# 1NC v Tommy

### 1NC --- K

#### Settler colonialism is a permeating structure that operates via the promotion of the nation-state – it thrives off of the elimination of indigenous people and their relationship to land – that appropriation turns them into ghosts

Tuck and Yang 12 (Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang; 2012; Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40; *“Decolonization is not a metaphor”*; accessed 12/7/21; <https://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf>; Eve Tuck is a Unangax̂ scholar in the field of Indigenous studies and educational research. Tuck is the associate professor of critical race and indigenous studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto; K. Wayne Yang is Provost of John Muir College and Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, San Diego; pages 5-7) HB \*brackets in original\* \*They use masculine pronouns to describe the settler not through direct association of the settler as a man but rather a dominating subject characterized as hypermasculine\*

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts - though they can overlap4 - and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place - indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves5 , whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making a new "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6 The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire - utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth). Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context - empire, settlement, and internal colony - make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires7 . Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone

#### The 1AC is located within the second university – their investments into critical theory as a praxis of naturally produced freedom is a method of settler futurity that relies on the same systems that perpetuate conditions of exploitation

La Paperson 17 (La Paperson, AKA K. Wayne Yang; 2017; The University of Minnesota Press; *“A Third University is Possible”*; accessed 12/21/21; ask me for the pdf; K. Wayne Yang is a professor and scholar in Indigenous organizing and critical pedagogy. He is a professor of ethnic studies at the University of California, San Diego and Provost of John Muir College) HB \*La Paperson uses masculine pronouns to describe the settler not through direct association of the settler as a man but rather a dominating subject characterized as hypermasculine\*

The Second University Critiques The second world university, like Second Cinema, is marked by its investments in critical theory, that is, the diverse work of the Frankfurt School in critiquing media and capitalist systems in the “West” that emerged out of World War II. Two threads of critical theory run through academia in the arts and humanities, on one hand, and the social sciences, on the other. Literary critical theory focuses on the deconstruction of texts for their underlying meanings, whereas social theory focuses on domination within social systems, usually from a neo-Marxist frame.[15] At least ideologically, the second world university is committed to the transformation of society through critique, through a deconstruction of systems of power, and in this way offers fundamental analyses for any third world university curriculum. Yet its hidden curriculum reflects the material conditions of higher education—fees, degrees, expertise, and the presumed emancipatory possibilities of the mind—and reinscribes academic accumulation. Usually, when traditionalists speak with nostalgia for the idealized university of old, the library counter in the sky where Kant and Hegel and Freire study together, this is the second world university. We are familiar with it; in the United States, it often houses the Marxist scholars, the ethnic studies formations, women’s studies, gender studies, and American studies. To borrow some rhetoric from Gayatri Spivak, it is the house of the hegemonic radical, the postcolonial ghetto neighborhood within the university metropolis. One of the tautological traps of the second world university is mistaking its personalized pedagogy of self-actualization for decolonial transformation. When people say “another university is possible,” they are more precisely saying that “a second university is possible,” and they are often imagining second world utopias, where the professor ceases to profess, where hierarchies disappear, where all personal knowledges are special, and, in other words, none are. Their assumption is that people will “naturally” produce freedom, and freedom’s doppelganger is critical consciousness. They are rarely talking about a university that rematriates land, that disciplines scholar-warriors rather than “liberating” its students, that repurposes the industrial machinery, that supports insurrectionary nationalisms as problematic antidotes to imperialist nationalism, that acts upon financial systems rather than just critiquing them, that helps in the accumulation of third world power rather than simply disavowing first world power, that is a school-to-community pipeline, not a community-to-school pipeline. In short, “another university is possible,” so far, hasn’t made possible a third world university. The second world university announces itself through nostalgia. Sara Ahmed describes this as “an academic world [that] can be idealised in being mourned as a lost object; a world where dons get to decide things; a world imagined as democracy, as untroubled by the whims and wishes of generations to come.”[16] This nostalgia can be futuristic, indeed, the dons are imagining themselves a permanent future in a white academic pantheon. This is similar to settler futurity, which is always nostalgic for its own current power, fearful that it may come to pass. The second world university is a pedagogical utopia. Its horizons are still total in that its end goal is a utopia that everyone should and can attend. This liberal expansion rests materially on the continued accumulation of fees, debt, and land by its big baby turned big baby daddy, the first world university.[17] Nonetheless, second world critique does inform third world work. As Denise da Silva has often said, “we cannot stay in the work of critique, but we must go through critique to get to the work.” Through critique, and the dirty work that follows it, we might find some machinery useful for a third world.

