# Space NC V1 - Peninsula

## Case Answers

### Debris

**Space debris overhyped--- thousands of satellites; only 15 debris collisions ever**

Mark **Albrecht 16** - (“Congested space is a serious problem solved by hard work, not hysteria,” Space News, 5-9-16, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-congested-space-is-a-serious-problem-solved-by-hard-work-not-hysteria/)

There are over a half million pieces of human-made material in orbit around our planet. Some are the size of school buses, some the size of BB gun pellets. They all had a function at some point, but now most are simply space debris littered from 100 to 22,000 miles above the Earth. Yet, all behave perfectly according to the laws of physics. Many in the space community have called the collision hazard caused by space debris a crisis.

Popular culture has embraced the risks of collisions in space in films like Gravity. Some participants have dramatized the issue by producing graphics of Earth and its satellites, which make our planet look like a fuzzy marble, almost obscured by a dense cloud of white pellets meant to conceptualize space congestion.

Unfortunately, for the sake of a good visual, satellites are depicted as if they were hundreds of miles wide, like the state of Pennsylvania (for the record, there are no space objects the size of Pennsylvania in orbit). Unfortunately, this is the rule, not the exception, and almost all of these articles, movies, graphics, and simulations are **exaggerated and misleading**. Space debris and collision risk is real, but it **certainly** is **not a crisis.**

So what are the facts?

On the positive side, space is **empty** and it is **vast**. At the altitude of the International Space Station, **one half a degree** of Earth longitude is almost **40 miles long**. That same one half a degree at geostationary orbit, some 22,000 miles up is over 230 miles long. Generally, we don’t intentionally put satellites closer together than one-half degree. That means at geostationary orbit, they are no closer than 11 times as far as the eye can see on flat ground or on the sea: That’s the horizon over the horizon 10 times over. In addition, other than minute forces like solar winds and sparse bits of atmosphere that still exist 500 miles up, **nothing gets in the way of orbiting objects** and **they behave quite predictably**. The location of the smallest spacecraft can be predicated within a 1,000 feet, 24 hours in advance.

#### No debris cascades; even worst case confined to low LEO with no impact

Daniel Von **Fange 17**, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler\_syndrome\_is\_over\_hyped/

Kessler Syndrome is **overhyped**. A **chorus of online commenters** great any news of upcoming low earth orbit satellites with worry that humanity will to lose access to space. I now think they are **wrong**.

What is Kessler Syndrome?

Here’s the popular view on Kessler Syndrome. Every once in a while, a piece of junk in space hits a satellite. This single impact destroys the satellite, and breaks off several thousand additional pieces. These new pieces now fly around space looking for other satellites to hit, and so exponentially multiply themselves over time, like a nuclear reaction, until a sphere of man-made debris surrounds the earth, and humanity no longer has access to space nor the benefits of satellites.

It is a dark picture.

Is Kessler Syndrome likely to happen?

I had to stop everything and spend an afternoon doing back-of-the-napkin math to know how big the threat is. To estimate, we need to know where the stuff in space is, how much mass is there, and how long it would take to deorbit.

The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions.

**Low LEO** - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO **doesn’t matter** for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over.

**High LEO** - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue.

**Mid Orbit** - **GPS** satellites and other **nav**igation **sat**ellite**s** travel here in lonely, long lives. The **volume of space is so huge**, and the **number of satellites so few**, that we **don’t need to worry** about Kessler **here**.

**GEO** - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the **sat**ellite**s** here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about **one satellite per 1000km** of the ring. Kessler is **not a problem** here.

#### No link - Sat attacks don’t cause nuke war

**Zarybnisky 18** [Eric J. Zarybnisky, MA in National Security Studies from the Naval War College, PhD in Operations Research from the MIT Sloan School of Management, Lt Col, USAF. Celestial Deterrence: Deterring Aggression in the Global Commons of Space. March 28, 2018. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1062004.pdf>]

PREVENTING AGGRESSION IN SPACE

While deterrence and the Cold War are strongly linked in the public’s mind through the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the fundamentals of deterrence date back millennia and deterrence remains relevant. Thucydides alludes to the concept of deterrence in his telling of the Peloponnesian War when he describes rivals seeking advantages, such as recruiting allies, to dissuade an adversary from starting or expanding a conflict.6F 6 Aggression in space was successfully avoided during the Cold War because both sides viewed an attack on military **sat**ellite**s** as highly escalatory, and such an action would likely result in general nuclear war.7F 7 In today’s more **nuanced world**, **attacking** satellites, including **military** **sat**ellite**s**, **does not** necessarily **result in nuclear war**. For instance, foreign countries have used highpowered lasers against American intelligence-gathering **sat**ellite**s**8F 8 and the **U**nited **S**tates has been **reluctant to respond**, let alone retaliate with nuclear weapons. This shift in policy is a result of the broader use of gray zone **op**eration**s**, to which countries struggle to respond while limiting escalation. Beginning with the fundamentals of deterrence illuminates how it applies to prevention of aggression in space

#### Their internal link card says that “unplanned manuevers” (not debris) impedes day to day ops (not triggers radars) this card is just really bad

## Disads

### China

#### US wins space race now due to private competition – its key to space dominance and militarization is good – the plan nukes the US’s silver bullet against Chinese aggression

**Weichert 21** – former Congressional staff member who holds a Master of Arts in Statecraft & National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. He is the founder of The Weichert Report: An Online Journal of Geopolitics [Brandon, “The Future of Space Exploration Depends on the Private Sector,” 7/5/2021, https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/07/the-future-of-space-exploration-depends-on-the-private-sector/#slide-1]

As Jeff Bezos, the wealthiest man on the planet, readies to launch himself into space aboard one of his own rockets, the world is watching the birth of a new dawn in space. Previously, America relied on its government agency, NASA, to propel it to the cosmos during the last space race with the Soviet Union. Today, America’s greatest hopes are with its private sector.

