Bronx Science Kim Aff
| Tournament | Round | Opponent | Judge | Cites | Round Report | Open Source | Edit/Delete |
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| Apple Valley | 1 | Westwood AG | Grant Brown |
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| Apple Valley | 3 | Scarsdale JT | Animesh Joshi |
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| Apple Valley | 5 | Troy Independent AP | Saianurag Karavadi |
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| Emory | 1 | Strake KS | Derek Ying |
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| Emory | 3 | Immaculate Heart RR | Bennett Dombcik |
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| Emory | 6 | Unionville AS | Nigel Ward |
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| Emory | Triples | Lexington AT | panel |
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| Glenbrooks | 1 | Immaculate Heart RR | Andrew Qin |
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| Glenbrooks | 4 | James Logan RS | Dylan Jones |
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| Glenbrooks | 5 | Cypress Bay ZR | Nicky Smith |
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| Harvard | 1 | Lexington CH | Josh Porter |
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| Harvard | 4 | Aragon ZA | Michael Kurian |
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| Lexington | 1 | Ridge VZ | Braeden Kirkpatrick |
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| Lexington | 5 | LHP SV | Brett Cryan |
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| Lexington | 6 | Bridgeland PT | Grant Brown |
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| Princeton | 1 | Olympia BO | Ethan Massa |
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| Princeton | 3 | Stuyvesant HJ | Henry Eberhart |
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| Princeton | 6 | Millburn ST | Chetan Hertzig |
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| Yale | 4 | Harrison TB | Amelia Ritenour |
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| Yale | 6 | Stuyvesant LC | Jacob Nails |
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| Yale | 1 | Lexington FM | Kirsten Gray |
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| Tournament | Round | Report |
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| Apple Valley | 1 | Opponent: Westwood AG | Judge: Grant Brown 1AC - Alienation |
| Apple Valley | 3 | Opponent: Scarsdale JT | Judge: Animesh Joshi 1AC - alienation |
| Apple Valley | 5 | Opponent: Troy Independent AP | Judge: Saianurag Karavadi 1AC - alienation |
| Emory | 1 | Opponent: Strake KS | Judge: Derek Ying 1AC - Heidegger |
| Emory | 3 | Opponent: Immaculate Heart RR | Judge: Bennett Dombcik 1ac - heidegger |
| Emory | 6 | Opponent: Unionville AS | Judge: Nigel Ward 1AC - heidegger |
| Emory | Triples | Opponent: Lexington AT | Judge: panel 1AC - heidegger |
| Glenbrooks | 1 | Opponent: Immaculate Heart RR | Judge: Andrew Qin 1AC - alienation |
| Glenbrooks | 4 | Opponent: James Logan RS | Judge: Dylan Jones 1AC - alienation |
| Glenbrooks | 5 | Opponent: Cypress Bay ZR | Judge: Nicky Smith 1AC - alienation |
| Harvard | 1 | Opponent: Lexington CH | Judge: Josh Porter 1AC - Heidegger |
| Harvard | 4 | Opponent: Aragon ZA | Judge: Michael Kurian 1AC - Heidegger |
| Lexington | 1 | Opponent: Ridge VZ | Judge: Braeden Kirkpatrick 1ac - heidegger |
| Lexington | 5 | Opponent: LHP SV | Judge: Brett Cryan 1ac - heidegger |
| Lexington | 6 | Opponent: Bridgeland PT | Judge: Grant Brown 1ac - heidegger |
| Princeton | 1 | Opponent: Olympia BO | Judge: Ethan Massa 1AC - alienation |
| Princeton | 3 | Opponent: Stuyvesant HJ | Judge: Henry Eberhart 1AC - alienation |
| Princeton | 6 | Opponent: Millburn ST | Judge: Chetan Hertzig lay |
| Yale | 4 | Opponent: Harrison TB | Judge: Amelia Ritenour 1AC - Heidegger |
| Yale | 6 | Opponent: Stuyvesant LC | Judge: Jacob Nails 1AC - contracts |
| Yale | 1 | Opponent: Lexington FM | Judge: Kirsten Gray lay |
| any | Quads | Opponent: any | Judge: any afdaf |
| any | Octas | Opponent: any | Judge: any adskf |
| any | Semis | Opponent: any | Judge: anyone interps |
| any | Doubles | Opponent: any | Judge: any wiki |
To modify or delete round reports, edit the associated round.
Cites
| Entry | Date |
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0 - CitesTournament: any | Round: Doubles | Opponent: any | Judge: any | 1/16/22 |
0 - ContactTournament: any | Round: Quads | Opponent: any | Judge: any contact: pronouns: he/him | 9/20/21 |
1 - Broken InterpsTournament: any | Round: Semis | Opponent: any | Judge: anyone Interpretation: If the negative debater reads an alternative or counter-plan in the 1N, they must spec the status of the alternative or counter-plan in that speech. | 12/4/21 |
JANFEB - AC - HeideggerTournament: Lexington | Round: 1 | Opponent: Ridge VZ | Judge: Braeden Kirkpatrick 1ACLife is fundamentally pre-ontological – an essential openness that exists solely in relation to the world around it. We have no essence aside from our ability to read possibility into the objects around us – this interaction makes the world intelligible and fosters our being within it.Sheehan 15 ~Thomas Sheehan (PhD. American philosopher who is the current professor at the Department of Religious Studies, Stanford University and Professor Emeritus at the Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago.) "Making Sense of Heidegger: eA Pardigm Shift." Chapter 4. Rowman and Littlefield International. 2015~ *brackets in original* ~bxnk AND those contexts. We live in many such contexts at the same time. Western philosophy and scientific thought are the very essence of technology – an incessant striving to capture, calculate, and inquire about the world within a preset context that only propagates the nihilism of modernity.Linker 06 ~Damon Linker, Senior Writing Fellow in the Center for Critical Writing at the University of Pennsylvania, "Heidegger’s Revelation: The End of Enlightenment," (American Behavioral Scientist), 733-749 (2006). 10.1177/0002764205282221~ ~bxnk AND why" from a pair of essays Heidegger wrote in the early 1950s. The technical rationalization of education policy has entrenched socioeconomic inequality and political passivity – the totalization of calculative metaphysics subverts deliberative politics and enrolls students in an abhorrent process of endless economic commodificationClarke 13 – Matthew Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Education at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. The (absent) politics of neo-liberal education policy, Critical Studies in Education Vol. 53, No. 3, October 2012, 297–310, msmrehighlighted ~bxnk AND structural and socio-economic factors that impact on educational achievement (Hyslop- Scientific rationalism, ideals of social progress and efficiency results in the worst atrocities – an embrace of radical responsibility that imagines social justice as an ontological imperative is a prerequisite to political theorizationKalanges 10 – Kristine Kalanges is Associate Professor of Law and Concurrent Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. From the Violence of Positivism to the Ethics of Encounter: Restoring Relationality to International Relations, 9-23-2010, msmrehighlighted ~bxnk AND everything, even the mysterious, through the lens of scientific rationalism. T Thus, this debate ought to be a question of the aff’s form of relating to educational institutions.~1~ Specificity – We are in the university, which requires a paradigmatic analysis of the way it operates to be ethically responsible; an interrogation of the space is a prior question since all your arguments presume a neutral starting point.~2~ Education is the internal link to the rest of society since ~a~ It’s a prior question to engaging in any form of scholarship if that scholarship is influenced by the university ~b~ Systems of technology control society through a manipulation of education, that’s the Clarke evidence ~c~ Education is independently necessary to solve any problem since only learning about the problem and how to solve can actually solve anything, if solvency matters.I defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.The role of the ballot is to embrace ontological thinking, a form of thought that interrupts our pre-conceived hegemonic understandings of being.Thomson 16 – Iain, associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Mexico, Rethinking education after Heidegger: Teaching learning as ontological response-ability, Educational Philosophy and Theory, msmrecut ~bxnk AND important, and inspiring (Thomson, 2011, chapters seven and eight). Appropriation is fueled by the will to mastery – a dangerous illusion of control to dominate new "frontiers" and flee the impacts of destruction on Earth.Rahder 19 - "Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth" by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 ~https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/~~ ahs emi AND of the human species as the ontological basis and scale for extraterrestrial futures. Colonization is the will to technology that affirms our inability to appropriate the Earth.Karamercan ’21 ~O. PhD in philosophy and gender studies from the University of Tasmania. Could Humans Dwell beyond the Earth? Thinking with Heidegger on Space Colonization and the Topology of Technology. ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment. doi:10.1093/isle/isaa164~ bxnk AND decolonizing the earth, its skies and waters, rather than colonizing space? | 1/16/22 |
