American Heritage Broward Mathew Neg
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| yale | 4 | bryan shi | grant chmielewski |
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| yale | 5 | vik maan | conal |
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| yale | Doubles | jayden bai | panel |
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| yale | Octas | christian han | panel |
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| All | 1 | Opponent: anyone | Judge: anyone ignore |
| any | 2 | Opponent: anyone | Judge: anyone ignore |
| yale | 4 | Opponent: bryan shi | Judge: grant chmielewski *lay round |
| yale | 5 | Opponent: vik maan | Judge: conal ac |
| yale | Doubles | Opponent: jayden bai | Judge: panel ac |
| yale | Octas | Opponent: christian han | Judge: panel ac |
To modify or delete round reports, edit the associated round.
Cites
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0 - ContactTournament: All | Round: 1 | Opponent: anyone | Judge: anyone Pronouns: she/her If there's anything I don't meet just message me before round so we can have a substantive debate. | 9/16/21 |
0 - Trigger Warnings - Read PlzTournament: any | Round: 2 | Opponent: anyone | Judge: anyone | 9/19/21 |
G - Determinism NCTournament: yale | Round: 5 | Opponent: vik maan | Judge: conal Permissibility Negates –~1~ Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two.~2~ Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.~3~ Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the "P" and "~P" are true.~4~ Shiftiness – Permissibility ground encourages the aff to load up with triggers and the 1ar controls the direction of the round which means they can moot all my offense, I need permissibility in the 2n to compensate.Determinism is true and negates: Determinism denies the moral value of prohibitions and obligations because our acts would be up to the consequences of nature. This negates the prescriptive value of ought statements making the aff incoherent because individuals cannot have control over their own actions. proves skep negates as the aff must prove the absolute existence of an obligation.~1~ Causality: The first law of thermodynamics holds that nothing can be created or destroyed, thus everything must have a cause if something cannot come from nothing. This means that either A) free will, which definitionally causes it self, is illogical as it does not have one or B) our free will is caused by something which is a contradiction and proves determinism true.~2~ Eternalism is true: Events do not solely exist in the present but instead exist with the past and future as one continuous spectrum meaning all our future actions already exist.Scott Ryan, Doctor of Philosophy in Religion from Baylor University and post doc fellow at Baylor, A Short Argument for Eternalism, 2013, http://www.scholardarity.com/?page'id=3845 /AHS PB AND by apparently cleaving to common sense in the end departs from it egregiously. ~3~ The best neuroscientific, psychological, and medical evidence show free will doesn’t exist.Andrea Lavazza, Neuroethics, Centro Universitario Internazionale, Arezzo, Italy, Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It, 2016, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4887467/ /AHS PB BRACKETED FOR CLARITY recut emi AND in the complete absence of consciousness" (Vierkant et al., 2013). ~4~ Double bind: Denying Determinist theory of causality proves that free will doesn’t existMcGinn 93 - Colin McGinn. British philosopher. He has held teaching posts and professorships at University College London, the University of Oxford, Rutgers University and the University of Miami, Problems in Philosophy: The Limits of Inquiry. London: Wiley, 1993. P. 80 "lol I copped this card off the big questions start pack so I guess I rehighlighted it." perrys card AND of possible world. The concept contains the seeds of its own destruction.. | 9/18/21 |
G - Pain NarrativesTournament: yale | Round: Octas | Opponent: christian han | Judge: panel Pain Narratives KPain narratives in the academy only ever serve colonial ends. Form over content, they have the most real world impact.Tuck and Yang 13 – Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang, Dec 19, 2013 "R-WORDS: REFUSING RESEARCH"~http://townsendgroups.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/tuckandyangrwords'refusingresearch.pdf~~ Accessed 10/19/18 SAO AND through erasure, but importantly also through inclusion, and its own imperceptibility. Representations must come first in scholarship production in the Global North.Curbishley 15 - Liddy Scarlet Curbishley student Masters of Humanities in Gender Studies August 2015 "Destabilizing the Colonization of Indigenous Knowledge In the Case of Biopiracy" ~https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/319612/Liddy20Thesis.pdf~~ Accessed 8/13/21 SAO AND instead move beyond these dominating dualistic ways of perceiving the world (200). | 9/19/21 |
SO - Alienation Side constraintTournament: yale | Round: 5 | Opponent: vik maan | Judge: conal Being non-alienated is a side constraint on the aff fwk: Only way to evaluate non-natural properties is through our relationsOur functional capacity of willing and taking actions is mediated by social roles – as the authentic self is inexplicably linked to the self that engages in social communities with others through duplication. Understanding the functionality of the will is impossible in a vacuum.Jaeggi 1, Jaeggi, Rahel. "Alienation." Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation/Scopa. The positions of both authors can be reduced to the following common denominator: roles are less alienating than constitutive for the development of persons and personality. They are constitutive in the sense that they are directly bound up with a person’s development and, so, "productive." At first glance this position might seem to come down on one side of the two alternatives—an unconditional affirmation of roles—but after giving a brief account of the position, I will make use of it to move beyond the two alternatives. Once the "productivity thesis" has been articulated, it will be possible to distinguish between alienating and non-alienating aspects of role behavior. THE HUMAN BEING AS DOPPELGÄNGER Roles are productive. In and through them we first become ourselves. This is the essence of Helmuth Plessner’s conception of the positive significance of roles (which he developed as a direct response to critiques of them as alienating). "The human being is always himself only in ‘doubling’ in relation to a role figure he can experience. Also, all that he sees as comprising his authenticity is but the role he plays before himself and others.22 Roles on this view are not only necessary in order to make social interaction possible, whether this be a "being together" of individuals or a benign "passing each other by;" interaction mediated by roles is also constitutive of an individual’s relation to herself.This culminates in the act of appropriation – the ability to view yourself as a practical agent capable of taking up a project that actively changes your own subject and the role itself. Jaeggi 2, Jaeggi, Rahel. "Alienation." Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation/Scopa. What does it mean to appropriate something?12 If the concept of appropriation refers to a specific relation between self and world, between individuals and objects (whether spiritual or material), what precisely does this relation look like, what are its particular character and its specific structure? Various aspects come together here, and together they account for the concept’s appeal and potential. As opposed to the mere learning of certain contents, talk of appropriation emphasizes that something is not merely passively taken up but actively worked through and independently assimilated. In contrast to merely theoretical insight into some issue, appropriation—comparable to the psychoanalytic process of "working through"—means that one can "deal with" what one knows, that it stands at one’s disposal as knowledge and that one really and practically has command over it. And appropriating a role means more than being able to fill it: one is, we could say, identified with it. Something that we appropriate does not remain external to ourselves. In making something our own, it becomes a part of ourselves in a certain respect. This suggests a kind of introjection and a mixing of oneself with the objects of appropriation. It also evokes the idea of productively and formatively interacting with what one makes one’s own. Appropriation does not leave what is appropriated unchanged. This is why the appropriation of public spaces, for example, means more than that one uses them. We make them our own by making a mark on them through what we do in and with them, by transforming them through appropriative use such that they first acquire a specific form through this use (though not necessarily in a material sense). Although it has one of its roots in an account of property relations, the concept of appropriation, in contrast to mere possession, emphasizes the particular quality of a process that first constitutes a real act of taking possession of something. Accordingly, appropriation is a particular mode of seizing possession.13 Someone who appropriates something puts her individual mark on it, inserts her own ends and qualities into it. This means that sometimes we must still make something that we already possess our own. Relations of appropriation, then, are characterized by several features: appropriation is a form of praxis, a way of relating practically to the world. It refers to a relation of penetration, assimilation, and internalization in which what is appropriated is at the same time altered, structured, and formed. The crucial point of this model (also of great importance for Marx) is a consequence of this structure of penetration and assimilation: appropriation always means a transformation of both poles of the relation. In a process of appropriation both what is appropriated and the appropriator are transformed.Thus, the side-constraint is consistency with non-alienated relations.Prefer –1. Performativity – Every exercise you engage in is an instance of using your volition to establish some relation to the world and only non-alienation can establish that relationship as normatively legitimate.2. Action theory – Only viewing an agent as an active body capable of generating intentions can hold agents culpable and decipher the difference between actions and wishes. That’s a necessary feature of ethics since we must be able to warrant a coherent conception of what motivates our actions in order to provide a method to actually implement ethical principles.3. Epistemology – Only an understanding of appropriation can unify the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge. Theoretical abstract concepts like 2+24 are true and necessary, but can only become useful once explained in context of how they actualize in the world through our intentions. That means absent an explanation of how that knowledge mixes with the world around us, it becomes useless. ==== I contend that member nations of the WTO ought not reduce intellectual property protections for medicine.~1~ Intellectual property is a self-expression of the subject. When it’s used in a way that doesn’t reflect the framer’s intent, it is alienating.Justin Hughes 98, "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property," 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 330-350 (1988) ~https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html~~ AHSMAK recut emi Accessed 8/10/21 AND permanence and a greater ability than other property to give its own economic security ~2~ IP is key to recognizing agents through the personality in their work. Recognition is necessary for agents to be non-alienated bc we need to establish relations with the world.Hughes 2 - "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property," 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 330-350 (1988) by Justin Hughes ~https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html~~ ahs emi AND is destroyed; when the second condition is violated, it is distorted. ~3~ Objectification - Absent intellectual property, agents feel like objects since they aren’t recognized for their exercise of agency. This procedurally prevents further appropriation bc agents lack incentive to innovate when they’re detached from their goods. | 9/18/21 |
