### 1

#### A] Interpretation: The aff must disclose cases on the 2020-2021 NDCA wiki at least 30 minutes before the round.

#### B] Violation: They don’t disclose, and I checked at 10:00. I have screenshots.

Graphical user interface, text, application, Word

Description automatically generated

#### C] Standards —

#### 1] Quality engagement—disclosure allows in-depth preparation before the round which checks back against unpredictable positions and allows debaters to effectively write case negs and blocks—allows for reciprocal engagement where each side has an equal opportunity to prepare as opposed to scouting capacity to determine success, and incentivizes in-depth debates which is key to clash and good topic education. Clash is key to education because it forces in depth discussion and analysis about the topic

#### 2] Reciprocity—the majority of national circuit buys into disclosure and put stuff on the wiki. They get access to cites and cards for cases and prep, which improves quality ground and means they can predict what other people are running, but we can’t predict them. This outweighs—a) every reason disclosure is good is an advantage for them and not me, b) view their counter-interp with a grain of salt since it’s self-serving. Reciprocity key to fairness—ensures equal access to the ballot.

#### 3] Academic Ethics— Full disclosure deters mis-cutting, card-clipping, power-tagging, abuse of brackets and ellipses, and plagiarism—independent voter for academic honesty—it’s a real-world norm and debate loses educational value if we can just make up cards.

#### Use competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time.

#### Fairness is a voter – debate is a competitive activity and needs both debaters to be on an equal playing field argumentatively.

#### Education is a voter – debate is a school funded activity and there for our educational benefit.

#### No RVIs--the neg should reasonably have the ability to test whether or not the aff is abusive. Not all shells are yes/no and the neg doesn’t know the quality of the 1ar because the aff has infinite prep which means RVIs chill reasonable theory arguments, proliferating abuse and destroy substantive education by making the entire debate about theory post-1ac

### 2

#### Interpretation: The aff must defend that member nations of the WTO reduce intellectual property protections for all medicines

#### Violation: They specify specific countries

#### The upward entailment test and adverb test determine the genericity of a bare plural

Leslie and Lerner 16 [Sarah-Jane Leslie, Ph.D., Princeton, 2007. Dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy. Served as the vice dean for faculty development in the Office of the Dean of the Faculty, director of the Program in Linguistics, and founding director of the Program in Cognitive Science at Princeton University. Adam Lerner, PhD Philosophy, Postgraduate Research Associate, Princeton 2018. From 2018, Assistant Professor/Faculty Fellow in the Center for Bioethics at New York University. Member of the [Princeton Social Neuroscience Lab](http://psnlab.princeton.edu/).] “Generic Generalizations.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. April 24, 2016. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/> TG

1. Generics and Logical Form

In English, generics can be expressed using a variety of syntactic forms: bare plurals (e.g., “tigers are striped”), indefinite singulars (e.g., “a tiger is striped”), and definite singulars (“the tiger is striped”). However, none of these syntactic forms is dedicated to expressing generic claims; each can also be used to express existential and/or specific claims. Further, some generics express what appear to be generalizations over individuals (e.g., “tigers are striped”), while others appear to predicate properties directly of the kind (e.g., “dodos are extinct”). These facts and others give rise to a number of questions concerning the logical forms of generic statements.

1.1 Isolating the Generic Interpretation

Consider the following pairs of sentences:

(1)a.Tigers are striped.

b.Tigers are on the front lawn.

(2)a.A tiger is striped.

b.A tiger is on the front lawn.

(3)a.The tiger is striped.

b.The tiger is on the front lawn.

The sentence pairs above are prima facie syntactically parallel—both are subject-predicate sentences whose subjects consist of the same common noun coupled with the same, or no, article. However, the interpretation of first sentence of each pair is intuitively quite different from the interpretation of the second sentence in the pair. In the second sentences, we are talking about some particular tigers: a group of tigers in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), some individual tiger in ([2b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex2b)), and some unique salient or familiar tiger in ([3b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex3b))—a beloved pet, perhaps. In the first sentences, however, we are saying something general. There is/are no particular tiger or tigers that we are talking about.

The second sentences of the pairs receive what is called an existential interpretation. The hallmark of the existential interpretation of a sentence containing a bare plural or an indefinite singular is that it may be paraphrased with “some” with little or no change in meaning; hence the terminology “existential reading”. The application of the term “existential interpretation” is perhaps less appropriate when applied to the definite singular, but it is intended there to cover interpretation of the definite singular as referring to a unique contextually salient/familiar particular individual, not to a kind.

There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) does not entail that animals are striped, but ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995).

Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.)

#### It applies to “member countries” – adding “generally” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because the res never specified further

#### Vote negative:

#### 1] Precision – they justify arbitrarily mooting words in the resolution at their own whim in order to justify some potentially good interp.

#### Semantics outweighs:

#### [a] Lexical priority – it doesn’t matter if their interp if the debate is not pertinent i.e. it might me more educational for me to study for AP physics, outweighs since the topic constrains what pragmatics are relevant.

#### 2] Limits and ground – their model allows affs to defend any medicine which explodes neg prep bc theres an infinite amount I can’t prepare for, like covid-19 vaccines, influenza, common colds, Marijuana, etc. and they all bracket out different DA’s

#### 3] TVA: Read a whole res aff with the same advantage

### 3

#### Interp and Violation: the affirmative must defend the member nations of the world trade organization – they don’t even know if they do

#### WTO is an international trading organization

WTO ND [World Trade Organization, ND, "WTO," accessed 9-17-2021, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/inbrief\_e/inbr\_e.htm] //kn

In brief, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only international organization dealing with the global rules of trade. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible

#### standards:

#### Predictability - there a ton of countrie sthat arent in the wto means – they can no link out of args and pick and choose countries with no lit base

#### Limits and ground: key to specs and counter

#### Topic education -– in-depth discussion of the topic requires a clear understanding of what it means – lets us get into the policy details of what the plan would do and how states would react to it – otherwise all ed is trapped at the surface-level.

#### voter for fairness and education

use competing interps

### 4

#### Capitalism created international law to spread capitalism. Any agreements on an international level by countries comes with it expanding their interest to other parties yet large power players can disregard those same laws as there is an unequal relationship between states, altering how institutional organizations function

Chimni 17 (“Towards an Integrated Marxist Approach to International Law (IMAIL) In International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches (pp. 440-550). by B.S. Chimni (Legal scholar, Distinguished Professor of International Law at Jindal Global Law School and served on the Academic Advisory Committee of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 96-00) ambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781107588196.009) 0:43

First, he noted that ‘the spread and development of international law occurred on the basis of the spread and development of the capitalist mode of production’. 109 That is to say, ‘the victory of the bourgeoisie, in all the European countries, had to lead to the establishment of new rules and new institutions of international law which protected the general and basic interests of the bourgeoisie, i.e., bourgeois property’. 110 But Pashukanis recognized that while ‘as a separate force which set itself off from society, the state only finally emerged in the modern capitalist bourgeois period’ it by no means followed that ‘the contemporary forms of international legal intercourse, and the individual institutions of international law, only arose in the most recent times’. 111 Since exchange relations existed among tribes and communities, international law was prevalent among the earliest ancient legal institutions that existed. In this period international law helped resolve disputes, including territorial disputes, between tribes. 112 In these contexts Pashukanis went on to touch upon developments in Greek and Roman law. 113 However, he emphasized that it is only in the capitalist period ‘having subordinated itself to the state machine, the bourgeoisie brought the principle of the public nature of authority to its clearest expression’, and therefore ‘the state only fully becomes the subject of international law as the bourgeois state ’. 114 In the same way as an individual assumed the quality of a legal subject only under capitalism, the state becomes the subject of international law only as a capitalist state.