#### The alternative is a refusal of the affirmative – an engagement in the process of decentering settler subjectivities and injecting indigenous knowledge – in this project, refusal constitutes a multi-faceted method towards decolonization

Grande 18 (Sandy Grande; 2018; Routledge Publishing; *“Refusing the University,”* a chapter in the series of essays *“Toward What Justice?: Describing Diverse Dreams of Justice in Education”*; accessed 12/22/21; ask me for the pdf; Sandy Grande is associate professor and Chair of the Education Department at Connecticut College. Her research interfaces critical Indigenous theories with the concerns of education; 58-62) HB

Taking into account the power relations of both capitalism and white supremacy, Indigenous scholars posit refusal as a positive stance that is: less oriented around attaining an affirmative form of recognition… and more about critically revaluating, reconstructing and redeploying culture and tradition in ways that seek to prefigure… a radical alternative to the structural and psycho-affective facets of colonial domination. (Coulthard, 2007, p. 456) In this way, Indigenous refusal both negatively rejects the (false) promise of inclusion and other inducements of the settler state and positively asserts Indigenous sovereignty and peoplehood. In Mohawk Interruptus (2014), Audra Simpson theorizes refusal as distinct from resistance in that it does not take authority as a given. More specifically, at the heart of the text, she theorizes refusal at the “level of method and representation,” exposing the colonialist underpinnings of the “demand to know” as a settler logic. In response, she develops the notion of ethnographic refusal as a stance or space for Indigenous subjects to limit access to what is knowable and to being known, articulating how refusal works “in everyday encounters to enunciate repeatedly to ourselves and to outsiders that ‘this is who we are, this is who you are, these are my rights’” (Simpson, 2007, p. 73). Mignolo (2011) and Quijano (1991) similarly take up refusal in relation to knowledge formation, asserting Indigenous knowledge itself as a form of refusal; a space of epistemic disobedience that is “delinked” from Western, liberal, capitalist understandings of knowledge as production. Gómez-Barris (2012) theorizes the Mapuche hunger strikes as “an extreme bodily performance and political instantiation” of refusal, an act wherein their starving bodies upon the land literally enact what it means to live in a state of permanent war (p. 120). Understood as expressions of sovereignty, such acts of refusal threaten the settler state, carrying dire if not deadly consequences for Indigenous subjects. As noted by Ferguson (2015), “capitalist settler states prefer resistance” because it can be “negotiated or recognized,” but refusal “throws into doubt” the entire system and is therefore more dangerous. While within the university the consequences of academic refusal are much less dire, they still carry a risk. To refuse inclusion offends institutional authorities offering “the gift” of belonging, creating conditions of precarity for the refuser. For example, refusal to participate in the politics of respectability that characterizes institutional governance can result in social isolation, administrative retribution, and struggles with self-worth. Similarly, the refusal to comply with the normative structures of tenure and promotion (e.g., emphasizing quantity over quality; publishing in “mainstream” journals) can and does lead to increased marginalization, exploitation, and job loss.16 And, in a system where Indigenous scholars comprise less than 1% of the professorate, such consequences not only bear hardships for individuals but also whole communities. That said, academic “rewards” and inducements accessed through recognition-based politics can have even deeper consequences. As Jodi Byrd (2011) reminds us, the colonization of Indigenous lands, bodies, and minds will not be ended by “further inclusion or more participation” (Byrd, 2011, p. xxvi). The inspirational work of Black radical and Indigenous scholars compels thinking beyond the limits of academic recognition and about the generative spaces of refusal that not only reject settler logics but also foster possibilities of co-resistance. The prospect of coalition re-raises one of the initial animating questions of this chapter: What kinds of solidarities can be developed among peoples with a shared commitment to working beyond the imperatives of capital and the settler state? Clearly, despite the ubiquitous and often overly facile calls for solidarity, building effective coalitions is deeply challenging, even among insurgent scholars. Within this particular context, tensions between Indigenous sovereignty and decolonial projects and anti-racist, social justice projects, raise a series of suspicions: whether calls for Indigenous sovereignty somehow elide the a priori condition of blackness (the “unsovereign” subject),17 whether anti-racist struggles sufficiently account for Indigenous sovereignty as a land-based struggle elucidated outside regimes of property, and whether theorizations of settler colonialism sufficiently account for the forces and structures of white supremacy, racial slavery, and antiblackness. Rather than posit such tensions as terminally incommensurable, however, I want to suggest a parallel politics of dialectical co-resistance. When Black peoples can still be killed but not murdered; when Indians are still made to disappear; when (Indigenous) land and Black bodies are still destroyed and accumulated for settler profit; it is incumbent upon all those who claim a commitment to refusing the white supremacist, capitalist, settler state, to do the hard work of building “interconnected movements for decolonization” (Coulthard, 2014). The struggle is real. It is both material and psychological, both method and politics, and