Jeff Bezos is not engaging in such risky behavior simply because he’s an adrenaline junky. No, he’s launching himself into orbit because his Blue Origins is in a titanic struggle with Elon Musk’s SpaceX — and Bezos’s firm is losing.

Whatever happens, **the American people will benefit from the competition that is shaping up between America’s space entrepreneurs. This has always been how innovation occurs: through** the dynamic, often **cutthroat competition between actors in the private sector.** While money is their ultimate prize, fame and fortune are also alluring temptations to make men like Musk and Bezos risk much of their wealth to change the world.

**The private space race** among these entrepreneurs **is part of a far more important marathon between** Red **China and the U**nited **S**tates**. Whichever nation wins the new space race will determine the future of the earth below.**

Consider this: Since winning its initial contracts to launch sensitive U.S. military satellites into orbit, **SpaceX has lowered the cost of military satellite launches** on taxpayers by “over a million dollars less” than what bigger defense contractors can do. Elon **Musk** is convinced that he **can bring these costs down even more**, thanks to his reusable Falcon 9 rocket.

The competition between the private space start-ups is fierce — just as the competition between Edison and Westinghouse was — but the upshot is ultimately greater innovation and lower costs for you and me. In fact, Elon Musk insists that if NASA gives SpaceX the contract for building the Human Landing System for the Artemis mission, NASA would return astronauts to the lunar surface by 2024 — four years before NASA believes it will do so. (Incidentally, 2024 is also when China anticipates having a functional base on the moon’s southern pole.)

Whereas China has an all-of-society approach to its space race with the United States, Washington has yet to fully galvanize the country in the way that John F. Kennedy rallied America to wage — and win — the space race in the Cold War. **America’s private sector**, therefore, **is the silver bullet against China’s quest for** total **space dominance. If left unrestricted by** meddlesome **Washington** bureaucrats, **these companies will ensure** that **the U**nited **S**tates **retains its overall competitive advantage over China** — and all other challengers, for that matter.

Indeed, the next four years could prove decisive in who will be victorious.

Enter the newly minted NASA director, Bill Nelson, whose station at the agency has effectively poured cold water on the private sector’s ambitious space plans. “Space is not going to be the Wild West for billionaires or anyone else looking to blast off,” Nelson admonished an inquiring reporter.

Why not?

America’s actions during its western expansion created a dynamic and advanced nation that was well-positioned to dominate the world for the next century. Should we not attempt to emulate this in order to remain dominant in the next century?

More important, this is precisely how **China treats space: as a new Wild West** . . . but one in **which Beijing’s forces will dominate**. China takes a leap-without-looking approach to space development — everything that can be done to further its grand ambition of becoming the world’s most dominant power by 2049 will be done. Meanwhile, the Biden administration wants to prevent America’s greatest strength, the free market, from helping to beat its foremost geopolitical competitor.

Nelson’s comments are fundamentally at odds with America’s spirit and animating principles. Whatever one’s opinion about Bezos or Musk, the fact is that their private space companies are inspiring greater innovation today in the space sector after years of its being left in the sclerotic hands of the U.S. government.

Sensing that the federal government’s dominance of U.S. space policy is waning, the Biden administration would rather cede the strategic high ground of space to China than let wildcatting innovators do the hard work. Today, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and NASA are contriving new ways for strangling the budding private space sector, just as it is taking flight.

Risk aversion is not how one innovates. Risk is what led Americans to the moon just 66 years after the Wright brothers flew their first airplane. A willingness for risk doesn’t exist today in the federal government — which is why the feds shouldn’t be running space policy.

The U.S. government should be partnering with the new space start-ups, not shunning them. The FAA should be automatically approving SpaceX launches, not stymying them. The federal government will not win space any more than it could win the West or build the locomotive. It takes strong-willed, brilliant individuals of a rare caliber to do that. All government can do is to give the resources and support to private-sector innovators and let them make history for us.

The next decade will decide who wins space. Let it be America — and let America’s dynamic start-ups win that race, not China’s state capitalism.

#### Space dominance key to global peace – nuclear and conventional deterrence is collapsing, which will provoke civilization-ending revisionist aggression from Russia and China

Dr. Robert **Zubrin 19**, Masters in Aeronautics and Astronautics and Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Washington, President of Pioneer Energy, Founder and President of the Mars Society, Senior Fellow with the Center for Security Policy, The Case for Space: How the Revolution in Spaceflight Opens Up a Future of Limitless Possibility, p. Google Books

The **U**nited **S**tates needs a new national security policy. For the first time in more than 60 years, we face the real possibility of a **large-scale conventional war**, and we are **woefully unprepared**.

Eastern and Central Europe is now **so weakly defended** as to **virtually invite invasion**. The **U**nited **S**tates is not about to go to nuclear war to defend any foreign country. So **deterrence is dead**, and, with the German army cut from 12 divisions to three, the British gone from the continent, and American forces down to a 30,000-troop **tankless remnant**, the only serious and committed ground force that stands between Russia and the Rhine is the Polish army. **It’s not enough**. Meanwhile, in **Asia**, the powerful growth of the Chinese economy promises that nation eventual overwhelming numerical force superiority in the region.

How can we **restore the balance**, creating a **sufficiently powerful** conventional force to **deter aggression**? It won’t be by matching potential adversaries tank for tank, division for division, replacement for replacement. Rather, the **U**nited **S**tates must seek to **totally outgun** them by obtaining a **radical technological advantage**. This can be done by achieving **space supremacy**.

To grasp the importance of space power, some historical perspective is required. Wars are fought for control of territory. Yet for thousands of years, victory on land has frequently been determined by dominance at sea. In the 20th century, victory on both land and sea almost invariably went to the power that controlled the air. In the **21st century**, victory on land, sea or in the air will go to the power that controls **space**.