Second, responding to the eternal question as to whether international law is law, Pashukanis noted that ‘bourgeois jurisprudence has devoted a great amount of fruitless effort in solving this contradiction’. 115 According to Pashukanis, the answer to the question whether international law is law lies in – here he anticipates classical realists like Hans Morgenthau – ‘the real balance of forces’ between bourgeois states. 116 He, of course, recognized that ‘within the limit set by a given balance of forces, separate questions may be decided by compromises and by exchange i.e., on the basis of law’. 117 But international law was likely to be disregarded when the interests of a state so demanded. 118 This was especially so in periods of crisis when the balance of forces ‘fluctuated seriously’ and when ‘vital interests’ or the ‘very existence of a state’ was threatened. 119 Pashukanis mentioned in this regard the period of 1914– 1918  ‘during which both sides continuously violated international law’. 120 However, he went on to make the acute observation that ‘every state in violating international law also tries to depict the matter as if there has been no violation whatsoever’. 121 The reason is that ‘the open denial of international law is politically unprofitable for the bourgeoisie since it exposes them to the masses and thus hinders preparations for new wars. It is much more profitable for the imperialists to act in the guise of pacifism and as the champions of international law’. 122

Third, Pashukanis rejected technical definitions of international law advanced by bourgeois international lawyers from which ‘the class character of international law’ was absent. 123 In his view, ‘bourgeois jurisprudence consciously or unconsciously strives to conceal the element of class’. 124 On his part he noted the links between capitalism and imperialism, and inter- imperialist competition, and observed that the capitalist countries divided the world into civilized and semi- civilized revealing ‘modern international law as the class law of the bourgeoisie ’. 125 According to Pashukanis, international law of his times was ‘the totality of norms which the capitalist bourgeois states apply in their relations with each other, while the remainder of the world is considered as a simple object of their completed transactions’. 126 Pashukanis was certainly right as ‘the real historical content of international law’ in this period was ‘the struggle between capitalist states’. 127 In fact international law owed ‘its existence to the fact that the bourgeoisie exercise(d) its domination over the proletariat and over the colonial countries’. 128 It was therefore indeed the class law of the bourgeoisie.

Fourth, he noted with respect to the assertion of basic or equal rights of states under international law that ‘it is most obvious that we are dealing here with ideas drawn from the sphere of civil law relationships with a basis in equality between the parties’. 129 He conceded that ‘to a certain degree the analogy may be extended. Bourgeois private law assumes that subjects are formally equal yet simultaneously permits real inequality in property, while bourgeois international law in principle recognizes that states have equal rights yet in reality they are unequal in their signifi-cance and their power’. 130 Therefore, at the level of political economy there was only ‘a difference in degree’ between domestic law and international law. 131 But he also went on to observe that the ‘dubious benefits of formal equality are not enjoyed at all by those nations which have not developed capitalist civilization and which engage in international intercourse not as subjects, but as objects of the imperialist states’ colonial policy’. 132 In other words, he recognized that in the instance of colonized states the analogy between domestic law and international law collapsed.

Fifth, he criticized Marxist scholars such as Karl Renner for stressing the ‘peaceful functions of international law’. 133 Pashukanis pointed out that ‘even those agreements between capitalist states which appear to be directed to the general interest are, in fact, for each of the participants a means of jealously protecting their particular interests, preventing the expansion of their rivals’ influence, thwarting unilateral conquest, i.e., in another form continuing the same struggle which will exist for as long as capitalist competition exists’. 134 He extended this logic to international organizations and wrote that ‘the struggle among imperialist states for domination of the rest of the world is thus a basic factor in defining the nature and fate of the corresponding institutions’. 135

#### Pandemics like COVID and environmental destruction are symptoms of capitalism that cannot be reformed away

Eds. 8/20 [Eds., 8-1-2020, " COVID-19, capitalism and climate," MR Online, accessed 9-29-2020, https://mronline.org/2020/08/01/covid-19-capitalism-and-climate/?utm\_source=rss&amp;utm\_medium=rss&amp;utm\_campaign=covid-19-capitalism-and-climate] //YBKN

Because while COVID-19 is ravaging humanity planet-wide, it is merely a symptom of the real underlying disease of capitalism. The profit motive drives capitalists to dominate “the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere.” Scientists have identified nine planetary boundaries for a livable planet: ozone depletion, biodiversity loss and extinctions, Chemical pollution, Climate Change, Ocean acidification, Freshwater consumption, Land system change, Nitrogen and phosphorus flows to the biosphere and oceans and Atmospheric aerosol loading. In a few hundred years of capitalist domination of the world, all nine have been or are in danger of being crossed. Geographer Jason Moore put it this way: “Capitalist production does not have an epidemiology so much as it is an epidemiology”. Fighting for reforms that can help people, preserve the environment and contribute to better outcomes is not optional. Socialists who help organize to win struggles from below in workplaces, schools and communities against the system build confidence in the ability of ordinary people to change the world, and aim to organize the movement. But ultimately, we can’t reform a system whose logic is to pursue every possible profitable enterprise, regardless of what it does to the health of animals and the natural environment or human beings. It is a system that will produce new killer pandemics along with the food we eat.

It is a system that rewards the cutting down of the Amazon Rainforest, the earth’s lungs, to produce more meat that we don’t need. It is a system that will allow oil companies to extract every drop from the earth despite the fact that this will surely make the planet unliveable for humans and many other species. It is a system that controls, tortures and kills Black and Indigenous people and justifies it with racist mythologies to keep the profits going. The power to change the system lies with the working class, the overwhelming majority. But to lead a working class of millions we urgently need a revolutionary party comprised of the most class conscious elements linking the struggles against the system together and fighting for unity against racist, sexist, homophobic and transphobic divisions. The IS makes no pretense of being a mass party, but remains committed to the task of building such a revolutionary party in so-called Canada

#### Cap causes extinction – nuclear war, environmental destruction, and social inequality. The collapse will come by 2050 and cause extinction absent radical recalibration.

Streeck 16.(Wolfgang, Emeritus Director of the Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, *How Will Capitalism End?: Essays on a Failing System*, p. 1-15)

Capitalism has always been an improbable social formation, full of conflicts and contradictions, therefore **permanently unstable** and in flux, and highly conditional on historically contingent and precarious supportive as well as constraining events and institutions. Capitalist society may be described in shorthand as a 'progressive' society in the sense of Adam Smith 1 and the enlightenment, a society that has coupled its 'progress' to the continuous and unlimited production and accumulation of productive capital, effected through a conversion, by means of the invisible hand of the market and the visible hand of the state, of the private vice of material greed into a public benefit.' Capitalism promises **infinite growth** of commodified material wealth in a finite world, by conjoining itself with modern science and technology, making capitalist society the first industrial society, and through unending expansion of free, in the sense of contestable, risky markets, on the coat-tails of a hegemonic carrier state and its market -opening policies both domestically and internationally. 3 As a version of industrial society, capitalist society is distinguished by the fact that its collective productive capital is accumulated in the hands of a minority of its members who enjoy the legal privilege, in the form of rights of private property, to dispose of such capital in any way they see fit, including letting it sit idle or transferring it abroad. One implication of this is that the vast majority of the members of a capitalist society must work under the direction, however mediated, of the private owners of the tools they need to provide for themselves, and on terms set by those owners in line with their desire to maximize the rate of increase of their capital. Motivating non-owners to do so- to work hard and diligently in the interest of the owners - requires artful devices - sticks and carrots of the most diverse sorts that are never certain to function - that have to be continuously reinvented as capitalist progress continuously renders them obsolescent. The tensions and contradictions within the capitalist political-economic configuration make for an ever-present possibility of structural breakdown and social crisis. Economic and social stability under modern capitalism must be secured on a background of systemic restlessness4 produced by competition and expansion, a difficult balancing act with a constantly uncertain outcome. Its success is contingent on, among other things, the timely appearance of a new technological paradigm or the development of social needs and values complementing changing requirements of continued economic growth. For example, for the vast majority of its members, a capitalist society must manage to convert their ever-present fear of being cut out of the productive process, because of economic or technological restructuring, into acceptance of the highly unequal distribution of wealth and power generated by the capitalist economy and a belief in the legitimacy of capitalism as a social order. For this, highly complicated and inevitably fragile institutional and ideological provisions arc necessary. The same holds true for the conversion of insecure workers - kept insecure to make them obedient workers - into confident consumers happily discharging their consumerist social obligations even in the face of the fundamental uncertainty oflabour markets and employment.' In light of the inherent instability of modern societies founded upon and dynamically shaped by a capitalist economy, it is small wonder that theories of capitalism, from the time the concept was first used in the early 1800s in Germany" and the mid-1800s in England/ were always also theories of crisis. This holds not just for Marx and Engels but also for writers like Ricardo, Mill, Sombart, Keynes, Hilferding, Polanyi and Schumpeter, all of whom expected one way or other to see the end of capitalism during their lifetime." What kind of crisis was expected to finish capitalism off differed with time and authors' theoretical priors; structuralist theories of death by overproduction or underconsumption, or by a tendency of the rate of profit to fall (Marx), coexisted with predictions of saturation of needs and markets (Keynes), of rising resistance to further commodification oflife and society (Polanyi), of exhaustion of new land and new labour available for colonization in a literal as well as figurative sense (Luxemburg), of technological stagnation (Kondratieff), financial-political organization of monopolistic corporations suspending liberal markets (Hilferding), bureaucratic suppression of entrepreneurialism aided by a worldwide trahison des clercs (Weber, Schumpeter, Hayek) etc., etc." While none of these theories came true as imagined, most of them were not entirely false either. In fact, the history of modern capitalism can be written as a succession of crises that capitalism survived only at the price of deep transformations of its economic and social institutions, saving it from bankruptcy in unforeseeable and often unintended ways. Seen this way, that the capitalist order still exists may well appear less impressive than that it existed so often on the brink of collapse and had continuously to change, frequently depending on contingent exogenous supports that it was unable to mobilize endogenously. The fact **that capitalism has**, until now, **managed to outlive all predictions of its impending death, need not mean that it will forever be able to do so**;

there is no inductive proof here, and we cannot rule out the possibility that, **next time**, whatever cavalry capitalism may require for its rescue may fail to show up. A short recapitulation of the history of modern capitalism serves to illustrate this point. 10 Liberal capitalism in the nineteenth century was confronted by a revolutionary labour movement that needed to be politically tamed by a complex combination of repression and co-optation, including democratic power sharing and social reform. In the early twentieth century, capitalism was commandeered to serve national interests in international wars, thereby converting it into a public utility under the planning regimes of a new war economy, as private property and the invisible hand of the market seemed insufficient for the provision of the collective capacities countries needed to prevail in international hostilities. After the First World War, restoration of a liberal-capitalist economy failed to produce a viable social order and had to give way in large parts of the industrial world to either Communism or Fascism, while in the core countries of what was to become 'the West' liberal capitalism was gradually succeeded, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, by Keynesian, state-administered capitalism. Out of this grew the democratic welfare-state capitalism of the three post-war decades, with hindsight the only period in which economic growth and social and political stability, achieved through democracy, coexisted under capitalism, at least in the OECD world where capitalism came to be awarded the epithet, 'advanced'. In the 1970s, however, what had with hindsight been called the 'post-war settlement' of social-democratic capitalism began to disintegrate, gradually and imperceptibly at first but increasingly punctuated by successive, ever more severe crises of both the capitalist economy and the social and political institutions embedding, that is, supporting as well as containing it. This was the period of both intensifying crisis and deep transformation when 'late capitalism', as impressively described by Werner Sombart in the 1920s, 11 gave way to neoliberalism. Crisis Theory Redux Today, after the watershed of the financial crisis of 2008, critical and indeed crisis-theoretical reflection on the prospects of capitalism and its society is again en vogue. Does Capitalism Have a Future? is the title of a book published in 2013 by five outstanding social scientists: Immanuel Wallerstein, Randall Collins, Michael Mann, Georgi Derluguian and Craig Calhoun. Apart from the introduction and the conclusion, which are collectively authored, the contributors present their views in separate chapters, and this could not be otherwise since they differ widely. Still, all five share the conviction that, as they state in the introduction, 'something big looms on the horizon: a structural crisis much bigger than the recent Great Recession, which might in retrospect seem only a prologue to a period of deeper troubles and transformations: 12 On what is causing this crisis, however, and how it will end, there is substantial disagreement- which, with authors of this calibre, may be taken as a sign of the multiple uncertainties and possibilities inherent in the present condition of the capitalist political economy. To give an impression of how leading theorists may differ when trying to imagine the future of capitalism today, I will at some length review the prospects and predictions put forward in the book. A comparatively conventional crisis theory is probably the one offered by Wallerstein (pp. 9-35), who locates contemporary capitalism at the bottom of a Kondratieff cycle (Kondratieff B) with no prospect of a new (Kondratieff A) upturn. This is said to be due to a 'structural crisis' that began in the 1970s, as a result of which 'capitalists may no longer find capitalism rewarding'. Two broad causes are given, one a set of long-term trends 'ending the endless accumulation of capital', the other the demise, after the 'world revolution of 1968', of the 'dominance of centrist liberals of the geoculture' (p. 21 ). Structural trends include the exhaustion of virgin lands and the resulting necessity of environmental repair work, growing resource shortages, and the increasing need for public infrastructure. All of this costs money, and so does the pacification of a proliferating mass of discontented workers and the unemployed. Concerning global hegemony, Wallerstein points to what he considers the final decline of the U.S.-centred world order, in military and economic as well as ideological terms. Rising costs of doing business combine with global disorder to make restoration of a stable capitalist world system impossible. Instead Wallerstein foresees 'an ever-tighter gridlock of the system. Gridlock will in turn result in ever-wilder fluctuations, and will consequently make short-term predictions - both economic and political - ever more unreliable. And this in turn will aggravate ... popular fears and alienation. It is a negative cycle' (p. 32). For the near future Wallerstein expects a global political confrontation between defenders and opponents of the capitalist order, in his suggestive terms: between the forces of Davos and of Porto Alegre. Their final battle 'about the successor system' (p. 35) is currently fomenting. Its outcome, according to Wallerstein, is unpredictable, although 'we can feel sure that one side or the other will win out in the coming decades, and a new reasonably stable world-system (or set of world-systems) will be established: Much less pessimistic, or less optimistic from the perspective of those who would like to see capitalism dose down, is Craig Calhoun, who finds prospects of reform and renewal in what he, too, considers a deep and potentially final crisis (pp. 131-61). Calhoun assumes that there is still time for political intervention to save capitalism, as there was in the past, perhaps with the help of a 'sufficiently enlightened faction of capitalists' (p. 2). But he also believes 'a centralized socialist economy' to be possible, and even more so 'Chinese-style state capitalism': 'Markets can exist in the future even while specifically capitalist modes of property and finance have declined' (p. 3). Far more than Wallerstein, Calhoun is reluctant when it comes to prediction (for a summary of his view see pp. 158-61 ). His chapter offers a list of internal contradictions and possible external disruptions threatening the stability of capitalism, and points out a wide range of alternative outcomes. Like Wallerstein, Calhoun attributes particular significance to the international system, where he anticipates the emergence of a plurality of more or less capitalist political-economic regimes, with the attendant problems and pitfalls of coordination and competition. While he does not rule out a 'large-scale, more or less simultaneous collapse of capitalist markets ... not only bringing economic upheaval but also upending political and social institutions' (p. 161), Calhoun believes in the possibility of states, corporations and social movements re-establishing effective governance for a transformative renewal of capitalism. To quote, The capitalist order is a very large-scale, highly complex system. The events of the last forty years have deeply disrupted the institutions that kept capitalism relatively well organized through the postwar period. Efforts to repair or replace these will change the system, just as new technologies and new business and financial practices may. Even a successful renewal of capitalism will transform it ... The question is whether change will be adequate to manage systemic risks and fend off external threats. And if not, will there be widespread devastation before a new order emerges? (p. 161) Even more agnostic on the future of capitalism is Michael Mann ('The End May Be Nigh, But for Whom?: pp. 71-97). Mann begins by reminding his readers that in his 'general model of human society', he does 'not conceive of societies as systems but as multiple, overlapping networks of interaction, of which four networks - ideological, economic, military and political power relations - are the most important. Geopolitical relations can be added to the four .. : Mann continues: Each of these four or five sources of power may have an internal logic or tendency of development, so that it might be possible, for example, to identify tendencies toward equilibrium, cycles, or contradictions within capitalism, just as one might identify comparable tendencies within the other sources of social power. (p. 72) Interactions between the networks, Mann points out, are frequent but not systematic, meaning that 'once we admit the importance of such interactions we are into a more complex and uncertain world in which the development of capitalism, for example, is also influenced by ideologies, wars and states' (p. 73). Mann adds to this the possibility of uneven development across geographical space and the likelihood of irrational behaviour interfering with rational calculations of interest, even of the interest in survival. To demonstrate the importance of contingent events and of cycles other than those envisaged in the Wallerstein-Kondratieff model of history, Mann discusses the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession of 2008. He then proceeds to demonstrate how his approach speaks to the future, first of U.S. hegemony and second of 'capitalist markets'. As to the former, Mann (pp. 83-4) offers the standard list of American weaknesses, both domestic and international, from economic decline to political anomy to an increasingly less effective military- weaknesses that 'might bring America down' although 'we cannot know for sure: Even if U.S. hegemony were to end, however, 'this need not cause a systemic crisis of capitalism'. What may instead happen is a shift of economic power 'from the old West to the successfully developing Rest of the world, including most of Asia. This would result in a sharing of economic power between the United States, the European Union and (some of) the BRICS, as a consequence of which 'the capitalism of the medium term is likely to be more statist' (p. 86). Concerning 'capitalist markets' (pp. 86-7), Mann believes, pace Wallerstein, that there is still enough new land to conquer and enough demand to discover and invent, to allow for both extensive and intensive growth. Also, technological fixes may appear any time for all sorts of problems, and in any case it is the working class and revolutionary socialism, much more than capitalism, for which 'the end is nigh: In fact, if growth rates were to fall as predicted by some, the outcome might be a stable low-growth capitalism, with considerable ecological benefits. In this scenario, 'the future of the left is likely to be at most reformist social democracy or liberalism. Employers and workers will continue to struggle over the mundane injustices of capitalist employment [ ... ] and their likely outcome will be compromise and reform .. .' Still, Mann ends on a considerably less sanguine note, naming two big crises that he considers possible, and one of them probable - crises in which capitalism would go under although they would not be crises of capitalism, or of capitalism alone, since capitalism would only perish as a result of **the destruction of all human civilization**. One such scenario would be **nuclear war**, started by collective human irrationality, the other an ecological catastrophe resulting from 'escalating **climate change'**. In the latter case (pp. 93ff.), capitalism figures - together with the nation state and with 'citizen rights', defined as entitlements to unlimited consumption - as one of three 'triumphs of the modern period' that happen to be ecologically unsustainable. 'All three triumphs would have to be challenged for the sake of a rather abstract future, which is a very tall order, perhaps not achievable' (p. 95). While related to capitalism, ecological disaster would spring from 'a causal chain bigger than capitalism' (p. 97). However, 'policy decisions matter considerably', and 'humanity is in principle free to choose between better or worse future scenarios- and so ultimately the future is unpredictable' (p. 97). The most straightforward theory of capitalist crisis in the book is offered by Randall Collins (pp. 37-69) - a theory he correctly characterizes as a 'stripped-down version of (a] fundamental insight that Marx and Engels had formulated already in the 1840s' (p. 38). That insight, as adapted by Collins, is that capitalism is subject to 'a long-term structural weakness: namely 'the technological displacement of labor by machinery' (p. 37). Collins is entirely unapologetic for his strictly structuralist approach, even more structuralist than Wallerstein's, as well as his mono-factorial technological determinism. In fact, he is convinced that 'technological displacement of labor' will have finished capitalism, with or without revolutionary violence, **by the middle of this century** - earlier than it would be brought down by the, in principle, equally destructive and definitive ecological crisis, and more reliably than by comparatively difficult-to-predict financial bubbles. 'Stripped-down' Collins's late-Marxist structuralism is, among other things, because unlike Marx in his corresponding theorem of a secular decline of the rate of profit, Collins fails to hedge his prediction with a list of countervailing factors,' 3 as he believes capitalism to have run out of whatever saving graces may in the past have retarded its demise. Collins does allow for Mann's and Calhoun's non-Marxist, 'Weberian' influences on the course of history, but only as secondary forces modifying the way the fundamental structural trend that drives the history of capitalism from below will work itself out. Global unevenness of development, dimensions of conflict that are not capitalism-related, war and ecological pressures may or may not accelerate the crisis of the capitalist labour market and employment system; they cannot, however, suspend or avert it. What exactly does this crisis consist of? While labour has gradually been replaced by technology for the past two hundred years, with the rise of information technology and, in the very near future, artificial intelligence, that process is currently reaching its apogee, in at least two respects: first, it has vastly accelerated, and second, having in the second half of the twentieth century destroyed the manual working class, it is now attacking and about to destroy the middle class as well - in other words, the new petty bourgeoisie that is the very carrier of the neocapitalist and neoliberal lifestyle of 'hard work and hard play', of careerism-cum-consumerism, which, as will be discussed infra, may indeed be considered the indispensable cultural foundation of contemporary capitalism's society. What Collins sees coming is a rapid educational work by machinery intelligent enough even to design and create new, more advanced machinery. Electronicization will do to the middle class what mechanization has done to the working class, and it will do it much faster. The result will be **unemployment in the order of 50 to 70 per cent** by the middle of the century, hitting those who had hoped, by way of expensive education and disciplined job performance (in return for stagnant or declining wages), to escape the threat of redundancy attendant on the working classes. The benefits, meanwhile, will go to 'a tiny capitalist class of robot owners' who will become immeasurably rich. The drawback for them is, however, that they will increasingly find that their product 'cannot be sold because too few persons have enough income to buy it. Extrapolating this underlying tendency', Collins writes, 'Marx and Engels predicted the downfall of capitalism and its replacement with socialism' (p. 39), and this is what Collins also predicts. Collins's theory is most original where he undertakes to explain why technological displacement is only now about to finish capitalism when it had not succeeded in doing so in the past. Following in Marx's footsteps, he lists five 'escapes' that have hitherto saved capitalism from self-destruction, and then proceeds to show why they won't save it any more. They include the growth of new jobs and entire sectors compensating for employment losses caused by technological progress (employment in artificial intelligence will be miniscule, especially once robots begin to design and build other robots); the expansion of markets (which this time will primarily be labour markets in middle-class occupations, globally unified by information technology, enabling global competition among educated job seekers); the growth of finance, both as a source of income ('speculation') and as an industry (which cannot possibly balance the loss of employment caused by new technology, and of income caused by unemployment, also because computerization will make workers in large segments of the financial industry redundant); government employment replacing employment in the private sector (improbable because of the fiscal crisis of the state, and in any case requiring ultimately 'a revolutionary overturn of the property system' [p. 51]); and the use of education as a buffer to keep labour out of employment, making it a form of 'hidden Keynesian ism' while resulting in 'credential inflation' and 'grade inflation' (which for Collins is the path most probably taken, although ultimately it will prove equally futile as the others, as a result of demoralization within educational institutions and problems of financing, both public and private). **All five escapes closed**, there is no way society can prevent capitalism from causing accelerated displacement of labour and the attendant stark economic and social inequalities. Some sort of **socialism**, so Collins concludes, **will finally have to take capitalism's place**. What precisely it will look like, and what will come after socialism or with it, Collins leaves open, and he is equally agnostic on the exact mode of the transition. Revolutionary the change will be - but **whether it will be a violent social revolution** that will end capitalism or a **peaceful institutional revolution accomplished under political leadership** cannot be known beforehand. Heavy taxation of the super-rich for extended public employment or a guaranteed basic income for everyone, with equal distribution and strict rationing of very limited working hours by more or less dictatorial means a la Keynes' 4 - we are free to speculate on this as Collins's 'stripped-down Marxism' does not generate predictions as to what kind of society will emerge once capitalism will have run its course. **Only one thing is certain: that capitalism will end, and much sooner than one may have thought**. Something of an outlier in the book's suite of chapters is the contribution by Georgi Derluguian, who gives a fascinating inside account of the decline and eventual demise of Communism, in particular Soviet Communism (pp. 99-129). The chapter is of interest because of its speculations on the differences from and the potential parallels with a potential end of capitalism. As to the differences, Derluguian makes much of the fact that Soviet Communism was from early on embedded in the 'hostile geopolitics' (p. 110) of a 'capitalist world-system' ( 111). This linked its fate inseparably to that of the Soviet Union as an economically and strategically overextended multinational state. That state turned out to be unsustainable in the longer term, especially after the end of Stalinist despotism. By then the peculiar class structure of Soviet Communism gave rise to a domestic social compromise that, much unlike American capitalism, included political inertia and economic stagnation. The result was pervasive discontent on the part of a new generation of cultural, technocratic and scientific elites socialized in the revolutionary era of the late 1960s. Also, over-centralization made the state-based political economy of Soviet Communism vulnerable to regional and ethnic separatism, while the global capitalism surrounding it provided resentful opponents as well as opportunistic apparatchiks with a template of a preferable order, one in which the latter could ultimately establish themselves as self-made capitalist oligarchs. Contemporary capitalism, of course, is much less dependent on the geopolitical good fortunes of a single imperial state, although the role of the United States in this respect must not be underestimated. More importantly, capitalism is not exposed to pressure from an alternative political-economic model, assuming that Islamic economic doctrine will for a foreseeable future remain less than attractive even and precisely to Islamic elites (who are deeply integrated in the capitalist global economy). Where the two systems may, however, come to resemble each other is in their internal political disorder engendered by institutional and economic decline. When the Soviet Union lost its 'state integrity', Derluguian writes, this 'undermined all modern institutions and therefore disabled collective action at practically any level above family and crony networks. This condition became self-perpetuating' (p. 122). One consequence was that the ruling bureaucracies reacted 'with more panic than outright violence' when confronted by 'mass civic mobilizations like the 1968 Prague Spring and the Soviet perestroika at its height in 1989', while at the same time 'the insurgent movements ... failed to exploit the momentous disorganization in the ranks of dominant classes' (p. 129). For different reasons and under different circumstances, a similar weakness of collective agency, due to de-institutionalization and creating comparable uncertainty among both champions and challengers of the old order, might shape a future transition from capitalism to post-capitalism, pitting against each other fragmented social movements on the one hand and disoriented political-economic elites on the other. My own view builds on all five contributors but differs from each of them. I take the diversity of theories on what all agree is a severe crisis of capitalism and capitalist society as an indication of contemporary capitalism having entered a period of deep indeterminacy - a period in which unexpected things can happen any time and knowledgeable observers can legitimately disagree on what will happen, due to long-valid causal relations having become historically obsolete. In other words, I interpret the coexistence of a shared sense of crisis with diverging concepts of the nature of that crisis as an indication that **traditional economic** and sociological **theories have today lost much of their predictive power**. As I will point out in more detail, below, I see this as a result, but also as a cause, of a destruction of collective agency in the course of capitalist development, equally affecting Wallerstein's Davos and Porto Alegre people and resulting in a social context beset with unintended and unanticipated consequences of purposive, but in its effects increasingly unpredictable, social action. '5 Moreover, rather than picking one of the various scenarios of the crisis and privilege it over the others, I suggest that they all, or most of them, may be aggregated into a diagnosis of **multi-morbidity** in which **different disorders coexist and**, more often than not, **reinforce each other**. Capitalism, as pointed out at the beginning, was always a fragile and improbable order and for its survival depended on ongoing repair work. Today, however, **too many frailties have become simultaneously acute** while **too many remedies have been exhausted** or destroyed. **The end of capitalism** can then be imagined as a **death from a thousand cuts**, or from a multiplicity of infirmities each of which will be all the more untreatable as all will demand treatment at the same time. As will become apparent, **I do not believe that any of the potentially stabilizing forces** mentioned by Mann and Calhoun, be it regime pluralism, regional diversity and uneven development, political reform, or independent crisis cycles, **will be strong enough to neutralize** the syndrome of **accumulated weaknesses** that characterize contemporary capitalism. No effective opposition being left, and no practicable successor model waiting in the wings of history, capitalism's accumulation of defects, alongside its accumulation of capital, may be seen, with Collins, '6 as an **entirely endogenous dynamic of self-destruction**, following an evolutionary logic moulded in its expression but not suspended by contingent and coincidental events, along a historical trajectory from early liberal via state-administered to neoliberal capitalism, which culminated for the time being in the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath. For the decline of capitalism to continue, that is to say, no revolutionary alternative is required, and certainly no masterplan of a better society displacing capitalism. Contemporary capitalism is vanishing on its own, **collapsing from internal contradictions**, and not least as a result of having vanquished its enemies - who, as noted, have often rescued capitalism from itself by forcing it to assume a new form. What comes after capitalism in its final crisis, now under way, is, I suggest, not socialism or some other defined social order, but a lasting interregnum - no new world system equilibrium ala Wallerstein, but a prolonged period of social entropy, or disorder (and precisely for this reason a period of uncertainty and indeterminacy). It is an interesting problem for sociological theory whether and how a society can turn for a significant length of time into less than a society, a post-social society as it were, or a society lite, until it may or may not recover and again become a society in the full meaning of the term. ' 7 I suggest that one can attain a conceptual fix on this by drawing liberally on a famous article by David Lockwood'' to distinguish between system integration and social integration, or integration at the macro and micro levels of society. An interregnum would then be defined as a breakdown of system integration at the macro level, depriving individuals at the micro level of institutional structuring and collective support, and shifting the burden of ordering social life, of providing it with a modicum of security and stability, to individuals themselves and such social arrangements as they can create on their own. A society in interregnum, in other words, would be a de-institutionalized or under-institutionalized society, one in which expectations can be stabilized only for a short time by local improvisation, and which for this very reason is essentially ungovernable. Contemporary capitalism, then, would appear to be a society whose system integration is critically and irremediably weakened, so that the continuation of capital accumulation - for an intermediate period of uncertain duration - becomes solely dependent on the opportunism of collectively incapacitated individualized individuals, as they struggle to protect themselves from looming accidents and structural pressures on their social and economic status. Undergoverned and undermanaged, the social world of the post-capitalist interregnum, in the wake of neoliberal capitalism having cleared away states, governments, borders, trade unions and other moderating forces, can at any time be hit by disaster; for example, **bubbles imploding** or **violence penetrating from a collapsing periphery into the centre**. With individuals deprived of collective defences and left to their own devices, what remains of a social order hinges on the motivation of individuals to cooperate with other individuals on an ad hoc basis, driven by fear and greed and by elementary interests in individual survival. Society having lost the ability to provide its members with effective protection and proven templates for social action and social existence, individuals have only themselves to rely on while social order depends on the weakest possible mode of social integration, Zweckrationalitiit. As pointed out in Chapter 1 of this book, and partly elaborated in the rest of this introduction, I anchor this condition in a variety of interrelated developments, such as **declining growth** intensifying **distributional conflict**; the rising **inequality** that results from this; **vanishing macroeconomic manageability**, as manifested in, among other things, steadily growing indebtedness, a pumped-up money supply; and the ever-present possibility of another **economic breakdown**;'9 the suspension of post-war capitalism's engine of social progress, democracy, and the associated rise of **oligarchic rule**; the **dwindling capacity of governments** and the systemic inability of governance to limit the commodification of labour, nature and money; the omnipresence of **corruption** of all sorts, in response to intensified competition in winner-take-all markets with unlimited opportunities for self-enrichment; the erosion of public infrastructures and collective benefits in the course of commodification and privatization; the **failure** after 1989 of capitalism's host nation, the United States, to build and maintain a **stable global order**; etc., etc. These and other developments, I suggest, have resulted in widespread cynicism governing economic life, for a long time if not **forever ruling out a recovery of normative legitimacy for capitalism** as a just society offering equal opportunities for individual progress- a legitimacy that capitalism would need to draw on in critical moments - and founding social integration on collective resignation as the last remaining pillar of the capitalist social order, or disorder. 20

#### The alternative is to affirm the Communist party using dual power strategies. This debate is a question of the speed, scope, and scale of revolutionary strategy. Only dual power organizing builds institutions that meet the material needs of community, building a revolutionary base in the face of compounding crises of climate change, imperialism, and fascism.

Escalante, 19 [Alyson Escalante, Marxism, Radical Feminism, Continental Philosophy, 3-26-2019, "Communism and Climate Change: A Dual Power Approach," Regeneration Magazine, accessed 9-17-2021, https://regenerationmag.org/communism-and-climate-change-a-dual-power-approach/] //AD

I have previously argued that a crucial advantage to dual power strategy is that it gives the masses an infrastructure of socialist institutions which can directly provide for material needs in times of capitalist crisi

s. Socialist agricultural and food distribution programs can take ground that the capitalist state cedes by simultaneously meeting the needs of the masses while proving that socialist self-management and political institutions can function independently of capitalism. This approach is not only capable of literally saving lives in the case of crisis, but of demonstrating the possibility of a revolutionary project which seeks to destroy rather than reform capitalism. One of the most pressing of the various crises which humanity faces today is climate change. Capitalist production has devastated the planet, and everyday we discover that the small window of time for avoiding its most disastrous effects is shorter than previously understood. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that we have 12 years to limit (not even prevent) the more catastrophic effects of climate change. The simple, and horrific, fact that we all must face is that climate change has reached a point where many of its effects are inevitable, and we are now in a **post-brink world**, where damage control is the primary concern. The question is not whether we can escape a future of climate change, but whether we can survive it. Socialist strategy must adapt accordingly. In the face of this crisis, the democratic socialists and social democrats in the United States have largely settled on market based reforms. The Green New Deal, championed by Alexandria Ocasio Cortez and the left wing of the Democratic Party, remains a thoroughly capitalist solution to a capitalist problem. The proposal does nothing to challenge capitalism itself, but rather seeks to subsidize market solutions to reorient the US energy infrastructure towards renewable energy production, to develop less energy consuming transportation, and the development of public investment towards these ends. **The plan does nothing to call into question the profit incentives and endless resource consumption of capitalism which led us to this point**. Rather, it seeks to reorient the relentless market forces of capitalism towards slightly less destructive technological developments. While the plan would lead to a massive investment in the manufacturing and deployment of solar energy infrastructure, National Geographic reports that, “Fabricating [solar] panels **requires caustic chemicals** such as sodium hydroxide and hydrofluoric acid, and **the process uses water as well as electricity**, the production of which **emits greenhouse gases**.” Technology alone cannot sufficiently combat this crisis, as the production of such technology through capitalist manufacturing infrastructure **only perpetuates environmental harm**. Furthermore, subsidizing and incentivizing renewable energy stops far short of actually combating the fossil fuel industry driving the current climate crisis. The technocratic market solutions offered in the Green New Deal fail to adequately combat the driving factors of climate change. What is worse, they rely on a violent imperialist global system in order to produce their technological solutions. The development of high-tech energy infrastructure and the development of low or zero emission transportation requires the import of raw material and rare earth minerals which the United States can only access because of the imperial division of the Global South. This imperial division of the world requires constant militarism from the imperial core nations, and as Lenin demonstrates in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, facilitates **constant warfare** as imperial states compete for **spheres of influence** in order to facilitate cheap resource extraction. The US military, one of many imperialist forces, is the single largest user of petroleum, and one of its main functions is to ensure oil access for the United States. Without challenging this imperialist division of the world and the role of the United States military in upholding it, the Green New Deal fails even further to challenge the underlying causes of climate change. Even with the failed promises of the Green New Deal itself, it is unlikely that this tepid market proposal will pass at all. Nancy Pelosi and other lead Democrats have largely condemned it and consider it “impractical” and “unfeasible.” This dismissal is crucial because it reveals the total inability of capitalism to resolve this crisis. If the center-left party in the heart of the imperial core sees even milquetoast capitalist reforms as a step too far, we ought to have very little hope that a reformist solution will present itself within the ever shrinking 12 year time frame. There are times for delicacy and there are times for bluntness, and we are in the latter. To put things bluntly: the capitalists are not going to save us, and if we don’t find a way to save ourselves, the collapse of human civilization is a real possibility. The pressing question we now face is: **how are we going to save ourselves?** Revolution and Dual Power If capitalism will not be able to resolve the current encroaching climate crisis, we must find a way to organize outside the confines of capitalist institutions, towards the end of overthrowing capitalism. If the Democratic Socialists of America backed candidates cannot offer real anti-capitalist solutions through the capitalist state, we should be skeptical of the possibility for any socialist organization doing so. The DSA is far larger and far more well funded than any of the other socialist organizations in the United States, and they have failed to produce anything more revolutionary than the Green New Deal. We have to abandon the idea that electoral strategy will be sufficient to resolve the underlying causes of this crisis within 12 years. While many radicals call for revolution instead of reform, the reformists often raise the same response: revolution is well and good, but what are you going to do in the mean time? In many ways this question is fair. The socialist left in the United States today is not ready for revolutionary action, and a mass base does not exist to back the various organizations which might undertake such a struggle. Revolutionaries must concede that we have much work to be done before a revolutionary strategy can be enacted. This is a hard truth, but it is true. Much of the left has sought to ignore this truth by embracing adventurism and violent protest theatrics, in the vain hope of sparking revolutionary momentum which does not currently exist. If this is the core strategy of the socialist left, **we will accomplish nothing in the next 12 years**. Such approaches are as useless as the opportunist reforms pushed by the social democrats. Our task in these 12 years is not simply to arm ourselves and hope that magically the masses will wake up prepared for revolution and willing to put their trust in our small ideological cadres. We must instead, build a movement, and with it we must build infrastructure which can survive revolution and provide a framework for socialist development. Dual power is tooled towards this project best. The Marxist Center network has done an impressive amount of work developing socialist institutions across the US, largely through tenants organizing and serve the people programs. The left wing factions within the DSA itself have also begun to develop mutual aid programs that could be useful for dual power strategy. At the same time, mutual aid is not enough. We cannot simply build these institutions as a reform to make capitalism more survivable. Rather, we must make these institutions part of a broader revolutionary movement and they ought to function as a material prefiguration to a socialist society and economy. The institutions we build as dual power outside the capitalist state today ought to be structured towards revolutionary ends, such that they will someday function as the early institutions of a revolutionary socialist society. To accomplish this goal, we cannot simply declare these institutions to be revolutionary. Rather they have to be linked together through an actual revolutionary movement working towards revolutionary ends. This means that dual power institutions cannot exist as ends in and of themselves, nor can abstract notions of mutual aid cannot be conceptualized as an end in itself. The explicit purpose of these institutions has to be to radicalize the masses through meeting their needs, and providing an infrastructure for a socialist movement to meet the needs of its members and the communities in which it operates. Revolutionary institutions that can provide food, housing, and other needs for a revolutionary movement will be crucial for building a base among the masses and for constructing the beginnings of a socialist infrastructure for when we eventually engage in revolutionary struggle.

### Case

#### Infectious diseases don’t cause extinction

Owen Cotton-Barratt 17, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic.

One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

#### The plan gets circumvented through unilateral trade pressures – no IP case has ever gone to the ICJ, the strength of IP regimes has come solely through sanctions and threats.

Durand and Milberg, 18

[Cédric, Associate Prof. Political Economy @ U-Geneva, member @ Paris Nord Economics Center; and William, Dean @ The New School for Social Research: “Intellectual Monopoly in Global Value Chains,” published in 2018, https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01850438]//AD

Stricter IPRs at the national and international level support the expansion of GVC-based trade. Since the 1880s, the Paris and Berne Conventions – currently administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) - set some standards in terms of protection of industrial intellectual property and artistic works. However, their implementation has been problematic and no IP case has ever been subjected to the International Court of Justice. In the late 1970s, US IP-based industries realized that their competitive advantage was vulnerable as technological change made replication of their software, recorded music, videos, and pharmaceuticals increasingly easier and cheaper, in the absence of credible institutional means to sanction IP appropriators in developing countries. In the 1980s, they successfully lobbied the US government to use threats of unilateral trade sanctions to force developing countries to increase their IP protection and enlisted business associations in Europe and Japan to oppose what began to be framed as “piracy” and in favor of a stricter international IP regime. (Sell & Prakash, 2004, pp. 154–160).

#### Circumvention and they don’t solve – even if they say “durable fiat”, they have not defined the scope of the plan in the 1AC so you don’t know what the plan would materially look like

Mercurio 6/24 [Simon F.S. Li Professor of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong. June 24, 2021. “The IP Waiver for COVID-19: Bad Policy, Bad Precedent” <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/> Accessed 8/25 //gord0]

