American Heritage Broward Mathew Neg
| Tournament | Round | Opponent | Judge | Cites | Round Report | Open Source | Edit/Delete |
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| All | 1 | anyone | anyone |
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| Yale | 1 | La Salle TP | Mark Kivimaki |
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| yale | 4 | bryan shi | grant chmielewski |
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| yale | 5 | vik maan | conal |
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| All | 1 | Opponent: anyone | Judge: anyone ignore |
| Yale | 1 | Opponent: La Salle TP | Judge: Mark Kivimaki ac |
| yale | 4 | Opponent: bryan shi | Judge: grant chmielewski *lay round |
| yale | 5 | Opponent: vik maan | Judge: conal ac |
To modify or delete round reports, edit the associated round.
Cites
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0 - ContactTournament: All | Round: 1 | Opponent: anyone | Judge: anyone Pronouns: she/her If there's anything I don't meet just message me before round so we can have a substantive debate. | 9/16/21 |
G - DiscloseTournament: Yale | Round: 1 | Opponent: La Salle TP | Judge: Mark Kivimaki Interpretation: At all TOC bid-distributing tournaments, debaters must the plan text of the aff.Violation – u don’t hve a wiki. Net Benefits:1~ Accessibility: There is a section of literature base and evidence that is blanketed by paywalls and online protections. Full text disclosure means that even in the face of inaccessible evidence, debaters can still understand the crux of the arguments that are being detailed that a first three last three disclosure can never allow. Accessibility is an independent voter: we cannot have any debate without the ability to participate.2~ Research Burdens: The more disclosure happens the better – the more access we have to opponent cases, the more motivated we will be to read, learn and block out.Nails 13 A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third-Party Disclosure) by Jacob Nails NSD, Update October 10, 2013 AND , backfiles and briefs would have done LD in a long time ago.. Voter: Fairness is a voter since if the rounds been skewed its impossible to determine who the better debater was. Education- constitutive purpose ie why schools fund. Competing interps: 1. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom where we read increasingly unfair practices that minimally fit the brightline 2. Necessitates judge intervention to see if we meet th brightline and 3 collapses because we use offense defense paradigm. Drop the debater on theory: 1. Drop the arg is the same thing since the argument was their entire advocacy text. 2. Its key to deterring future abuse No RVIs – a~ illogical – fairness is a burden just like the aff has the burden of inherency b~ norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms c~ chilling effect – debaters are scared to check real abuse which means inf abuse goes unchecked d~ substance crowdout – prevents 1AR blipstorms and allows us to get back to substance | 9/17/21 |
SO - Contracts NCTournament: yale | Round: 4 | Opponent: bryan shi | Judge: grant chmielewski NCEthical Internalism is true:1. Epistemology – A) Equality – Externalism incorrectly assumes certain individuals have stronger epistemic access to moral truths which justifies the exclusion of those individuals from the creation of ethics and B) Inaccessibility – There is no universal character of moral judgements that is epistemically accessible since every argument for its existence presumes the correct normative starting point. Markovits 14, Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. Oxford University Press, 2014.Scopa Relatedly, internalism about reasons seems less presumptive than externalism. We should not assume that some of us have special epistemic access to what matters, especially in the absence of any criterion for making such a judgment. It’s better to start from the assumption, as internalism does, that everyone’s ends are equally worthy of pursuit – and correct this assumption only by appealing to standards that are as uncontroversial as possible. According to externalism about reasons, what matters normatively – that is, what we have reason to do or pursue or protect or respect or promote – does not depend in any fundamental way on what in fact matters to us – that is, what we do do and pursue and protect and respect and promote. Some of us happen to be motivated by what actually matters, and some of us are "wrongly" motivated. But externalists can offer no explanation for this supposed difference in how well we respond to reasons – no explanation of why some of us have the right motivations and some of us the wrong ones – that doesn’t itself appeal to the views about what matters that they’re trying to justify. (They can explain why some people have the right motivations by saying, e.g., that they’re good people, but that assumes the truth of the normative views that are at issue.22) A comparison to the epistemic case helps bring out what is unsatisfactory in the externalist position. We sometimes attribute greater epistemic powers to some people than to others despite not being able to explain why they’re more likely to be right in their beliefs about a certain topic. Chicken-sexing is a popular example of this among philosophers. We think some