JANFEB - AC - Heidegger v2Tournament: Lexington | Round: 5 | Opponent: LHP SV | Judge: Brett Cryan 1ACLife is fundamentally pre-ontological – an essential openness that exists solely in relation to the world around it. We have no essence aside from our ability to read possibility into the objects around us – this interaction makes the world intelligible and fosters our being within it.Sheehan 15 ~Thomas Sheehan (PhD. American philosopher who is the current professor at the Department of Religious Studies, Stanford University and Professor Emeritus at the Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago.) "Making Sense of Heidegger: eA Pardigm Shift." Chapter 4. Rowman and Littlefield International. 2015~ *brackets in original* ~bxnk AND those contexts. We live in many such contexts at the same time. Western philosophy and scientific thought are the very essence of technology – an incessant striving to capture, calculate, and inquire about the world within a preset context that only propagates the nihilism of modernity.Linker 06 ~Damon Linker, Senior Writing Fellow in the Center for Critical Writing at the University of Pennsylvania, "Heidegger’s Revelation: The End of Enlightenment," (American Behavioral Scientist), 733-749 (2006). 10.1177/0002764205282221~ ~bxnk AND why" from a pair of essays Heidegger wrote in the early 1950s. The technical rationalization of education policy has entrenched socioeconomic inequality and political passivity – the totalization of calculative metaphysics subverts deliberative politics and enrolls students in an abhorrent process of endless economic commodificationClarke 13 – Matthew Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Education at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. The (absent) politics of neo-liberal education policy, Critical Studies in Education Vol. 53, No. 3, October 2012, 297–310, msmrehighlighted ~bxnk AND structural and socio-economic factors that impact on educational achievement (Hyslop- Scientific rationalism, ideals of social progress and efficiency results in the worst atrocities – an embrace of radical responsibility that imagines social justice as an ontological imperative is a prerequisite to political theorizationKalanges 10 – Kristine Kalanges is Associate Professor of Law and Concurrent Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. From the Violence of Positivism to the Ethics of Encounter: Restoring Relationality to International Relations, 9-23-2010, msmrehighlighted ~bxnk AND everything, even the mysterious, through the lens of scientific rationalism. T Thus, this debate ought to be a question of the aff’s form of relating to educational institutions.~1~ Specificity – We are in the university, which requires a paradigmatic analysis of the way it operates to be ethically responsible; an interrogation of the space is a prior question since all your arguments presume a neutral starting point.~2~ Education is the internal link to the rest of society since ~a~ It’s a prior question to engaging in any form of scholarship if that scholarship is influenced by the university ~b~ Systems of technology control society through a manipulation of education, that’s the Clarke evidence ~c~ Education is independently necessary to solve any problem since only learning about the problem and how to solve can actually solve anything, if solvency matters.I defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.The role of the ballot is to embrace ontological thinking, a form of thought that interrupts our pre-conceived hegemonic understandings of being.Thomson 16 – Iain, associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Mexico, Rethinking education after Heidegger: Teaching learning as ontological response-ability, Educational Philosophy and Theory, msmrecut ~bxnk AND important, and inspiring (Thomson, 2011, chapters seven and eight). Appropriation is fueled by the will to mastery – a dangerous illusion of control to dominate new "frontiers" and flee the impacts of destruction on Earth.Rahder 19 - "Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth" by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 ~https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/~~ ahs emi AND of the human species as the ontological basis and scale for extraterrestrial futures. Colonization is the will to technology that affirms our inability to dwell within the Earth.Karamercan ’21 ~O. PhD in philosophy and gender studies from the University of Tasmania. Could Humans Dwell beyond the Earth? Thinking with Heidegger on Space Colonization and the Topology of Technology. ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment. doi:10.1093/isle/isaa164~ bxnk AND decolonizing the earth, its skies and waters, rather than colonizing space? | 1/16/22 |
JANFEB - AC - Heidegger v3Tournament: Lexington | Round: 6 | Opponent: Bridgeland PT | Judge: Grant Brown 1ACLife is fundamentally pre-ontological – an essential openness that exists solely in relation to the world around it. We have no essence aside from our ability to read possibility into the objects around us – this interaction makes the world intelligible and fosters our being within it.Sheehan 15 ~Thomas Sheehan (PhD. American philosopher who is the current professor at the Department of Religious Studies, Stanford University and Professor Emeritus at the Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago.) "Making Sense of Heidegger: eA Pardigm Shift." Chapter 4. Rowman and Littlefield International. 2015~ *brackets in original* ~bxnk AND those contexts. We live in many such contexts at the same time. Western philosophy and scientific thought are the very essence of technology – an incessant striving to capture, calculate, and inquire about the world within a preset context that only propagates the nihilism of modernity.Linker 06 ~Damon Linker, Senior Writing Fellow in the Center for Critical Writing at the University of Pennsylvania, "Heidegger’s Revelation: The End of Enlightenment," (American Behavioral Scientist), 733-749 (2006). 10.1177/0002764205282221~ ~bxnk AND why" from a pair of essays Heidegger wrote in the early 1950s. The technical rationalization of education policy has entrenched socioeconomic inequality and political passivity – the totalization of calculative metaphysics subverts deliberative politics and enrolls students in an abhorrent process of endless economic commodificationClarke 13 – Matthew Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Education at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. The (absent) politics of neo-liberal education policy, Critical Studies in Education Vol. 53, No. 3, October 2012, 297–310, msmrehighlighted ~bxnk AND structural and socio-economic factors that impact on educational achievement (Hyslop- Scientific rationalism, ideals of social progress and efficiency results in the worst atrocities – an embrace of radical responsibility that imagines social justice as an ontological imperative is a prerequisite to political theorizationKalanges 10 – Kristine Kalanges is Associate Professor of Law and Concurrent Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. From the Violence of Positivism to the Ethics of Encounter: Restoring Relationality to International Relations, 9-23-2010, msmrehighlighted ~bxnk AND everything, even the mysterious, through the lens of scientific rationalism. T Thus, this debate ought to be a question of the aff’s form of relating to educational institutions.~1~ Specificity – We are in the university, which requires a paradigmatic analysis of the way it operates to be ethically responsible; an interrogation of the space is a prior question since all your arguments presume a neutral starting point.