| Tournament | Round | Opponent | Judge | Cites | Round Report | Open Source | Edit/Delete |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Contact info | Finals | na | na |
|
| ||
| JW Patterson HS Invitational | 1 | James Bowie NW | Wesley Loofbourrow |
|
|
| Tournament | Round | Report |
|---|
To modify or delete round reports, edit the associated round.
| Entry | Date |
|---|---|
Contact InfoTournament: Contact info | Round: Finals | Opponent: na | Judge: na he/him Send any questions to | 11/12/21 |
JW Patterson R1 NegTournament: JW Patterson HS Invitational | Round: 1 | Opponent: James Bowie NW | Judge: Wesley Loofbourrow Resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines. The highest value in this round is quality of life. Pragmatism is the best way to uphold quality of life through promoting efficiency in the pharmaceutical industry. I offer the following observation: Ought is “used to express obligation, advisability, natural expectation, or logical consequence.” This means the aff must prove that it is advisable or obligatory to reduce IP protections, while the neg needs to prove it is inadvisable or not obligatory. Under the aforementioned framing, this means the burden of the aff is to prove that reducing IPP is pragmatic while the neg must prove it is not pragmatic. While nothing is assured, one can presume with some confidence that there will be more generous incentives for companies to invest in developing vaccines and infectious disease drugs. The public and policymakers most likely will continue to push for the accelerated development of new and affordable medicines. This accelerated development will demand more real-world evidence (RWE) to establish efficacy and safety, and, given future concerns about travel, clinical trials will become increasingly decentralized and patient-centric to increase convenience for enrollees. There is a theme emerging in all these changes: a new pragmatism. Contention 1 - Innovation and Tech Transfer IP protections give innovators certainty that their proprietary inventions or products are protected from copycats, encouraging them to pursue that one idea that may work despite hundreds of others that may fail. At the same time, innovators publish the specifics of their invention in exchange for these protections so others can learn from their research and use it as a building block for future, competing discoveries. Developing new medicines is a lengthy and complex process, and the work that goes into the initial discovery and patent application is just the beginning. A biopharmaceutical manufacturer must then demonstrate the safety and efficacy of a new treatment through rigorous testing that involves clinical trial data before a medicine can be made available to patients. By the time a medicine is ready for the market, it has typically taken on average $2.6 billion and 10 years—about half of the life of a patent.
Tech Transfer means IPP benefits developing countries’ access to medicine and information When examining the effects of IPRs on technology transfer, it is important to consider the modes of delivery of technology transfer through the different market channels: trade, FDI and licensing. The decisions among the different channels of technology transfer depend on the strength of IPRs and ownership advantage (Smith, 2001). These decisions concern whether or not to transfer production, and thus knowledge, outside the source country and/or the source firm. Firms engaging in exports hold their knowledge inside both the source country and firm. Firms that establish affiliates abroad transfer knowledge outside the source country, but hold knowledge assets inside the source firm. Firms that license their knowledge assets to unaffiliated foreign firms transfer knowledge outside both the source country and firm. Smith (2001) finds that strong IPRs have a larger effect on US knowledge transferred outside the country and firm, relative to knowledge located inside the country and internalised in the firm. In order words, strong IPRs give incentives to firms in developed countries to license their technologies to other firms in developing countries, since the former will be able to control better the knowledge transferred. Conversely, under weak IPRs, multinationals may be encouraged to transfer the knowledge only to their foreign affiliates in order to keep control of it. This Tech Transfer is necessary to end the pandemic Geneva – In a joint declaration published on 6 September 2021, the G20 Health Ministers gathered in Rome, Italy reaffirmed their commitment to global solidarity, equity, and a multilateral approach towards ending the COVID-19 pandemic and strengthening the global pandemic preparedness mechanisms. While supporting the global goal to vaccinate at least 40 of the population by the end of 2021, they highlighted the urgent need to share more doses and strengthen local and regional manufacturing capacity. The G20 Health Ministers reaffirmed their support to the work of key partners, including “WHO, Unitaid and the Medicines Patent Pool to facilitate voluntary technology transfers on mutually agreed terms, market shaping and increase local production capacities worldwide …” (7). “The current inequity in access to vaccines is behind the wave of death impacting hardest low- and middle-income countries,” said Charles Gore, Executive Director of the Medicines Patent Pool. “To address the global imbalance of manufacturing capacity for COVID-19 vaccines, MPP is working with many partners, including WHO on establishing the South African mRNA technology transfer hub that will allow for greater and more diversified vaccines manufacturing capability. We hope it will also contribute to strengthening African regional health security and respond more equitably to the current COVID-19 pandemic and future pandemics at global level.” Voluntary Tech Transfers solve better and faster than waivers Yet, pharmaceutical companies may not want to comply with WTO waivers, even if they come through--the WTO's next meeting to discuss IPR is in June, and the next is slated in October. Experts believe vaccine production after waivers will take well over a year to ease the current shortage. Contention 2 - Medicaid Alt Expanding Medicaid solves better than reducing IPP- Under this highly effective program, drug manufacturers must provide rebates to the federal government and states as a condition of having their drugs covered by Medicaid. These rebates are substantial. In 2019, for example, data from the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission indicate they lowered gross Medicaid prescription drug costs by 55.7 percent. In contrast, data from the Medicare Trustees report show that rebates negotiated by Medicare Part D plans reduced Medicare spending by only 26.7 percent. Moreover, a recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis compared prices, net of rebates and discounts, for the top-selling and highest-price Medicare Part D brand-name drugs across select federal programs and agencies including Medicaid, Medicare Part D, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). It found that Medicaid obtains the lowest prices, net of rebates and discounts, among the programs and agencies examined. The net prices were substantially below those in Medicare Part D plans and below even the prices negotiated by the VA. By lowering state and federal Medicaid prescription drug costs, the rebate program consequently reduces fiscal pressures on states that could lead to budget cuts that reduce low-income beneficiaries’ access to needed medications as well as other health care and long-term services and supports. Medicaid solves best - by improving access to those with low income and disabilities, the alternative specifically benefits the populations that can’t afford their medication and avoids the impacts of reducing or waiving IPP | 11/12/21 |
| Filename | Date | Uploaded By | Delete |
|---|