The **critical military importance** of space has been **obscured** by the fact that in the period since the **U**nited **S**tates has had space assets, all of our wars have been fought against **minor powers** that we could have defeated without them. Desert Storm has been called the first space war, because the allied forces made extensive use of GPS navigation satellites. However, if they had no such technology at their disposal, the end result would have been just the same. This has given some the impression that space forces are just a frill to real military power — a useful and convenient frill perhaps, but a frill nevertheless.

But consider how history might have changed had the Axis of World War II possessed reconnaissance satellites — merely one of many of today’s space-based assets — without the Allies having a matching capability. In that case, the Battle of the Atlantic would have gone to the U-boats, as they would have had infallible intelligence on the location of every convoy. Cut off from oil and other supplies, Britain would have fallen. On the Eastern front, every Soviet tank concentration would have been spotted in advance and wiped out by German air power, as would any surviving British ships or tanks in the Mediterranean and North Africa. In the Pacific, the battle of Midway would have gone very much the other way, as the Japanese would not have wasted their first deadly airstrike on the unsinkable island, but sunk the American carriers instead. With these gone, the remaining cruisers and destroyers in Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher’s fleet would have lacked air cover, and every one of them would have been hunted down and sunk by unopposed and omniscient Japanese air power. With the same certain fate awaiting any American ships that dared venture forth from the West Coast, Hawaii, Australia and New Zealand would then have fallen, and eventually China and India as well. With a monopoly of just one element of space power, the Axis would have won the war.

But modern space power involves far more than just **recon**naissance satellites. The use of space-based **GPS** can endow munitions with 100 times greater accuracy, while space-based **communications** provide an unmatched capability of **c**ommand and **c**ontrol of forces. Knock out the enemy’s reconnaissance satellites and he is effectively blind. Knock out his comsats and he is deaf. Knock out his navsats and he loses his aim. In any serious future conventional conflict, even between opponents as mismatched as Japan was against the United States — or Poland (with 1,000 tanks) is currently against Russia (with 12,000) — it is space power that will **prove decisive**.

Not only Europe, but **the defense of the entire free world hangs upon this** matter. For the past 70 years, U.S. Navy carrier task forces have controlled the world’s oceans, first making and then keeping the Pax Americana, which has done so much to secure and advance the human condition over the postwar period. But should there ever be another major conflict, an adversary possessing the ability to locate and target those carriers from space would be able to **wipe them out** with the **push of a button**. For this reason, it is **imperative** that the **U**nited **S**tates possess space capabilities that are **so robust** as to not only assure our own ability to operate in and through space, but also be able to **comprehensively deny it** to others.

*Space superiority* means having better space assets than an opponent. Space supremacy means being able to assert a **complete monopoly** of such capabilities. The latter is what we must have. If the United States can gain space supremacy, then the capability of any American ally can be multiplied by orders of magnitude, and with the support of the similarly multiplied striking power of our own land- and sea-based air and missile forces be made **so formidable** as to render any conventional attack **unthinkable**. On the other hand, should we **fail** to do so, we will remain **so vulnerable** as to increasingly **invite aggression** by ever-more-**emboldened** revanchist powers.

For this reason, both **Russia** and **China** have been developing and actively testing antisatellite (ASAT) systems. Up till now, the systems they have been testing have been ground launched, designed to orbit a few times and then collide with and destroy targets below one thousand kilometers altitude. This is sufficient to take out our reconnaissance satellites but not our GPS and communications satellites, which fly at twenty thousand and thirty-six thousand kilometers respectively. However, the means to reach these are straightforward, and, given their critical importance to us, there is every reason to believe that such development is well underway.11

The Obama administration sought to **dissuade** adversaries from developing ASATs by **setting a good example** and **not working on them ourselves**. This approach has **failed**. As a consequence, many defense policy makers are now advocating that we move aggressively to develop ASATs of our own. While more hardheaded than the previous policy, such an approach remains entirely inadequate to the situation.

The United States armed forces are far more dependent upon space assets than any potential opponent. Were both sides in a conflict able to destroy the space assets of the other, we would be the overwhelming loser by the exchange.

#### Space dominance solves hegemony – deterrence strategies, even rudimentary ones, are perceived as weakness and causes aggression

**Weichert 17** (Brandon J. Weichert. Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staff member who holds a Master of Arts in Statecraft & National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. He is the founder of The Weichert Report: An Online Journal of Geopolitics, “The High Ground: The Case for U.S. Space Dominance,” Orbis, Vol 61, Issue 2, 2017, pp 227 – 237, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438717300108>)

While space superiority and space dominance share a militarized view of space, there are fundamental differences in their stated end goals. Those who favor space superiority view space as a global commons, accessible to all in peacetime. They take a more defensive and reactive view of space and the actors who seek access to this domain. The space superiority model understands that U.S. dependence on space is vital for the basic functioning of American civilization (banking transactions, cell phone signals, GPS functions, television broadcasts, as well as essential military surveillance and support functions all across satellites in space). Yet, this model also accepts that current budgetary constraints mean that the United States is unlikely to invest significantly more into unwieldy and expensive space systems.

A strategy of space superiority accepts the risk arising from reliance on space systems, while deterring attacks on space assets. As actors such as China or Russia become increasingly dependent on space systems themselves, space superiority advocates believe that U.S. willingness to retaliate in kind against any attack on its own space assets is sufficient.7 This is in keeping with the classic deterrence model of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

Unfortunately, however, U.S. dependence on space assets for its very survival is so much greater than any other state that such a threat is unrealistic. The reason that states like China or Russia are developing counter-space capabilities is because the cost to them is extremely low, whereas the benefit for them (in the event of war with the United States) is high. For the cost of a ground-based laser or an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile launcher, China could knock out the ability of all U.S. forces in the Pacific to coordinate and adequately defend themselves from a Chinese offensive.