~2~ Education is the internal link to the rest of society since ~a~ It’s a prior question to engaging in any form of scholarship if that scholarship is influenced by the university ~b~ Systems of technology control society through a manipulation of education, that’s the Clarke evidence ~c~ Education is independently necessary to solve any problem since only learning about the problem and how to solve can actually solve anything, if solvency matters.I defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.We use an arm of the university and its operations to force the fiating of the removal of technologized entities through the injection of meaningless signs within the system. The use of an inherently meaningless construct of fiat exposes the operations of the university as we radically say ‘no’ to existential alienation and prevent its existence through the system’s own construction, proving any answer to the solvency mechanism of the aff is actually proof of our method. Using educational institutions is key to accessing the inside of the system and ontologizing meaning. The role of the ballot is to embrace ontological thinking, a form of thought that interrupts our pre-conceived hegemonic understandings of being.Thomson 16 – Iain, associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Mexico, Rethinking education after Heidegger: Teaching learning as ontological response-ability, Educational Philosophy and Theory, msmrecut ~bxnk AND important, and inspiring (Thomson, 2011, chapters seven and eight). Appropriation is fueled by the will to mastery – a dangerous illusion of control to dominate new "frontiers" and flee the impacts of destruction on Earth.Rahder 19 - "Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth" by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 ~https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/~~ ahs emi AND of the human species as the ontological basis and scale for extraterrestrial futures. Colonization is the will to technology that affirms our inability to dwell within the Earth.Karamercan ’21 ~O. PhD in philosophy and gender studies from the University of Tasmania. Could Humans Dwell beyond the Earth? Thinking with Heidegger on Space Colonization and the Topology of Technology. ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment. doi:10.1093/isle/isaa164~ bxnk AND decolonizing the earth, its skies and waters, rather than colonizing space? | 1/16/22 |
JANFEB - AC - Heidegger v4Tournament: Emory | Round: 1 | Opponent: Strake KS | Judge: Derek Ying Life is fundamentally pre-ontological – an essential openness that exists solely in relation to the world around it. We have no essence aside from our ability to read possibility into the objects around us – this interaction makes the world intelligible and fosters our being within it.Sheehan 15 ~Thomas Sheehan (PhD. American philosopher who is the current professor at the Department of Religious Studies, Stanford University and Professor Emeritus at the Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago.) "Making Sense of Heidegger: eA Pardigm Shift." Chapter 4. Rowman and Littlefield International. 2015~ *brackets in original* ~bxnk AND those contexts. We live in many such contexts at the same time. Western philosophy and scientific thought are the very essence of technology – an incessant striving to capture, calculate, and inquire about the world within a preset context that only propagates the nihilism of modernity.Linker 06 ~Damon Linker, Senior Writing Fellow in the Center for Critical Writing at the University of Pennsylvania, "Heidegger’s Revelation: The End of Enlightenment," (American Behavioral Scientist), 733-749 (2006). 10.1177/0002764205282221~ ~bxnk AND why" from a pair of essays Heidegger wrote in the early 1950s. The act of utilitarianism requires a divorce from the world – separating us from being and seeing subjectivity as objectivityThames 5 (Brad, recent PhD graduate of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and currently a postoctoral research and teaching fellow through the Office of Research at ND, "Beyond Ethical Dualisms: Heidegger and Modern Moral Philosophy", Continental Philosophy Course) http://www3.nd.edu/~~bthames/docs/Beyond20Ethical20Dualisms—Bradley20J20Thames.pdf AND and being-for are primordially part of our essence at its core. The technical rationalization of education policy has entrenched socioeconomic inequality and political passivity – the totalization of calculative metaphysics subverts deliberative politics and enrolls students in an abhorrent process of endless economic commodificationClarke 13 – Matthew Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Education at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. The (absent) politics of neo-liberal education policy, Critical Studies in Education Vol. 53, No. 3, October 2012, 297–310, msmrehighlighted ~bxnk AND structural and socio-economic factors that impact on educational achievement (Hyslop- Scientific rationalism, ideals of social progress and efficiency results in the worst atrocities – an embrace of radical responsibility that imagines social justice as an ontological imperative is a prerequisite to political theorizationKalanges 10 – Kristine Kalanges is Associate Professor of Law and Concurrent Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. From the Violence of Positivism to the Ethics of Encounter: Restoring Relationality to International Relations, 9-23-2010, msmrehighlighted ~bxnk AND everything, even the mysterious, through the lens of scientific rationalism. T I defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.The role of the ballot is to embrace ontological thinking, a form of thought that interrupts our pre-conceived hegemonic understandings of being.Thomson 16 – Iain, associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Mexico, Rethinking education after Heidegger: Teaching learning as ontological response-ability, Educational Philosophy and Theory, msmrecut ~bxnk AND important, and inspiring (Thomson, 2011, chapters seven and eight). Appropriation is fueled by the will to mastery – a dangerous illusion of control to dominate new "frontiers" and flee the impacts of destruction on Earth.Rahder 19 - "Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth" by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 ~https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/~~ ahs emi AND of the human species as the ontological basis and scale for extraterrestrial futures. Colonization is the will to will that affirms our inability to appropriate the Earth.Karamercan ’21 ~O. PhD in philosophy and gender studies from the University of Tasmania. Could Humans Dwell beyond the Earth? Thinking with Heidegger on Space Colonization and the Topology of Technology. ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment. doi:10.1093/isle/isaa164~ bxnk AND decolonizing the earth, its skies and waters, rather than colonizing space? | 1/29/22 |
JANFEB - AC - Heidegger v5Tournament: Emory | Round: 3 | Opponent: Immaculate Heart RR | Judge: Bennett Dombcik Life is fundamentally pre-ontological – an essential openness that exists solely in relation to the world around it. We have no essence aside from our ability to read possibility into the objects around us – this interaction makes the world intelligible and fosters our being within it.Sheehan 15 ~Thomas Sheehan (PhD. American philosopher who is the current professor at the Department of Religious Studies, Stanford University and Professor Emeritus at the Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago.) "Making Sense of Heidegger: eA Pardigm Shift." Chapter 4. Rowman and Littlefield International. 2015~ *brackets in original* ~bxnk AND those contexts. We live in many such contexts at the same time. Western philosophy and scientific thought are the very essence of technology – an incessant striving to capture, calculate, and inquire about the world within a preset context that only propagates the nihilism of modernity.Linker 06 ~Damon Linker, Senior Writing Fellow in the Center for Critical Writing at the University of Pennsylvania, "Heidegger’s Revelation: The End of Enlightenment," (American Behavioral Scientist), 733-749 (2006). 10.1177/0002764205282221~ ~bxnk AND why" from a pair of essays Heidegger wrote in the early 1950s. The act of utilitarianism requires a divorce from the world – separating us from being and seeing subjectivity as objectivityThames 5 (Brad, recent PhD graduate of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and currently a postoctoral research and teaching fellow through the Office of Research at ND, "Beyond Ethical Dualisms: Heidegger and Modern Moral Philosophy", Continental Philosophy Course) http://www3.nd.edu/~~bthames/docs/Beyond20Ethical20Dualisms—Bradley20J20Thames.pdf AND and being-for are primordially part of our essence at its core. The technical rationalization of education policy has entrenched socioeconomic inequality and political passivity – the totalization of calculative metaphysics subverts deliberative politics and enrolls students in an abhorrent process of endless economic commodificationClarke 13 – Matthew Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Education at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. The (absent) politics of neo-liberal education policy, Critical Studies in Education Vol. 53, No. 3, October 2012, 297–310, msmrehighlighted ~bxnk AND structural and socio-economic factors that impact on educational achievement (Hyslop- Scientific rationalism, ideals of social progress and efficiency results in the worst atrocities – an embrace of radical responsibility that imagines social justice as an ontological imperative is a prerequisite to political theorizationKalanges 10 – Kristine Kalanges is Associate Professor of Law and Concurrent Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. From the Violence of Positivism to the Ethics of Encounter: Restoring Relationality to International Relations, 9-23-2010, msmrehighlighted ~bxnk AND everything, even the mysterious, through the lens of scientific rationalism. T Thus, this debate ought to be a question of the aff’s form of relating to educational institutions.Prefer –~1~ Specificity – We are in the university, which requires a paradigmatic analysis of the way it operates to be ethically responsible; an interrogation of the space is a prior question since all your arguments presume a neutral starting point.