SO - Bioprospecting CP V Imperialism ACTournament: yale | Round: Octas | Opponent: christian han | Judge: panel CP Text: Countries in the WTO should create a consent and compensation mechanism to prevent biopiracy in drug developmentNard 03 - Craig Allen Nard, Director, Center for Law, Technology, and the Arts, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Minnesota Law Review, October 2003 "IN DEFENSE OF GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY" ~http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1277andcontext=faculty'publications~~ Accessed 8/26/21 SAO AND turn are to be invested, in part, in conservation efforts.58 Mutually Exclusivity: Countries can’t reduce patents and use them as mechanism for wealth transfer.Net Benefit: Capacity BuildingEmpirically bioprospecting with compensation leads to conservation and capacity building which is key to moving past an extractive imperial economy. Solves CaseCastree 2 - Noel Castree, in the journal Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, October 2002 "Bioprospecting: from theory to practice (and back again)" ~https://www.jstor.org/stable/3804566~~ Accessed 8/26/21 SAO AND for mutual gain’ (Pearce and Moran 1994, 102) that green developmentalism | 9/19/21 |
SO - Combo Shell v JaydenTournament: yale | Round: Doubles | Opponent: jayden bai | Judge: panel TheoryInterp – The affirmative debater must allow the negative a path to winning the debate.Violation – You read aff theory first, no rvi on aff theory, rvi on nc theory, and negating affirms.The standard is infinite abuse – I can’t answer aff theory which means you always win since I just don’t get to debate and it comes before substnace. Even if that’s not true, by negating u still vote aff.Impacts –A) Destroys clash since I literally am not allowed to make arguments, which controls the IL to education since the any form of education we can get happens through discussion.B) Prevents norm creation – the aff can claim literally any norm is good and the 1N cannot respond, which justifies infinitely unfair theory norms that set the model for all future debates. Use a norm setting model and theory and frame it as an independent voter – 1. It solves long term abuse whereas IRA only matters one round at a time 2. It’s best for the activity since it encourages deep reflection and debate about what the best world of debate looks like and strives toward it. C) Constitutivism – preventing me from making any arguments is a violation of the rules of debate since it’s essentially eliminating my speech time. IOnly evaluate the counter-interp – Anything else allows the aff to be infinitely abusive and use the tactics that gained them the competitive advantage to ensure they win every round by uplayering a true shell with meta-theory, takeouts, and deflationary paradigm issues, justifying the original abuse on the shell.Fairness is a voter since debate is a competitive activity that intrinsically requires equal footing when participating, to minimize one’s ability to participate in discussion disrespects the other member of the activity. It o/w – A) Evaluation – even if their arguments seem true, that’s only because they already had an advantage – fairness is a meta constraint on your ability to determine who best meets their ROB B) Inescapable – every argument you make concedes the authority of fairness: i.e. that the judge will evaluate your arguments. Absent some judge-debater reciprocal relationship, they could just hack against or for you.Drop the debater – 1. Deterrence – Prevents reading the abusive practice in the future since it’s not worth risking the loss which is k2 norm setting indefensible practices die out 2. TS – Otherwise you’ll read a bunch of abusive practices for the time trade off 3. Epistemic Skew – The round has already been skewed so it’s impossible to evaluate the rest of the flow 4. Drop the argument is incoherent under norm setting since you’re voting for the best rule, not a punishment of someone else’s wrong-doing.Use spirit of the interp since text encourages spamming blippy i-meets that avoid discussion of the actual abuse story.1NC Theory o/w – 1. Lexicality – If the neg was abusive it was reactionary to aff abuse which means it’s justified 2. Norm setting – 1ar theory can never set norms since I only get 1 speech so we can’t fully develop the debate 3. Infinite abuse – Otherwise it would justify the aff baiting theory and uplayering and allows them to get away with infinite abuse just by being the better theory debater 4. Reject 2ar weighing since they get the last word and will win every theory debate if they can dump a bunch of new reasons their args come first for 3 minutes even if they are winning 10 seconds of offense. | 9/19/21 |