What could the United States do to the Chinese in return? The best option for U.S. retaliation in space would be to launch some blinding attacks on the handful of China's space assets. However, this ultimately would not deter China from escalating any future conflict since China's investment in space is so low compared to that of the United States. In addition, since Chinese forces are designed to operate in an environment without those assets, such retaliation grounded on deterrence-based models becomes highly problematic and ineffective.

Rather than serving as a stabilizing force in space, then, the defensive and reactive space superiority model would be an inducement for conflict in the strategic high ground of space. Or, rather, the direction of attack would be unidirectional: from U.S. adversaries toward essential U.S. space systems. Thus, while space confers unequivocal advantages to the U.S. forces that depend on space assets for their vital functions, it also provides adversaries with an unprecedented weakness for them to exploit.

The fact is that United States, China, or Russia's dependence on space is asymmetrical. Over the long run, a deterrent-based, space superiority model would eventually allow other states not only to gain and maintain access to space, but also effectively to gain strategic parity with the United States in space. Make no mistake, **the more that states are able to access space, no matter how nascent or rudimentary** their space programs may be, the **more they will refine their capabilities** and be able to develop space programs for their own strategic ends. While most defense analysts believe that deterrence during the Cold War led to bipolar stability, a deterrence-based model in space would create instability. If a near-peer competitor like China or Russia believed that it had acquired the capacity to achieve parity with the United States, what would stop that state from trying to gain strategic advantage over America in space?

A Hegemonic Model

The best solution to avoid this situation is a hegemonic model. The only way that the United States can ensure its continued strategic advantage in space is to embrace fully the space dominance model by weaponizing space. While space superiority advocates will denounce this policy as both cost-ineffective and destabilizing, a hegemonic approach to space is far more in keeping with U.S. traditions and values. Indeed, as John Lewis Gaddis asserts, the American response to foreign threat is traditionally to take “the offensive, by becoming more conspicuous, by confronting, neutralizing, and if possible overwhelming the sources of danger rather than fleeing from them. Expansion, we have assumed, is the path to security.”8

What of the claim that a deterrence-based space superiority model creates stability? The primary claim of deterrence efficacy is that during the Cold War, the more or less equal nuclear balance ensured that neither side had an incentive to launch a disarming first strike. This view was the basis of the mutual assured destruction theory. Since there was no conceivable advantage to either side from these weapons, both sides were forced into a more constructive diplomatic relationship. In all of the time that deterrence was employed, American policymakers assured the public that MAD was better than the alternatives—compellence,9 Rollback,10 and hegemony—because it restrained Soviet aggression.

American policymakers assumed that the Soviet strategists in the Kremlin viewed nuclear arms in the same apocalyptic terms that they did. As such, U.S. policymakers were not only content to allow American nuclear dominance to erode, but also to degrade actively those capabilities through strategic arms agreements. In the meantime, until 1986, mainstream Soviet strategists and policymakers were convinced that they could prevail in a nuclear war. They were just biding their time.11

In this light then, deterrence was not built around the concept of enlightened self-interest, but more likely the result of U.S. policymakers’ inability to see through the fog of the Cold War. The Soviets were by definition a revolutionary power. Even after they had renounced the concept of spreading global communist revolution, however, the urge to transform fundamentally the world order to reflect their own image remained a high strategic priority for the USSR. The United States failed to discern this situation until the Reagan Administration.

President Ronald Reagan, rather than accept the Cold War deterrence paradigm, planned to bring American technical and strategic dominance to bear in space in order to help defeat the Soviet Union. Reagan also recognized that the demilitarized sanctuary view of space was irrelevant, and he **eschewed arms control agreements** that sought to counteract the inherent American advantages in space. President Reagan not only embraced a militarized view of space, but in 1983, he also called for the weaponization of space with his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

By the 1980s, the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on space for military purposes (primarily in the area of satellites). These space systems formed the backbone of the modern military force that Reagan was assembling to counter the Soviet Union. What is more, Reagan's preferred strategy of Rollback meant that the United States would no longer sacrifice its own strategic advantages on the altar of diplomacy. After all, Reagan did not accept the Soviets as an equal and legitimate global power. He detested communism and viewed its proponents in the USSR as the great villains on the world stage. Furthermore, Reagan was staunchly opposed to nuclear weapons. Therefore, he sought to remove the notion of deterrence through MAD and replace it with the concept of hegemony through “Mutual Assured Survival.”

These views coalesced into the Reagan Administration's commitment to placing missile defense systems in orbit. It also called for developing new technologies (i.e., directed-energy weapons) to be used in space. The United States would not only remove the threat of the Soviet nuclear arsenal by creating a working missile defense system in space, but it would also move beyond the Soviet threat by permanently dominating the high ground of space. This position was the basis of SDI.12 In fact, the Reagan Administration's shift in focus was a key factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union as the Soviet leadership then embarked on a tit-for-tat arms buildup that their economy simply could not sustain. 13

Even if deterrence did facilitate a significant reduction in hostility—thereby creating the bipolar stability—no such hope for stability exists in space today. As argued earlier, U.S. reliance on space assets for its most basic functions is far greater than that of other countries. Furthermore, there is no way that the United States can—or should—abandon its use of space as a strategic domain. Thus, a hegemonic model for **space dominance is the only hope to create the stability** that most planners seek, while at the same time defending the American position in space.