~2~ Education is the internal link to the rest of society since ~a~ It’s a prior question to engaging in any form of scholarship if that scholarship is influenced by the university ~b~ Systems of technology control society through a manipulation of education, that’s the Clarke evidence ~c~ Education is independently necessary to solve any problem since only learning about the problem and how to solve can actually solve anything, if solvency matters.I defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.The role of the ballot is to embrace ontological thinking, a form of thought that interrupts our pre-conceived hegemonic understandings of being.Thomson 16 – Iain, associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Mexico, Rethinking education after Heidegger: Teaching learning as ontological response-ability, Educational Philosophy and Theory, msmrecut ~bxnk AND important, and inspiring (Thomson, 2011, chapters seven and eight). Appropriation is fueled by the will to mastery – a dangerous illusion of control to dominate new "frontiers" and flee the impacts of destruction on Earth.Rahder 19 - "Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth" by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 ~https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/~~ ahs emi AND of the human species as the ontological basis and scale for extraterrestrial futures. Colonization is the will to will that affirms our inability to appropriate the Earth.Karamercan ’21 ~O. PhD in philosophy and gender studies from the University of Tasmania. Could Humans Dwell beyond the Earth? Thinking with Heidegger on Space Colonization and the Topology of Technology. ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment. doi:10.1093/isle/isaa164~ bxnk AND our existence. Thinking that space colonization is the only way to avoid extinction | 1/29/22 |
JANFEB - AC - Heidegger v6Tournament: Harvard | Round: 1 | Opponent: Lexington CH | Judge: Josh Porter 1ACI value morality.Life is a constant quest for meaning, as is the project of ethics, politics, and humanity.====Our ability to understand the world is framed by our pre-ontological status - an essential openness that exists solely in relation to the world around us. We have no essence aside from our ability to read possibility into the objects that we experience; this interaction makes the world intelligible and fosters our being within it. ==== AND those contexts. We live in many such contexts at the same time. That outweighs: Being is always a prior question – only an existential analysis of what comprises our subjective nature can allow for ethical judgements.A~ Facticity – objects and entities only have meaning in the specific contexts they are presently confronted with. A rock can be used for analysis by a geologist or as a hammer by a survivalist – its meaning is contingently signified in the moment and not a metaphysical truth.B~ Alienation – the fact we are thrown into a world at a particular place and time forces us to inculcate moral responsibility. Confronting our existential freedom to mold ourselves in our own image is a prerequisite to being able to view ourselves as being agents across space and time.However, subjects must first escape the nihilistic technological worldview that excludes them from meaning creation – only by reorienting our epistemic stance as per the ethical demand of the aff can allow us to embrace our fundamental openness to being.Blitz 14 ~Mark Blitz is the Fletcher Jones Professor of Political Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College. "Understanding Heidegger on Technology" (The New Atlantis). https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/understanding-heidegger-on-technology~~ bxnk AND of thought." By this questioning we may be saved from technology’s rule. The standard is thus to embrace ontological thought, a form of thought that escapes our technological orientation to Being.Thomson 16 – Iain, associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Mexico, Rethinking education after Heidegger: Teaching learning as ontological response-ability, Educational Philosophy and Theory, msmrecut ~bxnk AND important, and inspiring (Thomson, 2011, chapters seven and eight). Prefer additionally:~1~ Performativity – all theories require the ability to engage in them through the ability to act on your own purposes, which means merely reading or subscribing to an ethical system requires a commitment to radical freedom.~2~ Inescapable – The human condition is one that necessitates the exercise of radical freedom given the metaphysical understanding of the conscious subject. It is impossible to escape the conception of the self, as it is the only essential feature of existence.~3~ Motivation – existentialism is the only motivational ethic insofar as every action we take is driven by the desire to take that action; regardless of what the motivation is, whenever an act is externally realized, it entails the action was necessarily motivated by the freedom to take such action.~4~ Lexicality –~A~ All their arguments rely on pure human rationality through logic which the NC says is impossible with a technological wolrdview. Answering the NC proves it true since you had to first embrace your radical freedom to interpret the world to access rational argumentation.~B~ Western metaphysics, consequentialism, and liberal philosophy requires a divorce from the world – separating us from being and seeing subjectivity as objectivity. Only our standard can reconnect ethics to the lived world that forms its basis.Thames 5 (Brad, recent PhD graduate of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and currently a postdoctoral research and teaching fellow through the Office of Research at ND, "Beyond Ethical Dualisms: Heidegger and Modern Moral Philosophy", Continental Philosophy Course. http://www3.nd.edu/~~bthames/docs/Beyond20Ethical20Dualisms—Bradley20J20Thames.pdf) bxnk AND opposition that only reflects and reaffirms the very domination it claims to oppose. I contend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. Now affirm:~1~ Appropriation is fueled by the will to mastery – a dangerous illusion of control to dominate new "frontiers" and flee the impacts of destruction on Earth.Rahder 19 - "Home and Away The Politics of Life after Earth" by Micha Rahder. Rahder, Micha (2019). Home and Away. Environment and Society, 10(1), 158–177. doi:10.3167/ares.2019.100110 ~https://sci-hubtw.hkvisa.net/~~ ahs emi AND of the human species as the ontological basis and scale for extraterrestrial futures. ~2~ Space colonization is the will to will that affirms our inability to appropriate the Earth.Karamercan ’21 ~O. PhD in philosophy and gender studies from the University of Tasmania. Could Humans Dwell beyond the Earth? Thinking with Heidegger on Space Colonization and the Topology of Technology. ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment. doi:10.1093/isle/isaa164~ bxnk AND decolonizing the earth, its skies and waters, rather than colonizing space? | 2/19/22 |
NOVDEC - AC - AlienationTournament: Princeton | Round: 3 | Opponent: Stuyvesant HJ | Judge: Henry Eberhart FrameworkVolition, or the structure of the will, is the precondition for ethics and has intrinsic value. Desires like wanting to smoke a cigarette might arise against our will, but unlike animals, we can ultimately choose to identify with or discard those desires through examining the existing structure of our will – i.e., our underlying volition to quit smoking even if we’re addicted.Our moral choices as agents to act on what makes us who we are, like our desires and passions, thus presupposes the use of an unobstructed volition that compels us to establish our unique identity. Subjectivity can’t be a matter of pure passion or impulse, since whether a person identifies with their passion depends first on their volition.Rahel Jaeggi (August 2014). "Alienation." Columbia University Press. Translated by Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith. Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Rahel Jaeggi is professor of social and political philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Her research focuses on ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and critical theory. AND , too, fails to solve the problem raised in our initial example.