### 1

#### Interp - Reduce means a net decrease

Public Law 87-253 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, 97th US Congress, Sept 8, 1982, Lexis)

E) Prior to approving any application for a refund, the Secretary shall require evidence that such reduction in market- ings has taken place and that such reduction is a net decrease in marketings of milk and has not been offset by expansion of production in other production facilities in which the person has an interest or by transfer of partial interest in the produc- tion facility or by the taking of any other action. which is a scheme or device to qualify for payment.

#### Reduce means to make smaller.

Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2008, Twelfth Edition, Oxford Reference Online

Reduce v.

1. make or become smaller or less in amount, degree, or size. • boil (a sauce or other liquid) so that it becomes thicker and more concentrated. • (chiefly N. Amer.) (of a person) lose weight. • (Photography) make (a negative or print) less dense.

2. (reduce someone/thing to) bring someone or something by force or necessity to (an undesirable state or action). • (reduce someone to) make someone helpless with (shock, anguish, or amusement).

3. (reduce something to) change something to (a simpler or more basic form). • convert a fraction to (the form with the lowest terms).

4. (Chemistry) cause to combine chemically with hydrogen. • undergo or cause to undergo a reaction in which electrons are gained from another substance or molecule. The opposite of oxidize.

5. restore (a dislocated body part) to its proper position.

6. (archaic) besiege and capture (a town or fortress).

#### Violation: The plan text is adding a label to drugs as an FYI

#### Standards:

#### Ground – there are no core topic links to the aff because you don’t reduce IP patents – innovation DA, PTX da, pharma backlash, Indian Politics, unilaterialism vs multilat Das, etc are gone

#### Predictable limits – IPP reduction in the context of medicines is the backbone of neg ground -addding a label to it is is not predictable – adding any sort of label from any organization is infinite– destroying any ground that we have on the topic

#### Voters:

#### Fairness – Debate is a competitive activity and the better debater must win.

#### Education – it’s the only portable skill we take out of round.

#### Drop the debater – 1] a loss deters future abuse 2] dropping the arg severs from your original advocacy which creates a 7-6 timeskew when you read new offense.

#### Competing interps – 1] Your brightline is arbitrary and based on what you did rather than the best one. 2] Collapses – offense defense debate about your brightline is competing interps.

#### No RVI on T – sam says no 1] logic – you shouldn’t win for being topical – outweighs since logic is a litmus test for arguments. 2] they encourage you to read an abusive aff and prep out T. 3] enables us to return to substance and get that education rather than debating T the whole time.

#### OR this is extra T – if they are reduce, this addition is extra topical

### 2

#### The affirmative is a futile compromise in the battlefield of capitalism. Even softening ip protections will not resolve contradictions and inequalities in society but only preserve laborers needed for the capitalist economy to function.

Rikowski 2006 (“A Marxist Analyhsis of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.” By Ruthe Rikowski (Lecturer at London South Bank University. Senior Edoitor for Chandos Information Processional Series, and author of multiple books and journal articles.) Volume 4, Number 4 2006 of Policy Futures in Education. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.2304/pfie.2006.4.4.396>) 0:24

Fundamentally, it will be impossible to implement TRIPS in a way that will significantly benefit the developing world, because of the inherent inequalities and contradictions that are built into the very fabric of global capitalism itself. Furthermore, the drives of capital are infinite; it will never be satisfied. So, there will never come a point where it will be decided that the inequalities need to be lessened in any fundamental way. Instead, TRIPS, as a tool which aids the furtherance of global capitalism, is likely to increase the inequalities. Furthermore, inequalities and poverty will only ever be lessened (and largely on a temporary basis) when pressure is placed on those in positions of power. In regard to TRIPS this rests on putting pressure on the WTO through organisations such as the Third World Network and various NGOs in order to soften some of the most worrying of the implications of TRIPS for the poor and those in the developing world.

However, capitalism is a battlefield upon which various compromises are and can only ever be made, but it can never ultimately be for the benefit of the labourer and the poor. To change the situation on a permanent basis, we need to terminate capitalism and replace it with socialism and eventually with communism in my opinion.

#### Capitalism created international law to spread capitalism. Any agreements on an international level by countries comes with it expanding their interest to other parties yet large power players can disregard those same laws as there is an unequal relationship between states, altering how institutional organizations function

Chimni 17 (“Towards an Integrated Marxist Approach to International Law (IMAIL) In International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches (pp. 440-550). by B.S. Chimni (Legal scholar, Distinguished Professor of International Law at Jindal Global Law School and served on the Academic Advisory Committee of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 96-00) ambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781107588196.009) 0:43

First, he noted that ‘the spread and development of international law occurred on the basis of the spread and development of the capitalist mode of production’. 109 That is to say, ‘the victory of the bourgeoisie, in all the European countries, had to lead to the establishment of new rules and new institutions of international law which protected the general and basic interests of the bourgeoisie, i.e., bourgeois property’. 110 But Pashukanis recognized that while ‘as a separate force which set itself off from society, the state only finally emerged in the modern capitalist bourgeois period’ it by no means followed that ‘the contemporary forms of international legal intercourse, and the individual institutions of international law, only arose in the most recent times’. 111 Since exchange relations existed among tribes and communities, international law was prevalent among the earliest ancient legal institutions that existed. In this period international law helped resolve disputes, including territorial disputes, between tribes. 112 In these contexts Pashukanis went on to touch upon developments in Greek and Roman law. 113 However, he emphasized that it is only in the capitalist period ‘having subordinated itself to the state machine, the bourgeoisie brought the principle of the public nature of authority to its clearest expression’, and therefore ‘the state only fully becomes the subject of international law as the bourgeois state ’. 114 In the same way as an individual assumed the quality of a legal subject only under capitalism, the state becomes the subject of international law only as a capitalist state.

Second, responding to the eternal question as to whether international law is law, Pashukanis noted that ‘bourgeois jurisprudence has devoted a great amount of fruitless effort in solving this contradiction’. 115 According to Pashukanis, the answer to the question whether international law is law lies in – here he anticipates classical realists like Hans Morgenthau – ‘the real balance of forces’ between bourgeois states. 116 He, of course, recognized that ‘within the limit set by a given balance of forces, separate questions may be decided by compromises and by exchange i.e., on the basis of law’. 117 But international law was likely to be disregarded when the interests of a state so demanded. 118 This was especially so in periods of crisis when the balance of forces ‘fluctuated seriously’ and when ‘vital interests’ or the ‘very existence of a state’ was threatened. 119 Pashukanis mentioned in this regard the period of 1914– 1918  ‘during which both sides continuously violated international law’. 120 However, he went on to make the acute observation that ‘every state in violating international law also tries to depict the matter as if there has been no violation whatsoever’. 121 The reason is that ‘the open denial of international law is politically unprofitable for the bourgeoisie since it exposes them to the masses and thus hinders preparations for new wars. It is much more profitable for the imperialists to act in the guise of pacifism and as the champions of international law’. 122

Third, Pashukanis rejected technical definitions of international law advanced by bourgeois international lawyers from which ‘the class character of international law’ was absent. 123 In his view, ‘bourgeois jurisprudence consciously or unconsciously strives to conceal the element of class’. 124 On his part he noted the links between capitalism and imperialism, and inter- imperialist competition, and observed that the capitalist countries divided the world into civilized and semi- civilized revealing ‘modern international law as the class law of the bourgeoisie ’. 125 According to Pashukanis, international law of his times was ‘the totality of norms which the capitalist bourgeois states apply in their relations with each other, while the remainder of the world is considered as a simple object of their completed transactions’. 126 Pashukanis was certainly right as ‘the real historical content of international law’ in this period was ‘the struggle between capitalist states’. 127 In fact international law owed ‘its existence to the fact that the bourgeoisie exercise(d) its domination over the proletariat and over the colonial countries’. 128 It was therefore indeed the class law of the bourgeoisie.

Fourth, he noted with respect to the assertion of basic or equal rights of states under international law that ‘it is most obvious that we are dealing here with ideas drawn from the sphere of civil law relationships with a basis in equality between the parties’. 129 He conceded that ‘to a certain degree the analogy may be extended. Bourgeois private law assumes that subjects are formally equal yet simultaneously permits real inequality in property, while bourgeois international law in principle recognizes that states have equal rights yet in reality they are unequal in their signifi-cance and their power’. 130 Therefore, at the level of political economy there was only ‘a difference in degree’ between domestic law and international law. 131 But he also went on to observe that the ‘dubious benefits of formal equality are not enjoyed at all by those nations which have not developed capitalist civilization and which engage in international intercourse not as subjects, but as objects of the imperialist states’ colonial policy’. 132 In other words, he recognized that in the instance of colonized states the analogy between domestic law and international law collapsed.

