Tournament: 2021 NSD CAMP TOURNAMENT | Round: 1 | Opponent: WesErd Harun Vemulapalli | Judge: Rohit Lakshman
Business confidence is high now and is leading to economic growth
Conference Board 5/19 Conference Board. “The Conference Board Measure of CEO Confidence™.” CEO Confidence Hit All-Time High in Q2 | The Conference Board, 19 May 2021, www.conference-board.org/research/CEO-Confidence/.
Another Quarter of Soaring Optimism Leaves CEO Confidence at Highest Level since Measure began in 1976 The Conference Board Measure of CEO Confidence™ in collaboration with The Business Council improved further in the second quarter of 2021, following a sharp increase in Q1. The measure now stands at 82, up from 73. This marks the highest level of CEO confidence recorded since the measure began in 1976. (A reading above 50 points reflects more positive than negative responses.) CEOs’ assessment of current economic conditions rose substantially, after slightly moderating last quarter. In Q2, 94 percent said conditions are better compared to six months ago, up from 67 percent in Q1. CEOs also expressed greater optimism about conditions in their own industries, with 89 percent reporting better conditions compared to six months ago, up from 68 percent in Q1. Historically high expectations in Q1 climbed even further in Q2: 88 percent of CEOs expect economic conditions to improve over the next six months, up from 82 percent. “This quarter’s survey marks a remarkable turnaround from a year ago—when CEO confidence reached a nadir of 34 at the height of COVID-19’s first wave,” said Dana Peterson, Chief Economist of The Conference Board. “For CEOs, the challenge of navigating a once-in-a-century pandemic is receding, as the focus turns to hiring and investing to compete in an economy poised to see the fastest growth in decades over the months ahead.” In the job market, the pace of hiring is expected to accelerate over the next 12 months, with 54 percent of CEOs expecting to expand their workforce, up from 47 percent in Q1. While the outlook for wages was virtually unchanged in Q2, more CEOs are reporting difficulty finding qualified workers—57 percent in Q2, up from 50 percent in Q1. “Optimism is surging in C-suites and boardrooms across industries,” said Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman of The Business Council and Trustee of The Conference Board. “For CEOs, the challenge is no longer staying afloat, but keeping pace—in particular, with a likely resurgence of the labor shortages experienced before the pandemic.” Current Conditions CEOs’ assessment of general economic conditions rose sharply in Q2: 94 of CEOs reported economic conditions were better compared to six months ago, up from 67 in Q1. Only 2 said conditions were worse, down from 10. CEOs were similarly optimistic about conditions in their own industries in Q2: 89 of CEOs reported that conditions in their industries were better compared to six months ago, up from 68. Only 4 said conditions in their own industries were worse, down from 8. Future Conditions Expectations about the short-term economic outlook improved further in Q2: 88 percent of CEOs said they expect economic conditions to improve over the next six months, up from 82 in Q1. Only 1 expect conditions to worsen, down from 7. CEOs’ expectations regarding short-term prospects in their own industries also improved in Q2: 81 of CEOs expect conditions in their own industry to improve over the next six months, up from 78. Only 4 expected conditions to worsen, down from 7. Capital Spending, Employment, Recruiting, and Wages The survey also gauged CEOs’ expectations about four key actions their companies plan on taking over the next 12 months. Capital Spending: 47 of CEOs expect to increase their capital budgets in the year ahead, up from 45 in Q1. Employment: 54 of CEOs expect to expand their workforce, up from 47 in Q1. Hiring Qualified People: 57 of CEOs report some problems attracting qualified workers, up from 50 in Q1. Notably, 28 report difficulties that cut across the organization, rather than concentrated in a few key areas—up from 18 in Q1. Wages: 37 of CEOs expect to increase wages by 3 or more over the next year, virtually unchanged from 36 in Q1.
A shift towards pro union policies and helping bargaining power during worker strikes cause businesses to fail and undermine confidence due to a sudden shift left by the current administration.
John DiNardo University of Michigan, Ann Arbor and NBER David S. Lee UC Berkeley and NBER https://www.princeton.edu/~davidlee/wp/unionbf.pdf
It is widely understood that unions raise the cost of labor by raising members’ wages above market rates.1 Unions also impose other costs on employers - limiting discretion in hiring and firing, for example, and altering the structure of pay differentials across skill groups. A key question for understanding the social costs of unionization is whether the wage premiums and other costs of unionism create large or small distortions in the allocation of labor.2 These distortions can take the form of reduced employment at unionized firms, or most dramatically, an accelerated pace of business failures. The potentially adverse effects of unions on firm survival are acknowledged by employers and employees alike. During union organizing drives, firms routinely threaten to close a plant if the union drive is successful Bronfenbrenner 2000. Employees seem to take these threats seriously: the risk of plant closure is cited as the leading cause of union withdrawal from organizing attempts Commission for Labor Cooperation 1997. Such risks are arguably higher now, in light of rapidly expanding trade with low-wage countries such as China and Mexico, and increasing international capital mobility.
