some neighbouring countries are beginning to facilitate the cross-border flow of goods. At the regional level and among subsets of countries, governments have issued different statements to keep trade lanes open and supply chains moving (see Table A1 in the Annex). After a tepid declaration from G20 leaders, trade ministers reaffirmed their determination to cooperate and coordinate to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on trade and investment and to lay a solid foundation for a global economic recovery. They also endorsed a set of short-term collective actions on trade regulation, trade facilitation, transparency, operation of logistics networks and support for small enterprises, and a group of longer-term actions on WTO reform, GVC resilience and investment; monitoring of implementation was left to senior officials (G20 2020). These actions are positive and reflect the political will of governments to collaborate to some extent – even if they have not fully countered the flurry of barriers and restrictions surrounding trade in critical medical gear. They are no substitute for trade cooperation at the global level, either. In the case of medical products, for example, the EU, the US and China account for almost three-quarters of world exports (WTO 2020b); cooperation initiatives that do not include these members would fall short on impact. The venue for cooperation should be global and open to all, even if not all 164 WTO members opt to engage in all initiatives. TRADE MINISTERS SHOULD CALL THE SHOTS DURING CRISES Challenges notwithstanding, governments need to act now to empower the WTO to play an active part in coordinating the response to the pandemic. The WTO is more than an organisation immersed in myriad drama on the shores of Lake Geneva; it is a solid framework for global trade cooperation. It is in countries’ interest to preserve the relevance of the WTO; its role can be critical in helping members help themselves. In a member-driven organisation such as the WTO, the role of the Director-General and the Secretariat is important and can and should be enhanced, for example with greater power of initiative and strengthened monitoring and analytics capabilities. The WTO dedicated page on the pandemic is a step in the right direction.5 But the ultimate responsibility to provide direction and act rests with governments. The WTO is nothing more and nothing less than the collectivity of its members (Steger 2020), a point that is frequently forgotten in the public discourse. Without strong leadership, frequent engagement and serious interest among members in addressing its challenges, the WTO itself cannot deliver results (Cutler 2020). Paraphrasing VanGrasstek (2013), the multilateral trading system receives its inspiration from economists and is shaped primarily by lawyers, but it can only operate within the limits set by politicians.
9/4/21
SEPTOCT - CP - EU Proposal
Tournament: Greenhill RR | Round: 4 | Opponent: Northland Christian LB | Judge: Panel CP: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should adopt the European Union’s proposal to:
Ensure that COVID-19 vaccines, treatments and their components can cross borders freely 2. Encourage producers to expand their production, while ensuring that those countries most in need of vaccines receive them at an affordable price 3. Facilitate the use of compulsory licensing within the WTO's existing Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Solves vaccine access but avoids innovation Brachmann 6/8 (Steve, contributor to IPWatchdog.com, Research on Point, and Main Street Host writing about technology and innovation) “EU Offers Alternative to COVID-19 IP Waiver That Supports Innovation and Addresses Supply Chain Problems,” IP Watchdog, 6/8/2021 JL The EU’s proposal to the WTO regarding COVID-19 vaccine access focuses on three key elements. The first element focuses on international supply chain issues, advocating for countries producing vaccines to increase international exports and to avoid any trade restrictions on vaccines or their raw materials that could hinder the supply chain either for countries in need or the global COVAX Facility initiative. Supply chain issues have a real and devastating effect on unvaccinated communities, as evidenced by the recent news that Thailand government officials acknowledged delays and reductions for a promised shipment of 17 million doses of Thai-produced AstraZeneca vaccines to the Philippines. One of the biggest supply chain issues facing the unvaccinated world right now is the decision of India’s government, which along with South Africa proposed the patent waiver at the WTO, to stop exporting vaccines manufactured by the Serum Institute of India, the world’s largest vaccine manufacturer, in order to address India’s own exploding COVID-19 infection rates. For its part, the United States under President Joe Biden recently announced an increase of 20 million doses to the country’s planned COVID-19 vaccine exports. The second key element in the EU’s proposal requests that governments support vaccine manufacturers and developers to ensure affordable vaccine supplies. This portion of the EU’s proposal acknowledges the beneficial impacts of licensing, which ensures that developers and manufacturers enter into agreements that those companies are incentivized to uphold because they promote business interests. The EU’s proposal notes that the vaccine developers Pfizer, BioNTech, Johnson and Johnson and Moderna have all committed to agreements to deliver a combined 1.3 billion doses through 2021 at no profit to low-income countries and at low cost to middle-income countries. The final key element in the EU’s alternative focuses on intellectual property and recognizes that “voluntary licenses are the most effective instrument to facilitate the expansion of production and sharing of expertise.” While compulsory licensing could be available without voluntary licensing due to the extraordinary nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU advocates for using existing mechanisms for compulsory licensing under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). While the EU is currently drafting a communication dedicated to intellectual property rights which it plans to submit to all WTO members, the governmental body was clear on its thoughts regarding the India-South Africa proposal backed by many governments, including the Biden Administration: As regards the broad waiver proposed by a number of WTO members, the European Commission, while ready to discuss any option that helps end the pandemic as soon as possible, is not convinced that this would provide the best immediate response to reach the objective of the widest and timely distribution of COVID-19 vaccines that the world urgently needs. The forces urging the world towards waiving international patent rights under TRIPS for COVID-19 vaccines are about as legion as they are misguided. On June 7, the WTO announced that it had received a petition signed by 2.7 million people around the world calling for the suspension of patent rights on COVID-19 vaccines. Currently more than 60 nations have publicly supported the India-South Africa proposal to waive patent rights under TRIPS for COVID-19 vaccines. However, as the EU’s proposal indicates, developing effective responses to international supply chain issues regarding vaccines do not have to stoop to dismantling the system for encouraging the investment in pharmaceutical RandD that produced the vaccine in the first place. In fact, the EU’s proposal recognizes that properly respecting IP rights and encouraging voluntary licensing, while making some allowances for Article 31 of TRIPS, will be a much more effective answer than a political stance that creates more problems than it solves by reducing medical innovation at exactly the time that the world needs it the most. In supporting the waiver, the Biden Administration has arguably abdicated one of its first promises: that it would be an administration guided by science and truth. There is no science that exists to show that patents are barriers to vaccine access. That is a fact that has been acknowledged by the World Intellectual Property Organization, the UN’s agency for intellectual property rights, since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. The sentimentality driving those supporting the TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines won’t solve supply chain issues in manufacturing capacity, which the EU’s alternative does address, but it will do a great job at decreasing investment into medical RandD because weak patent rights decrease economic productivity. Decreased investment in medical RandD will slow down the research needed to cure new COVID-19 variants that continue to appear across the world, and needless human death will continue.
9/17/21
SEPTOCT - CP - Epilepsy
Tournament: St Marks | Round: 1 | Opponent: Ayala AM | Judge: Sam Larson CP: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should reduce intellectual property protections for medicines by implementing a one-and-done approach for patent protection except for extended-release formulations for epilepsy medicines. Holman 18 (Christopher M., Professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, where his primary research focus lies at the intersection of intellectual property and biotechnology) “Why Follow-On Pharmaceutical Innovations Should Be Eligible For Patent Protection,” Intellectual Property Watch, 9/12/2018 JL Follow-on pharmaceutical innovation can come in the form of an extended-release formulation that permits the drug to be administered at less frequent intervals than the original formulation. Critics of secondary patents downplay the significance of extended-release formulations, claiming that they represent nothing more than a ploy to extend patent protection without providing any real benefit to patients. In fact, the availability of a drug that can be taken once a day has been shown to improve patient compliance, a significant issue with many drugs, particularly in the case of drugs taken by patients with dementia or other cognitive impairments. Extended-release formulations can also provide a more consistent dosing throughout the day, avoiding the peaks and valleys in blood levels experienced by patients forced to take an immediate-release drug multiple times a day. Other examples of improved formulations that provide real benefits to patients are orally administrable formulations of drugs that could previously only be administered by more invasive intravenous or intramuscular injection, combination products that combine two or more active pharmaceutical agents in a single formulation (resulting in improved patient compliance), and a heat-stable formulation of a lifesaving drug used to treat HIV infection and AIDS (an important characteristic for use in developing countries with a hot climate).
Extended-release epilepsy medicines save lives Wheless and Phelps 18 (James W., professor of neurology and pediatrics and director of the Texas Comprehensive Epilepsy Program and of the Epilepsy/EEG Fellowship Program at the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston and Stephanie J., Professor of Clinical Pharmacy and Pediatrics at The University of Tennessee Health Science Center) “A Clinician's Guide to Oral Extended-Release Drug Delivery Systems in Epilepsy,” Journal of Pediatric Pharmacology and Therapeutics, 8/2018 JL There are many inherent advantages to using ER formulations. They may enhance adherence to AED therapy, minimize fluctuations in SDC, improve seizure control, and reduce toxicities associated with peak concentrations compared with IR formulations. Enhanced Medication Adherence and Improved Quality of Life. Non-adherence to AEDs is a problem in the management of epilepsy, and it can have serious or even fatal consequences if patients experience inadequate seizure control (Table 2).17–19 In a US survey of 661 patients with epilepsy, 71 noted dose omissions and 45 reported a seizure following a missed dose.19 A large retrospective database analysis in a US managed-care adult population showed that during a mean follow-up of 27 months, 39 of patients with epilepsy were non-adherent.18 In another retrospective open-cohort study of claims data for 33,658 US Medic-aid patients with epilepsy, non-adherence to AEDs was associated with a more than 3-fold increase in mortality compared with adherence, and during periods of non-adherence patients had significantly higher incidences of emergency department visits, hospital admissions, motor vehicle injuries, and fractures.20 Evidence shows that patients receiving an ER formulation are more likely to continue with therapy than patients receiving IR formulations, and that there are no significant differences in AEs between the 3 formulations (Tegretol ER carbamazepine, Carbatrol ER carbamazepine, and a generic IR carbamazepine).21 In a review of studies that compared ER, conventional, and IR formulations of AEDs, several studies noted increases in adherence following a change from an IR to an ER formulation.17 In general, ER formulations were associated with reduced AEs, greater tolerability, improved dosing convenience, increased efficacy, and improvements in quality of life.17 Finally, because the likelihood of missing a dose increases with dosing frequency, and with the number of tablets/capsules taken,19 the simplification of dosing regimens with ER formulations is an important approach to improving adherence.13,15,17,22 Decreased Fluctuation in Peak-and-Trough SDC. Many AEDs have short half-lives. For IR formulations, this necessitates frequent dosing to maintain SDCs within the targeted range for optimal seizure control. The resulting wide peak-to-trough fluctuations in concentrations (Figure 1B) may increase the likelihood of both seizures and AEs.13,15,22,23 Extended-release formulations enable the dosing interval to be increased, which maintains concentration within the targeted range while decreasing fluctuations in peak-to-trough concentrations (Figure 1B). The decreased fluctuations may result in reduced toxicity and fewer concentration-related AEs compared with IR formulations.14,15,24 This may make ER formulations more forgiving to occasional irregular dosing compared with IR formulations. A pharmacokinetic simulation of Trokendi XR (topiramate; Supernus Pharmaceuticals, Rockville, MD) showed that following a delayed or omitted dose, SDC could be restored by giving the ER dose at any point within the next dosing interval, or by giving an additional ER dose together with the next scheduled dose.25 Less Frequent Local and Systemic AEs. Extended-release DDSs typically have slower release rates, which can result in fewer concentration-related AEs and can prevent side effects that may occur during the absorption phase with IR formulations.26 Lower peak concentrations may allow some patients to have their total daily dose increased without experiencing AEs, resulting in improved seizure control for the same chemical moiety when an ER formulation is used. Uthman17 reviewed more than 15 studies comparing ER formulations of AEDs to IR, DR, or placebo products. A total of 4 of the 7 studies that directly compared ER and IR formulations showed significantly fewer AEs, better tolerability, and enhanced compliance for ER formulations of carbamazepine,27,28 levetiracetam,29 and valproate.30 Similarly to DR formulations, ER products have the potential to improve adherence by reducing local AEs, such as the gastrointestinal intolerance that can be associated with IR formulations. Additionally, ER formulations that are enteric coated may improve gastrointestinal tolerability in some patients. For example, the gastrointestinal AEs associated with valproic acid have been reduced by the introduction of enteric-coated formulations.31 Overall Decrease in Health Care Costs. The use of AED ER formulations is generally associated with better adherence and seizure control than IR formulations.17 Several studies in adults have shown that an increase in adherence was associated with a decrease in the costs of care and hospitalization (Table 2)18,32,33; hence, ER formulations have the potential to reduce overall health care costs compared with IR formulations. Helmers et al34 studied the economic burden associated with generic versus branded AEDs in the United States. They found that the periods of generic use were associated with higher total medical service cost (i.e., $3186) when compared to period of brand product use. Likewise, Labiner et al35 reported that generic AED use was associated with significantly greater use of medical services and increased risk of epilepsy-related medical events compared with brand use. Within an institutional setting, ER products require less pharmacy preparation and less nursing time related to administration (e.g., QD versus TID).
10/16/21
SEPTOCT - CP - Remdesivir
Tournament: Nano Nagle RR | Round: 4 | Opponent: Marlborough WR | Judge: Akshay Manglik CP: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should waive intellectual property protections for Covid-19 related medicines except for Remdesivir. Remdesivir patents are key to profits that enable continued production and future innovation Mossoff 20 (Adam, Professor of Law at Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, teaches a wide range of courses at the law school, including property, patent law, trade secrets, trademark law, remedies, and internet law, Visiting Intellectual Property Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, JD from the University of Chicago Law School) “US Should Not Confiscate Gilead's Remdesivir Patent,” Law360, 8/21/2020 JL These politicians allege that since the U.S. helped pay for some of remdesivir's clinical trials, the federal government can use its march-in power in a 1980 law to appropriate Gilead's patent and license it to generic manufacturers to lower the price and increase availability of the drug.
At first glance, their argument may seem appealing. Unfortunately, the state AGs' letter is another example of populist rhetoric contrary to both law and reason. The state AGs clearly don't understand the law in question — or the drug development process. If they succeed, this would sanction government theft of patents that will chill innovation and harm patients.
First, consider how their proposal rests on a foundation of sand.
The 1980 law they cite, the Bayh-Dole Act, was not enacted for the purpose of government confiscation of patents. Congress enacted this law to facilitate universities and other research institutions to obtain patents and then license their innovations in the marketplace. Before 1980, no one knew who owned inventions if one cent of federal funding was used in the basic research that led to the patent. As a result, life-saving innovations sat on the shelf in the university lab.
Bayh-Dole changed this. As former Sen. Bob Dole, R-Kan., recently observed, his legislation spurred the licensing of new innovations, promoted thousands of startups, and led to massive economic growth. It contributed to the explosion in new drugs over the past 40 years that have turned what were once death sentences into manageable conditions — from cancer to diabetes to hepatitis.
Bayh-Dole does authorize a march-in power for the federal government to take patents and license them under very limited conditions. Contrary to the state AGs' claim, this is not an authorization for the federal government to confiscate patents merely to lower a price by expanding production. The National Institutes of Health has repeatedly stated that "the extraordinary remedy of march-in is not an appropriate means of controlling prices."
Since 1980, bipartisan administrations have consistently rejected lobbying efforts to use the march-in power for the purpose of lowering prices of drugs. They did so for one simple reason: Bayh-Dole does not authorize it.
But there's a more basic legal problem with the state AGs' letter: Bayh-Dole doesn't even apply to remdesivir. The company readily acknowledges working with universities and the U.S. military in testing the drug, but it was invented by and patented by Gilead researchers. The chief patent counsel for the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, or USAMRIID, which assisted Gilead in some of the later-stage testing, recently stated that its contributions did "not qualify USAMRIID as a joint inventor of the compound."
Remdesivir is an example of the miracle drugs created by the modern biopharmaceutical sector. Researchers at Gilead labored for more than a decade and ultimately the company will spend more than a billion dollars in RandD expenditures on the drug. This is typical of the average time and RandD expenditures that lead to all life-enhancing drugs today.
The federal government's total funding of remdesivir's testing, and the additional funding provided in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, ranged from $30 million to $70 million. These federal monies are a minuscule fraction — approximately 3 to 7 — of the total $1 billion plus in private investments ultimately made by Gilead in this life-saving medicine. For this, the state AGs would have the federal government confiscate Gilead's entire patent.