thus must necessarily straddle the both/and (as opposed to either/or) coordinates of revolutionary change. In terms of process, this means working simultaneously beyond resistance and through the enactment of refusal—as fugitive, abolitionist, and Indigenous, sovereign subjects. Within the context of the university, this means replacing calls for more inclusive and diverse, safe spaces within the university with the development of a network of sovereign, safe houses outside the university. Kelley reminds us of the long history of this struggle, recalling the Institute of the Black World at Atlanta University (1969), the Mississippi Freedom Schools, and the work of Black feminists Patricia Robinson, Donna Middleton, and Patricia Haden as inspirational models. As a contemporary model, he references Harney and Moten’s vision of the undercommons as a space of possibility: a fugitive space wherein the pursuit of knowledge is not perceived as a path toward upward mobility and material wealth but rather as a means toward eradicating oppression in all of its forms (Undercommoning Collective). The ultimate goal, according to Kelley (2016), is to create in the present a future that overthrows the logic of neoliberalism. Scholars within Native studies similarly build upon a long tradition of refusing the university, theorizing from and about sovereignty through land-based models of education. Whereas a fugitive flees and seeks to escape, the Indigenous stands ground or, as Deborah Bird points out, “to get in the way of settler colonization, all the native has to do is stay at home” (as cited in Wolfe, 2006, p. 388). The ultimate goal of Indigenous refusal is Indigenous resurgence; a struggle that includes but is not limited to the return of Indigenous land. Again, while the aims may be different (and in some sense competing), efforts toward the development of parallel projects of co-resistance are possible through vigilant and sustained engagement. The “common ground” here is not necessarily literal but rather conceptual, a corpus of shared ethics and analytics: anti-capitalist, feminist, anti-colonial. Rather than allies, we are accomplices—plotting the death but not murder of the settler university. Toward this end, I offer some additional strategies for refusing the university: First and foremost, we need to commit to collectivity—to staging a refusal of the individualist promise project of the settler state and its attendant institutions. This requires that we engage in a radical and ongoing reflexivity about who we are and how we situate ourselves in the world. This includes but is not limited to a refusal of the cycle of individualized inducements—particularly, the awards, appointments, and grants that require complicity or allegiance to institutions that continue to oppress and dispossess. It is also a call to refuse the perceived imperative to self-promote, to brand one’s work and body. This includes all the personal webpages, incessant Facebook updates, and Twitter feeds featuring our latest accomplishments, publications, grants, rewards, etc. etc. Just. Make. It. Stop. The journey is not about self—which means it is not about promotion and tenure—it is about the disruption and dismantling of those structures and processes that create hierarchies of individual worth and labor. Second, we must commit to reciprocity—the kind that is primarily about being answerable to those communities we claim as our own and those we claim to serve. It is about being answerable to each other and our work. One of the many things lost to the pressures of the publish-or-perish, quantity-over-quality neoliberal regime is the loss of good critique. We have come to confuse support with sycophantic praise and critical evaluation with personal injury. Through the ethic of reciprocity, we need to remind ourselves that accountability to the collective requires a commitment to engage, extend, trouble, speak back to, and intensify our words and deeds. Third, we need to commit to mutuality, which implies reciprocity but is ultimately more encompassing. It is about the development of social relations not contingent upon the imperatives of capital—that refuses exploitation at the same time as it radically asserts connection, particularly to land. Inherent to a land-based ethic is a commitment to slowness and to the arc of inter-generational resurgence and transformation. One of the many ways that the academy recapitulates colonial logics is through the overvaluing of fast, new, young, and individualist voices and the undervaluing of slow, elder, and collective ones. And in such a system, relations and paradigms of connection, mutuality, and collectivity are inevitably undermined. For Indigenous peoples, such begin and end with land, centering questions of what it means to be a good relative. Toward this end, I have been thinking a lot lately about the formation of a new scholarly collective, one that writes and researches under a nom de guerre—like the Black feminist scholars and activists who wrote under and through the Combahee River Collective or the more recent collective of scholars and activists publishing as “the uncertain commons.”18 If furthering the aims of insurgence and resurgence (and not individual recognition) is what we hold paramount, then perhaps one of the most radical refusals we can authorize is to work together as one; to enact a kind of Zapatismo scholarship and a balaclava politics where the work of the collectivity is intentionally structured to obscure and transcend the single voice, body, and life. Together we could write in refusal of liberal, essentialist forms of identity politics, of individualist inducements, of capitalist imperatives, and other productivist logics of accumulation. This is what love as refusal looks like. It is the un-demand, the un-desire to be either of or in the university. It is the radical assertion to be on: land. Decolonial love is land.