people are more likely to form true beliefs about the sex of chickens than others even though we can’t explain why they are better at judging the sex of chickens. But in the case of chicken-sexing, we have independent means of determining the truth, and so we have independent verification that chicken-sexers usually get things right. Externalism seems to tell~s~ us that some of us are better reasons- sensors than others, but without providing the independent means of determining which of us are in fact more reliably motivated by genuine normative reasons (or even that some of us are).2. Motivation – A) Externalist notions of ethics collapse to internal since the only reason agents follow external demands is those demands are consistent with their internal account of the good. Motivation is a necessary feature for ethics since normativity only matters insofar as agents follow through on the ethic that’s generated from it B) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic.Thus, agents justify their actions based on individual moral preferences and deal with ethical dilemmas by prioritizing certain beliefs. It’s a constitutive feature of humanity to rationally maximize value under a particular index of the good. Gauthier 98, David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998, /AHS PB Recut by Scopa Fortunately, I do not have to defend normative foundationalism. One problem with accepting moral justification as part of our ongoing practice is that, as I have suggested, we no longer accept the world view on which it depends. But perhaps a more immediately pressing problem is that we have, ready to hand, an alternative mode for justifying our choices and actions. In its more austere and, in my view, more defensible form, this is to show that choices and actions maximize the agent ’s expected utility, where utility is a measure of considered preference. In its less austere version, this is to show that choices and actions satisfy, not a subjectively defined requirement such as utility, but meet the agent ’ s objective interests. Since I do not believe that we have objective interests, I shall ignore this latter. But it will not matter. For the idea is clear; we have a mode of justification that does not require the introduction of moral considerations. 11 Let me call this alternative nonmoral mode of justification, neutrally, deliberative justification. Now moral and deliberative justification are directed at the same objects – our choices and actions. What if they conflict? And what do we say to the person who offers a deliberative justification of his choices and actions and refuses to offer any other? We can say, of course, that his behavior lacks moral justification, but this seems to lack any hold, unless he chooses to enter the moral framework. And such entry, he may insist, lacks any deliberative justification, at least for him. If morality perishes, the justificatory enterprise, in relation to choice and action, does not perish with it. Rather, one mode of justification perishes, a mode that, it may seem, now hangs unsupported. But not only unsupported, for it is difficult to deny that deliberative justification is more clearly basic, that it cannot be avoided insofar as we are rational agents, so that if moral justification conflicts with it, morality seems not only unsupported but opposed by what is rationally more fundamental. Deliberative justification relates to our deep sense of self. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, and provides the basis for rationality, is the capacity for semantic representation. You can, as your dog on the whole cannot, represent a state of affairs to yourself, and consider in particular whether or not it is the case, and whether or not you would want it to be the case. You can represent to yourself the contents of your beliefs, and your desires or preferences. But in representing them, you bring them into relation with one another. You represent to yourself that the Blue Jays will win the World Series, and that a National League team will win the World Series, and that the Blue Jays are not a National League team. And in recognizing a conflict among those beliefs, you find rationality thrust upon you. Note that the first two beliefs could be replaced by preferences, with the same effect. Since in representing our preferences we become aware of conflict among them, the step from representation to choice becomes complicated. We must, somehow, bring our conflicting desires and preferences into some sort of coherence. And there is only one plausible candidate for a principle of coherence – a maximizing principle. We order our preferences, in relation to decision and action, so that we may choose in a way that maximizes our expectation of preference fulfillment. And in so doing, we show ourselves to be rational agents, engaged in deliberation and deliberative justification. There is simply nothing else for practical rationality to be. The foundational crisis of morality thus cannot be avoided by pointing to the existence of a practice of justification within the moral framework, and denying that any extramoral foundation is relevant. For an extramoral mode of justification is already present, existing not side by side with moral justification, but in a manner tied to the way in which we unify our beliefs and preferences and