This is not what Bayh-Dole was intended to do, as Dole has made clear. It was not enacted to justify confiscation of the patents that this law made possible in the first place. It was especially not enacted to justify confiscation simply to lower prices given massive disparities in federal funding versus private funding of the RandD in a life-saving drug.
The politicians and activists lobbying since February for the government to invoke its march-in power for any COVID-19 drugs do a disservice to innovators and to the American patients who benefit from the fruits of their inventive labors.
If the government can twist the Bayh-Dole law and arbitrarily decide when to confiscate patents, companies like Gilead will no longer risk billions of dollars and decades of research in creating miracle drugs like remdesivir. We will never see cures for diseases like Alzheimer's and ultimately for pandemics like COVID-19.
Remdesivir substantially reduces COVID mortality – turns case Antrim 7/27 (Aislinn, assistant editor at Pharmacy Times, BA in journalism from the University of North Carolina) “Remdesivir Associated With Reduction in Mortality Rate in Hospitalized Patients with COVID-19,” Pharmacy Times, 7/27/2021 JL Three analyses of large, retrospective, real-world data sets have found that remdesivir was associated with a reduction in mortality rates in patients hospitalized with COVID-19, according to a Gilead press release. Remdesivir is indicated for hospitalized adults and pediatric patients 12 years of age and older and weighing at least 40 kg for the treatment of COVID-19. The 3 data analyses include 98,654 patients who were hospitalized with COVID-19. Two of the studies observed treatment trends and outcomes in the United States using the HealthVerity and Premier Healthcare databases, whereas the third analysis compared clinical outcomes in patients receiving a 10-day treatment course of remdesivir in the extension phase of the SIMPLE-Severe study. “Clinical trials help us understand the efficacy and safety profile of a treatment, but their size can limit our ability to assess all potential aspects of a treatment’s effect due to low event rates in the trials,” said Robert L. Gottlieb, MD, PhD, a cardiologist at the Baylor University Medical Center, in a press release. “Large real-world datasets with greater sample sizes and robust methodologies can be helpful to assess treatment effects in both the overall patient population and in clinically relevant subsets of patients.” This reduction in mortality was observed across a spectrum of baseline oxygen requirements, and the results were consistent at different timeframes over the course of the pandemic and across geographies, according to the researchers. Two of the studies also found that patients who received remdesivir had a significantly increased chance of discharge from the hospital by day 28. The analysis of data from HealthVerity matched 24,856 patients treated with remdesivir 1:1 with matched controls between May 1, 2020, and May 3, 2021. Researchers found that in the overall population, patients receiving remdesivir had a statistically significant 23 lower mortality risk compared with patients in the control arm, regardless of baseline oxygen requirement. Investigators also observed a significantly greater likelihood of discharge by day 28 in patients who completed a full 5-day course of remdesivir compared with patients in the control arm. This result was most pronounced in patients with lower oxygen requirements at baseline. Similarly, an analysis of data from the Premier Healthcare Database found that patients treated with remdesivir had a significantly lower risk of mortality at days 14 and 28 compared with patients who did not receive remdesivir. Patients who received remdesivir and either no oxygen, low-flow oxygen, invasive mechanical ventilation, or extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) at baseline had a significantly lower risk of 14-day mortality. A significant reduction in mortality was also seen at day 28 for these same groups of patients, and patients on high-flow oxygen at baseline who received remdesivir also had significantly lower 14-day mortality. At 28 days, the difference in mortality in patients receiving high-flow oxygen at baseline was not statistically significant. The SIMPLE-Severe study evaluated hospitalized adult patients with severe COVID-19. Investigators found that in the overall population, treatment with remdesivir was associated with a statistically significant 54 lower mortality risk at 28 days compared to patients who were not treated with remdesivir, regardless of baseline oxygen requirements. Furthermore, patients who completed a full 10-day course of treatment had a significantly shorter time to discharge within 28 days, compared to patients who did not receive remdesivir. The result for time to discharge was not significant for patients receiving mechanical ventilation or ECMO at baseline. Finally, in the double-blind, placebo-controlled ACTT-1 clinical trial, investigators noted a trend toward reduced mortality at day 29 among patients who were treated with remdesivir compared with placebo, although this result was not statistically significant. Researchers also conducted a post-hoc analysis with no adjustment for multiple testing and determined that patients who required low-flow oxygen at baseline and who received remdesivir achieved a statistically significant 70 reduction in mortality at day 29, although this reduction was not statistically significant in the other groups.
10/16/21
SEPTOCT - CP - Sui Generis
Tournament: St Marks | Round: 3 | Opponent: Westwood AG | Judge: Kristiana Baez CP: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should establish a sui generis right for holders of traditional knowledge. That solves the aff by preventing biopiracy while ensuring indigenous communities can use IP as an economic bargaining chip Garcia 07 (Javier, attorney at Perkins Coie LLP in Seattle, Washington, J.D. from Gonzaga University School of Law and B.A. from the University of Redlands) “Fighting Biopiracy: The Legislative Protection of Traditional Knowledge,” Berkeley La Raza Law Journal,” 3/2007 JL The establishment of a sui generis right for holders of traditional knowledge would provide compensation for communities that do not otherwise qualify for patent protection. Under Article 8 of the TRIPS agreement, countries can adopt legislation to protect "sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development."'' 7 s A sui generis right could therefore be adopted in conjunction with domestic legislation as a catch-all provision pursuant to Article 8. The nature of a traditional knowledge sui generis right is detailed below. Establishing a sui generis right for traditional knowledge holders could resolve problems stemming from patent law's limited term of protection. 7 6 Foremost among them is that certain forms of traditional knowledge may fall under the realm of public domain, and thus, be exempt from any patent protection. 7 Likewise, some traditional knowledge holders may also seek terms of protection that are incompatible with patent law, seek to prevent any sharing of their knowledge, or seek exclusive rights over their knowledge for an unlimited amount of time. 7 1 Such efforts would prove at odds with current patent law, which only rewards patent . . ... . '79 protection for a limited period of time to enable further innovations. Although a sui generis right could address some of these concerns, traditional knowledge holders will likely have to make sacrifices to avoid the misappropriation of their intellectual property rights. For example, the documentation of traditional knowledge will ultimately submit any documented traditional knowledge to the public domain. This may prove contradictory to the values of some traditional knowledge holders who wish to maintain ownership and control of their knowledge forever; nonetheless, it is an adaptation that must be made to avoid the exploitation of traditional knowledge. A traditional knowledge sui generis right could also overcome patent law's relative incompatibility with communal ownership. Confronting this hurdle is necessary since it may be against communal customs for an individual to own knowledge developed and modified over many generations.' Recognition of a sui generis right could also overcome barriers posed by international patent standards that require that an invention be new and subject to industrial applicability. I5 ' Finally, a sui generis right could modify patent law with respect to traditional knowledge holders to allow benefit sharing among communities not considered inventors under current patent law. For example, in 2004, the University of California, Berkeley, signed an agreement with the Samoan government to isolate from an indigenous tree the gene for a promising anti-AIDS drug and to share any royalties from sale of a gene-derived drug with the people of Samoa. 182 The agreement, signed by the prime minister of Samoa and U.C. Berkeley's Vice Chancellor for research, allocates Samoa's fifty percent share to the government, villages, and the families of healers who first shared the knowledge of how to use the plant. 18 Under the agreement, any commercial developer must "first negotiate an equitable benefit-sharing agreement with Samoa."' 184 This landmark agreement could be duplicated in Mexico under domestic legislation. Agreements like these may pose a problem given the amount of government corruption in Mexico and other 185 developing countries. Nevertheless, it may be the lesser of the two evils. Under domestic legislation or a sui generis right, compensation from patent royalties would be guaranteed at least to the State and would hopefully be spent in Mexico, rather than abroad. Furthermore, local government officials may be more entitled to compensation from profitable traditional knowledge than foreign, corporations. An effective dispute resolution mechanism is necessary to make domestic legislation successful. First, it allows a country to establish jurisdiction over foreign companies that enter the country to extract resources. The mere existence of a dispute resolution process places foreign companies on notice that they are subject to jurisdiction and criminal or civil liability for violative conduct, such as environmental damage resulting from the excavation of resources, misappropriation of intellectual property rights, and civil rights violations. Currently, foreign companies are entering sovereign territories without permission, but governments do not have the legislation in place to regulate them effectively. 186 A dispute resolution mechanism will force entities to abide by the laws and regulations established by the proposed legislation. The mechanism should provide a dispute resolution process for domestic conflicts and conflicts involving other sovereign states, thus requiring two levels of dispute-resolution. The first level should be for States to resolve disputes. The second level should provide a dispute-resolution mechanism for private parties who claim ownership of traditional knowledge, such as two tribal communities claiming ownership over the same traditional knowledge. 189 This level of dispute resolution will adjudicate intellectual property rights among all domestic entities, including indigenous communities, local inventors, corporations, or any other patent applicants claiming ownership of traditional knowledge. The protection of traditional knowledge is vital to underdeveloped countries. Traditional knowledge is one of the few resources and bargaining chips these countries still retain. Accordingly, Mexico and other underdeveloped countries should protect themselves from the misappropriation of traditional knowledge that has already begun. Adopting domestic legislation provides the best means to regulate and control foreign entities seeking to extract and exploit traditional knowledge from vulnerable indigenous communities. It competes:
The CP is anti-topical action IPTF 04 (International Intellectual Property Institute, not-for-profit 501 corporation that provides education and training on intellectual property) “Is a Sui Generis System Necessary?” 1/14/2004 JL WIPO and the WTO are in the process of establishing international rules for the protection of biodiversity. One of the key questions under consideration is whether or not to create a sui generis system to establish the norms and rules for protection. A “sui generis” system simply means “one that is of its own kind1 ”. In this case it refers to the creation of a new national law or the establishment of international norms that would afford protection to intellectual property dealing with genetic resources -or biodiversity - and the biotechnology that might result. It also refers to a law that might protect creations, inventions, models, drawings, designs, innovations contained in images, figures, symbols, petroglyphs, art, music, history and other traditional artistic expressions.
2. Eliminate means get rid of – the CP doesn’t get rid of IP protections, just changes who they’re afforded to Oxford n.d. “Eliminate,” Oxford Languages JL completely remove or get rid of (something).
10/16/21
SEPTOCT - CP - Topic PIC
Tournament: Meadows | Round: 4 | Opponent: Martin Luther King JO | Judge: Gabriela Gonzalez CP: I endorse the entirety of the 1AC minus its call to reduce intellectual property protection for traditional medicines.
10/30/21
SEPTOCT - CP - WHO
Tournament: Loyola | Round: 3 | Opponent: Orange Lutheran AZ | Judge: Asher Towner CP: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should enter into a prior and binding consultation with the World Health Organization over eliminating patents for medicines. Member nations will support the proposal and adopt the results of consultation.
WHO says yes – it supports increasing the availability of generics and limiting TRIPS Hoen 03 (Ellen T., researcher at the University Medical Centre at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands who has been listed as one of the 50 most influential people in intellectual property by the journal Managing Intellectual Property, PhD from the University of Groningen) “TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines: Seattle, Doha and Beyond,” Chicago Journal of International Law, 2003 JL However, subsequent resolutions of the World Health Assembly have strengthened the WHO’s mandate in the trade arena. In 2001, the World Health Assembly adopted two resolutions in particular that had a bearing on the debate over TRIPS 30. The resolutions addressed: – the need to strengthen policies to increase the availability of generic drugs; – and the need to evaluate the impact of TRIPS on access to drugs, local manufacturing capacity, and the development of new drugs
Consultation displays strong leadership, authority, and cohesion among member states which are key to WTO legitimacy Gostin et al 15 (Lawrence O., Linda D. and Timothy J. O’Neill Professor of Global Health Law at Georgetown University, Faculty Director of the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Director of the World Health Organization Collaborating Center on Public Health Law and Human Rights, JD from Duke University) “The Normative Authority of the World Health Organization,” Georgetown University Law Center, 5/2/2015 JL Members want the WHO to exert leadership, harmonize disparate activities, and set priorities. Yet they resist intrusions into their sovereignty, and want to exert control. In other words, ‘everyone desires coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated.’ States often ardently defend their geostrategic interests. As the Indonesian virus-sharing episode illustrates, the WHO is pulled between power blocs, with North America and Europe (the primary funders) on one side and emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and India on the other. An inherent tension exists between richer ‘net contributor’ states and poorer ‘net recipient’ states, with the former seeking smaller WHO budgets and the latter larger budgets. Overall, national politics drive self-interest, with states resisting externally imposed obligations for funding and action. Some political leaders express antipathy to, even distrust of, UN institutions, viewing them as bureaucratic and inefficient. In this political environment, it is unsurprising that members fail to act as shareholders. Ebola placed into stark relief the failure of the international community to increase capacities as required by the IHR. Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone had some of the world's weakest health systems, with little capacity to either monitor or respond to the Ebola epidemic.20 This caused enormous suffering in West Africa and placed countries throughout the region e and the world e at risk. Member states should recognize that the health of their citizens depends on strengthening others' capacity. The WHO has a central role in creating systems to facilitate and encourage such cooperation. The WHO cannot succeed unless members act as shareholders, foregoing a measure of sovereignty for the global common good. It is in all states' interests to have a strong global health leader, safeguarding health security, building health systems, and reducing health inequalities. But that will not happen unless members fund the Organization generously, grant it authority and flexibility, and hold it accountable. WHO diplomacy solves great power conflict Murphy 20 (Chris, U.S. senator from Connecticut serving on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee) “The Answer is to Empower, Not Attack, the World Health Organization,” War on the Rocks, 4/21/2020 JL The World Health Organization is critical to stopping disease outbreaks and strengthening public health systems in developing countries, where COVID-19 is starting to appear. Yemen announced its first infection earlier this month, and other countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East are at severe risk. Millions of refugees rely on the World Health Organization for their health care, and millions of children rely on the WHO and UNICEF to access vaccines. The World Health Organization is not perfect, but its team of doctors and public health experts have had major successes. Their most impressive claim to fame is the eradication of smallpox – no small feat. More recently, the World Health Organization has led an effort to rid the world of two of the three strains of polio, and they are close to completing the trifecta. These investments are not just the right thing to do; they benefit the United States. Improving health outcomes abroad provides greater political and economic stability, increasing demand for U.S. exports. And, as we are all learning now, it is in America’s national security interest for countries to effectively detect and respond to potential pandemics before they reach our shores. As the United States looks to develop a new global system of pandemic prevention, there is absolutely no way to do that job without the World Health Organization. Uniquely, it puts traditional adversaries – like Russia and the United States, India and Pakistan, or Iran and Saudi Arabia – all around the same big table to take on global health challenges. It has relationships with the public health leaders of every nation, decades of experience in tackling viruses and diseases, and the ability to bring countries together to tackle big projects. This ability to bridge divides and work across borders cannot be torn down and recreated – not in today’s environment of major power competition – and so there is simply no way to build an effective international anti-pandemic infrastructure without the World Health Organization at the center.
WHO is critical to disease prevention – it is the only international institution that can disperse information, standardize global public health, and facilitate public-private cooperation Murtugudde 20 (Raghu, professor of atmospheric and oceanic science at the University of Maryland, PhD in mechanical engineering from Columbia University) “Why We Need the World Health Organization Now More Than Ever,” Science, 4/19/2020 JL WHO continues to play an indispensable role during the current COVID-19 outbreak itself. In November 2018, the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine organised a workshop to explore lessons from past influenza outbreaks and so develop recommendations for pandemic preparedness for 2030. The salient findings serve well to underscore the critical role of WHO for humankind. The world’s influenza burden has only increased in the last two decades, a period in which there have also been 30 new zoonotic diseases. A warming world with increasing humidity, lost habitats and industrial livestock/poultry farming has many opportunities for pathogens to move from animals and birds to humans. Increasing global connectivity simply catalyses this process, as much as it catalyses economic growth. WHO coordinates health research, clinical trials, drug safety, vaccine development, surveillance, virus sharing, etc. The importance of WHO’s work on immunisation across the globe, especially with HIV, can hardly be overstated. It has a rich track record of collaborating with private-sector organisations to advance research and development of health solutions and improving their access in the global south. It discharges its duties while maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between such diverse and powerful forces as national securities, economic interests, human rights and ethics. COVID-19 has highlighted how political calculations can hamper data-sharing and mitigation efforts within and across national borders, and WHO often simply becomes a convenient political scapegoat in such situations. International Health Regulations, a 2005 agreement between 196 countries to work together for global health security, focuses on detection, assessment and reporting of public health events, and also includes non-pharmaceutical interventions such as travel and trade restrictions. WHO coordinates and helps build capacity to implement IHR.