#### The role of the ballot should be to center indigenous scholarship – any project of research should begin and end with placing the indigenous demands and resistance at it’s forefront. Our role as settlers specifically obligates us to center our politics in the context of ensuring accountability

Carlson 16 (Elizabeth Carlson; 10/21/16; Settler Colonial Studies; *“Anti-colonial methodologies and practices for settler colonial studies”*; accessed 12/28/21; ask me for the pdf; Elizabeth Carlson is an Assistant Professor at the School of Social Work at Laurentian University; pages 9-10) HB

Relational and epistemic accountability to Indigenous peoples Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colonized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’. 42 Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies. I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral, and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoples, and take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous erasure, but rather take a longer and broader view. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. There is much pressure to claim unique space, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemonic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic. As has been argued, ‘the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices and to marginalize Indigenous resistance’. 44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humility and accountability. We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty. We can view oral Indigenous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and provided the foundations for our work. If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholarship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic.

# Case

#### Vote neg on presumpiont their attempt to do nothing caused them to do something which proves their method is bad

#### Bifo cherry picks examples and ignores broader social progress occurring in the status quo – dooms his analysis.

Sayarer 15 [Julian, “Cheer up ‘Bifo’—history hasn’t ended yet”]

Indeed, were it not that Berardi’s logic were so selective and its perspective so narrow, the book would be all the more disheartening. Fortunately, also conspicuous is an author who is himself struggling with the present, soothing his concerns with an easy, leftist lament that envisages no greater role for humans than that of the happy worker. He raises objections to algorithms (rather than—more helpfully—arguing that these tools might serve human ends), and wishes for a time when humans made ‘real objects.’ The book also advances an elementary critique of monetary systems that rightly illustrates the economy of faith that is currency, but seems only to conclude that some finite resource (such as gold and the gold standard it once underpinned) might in some way be an improvement. All of this is profoundly unfortunate, for few would deny that modern work patterns must be made fairer and more human. Early on, Berardi writes: “History has been replaced by the endless flowing recombination of fragmentary images… frantic precarious activity has taken the place of political awareness and strategy.” The ironic missed opportunity of Heroes is that in it, the author has produced only one further recombination: a pastiche of graphic events, mass shootings and assorted corporate abuses that fall victim to the same shallow lust for spectacle that Berardi devotes such worthy efforts to decry. Anders Breivik, Virginia Tech, the Aurora Killings, Japanese suicide patterns and much else besides—modern capitalism has had an enormously detrimental effect on the lives of billions, and yet a statistically irrelevant number of these sorrows and grievances culminate in either mass shootings or suicides. Berardi identifies the existence of an iceberg, and yet contents himself with describing only its very tip. He eschews the banal and the human to focus on the fast-sell of the sensational, prophesising some coming end rather than taking on the more trying but rewarding task of explaining how things persist when so much suggests they might fall apart. He explains exceptions delightfully, while seldom troubling himself with the rule itself, or the norm he condemns. It is this very tendency that must be redressed, as Berardi probably would agree. He affords no attention to peer to-peer lending, fossil fuel divestment, credit unions, ethical banking growth, worker co-ops, fair tax certification, communication expansion through cell phones and the internet, or innovations in mobile currency. All of these changes are potentially problematic developments that are of course vulnerable to the replication of old injustices. No less certainly, however, they offer evidence that the status quo Berardi describes is neither static nor condemned only to change the world for the worse.