so acquire our deep sense of self. We need not suppose that this deliberative justification is itself to be understood foundationally. All that we need suppose is that moral justification does not plausibly survive conflict with it.Since agents take their own ability to act as intrinsically valuable, permissibility is avoided through a system of mutual self restraint where agents refrain from impeding upon the actions of other agents, under the expectation that others will do the same out of rational self interest. This is achieved through a system of contracts which both parties’ consent to in order to regulate behavior.Thus, the standard is consistency with Contractarianism. And, the framework outweighs on actor specificity: States are not physical actors, but derive authority from contracts that allow them to constrain action.Prefer additionally –1. Flexibility – Contracts are key to a) Encompassing all other ethical calculus into our decision since we process the consistency of those frameworks with our self interest and b) Value pluralism – recognizing a singular ethic fails to account for the complexity of moral problems and genuine moral disagreement. My framework solves since we can recognize multiple legitimate values while allowing individuals to exclude ones that are bad.2. Bindingness – A) Arising of Ethics – Every interaction with another agent is mediated by consent to participate in that interaction since otherwise agents could simply leave, which means there is an implicit social contract formed in every ethical interaction and B) Culpability – Only contracts can ensure agents are held to their agreements since there is a verifiable basis for judging their action as wrong as well as a pre-established punishment for breaking it.Neg gets framework choice – a) aff speaks first and last which means they control the direction of the round b) infinite pre-round prep means they’re prepared for any debate – prep controls quality of arguments c) they get one more speech to contextualize arguments in different ways.I contend that the member nations of the World Trade Organization ought not reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.~1~ Stronger IPRs help equalize the bargaining field for developing countries to check western coercion which would diminish their place as world enforcer. Therefore, it’s not in mutual self-interest for them to remove IPs because they want to keep their own economies ahead of others.Hassan et al 10 "Intellectual Property and Developing Countries: A review of the literature: by Emmanuel Hassan, Ohid Yaqub, Stephanie Diepeveen. RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. ~https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical'reports/2010/RAND'TR804.pdf~~ ahs emi AND development, which initially falls as income rises, then increases after that. ~2~ IP rights are included in multiple international contracts – the aff violates that.Franklin 13 - "International Intellectual Property Law" by Jonathan Franklin* He earned his A.B., A.M. Anthropology and J.D. degrees from Stanford University and M.Libr. with a Certificate in Law Librarianship from the University of Washington. Prior to the University of Washington, he spent five years as an reference librarian and foreign law selector at the University of Michigan Law Library. In law school, he was a Senior Editor of the Stanford Environmental Law Journal and a Note Editor for the Stanford Law Review. He is a member of the American Association of Law Libraries. ~https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/ERG'IP.pdf~~ ahs emi AND ) provides a substantial list of country comparisons touching on intellectual property law. ~3~ Forecloses the ability for future contracts.Hilty et al 21 ~Reto Hilty Director at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition and a professor at the University of Zurich Pedro Henrique D. Batista Doctoral student and Junior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Suelen Carls Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Daria Kim Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Matthias Lamping Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Peter R. Slowinski Doctoral student and Junior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; "10 Arguments against a Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights," Oxford Law; 6/29/21; https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2021/06/10-arguments-against-waiver-intellectual-property-rights~~ Justin AND of these rights may therefore have detrimental consequences for the willingness to cooperate. | 9/18/21 |