9/4/21
SEPTOCT - DA - Fisheries
Tournament: Nano Nagle | Round: 2 | Opponent: Harker DV | Judge: Sam McLoughlin WTO is near consensus on fisheries subsidies – success will require continued focus, flexibility, and cooperation among members WTO 7/15 (World Trade Organization) “WTO members edge closer to fisheries subsidies agreement,” News and Events, 7/15/2021 JL During an all-day meeting with 104 ministers and heads of delegation, WTO members pledged to conclude the negotiations soon and certainly before the WTO's Ministerial Conference in early December, and to empower their Geneva-based delegations to do so. Members also confirmed that the negotiating text currently before them can be used as the basis for the talks to strike the final deal. “I feel new hope this evening. Because ministers and heads of delegation today demonstrated a strong commitment to moving forward and doing the hard work needed to get these negotiations to the finish line. I applaud you for this. In 20 years of negotiations, this is the closest we have ever come towards reaching an outcome — a high-quality outcome that would contribute to building a sustainable blue economy,” said Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. “One fundamental conclusion that I draw from your interventions today is that members are ready to use the text as the basis for future negotiations. A second takeaway from today was that there is universal agreement about the importance of the food and livelihood security of artisanal fishers in developing and least developed countries. The prospect for a deal in the autumn ahead of our Ministerial Conference has clearly improved.” The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that one-third of global fish stocks are overfished and most of the rest is fully exploited. This is up from 10 in 1970 and 27 in 2000. Depleted stocks threaten the food security of low-income coastal communities, and the livelihoods of poor and vulnerable fishers who must go further and further from shore only to bring back smaller and smaller hauls. Each year, governments hand out around $35 billion in fisheries subsidies, two-thirds of which go to commercial fishers. These subsidies keep at sea vessels which would otherwise be economically unviable. World leaders in 2015 made a fisheries subsidies agreement by 2020 part of the Sustainable Development Goals and trade ministers reaffirmed this pledge in 2017. The negotiations on fisheries subsidies disciplines have been ongoing for nearly 20 years. Although there has been recent progress thanks to the intensive work that led to the development of the negotiating text on which members are working, the lack of political impetus in the talks to close the remaining gaps inspired Director-General Okonjo-Iweala to call this meeting of ministers. Among the thorniest issues to resolve has been how to extend special and differential treatment to developing and least developed country WTO members while preserving the overall objective of enhanced sustainability of the oceans. Ministers said that the livelihoods and food security of poor and vulnerable artisanal fishers in developing and least developed countries were of great importance, as was preserving the sustainability objective of the negotiations. Amb. Santiago Wills of Colombia, who chairs the Rules Negotiating Group overseeing the fisheries subsidies negotiations, said he had received some valuable inputs from the discussions. He now has greater clarity on the path forward and the next steps that would be required to harvest an agreement. He will be consulting with the Director-General and WTO members about charting the path forward for the next stage of the talks. “I am very heartened by the responses and messages that we have heard today. What we sought from ministers today was political guidance to help close these negotiations soon. And we did hear that guidance. We have been given the ingredients to reach a successful conclusion; a commitment to finish well ahead of our Ministerial Conference a text that can be the platform for this final stage of the negotiations and fully empowered heads of delegations in Geneva. This represents a real success,” said Amb. Wills. The Director-General said that delegations needed to prepare for an intensive period of line by line negotiations. “As we enter this new phase of text-based discussions, the responsibility to conclude these negotiations is truly in the hands of members. To get from here to an agreement, it will be your job to find the necessary trade-offs and flexibilities. A successful outcome by MC12 is ultimately your responsibility,” she said. “The world is watching. The fisheries subsidies negotiations are a test both of the WTO's credibility as a multilateral negotiating forum and of the trading system's ability to respond to problems of the global commons. If we wait another 20 years, there may be no marine fisheries left to subsidise — or artisanal fishing communities to support.”
IP disputes fragment WTO unity and trade off with subsidies negotiation Patnaik 3/12 (Priti, journalist in Geneva, Switzerland, master’s in Development Studies from The Graduate Institute in Geneva and a master’s in Business and Economic Reporting from New York University) “Could Vaccine Nationalism Spur Disputes At The WTO?” Geneva Health Files, 3/12/2021 JL To protect domestic manufacturers and constituencies, countries may resort to filing disputes, if only to send a signal to other members, experts believe. To be sure, this is not only about vaccines. Going forward, export restrictions on raw materials can have implications for therapeutics as well. So the threat of a dispute may be a tool to deal with competition for scarce medical products during the pandemic, experts say. Although trade restrictive measures are short-sighted and not a preferred policy option, governments see them as powerful instruments to meet political goals, to send a message to domestic stakeholders, sources said. “My hunch is that all countries are sort of sitting on both sides of the fence. On the one hand, governments would like to maintain the discretion and the ability to impose export restrictions if they need to or if they think they need to. Whether that is medical products or personal protective equipment. On the other hand, everybody dislikes it when other countries impose export restrictions. So I think there is enough of an incentive for countries to sit down and negotiate,” one legal expert noted. Sources also pointed to political declarations last year where WTO members came together and said that they would not impose restrictive trade measures. “In order to be constructive, countries decided that they were going to signal to members that will not introduce exports restrictive measures even though it may be expedient to do so,” one trade expert said. The way out, some feel, is to find solution to placing limits on export restrictions. It is not just trade restrictive measures that could result in trade disputes. The heated political discussions on the TRIPS waiver at WTO is also aggravating the potential for disputes, according to experts involved in litigations in international trade in Geneva. Therefore these ostensibly independent processes, can catalyse disputes. “The waiver discussion is very heated and it is aggravating the discussion on the EU's export restrictions. If the waiver succeeds, then the opposing members cannot do anything about it. So they will be looking at other ways to beat up on behavior they do not like on the COVID-19 front,” one trade law expert said. Do not rule out disputes against supporters of the TRIPS waiver proposal, in case the waiver is adopted, the source added. In their statement at the WTO General Council meeting last week, the EU said, “In order to ensure that vaccines and their ingredients are not directed to export destinations in unjustified volumes, the European Union had no choice but to introduce a transparency mechanism on Covid-19 vaccine export transactions.” The EU has said that the measures are WTO-consistent. It added “Since the entry into force of the scheme on the 1 February, we have received 150 requests for export authorisation. All of them have been accepted. I repeat, all of them.” This week, the European Commission extended transparency and authorisation mechanism for exports of COVID-19 vaccines. The EU is also a part of the Ottawa Group proposal on Trade and Health that also spells out commitments towards export restrictions. (See also E.U. Exports Millions of Covid Vaccine Doses Despite Supply Crunch at Home) “Members bring disputes all the time, even when they know that it's going to take a long time to get a result and often they bring a dispute as leverage for negotiations. Filing a dispute does not mean they are looking for a solution. It does not mean the dispute will be litigated all the way to the end,” a trade lawyer said. It could also result in a negotiated arrangement, like it was in 2001 in the U.S.-Brazil case. “Why did the U.S. bring a case against Brazil? It gave them leverage in negotiations, and to satisfy domestic stakeholders,” the lawyer added. The impasse at the Appellate Body may not be a deterrent for countries to dissuade countries from bringing a dispute, some believe. “The Appellate Body not being functional is not a problem. Countries have recourse to Article 25 under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) that provides for ‘expeditious arbitration as a alternate means to dispute settlement’,” a source involved in the WTO litigation process said. (The EU, for example, is a signatory to the Multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement, MPIA.) While disputes may take up precious energy and resources of members already stretched in fighting to address the pandemic, it may likely be a strategy to address trade protectionism. Not all agree. “I think the law is not really an answer here, I hate to say that because I'm a lawyer. But I really don't think the law is an answer because the law is so generically drafted right that and it's politically so sensitive. Which WTO panel will tell a member that restricting vaccines is not legitimate? It will ultimately harm the legitimacy of the trading system,” the person added.
Overfishing collapses biodiversity DUJS 12 (Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science, official open access science journal of Dartmouth College, publishing original scientific research, multidisciplinary review articles, and science news) “The Threats of Overfishing: Consequences at the Commercial Level,” 3/11/2012 JL According to marine ecologists, overfishing is the greatest threat to ocean ecosystems today (1). Overfishing occurs because fish are captured at a faster rate than they can reproduce (2). Advanced fishing technology and an increased demand for fish have led to overfishing, causing several marine species to become extinct or endangered as a result (3, 4). In the long-term, overfishing can have a devastating impact on ocean communities as it destabilizes the food chain and destroys the natural habitats of many aquatic species (2). In the past, fishing was more sustainable because fishermen could not access every location and because they had a limited capacity for fish aboard their vessels. Today, however, small trawlers and fishing boats have been replaced by giant factory ships that can capture and process extremely large amounts of prey at a given time (2). These ships use sonar instruments and global positioning systems (GPS) to rapidly locate large schools of fish (1). Fishing lines are deployed with thousands of large hooks that can reach areas up to 120 kilometers deep. The trawling vessels and machines can even reach depths of 170 kilometers and can store an extraordinarily large volume of fish. Each year, these huge trawling ships comb an area twice the size of the United States. They use massive nets 50 meters wide with the capacity to pull the weight of a medium-sized plane (2). They also have several plants for processing and packing fish, large freezing systems, fishmeal processing plants, and powerful engines that can carry this enormous fishing gear around the ocean. Because these ships have all the equipment necessary to freeze and tin fish, they only need to return to their base once they are full. Even when the ships are filled, however, the fish are often transferred to refrigerated vessels in the middle of the ocean and are processed for consumption later (4). As such, industrial fishing has expanded considerably and fishermen can now explore new shores and deeper waters to keep up with the increased demand for seafood. In fact, it has been reported by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) that over 70 percent of the world’s fisheries are either ‘fully exploited’, ‘over exploited’ or ‘significantly depleted’ (5). The annual total global catch of fish is 124 million metric tons, which is equivalent in weight to 378 Empire State Buildings (2). Fishing gear is often non-selective in the fish it targets. For example, any fish that are too big to get through the mesh of a net are captured. Therefore, overfishing does not only threaten the species of fish that is targeted for food, but also many non-target species. As a result, these other species, including marine mammals and seabirds, are accidentally caught in the fishing gear and killed (6). For example, for every ton of prawn caught, three tons of other fish are killed and thrown away. Those in the trade refer to this practice of inadvertent catching of other species as bycatch (4). The FAO has pointed out that about 25 percent of the world’s captured fish end up thrown overboard because they are caught unintentionally, are illegal market species, or are of inferior quality and size. Many of the fish caught this way include endangered and over exploited species, 95 percent of which are eventually thrown away (2). Bycatch is not just limited to just unwanted fish, but rather affects all types of marine life, including whales, dolphins, porpoises, fur seals, albatrosses, and turtles. For example, tuna fisheries are indirectly responsible for the deaths of an estimated one million sharks annually due to bycatch. Small cetaceans, such as dolphins and porpoises, are also targets of bycatch as they are often caught in fishing nets. In fact, hundreds of dolphin corpses are washed up on the beaches of Europe every year, bringing attention to the growing scale of this problem (6). Many modern fishing methods are also irreversibly destructive. For example, bottom trawling, a technique that uses extremely wide nets armed with heavy metal rollers, can crush everything in the path of the gear, destroying fragile corals, smashing rock formations, and killing several tons of fish and animals as bycatch (7). As such, these practices can wreak havoc on delicate marine ecosystems. Not surprisingly, it has been reported that industrial fishing takes between only 10 and 15 years to wipe out a tenth of whichever species it targets (2). In fact, several marine species have already been fished to commercial extinction, and this number is rapidly increasing (1). One of the reasons for this is that the regulation of fishing vessels and the fishing industry is universally inadequate. Roughly two-thirds of the ocean is free of laws and fishing vessels only follow the laws ratified by their country of origin. However, most fishing countries have not ratified any international convention to protect the sea or marine life (2). Moreover, fishing factory ships and companies are given access to fisheries before the long–term impact of their fishing practices is understood (1). Today, the number of fish caught worldwide is actually shrinking as the fishing industry is in decline from many years of overfishing (2). The year 1988 was the first time in human history that global wild fish catches dropped and they have continued to fall ever since. In European waters, four out of every five known fish stocks are already beyond safe biological limits (7). Illegal and unreported fishing have also contributed a great deal to the depletion of the oceans and continues to be a serious problem. A new study conducted by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) found that 5 out of the 8 tuna species are at risk of extinction (8). All three species of bluefin tuna, for example, are threatened with extinction and are at a population that makes their recovery practically irreversible (2). The IUCN has also reported that freshwater fish are among the most endangered species, with more than a third facing extinction. Not surprisingly, among those at the greatest risk are species like the Mekong giant catfish, the freshwater stingray, and the European eel, which are used to make some of the most expensive caviars. The Mekong giant catfish is the closest to extinction, with as few as 250 left. Overfishing has reduced the numbers of Mekong freshwater stingray by over 50 percent in Southeast Asia and has reduced the giant Mekong salmon carp population by over 90 percent (9). As previously mentioned, shark populations have also been greatly affected by overfishing. There are already more than 135 species of shark on the IUCN’s list of endangered animals and more are being added each year. For example, the number of scalloped hammerhead shark has decreased by 99 over the past 30 years. Other species recently added to the endangered list include the smooth hammerhead, shortfin mako, common thresher, big-eye thresher, silky, tiger, bull, and dusky (10). Besides being caught as bycatch, sharks are now also being targeted by commercial fishermen for their fins which can fetch a substantial price on the Asian food market. Sharks are particularly vulnerable to exploitation because they have long life spans, are exceptionally slow to mature (taking as long as 16 years in some cases), and are relatively unprolific breeders (11). Recent reports suggest that over fishing has caused a 90 decline in shark populations across the world’s oceans and up to 99 along the US east coast, which are some of the best managed waters in the world. Because sharks are at the top of the food chain, a decline in their numbers has devastating consequences on marine ecosystems (10). Overfishing impacts not just the particular species that is exploited, but also damages other species of fish and disrupts local ecosystems. The stability of ecological communities depends largely on the interactions between predators and prey (12). Thereby, the balance of the food chain is disturbed when certain species are removed. As a result, many ocean species are disappearing and losing their habitats. The evolutionary process of marine species is also being altered, causing cycles of premature reproduction and relative decreases in the size of fish across generations. As predators diminish, the populations of smaller fish escalate because they were previously the food source of the bigger fish. In addition, the disappearance of these species affects many other species, like seabirds and sea mammals, which are vulnerable to the lack of food (2). A recent study found that overfishing is also decreasing the genetic diversity of fish worldwide. Diversity is projected to be reduced further if overfishing continues at the same rate (13). This has serious effects on nutrient recycling in marine ecosystems because fish species vary widely in their rates of nitrogen and phosphorus excretion. As such, altering fish communities creates divergent nutrient recycling patterns and disrupts the functioning of the ecosystem. Recently conducted studies in lakes affected by overfishing show that loss of species contributes to a decline in nutrient recycling and destabilizes the ecosystem (14). While it is often overlooked for other environmental issues, overfishing has historically caused more ecological extinction than any other human influence on coastal ecosystems, including water pollution (5). Unfortunately, due to a lack of data, the extent of this damage has only recently been recognized (15).