Fifth, he criticized Marxist scholars such as Karl Renner for stressing the ‘peaceful functions of international law’. 133 Pashukanis pointed out that ‘even those agreements between capitalist states which appear to be directed to the general interest are, in fact, for each of the participants a means of jealously protecting their particular interests, preventing the expansion of their rivals’ influence, thwarting unilateral conquest, i.e., in another form continuing the same struggle which will exist for as long as capitalist competition exists’. 134 He extended this logic to international organizations and wrote that ‘the struggle among imperialist states for domination of the rest of the world is thus a basic factor in defining the nature and fate of the corresponding institutions’. 135

#### International Law’s foundation to preserve human rights and freedoms of all people have been twisted and turned to be used as another tool within the neoliberal regime to conquer and feed the military war machine while creating more human rights violations along the way.

Heuer and Schirmer 98 **(**“Human Rights Imperialism” by Uwe-Jens Heuer (member of the dem soc budestag group on questions of law and justice) and Dr Gregor Schirmer (assistant to heuer) Monthly Review March 1, 1998. Accessed 12-17-2012. [https://monthlyreview.org/1998/03/01/human-rights-imperialism**/**](https://monthlyreview.org/1998/03/01/human-rights-imperialism/)**) 0:25**

Human rights were embodied in international law for the first time half a century ago. According to the United Nations Charter, one of the goals of the organization is international cooperation “to advance and strengthen the respect of human rights and basic freedoms for all people, regardless of race, sex, language and religion.” The thirty articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 set out in detail the UN Charter’s goal of international cooperation for the advancement of human rights and basic freedoms. The Convention on Prevention and Prosecution of Genocide of the same year is a great advance and landmark in the body of international law, binding on the states that have ratified it. These two achievements, which came at the very moment of the inception of the cold war, were due to the continuing democratic-antifascist impetus of the struggle and victory of the Anti-Hitler coalition in the Second World War. In the verdicts at Nuremberg the Nazi leaders were not only convicted of war crimes but also of crimes against humankind. The recognition of human rights in international law is thus a lasting triumph of the great antifascist coalition that split apart with the start of the cold war. But in its aspect as ideology (as opposed to its aspect as an element of international law), “human rights” became an effective weapon of the cold war and remains a heavily used propaganda tool of the new neoliberal global regime. It is on this distinction between human rights in international law and in (neo-imperial) ideology that we focus here.

The next great advance after 1948 came with the adoption of the two International Covenants, on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in 1966. These treaties are legally binding, but there is only an extremely weak mechanism for their implementation. The explicit inclusion of economic, social, and cultural rights as human rights within the scope of international law was a major accomplishment. It stands today as a reproach to orthodox neoliberal ideology, although it is characteristic that social rights are formulated as general goals to be gradually reached. These treaties were made in the context of that advance in human freedoms marked by the breakdown of the colonial system and the growth of the liberation movements. The primary international political actors have not been quick to ratify these treaties, which first took effect in 1976. The United States first joined the treaty on political rights in 1992, and still does not adhere to the treaty on social rights.

The human rights established in these and other universal and regional agreements are certainly not the *ne plus ultra* of the legal regulation of the development of human emancipation. But the world would certainly look completely different and much more just, were human rights to be realized like those recognized in Article 11 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (including the rights to food, clothing, shelter, and improvement of the conditions of life).

**II**

But the reality is different. In all parts of the world human rights were and are negated and trampled upon daily. One cause of the failure of the socialist states in Europe was the disregard of, and injury to, human rights. Today the countries which purport to be defenders of human rights, including Germany and the United States, disregard human rights in their own territories. In Germany there are continuous multiple violations of the human rights of non-EU foreign residents and of citizens of the former GDR. Hunger and poverty in the third world are denials of elementary human rights. In Rwanda, inhumane conditions degenerated into genocide.

In the case of grave injury to human rights, it seems clear that states should not remain passive in the name of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another country. But this is just one side of the story. The other side is that the question of human rights was abused by the United States and NATO as a tool aimed at the destruction of what had been achieved in the socialist countries, is still abused as a vehicle for the assertion of hegemonic interests against the independence of states of the third world, and is ever more frequently accompanied by the use of military power. This is a dangerous development which can properly be designated human rights imperialism.

Henry Kissinger argued in his book, *The Reason of Nations*, that where Nixon, Ford, and Carter had found “human rights” to be useful in their political language, Reagan and his advisors went further and put “human rights” into the toolbox to be actively used in the destruction of “communism” and the “democratization” of the Soviet Union. How the ideology of “human rights” was used to deprive hundreds of millions of people of their social and economic rights requires more attention than it has so far received.

#### Cap causes extinction – only reforms can challenge capitalism

Streeck 16.(Wolfgang, Emeritus Director of the Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, *How Will Capitalism End?: Essays on a Failing System*, p. 1-15)