Space dominance as a model for stability is nothing new. Indeed, Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) asserts that the most stable global systems are those in which one actor dominates the system. In such a system, power is aggregated so greatly into a single, dominant actor that such a hegemonic power acts as a stabilizing force. Due to its relative strength, the hegemonic power can set the agenda and the rules that govern the system. The relative weakness of the other actors in the system is well understood, which then prompts these weak actors to abandon any hope of challenging the hegemonic power's rule. Eventually, they end up accommodating the hegemonic power. The lack of challenge creates peaceful stability.14 The fact that one actor is setting the rules means that the system is simple to operate in, as well.

The same logic that buttresses the HST international relations theory arguably undergirds the military strategy of space dominance. If this claim is so, then American hegemony in space is essential for the continued survival of the United States. Whereas there are legitimate arguments to be made regarding the reliance on deterrence-based models for creating stability during the Cold War, the fact is that the world is more multipolar today than it was 25 years ago. Despite what writer Fareed Zakaria has dubbed “the rise of the rest,”15 the United States still retains greater relative power. Therefore, it is **inevitable** and logical that the United States should expand its hegemonic position in space, in order to secure its place there.

Whereas deterrence-based models, such as space superiority, may have worked in a less chaotic international system, no such stability can be achieved today. Many of America's competitors are revanchist states intent on redefining the world order. They are not interested in preserving the American position in space. Also, they are not cowed by a U.S. deterrence strategy in space. Rather, they view such a policy as a **concession that the United States is becoming weaker.**

Space dominance would create greater stability than space superiority. Missile defense systems, tungsten rods, and even directed-energy weapons potentially would all be placed in key orbits around the Earth. This, on top of the existing U.S. space infrastructure, would prove to the world that the United States is committed to preserving its position in space. In a world of rogue states, space-based weapons likely would prevent surprise nuclear attacks. Failing that, the fact that the United States possessed strategic, offensive weapons in orbit—that could be brought down against any hostile actor—undoubtedly, would make even the most intractable foe hesitant.

It is arguable that overwhelming U.S. space power would trickle down from the strategic high ground to lower strategic domains. Rather than wasting time demonstrating resolve by “temporarily blinding Chinese satellites,”16 for example, the overwhelming American presence in space presumably would dissuade potential attackers.

#### US hegemony prevents great-power conflicts that escalates to nuclear war

**Brands and Edel 19** (Hal Brands and Charles Edel. Hal Brands is the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Charles Edel is a senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and previously served on the U.S. Secretary of State’s policy planning staff, “Rediscovering Tragedy. In The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order; Chapter 6: The Darkening Horizon,” Yale University Press, pp 128-131 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvbnm3r9.11>)

Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and military exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. 34 More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post– Cold War era.

The revival of great-power competition entails **higher international tensions** than the world has known for decades, and the revival of **arms races, security dilemmas**, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper **conflicts over the international rules of the road** on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to **great-power war**, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history.

Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington.35 In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation.36 The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers.

Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, **Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power**” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America?

Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profi ted far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fi ctional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “**take center stage in the world”** and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38

These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how signifi cantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. **The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning**. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacifi c, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—**interests expand with power**, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because **geopolitical revisionism** by unsatisfied major powers has so often **presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and** even **war**. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come.

### Welfare

#### Social programs are how societies solve for econ inequality

Ramraj et al., 19 – (The impact of social assistance programs on population health: a systematic review of research in high-income countries,” BMC Health, 2019, https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-018-6337-1)

One of the most important ways that societies intervene to buffer the adverse consequences of socioeconomic disadvantage is through the provision of social assistance [[5](https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-018-6337-1#ref-CR5)]. Social assistance refers to government programs that provide a minimum level of income support to individuals and households living in poverty. These programs lend support either in the form of direct cash transfers or through a variety of in-kind benefits (e.g. food stamps and rent subsidies). Social assistance has been shown to strengthen the purchasing power of the poor and raise their material standards of living [[6](https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-018-6337-1#ref-CR6), [7](https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-018-6337-1#ref-CR7)]. From a public health point of view, the supplemental provision of income can also enable people to avoid harmful exposures and adopt practices beneficial to their health [[8](https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-018-6337-1#ref-CR8)]. Thus, theory predicts that social assistance programs offer an important means of protecting the health of socioeconomically disadvantaged groups and mitigating the extent of socioeconomic health inequalities [[9](https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-018-6337-1#ref-CR9), [10](https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-018-6337-1#ref-CR10)].

#### Tag

Collecting taxes and fees is a fundamental way for countries to generate public revenues that make it possible to finance investments in human capital, infrastructure, and the provision of services for citizens and businesses. Preliminary analyses estimate the financing gap for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals for developing countries at about $2.5 trillion annually. Much of this financing gap will need to be met by increased private-sector investment in sustainability, which requires appropriate tax policies to create the needed price incentives. Yet, developing countries that are most in need of revenues, including fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS), often face the steepest challenges in collecting taxes. Taxes have a key role to play in making growth sustainable and equitable, especially in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, and through such efforts as “greening” tax systems and fighting tax evasion and avoidance.

**Many countries are still struggling to collect sufficient revenues to finance their own development.**Countries collecting less than 15% of GDP in taxes must increase their revenue collection in order to meet basic needs of citizens and businesses. This level of taxation is an important tipping point to make a state viable and put it on a path to growth. As of 2018, 48% of IDA/Blend countries and 69% of FCS countries fall below this 15% baseline.

**Making it easier to pay taxes improves competitiveness.**Overly complicated tax systems are associated with high levels of tax evasion, large informal sectors, more corruption, and less investment. Modern tax systems should seek to optimize tax collections while minimizing the burden on taxpayers to comply with tax laws.

**There is a need to ensure that the tax system is fair and equitable.** Governments need to balance goals such as increased revenue mobilization, sustainable growth, and reduced compliance costs with ensuring that the tax system is fair and equitable. Fairness considerations includethe relative taxation of the poor and the rich; corporate and individual taxpayers; cities and rural areas; formal and informal sectors, labor and investment income; and the older and the younger generations.