Continued biodiversity loss causes extinction Carrington 18 (Damian, the Guardian's Environment editor) "Humanity has wiped out 60 of a animal populations since 1970, report finds," The Guardian, 10/29/18 TDI Humanity has wiped out 60 of mammals, birds, fish and reptiles since 1970, leading the world’s foremost experts to warn that the annihilation of wildlife is now an emergency that threatens civilisation. The new estimate of the massacre of wildlife is made in a major report produced by WWF and involving 59 scientists from across the globe. It finds that the vast and growing consumption of food and resources by the global population is destroying the web of life, billions of years in the making, upon which human society ultimately depends for clean air, water and everything else. “We are sleepwalking towards the edge of a cliff” said Mike Barrett, executive director of science and conservation at WWF. “If there was a 60 decline in the human population, that would be equivalent to emptying North America, South America, Africa, Europe, China and Oceania. That is the scale of what we have done.” “This is far more than just being about losing the wonders of nature, desperately sad though that is,” he said. “This is actually now jeopardising the future of people. Nature is not a ‘nice to have’ – it is our life-support system.” “We are rapidly running out of time,” said Prof Johan Rockström, a global sustainability expert at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research in Germany. “Only by addressing both ecosystems and climate do we stand a chance of safeguarding a stable planet for humanity’s future on Earth.” Many scientists believe the world has begun a sixth mass extinction, the first to be caused by a species – Homo sapiens. Other recent analyses have revealed that humankind has destroyed 83 of all mammals and half of plants since the dawn of civilisation and that, even if the destruction were to end now, it would take 5-7 million years for the natural world to recover. The Living Planet Index, produced for WWF by the Zoological Society of London, uses data on 16,704 populations of mammals, birds, fish, reptiles and amphibians, representing more than 4,000 species, to track the decline of wildlife. Between 1970 and 2014, the latest data available, populations fell by an average of 60. Four years ago, the decline was 52. The “shocking truth”, said Barrett, is that the wildlife crash is continuing unabated. Wildlife and the ecosystems are vital to human life, said Prof Bob Watson, one of the world’s most eminent environmental scientists and currently chair of an intergovernmental panel on biodiversity that said in March that the destruction of nature is as dangerous as climate change. “Nature contributes to human wellbeing culturally and spiritually, as well as through the critical production of food, clean water, and energy, and through regulating the Earth’s climate, pollution, pollination and floods,” he said. “The Living Planet report clearly demonstrates that human activities are destroying nature at an unacceptable rate, threatening the wellbeing of current and future generations.” The biggest cause of wildlife losses is the destruction of natural habitats, much of it to create farmland. Three-quarters of all land on Earth is now significantly affected by human activities. Killing for food is the next biggest cause – 300 mammal species are being eaten into extinction – while the oceans are massively overfished, with more than half now being industrially fished. Chemical pollution is also significant: half the world’s killer whale populations are now doomed to die from PCB contamination. Global trade introduces invasive species and disease, with amphibians decimated by a fungal disease thought to be spread by the pet trade. The worst affected region is South and Central America, which has seen an 89 drop in vertebrate populations, largely driven by the felling of vast areas of wildlife-rich forest. In the tropical savannah called cerrado, an area the size of Greater London is cleared every two months, said Barrett. “It is a classic example of where the disappearance is the result of our own consumption, because the deforestation is being driven by ever expanding agriculture producing soy, which is being exported to countries including the UK to feed pigs and chickens,” he said. The UK itself has lost much of its wildlife, ranking 189th for biodiversity loss out of 218 nations in 2016. The habitats suffering the greatest damage are rivers and lakes, where wildlife populations have fallen 83, due to the enormous thirst of agriculture and the large number of dams. “Again there is this direct link between the food system and the depletion of wildlife,” said Barrett. Eating less meat is an essential part of reversing losses, he said. The Living Planet Index has been criticised as being too broad a measure of wildlife losses and smoothing over crucial details. But all indicators, from extinction rates to intactness of ecosystems, show colossal losses. “They all tell you the same story,” said Barrett. Conservation efforts can work, with tiger numbers having risen 20 in India in six years as habitat is protected. Giant pandas in China and otters in the UK have also been doing well. But Marco Lambertini, director general of WWF International, said the fundamental issue was consumption: “We can no longer ignore the impact of current unsustainable production models and wasteful lifestyles.”
10/9/21
SEPTOCT - DA - Innovation
Tournament: Loyola | Round: 2 | Opponent: Sam Barlow EL | Judge: Julian Kuffour Biotech industry strong now. Cancherini et al. 4/30 (Laura, Engagement Manager @ McKinsey and Company, Joseph Lydon, Associate Partner @ McKinsey and Company, Jorge Santos Da Silva, Senior Partner at McKinsey and Company, and Alexandra Zemp, Partner at McKinsey and Company), “What’s ahead for biotech: Another wave or low tide?“, McKinsey and Company, 4-30-2021, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/whats-ahead-for-biotech-another-wave-or-low-tide TDI As the pandemic spread across the globe in early 2020, biotech leaders were initially pessimistic, reassessing their cash position and financing constraints. When McKinsey and BioCentury interviewed representatives from 106 biotech companies in May 2020,4 half of those interviewed were expecting delays in financing, and about 80 percent were tight on cash for the next two years and considering trade-offs such as deferring IPOs and acquisitions. Executives feared that valuations would decline because of lower revenue projections and concerns about clinical-trial delays, salesforce-effectiveness gaps, and other operational issues. Belying this downbeat mood, biotech has in fact had one of its best years so far. By January 2021, venture capitalists had invested some 60 percent more than they had in January 2020, with more than $3 billion invested worldwide in January 2021 alone.5 IPO activity grew strongly: there were 19 more closures than in the same period in 2020, with an average of $150 million per raise, 17 percent more than in 2020. Other deals have also had a bumper start to 2021, with the average deal size reaching more than $500 million, up by more than 66 percent on the 2020 average (Exhibit 3).6 What about SPACs? The analysis above does not include special-purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), which have recently become significant in IPOs in several industries. Some biotech investors we interviewed believe that SPACs represent a route to an IPO. How SPACs will evolve remains to be seen, but biotechs may be part of their story. Fundamentals continue strong When we asked executives and investors why the biotech sector had stayed so resilient during the worst economic crisis in decades, they cited innovation as the main reason. The number of assets transitioning to clinical phases is still rising, and further waves of innovation are on the horizon, driven by the convergence of biological and technological advances. In the present day, many biotechs, along with the wider pharmaceutical industry, are taking steps to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Together, biotechs and pharma companies have more than 250 vaccine candidates in their pipelines, along with a similar number of therapeutics. What’s more, the crisis has shone a spotlight on pharma as the public seeks to understand the roadblocks involved in delivering a vaccine at speed and the measures needed to maintain safety and efficacy standards. To that extent, the world has been living through a time of mass education in science research and development. Biotech has also benefited from its innate financial resilience. Healthcare as a whole is less dependent on economic cycles than most other industries. Biotech is an innovator, actively identifying and addressing patients’ unmet needs. In addition, biotechs’ top-line revenues have been less affected by lockdowns than is the case in most other industries. Another factor acting in the sector’s favor is that larger pharmaceutical companies still rely on biotechs as a source of innovation. With the top dozen pharma companies having more than $170 billion in excess reserves that could be available for spending on MandA, the prospects for further financing and deal making look promising. For these and other reasons, many investors regard biotech as a safe haven. One interviewee felt it had benefited from a halo effect during the pandemic. More innovation on the horizon The investors and executives we interviewed agreed that biotech innovation continues to increase in quality and quantity despite the macroeconomic environment. Evidence can be seen in the accelerating pace of assets transitioning across the development lifecycle. When we tracked the number of assets transitioning to Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III clinical trials, we found that Phase I and Phase II assets have transitioned 50 percent faster since 2018 than between 2013 and 2018, whereas Phase III assets have maintained much the same pace. There could be many reasons for this, but it is worth noting that biotechs with Phase I and Phase II assets as their lead assets have accounted for more than half of biotech IPOs. Having an early IPO gives a biotech earlier access to capital and leaves it with more scope to concentrate on science. Looking forward, the combination of advances in biological science and accelerating developments in technology and artificial intelligence has the potential to take innovation to a new level. A recent report from the McKinsey Global Institute analyzed the profound economic and social impact of biological innovation and found that biomolecules, biosystems, biomachines, and biocomputing could collectively produce up to 60 percent of the physical inputs to the global economy. The applications of this “Bio Revolution” range from agriculture (such as the production of nonanimal meat) to energy and materials, and from consumer goods (such as multi-omics tailored diets) to a multitude of health applications.
IP protections are key to innovation – recouping startup costs and high risk of failure Grabowski et al 15 (Henry, Professor of Economics, member of the faculty for the Health Sector Management Program, and Director of the Program in Pharmaceuticals and Health Economics at Duke University) “The Roles of Patents and Research And Development Incentives In Biopharmaceutical Innovation,” Health Affairs, 2/2015 JL The essential rationale for patent protection for biopharmaceuticals is that long-term benefits in the form of continued future innovation by pioneer or brand-name drug manufacturers outweigh the relatively short-term restrictions on imitative cost competition associated with market exclusivity. Regardless, the entry of other branded agents remains an important source of therapeutic competition during the patent term. Several economic characteristics make patents and intellectual property protection particularly important to innovation incentives for the biopharmaceutical industry. 5 The RandD process often takes more than a decade to complete, and according to a recent analysis by Joseph DiMasi and colleagues, per new drug approval (including failed attempts), it involves more than a billion dollars in out-of-pocket costs. 6 Only approximately one in eight drug candidates survive clinical testing. 6 As a result of the high risks of failure and the high costs, research and development must be funded by the few successful, on-market products (the top quintile of marketed products provide the dominant share of RandD returns). 7,8 Once a new drug’s patent term and any regulatory exclusivity provisions have expired, competing manufacturers are allowed to sell generic equivalents that require the investment of only several million dollars and that have a high likelihood of commercial success. Absent intellectual property protections that allow marketing exclusivity, innovative firms would be unlikely to make the costly and risky investments needed to bring a new drug to market. Patents confer the right to exclude competitors for a limited time within a given scope, as defined by patent claims. However, they do not guarantee demand, nor do they prevent competition from nonidentical drugs that treat the same diseases and fall outside the protection of the patents. New products may enter the same therapeutic class with common mechanisms of action but different molecular structures (for example, different statins) or with differing mechanisms of action (such as calcium channel blockers and angiotensin receptor blockers). 9 Joseph DiMasi and Laura Faden have found that the time between a first-in-class new drug and subsequent new drugs in the same therapeutic class has been dramatically reduced, from a median of 10.2 years in the 1970s to 2.5 years in the early 2000s. 10 Drugs in the same class compete through quality and price for preferred placement on drug formularies and physicians’ choices for patient treatment. Patents play an essential role in the economic “ecosystem” of discovery and investment that has developed since the 1980s. Hundreds of start-up firms, often backed by venture capital, have been launched, and a robust innovation market has emerged. 11 The value of these development-stage firms is largely determined by their proprietary technologies and the candidate drugs they have in development. As a result, the strength of intellectual property protection plays a key role in funding and partnership opportunities for such firms.
Biopharmaceutical innovation is key to prevent future pandemics and bioterror. Marjanovic and Feijao 20 (Sonja Marjanovic, Ph.D., Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Carolina Feijao, Ph.D. in biochemistry, University of Cambridge; M.Sc. in quantitative biology, Imperial College London; B.Sc. in biology, University of Lisbon.) "How to Best Enable Pharma Innovation Beyond the COVID-19 Crisis," RAND Corporation, 05-2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA407-1.html TDI As key actors in the healthcare innovation landscape, pharmaceutical and life sciences companies have been called on to develop medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for pressing public health challenges. The COVID-19 crisis is one such challenge, but there are many others. For example, MERS, SARS, Ebola, Zika and avian and swine flu are also infectious diseases that represent public health threats. Infectious agents such as anthrax, smallpox and tularemia could present threats in a bioterrorism context.1 The general threat to public health that is posed by antimicrobial resistance is also well-recognised as an area in need of pharmaceutical innovation. Innovating in response to these challenges does not always align well with pharmaceutical industry commercial models, shareholder expectations and competition within the industry. However, the expertise, networks and infrastructure that industry has within its reach, as well as public expectations and the moral imperative, make pharmaceutical companies and the wider life sciences sector an indispensable partner in the search for solutions that save lives. This perspective argues for the need to establish more sustainable and scalable ways of incentivising pharmaceutical innovation in response to infectious disease threats to public health. It considers both past and current examples of efforts to mobilise pharmaceutical innovation in high commercial risk areas, including in the context of current efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. In global pandemic crises like COVID-19, the urgency and scale of the crisis – as well as the spotlight placed on pharmaceutical companies – mean that contributing to the search for effective medicines, vaccines or diagnostics is essential for socially responsible companies in the sector. 2 It is therefore unsurprising that we are seeing industry-wide efforts unfold at unprecedented scale and pace. Whereas there is always scope for more activity, industry is currently contributing in a variety of ways. Examples include pharmaceutical companies donating existing compounds to assess their utility in the fight against COVID19; screening existing compound libraries in-house or with partners to see if they can be repurposed; accelerating trials for potentially effective medicine or vaccine candidates; and in some cases rapidly accelerating in-house research and development to discover new treatments or vaccine agents and develop diagnostics tests.3,4 Pharmaceutical companies are collaborating with each other in some of these efforts and participating in global RandD partnerships (such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative effort to accelerate the development of potential therapies for COVID-19) and supporting national efforts to expand diagnosis and testing capacity and ensure affordable and ready access to potential solutions.3,5,6 The primary purpose of such innovation is to benefit patients and wider population health. Although there are also reputational benefits from involvement that can be realised across the industry, there are likely to be relatively few companies that are ‘commercial’ winners. Those who might gain substantial revenues will be under pressure not to be seen as profiting from the pandemic. In the United Kingdom for example, GSK has stated that it does not expect to profit from its COVID-19 related activities and that any gains will be invested in supporting research and long-term pandemic preparedness, as well as in developing products that would be affordable in the world’s poorest countries.7 Similarly, in the United States AbbVie has waived intellectual property rights for an existing combination product that is being tested for therapeutic potential against COVID-19, which would support affordability and allow for a supply of generics.8,9 Johnson and Johnson has stated that its potential vaccine – which is expected to begin trials – will be available on a not-for-profit basis during the pandemic.10 Pharma is mobilising substantial efforts to rise to the COVID-19 challenge at hand. However, we need to consider how pharmaceutical innovation for responding to emerging infectious diseases can best be enabled beyond the current crisis. Many public health threats (including those associated with other infectious diseases, bioterrorism agents and antimicrobial resistance) are urgently in need of pharmaceutical innovation, even if their impacts are not as visible to society as COVID-19 is in the immediate term. The pharmaceutical industry has responded to previous public health emergencies associated with infectious disease in recent times – for example those associated with Ebola and Zika outbreaks.11 However, it has done so to a lesser scale than for COVID-19 and with contributions from fewer companies. Similarly, levels of activity in response to the threat of antimicrobial resistance are still low.12 There are important policy questions as to whether – and how – industry could engage with such public health threats to an even greater extent under improved innovation conditions.
Extinction Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028 Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25 of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10 of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86 loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95 loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98 loss of population). In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100 case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95 of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100 case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2
9/4/21
SEPTOCT - DA - Innovation v2
Tournament: Greenhill RR | Round: 4 | Opponent: Northland Christian LB | Judge: Panel Biotech industry strong now Cancherini et al. 4/30 (Laura, Engagement Manager @ McKinsey and Company, Joseph Lydon, Associate Partner @ McKinsey and Company, Jorge Santos Da Silva, Senior Partner at McKinsey and Company, and Alexandra Zemp, Partner at McKinsey and Company), “What’s ahead for biotech: Another wave or low tide?“, McKinsey and Company, 4-30-2021, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/whats-ahead-for-biotech-another-wave-or-low-tide TDI Belying this downbeat mood, biotech has in fact had one of its best years so far. By January 2021, venture capitalists had invested some 60 percent more than they had in January 2020, with more than $3 billion invested worldwide in January 2021 alone.5 IPO activity grew strongly: there were 19 more closures than in the same period in 2020, with an average of $150 million per raise, 17 percent more than in 2020. Other deals have also had a bumper start to 2021, with the average deal size reaching more than $500 million, up by more than 66 percent on the 2020 average (Exhibit 3).6 What about SPACs? The analysis above does not include special-purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), which have recently become significant in IPOs in several industries. Some biotech investors we interviewed believe that SPACs represent a route to an IPO. How SPACs will evolve remains to be seen, but biotechs may be part of their story. Fundamentals continue strong When we asked executives and investors why the biotech sector had stayed so resilient during the worst economic crisis in decades, they cited innovation as the main reason. The number of assets transitioning to clinical phases is still rising, and further waves of innovation are on the horizon, driven by the convergence of biological and technological advances. In the present day, many biotechs, along with the wider pharmaceutical industry, are taking steps to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Together, biotechs and pharma companies have more than 250 vaccine candidates in their pipelines, along with a similar number of therapeutics. What’s more, the crisis has shone a spotlight on pharma as the public seeks to understand the roadblocks involved in delivering a vaccine at speed and the measures needed to maintain safety and efficacy standards. To that extent, the world has been living through a time of mass education in science research and development. Biotech has also benefited from its innate financial resilience. Healthcare as a whole is less dependent on economic cycles than most other industries. Biotech is an innovator, actively identifying and addressing patients’ unmet needs. In addition, biotechs’ top-line revenues have been less affected by lockdowns than is the case in most other industries. Another factor acting in the sector’s favor is that larger pharmaceutical companies still rely on biotechs as a source of innovation. With the top dozen pharma companies having more than $170 billion in excess reserves that could be available for spending on MandA, the prospects for further financing and deal making look promising. For these and other reasons, many investors regard biotech as a safe haven. One interviewee felt it had benefited from a halo effect during the pandemic. More innovation on the horizon The investors and executives we interviewed agreed that biotech innovation continues to increase in quality and quantity despite the macroeconomic environment. Evidence can be seen in the accelerating pace of assets transitioning across the development lifecycle. When we tracked the number of assets transitioning to Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III clinical trials, we found that Phase I and Phase II assets have transitioned 50 percent faster since 2018 than between 2013 and 2018, whereas Phase III assets have maintained much the same pace. There could be many reasons for this, but it is worth noting that biotechs with Phase I and Phase II assets as their lead assets have accounted for more than half of biotech IPOs. Having an early IPO gives a biotech earlier access to capital and leaves it with more scope to concentrate on science.