Capitalism has always been an improbable social formation, full of conflicts and contradictions, therefore **permanently unstable** and in flux, and highly conditional on historically contingent and precarious supportive as well as constraining events and institutions. Capitalist society may be described in shorthand as a 'progressive' society in the sense of Adam Smith 1 and the enlightenment, a society that has coupled its 'progress' to the continuous and unlimited production and accumulation of productive capital, effected through a conversion, by means of the invisible hand of the market and the visible hand of the state, of the private vice of material greed into a public benefit.' Capitalism promises **infinite growth** of commodified material wealth in a finite world, by conjoining itself with modern science and technology, making capitalist society the first industrial society, and through unending expansion of free, in the sense of contestable, risky markets, on the coat-tails of a hegemonic carrier state and its market -opening policies both domestically and internationally. 3 As a version of industrial society, capitalist society is distinguished by the fact that its collective productive capital is accumulated in the hands of a minority of its members who enjoy the legal privilege, in the form of rights of private property, to dispose of such capital in any way they see fit, including letting it sit idle or transferring it abroad. One implication of this is that the vast majority of the members of a capitalist society must work under the direction, however mediated, of the private owners of the tools they need to provide for themselves, and on terms set by those owners in line with their desire to maximize the rate of increase of their capital. Motivating non-owners to do so- to work hard and diligently in the interest of the owners - requires artful devices - sticks and carrots of the most diverse sorts that are never certain to function - that have to be continuously reinvented as capitalist progress continuously renders them obsolescent. The tensions and contradictions within the capitalist political-economic configuration make for an ever-present possibility of structural breakdown and social crisis. Economic and social stability under modern capitalism must be secured on a background of systemic restlessness4 produced by competition and expansion, a difficult balancing act with a constantly uncertain outcome. Its success is contingent on, among other things, the timely appearance of a new technological paradigm or the development of social needs and values complementing changing requirements of continued economic growth. For example, for the vast majority of its members, a capitalist society must manage to convert their ever-present fear of being cut out of the productive process, because of economic or technological restructuring, into acceptance of the highly unequal distribution of wealth and power generated by the capitalist economy and a belief in the legitimacy of capitalism as a social order. For this, highly complicated and inevitably fragile institutional and ideological provisions arc necessary. The same holds true for the conversion of insecure workers - kept insecure to make them obedient workers - into confident consumers happily discharging their consumerist social obligations even in the face of the fundamental uncertainty oflabour markets and employment.' In light of the inherent instability of modern societies founded upon and dynamically shaped by a capitalist economy, it is small wonder that theories of capitalism, from the time the concept was first used in the early 1800s in Germany" and the mid-1800s in England/ were always also theories of crisis. This holds not just for Marx and Engels but also for writers like Ricardo, Mill, Sombart, Keynes, Hilferding, Polanyi and Schumpeter, all of whom expected one way or other to see the end of capitalism during their lifetime." What kind of crisis was expected to finish capitalism off differed with time and authors' theoretical priors; structuralist theories of death by overproduction or underconsumption, or by a tendency of the rate of profit to fall (Marx), coexisted with predictions of saturation of needs and markets (Keynes), of rising resistance to further commodification oflife and society (Polanyi), of exhaustion of new land and new labour available for colonization in a literal as well as figurative sense (Luxemburg), of technological stagnation (Kondratieff), financial-political organization of monopolistic corporations suspending liberal markets (Hilferding), bureaucratic suppression of entrepreneurialism aided by a worldwide trahison des clercs (Weber, Schumpeter, Hayek) etc., etc." While none of these theories came true as imagined, most of them were not entirely false either. In fact, the history of modern capitalism can be written as a succession of crises that capitalism survived only at the price of deep transformations of its economic and social institutions, saving it from bankruptcy in unforeseeable and often unintended ways. Seen this way, that the capitalist order still exists may well appear less impressive than that it existed so often on the brink of collapse and had continuously to change, frequently depending on contingent exogenous supports that it was unable to mobilize endogenously. The fact **that capitalism has**, until now, **managed to outlive all predictions of its impending death, need not mean that it will forever be able to do so**; there is no inductive proof here, and we cannot rule out the possibility that, **next time**, whatever cavalry capitalism may require for its rescue may fail to show up. A short recapitulation of the history of modern capitalism serves to illustrate this point. 10 Liberal capitalism in the nineteenth century was confronted by a revolutionary labour movement that needed to be politically tamed by a complex combination of repression and co-optation, including democratic power sharing and social reform. In the early twentieth century, capitalism was commandeered to serve national interests in international wars, thereby converting it into a public utility under the planning regimes of a new war economy, as private property and the invisible hand of the market seemed insufficient for the provision of the collective capacities countries needed to prevail in international hostilities. After the First World War, restoration of a liberal-capitalist economy failed to produce a viable social order and had to give way in large parts of the industrial world to either Communism or Fascism, while in the core countries of what was to become 'the West' liberal capitalism was gradually succeeded, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, by Keynesian, state-administered capitalism. Out of this grew the democratic welfare-state capitalism of the three post-war decades, with hindsight the only period in which economic growth and social and political stability, achieved through democracy, coexisted under capitalism, at least in the OECD world where capitalism came to be awarded the epithet, 'advanced'. In the 1970s, however, what had with hindsight been called the 'post-war settlement' of social-democratic capitalism began to disintegrate, gradually and imperceptibly at first but increasingly punctuated by successive, ever more severe crises of both the capitalist economy and the social and political institutions embedding, that is, supporting as well as containing it. This was the period of both intensifying crisis and deep transformation when 'late capitalism', as impressively described by Werner Sombart in the 1920s, 11 gave way to neoliberalism. Crisis Theory Redux Today, after the watershed of the financial crisis of 2008, critical and indeed crisis-theoretical reflection on the prospects of capitalism and its society is again en vogue. Does Capitalism Have a Future? is the title of a book published in 2013 by five outstanding social scientists: Immanuel Wallerstein, Randall Collins, Michael Mann, Georgi Derluguian and Craig Calhoun. Apart from the introduction and the conclusion, which are collectively authored, the contributors present their views in separate chapters, and this could not be otherwise since they differ widely. Still, all five share the conviction that, as they state in the introduction, 'something big looms on the horizon: a structural crisis much bigger than the recent Great Recession, which might in retrospect seem only a prologue to a period of deeper troubles and transformations: 12 On what is causing this crisis, however, and how it will end, there is substantial disagreement- which, with authors of this calibre, may be taken as a sign of the multiple uncertainties and possibilities inherent in the present condition of the capitalist political economy. To give an impression of how leading theorists may differ when trying to imagine the future of capitalism today, I will at some length review the prospects and predictions put forward in the book. A comparatively conventional crisis theory is probably the one offered by Wallerstein (pp. 9-35), who locates contemporary capitalism at the bottom of a Kondratieff cycle (Kondratieff B) with no prospect of a new (Kondratieff A) upturn. This is said to be due to a 'structural crisis' that began in the 1970s, as a result of which 'capitalists may no longer find capitalism rewarding'. Two broad causes are given, one a set of long-term trends 'ending the endless accumulation of capital', the other the demise, after the 'world revolution of 1968', of the 'dominance of centrist liberals of the geoculture' (p. 21 ). Structural trends include the exhaustion of virgin lands and the resulting necessity of environmental repair work, growing resource shortages, and the increasing need for public infrastructure. All of this costs money, and so does the pacification of a proliferating mass of discontented workers and the unemployed. Concerning global hegemony, Wallerstein points to what he considers the final decline of the U.S.-centred world order, in military and economic as well as ideological terms. Rising costs of doing business combine with global disorder to make restoration of a stable capitalist world system impossible. Instead Wallerstein foresees 'an ever-tighter gridlock of the system. Gridlock will in turn result in ever-wilder fluctuations, and will consequently make short-term predictions - both economic and political - ever more unreliable. And this in turn will aggravate ... popular fears and alienation. It is a negative cycle' (p. 32). For the near future Wallerstein expects a global political confrontation between defenders and opponents of the capitalist order, in his suggestive terms: between the forces of Davos and of Porto Alegre. Their final battle 'about the successor system' (p. 35) is currently fomenting. Its outcome, according to Wallerstein, is unpredictable, although 'we can feel sure that one side or the other will win out in the coming decades, and a new reasonably stable world-system (or set of world-systems) will be established: Much less pessimistic, or less optimistic from the perspective of those who would like to see capitalism dose down, is Craig Calhoun, who finds prospects of reform and renewal in what he, too, considers a deep and potentially final crisis (pp. 131-61). Calhoun assumes that there is still time for political intervention to save capitalism, as there was in the past, perhaps with the help of a 'sufficiently enlightened faction of capitalists' (p. 2). But he also believes 'a centralized socialist economy' to be possible, and even more so 'Chinese-style state capitalism': 'Markets can exist in the future even while specifically capitalist modes of property and finance have declined' (p. 3). Far more than Wallerstein, Calhoun is reluctant when it comes to prediction (for a summary of his view see pp. 158-61 ). His chapter offers a list of internal contradictions and possible external disruptions threatening the stability of capitalism, and points out a wide range of alternative outcomes. Like Wallerstein, Calhoun attributes particular significance to the international system, where he anticipates the emergence of a plurality of more or less capitalist political-economic regimes, with the attendant problems and pitfalls of coordination and competition. While he does not rule out a 'large-scale, more or less simultaneous collapse of capitalist markets ... not only bringing economic upheaval but also upending political and social institutions' (p. 161), Calhoun believes in the possibility of states, corporations and social movements re-establishing effective governance for a transformative renewal of capitalism. To quote, The capitalist order is a very large-scale, highly complex system. The events of the last forty years have deeply disrupted the institutions that kept capitalism relatively well organized through the postwar period. Efforts to repair or replace these will change the system, just as new technologies and new business and financial practices may. Even a successful renewal of capitalism will transform it ... The question is whether change will be adequate to manage systemic risks and fend off external threats. And if not, will there be widespread devastation before a new order emerges? (p. 161) Even more agnostic on the future of capitalism is Michael Mann ('The End May Be Nigh, But for Whom?: pp. 71-97). Mann begins by reminding his readers that in his 'general model of human society', he does 'not conceive of societies as systems but as multiple, overlapping networks of interaction, of which four networks - ideological, economic, military and political power relations - are the most important. Geopolitical relations can be added to the four .. : Mann continues: Each of these four or five sources of power may have an internal logic or tendency of development, so that it might be possible, for example, to identify tendencies toward equilibrium, cycles, or contradictions within capitalism, just as one might identify comparable tendencies within the other sources of social power. (p. 72) Interactions between the networks, Mann points out, are frequent but not systematic, meaning that 'once we admit the importance of such interactions we are into a more complex and uncertain world in which the development of capitalism, for example, is also influenced by ideologies, wars and states' (p. 73). Mann adds to this the possibility of uneven development across geographical space and the likelihood of irrational behaviour interfering with rational calculations of interest, even of the interest in survival. To demonstrate the importance of contingent events and of cycles other than those envisaged in the Wallerstein-Kondratieff model of history, Mann discusses the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession of 2008. He then proceeds to demonstrate how his approach speaks to the future, first of U.S. hegemony and second of 'capitalist markets'. As to the former, Mann (pp. 83-4) offers the standard list of American weaknesses, both domestic and international, from economic decline to political anomy to an increasingly less effective military- weaknesses that 'might bring America down' although 'we cannot know for sure: Even if U.S. hegemony were to end, however, 'this need not cause a systemic crisis of capitalism'. What may instead happen is a shift of economic power 'from the old West to the successfully developing Rest of the world, including most of Asia. This would result in a sharing of economic power between the United States, the European Union and (some of) the BRICS, as a consequence of which 'the capitalism of the medium term is likely to be more statist' (p. 86). Concerning 'capitalist markets' (pp. 86-7), Mann believes, pace Wallerstein, that there is still enough new land to conquer and enough demand to discover and invent, to allow for both extensive and intensive growth. Also, technological fixes may appear any time for all sorts of problems, and in any case it is the working class and revolutionary socialism, much more than capitalism, for which 'the end is nigh: In fact, if growth rates were to fall as predicted by some, the outcome might be a stable low-growth capitalism, with considerable ecological benefits. In this scenario, 'the future of the left is likely to be at most reformist social democracy or liberalism. Employers and workers will continue to struggle over the mundane injustices of capitalist employment [ ... ] and their likely outcome will be compromise and reform .. .' Still, Mann ends on a considerably less sanguine note, naming two big crises that he considers possible, and one of them probable - crises in which capitalism would go under although they would not be crises of capitalism, or of capitalism alone, since capitalism would only perish as a result of **the destruction of all human civilization**. One such scenario would be **nuclear war**, started by collective human irrationality, the other an ecological catastrophe resulting from 'escalating **climate change'**. In the latter case (pp. 93ff.), capitalism figures - together with the nation state and with 'citizen rights', defined as entitlements to unlimited consumption - as one of three 'triumphs of the modern period' that happen to be ecologically unsustainable. 'All three triumphs would have to be challenged for the sake of a rather abstract future, which is a very tall order, perhaps not achievable' (p. 95). While related to capitalism, ecological disaster would spring from 'a causal chain bigger than capitalism' (p. 97). However, 'policy decisions matter considerably', and 'humanity is in principle free to choose between better or worse future scenarios- and so ultimately the future is unpredictable' (p. 97). The most straightforward theory of capitalist crisis in the book is offered by Randall Collins (pp. 37-69) - a theory he correctly characterizes as a 'stripped-down version of (a] fundamental insight that Marx and Engels had formulated already in the 1840s' (p. 38). That insight, as adapted by Collins, is that capitalism is subject to 'a long-term structural weakness: namely 'the technological displacement of labor by machinery' (p. 37). Collins is entirely unapologetic for his strictly structuralist approach, even more structuralist than Wallerstein's, as well as his mono-factorial technological determinism. In fact, he is convinced that 'technological displacement of labor' will have finished capitalism, with or without revolutionary violence, **by the middle of this century** - earlier than it would be brought down by the, in principle, equally destructive and definitive ecological crisis, and more reliably than by comparatively difficult-to-predict financial bubbles. 'Stripped-down' Collins's late-Marxist structuralism is, among other things, because unlike Marx in his corresponding theorem of a secular decline of the rate of profit, Collins fails to hedge his prediction with a list of countervailing factors,' 3 as he believes capitalism to have run out of whatever saving graces may in the past have retarded its demise. Collins does allow for Mann's and Calhoun's non-Marxist, 'Weberian' influences on the course of history, but only as secondary forces modifying the way the fundamental structural trend that drives the history of capitalism from below will work itself out. Global unevenness of development, dimensions of conflict that are not capitalism-related, war and ecological pressures may or may not accelerate the crisis of the capitalist labour market and employment system; they cannot, however, suspend or avert it. What exactly does this crisis consist of? While labour has gradually been replaced by technology for the past two hundred years, with the rise of information technology and, in the very near future, artificial intelligence, that process is currently reaching its apogee, in at least two respects: first, it has vastly accelerated, and second, having in the second half of the twentieth century destroyed the manual working class, it is now attacking and about to destroy the middle class as well - in other words, the new petty bourgeoisie that is the very carrier of the neocapitalist and neoliberal lifestyle of 'hard work and hard play', of careerism-cum-consumerism, which, as will be discussed infra, may indeed be considered the indispensable cultural foundation of contemporary capitalism's society. What Collins sees coming is a rapid educational work by machinery intelligent enough even to design and create new, more advanced machinery. Electronicization will do to the middle class what mechanization has done to the working class, and it will do it much faster. The result will be **unemployment in the order of 50 to 70 per cent** by the middle of the century, hitting those who had hoped, by way of expensive education and disciplined job performance (in return for stagnant or declining wages), to escape the threat of redundancy attendant on the working classes. The benefits, meanwhile, will go to 'a tiny capitalist class of robot owners' who will become immeasurably rich. The drawback for them is, however, that they will increasingly find that their product 'cannot be sold because too few persons have enough income to buy it. Extrapolating this underlying tendency', Collins writes, 'Marx and Engels predicted the downfall of capitalism and its replacement with socialism' (p. 39), and this is what Collins also predicts. Collins's theory is most original where he undertakes to explain why technological displacement is only now about to finish capitalism when it had not succeeded in doing so in the past. Following in Marx's footsteps, he lists five 'escapes' that have hitherto saved capitalism from self-destruction, and then proceeds to show why they won't save it any more. They include the growth of new jobs and entire sectors compensating for employment losses caused by technological progress (employment in artificial intelligence will be miniscule, especially once robots begin to design and build other robots); the expansion of markets (which this time will primarily be labour markets in middle-class occupations, globally unified by information technology, enabling global competition among educated job seekers); the growth of finance, both as a source of income ('speculation') and as an industry (which cannot possibly balance the loss of employment caused by new technology, and of income caused by unemployment, also because computerization will make workers in large segments of the financial industry redundant); government employment replacing employment in the private sector (improbable because of the fiscal crisis of the state, and in any case requiring ultimately 'a revolutionary overturn of the property system' [p. 51]); and the use of education as a buffer to keep labour out of employment, making it a form of 'hidden Keynesian ism' while resulting in 'credential inflation' and 'grade inflation' (which for Collins is the path most probably taken, although ultimately it will prove equally futile as the others, as a result of demoralization within educational institutions and problems of financing, both public and private). **All five escapes closed**, there is no way society can prevent capitalism from causing accelerated displacement of labour and the attendant stark economic and social inequalities. Some sort of **socialism**, so Collins concludes, **will finally have to take capitalism's place**. What precisely it will look like, and what will come after socialism or with it, Collins leaves open, and he is equally agnostic on the exact mode of the transition. Revolutionary the change will be - but **whether it will be a violent social revolution** that will end capitalism or a **peaceful institutional revolution accomplished under political leadership** cannot be known beforehand. Heavy taxation of the super-rich for extended public employment or a guaranteed basic income for everyone, with equal distribution and strict rationing of very limited working hours by more or less dictatorial means a la Keynes' 4 - we are free to speculate on this as Collins's 'stripped-down Marxism' does not generate predictions as to what kind of society will emerge once capitalism will have run its course. **Only one thing is certain: that capitalism will end, and much sooner than one may have thought**. Something of an outlier in the book's suite of chapters is the contribution by Georgi Derluguian, who gives a fascinating inside account of the decline and eventual demise of Communism, in particular Soviet Communism (pp. 99-129). The chapter is of interest because of its speculations on the differences from and the potential parallels with a potential end of capitalism. As to the differences, Derluguian makes much of the fact that Soviet Communism was from early on embedded in the 'hostile geopolitics' (p. 110) of a 'capitalist world-system' ( 111). This linked its fate inseparably to that of the Soviet Union as an economically and strategically overextended multinational state. That state turned out to be unsustainable in the longer term, especially after the end of Stalinist despotism. By then the peculiar class structure of Soviet Communism gave rise to a domestic social compromise that, much unlike American capitalism, included political inertia and economic stagnation. The result was pervasive discontent on the part of a new generation of cultural, technocratic and scientific elites socialized in the revolutionary era of the late 1960s. Also, over-centralization made the state-based political economy of Soviet Communism vulnerable to regional and ethnic separatism, while the global capitalism surrounding it provided resentful opponents as well as opportunistic apparatchiks with a template of a preferable order, one in which the latter could ultimately establish themselves as self-made capitalist oligarchs. Contemporary capitalism, of course, is much less dependent on the geopolitical good fortunes of a single imperial state, although the role of the United States in this respect must not be underestimated. More importantly, capitalism is not exposed to pressure from an alternative political-economic model, assuming that Islamic economic doctrine will for a foreseeable future remain less than attractive even and precisely to Islamic elites (who are deeply integrated in the capitalist global economy). Where the two systems may, however, come to resemble each other is in their internal political disorder engendered by institutional and economic decline. When the Soviet Union lost its 'state integrity', Derluguian writes, this 'undermined all modern institutions and therefore disabled collective action at practically any level above family and crony networks. This condition became self-perpetuating' (p. 122). One consequence was that the ruling bureaucracies reacted 'with more panic than outright violence' when confronted by 'mass civic mobilizations like the 1968 Prague Spring and the Soviet perestroika at its height in 1989', while at the same time 'the insurgent movements ... failed to exploit the momentous disorganization in the ranks of dominant classes' (p. 129). For different reasons and under different circumstances, a similar weakness of collective agency, due to de-institutionalization and creating comparable uncertainty among both champions and challengers of the old order, might shape a future transition from capitalism to post-capitalism, pitting against each other fragmented social movements on the one hand and disoriented political-economic elites on the other. My own view builds on all five contributors but differs from each of them. I take the diversity of theories on what all agree is a severe crisis of capitalism and capitalist society as an indication of contemporary capitalism having entered a period of deep indeterminacy - a period in which unexpected things can happen any time and knowledgeable observers can legitimately disagree on what will happen, due to long-valid causal relations having become historically obsolete. In other words, I interpret the coexistence of a shared sense of crisis with diverging concepts of the nature of that crisis as an indication that **traditional economic** and sociological **theories have today lost much of their predictive power**. As I will point out in more detail, below, I see this as a result, but also as a cause, of a destruction of collective agency in the course of capitalist development, equally affecting Wallerstein's Davos and Porto Alegre people and resulting in a social context beset with unintended and unanticipated consequences of purposive, but in its effects increasingly unpredictable, social action. '5 Moreover, rather than picking one of the various scenarios of the crisis and privilege it over the others, I suggest that they all, or most of them, may be aggregated into a diagnosis of **multi-morbidity** in which **different disorders coexist and**, more often than not, **reinforce each other**. Capitalism, as pointed out at the beginning, was always a fragile and improbable order and for its survival depended on ongoing repair work. Today, however, **too many frailties have become simultaneously acute** while **too many remedies have been exhausted** or destroyed. **The end of capitalism** can then be imagined as a **death from a thousand cuts**, or from a multiplicity of infirmities each of which will be all the more untreatable as all will demand treatment at the same time. As will become apparent, **I do not believe that any of the potentially stabilizing forces** mentioned by Mann and Calhoun, be it regime pluralism, regional diversity and uneven development, political reform, or independent crisis cycles, **will be strong enough to neutralize** the syndrome of **accumulated weaknesses** that characterize contemporary capitalism. No effective opposition being left, and no practicable successor model waiting in the wings of history, capitalism's accumulation of defects, alongside its accumulation of capital, may be seen, with Collins, '6 as an **entirely endogenous dynamic of self-destruction**, following an evolutionary logic moulded in its expression but not suspended by contingent and coincidental events, along a historical trajectory from early liberal via state-administered to neoliberal capitalism, which culminated for the time being in the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath. For the decline of capitalism to continue, that is to say, no revolutionary alternative is required, and certainly no masterplan of a better society displacing capitalism. Contemporary capitalism is vanishing on its own, **collapsing from internal contradictions**, and not least as a result of having vanquished its enemies - who, as noted, have often rescued capitalism from itself by forcing it to assume a new form. What comes after capitalism in its final crisis, now under way, is, I suggest, not socialism or some other defined social order, but a lasting interregnum - no new world system equilibrium ala Wallerstein, but a prolonged period of social entropy, or disorder (and precisely for this reason a period of uncertainty and indeterminacy). It is an interesting problem for sociological theory whether and how a society can turn for a significant length of time into less than a society, a post-social society as it were, or a society lite, until it may or may not recover and again become a society in the full meaning of the term. ' 7 I suggest that one can attain a conceptual fix on this by drawing liberally on a famous article by David Lockwood'' to distinguish between system integration and social integration, or integration at the macro and micro levels of society. An interregnum would then be defined as a breakdown of system integration at the macro level, depriving individuals at the micro level of institutional structuring and collective support, and shifting the burden of ordering social life, of providing it with a modicum of security and stability, to individuals themselves and such social arrangements as they can create on their own. A society in interregnum, in other words, would be a de-institutionalized or under-institutionalized society, one in which expectations can be stabilized only for a short time by local improvisation, and which for this very reason is essentially ungovernable. Contemporary capitalism, then, would appear to be a society whose system integration is critically and irremediably weakened, so that the continuation of capital accumulation - for an intermediate period of uncertain duration - becomes solely dependent on the opportunism of collectively incapacitated individualized individuals, as they struggle to protect themselves from looming accidents and structural pressures on their social and economic status. Undergoverned and undermanaged, the social world of the post-capitalist interregnum, in the wake of neoliberal capitalism having cleared away states, governments, borders, trade unions and other moderating forces, can at any time be hit by disaster; for example, **bubbles imploding** or **violence penetrating from a collapsing periphery into the centre**. With individuals deprived of collective defences and left to their own devices, what remains of a social order hinges on the motivation of individuals to cooperate with other individuals on an ad hoc basis, driven by fear and greed and by elementary interests in individual survival. Society having lost the ability to provide its members with effective protection and proven templates for social action and social existence, individuals have only themselves to rely on while social order depends on the weakest possible mode of social integration, Zweckrationalitiit. As pointed out in Chapter 1 of this book, and partly elaborated in the rest of this introduction, I anchor this condition in a variety of interrelated developments, such as **declining growth** intensifying **distributional conflict**; the rising **inequality** that results from this; **vanishing macroeconomic manageability**, as manifested in, among other things, steadily growing indebtedness, a pumped-up money supply; and the ever-present possibility of another **economic breakdown**;'9 the suspension of post-war capitalism's engine of social progress, democracy, and the associated rise of **oligarchic rule**; the **dwindling capacity of governments** and the systemic inability of governance to limit the commodification of labour, nature and money; the omnipresence of **corruption** of all sorts, in response to intensified competition in winner-take-all markets with unlimited opportunities for self-enrichment; the erosion of public infrastructures and collective benefits in the course of commodification and privatization; the **failure** after 1989 of capitalism's host nation, the United States, to build and maintain a **stable global order**; etc., etc. These and other developments, I suggest, have resulted in widespread cynicism governing economic life, for a long time if not **forever ruling out a recovery of normative legitimacy for capitalism** as a just society offering equal opportunities for individual progress- a legitimacy that capitalism would need to draw on in critical moments - and founding social integration on collective resignation as the last remaining pillar of the capitalist social order, or disorder. 20

#### The alternative is to affirm the Communist party using dual power strategies. This debate is a question of the speed, scope, and scale of revolutionary strategy. Only dual power organizing builds institutions that meet the material needs of community, building a revolutionary base in the face of compounding crises of climate change, imperialism, and fascism.

Escalante, 19 [Alyson Escalante, Marxism, Radical Feminism, Continental Philosophy, 3-26-2019, "Communism and Climate Change: A Dual Power Approach," Regeneration Magazine, accessed 9-17-2021, https://regenerationmag.org/communism-and-climate-change-a-dual-power-approach/] //AD

I have previously argued that a crucial advantage to dual power strategy is that it gives the masses an infrastructure of socialist institutions which can directly provide for material needs in times of capitalist crisis. Socialist agricultural and food distribution programs can take ground that the capitalist state cedes by simultaneously meeting the needs of the masses while proving that socialist self-management and political institutions can function independently of capitalism. This approach is not only capable of literally saving lives in the case of crisis, but of demonstrating the possibility of a revolutionary project which seeks to destroy rather than reform capitalism. One of the most pressing of the various crises which humanity faces today is climate change. Capitalist production has devastated the planet, and everyday we discover that the small window of time for avoiding its most disastrous effects is shorter than previously understood. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that we have 12 years to limit (not even prevent) the more catastrophic effects of climate change. The simple, and horrific, fact that we all must face is that climate change has reached a point where many of its effects are inevitable, and we are now in a **post-brink world**, where damage control is the primary concern. The question is not whether we can escape a future of climate change, but whether we can survive it. Socialist strategy must adapt accordingly. In the face of this crisis, the democratic socialists and social democrats in the United States have largely settled on market based reforms. The Green New Deal, championed by Alexandria Ocasio Cortez and the left wing of the Democratic Party, remains a thoroughly capitalist solution to a capitalist problem. The proposal does nothing to challenge capitalism itself, but rather seeks to subsidize market solutions to reorient the US energy infrastructure towards renewable energy production, to develop less energy consuming transportation, and the development of public investment towards these ends. **The plan does nothing to call into question the profit incentives and endless resource consumption of capitalism which led us to this point**. Rather, it seeks to reorient the relentless market forces of capitalism towards slightly less destructive technological developments. While the plan would lead to a massive investment in the manufacturing and deployment of solar energy infrastructure, National Geographic reports that, “Fabricating [solar] panels **requires caustic chemicals** such as sodium hydroxide and hydrofluoric acid, and **the process uses water as well as electricity**, the production of which **emits greenhouse gases**.” Technology alone cannot sufficiently combat this crisis, as the production of such technology through capitalist manufacturing infrastructure **only perpetuates environmental harm**. Furthermore, subsidizing and incentivizing renewable energy stops far short of actually combating the fossil fuel industry driving the current climate crisis. The technocratic market solutions offered in the Green New Deal fail to adequately combat the driving factors of climate change. What is worse, they rely on a violent imperialist global system in order to produce their technological solutions. The development of high-tech energy infrastructure and the development of low or zero emission transportation requires the import of raw material and rare earth minerals which the United States can only access because of the imperial division of the Global South. This imperial division of the world requires constant militarism from the imperial core nations, and as Lenin demonstrates in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, facilitates **constant warfare** as imperial states compete for **spheres of influence** in order to facilitate cheap resource extraction. The US military, one of many imperialist forces, is the single largest user of petroleum, and one of its main functions is to ensure oil access for the United States. Without challenging this imperialist division of the world and the role of the United States military in upholding it, the Green New Deal fails even further to challenge the underlying causes of climate change. Even with the failed promises of the Green New Deal itself, it is unlikely that this tepid market proposal will pass at all. Nancy Pelosi and other lead Democrats have largely condemned it and consider it “impractical” and “unfeasible.” This dismissal is crucial because it reveals the total inability of capitalism to resolve this crisis. If the center-left party in the heart of the imperial core sees even milquetoast capitalist reforms as a step too far, we ought to have very little hope that a reformist solution will present itself within the ever shrinking 12 year time frame. There are times for delicacy and there are times for bluntness, and we are in the latter. To put things bluntly: the capitalists are not going to save us, and if we don’t find a way to save ourselves, the collapse of human civilization is a real possibility. The pressing question we now face is: **how are we going to save ourselves?** Revolution and Dual Power If capitalism will not be able to resolve the current encroaching climate crisis, we must find a way to organize outside the confines of capitalist institutions, towards the end of overthrowing capitalism. If the Democratic Socialists of America backed candidates cannot offer real anti-capitalist solutions through the capitalist state, we should be skeptical of the possibility for any socialist organization doing so. The DSA is far larger and far more well funded than any of the other socialist organizations in the United States, and they have failed to produce anything more revolutionary than the Green New Deal. We have to abandon the idea that electoral strategy will be sufficient to resolve the underlying causes of this crisis within 12 years. While many radicals call for revolution instead of reform, the reformists often raise the same response: revolution is well and good, but what are you going to do in the mean time? In many ways this question is fair. The socialist left in the United States today is not ready for revolutionary action, and a mass base does not exist to back the various organizations which might undertake such a struggle. Revolutionaries must concede that we have much work to be done before a revolutionary strategy can be enacted. This is a hard truth, but it is true. Much of the left has sought to ignore this truth by embracing adventurism and violent protest theatrics, in the vain hope of sparking revolutionary momentum which does not currently exist. If this is the core strategy of the socialist left, **we will accomplish nothing in the next 12 years**. Such approaches are as useless as the opportunist reforms pushed by the social democrats. Our task in these 12 years is not simply to arm ourselves and hope that magically the masses will wake up prepared for revolution and willing to put their trust in our small ideological cadres. We must instead, build a movement, and with it we must build infrastructure which can survive revolution and provide a framework for socialist development. Dual power is tooled towards this project best. The Marxist Center network has done an impressive amount of work developing socialist institutions across the US, largely through tenants organizing and serve the people programs. The left wing factions within the DSA itself have also begun to develop mutual aid programs that could be useful for dual power strategy. At the same time, mutual aid is not enough. We cannot simply build these institutions as a reform to make capitalism more survivable. Rather, we must make these institutions part of a broader revolutionary movement and they ought to function as a material prefiguration to a socialist society and economy. The institutions we build as dual power outside the capitalist state today ought to be structured towards revolutionary ends, such that they will someday function as the early institutions of a revolutionary socialist society. To accomplish this goal, we cannot simply declare these institutions to be revolutionary. Rather they have to be linked together through an actual revolutionary movement working towards revolutionary ends. This means that dual power institutions cannot exist as ends in and of themselves, nor can abstract notions of mutual aid cannot be conceptualized as an end in itself. The explicit purpose of these institutions has to be to radicalize the masses through meeting their needs, and providing an infrastructure for a socialist movement to meet the needs of its members and the communities in which it operates. Revolutionary institutions that can provide food, housing, and other needs for a revolutionary movement will be crucial for building a base among the masses and for constructing the beginnings of a socialist infrastructure for when we eventually engage in revolutionary struggle.

### 3

#### We can describe this condition as cruel optimism, an attachment to a possibility that is ultimately impossible or harmful. Sustaining fantasies of social transformation requires an intimate, proximate affective attachment, which debate conveniently provides to judges in the form of teams, but only at the cost of the detached apathy that explains how easily we pack up and do it all over again next round.

Berlant 11 [Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, *Cruel Optimism*, Routledge: Duke University Press, 2011, p. 33-6]

When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us. **This** cluster of promises **could be embedded in a** person**, a thing, an** institution**, a** text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, **a good idea -** whatever. To phrase 'the object of desire' as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what's incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as **proximity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises**, some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. In other words, all attachments are optimistic**. That does not mean that they** all **feel optimistic**: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent's typical misrecognition. **But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form**. In optimism, the subject leans toward promises contained within the present moment of the encounter with their object.' **'Cruel optimism' names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility** whose realisation is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic. What's cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, **is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though** its presence threatens their well-being**, because whatever the content of the** attachment **is, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject's sense of** what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject's desire to temporise an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object. One more thing: **the cruelty of an optimistic attachment is**, I think, usually **something an analyst observes about someone's** or some group's **attachment** to x, **since usually** that attachment exists without being an event, or even better, seems to lighten the load for someone/some group.^ But **if the cruelty of an attachment is experienced by someone**/some group, even in disavowed fashion, **the fear is that the loss of the object**/scene of promising itself **will defeat the capacity to have any hope about anything**. Often this fear of loss of a scene of optimism as such is unstated and only experienced in a sudden incapacity to manage startling situations, as we will see below. One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are problematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about what cluster of desires and affects we can manage to keep magnetised to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one's attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself. But some scenes of optimism are clearly crueller than others: **where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalising** or animating **potency of an object**/ scene **of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place**. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, working for a living, patriotism, all kinds of things. **One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one's attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire**/attrition. This means that a poetics of attachment always involves some splitting off of the story I can tell about wanting to be near x (as though x has autonomous qualities) from the activity of the emotional habitus I have constructed by having x in my life in order to be able to project out my endurance as proximity to the complex of what x seems to offer and proffer. **To understand cruel optimism**, therefore, **one must embark on** an analysis of rhetorical indirection, as **a way of thinking about the strange temporalities of projection into** an enabling object that is also disabling. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson's work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indirection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, **in a performance of fantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because this object is something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I'll describe a bit the shape of my transference with her thought**. In 'Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion,' which will be my key referent bere, Johnson tracks the political consequences of apostrophe for what has become foetal personhood: a silent, affectively present but physically displaced interlocutor (a lover, a foetus) is animated in speech as distant enough for a conversation but close enough to be imaginable by the speaker in whose head the entire scene is happening.' But **the condition of projected possibility**, of a hearing that cannot take place in the terms of its enunciation ('you' are not here, 'you' are eternally belated to the conversation with you that I am imagining) **creates a** fake present moment of intersubjectivity **in which, nonetheless, a performance of address can take place. The present moment is made possible by the fantasy** of you, **laden with the** x **qualities I can project** onto you, given your convenient absence. Apostrophe therefore appears to be a reaching out to a you, a direct movement from place x to y, but it is actually a turning back**, an animating of a receiver on behalf of the desire to make something happen now that realises something in the speaker**, makes the speaker more or differently possible, because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, as, and to, two: but only under **the** condition, and **illusion**, that the two is really (in) one. Apostrophe **is thus an indirect, unstable, physically impossible but phenomenologically vitalising movement of rhetorical animation that permits subjects to suspend themselves in the optimism of a potential occupation of the same psychic space of others, the objects of desire who make you possible** (by having some promising qualities, but also by not being there).'' Later work, such as on 'Muteness Envy,' elaborates Johnson's description of the gendered rhetorical politics of this projection of voluble intersubjectivity.'^ The paradox remains that **the conditions of the lush submerging of one consciousness into another require a double negation: of the speaker's boundaries**, so s/he can grow bigger in rhetorical proximity to the object of desire; **and of the spoken of, who is** more or less **a** powerful mute **placeholder providing an opportunity for the speaker's imagination**