#### Materialism first – applying Bifo’s theory ignores the massive violence done by contemporary capitalism to continue.

Keefer 11 [Lucas Keefer is currently a graduate student studying philosophy and psychology at Georgia State University. “Review - The Soul at Work”]

Of course, some Marxist theorists have already been aware of this need for a critique of contemporary consciousness and have suggested important alternatives. Berardi follows Deleuze and Guattari in adopting a therapeutic approach, though we might also follow Lefebvre (1943/2009) and suggest that a critique of semiocapitalism might also depend on returning to an analysis of the reality of alienation in the everyday lives of those oppressed. If the “soul” oppresses itself under semiocapitalism, it does so only by investing all meaning in the symbolic reality of simulations. Marxist-scientific critique remains, therefore, one way of returning this oppressed symbolic consciousness to the reality of its oppression (see also e.g. Martín-Baró, 1994). Berardi also notes the ways in which semiocapitalism pathologizes (and medicates) reactions against alienation (207). The increased rates of depression and availability of anti-depressants, Berardi suggests, are an indication of humanity’s resistance to a system of symbolic production that exploits subjectivity. As a result, no medicalization of depression can ever hope to successfully treat the root cause of depression, which lies in the alienated existence of postmodernity. The problem here is striking: treatments for depression cost money and only further demand that people labor under semiocapitalism to afford their medications and therapy. It is a race to the bottom in which exploitation and treatment perpetuate each other indefinitely. Berardi suggests a therapeutic shift towards schizoanalysis, following Deleuze (214-219), which suggests that therapeutics must be an ongoing project of restoring autonomy in the face of capitalism’s control over desire. One noteworthy omission from this text is the absence of any consideration of semiocapitalism’s relationship to other capitalisms. While Berardi illustrates the process of alienation in semiocapitalism, these analyses must be tempered by a recognition that cognitive labor is not the norm. While globalization may change this over time, we should recognize that semiocapitalism itself depends upon the more concrete alienation of the physical laborers who provide food (e.g. de Botton, 2009), etc. For semiocapitalism to be parasitic upon the “souls” of human laborers, it must also be parasitic upon the bodies of others to perpetuate the physical existence that underlies the alienation of the soul.

#### Bifo’s explanation of semiocap is vague af and enables the continuation of wage slavery and exploitation – only collective action to challenge de-regulation can solve

Giovanni Vimercati, 12-13-17, contributor to the Brooklyn Rail. "Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi’s Futurability: The Age of Impotence and the Horizon of Possibility," Brooklyn Rail, <https://brooklynrail.org/2017/12/books/Franco-Bifo-Berardis-The-Age-of-Impotence-and-the-Horizon-of-Possibility> --rubaie

Bifo remains predictably vague when it comes to concretely suggesting a possible way out, and it would be naïve and possibly even dangerous to expect otherwise. If we are to ever survive the end of capitalism, it won’t be thanks to a magic formula readily laid out in a book, and certainly not by someone who spent his life advocating the joy of collective action against the sadness of individual indifference. Bifo sees the “emancipation of knowledge from capital accumulation” as the key to the liberation of everyday life. What cognitive workers need, according to him, is “a technical platform for autonomous cooperation” in order to “dismantle and re-programme the machine.” Left out from the emancipatory equation, though, are the millions of neo-slaves, be they Chinese factory workers, Uber drivers, undocumented migrant laborers, or eastern European prostitutes. Are we sure that general intellect alone can emancipate workers, not only cognitive ones, from the increasingly medieval conditions that are being forced upon them? Unlike accelerationist enthusiasts, Bifo knows and stresses the fact that automation and the consequent reduction of manual jobs does not automatically mean liberation from wage slavery. Quite the contrary, the paradox of automation under capitalism is that “it blackmails workers to work faster in exchange for less and less money in an impossible race against robots.” As outdated and antiquated as it may sound, perhaps workers’ struggles, made almost impossible by the violent deregulation of the job market, remain the cardinal juncture through which a future without exploitation, or at least less of it, has to go. That said, Bifo’s central intuition about the centrality of bodies, radical generosity, and affection is indeed precious—though maybe preliminary. To share, disinterestedly, whatever little we have left, both materially and emotionally, is indeed the toughest challenge ahead of us.