Lack of IP protection makes medical innovation prohibitively risky and expensive Grabowski et al 15 (Henry, Professor of Economics, member of the faculty for the Health Sector Management Program, and Director of the Program in Pharmaceuticals and Health Economics at Duke University) “The Roles of Patents and Research And Development Incentives In Biopharmaceutical Innovation,” Health Affairs, 2/2015 JL The essential rationale for patent protection for biopharmaceuticals is that long-term benefits in the form of continued future innovation by pioneer or brand-name drug manufacturers outweigh the relatively short-term restrictions on imitative cost competition associated with market exclusivity. Regardless, the entry of other branded agents remains an important source of therapeutic competition during the patent term. Several economic characteristics make patents and intellectual property protection particularly important to innovation incentives for the biopharmaceutical industry. 5 The RandD process often takes more than a decade to complete, and according to a recent analysis by Joseph DiMasi and colleagues, per new drug approval (including failed attempts), it involves more than a billion dollars in out-of-pocket costs. 6 Only approximately one in eight drug candidates survive clinical testing. 6 As a result of the high risks of failure and the high costs, research and development must be funded by the few successful, on-market products (the top quintile of marketed products provide the dominant share of RandD returns). 7,8 Once a new drug’s patent term and any regulatory exclusivity provisions have expired, competing manufacturers are allowed to sell generic equivalents that require the investment of only several million dollars and that have a high likelihood of commercial success. Absent intellectual property protections that allow marketing exclusivity, innovative firms would be unlikely to make the costly and risky investments needed to bring a new drug to market. Patents confer the right to exclude competitors for a limited time within a given scope, as defined by patent claims. However, they do not guarantee demand, nor do they prevent competition from nonidentical drugs that treat the same diseases and fall outside the protection of the patents. New products may enter the same therapeutic class with common mechanisms of action but different molecular structures (for example, different statins) or with differing mechanisms of action (such as calcium channel blockers and angiotensin receptor blockers). 9 Joseph DiMasi and Laura Faden have found that the time between a first-in-class new drug and subsequent new drugs in the same therapeutic class has been dramatically reduced, from a median of 10.2 years in the 1970s to 2.5 years in the early 2000s. 10 Drugs in the same class compete through quality and price for preferred placement on drug formularies and physicians’ choices for patient treatment. Patents play an essential role in the economic “ecosystem” of discovery and investment that has developed since the 1980s. Hundreds of start-up firms, often backed by venture capital, have been launched, and a robust innovation market has emerged. 11 The value of these development-stage firms is largely determined by their proprietary technologies and the candidate drugs they have in development. As a result, the strength of intellectual property protection plays a key role in funding and partnership opportunities for such firms.
MRNA solves a litany of diseases, but continued innovation is key Gupta 5/7 (Swati, vice president and head of emerging infectious diseases and scientific strategy at IAVI, a nonprofit scientific research organization that develops vaccines and antibodies for HIV, tuberculosis, emerging infectious diseases (including COVID-19) and neglected diseases, PhD and MPH from Yale University) “The Application and Future Potential of mRNA Vaccines,” Yale School of Public Health, 5/7/2021 JL The implications of mRNA technology are staggering. Several vaccine developers are studying this technology for deployment against rabies, influenza, Zika, HIV and cancer, as well as for veterinary purposes. Its potential utility is based upon its being a “platform technology” that can be developed and scaled rapidly. Given that only the genetic code for a protein of interest is needed, synthetically produced mRNA vaccines can be made rapidly, in days. Other vaccine approaches involve growing and/or producing proteins in cells, a process that can take months. Messenger RNA vaccines are generally regarded as safe, since they do not integrate into our cells’ DNA and naturally degrade in the body after injection. They also can be safely administered repeatedly, as we are seeing with the two-dose regimen for both the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines. Despite the current success of mRNA vaccines for COVID-19, scientists continue to work on making the technology better. A number of laboratories are testing more thermostable formulations of mRNA vaccines, which currently must be kept at freezing or ultra-cold temperatures. Others are investigating second-generation vaccines that will only require a single shot, and “universal” coronavirus vaccines that could protect against future emerging coronaviruses. Messenger RNA vaccines that target a broad range of different diseases, all in one shot, are also in development; this approach has the potential to greatly simplify current vaccination schedules. Taken together, these advantages and potential future developments position mRNA vaccines as an increasingly important technology in our arsenal of tools against infectious disease outbreaks, and are likely to be critical to fighting future epidemics and pandemics. Global partnerships like the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness and Innovation (CEPI), tasked with facilitating the development of vaccines to stop future epidemics, have called for vaccines to be able to be tested in the clinic within months after a new pathogen is identified. With the latest discoveries in mRNA technology, we are well on our way to this goal; the ability of this platform technology to be transformative is no longer a hope, but more likely to be a reality in the very near future. Reducing patents sets a precedent that spills over to all future diseases – Hopkins 21: Jared S. Hopkins {Jared S. Hopkins is a New York-based reporter for The Wall Street Journal covering the pharmaceutical industry, including companies such as Pfizer Inc. and Merck and Co. He previously was a health-care reporter at Bloomberg News and an investigative reporter at the Chicago Tribune. Jared started his career at The Times-News in Twin Falls, Idaho covering politics. In 2014, he was a finalist for the Livingston Award For Young Journalists for an investigation into charities founded by professional athletes. In 2011, he was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in Investigative Reporting for a series about neglect at a residential facility for disabled kids. Jared graduated from the Merrill College of Journalism at the University of Maryland-College Park with a bachelor's degree in journalism}, 21 - ("U.S. Support for Patent Waiver Unlikely to Cost Covid-19 Vaccine Makers in Short Term ," WSJ, 5-7-2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-support-for-patent-waiver-unlikely-to-cost-covid-19-vaccine-makers-in-short-term-11620414260)//marlborough-wr/ The Biden administration’s unexpected support for temporarily waiving Covid-19 vaccine patents won’t have an immediate financial impact on the companies making the shots, industry officials and analysts said. Yet the decision could mark a shift in Washington’s longstanding support of the industry’s valuable intellectual property, patent-law experts said. A waiver, if it does go into effect, may pose long-term risks to the vaccine makers, analysts said. Moderna Inc., MRNA -4.12 Pfizer Inc. PFE -3.10 and other vaccine makers weren’t counting on sales from the developing countries that would gain access to the vaccine technology, analysts said. If patents and other crucial product information behind the technology is made available, it would take at least several months before shots were produced, industry officials said. Yet long-term Covid-19 sales could take a hit if other companies and countries gained access to the technologies and figured out how to use it. Western drugmakers could also confront competition sooner for other medicines they are hoping to make using the technologies. A World Trade Organization waiver could also set a precedent for waiving patents for other medicines, a long-sought goal of some developing countries, patient groups and others to try to reduce the costs of prescription drugs. “It sets a tremendous precedent of waiving IP rights that’s likely going to come up in future pandemics or in other serious diseases,” said David Silverstein, a patent lawyer at Axinn, Veltrop and Harkrider LLP who advises drugmakers. “Other than that, this is largely symbolic.”
Disease causes extinction – defense is wrong Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028 Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25 of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10 of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86 loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95 loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98 loss of population). In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100 case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95 of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100 case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2
9/17/21
SEPTOCT - DA - Innovation v3
Tournament: Greenhill | Round: 1 | Opponent: McNeil AR | Judge: Chris Castillo Biotech industry strong now. Cancherini et al. 4/30 (Laura, Engagement Manager @ McKinsey and Company, Joseph Lydon, Associate Partner @ McKinsey and Company, Jorge Santos Da Silva, Senior Partner at McKinsey and Company, and Alexandra Zemp, Partner at McKinsey and Company), “What’s ahead for biotech: Another wave or low tide?“, McKinsey and Company, 4-30-2021, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/whats-ahead-for-biotech-another-wave-or-low-tide TDI As the pandemic spread across the globe in early 2020, biotech leaders were initially pessimistic, reassessing their cash position and financing constraints. When McKinsey and BioCentury interviewed representatives from 106 biotech companies in May 2020,4 half of those interviewed were expecting delays in financing, and about 80 percent were tight on cash for the next two years and considering trade-offs such as deferring IPOs and acquisitions. Executives feared that valuations would decline because of lower revenue projections and concerns about clinical-trial delays, salesforce-effectiveness gaps, and other operational issues. Belying this downbeat mood, biotech has in fact had one of its best years so far. By January 2021, venture capitalists had invested some 60 percent more than they had in January 2020, with more than $3 billion invested worldwide in January 2021 alone.5 IPO activity grew strongly: there were 19 more closures than in the same period in 2020, with an average of $150 million per raise, 17 percent more than in 2020. Other deals have also had a bumper start to 2021, with the average deal size reaching more than $500 million, up by more than 66 percent on the 2020 average (Exhibit 3).6 What about SPACs? The analysis above does not include special-purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), which have recently become significant in IPOs in several industries. Some biotech investors we interviewed believe that SPACs represent a route to an IPO. How SPACs will evolve remains to be seen, but biotechs may be part of their story. Fundamentals continue strong When we asked executives and investors why the biotech sector had stayed so resilient during the worst economic crisis in decades, they cited innovation as the main reason. The number of assets transitioning to clinical phases is still rising, and further waves of innovation are on the horizon, driven by the convergence of biological and technological advances. In the present day, many biotechs, along with the wider pharmaceutical industry, are taking steps to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Together, biotechs and pharma companies have more than 250 vaccine candidates in their pipelines, along with a similar number of therapeutics. What’s more, the crisis has shone a spotlight on pharma as the public seeks to understand the roadblocks involved in delivering a vaccine at speed and the measures needed to maintain safety and efficacy standards. To that extent, the world has been living through a time of mass education in science research and development. Biotech has also benefited from its innate financial resilience. Healthcare as a whole is less dependent on economic cycles than most other industries. Biotech is an innovator, actively identifying and addressing patients’ unmet needs. In addition, biotechs’ top-line revenues have been less affected by lockdowns than is the case in most other industries. Another factor acting in the sector’s favor is that larger pharmaceutical companies still rely on biotechs as a source of innovation. With the top dozen pharma companies having more than $170 billion in excess reserves that could be available for spending on MandA, the prospects for further financing and deal making look promising. For these and other reasons, many investors regard biotech as a safe haven. One interviewee felt it had benefited from a halo effect during the pandemic. More innovation on the horizon The investors and executives we interviewed agreed that biotech innovation continues to increase in quality and quantity despite the macroeconomic environment. Evidence can be seen in the accelerating pace of assets transitioning across the development lifecycle. When we tracked the number of assets transitioning to Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III clinical trials, we found that Phase I and Phase II assets have transitioned 50 percent faster since 2018 than between 2013 and 2018, whereas Phase III assets have maintained much the same pace. There could be many reasons for this, but it is worth noting that biotechs with Phase I and Phase II assets as their lead assets have accounted for more than half of biotech IPOs. Having an early IPO gives a biotech earlier access to capital and leaves it with more scope to concentrate on science.
IP protections for traditional knowledge are key to innovation Ngatcha 20 (Beatrice T., lawyer and patent agent in Lavery’s intellectual property group, patent agent registered to practice in Canada and the United States,member of the Quebec Bar, doctoral degree in chemistry from Université Laval and post-doctoral fellow at the National Research Council in Ottawa) “Natural Products and Pharmaceutical Innovations: What are the Patent Options?” Lavery, 5/29/2020 JL Natural products play an important role in pharmaceutical innovation. They are active components in many medicines. For example, nearly half of the small molecules used to treat cancer are natural products or directly derived from natural products.1 They are also components of vaccines. The pharmaceutical industry is constantly seeking access to natural products and the traditional knowledge associated with them. These include plants (roots, bark, leaves), micro-organisms (terrestrial and marine), toxins, venoms and other natural biological agents. In the current race to develop a drug and/or vaccine against COVID-19, natural products or derivatives are surely worth considering as a starting point. The harvesting of natural resources for use by the pharmaceutical industry is usually carried out by partners such as traditional healers, farmers, academics or businesses. Thus, the process usually involves several stakeholders, including providers and users of natural resources and associated traditional knowledge, which are often located in different parts of the world. Fair and equitable collaboration in such a context requires well-developed collaboration agreements and access and benefit-sharing agreements. Various instruments of international law encourage the signing of such agreements, including: The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which recognizes the sovereignty of states over their natural resources. The CBD sets out fundamental principles to regulate access and benefit-sharing, including that access to natural resources, their use and the sharing of benefits arising from them should be based on “mutually agreed terms.”2 The Nagoya Protocol covers the sharing of the results of research and development, the payment of royalties and joint ownership of intellectual property (IP) rights.3 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has developed a guide to assist providers and users of natural resources and associated traditional knowledge in the negotiation and establishment of IP clauses in access and benefit-sharing agreements. The guide describes how IP rights can be exploited and managed to achieve the desired objectives, and how the benefits arising from the use can be created and shared in a fair and equitable manner, thereby promoting the conservation and use of biodiversity.4 Furthermore, research and development activities in the pharmaceutical industry are known to be associated with high risk and high investment costs. Indeed, it is widely recognized that the process to develop a drug can take up to 15 years, only about 16 of molecules entering the clinical phase will be approved, and only 1 in 5 marketed drugs generates revenues equal to or greater than the research and development costs involved.5 In the pharmaceutical industry, intellectual property, especially patents and data protection, is thus considered an essential instrument for securing the economic benefits of an innovation. Efforts in this intense period of development of a drug/vaccine against COVID-19 are of course focused on the technical aspects directly related to research and development. Nevertheless, those involved should not lose sight of the importance of collaboration agreements and access and benefit-sharing agreements.
50 of medicine comes from IK Eiland 08 Dr. Eiland received a doctorate in Oriental Archaeology from Oxford University and an LLM from the Munich Intellectual Property Law Center, “Patenting Traditional Medicine”, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH and Co. KG, pg. 7-10, 2008 SLC PK - TM = traditional medicine In 1982, it was estimated that about 50 of all filled prescriptions in the US originated from drugs that were derived – one way or another – from natural substances. This generated US sales of about 20 billion.4 Another estimate found that 3/4 of the plants used in prescription drugs originally came to the attention of drug companies because of their use in TM.5 In 1995, the worldwide market value of TM derived pharmaceuticals was estimated to be $43 billon.6 While one could argue about the precise values, TM has significant pharmaceutical applications. Drug companies are interested in acquiring TM, both natural substances, as well as the knowledge about how to use them.