SO - Volition NCTournament: Yale | Round: 1 | Opponent: La Salle TP | Judge: Mark Kivimaki NCVolition, or the structure of the will, is a pre-condition for ethics and has intrinsic value – A) Proceduralism – the will is the mechanism by which every agent engages in any activity, which means regardless of the content of any ethical theory, the ability to will that theory is an intrinsic good B) Motivation – the structure of the will is the primary source of all our desires, reasons, and beliefs since it generates what counts as motivational to the subject C) Identity – the nature of the will is most constitutive to the creation of the subject since it determines what each subject considers intrinsic to its identity and what exists externally as an façade.Ethical theories to evaluate the will face a dilemma – they are either paternally objectivist to the extent they restrict the will, or they are weakened by subjectivism to the extent that it’s impossible to make true moral claims. Jaeggi 14, Jaeggi, Rahel. "Alienation." Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation/Scopa. From the perspective of liberal theory one aspect of the critique of alienation appears problematic above all others: theories of alienation appear to appeal to objective criteria that lie beyond the "sovereignty" of individuals to interpret for themselves what the good life consists in. Herbert Marcuse exemplifies this tendency of many theories of alienation in One Dimensional Man—a book that provided a crucial impulse for the New Left’s critique of alienation in the 1960s and 1970s— when, unconcerned with the liberal objection, he defends the validity of diagnoses of alienation with respect to the increased integration and identification with social relations that characterize the members of affluent industrial societies: "I have just suggested that the concept of alienation seems to become questionable when the individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in it their own development and satisfaction. This identification is not illusion, but reality. However, the reality constitutes a more progressive stage of alienation. The latter has become entirely objective; the subject which is alienated is swallowed up by its alienated existence."10 The subjective satisfaction of those who are integrated into objectively alienated relations is, according to Marcuse, "a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood."11 Here, however, the theory of alienation appears to have made itself immune to refutation. It would seem, then, that the concept of alienation belongs to a perfectionist ethical theory that presupposes, broadly speaking, that it is possible to determine what is objectively good for humans by identifying a set of properties or a set of functions inherent in human nature—a "purpose"—that ought to be realized. But if the foundation of modern morality and the fundamental conviction of liberal conceptions of society is the idea "that it should be left to each individual how he lives his own life" 12—that individuals are sovereign with respect to interpreting their own lives—then a theory of alienation that relies on objective perfectionist ideals appears to reject this idea in favor of a paternalist perspective that claims to "know better." For the latter (and as seems to be the case for Marcuse), it is possible for something to count as objectively good for someone without him subjectively valuing it as such. By the same token, it is possible to criticize a form of life as alienated or false without there being any subjective perception of suffering. But can someone be alienated from herself in the sense outlined here if she herself fails to perceive it? Can we claim of someone that she is alienated from her own desires or driven by false (alienated) needs or that she pursues an alienated way of life if she claims to be living precisely the life she wants to lead? In diagnoses of alienation the question arises, then, whether there can be objective evidence of pathology that contradicts individuals’ subjective assessments or preferences. This is a dilemma that is difficult to resolve. On the one hand, the concept of alienation (this is what distinguishes it from weaker forms of critique) claims to be able to bring to individuals’ prima facie evaluations and preferences a deeper dimension of critique—a critical authority—that functions as a corrective to their own assertions. On the other hand, it is not easy to justify the position of such a critical corrective. What could the objective criteria that overrule the assessments and preferences of individuals be in this case? 13 The arguments from human nature frequently appealed to in this context demonstrate, even in their most methodologically sophisticated, "thin" variants, the problems that plague attempts to derive normative standards from some conception of human nature. 14 Even if there is—in a banal sense—something humans share on the basis of their natural, biological constitution, and even if—in a banal sense—certain functional needs can be derived from these basic presuppositions of human life (all humans need nourishment or certain climatic conditions in order to survive), these basic conditions imply very little when it comes to evaluating how humans, in relation to issues beyond mere survival, lead their lives. On the other hand, the more human nature is given a specific content such that it becomes relevant to (culturally specific) forms of life, the more controversial and contestable the claims become. How are we to define human nature when its extraordinary variability and malleability appear to be part of human nature itself?15 And how are we to pick out among diverse forms of human life those that really correspond to human nature, given that even forms of life criticized as alienated have been in some way developed, advanced, and lived by human beings? Only a functional understanding of the will solves – it ensures the very nature of the will is taken care of through appropriate willing capacities, without over-limiting it to a strict set of substantive rules. This functional capacity of willing is mediated by social roles – as the authentic self is inexplicably linked to the self that engages in social communities with others through duplication. Understanding the functionality of the will is impossible in a vacuum. Jaeggi 2, Jaeggi, Rahel. "Alienation." Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation/Scopa. The positions of both authors can be reduced to the following common denominator: roles are less alienating than constitutive for the development of persons and personality. They are constitutive in the sense that they are directly bound up with a person’s development and, so, "productive." At first glance this position might seem to come down on one side of the two alternatives—an unconditional affirmation of roles—but after giving a brief account of the position, I will make use of it to move beyond the two alternatives. Once the "productivity thesis" has been articulated, it will be possible to distinguish between alienating and non-alienating aspects of role behavior. THE HUMAN BEING AS DOPPELGÄNGER Roles are productive. In and through them we first become ourselves. This is the essence of Helmuth Plessner’s conception of the positive significance of roles (which he developed as a direct response to critiques of them as alienating). "The human being is always himself only in ‘doubling’ in relation to a role figure he can experience. Also, all that he sees as comprising his authenticity is but the role he plays before himself and others.22 Roles on this view are not only necessary in order to make social interaction possible, whether this be a "being together" of individuals or a benign "passing each other by;" interaction mediated by roles is also constitutive of an individual’s relation to herself.This culminates in the act of appropriation – the ability to view yourself as a practical agent capable of taking up a project that actively changes your own subject and the role itself. Jaeggi 3, Jaeggi, Rahel. "Alienation." Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation/Scopa. What does it mean to appropriate something?12 If the concept of appropriation refers to a specific relation between self and world, between individuals and objects (whether spiritual or material), what precisely does this relation look like, what are its particular character and its specific structure? Various aspects come together here, and together they account for the concept’s appeal and potential. As opposed to the mere learning of certain contents, talk of appropriation emphasizes that something is not merely passively taken up but actively worked through and independently assimilated. In contrast to merely theoretical insight into some issue, appropriation—comparable to the psychoanalytic process of "working through"—means that one can "deal with" what one knows, that it stands at one’s disposal as knowledge and that one really and practically has command over it. And appropriating a role means more than being able to fill it: one is, we could say, identified with it. Something that we appropriate does not remain external to ourselves. In making something our own, it becomes a part of ourselves in a certain respect. This suggests a kind of introjection and a mixing of oneself with the objects of appropriation. It also evokes the idea of productively and formatively interacting with what one makes one’s own. Appropriation does not leave what is appropriated unchanged. This is why the appropriation of public spaces, for example, means more than that one uses them. We make them our own by making a mark on them through what we do in and with them, by transforming them through appropriative use such that they first acquire a specific form through this use (though not necessarily in a material sense). Although it has one of its roots in an account of property relations, the concept of appropriation, in contrast to mere possession, emphasizes the particular quality of a process that first constitutes a real act of taking possession of something. Accordingly, appropriation is a particular mode of seizing possession.13 Someone who appropriates something puts her individual mark on it, inserts her own ends and qualities into it. This means that sometimes we must still make something that we already possess our own. Relations of appropriation, then, are characterized by several features: appropriation is a form of praxis, a way of relating practically to the world. It refers to a relation of penetration, assimilation, and internalization in which what is appropriated is at the same time altered, structured, and formed. The crucial point of this model (also of great importance for Marx) is a consequence of this structure of penetration and assimilation: appropriation always means a transformation of both poles of the relation. In a process of appropriation both what is appropriated and the appropriator are transformed.Thus, the standard is consistency with non-alienated relations.Prefer –1. Performativity – Every exercise you engage in is an instance of using your volition to establish some relation to the world and only non-alienation can establish that relationship as normatively legitimate.2. Action theory – Only viewing an agent as an active body capable of generating intentions can hold agents culpable and decipher the difference between actions and wishes. That’s a necessary feature of ethics since we must be able to warrant a coherent conception of what motivates our actions in order to provide a method to actually implement ethical principles.3. Epistemology – Only an understanding of appropriation can unify the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge. Theoretical abstract concepts like 2+24 are true and necessary, but can only become useful once explained in context of how they actualize in the world through our intentions. That means absent an explanation of how that knowledge mixes with the world around us, it becomes useless. ==== offenseI contend that member nations of the WTO ought not reduce intellectual property protections for medicine.