#### Bifo’s analysis is reductive and over-totalizing

Pursley 10 [Mike, “From Alienation to Autonomy by Franco "Bifo" Berardi”]

Here’s a taste of some of the most abstract: “The infinite capacity of replication of the recombining simulator device erases the originality of the event.” Or how about: “The productive finalization of technology ends up subjugating the thinking process from the standpoint of its own epistemological structures.” Indeed. Capitalism, and his absolute distaste for it, is where Bifo makes himself absolutely clear. It’s the catch-all cause for all modern strife, a “pathogenic mechanism” that is the ruin of everything. Preaching “liberation from capitalism” is where the author will most likely loose all but the most radical of readers. The capitalist system is clearly not without faults, but presenting it as scapegoat for every ill we face may be too simple. At times Bifo seems a cranky old curmudgeon madly shaking his fist at the present. This is the Bifo that bemoans “collective mental pollution” and says of the world: “too many signs, too fast, too chaotic.” His qualms with hyperreal society are at times a good diagnosis of our problems, but the prescribed anti-capitalist panacea remains questionable. For all the theory involved to make his case, Bifo’s solution is strangely and kind of awesomely underwhelming. We are urged to reconsider how wealth is defined, to focus more on friendships and an easygoing life rather than profits. Who but Henry Ford himself could argue with that? The volume ends with a few thoughts on the current Great Recession, where the collapse of the economy “can be read as the return of the soul.” For that, we will have to see.

#### Bifo’s alternative fails at disrupting capital

Lear 12 Ben Lear is an underemployed researcher living in Manchester, UK. He recently co-authored an article in Occupy Everything! Reflections on Why it's Kicking off Everywhere, and is a member of Plan C., "Lifeboat Communism – A Review of Franco “Bifo” Berardi’s After the Future," 5-18-2012, Viewpoint Magazine, http://viewpointmag.com/2012/05/18/lifeboat-communism-a-review-of-franco-bifo-berardis-after-the-future/