Business confidence dictates growth
McQuarie 16 McQuarie, Economic risk consulting firm, 5 factors that impact business and consumer confidence, 25 May 2016 https://www.macquarie.com/au/advisers/expertise/market-insights/business-consumer-confidence-australia TR
In 1933, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt pointedly noted that "confidence... thrives on honesty, on honour, on the sacredness of obligations, on faithful protection and on unselfish performance. Without them it cannot live". And over 80 years later these words still resonate with political, policy and business leaders as they grapple with increasingly fickle cycles of consumer and business confidence. To be fair, global policymakers are currently confronting a perplexing set of factors in the aftermath of the financial crisis and major central banks' deployment of unconventional monetary policy via unprecedented asset purchase programs and negative interest rates. Arguably, the crisis of 2008-09 and its legacy continue to cast some doubt on the effectiveness and accountability of policymaking institutions in the major developed economies. Confidence levels in the major developed economies have also been influenced by concerns about the socioeconomic consequences of the unrelenting pressure for ‘structural change’ in an increasingly competitive global economic system. At the household/consumer level, a key concern has been persistently high levels of unemployment faced in some regions and subdued income growth in developed economies, while for businesses, sluggish demand and highly competitive operating conditions continue to influence perceptions of resilience and confidence. Consequently, as the global economy moves into the second half of 2016 it is important to understand the causes and consequences of shifts in consumer and business confidence and the possible implications for the business cycle and macroeconomic policy settings. Confidence may be a case of shifting sands With policymakers in the major economies working hard to restore and maintain confidence levels and shifts in sentiment indicators playing a key role in risk assessments of investors, it is worthwhile to consider the various influences on this qualitative economic measure. Our analysis of the various indicators of consumer and business confidence that are regularly published highlight several common factors that have the potential to cause marked shifts in sentiment; including: Changes in interest rates and/or exchange rates, particularly if they are rapid, large and unexpected Swings in the business cycle and associated movements in employment/unemployment levels and business investment intentions Shifts in the relative prices of nondiscretionary goods and services, notably petrol, healthcare, education and utilities prices Large external economic and/or financial shocks, such as the financial crisis of 2008/09 and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2010/11 Announced policy shifts in the stance of government fiscal policy, including large structural spending cuts or increases/decreases in taxation rates. Interestingly, it is widely accepted by economists that the financial economy operating via interest rates and exchange rates acts as a buffer for the real economy in terms of external shocks, but this effect can often be magnified due to the out-sized impact on consumer and business confidence. For example, Australia was not directly affected by either the financial crisis or the subsequent Eurozone debt crisis, but on both occasions a considerable upsurge in general anxiety and slumping confidence were recorded. Australian households and businesses reported concerns about the economy's vulnerability in the face of unprecedented upheaval in global financial markets. Not surprisingly, in some quarters concerns continue to be expressed that small open economies such as Australia and New Zealand often experience disproportionate reactions to economic and financial disturbances that emanate from much larger and more complex economies, including the US, the Eurozone, Japan, and China. To be sure, we are not suggesting that economic policymakers should maintain inappropriate macro policy settings in order to buoy consumer and business confidence. Rather, the announcement and implementation of shifts in key macro policy needs to be sensitive to the psychological impact on households and firms in the real economy. It is the need to manage psychology that has led the major central banks to bolster their policy 'forward guidance' activities, as they fine-tune strategies to eventually end a period of extraordinary monetary policy accommodation. It's not all in the mind as sentiment shapes activity Although it is often said that 'confidence can turn on a dime', this should not be taken as diminishing the role of sentiment in shaping economic activity and in turn the path of business cycles. The power of confidence was patently demonstrated in late 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent slump in global consumer and business sentiment. This was accompanied by an unprecedented collapse in global trade volumes, industrial production, investment and importantly risk-taking. It is estimated that in the major developed economies, including Australia and New Zealand, consumer spending contributes up to two thirds of aggregate demand, based on income levels or changes, buying and spending trends, and underlying economic conditions. If we consider credit and liquidity to be the life-blood of the economic system, then it is reasonable to regard confidence as the oxygen that sustains the system. So heightened economic anxiety and languishing confidence will have manifest impacts on the health and wellbeing of the economy, often determining whether or not it can reach and sustain its long term potential rates of growth. Recent experience indicates that there are several important consequences of low and declining levels of confidence, including: unusually high household and business savings rates, including the hoarding of capital by financial and nonfinancial firms subdued nominal income growth and tepid private sector credit growth widespread household deleveraging declining business investment spending and weak employment growth dominance of short-term thinking and absence of longer-term strategic activity risk of a decline in the economy’s structural growth rate and associated deterioration in productivity growth. Therefore, economies facing 'crises of confidence' may find if this prevails it will undermine productive capacity and prove to be 'growth limiting'. In this event, it could lead to deterioration in living standards as the base of economic activity gradually contracts and the willingness and capacity to engage in risk-taking is curtailed.
Nuclear War
Tønnesson 15 Stein Tønnesson, PhD from the University of Oslo, is research professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo(PRIO), adjunct professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research,Uppsala University where he leads a six-year research programme on the East AsianPeace, associate editor for Asia in the Journal of Peace Research, International Area Studies Review, 2015, Vol. 18(3), “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace”, 297–311
Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.
Nuke war causes extinction
PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf Re-cut by Elmer
Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, th1AR - AT: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about 20 percent for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.