Biopharmaceutical innovation is key to prevent future pandemics and bioterror. Marjanovic and Feijao 20 (Sonja Marjanovic, Ph.D., Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Carolina Feijao, Ph.D. in biochemistry, University of Cambridge; M.Sc. in quantitative biology, Imperial College London; B.Sc. in biology, University of Lisbon.) "How to Best Enable Pharma Innovation Beyond the COVID-19 Crisis," RAND Corporation, 05-2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA407-1.html TDI As key actors in the healthcare innovation landscape, pharmaceutical and life sciences companies have been called on to develop medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for pressing public health challenges. The COVID-19 crisis is one such challenge, but there are many others. For example, MERS, SARS, Ebola, Zika and avian and swine flu are also infectious diseases that represent public health threats. Infectious agents such as anthrax, smallpox and tularemia could present threats in a bioterrorism context.1 The general threat to public health that is posed by antimicrobial resistance is also well-recognised as an area in need of pharmaceutical innovation. Innovating in response to these challenges does not always align well with pharmaceutical industry commercial models, shareholder expectations and competition within the industry. However, the expertise, networks and infrastructure that industry has within its reach, as well as public expectations and the moral imperative, make pharmaceutical companies and the wider life sciences sector an indispensable partner in the search for solutions that save lives. This perspective argues for the need to establish more sustainable and scalable ways of incentivising pharmaceutical innovation in response to infectious disease threats to public health. It considers both past and current examples of efforts to mobilise pharmaceutical innovation in high commercial risk areas, including in the context of current efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. In global pandemic crises like COVID-19, the urgency and scale of the crisis – as well as the spotlight placed on pharmaceutical companies – mean that contributing to the search for effective medicines, vaccines or diagnostics is essential for socially responsible companies in the sector. 2 It is therefore unsurprising that we are seeing industry-wide efforts unfold at unprecedented scale and pace. Whereas there is always scope for more activity, industry is currently contributing in a variety of ways. Examples include pharmaceutical companies donating existing compounds to assess their utility in the fight against COVID19; screening existing compound libraries in-house or with partners to see if they can be repurposed; accelerating trials for potentially effective medicine or vaccine candidates; and in some cases rapidly accelerating in-house research and development to discover new treatments or vaccine agents and develop diagnostics tests.3,4 Pharmaceutical companies are collaborating with each other in some of these efforts and participating in global RandD partnerships (such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative effort to accelerate the development of potential therapies for COVID-19) and supporting national efforts to expand diagnosis and testing capacity and ensure affordable and ready access to potential solutions.3,5,6 The primary purpose of such innovation is to benefit patients and wider population health. Although there are also reputational benefits from involvement that can be realised across the industry, there are likely to be relatively few companies that are ‘commercial’ winners. Those who might gain substantial revenues will be under pressure not to be seen as profiting from the pandemic. In the United Kingdom for example, GSK has stated that it does not expect to profit from its COVID-19 related activities and that any gains will be invested in supporting research and long-term pandemic preparedness, as well as in developing products that would be affordable in the world’s poorest countries.7 Similarly, in the United States AbbVie has waived intellectual property rights for an existing combination product that is being tested for therapeutic potential against COVID-19, which would support affordability and allow for a supply of generics.8,9 Johnson and Johnson has stated that its potential vaccine – which is expected to begin trials – will be available on a not-for-profit basis during the pandemic.10 Pharma is mobilising substantial efforts to rise to the COVID-19 challenge at hand. However, we need to consider how pharmaceutical innovation for responding to emerging infectious diseases can best be enabled beyond the current crisis. Many public health threats (including those associated with other infectious diseases, bioterrorism agents and antimicrobial resistance) are urgently in need of pharmaceutical innovation, even if their impacts are not as visible to society as COVID-19 is in the immediate term. The pharmaceutical industry has responded to previous public health emergencies associated with infectious disease in recent times – for example those associated with Ebola and Zika outbreaks.11 However, it has done so to a lesser scale than for COVID-19 and with contributions from fewer companies. Similarly, levels of activity in response to the threat of antimicrobial resistance are still low.12 There are important policy questions as to whether – and how – industry could engage with such public health threats to an even greater extent under improved innovation conditions.
Extinction – defense is wrong Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028 Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25 of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10 of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86 loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95 loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98 loss of population). In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100 case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95 of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100 case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2
9/18/21
SEPTOCT - K - Neolib
Tournament: Loyola | Round: Finals | Opponent: Diamond Bar NC | Judge: Panel The aff’s portrayal of a world with reduced IP protections as an “information commons” where medical inequality is solved by deregulation perpetuates the neoliberal myth of a perfect market Kapczynski 14 (Amy, a Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Faculty Co-Director of the Global Health Justice Partnership, and Faculty Co-Director of the Collaboration for Research Integrity and Transparency. She is also Faculty Co-Director of the Law and Political Economy Project and cofounder of the Law and Political Economy blog. Her areas of research include information policy, intellectual property law, international law, and global health.) “INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S LEVIATHAN” Duke Law, Law and Contemporary problems, 2014. https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4710andcontext=lcp BC Over the last decade or so, a powerful set of critiques has emerged to contest the dominant account just sketched out as well as the contemporary state of IP law.12 These arguments have come from many directions, some even arising from scholars who previously were champions of the dominant account.13 The most prominent and potent line of theoretical critique in the legal literature has come in the guise of arguments for free culture and the “information commons” and has been most influentially articulated by Lawrence Lessig and Yochai Benkler.14 Both have stressed the problems with expansive exclusive rights regimes in information and have also sketched a set of actually existing alternatives to market-based exclusionary forms of information and cultural production. Lessig has written a series of influential books that have made him a “rock star of the information age,”15 particularly for young Internet and free-culture activists. He has argued powerfully, for example, that existing copyright law is in deep conflict with the radical new possibilities for creativity in the digital age. As he points out, when a mother posting a video of her toddler dancing to a Prince song on YouTube is threatened with a $150,000 fine for copyright infringement, something has gone seriously awry.16 Lessig also contends that copyright law today is too long, too expansive, and instantiates a “permission culture” that is antithetical to free expression in the age of the remix.17 As he puts it, “the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that reaches far beyond local boundaries,” creating the possibility of markets that “include a much wider and more diverse range of creators,” if not stifled by incumbents who use IP law to “protect themselves against this competition.”18 Benkler’s work has also been extraordinarily formative in the field, particularly for his insights into the multiplicity of modes of information production. As he has stressed, the conventional justification for IP does not account for the many successful and longstanding modes of market nonexclusionary information production.19 For example, attorneys write articles to attract clients, software developers sell services customizing free and opensource software for individual clients, and bands give music away for free to increase revenues from touring or merchandise.20 More pathbreaking still is Benkler’s account of the importance of “commons-based peer production,” a form of socially motivated and cooperative production exemplified by the volunteer network that maintains Wikipedia or the groups of coders who create open-source software products such as the Linux operating system.21 In the digital networked age, as Benkler describes, the tools of information production are very broadly distributed, “creating new opportunities for how we make and exchange information, knowledge, and culture.”22 These changes have increased the relative role in our information economy of nonproprietary production and facilitate “new forms of production that are based neither in the state nor in the market.”23 Because commons-based peer production is not hierarchically organized and is motivated by social dynamics and concerns, it also offers new possibilities for human development, human freedom, a more critical approach to culture, and more democratic forms of political participation.24 This line of critique has been profoundly generative and has helped launch an important new conceptualization of the commons as a paradigm. That paradigm, as a recent book puts it, “helps us ‘get outside’ of the dominant discourse of the market economy and helps us represent different, more wholesome ways of being.”25 Proponents of the commons concept draw upon contemporary articulations of successful commons-based resource management by Elinor Ostrom and her followers.26 They do mobilize retellings of the political and economic history of the commons in land in Europe before enclosure,27 and recent evidence from psychology and behavioral economics that suggests that humans have deep tendencies toward cooperation and reciprocation.28 They argue that A key revelation of the commons way of thinking is that we humans are not in fact isolated, atomistic individuals. We are not amoebas with no human agency except hedonistic “utility preferences” expressed in the marketplace. No: We are commoners—creative, distinctive individuals inscribed within larger wholes. We may have unattractive human traits fueled by individual fears and ego, but we are also creatures entirely capable of self-organization and cooperation; with a concern for fairness and social justice; and willing to make sacrifices for the larger good and future generations.29 This stands, of course, as a powerful rebuke to the neoliberal imaginary, which “constructs and interpellates individuals as . . . rational, calculating creatures whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for ‘self-care’— the ability to provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions.”30 III Given this radical—and, in my view, critically important—attempt to rethink the subject at the core of neoliberal accounts, it is all the more striking that proponents of the commons often appear to adopt a neoliberal image of the state. For example, the introduction to a recently edited volume that gathers writings on the commons from seventy-three authors in thirty countries (entitled, tellingly, The Wealth of the Commons: A World Beyond Market and State) has this to say: The presumption that the state can and will intervene to represent the interests of citizens is no longer credible. Unable to govern for the long term, captured by commercial interests and hobbled by stodgy bureaucratic structures in an age of nimble electronic networks, the state is arguably incapable of meeting the needs of citizens as a whole.31 The commons, they suggest, is a concept that seeks not only to liberate us from predatory and dysfunctional markets, but also from predatory and dysfunctional states. Something immediately seems incongruous here. If people are inherently cooperative reciprocators, why are states irredeemably corrupt? After all, as Harold Demsetz famously wrote in his 1967 attack on Arrow’s optimism about state production of information, “government is a group of people.”32 Lessig, one of the progenitors of the language of the commons in the informational domain, often leads with a similar view of the state: If the twentieth century taught us one lesson, it is the dominance of private over state ordering. Markets work better than Tammany Hall in deciding who should get what, when. Or as Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase put it, whatever problems there are with the market, the problems with government are more profound.33 Lessig reveals his own sense of the power of this conception of the state when he seeks to tar IP law with the same brush; we should rebel against current IP law, he suggests, because we should “limit the government’s role in choosing the future of creativity.”34 Benkler is more measured but admits as well to viewing the state as “a relatively suspect actor.”35 We should worry, he suggests, that direct governmental intervention “leads to centralization in the hands of government agencies and powerful political lobbies,”36 a view that echoes the neoliberal account described above. It should perhaps not surprise us that leading critics of neoliberal information policy embrace a neoliberal conception of the state. After all, neoliberalism is not merely an ideology, but also a set of policy prescriptions that may have helped to call forth the state that it has described. As David Harvey puts it, “the neoliberal fear that special-interest groups would pervert and subvert the state is nowhere better realized than in Washington, where armies of corporate lobbyists . . . effectively dictate legislation to match their special interests.”37 There are, it must be said, few areas of law that better exemplify this problem than IP law. For example, Jessica Litman has documented the astonishing process through which the 1976 Copyright Act was drafted, in which Congress delegated most of the drafting to interest groups that were forced to negotiate with one another.38 Other scholars have offered similarly startling accounts of the genesis of the most important IP treaty today, the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. TRIPS came into force in 1996, revolutionizing international IP law by both imposing new standards and by rendering them enforceable through the WTO’s disputeresolution system, which authorizes trade retaliation to enforce its judgments. Most countries in the world are members of TRIPS, and the Agreement introduced, for developing countries in particular, substantial new obligations, such as the obligation to grant patents on medicines and food-related inventions. Several excellent histories of the treaty have been written, documenting its beginnings as a brash idea proposed by “twelve chief executive officers (representing pharmaceutical, entertainment, and software industries).”39 As Susan Sell has described, the TRIPS Agreement was a triumph of industry organizing. Through TRIPS, Industry revealed its power to identify and define a trade problem, devise a solution, and reduce it to a concrete proposal that could be sold to governments. Neoliberal exploitation causes extinction. Clark 18 (Brett, associate professor of sociology and sustainability studies at the University of Utah; Stefano B. Longo, Assistant Professor specializing in Environmental Sociology at NC State; “Land–Sea Ecological Rifts”, Land–Sea Ecological Rifts, https://monthlyreview.org/2018/07/01/land-sea-ecological-rifts/) Covering approximately 70 percent of the Earth’s surface, the World Ocean is “the largest ecosystem.”1 Today all areas of the ocean are affected by multiple anthropogenic effects—such as overfishing, pollution, and emission of greenhouse gases, causing warming seas as well as ocean acidification—and over 40 percent of the ocean is strongly affected by human actions. Furthermore, the magnitude of these impacts and the speed of the changes are far greater than previously understood.2 Biologist Judith S. Weis explains that “the most widespread and serious type of marine pollution worldwide is eutrophication due to excess nutrients.”3 The production and use of fertilizers, sewage/waste from humans and farm animals, combustion of fossil fuels, and storm water have all contributed to dramatic increases in the quantity of nutrients in waterways and oceans. Research in 2008 indicated that there were over 400 “dead zones,” areas of low oxygen, mostly near the mouths of rivers.4 Nutrient overloading thus presents a major challenge to maintaining healthy aquatic ecosystems. Nutrients are a basic source of nourishment that all organisms need to survive. Plants require at least eighteen elements to grow normally; of these, nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium are called macronutrients, because they are needed in larger quantities. While all essential nutrients exist in the biosphere, these three are the ones most commonly known to be deficient in commercial agricultural production systems. Beginning in the early twentieth century with the Haber-Bosch process, atmospheric nitrogen was converted into ammonia to create synthetic nitrogen fertilizer. The fixation of nitrogen, an energy-intensive process, made the nutrient far more widely available for use in agriculture. This in turn dramatically changed production systems, which no longer depended on legumes and manures to biologically supply nitrogen for other crops such as wheat, corn, and most vegetables. In the modern era, particularly since the Second World War, the increased production and use of fertilizers served to greatly expand food production and availability. Major macronutrients are routinely applied to soils in order to maintain and increase the growth of plant life on farms, as well as private and public landscapes such as golf courses, nurseries, parks, and residences. They are used to produce fruits, vegetables, and fibers for human and non-human consumption, expand areas of recreation, and beautify communities. However, like many aspects of modern production, given the larger social dynamics and determinants that shape socioecological relationships, these technological and economic developments have generated serious negative—often unforeseen—consequences. The wide expansion and increasing rates of nitrogen and phosphorus application have caused severe damage to aquatic systems in particular. Rivers, streams, lakes, bays (estuaries), and ocean systems have been inundated with nutrient runoff, which has had far-reaching effects. Here we examine the socioecological relationships and processes associated with the transfer of nutrients from terrestrial to marine systems. We employ a metabolic analysis to highlight the interchange of matter and energy within and between socioecological systems. In particular, we show how capitalist agrifood production contributes to distinct environmental problems, creating a metabolic rift in the soil nutrient cycle. We emphasize how the failure to mend nutrient cycles in agrifood systems has led to approaches that produce additional ruptures, such as those associated with nutrient overloading in marine systems. This analysis reveals the ways that the social relations of capitalist agriculture tend to produce interconnected ecological problems, such as those in terrestrial and aquatic systems. Further, we contend that these processes undermine the basic conditions of life on a wide-ranging scale. It is important to recognize that nutrient pollution of groundwater as well as surface waters has been a major concern since the rise of modern capitalist agriculture and the development of the global food regime.5 The failure to address the metabolic rupture in the soil nutrient cycle and the contradictions of capital are central to contemporary land-sea ecological rifts.