~1~ Intellectual property is a self-expression of the subject. When it’s used in a way that doesn’t reflect the framer’s intent, it is alienating.Justin Hughes 98, "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property," 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 330-350 (1988) ~https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html~~ AHSMAK recut emi Accessed 8/10/21 AND permanence and a greater ability than other property to give its own economic security ~2~ IP is key to recognizing agents through the personality in their work. Recognition is necessary for agents to be non-alienated bc we need to establish relations with the world.Hughes 2 - "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property," 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 330-350 (1988) by Justin Hughes ~https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html~~ ahs emi AND is destroyed; when the second condition is violated, it is distorted. ~3~ Objectification - Absent intellectual property, agents feel like objects since they aren’t recognized for their exercise of agency. This procedurally prevents further appropriation bc agents lack incentive to innovate when they’re detached from their goods. | 9/17/21 |
SO - Waivers TTournament: Yale | Round: 1 | Opponent: La Salle TP | Judge: Mark Kivimaki Interpretation: Affirmatives must reduce intellectual property protections for medicines unconditionally and permanently.Reynolds 59: Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents ~NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL~ Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959, lexis) AND or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency. Violation: The waiver is temporary.Gupta and Namboodiri 21: Gupta, Vineeta ~a maternal and child health physician, human rights advocate, and a passionate activist for health equity. As director, she leads the ACTION Global Health Advocacy Partnership as well as a volunteer-based policy advocacy organization that unites the Indian diaspora to mount a prompt, global response to the COVID-19 crisis in India. Dr. Gupta has more than 20 years of tri-sector experience in leading and supporting projects in more than 25 countries. In addition to conducting organization development, diversity, inclusion, equity, and global health equity workshops, Gupta has designed and facilitated partnership projects to achieve agreements and results on complex issues. She has been invited to speak in more than 60 universities in the US and Europe.~ Namboodiri, Sreenath ~LLM, LLB, is assistant professor at the School of Ethics, Governance, Culture and Social Systems at Chinmaya Vishwavidyapeeth and a post-graduate on law of intellectual property rights (IPR) from Inter University Centre for IPR Studies, CUSAT, Kochi. His areas of interest are in intellectual property rights vis-à-vis health systems, sustainable development and innovation, pharmaceutical patents, knowledge governance, and technology and law. He is an honorary fellow of the Centre for Economy, Development, and Law since 2013. Namboodiri is part of the editorial team of Elenchus Law Review, a biannual peer-reviewed journal from the Centre (CEDandL). He has also worked as a guest lecturer in Inter University Centre for IPR Studies, CUSAT, Kochi, where he provided courses on access to medicine and IP, and patents and biotechnology~ "America And The TRIPS Waiver: You Can Talk The Talk, But Will You Walk The Walk?," July 13, 2021 AA AND so far the US has not gone further than its announcement of support. No plan text in a vacuum – the offense defines what the plan looks like. Worst case scenario, you vote neg on presumption because all their solvency evidence is about a waiver.Prefer my interpretation:1~ Limits: they open the door to an infinite number of affs – from any condition to any time restriction. Each one becomes its own new aff.2~ Ground: condition and delay counterplans are all ground we are entitled to because they disprove the idea of passing the plan right now.3~ Topic lit: authors aren’t writing about a reduction that happens a few years or now or under a specific condition.4~ Semantics: not defending the text of the resolution justifies the affirmative doing away with random words in the resolution which destroys predictability because they are no longer bounded by the resolution. | 9/17/21 |
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9/17/21 | pl237812@ahschoolcom |
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9/18/21 | pl237812@ahschoolcom |
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