What does the end of the future mean for rad­i­cal pol­i­tics? It is at this point that Bifo’s argu­ment becomes prob­lem­atic. In an argu­ment that inter­sects with groups such as Tiqqun, Bifo argues that we must see “Com­mu­nism as a neces­sity in the col­lapse of cap­i­tal.” Dis­tant from the vol­un­tarism of pre­vi­ous forms of Com­mu­nist pol­i­tics, this “post-growth Com­mu­nism” will be best under­stood as a nec­es­sary response to capital’s refusal of labour. Cut adrift from the “oppor­tu­nity” to work, with wel­fare sys­tems dis­man­tled, Bifo argues that we will wit­ness the pro­lif­er­a­tion of zones of auton­omy respond­ing to the needs of an increas­ingly pre­car­i­ous and super­flu­ous social body. Com­mu­nist pol­i­tics will emerge from an exo­dus, both vol­un­tary and com­pul­sory, from a stag­nat­ing and increas­ingly preda­tory state-capital nexus. This exo­dus is both social, in the devel­op­ment of an alter­na­tive infra­struc­ture, and per­sonal, in the with­drawal from the hyper-stimulation of the semi­otic econ­omy. Bifo aban­dons hope in col­lec­tive con­tes­ta­tion at the level of the political. Bifo’s pol­i­tics could be described as a kind of “lifeboat com­mu­nism.” As the cri­sis rip­ples, mutates, and deep­ens, Bifo sees the role of com­mu­nism as the cre­ation of spaces of sol­i­dar­ity to blunt the worst effects of the cri­sis of social repro­duc­tion. Gone is the demand for a bet­ter world for all, the lib­er­a­tion of our col­lec­tive social wealth, or the unlock­ing of the social poten­tials of tech­nol­ogy. Rather, Bifo’s pol­i­tics are based around insu­lat­ing a nec­es­sar­ily small por­tion of soci­ety from the dic­tates of cap­i­tal. By with­draw­ing from the polit­i­cal sphere, we accept the like­li­hood of los­ing the final scraps of the wel­fare state and con­cede the ter­rain of the polit­i­cal to zom­bie pol­i­tics and preda­tory cap­i­tal. Rather than seek­ing new forms of orga­ni­za­tion to re-enter the polit­i­cal stage, Bifo seems to sug­gest that we seek shel­ter beneath it as best we can. This shy­ing away from the polit­i­cal stage is the weak­ness at the heart of the book. Recent erup­tions of polit­i­cal strug­gle have cap­tured the col­lec­tive-imag­i­na­tion because they demon­strate that polit­i­cal con­tes­ta­tion is still pos­si­ble today, in spite of the obsta­cles Bifo has described. The Occupy move­ment and the upris­ings in the Mid­dle East and North Africa have res­onated with all those who still have hope in col­lec­tive strug­gle. Although these move­ments have encoun­tered vary­ing prob­lems, to which we must develop solu­tions, they dis­pel the idea of an unchange­able present. The cur­rent block­ages to suc­cess­ful organ­is­ing have been shown to be strate­gic and tac­ti­cal, not ter­mi­nal. Mis­di­ag­nos­ing the cur­rent iner­tia of post-political pub­lic life as a ter­mi­nal con­di­tion leads the left towards an evac­u­a­tion of the polit­i­cal, while we should instead reassert its pri­macy. If we aban­don any hope of fight­ing in, against, and beyond the exist­ing archi­tec­ture of the state and cap­i­tal, and instead seek refuge in small com­munes, and go-slow prac­tices, we aban­don all real hope of a gen­er­al­ized, or gen­er­al­iz­able, eman­ci­pa­tory pol­i­tics. Although Bifo’s analy­sis of the dif­fi­cul­ties of col­lec­tive action res­onates with all of us who have attempted to orga­nize strug­gles in the past few decades, the pro­posal for a sim­ple with­drawal from cap­i­tal­ism is a bleak pol­i­tics indeed – which, at its most opti­mistic, calls for an orderly default by por­tions of the pro­le­tariat. The hori­zons of com­mu­nist pol­i­tics appear much nar­rower when cap­i­tal­ism is no longer seen as the repos­i­tory of a vast store of social wealth await­ing col­lec­tive redis­tri­b­u­tion, but rather rede­fined as an unas­sail­able site of uni­ver­sal and per­ma­nent aus­ter­ity com­bined with widen­ing social redundancy. It is hard to imag­ine a net­work of self-organized projects and sys­tems sup­port­ing the major­ity of the pop­u­la­tion in the con­text of an increas­ingly preda­tory cap­i­tal­ism. Emerg­ing from the and iso­lated left­ist scenes, this lifeboat com­mu­nism will by its very nature have a lim­ited car­ry­ing capac­ity, as the anar­chist expe­ri­ence in post-Katrina New Orleans attests. The lifeboats that Bifo calls for will undoubt­edly be too small and makeshift to har­bor us all. The cri­sis is twofold. It is a cri­sis of cap­i­tal­ist prof­itabil­ity, and of an increas­ingly pre­car­i­ous and sur­plus global pro­le­tariat whose repro­duc­tion (as both labour and body) is under threat. It is unlikely that the pro­lif­er­a­tion of com­munes, squats, food co-ops, file shar­ers, urban gar­den­ers, and vol­un­tary health ser­vices will bring forth a new, bet­ter world. But while the cur­rent seem­ingly post-political sit­u­a­tion throws up mas­sive obsta­cles to orga­niz­ing, there is still a poten­tial for col­lec­tive con­tes­ta­tion. The cap­i­tal­ist state, racked by its own legit­i­macy cri­sis and weekly polit­i­cal scan­dals, is more vul­ner­a­ble than it appears. We need only recall the period of unex­pected hope built by stu­dents in Britain, occu­piers in Oak­land, and vast swathes of North Africa and the Mid­dle East dur­ing the past two years. These move­ments were mobilised through the betrayal of a vision of the future – but along­side their rage, they put forth a hope which can guide our politics. The task at hand is to unlearn old behav­iour and to forge new tac­ti­cal and organ­i­sa­tional weapons for strug­gle. Bifo’s con­tri­bu­tion is a timely and chal­leng­ing one, but it ulti­mately leads us back towards a DIY cul­ture and “out­reach” pol­i­tics. As our move­ments come to terms with these lim­its, we must also hold onto the belief that lux­ury for all is pos­si­ble. The social poten­tial of unfilled blocks of flats, emerg­ing tech­nolo­gies like [3D-printing](http://www.open-designism.com/profiles/blogs/finally-it-has-happened-the-pirate-bay-goes-product-bay), and the desires of the mil­lions of under­em­ployed, should remind us of this. This will not be pos­si­ble with­out a col­lec­tive strug­gle against the state and the demands of cap­i­tal, one which simul­ta­ne­ously defends what we have and attempts to move beyond it. A retreat to lifeboat pol­i­tics is both pre­ma­ture and a self-fulfilling prophecy. While Bifo cor­rectly analy­ses the cur­rent con­junc­ture – clearly iden­ti­fy­ing the post-political state, the weak­ness of the Left, the cri­sis of prof­itabil­ity and new forms of labour, and their impact on the sub­ject – his polit­i­cal pre­scrip­tions lead us in the wrong direc­tion. Just as Bifo does, we place the strug­gle against work at the cen­ter; but we can also seek to lib­er­ate social wealth, rather than insu­late a lucky few from the rav­ages of cap­i­tal. Rather than “No Future,” we must raise a dif­fer­ent ban­ner: “The future’s here, it just needs reorganizing.”

#### Calling for the ballot re-affirms the status quo

Campbell 98 [David, “Performing Politics and the Limits of Language, Theory & Event”]

Those who argue that hate speech demands juridical responses assert that not only does the speech communicate, but that it constitutes an injurious act. This presumes that not only does speech act, but that "it acts upon the addressee in an injurious way" (16). This argumentation is, in Butler's eyes, based upon a "sovereign conceit" whereby speech wields a sovereign power, acts as an imperative, and embodies a causative understanding of representation. In this manner, hate speech constitutes its subjects as injured victims unable to respond themselves and in need of the law's intervention to restrict if not censor the offending words, and punish the speaker: This idealization of the speech act as a sovereign action (whether positive or negative) appears linked with the idealization of sovereign state power or, rather, with the imagined and forceful voice of that power. It is as if the proper power of the state has been expropriated, delegated to its citizens, and the state then rememerges as a neutral instrument to which we seek recourse to protects as from other citizens, who have become revived emblems of a (lost) sovereign power (82). Two elements of this are paradoxical. First, the sovereign conceit embedded in conventional renderings of hate speech comes at a time when understanding power in sovereign terms is becoming (if at all ever possible) even more difficult. Thus the juridical response to hate speech helps deal with an onto-political problem: "The constraints of legal language emerge to put an end to this particular historical anxiety [the problematisation of sovereignty], for the law requires that we resituate power in the language of injury, that we accord injury the status of an act and trace that act to the specific conduct of a subject" (78). The second, which stems from this, is that (to use Butler's own admittedly hyperbolic formulation) "the state produces hate speech." By this she means not that the state is the sovereign subject from which the various slurs emanate, but that within the frame of the juridical account of hate speech "the category cannot exist without the state's ratification, and this power of the state's judicial language to establish and maintain the domain of what will be publicly speakable suggests that the state plays much more than a limiting function in such decisions; in fact, the state actively produces the domain of publicly acceptable speech, demarcating the line between the domains of the speakable and the unspeakable, and retaining the power to make and sustain the line of consequential demarcation" (77). The sovereign conceit of the juridical argument thus linguistically resurrects the sovereign subject at the very moment it seems most vulnerable, and reaffirms the sovereign state and its power in relation to that subject at the very moment its phantasmatic condition is most apparent. The danger is that the resultant extension of state power will be turned against the social movements that sought legal redress in the first place (24)