The alternative is a global socialist movement that ends globalization Galant 19 (Michael, a coordinator of the Wire Pillar of the Progressive International, former economics and trade fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, MPP from Harvard University’s Kennedy School and BA in political economy from Brown University) “The Battle of Seattle: 20 years later, it's time for a revival” Open Democracy, 11/30/2019. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/battle-seattle-20-years-later-its-time-revival/ BC 20 years ago today, the streets of Seattle became front lines in the global class war. Over the course of five days, some 40,000 individuals, representing unions, environmental groups, and Leftist organizations from around the world came together in an attempt to disrupt the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Using direct action tactics, activists physically delayed access to the meeting and led marches, rallies, and teach-ins that drew massive crowds. Protesters of all stripes were attacked by a violent police force – attracting international media coverage. The demonstrations outside became a wedge that would help drive the negotiations inside to collapse. The Battle of Seattle was won. But the war continued. Seattle was about more than any single organization. The WTO was a symbol of the larger project of neoliberal globalization that was, in 1999, well on its way to reshaping the world in the interest of capital. The Battle of Seattle would become an equally potent symbol of resistance. The WTO protests marked the moment that the Alter-Globalization Movement (AGM), also known as the Global Justice, or disparagingly, the Anti-Globalization Movement, was launched into the public consciousness. Much has changed in the two decades since. The AGM won many meaningful victories and experienced many more profound losses. Eventually, the movement faded. Today’s global economy resembles the neoliberal nightmare the Seattle protesters were fighting against more than the world they were fighting for. But recent years have revealed cracks in the surface. With an opportunity to finish what was started, it’s time to revive the spirit of Seattle. Globalization and its dissent Neoliberal globalization is a political project intended to raise the power of capital to the international level – to cement its supremacy as an immutable universal law beyond the reach of political communities. “Free trade” agreements and WTO rules establish the primacy of profit over democracy, labor, environmental, and consumer protections. World Bank and IMF loan conditions impose austerity, privatization, and deregulation on nations of the Global South. An international system of tax havens allows corporations and wealthy individuals to hoard their plundered resources. Global supply chain fragmentation shields multinationals from accountability for their abuses. Investment treaties unleash finance and corporations to cross borders in search of opportunities for exploitation, setting off a regulatory race to the bottom. If there was doubt before that capitalism must be confronted at the global level to be defeated, the power grab that is neoliberal globalization puts those doubts to rest. Capital is global. Labor must be too. Yet there are forces preventing such global solidarity. Beginning during the Cold War, the majority of Northern labor accepted a compromise: support a foreign policy that enacts the interests of capital, and benefit from a share of the spoils in the form of minor concessions, a tempered welfare state, and cheap consumer goods. This tacit agreement survived largely intact into the neoliberal era – dividing the interests of a global working class and quelling demands for systemic global change. The Alter-Globalization Movement rejected the compromise. While activists in the Global South had long resisted destructive free trade agreements and World Bank austerity, occasionally with solidarity from the North, the extremity of turn-of-the-century neoliberalism led to the explosion of a movement that refused to accept the mere crumbs of neocolonial extraction, and sought instead to build an alternative global economy for the many, both North and South. This was a movement that brought together American anarchists with Korean peasants; libertarian socialist indigenous groups in Mexico with US anti-sweatshop activists; the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions with the Industrial Workers of the World; the Brazilian Movement for Landless Workers with Greenpeace; Filipino anti-capitalist scholars with French farmer activists best known for physically dismantling a McDonald’s. Their demands were many and varied – from land redistribution to the abolition of the World Bank, from a renegotiated NAFTA to the protection of indigenous knowledge of seeds from privatization – but all shared a vision of a global solidarity that would overcome the forces of neoliberal globalization. Organizing under such a big tent, the AGM is better understood as a dispersed, informal network – a “movement of movements” – than a unified political structure. This fluid network manifested in many forms. The flagship World Social Forum regularly convened activists in an alternative to the annual World Economic Forum. Transnational advocacy networks campaigned on issues such as Global South debt relief. Northern activists used their positions of relative privilege to support local campaigns in the South, fighting water privatization in Bolivia and indigenous displacement from hydroelectric dams in India. And, as in Seattle, meetings of international organizations became rallying points for major global demonstrations. With these organizing methods, the movement achieved substantial victories. The Jubilee 2000 campaign led to significant debt relief for Southern nations. Potentially disastrous trade agreements from the FTAA to TPP have been, at least temporarily, defeated. International Financial Institutions like the IMF and World Bank – while still agents of global capital – have vastly improved their lending practices since the 90’s. But its greatest successes were intangible: the AGM undermined the hegemonic ambitions embodied in Thatcher’s “There Is No Alternative”, slowed neoliberal globalization’s seemingly inexorable onslaught, and kept alive the flame of resistance during an otherwise nadir of Leftist politics. The AGM should not, however, be romanticized. Emerging in a moment when the failures of 20th century socialist politics weighed heavily on the Left’s imagination, the AGM turned too far in the opposing direction. Big-tentism led to a dilution of demands and paved the way for the NGO-ization of the World Social Fora. A preference for all things decentralized made grabbing headlines easy, but building lasting political structures difficult. Resistance was often treated as an intrinsically valuable ends, rather than a means to taking power. And criticisms of “neoliberalism” typically fell short of identifying the true enemy – capitalism – or advancing a coherent alternative – socialism. Ultimately, the neoliberal plan for the global economy succeeded more than not. While resistance to neoliberal globalization would rage on in the South, Northern solidarity faded. The September 11th attacks were the beginning of the end. Energy shifted to the anti-war movement, the state expanded its repression of Leftist organizing, and increased pressures toward “patriotism” led some to reconsider the old foreign policy compromise. By the mid-2000’s, little was left of what the AGM once was. A call for revival It’s time to rekindle the flame. The global economy is still structured in the interest of capital. But the neoliberal consensus has begun to waver under the weight of its own contradictions. The Right has a response to the crisis. Reactionary nationalists like Trump and Johnson seize upon existing systems of oppression to scapegoat the symptoms of a failed economic model. The problem is not that the global working class has lost out to a global capital class. The problem is that “we” – White, Christian, cishet, native-born Americans – have lost out to “them” – People of Color, immigrants, entire foreign countries, feminists, LGBTQ+ folks, and all those who threaten our supremacy in their struggles for liberation. The Left must offer an alternative vision. The dramatic growth of socialist organizing and rise in popularity of social democratic politicians should offer great hope. But as the AGM understood, social democracy for the North is not enough. Our socialism must not mean merely a greater share of neocolonial extraction for Northern workers. Our socialism must rightly identify the global nature of our challenge, and unite across borders to confront a globalized capital. That means internationalizing labor organizing to confront multinational corporations. Changing the rules of trade and investment. Ending tax havens. Building alternatives to the existing intellectual property regime. Holding corporations accountable for abuses in their supply chains. Supporting the struggles of peasants, indigenous peoples, and all global subaltern groups. Democratizing global governance. Opening borders to those displaced by the ravages of global capitalism. Advancing alternative models of development. Transforming, if not abolishing and replacing, the Bretton Woods Institutions. And confronting the all-important threat of climate collapse with, to begin with, a global Green New Deal. These are not minor addendums to a socialist platform. Class war is global. Internationalist demands are fundamental. Organizations that remain from the AGM, international labor, and newcomers like Justice Is Global, the Fight Inequality Alliance, and Bernie Sanders and Yanis Varoufakis’s Progressive International, are already struggling for this vision. But its fruition depends on the backing of a far broader movement. Like the AGM, we must take a global frame of analysis, and see neoliberal globalization as a concerted effort to undermine our power. Unlike the AGM, we must understand that neoliberalism is merely one manifestation of a greater enemy. Like the AGM, we must build diverse, anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-xenophobic movements that transcend borders. Unlike the AGM, we must not allow fears of centralization to undermine a coherent platform. Like the AGM, we must reject a class compromise that sacrifices the possibility of a better world for the crumbs of colonialism. Unlike the AGM, we must build lasting political structures that back our rejection with political power. 20 years ago, the streets of Seattle echoed with a chant that would become the defining motto of the movement: “another world is possible!” It still is – if we’re willing to fight for it.
9/7/21
SEPTOCT - NC - Anti-Realism
Tournament: Loyola | Round: 3 | Opponent: Orange Lutheran AZ | Judge: Asher Towner Moral realism posits the existence of truths that hold independently of our evaluative attitudes – ought statements are an example Street 06 (Sharon, Professor of Philosophy and Associate Chair of the Department of Philosophy at New York University) “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” Springer, 2006 The defining claim of realism about value, as I will be understanding it, is that there are at least some evaluative facts or truths that hold independently of all our evaluative attitudes.1 Evaluative facts or truths I understand as facts or truths of the form that X is a normative reason to Y, that one should or ought to X, that X is good, valuable, or worthwhile, that X is morally right or wrong, and so on.2 Evaluative attitudes I understand to include states such as desires, attitudes of approval and disapproval, unreflective evaluative tendencies such as the tendency to experience X as counting in favor of or demanding Y, and consciously or unconsciously held evaluative judgements, such as judgements about what is a reason for what, about what one should or ought to do, about what is good, valuable, or worthwhile, about what is morally right or wrong, and so on.
It is important to note that it is not enough to be a realist to claim that the truth of an evaluative judgement holds independently of one’s making that particular evaluative judgement. Antirealists can agree with that much. Consider, for example, a constructivist view according to which the truth of ‘‘X is a reason for agent A to Y’’ is a function of whether that judgement would be among A’s evaluative judgements in reflective equilibrium. This view is antirealist because it understands truths about what reasons a person has as depending on her evaluative attitudes (in particular, on what those attitudes would be in reflective equilibrium). Yet on this view, it is quite possible for someone to have a reason independently of whether she thinks she does, for whether she has a reason is not a function of whether she (presently) judges she has it, but rather a function of whether that judgement would be among her evaluative judgements in reflective equilibrium. Antirealists can therefore agree with realists that the truth of a given evaluative judgement holds independently of whether one makes that particular judgement. Where antirealists part ways with realists is in denying that there are evaluative truths which hold independently of the whole set of evaluative judgements we make or might make upon reflection, or independently of the whole set of other evaluative attitudes we hold or might hold upon reflection.
The kind of independence from our evaluative attitudes that realists endorse is what Russ Shafer-Landau has called stance-independence. 3 To illustrate: Realists of course agree that the evaluative truth that ‘‘Hitler was morally depraved’’ depends in part on Hitler’s evaluative attitudes in the sense that if Hitler had valued peace and universal human rights instead of dictatorial power and genocide, then it would have been false instead of true that he was morally depraved. But given that Hitler did value dictatorial power and genocide, value realists think that it is true, independent of all of our (and any of Hitler’s other) evaluative attitudes, that Hitler was morally depraved. According to realists, the truth that Hitler was morally depraved holds independently of any stance that we (or Hitler) might take toward that truth, whether now or upon reflection.
There are different brands of realism about value. What unites them is the view that there are evaluative facts or truths that hold independently of all our evaluative attitudes (now keeping in mind the qualification about stance-independence). What separates different kinds of realists from one another is how they construe the nature of these facts or truths. According to what I will call non-naturalist versions of value realism, evaluative facts or truths are not reducible to any kind of natural fact, and are not the kinds of things that play a role in causal explanations; instead, they are irreducibly normative facts or truths.4 This brand of realism has been gaining increasing numbers of adherents in recent years, and it lies squarely within the target of the Darwinian Dilemma.
In contrast to non-naturalist versions of value realism, the position I will call value naturalism holds that evaluative facts are identical with or constituted by (certain) natural facts, and that evaluative facts are the kinds of things that play a role in causal explanations.5 According to such views, much as water is identical with H2O, so evaluative properties are identical with certain natural properties, though we may or may not ever be able to provide a reduction telling exactly which natural properties evaluative properties are identical with (different naturalists taking different views on the possibility of such a reduction).6 Whereas non-naturalist versions of value realism lie straightforwardly within my target in this paper, it is a more complicated matter whether versions of value naturalism lie within my target. Answering this question requires making a distinction (in section 7) between versions of value naturalism which count as genuinely realist on my understanding and versions which don’t; my argument will be that the former, but not the latter, are vulnerable to the Darwinian Dilemma. Before introducing these complexities, however, it is important to get the fundamental dilemma for realism on the table.7 Selective pressures have had a relentless impact on the content of our evaluative judgements – shared values and animal tendencies prove Street 06 (Sharon, Professor of Philosophy and Associate Chair of the Department of Philosophy at New York University) “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” Springer, 2006 To begin, note the potentially phenomenal costs and benefits, as measured in the Darwinian currency of reproductive success, of accepting some evaluative judgements rather than others. It is clear, for instance, how fatal to reproductive success it would be to judge that the fact that something would endanger one’s survival is a reason to do it, or that the fact that someone is kin is a reason to harm that individual. A creature who accepted such evaluative judgements would run itself off cliffs, seek out its predators, and assail its offspring, resulting in the speedy elimination of it and its evaluative tendencies from the world.13 In contrast, it is clear how beneficial (in terms of reproductive success) it would be to judge that the fact that something would promote one’s survival is a reason in favor of it, or that the fact that something would assist one’s offspring is a reason to do it. Different evaluative tendencies, then, can have extremely different effects on a creature’s chances of survival and reproduction. In light of this, it is only reasonable to expect there to have been, over the course of our evolutionary history, relentless selective pressure on the content of our evaluative judgements, or rather (as I discuss below) ‘‘proto’’ versions thereof. In particular, we can expect there to have been overwhelming pressure in the direction of making those evaluative judgements which tended to promote reproductive success (such as the judgement that one’s life is valuable), and against making those evaluative judgements which tended to decrease reproductive success (such as the judgement that one should attack one’s offspring).
The hypothesis that this is indeed very roughly what happened is borne out by the patterns of evaluative judgement that we observe in human beings today. There is, of course, a seemingly unlimited diversity to the evaluative judgements that human beings affirm. Yet even as we note this diversity, we also see deep and striking patterns, across both time and cultures, in many of the most basic evaluative judgements that human beings tend to make. Consider, as a brief sampling, the following judgements about reasons:
(1) The fact that something would promote one’s survival is a reason in favor of it. (2) The fact that something would promote the interests of a family member is a reason to do it. (3) We have greater obligations to help our own children than we do to help complete strangers. (4) The fact that someone has treated one well is a reason to treat that person well in return. (5) The fact that someone is altruistic is a reason to admire, praise, and reward him or her. (6) The fact that someone has done one deliberate harm is a reason to shun that person or seek his or her punishment.
What explains the widespread human acceptance of such judgements? There are so many other possible judgements about reasons we could make so why these? Why, for instance, do we view the death of our offspring as a horror, rather than as something to be sought after? Why do we think that altruism with no hope of personal reward is the highest form of virtue, rather than something to be loathed and eliminated? Evolutionary biology offers powerful answers to these questions, very roughly of the form that these sorts of judgements about reasons tended to promote survival and reproduction much more effectively than the alternative judgements. The details of how survival and reproduction were promoted will vary depending on the evaluative tendency in question. In the case of judgement (1), for instance, the rough explanation is obvious: creatures who possessed this general evaluative tendency tended to do more to promote their survival than those who, say, had a tendency to view the fact that something would promote their survival as counting against it, and so the former tended to survive and reproduce in greater numbers. The explanation of evaluative tendencies in the direction of judgements such as (2) and (3) will be somewhat more complicated, drawing on the evolutionary theory of kin selection.14 The explanation in the case of evaluative tendencies in the direction of judgements (4), (5), and (6), meanwhile, will appeal to the biological theory of reciprocal altruism.15
For the sake of contrast, consider the following possible evaluative judgements: (1) The fact that something would promote one’s survival is a reason against it. (2) The fact that something would promote the interests of a family member is a reason not to do it. (3) We have greater obligations to help complete strangers than we do to help our own children. (4) The fact that someone has treated one well is a reason to do that individual harm in return. (5) The fact that someone is altruistic is a reason to dislike, condemn, and punish him or her. (6) The fact that someone has done one deliberate harm is a reason to seek out that person’s company and reward him or her.
If judgements like these ones that would, other things being equal, so clearly decrease rather than increase the reproductive success of those who made them predominated among our most deeply and widely held evaluative judgements across both time and cultures, then this would constitute powerful evidence that the content of our evaluative judgements had not been greatly influenced by Darwinian selective pressures. But these are not the evaluative judgements we tend to see; instead, among our most deeply and widely held judgements, we observe many like those on the first list many with exactly the sort of content one would expect if the content of our evaluative judgements had been heavily influenced by selective pressures. In this way, the observed patterns in the actual content of human evaluative judgements provide evidence in favor of the view that natural selection has had a tremendous influence on that content.
A further piece of evidence in favor of this view is the striking continuity that we observe between many of our own widely held evaluative judgements and the more basic evaluative tendencies of other animals, especially those most closely related to us. It does not seem much of a stretch, for example, to say that chimpanzees, in some primitive, non-linguistic sort of fashion, experience certain things in the world as calling for or counting in favor of certain reactions on their part. Moreover, the content of these evaluative experiences seems to overlap significantly with the content of many of our own evaluative tendencies. Like us, individual chimpanzees seem to experience at some basic motivational level actions that would promote their survival or help their offspring as in some way ‘‘called for.’’ More strikingly, and again at some basic motivational level, chimpanzees seem to experience the fact that another chimpanzee has helped them, whether by sharing food, grooming them, or supporting their position within the group hierarchy, as ‘‘counting in favor of’’ assisting that other individual in similar ways.16 While more work is needed to make such claims precise and subject them to thorough scientific testing, they have a strong basic plausibility, such that the conspicuous continuities between the basic evaluative tendencies of our close animal relatives and our own evaluative judgements lend further support to the view that evolutionary forces have played a large role in shaping the content of our evaluative judgements. We may view many of our evaluative judgements as conscious, reflective endorsements of more basic evaluative tendencies that we share with other animals.
Pain’s badness is a contingent truth – if evolution favored those who pursued pain, our evaluative judgements would be different Street 06 (Sharon, Professor of Philosophy and Associate Chair of the Department of Philosophy at New York University) “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” Springer, 2006 Suppose, however, there is remaining doubt and some are still tempted by a realist position on the badness of pain so understood. It’s at this point that the Darwinian Dilemma arises again for the realist. To see how, suppose again that pain is given some definition according to which it is not a necessary feature of pain that we unreflectively experience it as counting in favor of what would avoid, lessen, or stop it. In that case, the following becomes a legitimate scientific question: given that it is perfectly conceivable that we all could have ended up taking pain sensations to count in favor of what would cause them and intensify them rather than in favor of what would lessen them and stop them, what explains the fact that such a huge percentage of us so consistently do the latter? Here, as in earlier cases, there is a powerful evolutionary answer. I’ve left it open how the person opting for the first horn of the Pain Dilemma is defining pain (so long as that definition makes no reference to the idea that pain is a sensation that we unreflectively take to count in favor of what would stop it). But if the proposed definition is to be plausible at all, then it will pick out (predominantly, one assumes) sensations associated with the sorts of bodily conditions that we normally consider painful, such as cuts, burns, bruises, broken bones, and so on. And it is of course no mystery whatsoever, from an evolutionary point of view, why we and the other animals came to take the sensations associated with bodily conditions such as these to count in favor of what would avoid, lessen, or stop them rather than in favor of what would bring about and intensify them. One need only imagine the reproductive prospects of a creature who relished and sought after the sensations of its bones breaking and its tissues tearing; just think how many descendants such a creature would leave in comparison to those who happened to abhor and avoid such sensations. As in earlier cases, the realist faces a problem when confronted with such an explanation. For once again we see that there is a striking coincidence between the content of the independent evaluative truth posited by the realist, on the one hand, and the content that evolutionary theory would lead us to expect, on the other. The realist tells us that it is an independent evaluative truth that pain sensations (however he or she defines them) are bad, and yet this is precisely what evolutionary theory would have predicted that we come to think. And once again the realist is unable to give any good account of this coincidence. To insist that the coincidence is mere coincidence is implausible. The realist’s alternative, here as in earlier cases, is to defend some sort of tracking account, according to which we were selected to be able to discern independent evaluative truths, among them the truth that these pain sensations (however the realist is defining them) are bad. Yet here as in earlier cases, the tracking account is scientifically unacceptable. In order to explain why we came to think that these sensations are bad, we need make no reference whatsoever to the fact that they are bad; we need only point out how it tended to promote reproductive success to take them to be bad (due to their connection with bodily conditions that tended to diminish reproductive success). The realist, then, is forced to the other horn of the Pain Dilemma. To salvage realism about the badness of pain, he or she is forced to understand pain as a sensation such that the creature who has it unreflectively takes that sensation to count in favor of whatever would avoid, lessen, or stop it. But now notice what this means. In order to salvage his or her view of pain as bad independently of our evaluative attitudes, the realist must admit that pain’s badness depends on its being a sensation such that the creature who has it is unreflectively inclined to take it to be bad. But this, in turn, is just to admit that its badness depends in an important sense on our evaluative attitudes in particular, on our being unreflectively inclined to take it to be bad. Pain may well be bad, in other words, but if it is so, its badness hinges crucially on our unreflective evaluative attitudes toward the sensation which pain is. The realist is thus forced to recognize the role of our evaluative attitudes in determining the disvalue of pain. Though initially plausible, it is a mistake to say that pain is bad independently of our evaluative attitudes. Pain, if it is plausibly to be construed as bad independently of our other evaluative attitudes, must be understood as a sensation such that we have a certain evaluative attitude toward it and it’s that evaluative attitude which (at least in part) makes the sensation bad.
The Darwinian Dilemma makes moral realism impossible – the realist must defend judgements being true by pure coincidence or an anti-scientific account of evolution Street 06 (Sharon, Professor of Philosophy and Associate Chair of the Department of Philosophy at New York University) “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” Springer, 2006 Contemporary realist theories of value claim to be compatible with natural science. In this paper, I call this claim into question by arguing that Darwinian considerations pose a dilemma for these theories. The main thrust of my argument is this. Evolutionary forces have played a tremendous role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes. The challenge for realist theories of value is to explain the relation between these evolutionary influences on our evaluative attitudes, on the one hand, and the independent evaluative truths that realism posits, on the other. Realism, I argue, can give no satisfactory account of this relation. On the one hand, the realist may claim that there is no relation between evolutionary influences on our evaluative attitudes and independent evaluative truths. But this claim leads to the implausible skeptical result that most of our evaluative judgements are off track due to the distorting pressure of Darwinian forces. The realist’s other option is to claim that there is a relation between evolutionary influences and independent evaluative truths, namely that natural selection favored ancestors who were able to grasp those truths. But this account, I argue, is unacceptable on scientific grounds. Either way, then, realist theories of value prove unable to accommodate the fact that Darwinian forces have deeply influenced the content of human values. After responding to three objections, the third of which leads me to argue against a realist understanding of the disvalue of pain, I conclude by sketching how antirealism is able to sidestep the dilemma I have presented. Antirealist theories of value are able to offer an alternative account of the relation between evolutionary forces and evaluative facts an account that allows us to reconcile our understanding of evaluative truth with our understanding of the many non-rational causes that have played a role in shaping our evaluative judgements. No new framework warrants – 1NC strategy is premised on the 1AC and late-breaking debates kill clash Our argument doesn’t justify inaction; it may be that the government should do the plan, but that’s not the question the resolution asks. The rez asks: “is there a moral obligation to do the plan?” not “is the plan beneficial?” or “do the benefits of doing the plan outweigh the costs?” Our interpretation is that the aff must prove that WTO member nations have a moral obligation to eliminate patents for medicines. Ought expresses a moral obligation Dictionary n.d. (Dictionary.com) “Ought” JL (used to express duty or moral obligation): Ought statements assume moral realism Anscombe 58 (G.E.M. Anscombe) Modern Moral Philosophy, The Journal of the The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 1/1958 DRD The terms "should" or "ought" or "needs" relate to good and bad: e.g. machinery needs oil, or should or ought to be oiled, in that running without oil is bad for it, or it runs badly without oil. According to this conception, of course, "should" and "ought" are not used in a special "moral" sense when one says that a man should not bilk. (In Aristotle's sense of the term "moral" (ijfo/cds), they are being used in connection with a moral subject-matter: namely that of human passions and (non-technical) actions.) But they have now acquired a special so-called "moral" sense—i.e. a sense in which they imply some absolute verdict (like one of guilty / not guilty on a man) on what is described in the "ought" sentences used in certain types of context: not merely the contexts that Aristotle would call "moral"—passions and actions—but also some of the contexts that he would call "intellectual." The ordinary (and quite indispensable) terms "should," "needs," "ought," "must"—acquired this special sense by being equated in the relevant contexts with "is obliged," or "is bound," or "is required to," in the sense in which one can be obliged or bound by law, or something can be required by law.
Prefer it:
Precision – the resolution says “ought to,” not should – the resolution is the most predictable stasis point for debates, anything outside of that ruins prep and clash by allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for debate 2. Phil Ed – all of the debates that happen under their interp can still occur; we just also allow for debates about meta-ethics. Those debates are valuable -- saying “we have a moral obligation to do X” is useless if you can’t answer the argument that moral obligations don’t exist. 3. Ground – anti-moral realism is a key negative generic, especially on a topic where there’s an aff about every WTO member and kind of medicine, but no neg args that answer every aff 4. No offense – a. Stale debates are inevitable because of generics like Nebel T, but generic meta ethics debates are better since they produce transferrable skills b. Our interp filters out bad arguments – a prioris and paradoxes don’t negate since they don’t disprove that states have a moral obligation to do the plan
9/4/21
SEPTOCT - T - Medicine
Tournament: Greenhill | Round: 3 | Opponent: Strath Haven AM | Judge: Eric He Interpretation – topical affs must defend a reduction of intellectual property protections for medicines. Violation – they reduce IP protections on vaccines which is categorically distinct Medicines are drugs Senate Journal 12 (SENATE JOURNAL STATE OF ILLINOIS )”NINETY-SEVENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 92ND LEGISLATIVE DAY”, https://www.ilga.gov/senate/journals/97/2012/SJ097092R.pdf, MARCH 8, 2012 Medicines means and includes all drugs intended for human or veterinary use approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration. Vaccines are not drugs He et al 12 (Yongqun, Professor of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Michigan Medical School, primary bioinformatics interests are development of biomedical ontologies and their applications in literature mining, Bayesian network modeling, microbial genomics, and vaccine informatics)“A 2012 Workshop: Vaccine and Drug Ontology in the Study of Mechanism and Effect,” Journal of Biomedical Semantics, 12/18/2012 JL Innovative therapeutic interventions are critical to prevent and treat human and animal diseases. A way to broadly classify therapeutic interventions is through their timing in administration: Vaccines are classically administered to prevent the appearance of a medical problem, while drugs are generally administered to treat a medical problem. Noticeable exceptions can be found for both classes of therapeutic interventions such as cancer vaccines (that are administered after detection of the problem), and protein pump inhibitors (that are often administered to prevent gastric problems in co-therapy with other drugs or in specific hospital settings). Nevertheless, vaccines and drugs are similarly regulated both in research and development, manufacturing, clinical trials, government approval and regulation, and post-licensing usage surveillance and monitoring. In a broader scope, vaccine is a special type of drug. Vaccines and drugs also have many differences. For example, for vaccines, dose, time, route, and frequency of administration are generally known quite precisely. However, since drugs are used for patients with different conditions, dose, time, and frequency of drug administration are often very difficult to establish. Since vaccines are often administered to healthy people to prevent medical problems, attribution of an adverse event following vaccination is less likely to be confounded by signs or symptoms of underlying medical problems as it is with drugs that are administered to treat medical problems. However, separation of manifestation of medical problem from manifestation of drug adverse event is often very challenging. In the U.S.A, vaccines are regulated under different laws by the Center for Biologics (CBER) at FDA, while drugs are regulated under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act by the Center for Drugs (CDER) at FDA. Safety surveillance for vaccines is for the most part carried out by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, while for drugs it is carried out by the FDA. Due to these similarities and differences between vaccines and drugs, a closer communication between these two areas is important to create effective ontological frameworks around which we can build comparative and predictive systems for both vaccines and drugs. Prefer –
Limits – allowing non medicines explodes limits to include affs that defend reducing protections for surgeries, therapy, injury prevention, cosmetic procedures, etc. – makes neg prep impossible because the case neg to the Botox and Laser Eye Surgery affs would have no overlap – privileges the aff by stretching pre-tournament neg prep too thin and precluding nuanced rigorous testing of aff 2. Ground – arbitrarily not defending medicines kills links to core neg generics about drug innovation, competition over pharmaceutical development, or production of medicine needing to increase because medical interventions are uncontroversial – plus they’re regulated by different agencies – pushes 1NCs to the fringes like Ks that disagree with everything or sketchy CPs which destroys clash. 3. No plan text in a vacuum – the only way to logically join the plan text and advantage is to presume they defend the medicines discussed in their advantage
Paradigm issues –
Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start 2. Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical 3. Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation 4. Fairness is a voter ¬– necessary to determine the better debater 5. Education is a voter – why schools fund debate
9/18/21
SEPTOCT - T - Nebel Medicines
Tournament: Loyola | Round: 5 | Opponent: Saratoga AG | Judge: Ronak Ahuja Interpretation: medicines is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that member nations of the World Trade Organization reduce intellectual property protections for a subset of medicines. Nebel 19 Jake Nebel Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. , 8-12-2019, "Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution," Briefly, https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/ SM Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions. Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. 1.1 “Colleges and Universities” “Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “colleges and universities” fails the upward-entailment test for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution. Fourth, it is extremely unlikely that the topic committee would have written the resolution with the existential interpretation of “colleges and universities” in mind. If they intended the existential interpretation, they would have added explicit existential quantifiers like “some.” No such addition would be necessary or expected for the generic interpretation since generics lack explicit quantifiers by default. The topic committee’s likely intentions are not decisive, but they strongly suggest that the generic interpretation is correct, since it’s prima facie unlikely that a committee charged with writing a sentence to be debated would be so badly mistaken about what their sentence means (which they would be if they intended the existential interpretation). The committee, moreover, does not write resolutions for the 0.1 percent of debaters who debate on the national circuit; they write resolutions, at least in large part, to be debated by the vast majority of students on the vast majority of circuits, who would take the resolution to be (pretty obviously, I’d imagine) generic with respect to “colleges and universities,” given its face-value meaning and standard expectations about what LD resolutions tend to mean.
It applies to medicines:
Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying that nations ought to reduce IPP for one medicine does not entail that those nations ought to reduce IPP for all medicines 2. Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because a reduction is permanent
Vote neg:
Semantics outweigh: a. T is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden – they agreed to debate the topic when they came here b. Jurisdiction – you can’t vote aff if they haven’t affirmed the resolution c. It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement – there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it
2. Limits – there are countless affs accounting for thousands of medicines – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs
There are over 20,000 affs FDA 11/18 (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, federal agency of the Department of Health and Human Service) “Fact Sheet: FDA at a Glance,” 11/18/2020 JL There are over 20,000 prescription drug products approved for marketing. FDA oversees over 6,500 different medical device product categories. There are over 1,600 FDA-approved animal drug products. There are about 300 FDA-licensed biologics products.
3. Ground – spec guts core generics like innovation that rely on reducing IP for all medicines because individual medicines don’t affect the pharmaceutical industry broadly – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs
4. TVA solves – read as an advantage to whole rez
Paradigm issues:
Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start 2. Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical 3. Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation 4. No RVIs – fairness and education are a priori burdens – and encourages baiting – outweighs because if T is frivolous, they can beat it quickly 5. Fairness is a voter ¬– necessary to determine the better debater 6. Education is a voter – why schools fund debate
9/5/21
SEPTOCT - T - WTO
Tournament: Greenhill RR | Round: Finals | Opponent: Harker DS | Judge: Panel Interp – topical affs must fiat an action through the World Trade Organization. Member nations of the WTO make policies as a whole – WTO ND (World Trade Organization) “What is the WTO?” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm BC The WTO is run by its member governments. All major decisions are made by the membership as a whole, either by ministers (who usually meet at least once every two years) or by their ambassadors or delegates (who meet regularly in Geneva). Nation and state are synonymous Merriam Webster ND “nation” Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nation BC Definition of nation (Entry 1 of 2) 1a(1): NATIONALITY sense 5athree Slav peoples … forged into a Yugoslavia without really fusing into a Yugoslav nation— Hans Kohn (2): a politically organized nationality (3)in the Bible : a non-Jewish nationality why do the nations conspire— Psalms 2:1 (Revised Standard Version) b: a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government Canada is a nation with a written constitution— B. K. Sandwell c: a territorial division containing a body of people of one or more nationalities and usually characterized by relatively large size and independent status a nation of vast size with a small population— Mary K. Hammond
Violation – they don’t – EU member states are distinct from WTO member nations Prefer
Ground – justifies affs about any country reducing any IP protection on medicine – only our interp ensures link magnitude by ensuring it is an international reduction for IPP for medicine which is key to generics like the innovation DA, WTO bad, consult the WHO, and the IP NC -- privileges the aff by stretching pre-tournament neg prep too thin and precluding nuanced rigorous testing of aff. 2. Topic ed – WTO patent wavers are the core topic controversy – their aff is just domestic policy passed in European Union Member states. Proven by their second advantage – none of their internal links are about medical trade secrets which proves their interpretation is a cheap way of getting a relations impact about any two countries that does trade – justifies the US-Mexico or China-Japan aff. Outweighs aff flex -- prep is determined by the lit and we only have 2 months to debate the topic and it provides better link magnitude to all your generics because this is the statis point the topic is centered around. 3. Precision - even if all EU member states are in the WTO that doesn’t mean all WTO member nations are in the EU – prefer our interp – we have evidence from the WTO that explains what coordinated action looks like. Paradigm issues:
Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start 2. Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation 3. Fairness is a voter ¬– necessary to determine the better debater 4. Education is a voter – why schools fund debate