~~ Alienation occurs when a subject doesn’t know why their desires belong to them. The difference between an alienated and non-alienated subject is that an alienated subject cannot identify their desire as being important to their will, and thus cannot act purely on their own principles.Thus, volition comes first and outweighs: A) Proceduralism – the will is the mechanism by which every subject engages in any activity, which means regardless of the content of any ethical theory, the ability to will that theory is an intrinsic good B) Foundations – the will is the basis for what constitutes an ethical subject which means its relation to the world is the primary ethical consideration C) Motivation – the structure of the will is the primary source of all our desires, reasons, and beliefs since it generates what counts as motivational to the subject D) Identity – the nature of the will is most constitutive to the creation of the subject since it determines what each subject considers intrinsic to its identity and what exists externally as an façade.However, ethical theories to evaluate the will face a dilemma – they are either paternally objectivist to the extent they restrict the will by presupposing an objective "good" that not everyone identifies with, or they are weakened by subjectivism to the extent that it’s impossible to make true moral claims.The only solution is a concept of alienation that understands the will in a functional capacity to relate to itself and the world – a criterion that is concerned with how one wills, rather than what one wills.Jaeggi 2, Jaeggi, Rahel. "Alienation." Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation/Scopa. In "The Ethics of Antiquity and Modernity" Tugendhat raises the problem of whether it is possible to reformulate antiquity’s inquiry into the nature of happiness (or the good life) under modern conditions. A modern inquiry into the good life must, on the one hand, do justice to the view that its answer cannot "deny the autonomy and thus the interpretive sovereignty of those concerned," and its method must be such that it avoids committing itself to a "specific and unjustifiable picture of the human being."3 On the other hand, if modern ethical theory is to recover the interpretive content of ancient ethics, it must be able to identify an objective criterion that allows us to say "whether it is going well or badly for a person independently of their actual perceptions of their present or future well-being." What is needed, then, is a criterion that, on the one hand, is not identical with the desires or preferences a person actually has and that, on the other hand, does not call into question the interpretive sovereignty of the person and with it the modern ideal of self-determination. Tugendhat’s proposed solution is to develop a formal conception of psychological health. Starting from (what appears to him to be) an unproblematic definition of physical health in terms of "functional capacity," he develops for psychological health a conception of the "functional capacity of willing" and its possible impairment.4 Tugendhat elaborates his criterion with the example of compulsive behavior: a volition that is compulsive in some sense would count as impaired and hence as being disturbed in its functional capacity. This provides a standpoint that is immanent to the subject’s will and, at the same time, not subjective in the sense in which contingent and unevaluated preferences are: "In this way we would attain precisely what is sought, a point of view that is independent of the respective subjective goals of our willing but that nevertheless derives its authority from the perspective of willing itself. As willing (freely choosing) beings, we always will to be unlimited in our free choosing."5 With the standard of the "impairment of the functional capacity of willing," which asks whether we have ourselves at our command in what we will, Tugendhat has achieved a middle ground between subjectivistic and objectivistic positions of the sort he was looking for. One could call such a position a "qualified subjectivism."6 This provides us with a starting point for overcoming the opposition between modern antipaternalism and the paternalism of a more substantial ethical theory: whether something is good for me always depends (antipaternalistically) on my personal view, on whether I in fact want it. This view, however, must be qualified in the sense that the volition it expresses must be a "true volition" and therefore not subject to internal constraints. I must be free in what I will; I must have my will at my command if it is to count as my own. This criterion is, in the first place, formal: it concerns the How, not the What, of willing. That is, I need not will anything in particular; rather, I must be able to will what I will in a free or self-determined manner. It is not necessary, then, to identify a "true object of willing," but only a certain way of relating, in one’s willing, to oneself and to what one wills. As Tugendhat puts it, "the question of what we truly will concerns not the goals of our willing but the How of willing." Second, this criterion is immanent: the criterion is the functional capacity of willing itself, a claim posited by the act of willing itself. When I say, "I want to be able to do what I will," I must also mean, "I want to be able—freely—to will." My account of the problem of alienation can be linked up with this conception of willing in the following way: instances of alienation can be understood as obstructions of volition and thereby—formulated more generally—as obstructions in the relations individuals have to themselves and the world. With the help of Tugendhat’s conception of having oneself at one’s command, instances of alienation can be reconstructed in terms of disturbed ways of establishing relations to oneself and to the world. In this way the problem of alienation is tied to that of freedom. FREEDOM AND ALIENATION My thesis is that alienation can be understood as a particular form of the loss of freedom, as an obstruction of what could be called, following Isaiah Berlin, positive freedom. 8 Formulating the notoriously controversial distinction as briefly as possible, freedom in this sense refers not (merely negatively) to the absence of external coercion but (positively) to the capacity to realize valuable ends. In the sense described (and criticized) by Berlin, positive freedom has a variety of implications: The "positive" sense of the word "liberty" derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer—deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. . . . I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not. 9 As unsystematic and indeterminate the various dimensions of positive freedom might be, the important point is that conceptions of positive freedom always depict the free life as not alienated and vice versa.10 As Robert Pippin puts it, only those acts and intentions that I can "link . . . with me such that they count as due to me or count as mine" are "instances of freedom."11 Being a human being rather than a thing means, according to this view, ascribing to oneself what one wills and does, taking responsibility for it and (therefore) being able to identify with it. Understood in this way, the concept of alienation concerns itself with the complex conditions of "linking" one’s actions and desires (or, more generally, one’s life) with oneself, "counting them as due to" oneself, or making them "one’s own." It also concerns itself with the various obstructions and disturbances that can affect these relations. One is not always already "with oneself;" one’s actions and desires are not always one’s own from the start, and one’s relation to the surrounding natural and social world is equally constitutive and threatened. Positively formulated, clarifying the various dimensions of alienation enables us to specify the conditions for being able to understand one’s life as one’s own (and therefore to lead one’s life freely). An unalienated life, according to this view, is not one in which specific substantial values are realized but one that is lived in a specific—unalienated—manner. The belief that everyone should be able to live her own life no longer stands in opposition, then, to the project of alienation critique. Rather, the absence of alienating impediments and the possibility of appropriating self and world without such impediments is a condition of freedom and self-determination. That functional capacity of willing is mediated by social roles – as the authentic self is inexplicably linked to the self that engages in social communities with others through duplication. Understanding the functionality of the will is impossible in a vacuum.Jaeggi 3, Jaeggi, Rahel. "Alienation." Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation/Scopa. AND conception of the self: there are various layers but no inner core. This culminates in the act of appropriation – the ability to view yourself as a practical agent capable of taking up a project that actively changes your own subject and the role itself.Jaeggi 4, Jaeggi, Rahel. "Alienation." Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation/Scopa. What does it mean to appropriate something?12 If the concept of appropriation refers to a specific relation between self and world, between individuals and objects (whether spiritual or material), what precisely does this relation look like, what are its particular character and its specific structure? Various aspects come together here, and together they account for the concept’s appeal and potential. As opposed to the mere learning of certain contents, talk of appropriation emphasizes that something is not merely passively taken up but actively worked through and independently assimilated. In contrast to merely theoretical insight into some issue, appropriation—comparable to the psychoanalytic process of "working through"—means that one can "deal with" what one knows, that it stands at one’s disposal as knowledge and that one really and practically has command over it. And appropriating a role means more than being able to fill it: one is, we could say, identified with it. Something that we appropriate does not remain external to ourselves. In making something our own, it becomes a part of ourselves in a certain respect. This suggests a kind of introjection and a mixing of oneself with the objects of appropriation. It also evokes the idea of productively and formatively interacting with what one makes one’s own. Appropriation does not leave what is appropriated unchanged. This is why the appropriation of public spaces, for example, means more than that one uses them. We make them our own by making a mark on them through what we do in and with them, by transforming them through appropriative use such that they first acquire a specific form through this use (though not necessarily in a material sense). Although it has one of its roots in an account of property relations, the concept of appropriation, in contrast to mere possession, emphasizes the particular quality of a process that first constitutes a real act of taking possession of something. Accordingly, appropriation is a particular mode of seizing possession.13 Someone who appropriates something puts her individual mark on it, inserts her own ends and qualities into it. This means that sometimes we must still make something that we already possess our own. Relations of appropriation, then, are characterized by several features: appropriation is a form of praxis, a way of relating practically to the world. It refers to a relation of penetration, assimilation, and internalization in which what is appropriated is at the same time altered, structured, and formed. The crucial point of this model (also of great importance for Marx) is a consequence of this structure of penetration and assimilation: appropriation always means a transformation of both poles of the relation. In a process of appropriation both what is appropriated and the appropriator are transformed. In the process of incorporation (appropriative assimilation) the incorporator does not remain the same. This point can be given a constructivist turn: what is appropriated is itself constituted in the process of appropriation; by the same token, what is appropriated does not exist in the absence of appropriation. (In some cases this is obvious: there is no public space as such without its being publicly appropriated; but even social roles exist only insofar as they are constantly reappropriated.) One now sees the potential and the peculiar character of the concept: the possibility of appropriating something refers, on the one hand, to a subject’s power to act and form and to impose its own meaningful mark on the world it appropriates. (A successful appropriation of social roles or activities and, by extension, the appropriating relation one can take to one’s life in general constitute something like self-determination and being the author of one’s own life.) On the other hand, a process of appropriation is always bound to a given, previously existing content and thereby also to an independent meaning and dynamic over which one does not have complete command. (Thus a role, for example, in order to be appropriated, must always be "found" as an already existing model and complex of rules; it can be reinterpreted but not invented from scratch. Skills that we appropriate are constrained by success conditions; leading our own life depends on circumstances over which we do not have complete command.) There is, then, an interesting tension in the idea of appropriation between what is previously given and what is formable, between taking over and creating, between the subject’s sovereignty and its dependence. The crucial relation here is that between something’s being alien and its accessibility: objects of appropriation are neither exclusively alien nor exclusively one’s own. As Michael Theunissen puts it, "I do not need to appropriate what is exclusively my own, and what is exclusively alien I am unable to appropriate."14 In contrast to Marx, then, for whom appropriation is conceived of according to a model of reappropriation, the account of the dynamic of appropriation and alienation that I am proposing reconceives the very concept of appropriation. This involves rehabilitating what is alien in the model of appropriation and radicalizing that model in the direction of a nonessentialist conception of appropriation. Appropriation would then be a permanent process of transformation in which what is appropriated first comes to be through its appropriation, without one needing to fall back into the myth of a creation ex nihilo. Understanding appropriation as a relation in which we are simultaneously bound to something and separated from it, and in which what is appropriated always remains both alien and our own, has important implications for the ideas of emancipation and alienation bound up with the concept of appropriation. The aspiration of a successful appropriation of self and world would be, then, to make the world one’s own without it having been already one’s own and in wanting to give structure to the world and to one’s own life without beginning from a position of already having complete command over them. Thus, the standard and role of the ballot is to investigate the conditions that instigate alienation. Only this coheres the nature of who you are and prevents psychological violence.Education must be oriented around reducing alienation and creating the potential for the oppressed and the individual to actively engage in the world. Cognition itself is impossible without active engagement. FRYMER 2:The alienated condition of the oppressed necessitates a revolutionary pedagogy for humanization and critical consciousness. This pedagogy is no mere collection of methods or technical teaching skills to be applied within the framework of traditional schooling. It is impossible to separate Freire’s methodology from his philosophy and social theory of the dialectic of oppression and liberation. For Freire, the pedagogy of the oppressed must be consistently dialogical. Education for liberation cannot be imposed on or imparted to the oppressed; it can only be created with them in the process of humanization. Dialogical education is based on the assumption that human beings are potentially active, conscious agents capable of knowing and transforming the worlds they live in. Drawing upon Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Jaspers, Freire argues that libratory pedagogy must recognize that students can learn to think actively, and with intentionality and purpose—in other words, with a critical consciousness. Cognition for Freire is not passive or unfocused but always a part of our actions in the world and our intentions to carry out acts in the situations we confront. Corresponding to this unique feature of human being, Freire advocates a critical and dialogical education that poses problems for students. Teacher and students work together as equals to actively solve problems about the nature of social reality and, in the process, to change it. If consciousness is intentional and active, authentic education cannot be based on depositing facts into it, or what Freire termed "banking education." For Freire, the banking notion of education is motivated not by a concern for the student, but by a kind of interest in death—of the self, of the critical faculty of consciousness, and therefore of the soul. Impact calc: 1. There are four types of alienating relations: A) Objectification – treating an agent with normative potential as a passive object B) Standardization – Enforcing one particular way to engage in a role such that the subject has no interpretive leeway C) Fixation – preventing the acquisition of new experiences within a particular role rather than fostering the development of an agent and D) Over-identification – allowing the portrayal of a particular role to over-identify you as merely that role.Prefer additionally –~1~ Ignore consequences/utilitarian impacts to the framework – focus on future simulations is alienating due its unpredictableness.Rahel Jaeggi 4 (August 2014). "Alienation." Columbia University Press. Translated by Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith. Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Rahel Jaeggi is professor of social and political philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Her research focuses on ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and critical theory. AND uncontrollability is negotiated. Conversely, alienation is a halting of this process. ~2~ Performativity – every exercise you engage in is an instance of using your volition to establish some relation to the world and only non-alienation can establish that relationship as normatively legitimate.~3~ And, the basis of colonization is alienation and the denial of the internal life of the oppressed. Any politics of resistance starts off with the recognition of alienation. OLIVER 04:OLIVER K. 2004. The colonization of psychic space: A psychoanalytic social theory of oppression. U of Minnesota Press. AND to occupy the place of Other or object for the modern privileged subject. ~4~ Subject formation is derived from deliberation and labor, ability to take ownership of labor is necessary to moral agencyWartenberg 82 ""Species-Being" and "Human Nature" in Marx" by Thomas E. Wartenberg Human Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1982) p.79-80 LHP AM AND in an egalitarian assumption, something to be valued for its own sake. ContentionI defend that a just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike through coercive tactics as outlined in Gourevitch. The aff rectifies conditions of alienation:~A~ Objectification – coercive strikes are intrinsic expressions of collective appropriation and self-determination that are key to resist capitalist oppression and self-alienation due to worker passivity - that comes firstGourevitch ‘18 ~Alex, associate professor of political science at Brown University and the author of From Slavery To the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century. "A Radical Defense of the Right to Strike," (Jacobin), https://jacobinmag.com/2018/07/right-to-strike-freedom-civil-liberties-oppression.~~ BXNK AND up rhetoric about liberty and justice for all can shroud that inescapable fact. ~B~ Through labor, one becomes alien to the rest of the world since your life becomes meaningless once you orient yourself towards private property. Setting up a system of property like that in the neg world entails that individuals are separated from their projects by the property they have. MARX 44:Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Karl Marx "Estranged Labour" AND summarized the estrangement, the alienation, in the activity of labor itself. This outweighs – having everything around one non-alienated doesn’t solve alienation, but rather, one must be able to identify with the alien events that happen around the self. | 1/14/22 |
SEPOCT - AC - ContractsTournament: Yale | Round: 6 | Opponent: Stuyvesant LC | Judge: Jacob Nails FrameworkMoral internalism is true:~1~ Epistemology – There is no universal character of moral judgements that is epistemically accessible since every argument for its existence presumes the correct normative starting point.Markovits 14. ~Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. https://philpapers.org/rec/ROCJMM Oxford University Press, 2014.Scopa~ BHHS AK AND motivated by genuine normative reasons (or even that some of us are). ~2~ Regress – a priori knowledge is merely an acceptance of an individual’s conception of rationality which means anything external collapses. Macintyre 81.~Macintyre 81, Alasdair Macintyre, https://undpress.nd.edu/9780268035044/after-virtue/ After Virtue, 1981~ SHS ZS AND only such authority as it chooses to confer upon them by adopting them. ~3~ Motivation – A) Externalist notions of ethics collapse to internal since the only reason agents follow external demands is those demands are consistent with their internal account of the good. Motivation is a necessary feature for ethics since normativity only matters insofar as agents follow through on the ethic that’s generated from it B) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic – there would be no disagreement otherwise.~4~ Open question - Goodness cannot be a property of an object because it would make moral claims tautological.Pidgen 07 (Pigden, Charles. "Russell’s Moral Philosophy." SEP. 2007.) ScopaFor any naturalistic or metaphysical ‘X’, if ‘good’ meant ‘X’, then | 9/20/21 |
SEPOCT - AC - HeideggerTournament: Yale | Round: 4 | Opponent: Harrison TB | Judge: Amelia Ritenour Life is fundamentally pre-ontological – an essential openness that exists solely in relation to the world around it. We have no essence aside from our ability to read possibility into the objects around us – this interaction makes the world intelligible and fosters our being within it.Sheehan 15 ~Thomas Sheehan (PhD. American philosopher who is the current professor at the Department of Religious Studies, Stanford University and Professor Emeritus at the Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago.) "Making Sense of Heidegger: eA Pardigm Shift." Chapter 4. Rowman and Littlefield International. 2015~ *brackets in original* ~bxnk AND those contexts. We live in many such contexts at the same time. Western philosophy and scientific thought are the very essence of technology – an incessant striving to capture, calculate, and inquire about the world within a pre-given context that only propagates the nihilism of modernity.Linker 06 ~Damon Linker, Senior Writing Fellow in the Center for Critical Writing at the University of Pennsylvania, "Heidegger’s Revelation: The End of Enlightenment," (American Behavioral Scientist), 733-749 (2006). 10.1177/0002764205282221~ ~bxnk AND why" from a pair of essays Heidegger wrote in the early 1950s. The technical rationalization of education policy has entrenched social and economic inequality and cemented political passivity – the totalization of calculative metaphysics subverts deliberative politics and enrolls students in an abhorrent process of endless economic commodificationClarke 13 – Matthew Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Education at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. The (absent) politics of neo-liberal education policy, Critical Studies in Education Vol. 53, No. 3, October 2012, 297–310, msmrehighlighted ~bxnk AND structural and socio-economic factors that impact on educational achievement (Hyslop- Scientific rationalism, ideals of social progress and efficiency results in the worst atrocities – an embrace of radical responsibility that imagines social justice as an ontological imperative is a prerequisite to political theorizationKalanges 10 – Kristine Kalanges is Associate Professor of Law and Concurrent Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. From the Violence of Positivism to the Ethics of Encounter: Restoring Relationality to International Relations, 9-23-2010, msmrecut BXNK AND everything, even the mysterious, through the lens of scientific rationalism. T Thus, this debate ought to be a question of the aff’s form of relating to educational institutions.~1~ Specificity – We are in the university, which requires a paradigmatic analysis of the way it operates to be ethically responsible; an interrogation of the space is a prior question since all your arguments presume a neutral starting point.~2~ Education is the internal link to the rest of society since ~a~ It’s a prior question to engaging in any form of scholarship if that scholarship is influenced by the university ~b~ Systems of technology control society through a manipulation of education, that’s the Clarke evidence ~c~ Education is independently necessary to solve any problem since only learning about the problem and how to solve can actually solve anything, if solvency matters.The Role of the Ballot and Judge is to embrace ontological thinking, a form of thought that interrupts our pre-conceived hegemonic understandings of being.Thomson 16 – Iain, associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Mexico, Rethinking education after Heidegger: Teaching learning as ontological response-ability, Educational Philosophy and Theory, msmrecut ~bxnk AND important, and inspiring (Thomson, 2011, chapters seven and eight). IP laws are a façade through which individuals securitize themselves against contingent experimentation with the law that inevitably upends their stable metaphysical view of the law being a vanguard of natural rights - this fuels the relentless drive towards utility and appropriation by desiring the absolute demarcation of who should and should not have propertyWu 1 ~Tim Wu, White House official and professor of law at Columbia university. "Intellectual Property Experimentalism by Way of Competition Law" (2014) https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2843andcontext=faculty'scholarship~~ BXNK AND but against subsequent government action that might threaten the value of existing rights. The WTO and IP laws represent a will to mastery and uniformity that reactively seek to safeguard the system and our static perception of property - homogenizing individual and geographic variation into an absolutist international agreementWu 2 ~Tim Wu, White House official and professor of law at Columbia university. "Intellectual Property Experimentalism by Way of Competition Law" (2014) https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2843andcontext=faculty'scholarship~~ BXNK AND That tendency is sharply at odds with the predispositions of the competition laws. | 9/18/21 |
SEPOCT - AC - LayTournament: Yale | Round: 1 | Opponent: Lexington FM | Judge: Kirsten Gray I value morality.I offer one observation - intellectual property includes copyright, trademarks, patents, industrial designs, and trade secrets.WTO World Trade Organization, Organization that deals with the global rules of trade between nations, Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible. What are intellectual property rights? https://www.wto.org/english/tratop'e/trips'e/intel1'e.htm. AND has to be found between the legitimate interests of right holders and of users The value criterion is willing consistently with freedom. People are free when they act for purposes they set themselves rather than purposes set by others.Willing freedom is the necessary first step to will anything else, because you have to will your ability to act implicitly in order to do anything else. Because people set their own purposes, they must will their own freedom from others’ choices.But it’s impossible for a single person to individually secure their own freedom, since they can’t by themselves control what others will do. Instead they—along with everyone else—must will the security of everyone’s freedom. A just government is the instantiation and necessary agent of this general will. Its power extends only as much as necessary to maintain everyone’s freedom.Thus I affirm the resolution resolved, the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.1. Universalizability – A) IP is created to encourage innovation but necessarily entails a prevention of innovation through restriction of necessary prior knowledge and B) In attempting to allow freedom, it restricts it. Pievatolo 10, Pievatolo, Maria. "Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?" Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?, 7 Feb. 2010, bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html. SJEPIn the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of real rights are only corporeal entities or res corporales: «Sache ist ein Ding, was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches selbst der Freiheit ermangelt, heiß daher Sache (res corporalis)». 32 Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate to incorporeal things as well. According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished from its sensible possession. Something external would be rightfully mine «only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even though I am not in possession of it» (AA.06 245:13-16). The rightful possession is an intelligible, not sensible, relation. I can claim that my bicycle is mine only if I am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the backyard. Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property as explained in his 1793 essay, according to which we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author to claim a rightful property on his work. Is it really so obvious that originality implies property? Property is a comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all the time over the use of material objects. It is so comfortable just because it is physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property when something cannot be separated from someone. I say both that my fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But these two "mine" have a different meaning: the former is the "mine" of attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property. The former can be used to identify someone, and conveys the historical circumstance that something is related exclusively to someone; the latter points only to an accidental relation with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. It is possible to lie on a historical circumstance, by plagiarizing a text, i.e. by attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no one can "steal" the historical connection between "my" writing style and me: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if Fichte's principle were the only justification of property right, it would undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations. Although he defines things as res corporales, Kant determines the rightful possession of a thing as a possession without detentio, by ignoring all its sensible facets. Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - is exerted on an object that is "merely distinct from me", regardless of its position in space and time. Space and time, indeed, are sensible determinations and should be left out of consideration. According to the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a permissive law of reason: 33 if a rightful possession were not possible, every object would be a res nullius and nobody would be entitled to use it. Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res corporales. Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (AA.6, 249:5-7). If property is a merely intelligible relation with an object that is simply distinct from the subject, we have no reason to deny that such an object might be immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property. Why, then, does Kant refrain from using the very concept of it? According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of personal rights. A person who is speaking to the people is engaging a relationship with them; if someone else engages such a relationship in his name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with property: he is only an agent without authority. Speeches, by Kant, cannot be separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised land of intellectual property without entering it. According to Kant, before the acquired rights, everyone has a moral capacity for putting others under obligation that he calls innate right or internal meum vel tuum (AA.06, 237:24-25). The innate right is only one: freedom as independence from being constrained by another's choice, insofar it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity: in other words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the very possibility condition of law. Freedom implies innate equality, «that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone, and finally his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it - such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them.» (AA.06, 237-238) 34 In spite of his intellectual theory of property, 35 Kant does not enter in the realm of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without suppressing freedom itself. If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to mix copyright protection and censorship. 36 Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used. We cannot, however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from speeches would be like excluding them from freedom. Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the scope of copyright to publishing, or, better, to the publishing of the age of print: the Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without the author's permission and distributes its copies to the public. If someone copies a book for his personal use, or lets others do it, or translates and elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone. Kant does not stick to the Roman Law tradition because of conservatism, but because of Enlightenment. 2. Means to an End – Property rights on medicine use individuals suffering from disease or injury as a means for the owners of medicine to make as much profit as possible. This is a direct violation since property owners use their freedom to leverage the life of another agent for their own gain, rather than considering all agents ends that we ought to relieve our instrumental goods for.3. Kingdom of Ends – A) Intellect – the intellectual realm is a public good because no agent has special access to it, which means cornering off aspects of it for ownership is incoherent, since apriori reason entails an equal accessibility to the realm of ideas, individuals cannot claim to own a portion of that realm B) Medicine – Medicine specifically is a necessary good that an agent in a kingdom of ends would never claim ownership over, because it is necessarily required for an agent to exist. In the same way no agent would allow for an individual to have ownership over the chemical compound that comprises water, no agent would allow for ownership of medicinal properties.And, property rights libertarianism turns are incoherent: A) Logic – it’s impossible for an individual to claim ownership over a non-natural property because the protections of property requires a good to be protected. You cannot ensure another agents doesn’t steal an idea since the idea exists purely metaphysically in the realm of ideas B) Creationism – Property rights are based on the notion of an individual mixing a unique aspect of themselves with a physical property that justifies a deserving of ownership, but intellectual property is not created by individuals, but rather, is discovered. That means we’d be providing arbitrary ownership of an idea to an agent that didn’t create it. | 1/14/22 |
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