#### Tag

In a controversial statement this week, President Donald Trump highlighted Norway as the kind of country from which he’d like more emigrants to the United States. Many residents of Norway politely declined, according to Reuters, likely because “the Nordic country, one of the richest in the world by GDP per capita, was last year named the happiest nation on the planet.” Indeed, according to the United Nations’ latest World Happiness Report, as covered by CBS News, the top 10 happiest countries are: 1. Norway 2. Denmark 3. Iceland 4. Switzerland 5. Finland 6. Netherlands 7. [Canada](https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/07/canadians-may-pay-more-taxes-than-americans-but-theres-a-catch.html) 8. New Zealand 9. Australia 10. Sweden Those countries have one interesting thing in common: They’re all highly taxed. That’s not a coincidence, says report co-author [Jeffrey Sachs](http://unsdsn.org/about-us/people/jeffrey-sachs/), who is also the director of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network. He tells CBS that “happiness is a result of creating strong social foundations,” and that if other nations prioritized “social trust” and “healthy lives,” they could also find that their citizens become more content. The top three happiest countries, Norway, Denmark and Iceland, are all among the highest taxed countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in terms of total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. The widely enjoyed social benefits residents get in exchange for their taxes, such as universal health care, access to education and subsidized parental leave, could have something to do with the “strong social foundations” touted by Sachs. Indeed, citizens’ satisfaction is related to what they get for their tax dollars, Sachs tells CNBC Make It: “They are happy because these societies are not only prosperous but also with high equality, social trust and honesty of government. They enjoy long paid vacations, zero out-of-pocket costs of health care, zero or low tuition costs and quality public services for all.” He adds that, “by the way, they are also environmentally conscious and moving to become zero-emission economies.” As of 2014, in terms of total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP and measured per capita, Norway came in at No. 2 out of 35 countries ($37,682 USD), Denmark at No. 3 ($30,630 USD), and Iceland came in at No. 9 ($20,418 USD), according to the [OECD](https://data.oecd.org/chart/4UfK). Every country on the top 10 list paid more than the 2014 average ($14,916 USD), except one: New Zealand, which came in at $14,327 USD, about average, and about the same as the United States ($14,115). Unlike Americans, however, residents of New Zealand enjoy the protection of [a robust welfare state](https://www.newzealandnow.govt.nz/living-in-nz/money-tax/financial-assistance) including [a public health system](https://www.newzealandnow.govt.nz/living-in-nz/healthcare), 18 weeks of subsidized parental leave and benefits for middle- and low-income families with young children.

## CP

### Debris

#### States should:

#### Remove the most volatile and largest Debris pieces from the most congested orbits

#### Mandate UN guidelines on space debris mitigation

#### Collaborate on techniques to track and display the location of objects in real time and AI to automate debris-avoidance maneuvers

#### Indefinitely stall deployment of low earth orbit ASAT’s.

#### Solves satellites, miscalc, Kessler, and debris collisions

**Nature 21** – (“The world must cooperate to avoid a catastrophic space collision,” Nature, 8-11-21, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02167-5)

But there are no traffic cops in space, nor international borders with clearly delineated areas of responsibility. To avoid further damage, **it’s crucial that satellite operators have an accurate and up-to-date list of where objects are in space**. At present, the main global catalogue of space objects is published at Space-Track.org by the US Space Command, a branch of the military. The catalogue is the most widely used public listing available, but it lacks some satellites that countries — including the United States, China and Russia — have not acknowledged publicly. In part because of this lack of transparency, other nations also track space objects, and some private companies maintain commercially available catalogues. Rather than this patchwork of incomplete sources, **what the world needs is a unified system of space traffic management**. Through this, spacefaring nations and companies could agree to share more of their tracking data and cooperate to make space safer. This might require the creation of a **new global regime, such as an international convention, through which rules and technical standards could be organized**. One analogy is the International Telecommunication Union, the United Nations agency that coordinates global telecommunications issues such as who can transmit in which parts of the radio spectrum. It won’t be easy to create such a system for space traffic. For it to succeed, questions of safety (such as avoiding smashing up a satellite) will need to be disentangled from questions of security (such as whether that satellite is spying on another nation) so that **countries can be assured that participating in such an effort would not compromise national security**. Countries could, for instance, share information about the location of a satellite without sharing details of its capabilities or purpose for being in space. One near-term move that would help would be for the United States to complete a planned shift of responsibility for the Space-Track.org catalogue from the military to the civilian Department of Commerce. Because this catalogue has historically been the most widely used around the world, shifting it to a civilian agency could start to **defuse geopolitical tensions** and so improve global efforts to manage space debris. It might one day feed into a global space-traffic agreement between nations; even the nascent space superpower **China would have a big incentive to participate**, despite rivalries with the United States. The transition was called for in a 2018 US presidential directive that recognizes that companies are taking over from national governments as the dominant players in space, but it has yet to occur, in part because Congress has not allocated the necessary funds. On 25 August, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space will meet to discuss a range of topics related to international cooperation in space. The UN is the right forum through which spacefaring nations can work together to establish norms for responsible space behaviour, and that should include how the world can track objects to make space safer. It should continue recent work it has been doing emphasizing space as a secure and sustainable environment, which at least brings countries such as the United States and China into the same conversation. Basic research has a role, too: innovations such as **techniques to track and display the locations of orbiting objects in real time**, and **artificial intelligence to help automate debris-avoidance manoeuvres**, could bolster any global effort to monitor and regulate space. If governments and companies around the world do not take urgent action to work together to make space safer, they will one day face a catastrophic collision that knocks out one or more satellites key to their safety, economic well-being or both. Space is a global commons and a global resource. A global organization responsible for — and capable of — managing the flow of space traffic is long overdue.