SO - Contracts NCTournament: yale | Round: 4 | Opponent: bryan shi | Judge: grant chmielewski NCEthical Internalism is true:1. Epistemology – A) Equality – Externalism incorrectly assumes certain individuals have stronger epistemic access to moral truths which justifies the exclusion of those individuals from the creation of ethics and B) Inaccessibility – There is no universal character of moral judgements that is epistemically accessible since every argument for its existence presumes the correct normative starting point. Markovits 14, Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. Oxford University Press, 2014.Scopa Relatedly, internalism about reasons seems less presumptive than externalism. We should not assume that some of us have special epistemic access to what matters, especially in the absence of any criterion for making such a judgment. It’s better to start from the assumption, as internalism does, that everyone’s ends are equally worthy of pursuit – and correct this assumption only by appealing to standards that are as uncontroversial as possible. According to externalism about reasons, what matters normatively – that is, what we have reason to do or pursue or protect or respect or promote – does not depend in any fundamental way on what in fact matters to us – that is, what we do do and pursue and protect and respect and promote. Some of us happen to be motivated by what actually matters, and some of us are "wrongly" motivated. But externalists can offer no explanation for this supposed difference in how well we respond to reasons – no explanation of why some of us have the right motivations and some of us the wrong ones – that doesn’t itself appeal to the views about what matters that they’re trying to justify. (They can explain why some people have the right motivations by saying, e.g., that they’re good people, but that assumes the truth of the normative views that are at issue.22) A comparison to the epistemic case helps bring out what is unsatisfactory in the externalist position. We sometimes attribute greater epistemic powers to some people than to others despite not being able to explain why they’re more likely to be right in their beliefs about a certain topic. Chicken-sexing is a popular example of this among philosophers. We think some people are more likely to form true beliefs about the sex of chickens than others even though we can’t explain why they are better at judging the sex of chickens. But in the case of chicken-sexing, we have independent means of determining the truth, and so we have independent verification that chicken-sexers usually get things right. Externalism seems to tell~s~ us that some of us are better reasons- sensors than others, but without providing the independent means of determining which of us are in fact more reliably motivated by genuine normative reasons (or even that some of us are).2. Motivation – A) Externalist notions of ethics collapse to internal since the only reason agents follow external demands is those demands are consistent with their internal account of the good. Motivation is a necessary feature for ethics since normativity only matters insofar as agents follow through on the ethic that’s generated from it B) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic.Thus, agents justify their actions based on individual moral preferences and deal with ethical dilemmas by prioritizing certain beliefs. It’s a constitutive feature of humanity to rationally maximize value under a particular index of the good. Gauthier 98, David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998, /AHS PB Recut by Scopa Fortunately, I do not have to defend normative foundationalism. One problem with accepting moral justification as part of our ongoing practice is that, as I have suggested, we no longer accept the world view on which it depends. But perhaps a more immediately pressing problem is that we have, ready to hand, an alternative mode for justifying our choices and actions. In its more austere and, in my view, more defensible form, this is to show that choices and actions maximize the agent ’s expected utility, where utility is a measure of considered preference. In its less austere version, this is to show that choices and actions satisfy, not a subjectively defined requirement such as utility, but meet the agent ’ s objective interests. Since I do not believe that we have objective interests, I shall ignore this latter. But it will not matter. For the idea is clear; we have a mode of justification that does not require the introduction of moral considerations. 11 Let me call this alternative nonmoral mode of justification, neutrally, deliberative justification. Now moral and deliberative justification are directed at the same objects – our choices and actions. What if they conflict? And what do we say to the person who offers a deliberative justification of his choices and actions and refuses to offer any other? We can say, of course, that his behavior lacks moral justification, but this seems to lack any hold, unless he chooses to enter the moral framework. And such entry, he may insist, lacks any deliberative justification, at least for him. If morality perishes, the justificatory enterprise, in relation to choice and action, does not perish with it. Rather, one mode of justification perishes, a mode that, it may seem, now hangs unsupported. But not only unsupported, for it is difficult to deny that deliberative justification is more clearly basic, that it cannot be avoided insofar as we are rational agents, so that if moral justification conflicts with it, morality seems not only unsupported but opposed by what is rationally more fundamental. Deliberative justification relates to our deep sense of self. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, and provides the basis for rationality, is the capacity for semantic representation. You can, as your dog on the whole cannot, represent a state of affairs to yourself, and consider in particular whether or not it is the case, and whether or not you would want it to be the case. You can represent to yourself the contents of your beliefs, and your desires or preferences. But in representing them, you bring them into relation with one another. You represent to yourself that the Blue Jays will win the World Series, and that a National League team will win the World Series, and that the Blue Jays are not a National League team. And in recognizing a conflict among those beliefs, you find rationality thrust upon you. Note that the first two beliefs could be replaced by preferences, with the same effect. Since in representing our preferences we become aware of conflict among them, the step from representation to choice becomes complicated. We must, somehow, bring our conflicting desires and preferences into some sort of coherence. And there is only one plausible candidate for a principle of coherence – a maximizing principle. We order our preferences, in relation to decision and action, so that we may choose in a way that maximizes our expectation of preference fulfillment. And in so doing, we show ourselves to be rational agents, engaged in deliberation and deliberative justification. There is simply nothing else for practical rationality to be. The foundational crisis of morality thus cannot be avoided by pointing to the existence of a practice of justification within the moral framework, and denying that any extramoral foundation is relevant. For an extramoral mode of justification is already present, existing not side by side with moral justification, but in a manner tied to the way in which we unify our beliefs and preferences and so acquire our deep sense of self. We need not suppose that this deliberative justification is itself to be understood foundationally. All that we need suppose is that moral justification does not plausibly survive conflict with it.Since agents take their own ability to act as intrinsically valuable, permissibility is avoided through a system of mutual self restraint where agents refrain from impeding upon the actions of other agents, under the expectation that others will do the same out of rational self interest. This is achieved through a system of contracts which both parties’ consent to in order to regulate behavior.Thus, the standard is consistency with Contractarianism. And, the framework outweighs on actor specificity: States are not physical actors, but derive authority from contracts that allow them to constrain action.Prefer additionally –1. Flexibility – Contracts are key to a) Encompassing all other ethical calculus into our decision since we process the consistency of those frameworks with our self interest and b) Value pluralism – recognizing a singular ethic fails to account for the complexity of moral problems and genuine moral disagreement. My framework solves since we can recognize multiple legitimate values while allowing individuals to exclude ones that are bad.2. Bindingness – A) Arising of Ethics – Every interaction with another agent is mediated by consent to participate in that interaction since otherwise agents could simply leave, which means there is an implicit social contract formed in every ethical interaction and B) Culpability – Only contracts can ensure agents are held to their agreements since there is a verifiable basis for judging their action as wrong as well as a pre-established punishment for breaking it.Neg gets framework choice – a) aff speaks first and last which means they control the direction of the round b) infinite pre-round prep means they’re prepared for any debate – prep controls quality of arguments c) they get one more speech to contextualize arguments in different ways.I contend that the member nations of the World Trade Organization ought not reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.~1~ Stronger IPRs help equalize the bargaining field for developing countries to check western coercion which would diminish their place as world enforcer. Therefore, it’s not in mutual self-interest for them to remove IPs because they want to keep their own economies ahead of others.Hassan et al 10 "Intellectual Property and Developing Countries: A review of the literature: by Emmanuel Hassan, Ohid Yaqub, Stephanie Diepeveen. RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. ~https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical'reports/2010/RAND'TR804.pdf~~ ahs emi AND development, which initially falls as income rises, then increases after that. ~2~ IP rights are included in multiple international contracts – the aff violates that.Franklin 13 - "International Intellectual Property Law" by Jonathan Franklin* He earned his A.B., A.M. Anthropology and J.D. degrees from Stanford University and M.Libr. with a Certificate in Law Librarianship from the University of Washington. Prior to the University of Washington, he spent five years as an reference librarian and foreign law selector at the University of Michigan Law Library. In law school, he was a Senior Editor of the Stanford Environmental Law Journal and a Note Editor for the Stanford Law Review. He is a member of the American Association of Law Libraries. ~https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/ERG'IP.pdf~~ ahs emi AND ) provides a substantial list of country comparisons touching on intellectual property law. ~3~ Forecloses the ability for future contracts.Hilty et al 21 ~Reto Hilty Director at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition and a professor at the University of Zurich Pedro Henrique D. Batista Doctoral student and Junior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Suelen Carls Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Daria Kim Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Matthias Lamping Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Peter R. Slowinski Doctoral student and Junior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; "10 Arguments against a Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights," Oxford Law; 6/29/21; https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2021/06/10-arguments-against-waiver-intellectual-property-rights~~ Justin AND of these rights may therefore have detrimental consequences for the willingness to cooperate. | 9/18/21 |
Open Source
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