The role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and access to medicines is contentious. On the one hand, IPRs encourage investment, innovation and the advancement of health science. On the other hand, the limited-term monopoly rights can result in artificially high prices and become a barrier to access to medicines. While the wisdom of the IPRs system has at times been tested, it has proven its value in the current COVID-19 pandemic as IPRs played a large role in the rapid (and unprecedented) development and availability of multiple vaccines. Despite the success, India and South Africa proposed that the World Trade Organization (WTO) waive IPRs under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) in order to increase access to vaccines and other COVID-19-related technologies.[1](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn1) The proposal, tabled at a meeting of the TRIPS Council in October 2020, calls on Members to waive IPRs relating to and having an impact on the “prevention, containment or treatment of COVID-19”.[2](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn2) The proposal attracted support from the majority of developing country Members,[3](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn3) but was opposed by a handful of Members including the United States (US).[4](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn4) Given that consensus could not be reached within the deadline of 90 days as set out in Art. IX:3 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, Members agreed to keep the waiver proposal on the agenda of the TRIPS Council in 2021.[5](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn5) On 5 May 2021, the US reversed its position and announced that it would support a waiver for COVID-19 vaccines.[6](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn6) To be clear, this does not mean that the US supported the waiver as proposed by India and South Africa. Instead, the US has simply agreed to negotiate the perimeters of a waiver. Others, including the European Union (EU), Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and even leading developing countries such as Brazil, Chile and Mexico remain opposed or lukewarm on the waiver.[7](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn7) The US dropping opposition does not mean the concerns of other Members will simply disappear – one would hope that these nations opposed the waiver for valid reasons and did not simply blindly follow the US. Indeed, many of the above-listed Members remain unconvinced that even such a draconian step as a waiver of IPRs would accomplish the goal of increased vaccine production.[8](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn8) For its part, the EU continues to favour an approach which makes better use of existing flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement.[9](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn9) Thus, those expecting quick agreement on the waiver will be disappointed. Negotiations at the WTO are always difficult and lengthy, and US Trade Representative Katherine Tai acknowledged that the “negotiations will take time given the consensus-based nature of the institution and the complexity of the issues involved”.[10](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn10) Issues of negotiation will include the scope of the waiver. Whereas the original proposal and its amended form extend the waiver beyond patents and vaccines to include nearly all forms of IP (i.e. copyright,[11](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn11) industrial designs and trade secrets) as well as to all “health products and technologies including diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccines, medical devices, personal protective equipment, their materials or components, and their methods and means of manufacture for the prevention, treatment or containment of COVID-19”[12](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn12) (with no requirement on how or the extent to which they are related to or useful in combatting COVID-19), the US and others seem to support a waiver limited to patents and vaccines.[13](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn13) The length of the waiver will also be a contentious negotiating issue, with proponents seeking a virtual indefinite waiver lasting until the Membership agrees by consensus that it is no longer required – meaning even a single Member’s objection to ending the waiver would mean the waiver continues to remain in force[14](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn14) – as will the request that any action claimed to be taken under the waiver is outside the scope of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.[15](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn15) These provisions will almost certainly be opposed by other Members, who would perhaps agree to a time-limited waiver which could be extended rather than an unchallengeable indefinite waiver which will be difficult to reverse. The proposal also fails to mention anything in relation to transparency and notification requirements and lacks safeguards against abuse or diversion. These points will likely also prove contentious in the negotiations. With so many initial divergences and as yet undiscussed issues, the negotiations at best could be completed by the time of the next WTO Ministerial Conference, scheduled to begin on 20 November 2021. There is precedent in this regard, as previous TRIPS negotiations involving IP and pharmaceuticals were not fully resolved until the days before the Ministerial Conferences (in 2003 and 2005).[16](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn16) There is also a chance that the negotiations will continue past the calendar year 2021. The chance for a swift negotiation diminished with the release of a revised proposal by India and South Africa on 22 May 2021. As mentioned above, the proposal contains no limit as to product coverage, scope, notification requirements or safeguards and proposes that the waiver will remain in effect for what could be an indefinite period. This was not a proposal designed to engender quick negotiations and a solution. Instead, the proposal perhaps reveals India’s and South Africa’s true intent to use the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to roll-back IPRs rather than a good-faith effort to rapidly increase access to lifesaving vaccines and treatments around the world. It is not only the length of time which is an issue but also the ultimate impact of the waiver. A waiver simply means that a WTO Member would not be in violation of its WTO obligations if it does not protect and enforce the COVID-19-related IPRs for the duration of the waiver. The waiver would thus allow Members to deviate from their international obligations but not obligate Members to suspend protection and enforcement of the IPRs. Members like the US who support the waiver may not implement the necessary domestic legislation to waive IPRs within the jurisdiction. It is questionable whether the US could even legally implement the waiver given that IPRs are a matter of constitutional law.[17](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn17) The US announcement remains meaningful, however, for two reasons. First, it signals a departure from the longstanding and bipartisan support for the pharmaceutical industry, which for decades has been instrumental in setting the IP and trade agenda.[18](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn18) Second, it sends a strong signal that the US does not oppose others from waiving patent protection for vaccines. This shift may also be part of a broader and alternative strategy to increase vaccine production and distribution, whereby the US is not viewing or supporting waiver negotiations as a legal tool but more so as a threat to encourage vaccine innovators to increase production. In essence, the desired reaction would be that the IP holders increase efforts to license, transfer technology and expand manufacturing – exactly what the world needs at this time. Alan Beattie, writing in the Financial Times, believes that even the proponents of the waiver desire this outcome: “having talked to the proponents, [the original proposal] was always a tactical position designed to start a debate, identify possible support and flush out opponents rather than a likely outcome. To that end, it seems to have worked rather well.”[19](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn19) India’s negotiator to the TRIPS Agreement and longtime WTO staffer, Jayashree Watal, agrees, stating the proposal is an “indirect attempt to put pressure on the original manufacturers to cooperate [and license production to companies in their countries]”.[20](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn20) This view makes sense, as the proponents (and their supporters) have not even pointed to one credible instance where IPRs have blocked the production of a COVID-19 vaccine. Moreover, it is well known that the leading vaccines using mRNA are difficult to reproduce and having the “blueprints” does not guarantee safe and effective production. Simply stated, if a pastry chef provides instructions on how to bake a cake, the cake they bake is still going to be better than cakes baked by novices using the exact same recipe. The know-how and trade secrets are the key ingredient to the manufacture of quality, safe and effective pharmaceuticals or vaccines, and not only is it not transferred through compulsory licenses but it is hard to imagine how any government would force the transfer of such information even under a waiver. For this reason, instead of encouraging production everywhere – including in locations where safety and efficacy standards are virtually nonexistent – and accepting that there will be a flood of substandard vaccines coming onto the world market (with devastating effects) it is much more sensible to find out where potential manufacturing capabilities exist and find ways to exploit them and scale them up. When asked if a waiver would improve vaccine availability and equity, Watal responded: “No. It won’t. That’s clear.”[21](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn21) I share Watal’s view and do not support a TRIPS waiver for IPRs or even a limited waiver for patents. With evidence mounting that “what the proposal … will definitely not achieve is speeding up the Covid-19 vaccination rate in India or other parts of the Global South”[22](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn22) I refuse to sacrifice academic integrity by supporting a proposal simply because it is gaining traction in some circles.[23](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn23) IPRs played a key role in delivering vaccines within a year of the discovery of a new pathogen; it seems inexplicable that the world would abandon the system without any evidence that IPRs are limiting during the current crisis.[24](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8223179/#Fn24) Moreover, innovators have been generous in licensing technology transfer and production and one would be hard-pressed to find credible reports of qualified generic producers being refused a license. This is not surprising, since multiple competing vaccines are on the market it simply does not make economic sense for innovators to refuse a license – the generic manufacturer would simply obtain a license (and market share) and pay royalties to a competitor. Instead, I support efforts to enable prompt and effective use of existing flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement and concerted and coordinated efforts involving governments and the private sector to ensure all qualified generic producers willing and capable of manufacturing vaccines are doing so and to create supply by working to bring more facilities up to standard. Cooperation will not only lead us out of this pandemic but also put us in a better position to deal with the next one. Killing the goose that laid the golden egg may seem appealing to some in the short term but will only ensure that no eggs are delivered in the next pandemic.

#### The WTO can’t enforce the aff- causes circumvention.

Lamp 19 [Nicholas; Assistant Professor of Law at Queen’s University; “What Just Happened at the WTO? Everything You Need to Know, Brink News,” 12/16/19; <https://www.brinknews.com/what-just-happened-at-the-wto-everything-you-need-to-know/>] Justin

Nicolas Lamp: For the first time since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the Appellate Body cannot accept any new appeals, and that has knock-on effects on the whole global trade dispute settlement system. When a member appeals a WTO panel report, it goes to the Appellate Body, but if there is no Appellate Body, it means that that panel report will not become binding and will not attain legal force.

The absence of the Appellate Body means that members can now effectively block the dispute settlement proceedings by what has been called appealing panel reports “into the void.”

The WTO panels will continue to function as normal. When a panel issues a report, it will normally be automatically adopted — unless it is appealed. And so, even though the panel is working, the respondent in a dispute now has the option of blocking the adoption of the panel’s report. It can, thereby, shield itself from the legal consequences of a report that finds that the member has acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations.

#### Economic crises don’t cause war

Christopher Clary 15, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2597712

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles.

Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination

I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically.

This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further:

The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3

Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5

Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination?

Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

### 2nr

#### Interp - Debaters shouldn’t use ableist langue – they did – they said dumb twice

#### Deaf or Dumb assume one is ‘silent’ or that they have a learning disability

Clark and Marsh, Disability activists, 2

(Laurence and Stephen, “Patriarchy in the UK: The Language of Disability”, <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/Clark,%20Laurence/language.pdf>, accessed 7/9/12, sl)

For thousands of years, being a Deaf person has been associated with ‘dumbness’ or lack of intelligence; the use of the term ‘deaf and dumb’ is commonly used to label Deaf people (Carver, 1995). The Greek philosopher Aristotle (350 BC) is credited with being one of the first to associate ‘deaf’ with ‘dumb’: “accordingly, of persons destitute from birth of either sense, the blind are more intelligent than the deaf and dumb.” Over the years the word ‘dumb’ when used in this context became synonymous with ‘silent’. The American National Association of the Deaf point out two reasons why Deaf people consider this offensive. First, Deaf and hard of hearing people are by no means silent since they use sign language and lip-reading to communicate. Second, the word ‘dumb’ is misleading since it automatically implies that all Deaf people also have a learning difficulty (Gannon, 1981). The two words are associated with each other a couple of times in the bible: “And were beyond measure astonished, saying, He hath done all things well: he maketh both the deaf to hear, and the dumb to speak” (Mark 7:37).

#### Ableism must be challenged in rhetoric

Prefer –

#### Violence – means theyre harming communities and using bad language – you should vote for safety and care – making me not only feel “dumb” but theyre using violent language - DTD not DTA – the damage has already been done and they can’t make up for what they did – I don’t get a 3nr