#### Removing the largest debris and implementing UN mandates solves – lack of clarity is the problem

**Khlystov 18** [Nikolai Khlystov](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/authors/nikolai-khlystov) Lead, Space, and lead, Global Future Council on Space, World Economic Forum. 3 April, 2018 “We have a space debris problem Here’s how to solve it” [We have a space debris problem. Here’s how to solve it | World Economic Forum (weforum.org)](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/we-have-a-space-debris-problem-heres-how-to-solve-it/) Accessed 12-19 // gord0

The first Chinese space station, Tiangong-1, crashed on 1 April over the Southern Pacific, after uncontrollably re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere.

In fact, the station most likely all but burned up on re-entry, ironically very close to the location called ‘spacecraft cemetery’, where space agencies purposefully guide their old spacecraft to crash as it is the most isolated location in the ocean.

The Chinese authorities lost contact with the station back in 2016 and could not guide it since then.

Tiangong-1 is one example of space debris that ended up coming back to Earth and burning up, just like most other debris that re-enters Earth’s atmosphere. That is not a bad thing.

But large quantities of space junk end up staying in various orbits around Earth, threatening satellites, the International Space Station (ISS), as well as future missions beyond Earth's vicinity – to asteroids, the Moon and Mars.

Somewhat similar to pieces of tyres that litter the highways on Earth, debris can be parts of old satellites, from paint chips, to bolts, larger sections, and entire defunct satellites; it can also include spent rocket bodies, the sections of rockets that don’t fall back to Earth after a rocket's launch. The total number of debris pieces larger than a marble counts more than half a million.

[photo omitted]

The key difference is that while it would be dangerous for your car to hit a piece of garbage on the highway at 100 km/h, in orbit, things are moving at the much faster speed of 28,000 km/h – the speed required by the laws of physics for objects to stay in orbit and not fall back to the ground.

At that speed, even a small bolt could destroy an entire satellite, or even endanger the entire Space Station. That is the reason why astronauts or cosmonauts on board the ISS have to huddle into the escape capsules several times a year, when a piece of debris is being tracked close to the Space Station. Currently only the Russian Soyuz offers a way of getting to and from the ISS for humans.

The most polluted orbits in general are considered to be those between 200-2000 km above Earth (Lower Earth Orbits or LEO), and the 36,000 km orbit (Geosynchronous).

This is a growing issue, which has become more widely known to the public through the movie ‘Gravity’.

Out-of-control space junk in LEO orbit – the so-called Kessler Syndrome – in real life would not be quite as dramatic as in the movie; however, it does pose a serious and an ever-growing threat, nonetheless.

There are two key elements to addressing this global risk.

First, we need to start removing the most volatile and biggest pieces from the most congested orbits.

A number of companies, such as Astroscale and Saber Astronautics, are looking at this very complicated and technical solution already. The idea is essentially to grab a piece of debris with a special satellite and de-orbit both of them, in the process burning up both objects above the aforementioned ‘spacecraft cemetery’.

Other technologies include moving objects with a powerful laser beam. It is important to start doing that soon – current scientific estimates predict that without active debris removal, certain orbits will become unusable over the coming decades.

Though it is hard to capture objects that are moving as fast as this debris, it is certainly possible. After all, spacecraft dock with the ISS all the time.

The bigger issues are financing and international cooperation. The question of who pays for these ‘garbage collection’ missions is a tricky one. Perhaps even trickier, is negotiating the international diplomatic space and persuading, for example Russia, that their old military satellite needs to be de-orbited by a technology company.

[photo omitted]

The second part of the puzzle to ensure the long-term accessibility of orbits is to adjust our current behaviour in space in order to minimize the creation of new debris. We need to be more careful with existing operational satellites and new missions.

The UN guidelines on space debris mitigation are among the key international efforts to get different actors to follow proper rules of the road, but they are voluntary.

There are over 1,500 active satellites in various orbits, but this figure is set to grow dramatically over the coming years.

Large constellations that number hundreds and thousands of satellites, such as OneWeb and SpaceX, are being developed currently (mostly for LEO orbits), and promise to provide affordable connectivity to all parts of the world.

New governments are also entering the race to get access to space. The question is, with such an increase in traffic, how do we get all the private and public actors to think more sustainably?

The [Global Future Council on Space Technologies](https://www.weforum.org/communities/the-future-of-space-technologies) is working on an industry framework to incentivize private actors to step up their act. Other efforts are needed.

Orbits are a critical part of the Earth environment, a global commons just like the oceans, and we need to protect this resource for future generations.

### Space Tax

#### States should:

* Institute orbital use fees for privately owned satellites already in space and for those not yet in space
* For non-privately owned satellites, offer a financial incentive to remove defunct satellites

**UC Boulder, 20** – (“Orbital Use Fees Proposed As the Most Effective Way to Solve the Space Junk Problem,” SciTech Daily, 5-27-20, https://scitechdaily.com/orbital-use-fees-proposed-as-the-most-effective-way-to-solve-the-space-junk-problem/)