of her/his/their flourishing. Of course **psychoanalytically speaking** all intersubjectivity is impossible**. It is a** wish, a **desire**, and a demand for an enduring sense of being with and in x, and is related to that big knot **that marks the indeterminate relation between a feeling of recognition and misrecognition** - recognition is the misrecognition you can bear, **a transaction that affirms you** without, again, necessarily feeling good or accurate (it might idealise, **it might affirm your monstrosity**, it might mirror your desire to be nothing enough to live under the radar, it might feel just right, and so on).'' Johnson's work on projection shows that scenes of impossible identity, rhetorically rendered, open up meaning and knowledge by mining the negative - projective, boundary dissolving - spaces of attachment to the object of address who must be absent in order for the desiring subject of intersubjectivity to get some traction, to stabilise her proximity to the object/scene of promise. In free indirect discourse, a cognate kind of suspension, the circulation of this kind of merged and submerged observational subjectivity, has less pernicious outcomes, at least when Johnson reads Zora Neale Hurston's practice of it.' In a narrator's part-merging with a character's consciousness, say, free indirect discourse performs the impossibility of locating an observational intelligence in one or any body, and therefore forces the reader to transact a different, more open relation of unfolding to what she is reading, judging, being, and thinking she understands. In Jobnson's work such a transformative transaction through reading/speaking 'unfolds' the subject in a good way, despite whatever desires they may have not to become significantly different." In short, **Johnson's work on projection is about the optimism of attachment**, and is often itself optimistic about the negations and extensions of personhood that forms of suspended intersubjectivity demand from the reader. What follows is not so buoyant: this is an essay politicising Freud's observation that 'people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them'.^ It comes from a longer project about the politics, aesthetics, and projections of political depression. Political depression **persists in affective judgments of the world's intractability** - evidenced in affectlessness, apathy, coolness, cynicism, and so on - **modes of what might be called detachment that are really not detached at all but** constitute ongoing relations of sociality**.'" The politically depressed position is manifested in the problem of** the difficulty of detaching from life-building modalities that can no longer be said to be doing their work, andwhich indeed make obstacles to the desires that animate them; my archive tracks practices of self-interruption, self-suspension, and self-abeyance that indicate people's struggles to change, but not traumatically, the terms of value in which their life-making activity has been cast." **Cruel optimism is**, then, like all phases, a deictic, a phrase that points to a proximate location: as **an analytic lever** it is an incitement to inhabit and **to track the** affective **attachment to what we call 'the good life,'** which is for so many a bad life that wears out the subjects who nonetheless, and at the same time, find their conditions of possibility within it**.** My assumption is that **the conditions of ordinary life** in the contemporary world even of relative wealth, as in the US, **are conditions of the** attrition or the **wearing out of the subject**, and that the irony - that the labour of reproducing life in the contemporary world is also the activity of being worn out by it - has specific implications for thinking about the ordinariness of suffering, the violence of normativity, and the 'technologies of patience' or lag that enable a concept of the later to suspend questions of the cruelty of the now.'^ **Cruel optimism is** in this sense **a concept pointing toward a mode of lived imminence**, one that grows from a perception about **the reasons people** are not Bartlehy, do not prefer to interfere with varieties of immiseration, but **choose to ride the wave of the system of attachment that they are used to, to syncopate with it, or to be held in a relation of reciprocity, reconciliation, or resignation that does not mean defeat by it**. Or perhaps they move to normative form to get numb with the consensual promise, **and** to **misrecognise that** promise **as an achievement**. This essay traverses three episodes of suspension - from John Ashhery, Charles Johnson, and Ceoff Ryman - of the reproduction of habituated or normative life. These suspensions open up revelations about the promises that had clustered as people's objects of desire, stage moments of exuberance in the impasse near the normal, and provide tools for suggesting why these exuberant attachments keep ticking not like the time bomb they might be but like a white noise machine that provides assurance that what seems like static really is, after all, a rhythm people can enter into while they're dithering, tottering, bargaining, testing, or otherwise being worn out by the promises that they have attached to in this world.

#### Instead we must refuse the politics of liberalism and its accompanying economization of injury and suffering—our politics does not ignore the violence of the world, but rather refuses those particular representations and values which frame violence in favor of a politics of sensuous life.

Abbas ’10 /Asma, Professor and Division Head in Social Studies, Political Science, Philosophy at the Liebowitz Center for International Studies at Bard College at Simon’s Rock, Liberalism and Human Suffering: Materialist Reflections on Politics, Ethics, and Aesthetics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. Pg. 183 - 187/

In Martha Nussbaum’s celebration of cosmopolitanism, the familiar move of the invocation of the worst sufferings of mankind is bound to shut up and line everyone else in submission, not to the pain of others (as it may appear), but more fundamentally to iterations of who I am as one who suffers, as one who responds to suffering, and as one troubled by each of those questions rather than having settled them.47 Nussbaum or Shklar, in their philosophical commitments to different metaphysics (even in explicit noncommitments to metaphysics), do not even consider that their invocation of events of unimaginable suffering as cautionary tales for all of humanity is beholden to the sublime in ways complicit with liberalism’s political economy of suffering. In being so, they inadvertently evacuate the political in favor of some formalistic ethical certitude that may carry its own violent obliterations, dysfunctionalizing political judgment in submission to ethical judgments already made for us. The ethicization of discourse on suffering, and the submission to the violence of violence, is a parallel to the death of the political. Similarly, as long as the aesthetic follows this logic—that representation is unethical and violent in nature and that we must somehow leave it behind—it will be limited in its vision, unable to see the deep and necessary ontological connection between suffering and representation. Beyond considering aesthetics at play in the artistry of rights and interests that privileges the Western scopic and rhetoricist regimes, the aesthetic must be seen as more closely derived from aisthesis (perception from the senses). The resulting essential, ontic, and experiential proximity to suffering may allow us to radically reimagine our subjection to injuries, interests, and rights. The elements of a historical materialism of suffering introduced over the course of this chapter—necessity, hope, and a materialist sensuous ethos—reconsider woundedness and victimhood in order to illuminate the multiplicity of relations that are, and can be, had to our own and others’ suffering. They expose the presumptions and certainties regarding the imperatives suffering poses for sufferers that codify a basic distance from suffering and an inability to insinuate the question of suffering in our comportments, orientations, and internal relations of simultaneity to the world. A righteous or tolerant pluralism of sufferings, enacted wounds, and relations to our own and others’ suffering is not my objective here. One only has to consider, to build to a different end, how the judgments, actions, and reactions of many among us cannot help but reject consolations that come from codified knowledges and certitudes, such as those pertaining to what suffering is, how we must despise it, and how we must fix it. Then, one only has to question the imperatives these knowledges and certitudes pose for all of us, and examine the utilitarian charm of the beguiling tragedy of “powerless” institutions and other conscriptions of sympathy, empathy, voice, and desire for a markedly different world. This may involve not giving liberal institutions or fervent recruiters of various marginalities the power to set the terms of honoring the suffering and hope of others, and not giving them the power to corner our pathos, in a moment of ethical noblesse, by emphasizing how another’s suffering is impenetrable and unknowable. As much as this ethical noblesse upholds the letting be of the other, it is a preservation, first and foremost, of oneself—perversely reminiscent of the confusing touch-me-not of the Christ back from the dead, a Christ whose triumph over death ironically inspires entire cultures built on surplus fear, suffering, and death as offerings for those with terminal senses but endless lives (often the courtesy of the same historical cryogenics). It is imperative to reject both the righteous or tolerant pluralism of sufferings and the touch-me-not version of seemingly other-centered politics in favor of seeing our sufferings and our labors as coconstitutive of the world we inhabit. What would it mean, as Louis puts it to the Rabbi, to “incorporate sickness into one’s sense of how things are supposed to go,” to convoke a politics that is “good with death” but asks for “more life”? Perhaps the sufferer not be incidental to the suffering when suffering is defined as a problem only in the terms we can pretend to solve, only to fail at that, too. Perhaps liberal politics should accept that statistics of diseases, mortalities, and morbidities, calculated in terms of the loss in human productivity, on the one hand, and those of prison populations and philanthropic gifts, on the other, are not graceful confessions of its mastery of suffering or death. It is not that there are no sufferings to be named, interpreted, and tended to. However, it is important to remember that this is not a random, altruistic, or unmediated process, and it benefits those with the agency and position to act on another’s suffering. Perhaps politics should be able to speak to, and for, the reserve army of those with abject, yet-to-be-interpreted-and-recompensed sufferings, and those who have no ability to be injured outside of the terms native to liberal capitalist discourse. Perhaps politics can diverge from its reliance on certain frames of suffering in order to address the ubiquity and ordinariness of human tragedy and suffering. Perhaps, still, if politics is concerned with the creation and maintenance of forms of life, then the activities of this making, when they negotiate with the past, present, and future, necessitate a look at the way old and new wounds are enacted in order to yield forms that are different. Ultimately, perhaps liberalism’s colonization of suffering, and its moral dominion over it, needs to be resisted and loosened. Questioning the forms in which we suffer and are told to do so is not the same as altogether questioning the reality or centrality of suffering and our responsibility to it. The ways in which we suffer tell us what we need and do not need, what our bodies can and cannot bear. Politics must be pushed to engineer the passing of certain forms of suffering, not the passing of suffering altogether. The claim to having nailed the problem of suffering becomes suspect when politics learns from suffering not via the question of justice but, more immediately, as it responds to the suffering that is life; when it is urgent to understand those ways of suffering that do not follow liberal logics; when attending to bodies who suffer, remember, and act out of their wounds differently is extremely necessary; when the question of the suffering of action is inseparable from the actions of the suffering; when our experience of the world and its ethical, political, and aesthetic moments is not prior to or outside of justice, but constitutive of it; and when the need to understand necessity, the lack of choice, and the ordinariness of tragedy is part of the same story as the clumsiness of our responses to grand disaster. This is an offering toward a politics that is not modeled on the liberal, capitalist, and colonizing ideals of healthy agents who are asked to live diametrically across from the pole of victimhood. Such an approach would factor in the material experiences of destruction, tragedy, violence, defeat, wounds, memory, hope, and survival that risk obliteration even by many well-meaning victim-centered politics. The imagining of such a politics is not merely premised on suffering as something to be undone. Rather, it holds on to the ability to suffer as something to be striven for, grasped anew, and salvaged from the arbitrary dissipations imposed on it by global powers who not only refuse to take responsibility for the plight that they have every role in creating and locating but also shamelessly arbitrate how the wounded can make their suffering matter. Modern schemes for solving the problem of human suffering succumb to their own hubris, even as they set the terms of joy and sorrow, love and death, life and hope, salvation and freedom, that those subject to these schemes ought to have a role in determining. Maybe these schemes have no relevance to those who suffer abjectly, or maybe the latter have lost their senses living among the dead who tyrannize us and the dead who beseech us. It is time that we confront the nauseating exploitations and self-affirming decrepitude of Western liberal capitalist arbitrations of where suffering must live and where it must die—these moralities keep themselves alive and ascendant by always invoking their choice exceptions, fixating on those marginal relations to suffering and life signified in the savage acts of, say blowing up one’s own and others’ bodies, often regarded as savage for no other reason than their violation of some silly rational choice maxim. There are many other exceptions that confront these dominations, not the least of which are the forms of acculturations, past and present, that see the realm of ethics as deeper and richer than the space of individual moralities acted out. Similarly, some of these exceptions to learn from hold and honor suffering as an inherently social act, as a welcome burden to carry with and for each other. If it is indeed the case that the world is so because the colonized have not stopped regurgitating, then the incipient fascisms in the metropoles today ought to make us wonder whether our problem as people of this world is not that there is not enough liberalism, but that, at best, liberalism is insufficient, and, at worst, it is complicit. Perhaps the majority of the world needs a politics that is material enough to speak to, and with, their silences, their pain, their losses, their defeats, their victories, their dispensabilities, their mutilations, their self-injuries, their fidelities, their betrayals, their memories, their justice, their humor, and their hope. At stake in such an imagining is nothing less than the possibility of newer forms of joy, desire, hope, and life itself.

## Case

### framework

#### The ROB is to vote for the better debater – anything else is arbitrary and self-serving

#### Prefer:

#### Checks side bias on frameworks – ie allows comparison of affirmative versus negative debate instead of hyper focus on one

#### Allows nuanced turn debates – if we win a turn on a case, we should still win the debate

#### Their framework would deck negative ground – we would only be able to run methodologies that they allow us to have

#### Most predictable – offense defense related while theirs is infinitely regressive

#### Their framework is cruel optimism – their fantasies associated with creating change in fabric order means they link harder to the berlant k

### Case

#### AT Newman – we aren’t a state bad k – we are a CAPITALISTIC STATE bad K – that’s escalante

#### AT Transition wars - Transition won’t be violent – elites will be de-empowered, which eliminates backlash, and Cuba as an empiric disproves. It transitioned after the oil crisis to a 100% self-sufficient, localized economy. Also transition wars inevitable, we are already at the end of this epoch of capitalism – streeck 1nc

#### **Postcolonialism mystifies the role of capitalism in creating the foundation of European power and denies the structural analysis necessary for collective resistance.**

Dirlik, PhD in History from the University of Rochester and professor of history at Duke University, 1994

(Arif, *Critical Inquiry,* “The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism,” Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 338-356, Winter 1994, jstor)

Postcolonialism's repudiation of structure and totality in the name of history ironically ends up not in an affirmation of historicity but in a self-referential, universalizing historicism that reintroduces through the back door an unexamined totality; it projects globally what are but local experiences. The problem here may be the problem of all historicism without a sense of structure. Without a web of translocal relationships, it is impossible to determine what is different, heterogeneous, and local. In his critique of "essentializing" procedures (of India, of the Third World), Prakash offers as a substitute an understanding of these categories in terms of "relationships" but does not elaborate on what these relationships might be. The critique of an essentialist fixing of the Third World is not novel; Carl E. Pletsch's eloquent critique of three worlds theory (without the aid of postcoloniality), published a decade ago, enunciated clearly the problem of ideological essentializing in modernization theory.25 Nor is Prakash's conceptual "innovation"-relationships-truly new. Pletsch himself pointed to global relationships as part of the concep- tual underpinnings of modernization theory as well as to their importance in understanding problems of development, and an understanding of modern global history in terms of relationships, needless to say, is the crucial thesis of world-system analysis. The difference between world-system analysis and Prakash's post-foundational understanding of relationships is Prakash's rejection of foundational categories, chief among them, capitalism. What O'Hanlon and Washbrook say on this issue is worth quoting at some length: What [Prakash's] position leaves quite obscure is what status exactly this category of "capitalist modernity" occupies for him. If our strategy should be to "refuse" it in favour of marginal histories, of multiple and heterogeneous identities, this suggests that capitalist modernity is nothing more than a potentially disposable fiction, held in place simply by our acceptance of its cognitive categories and values. Indeed, Prakash is particularly disparaging of Marxist and social historians' concern with capitalism as a "system"of political economy and coercive instrumentalities. Yet in other moments Prakash tells us that history's proper task is to challenge precisely this "homogenization of the world by contemporary capitalism." If this is so, and there is indeed a graspable logic to the way in which modern capital- ism has spread itself globally, how are we to go about the central task of comprehending this logic in the terms that Prakash suggests cause to recognize them would make his postfoundational history unten- able (see "PC,"pp. 13-14). Fernando Coronil outlines the political consequences of the postcolonialist repudiation of metanarratives in his observation that such opposition "produces disjointed mininarratives which reinforce dominant worldviews; reacting against determinisms, it presents free-floating events; refusing to fix identity in structural categories, it essentializes identity through difference; resisting the location of power in structures or institutions, it diffuses it throughout society and ultimately dissolves it."''26It also relieves "self-defined minority or subaltern critics," O'Hanlon and Washbrook note, of the necessity of "doing what they constantly demand of others, which is to historicise the conditions of their own emergence as authoritative voices-conditions which could hardly be described without reference of some kind to material and class relations" ("AO,"pp. 165-66). Finally, the postcolonial repudiation of the Third World is intimately linked with the repudiation of capitalism's structuring of the modern world. Once again, essentialism serves as a straw man, diverting attention from radical conceptualizations of the Third World that are not essentialist but relational, as in world-system approaches. Rather than fixing it ahistorically, as Prakash would have it, the world-system approach com- prehends the Third World as a structural position within a capitalist world order, a position that changes with changing structural relationships. To be sure, world-system analysis, like one based on modernization, locates the Third World discursively, but, as I have argued above, so does postcolonialist analysis. The question then becomes how well competing discourses account for historical changes in "global relationships and the oppositional practices to which they point. I will say more on the former below. As for oppositional practices, postcoloniality by its very logic permits little beyond local struggles and, since it makes no reference to structure or totality, directionless ones at that. For all its contradictions, Shohat writes, "'Third World' usefully evokes structural commonalities of struggles. The invocation of the 'Third World' implies a belief that the shared history of neocolonialism and internal racism form sufficient common ground for alliances among ... diverse peoples. If one does not believe or envision such commonalities, then indeed the term 'Third World' should be discarded" ("NP,"p. 111). The denial of capitalism's foundational status also reveals a culturalism in the postcolonialist argument that has important ideological consequences. This involves the issue of Eurocentrism. Without capitalism as the foundation for European power and the motive force of its globaliza- tion, Eurocentrism would have been just another ethnocentrism (comparable to any other ethnocentrism from the Chinese and the Indian to the most trivial tribal solipsism). An exclusive focus on Eurocentrism as a cultural or ideological problem that blurs the power relationships that dynamized it and endowed it with hegemonic persuasiveness fails to explain why, in contrast to regional or local ethnocentrisms, this particular ethnocentrism was able to define modern global history and itself as the universal aspiration and end of that history. By throwing the cover of culture over material relationships, as if the one had little to do with the other, such a focus diverts criticism of capitalism to the criticism of Eurocentric ideology, which not only helps postcolonialism disguise its own ideological limitation but also, ironically, provides an alibi for inequality, exploitation, and oppression in their modern guises under capitalist relationships. The postcolonialist argument projects upon the past the same mystification of the relationship between power and culture that is characteristic of the ideology of global capitalism of which it is a product.

## Condo good

#### Conditionality --- it’s good

#### Interp – negatives may run 2 conditional advocacies

#### 1] It’s most logical --- the role of the neg is to prove the Aff bad, while the Aff should prove that they’re optimal. Every counterplan establishes an opportunity cost to the plan --- any limit on that is arbitrary – this also proves you should judge kick if the squo is better than the counterplan

#### 2] Key to neg flex --- they set the terms of debate and know the plan better than us, so multiple options ensures the neg doesn’t auto lose after the 2AC

#### 4] Reasonability --- competing interps leads to substance crowd-out by letting minor infractions end the debate – don’t vote AFF if we didn’t make debate impossible it’s only 3 off and case

#### 3] Skews inevitable – speed, card quality, coaching, or topic imbalances all make debate harder – they haven’t proven that we structurally skewed the debate any more