Space is getting crowded. Aging satellites and space debris crowd low-Earth orbit, and launching new satellites adds to the collision risk. The most effective way to solve the space junk problem, according to a new study, is not to capture debris or deorbit old satellites: it’s an international agreement to charge operators “orbital-use fees” for every satellite put into orbit. Orbital use fees would also increase the long-run value of the space industry, said economist Matthew Burgess, a CIRES Fellow and co-author of the new paper. By reducing future satellite and debris collision risk, an annual fee rising to about $235,000 per satellite would quadruple the value of the satellite industry by 2040, he and his colleagues concluded in a paper published today in the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*. “Space is a common resource, but companies aren’t accounting for the cost their satellites impose on other operators when they decide whether or not to launch,” said Burgess, who is also an assistant professor in Environmental Studies and an affiliated faculty member in Economics at the University of Colorado Boulder. “We need a policy that lets satellite operators directly factor in the costs their launches impose on other operators.” Currently, an estimated 20,000 objects — including satellites and space debris — are crowding low-Earth orbit. It’s the latest Tragedy of the Commons, the researchers said: Each operator launches more and more satellites until their private collision risk equals the value of the orbiting satellite. So far, proposed solutions have been primarily technological or managerial, said Akhil Rao, assistant professor of economics at Middlebury College and the paper’s lead author. Technological fixes include removing space debris from orbit with nets, harpoons, or lasers. Deorbiting a satellite at the end of its life is a managerial fix. Ultimately, engineering or managerial solutions like these won’t solve the debris problem because they don’t change the incentives for operators. For example, removing space debris might motivate operators to launch more satellites — further crowding low-Earth orbit, increasing collision risk, and raising costs. “This is an incentive problem more than an engineering problem. What’s key is getting the incentives right,” Rao said. A better approach to the space debris problem, Rao and his colleagues found, is to implement an orbital-use fee — a tax on orbiting satellites. “That’s not the same as a launch fee,” Rao said, “Launch fees by themselves can’t induce operators to deorbit their satellites when necessary, and it’s not the launch but the orbiting satellite that causes the damage.” Orbital-use fees could be straight-up fees or tradeable permits, and they could also be orbit-specific, since satellites in different orbits produce varying collision risks. Most important, the fee for each satellite would be calculated to reflect the cost to the industry of putting another satellite into orbit, including projected current and future costs of additional collision risk and space debris production — costs operators don’t currently factor into their launches. “In our model, what matters is that satellite operators are paying the cost of the collision risk imposed on other operators,” said Daniel Kaffine, professor of economics and RASEI Fellow at the University of Colorado Boulder and co-author on the paper. And those fees would increase over time, to account for the rising value of cleaner orbits. In the researchers’ model, the optimal fee would rise at a rate of 14 percent per year, reaching roughly $235,000 per satellite-year by 2040. For an orbital-use fee approach to work, the researchers found, all countries launching satellites would need to participate — that’s about a dozen that launch satellites on their own launch vehicles and more than 30 that own satellites. In addition, each country would need to charge the same fee per unit of collision risk for each satellite that goes into orbit, although each country could collect revenue separately. Countries use similar approaches already in carbon taxes and fisheries management. In this study, Rao and his colleagues compared orbital-use fees to business as usual (that is, open access to space) and to technological fixes such as removing space debris. They found that orbital use fees forced operators to directly weigh the expected lifetime value of their satellites against the cost to industry of putting another satellite into orbit and creating additional risk. In other scenarios, operators still had incentive to race into space, hoping to extract some value before it got too crowded. With orbital-use fees, the long-run value of the satellite industry would increase from around $600 billion under the business-as-usual scenario to around $3 trillion, researchers found. The increase in value comes from reducing collisions and collision-related costs, such as launching replacement satellites. Orbital-use fees could also help satellite operators get ahead of the space junk problem. “In other sectors, addressing the Tragedy of the Commons has often been a game of catch-up with substantial social costs. But the relatively young space industry can avoid these costs before they escalate,” Burgess said.

#### Tag

Firstname **Lastname, Year** – (“Title,” Source, M-D-Y, link)

## Topicality/Theory

### Nebel T

#### Interpretation: private entities is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that the appropriation of outer space by a subset of private entities is unjust.

Jake **Nebel, 19** ("Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution," Briefly, 8-12-19, https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution)

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions. Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. 1.1 “Colleges and Universities” “Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “colleges and universities” fails the upward-entailment test for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution. Fourth, it is extremely unlikely that the topic committee would have written the resolution with the existential interpretation of “colleges and universities” in mind. If they intended the existential interpretation, they would have added explicit existential quantifiers like “some.” No such addition would be necessary or expected for the generic interpretation since generics lack explicit quantifiers by default. The topic committee’s likely intentions are not decisive, but they strongly suggest that the generic interpretation is correct, since it’s prima facie unlikely that a committee charged with writing a sentence to be debated would be so badly mistaken about what their sentence means (which they would be if they intended the existential interpretation). The committee, moreover, does not write resolutions for the 0.1 percent of debaters who debate on the national circuit; they write resolutions, at least in large part, to be debated by the vast majority of students on the vast majority of circuits, who would take the resolution to be (pretty obviously, I’d imagine) generic with respect to “colleges and universities,” given its face-value meaning and standard expectations about what LD resolutions tend to mean.

#### It applies to private entities:

#### Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying that one company’s appropriation is bad does not entail that all companies’ appropriation is bad

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision –any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### 2] Limits—specifying a type of appropriation offers huge explosion in the topic since they get permutations of hundreds of governments, specific companies, and different sectors in the world.

#### Drop the debater to preserve fairness and education – use competing interps –reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### Hypothetical neg abuse doesn’t justify aff abuse, and theory checks cheaty CPs

No RVIs—it’s their burden to be topical.

### Redefining space through positive action bad

#### Interp: Unjust refers to a negative action – it means contrary. As such the affirmative is non-topical if they present a case reliant on positive action, such as redefining space as a global commons. They must garner offense on negative action regarding the harms of appropriation under the current definition of outer space.

**Black Laws No Date** "What is Unjust?" <https://thelawdictionary.org/unjust/> //Elmer

**Contrary to right and justice**, or to the enjoyment of his rights by another**, or to the standards of conduct furnished by the laws**.

#### Violation: The aff has violated the motion of they rely on a positive action such as creating a new concept for Space i.e. the treating of Space as a “Global Commons” or “expanding PTD.”

#### Standards

#### Ground: the aff having access to positive ground wrecks neg generics because we can’t say private entities appropriation good since the GC approach disallows ownership of property in space by private entities.

Use Competing Interps – Topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical