### 1NC – Disclosure

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose the 1AC with cites and open source on the 2021-2022 NDCA wiki, or tell the negative what the 1AC will be and if there are any changes to said 1AC 30 minutes prior to the round.

#### Violations: They didn’t -- SC in the doc prove

A screenshot of a computer

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#### Standards:

#### 1] Research - disclosure allows debaters to pursue more information on an opponent’s case and exposes us to more literature. More reading means we get the most holistic education from the preparation process, rather than having the shallow process of reading tag lines and hearing only what is high lighted

#### 2] Strategy – I’m able to prepare a much better neg strategy which allows the aff to be tested to a much greater depth which in turn leads to the best rounds and most education.

#### 3] Ethics – its ethical to disclose for a few reasons. 1. Online it lets us still debate with poor internet connection which is key to retain accessibility. 2. It allows us to make sure that the evidence that is being read is not being misrepresented and is legit.

#### 4] Reciprocity – I’ve open sourced all of my positions on the neg and they haven’t told me what aff they are reading this round which makes it impossible for me to prepare before the round but they can prepare against me.

#### Voter:

#### 1] Education and fairness – not disclosing kills our ability to engage with the aff which kills education and fairness which must be prioritized.

#### 2] Inclusivity is a voter - the ballot is supposed to test the argumentative capacity of the debater. We should strive to eliminate external influence over this decision.

#### DTD –

#### A] Deters future abuse

#### B] Drop the arg cant solve – the abuse has already happened

#### Competing interps –

#### A] Reasonability is Arbitrary and invites judge intervention – impossible to determine what is reasonable, which means debating over specific interps is best and we don’t know you’re bs meter or what you think is reasonable

#### B] Intervention – judges have to intervene and determine what is reasonable which is bad bc it forces judges to make decisions along preferred biases, which causes biased and possibly discriminatory decisions.

#### C] Collapses – we would just debate over the bright line which is functionally competing interps

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#### No RVI’s

#### A] Baiting – that invites maximally abusive praxis bc people will just prep out the shell

#### B] Chilling – if we drop by trying to enforce a norm that we think is good then we wont do it again – this means were never able to create norms which ows on magnitude

#### C] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for meeting your burden if that was the case, affs could just win by saying they affirm the topic.

### 1NC – K

#### Epistemic appeals to the validity of the real are a farce – The media represents a world more real than real; information has fallen into the void of illusion – we are gorged with meaning to the point that trump can spew nonsense and it becomes real – The affirmatives form of communication is just a new expansion of the hyper real – we must reject the appeal to information as a method of actualizing progress.

Shapiro, 20 [Alan Shapiro, specialist in Applied Baudrillard, “Is Trump a Fascist or is He the Parody of Fascism?” 10/31/2020, http://www.alan-shapiro.com/is-trump-a-fascist-or-is-he-the-parody-of-fascism/]//Townes

Epistemology of True and False¶ The kind of media theory or media analysis which has been prevalent on the American political left for the past several decades operates essentially with an epistemology of true and false. Noam Chomsky has always been subtle and nuanced in describing the moral complicity of the intellectual class (and his own personal struggle to overcome that complicity) with abhorrent U.S. government policies such as the destruction of Vietnam in the 1960s or of Iraq in 1991. Yet Chomsky’s commentaries on what the corporate liberal media reports on politics, current events, and world affairs are largely about exposing the lies that the news media tells and recounting the contextual and factual realities on the ground which they conceal. Chomsky only analyzes the entity called the news media. He does not analyze the media as a whole – for example, entertainment TV shows, advertising, celebrity culture, or blockbuster movies. He assumes that an understanding of the news media or of the domain called politics or the public sphere can be accomplished without connecting the news media to the media in general in the overall situation of advanced capitalism. In classic works such as Manufacturing Consent (co-authored with Edward S. Herman and published in 1992) and Media Control (2002), Chomsky argues that the mass communications news media carries out the propaganda function of lying.1 Powerful business interests which have a profit motive manipulate the media, which in turn manipulates and controls the citizenry. The truth that American foreign policy has the essential function of establishing governments around the world which are politically controlled by us and are friendly to big companies is concealed by the dissemination of falsehoods. The role of the leftist activist or journalist is to tell the truth about any given political conjuncture. Chomsky’s work is extremely valuable, yet what is Chomsky’s perspective missing?¶ In their war against Trump, the liberal political media – CNN and the New York Times, for example – take the same tack as Noam Chomsky in epistemologically framing their struggle with the fake billionaire as a battle between true and false, between facts and lies. Trump is constantly telling lies and the Washington Post is unmasking them every day, keeping a list of them, setting the record straight. As of July 2020, Trump had told twenty thousand lies. It is no surprise that Chomsky and the liberal media share this same epistemology – they both believe in the philosophy and the historical project of the modernist Enlightenment: facts, science, truth, communication, rationality – these are allegedly the great achievements of the democratic West. Never mind that it was this same liberal media that helped Trump win the Republican nomination for President in the first place against sixteen other candidates in 2016. Trump merged the sphere of politics with shock jock Reality TV World Wrestling Federation media entertainment. He provided those liberal TV stations, newspapers, and websites with a new sensationalistic headline every day for many months. Since making money is their highest priority – and astonishment, titillation, and breakdown are the commodities they sell – the media loved it and made Trump their absolute focus of attention.¶ Society of the Spectacle and Hyperreality¶ An alternative to the epistemology of true and false as a media theory – which is derivative of the assumption that Enlightenment rationality and the civilized discussion advocated by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty are going to save us – was offered by the French Situationist Guy Debord in his 1967 book Society of the Spectacle.2 Let me state that my position is that we should seek a balance between the modernist commitment to truth and the post-modernist placing into question of that assumption. I do not want to reject rationality and truth, but I believe that new strategies are urgently required as well. Guy Debord was a neo-Marxist thinker attempting to comprehend how control over the lives of workers by capitalists expanded from the sphere of production to consumerism, everyday life, and the media culture of images and rhetoric in the historical progression to advanced capitalism. With his concept of the spectacle, Debord understood that the omnipresence of visual images institutes a world of both abstraction and passivity, a diminishing of what is “directly lived” and an increase in the autonomy and power of the images themselves.3 Something becomes true – or more true than true – by virtue of having been said, or said charismatically, in the media. In the spectacle, “the liar has lied to himself.” “In a world which is topsy-turvy,” writes Debord, “the true is a moment of the false.”4 Social life goes beyond the shift from being to having to appearing and the reign of appearances.¶ The media theorist and semiotician Jean Baudrillard developed Guy Debord’s notion of the society of the spectacle even further into his theory of simulation, simulacra, and hyper-reality.5 Baudrillard’s most celebrated book is his 1981 volume Simulacra and Simulation, where he famously wrote about the map preceding the territory, and about Disneyland existing to conceal the fact that all of America is Disneyland.6 Simulacra are copies without originals. Semiotics (linguistics applied to culture) teaches us about the signifier and the signified, which together constitute the linguistic-cultural sign. In post-modernism, the signifiers (images and discourses) come to replace the signifieds (facts and references) of which the visuals and words are supposed to be the reliable and verifiable representations. Representation is surpassed by simulation. Words and images stand on their own and have no reference.7¶ The spectacle itself has become the main thing that the contemporary society and economy produce. Consumer objects, architectural ambiences, and media artefacts all primarily have an abstract semiotic function. In the system of objects (Baudrillard’s first book of 1968 was The System of Objects), the physicality and definite location of objects gets subordinated to their participation in the “perfect circulation of messages.”8 The intercommunication and relationality of sign-objects to each other takes precedence over the specificity of each. All objects and media content enter into an equivalence through their common belonging to the universal self-congratulatory communication system. Each product ad refers not only to the individual product that it is informing us about – it also refers to itself as ad, endorsing the wonder of advertising per se. Through the spectacular celebration or radical visibility of a single object or brand, it is the totality of objects and a universe made complete by brands that is promoted. In speaking of one single consumer object, advertising virtually glorifies all spectacle objects and media images. Consumer society (Baudrillard’s second book of 1970 was The Consumer Society) does not satisfy needs but is rather a manipulation of signs.9 To become a consumer object or media message, the entity must first enter into the universal sign-system.¶ Baudrillard’s third book of 1972 was For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign.10 Karl Marx’s political-economic theory of the commodity-form of exchange value in production capitalism gets merged – and in a critical way – with a radicalization of Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic semiotics in an original fusion critique of the sign-form in consumer capitalism.11 Baudrillard articulates the homology between Saussure’s linguistic sign and Marx’s commodity form. This unified political economy of the sign or analysis of the commodity-slash-sign form equals the code. The real, the lived, the myth of an objective reality – they all become alibis for the simulation models. The signifier of the greatness of America’s prosperity is standing in for concrete singularities of objects. The code of signifiers substitutes for references in the immense process of simulation. We live in the formal democracy of standards of living and signs of affluence – the republic of the automobile, the cheeseburger, and the home entertainment system. Affluence is the accumulation of signs of happiness.¶ The media in general have cut us off from real access to historical events. Everything that I know about the Holocaust, the Second World War, and the Vietnam War comes from Hollywood films about those events which I have seen. Baudrillard cites many times an aphorism by Jewish German-language philosopher Elias Canetti from 1945, speaking about a certain point in history, when exactly this point was is unknowable, when history itself disappeared. Canetti writes: “As of a certain point, history was no longer real. Without noticing it, all mankind suddenly left reality, everything happening since then was not true; but we didn’t notice.”12 In his essay on Francis Ford Coppola’s 1979 blockbuster Vietnam War movie Apocalypse Now, Baudrillard writes that Coppola’s masterpiece is the continuation of the Vietnam War by other means. “Nothing else in the world smells like that,” says Lt. Colonel Bill Kilgore (Robert Duvall). “I love the smell of napalm in the morning… It smells like victory.”13 The high-budget extravaganza was produced the same way that America fought in Vietnam. “War became film,” writes Baudrillard. “Film becomes war, the two are joined by their common hermorrhage into technology.”14 There is implosion or mutual contamination between film becoming Virtual Reality and War.¶ Donald Trump the Empty Signifier¶ Donald Trump is a product of this culture of postmodern anything goes images and rhetoric. The mythology of Trump was born during the New York City gilded 1980s, the era of Ivan Boesky and Gordon Gecko greed and Wall Street insider trading. Donald Trump plastered the name Donald Trump everywhere he could. He of the golden toilet, he the playboy ladies’ man, the casino owner, the entrepreneur of the opulence of the billion-dollar Atlantic City Taj Majal gambling and entertainment paradise-complex. He was a failed businessman and a gangster, but on Reality TV he played the ultimate glamorous billionaire whom many Americans admired and dreamed of themselves becoming. President Trump lies and his supporters believe it. For them, his charismatic speech has become more powerful than the democratic and scientific systems of true and false.¶ In two of his final texts – Carnival and Cannibal and The Agony of Power – written shortly before his death in 2007, Jean Baudrillard describes a newer “order of simulacra” which is the phase of irony, parody and the carnivalesque.15 Baudrillard upgrades his concepts of simulacra, simulation, and hyper-reality into a cogent diagnosis of the self-parodistic stage of Western society. Simulation or hyper-reality is no longer the artificial staging of a so-called reality by the models and codes which precede it. Simulation is now a farce, an immense irony, a masquerade, a funhouse-mirror distortion of the previous values and ideals of modernism: freedom, culture, truth, humanitarianism. “Every signification is eliminated in its own sign,” writes Baudrillard in The Agony of Power, “and the profusion of signs parodies a by now unobtainable reality… Power is only the parody of the signs of power – the cannibalization of reality by signs.”16 The values of the West and of America degenerate into a caricature of themselves and devour themselves. This is Donald Trump.¶ We have experienced these past four years – in the masterful showmanship of Donald Trump and his fanatic deplorable followers, in the full-scale replacement of politics by Reality TV, in the tele-morphosis of the merger between Reality TV and everyday life – the disappearance of political substance into the fascination with the banality of insults (see Hannah Arendt’s banality of evil) that is now the hallmark of the media-celebrity-gossip culture of obscenity which dominates American life and the online monopoly social media platforms.17 Donald Trump is a successful empty signifier. “The bigger he got as a name, the smaller he got as a person,” said recently the former Trump Organization executive Barbara A. Res.18 Trump is the ultimate simulacrum, the living demonstration of the rule of the signifiers over the signifieds. Fake is not a betrayal of authenticity. Trump is the most talented fake in the world. Lies are exciting. They set in motion their own forceful narrative. When Trump says something, it becomes true because Trump says it, and there is little that the New York Times or the Washington Post can do about it. The institutional bases for consensus and legitimation of the truth have disappeared beneath the mountains of information and the virtualization of discourse. The media culture in general paved the way for Trump. All of America is responsible for the disastrous situation in which we now find ourselves.¶ From Simulation to the Grotesque and the Self-Parody¶ A not so well-known aspect of Baudrillard’s theory of simulation and hyper-reality is the way that he links the postmodern culture of media images to the motif of the grotesque in art, literature and performance, as a cultural expression moves from parody to self-parody, as something becoming a parody or caricature of itself. We are living the historical phase of the self-parody of the revered values of Western civilization. Simulation takes a major step forward from merely “the hyper-real replacing the real” to the grotesque. We are on the fast track to what Baudrillard calls carnivalization and cannibalization. Carnivals were historically very political – they were parodies made of the powerful by the oppressed. At festivals, the black African colonized dressed up monkeys in admiral suits and hats to parody the white colonizers.19 In Cologne and in the Rhineland region of Germany, parody and mockery of the French and Prussian occupiers were at the center of the carnival tradition that began in the nineteenth century. But self-parody is something different. It occurs without conscious intention. It is like what Karl Marx wrote in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, writing about the French coup d’état of 1851, when Marx famously said: “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.”20 To avoid having to give up the Presidency, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte staged a self-coup to stay in power. He carried out Operation Rubicon on the anniversary of his uncle Napoleon’s triumph at Austerlitz in 1805.¶ Self-parody sinks its unaware performer into debasement or abjection. America sank into abjection with the 2004 Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse scandal (Baudrillard wrote about Abu Ghraib in his 2004 essay “War Porn”).21 U.S. Army and Central Intelligence Agency personnel sent selfies to their friends and relatives from Saddam Hussein’s infamous prison, now taken over by the occupying American power, smiling and saying cheese while standing next to prisoners whom they had just sodomized and tortured. Disneyland and the Americana culture of universal total simulation seem like harmless fun. Radical simulation is how America came to achieve hegemony over the world. America had no peers in its fabrication of fantasies and spectacles. Yet at what point does that become seriously perverse? Donald Trump is the embodied metaphor of that turning point. You want to be the world’s only superpower through the image? Then you will bring yourself down by the endlessly looping video image and the image-playback.22 After the tragic event of September 11, 2001, the video footage of the implosion of the World Trade Center twin towers was played back thousands of times over and over again on TV in an endless loop, the eyes of the tele-spectators fixed to the screen in perverse fascination. Baudrillard detected a symbolism in the way that the two tallest buildings of the Manhattan skyline collapsed or imploded in a visually suicidal motion, seemingly responding in turn as a counter-gesture to the murder-suicides of the 19 terrorists.23 The carnival of the image is also the self-cannibalization by the image.24¶ An important precursor of Trump playing the President on television and on Twitter was the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger as governor of California in 2003. The elevation to a powerful political post of the Mr. Olympia bodybuilder and star of the Terminator series of science fiction films was a not-so-surprising caricature of democracy. Reagan the Hollywood actor and TV host of General Electric Theater had already been governor and President. Politics has been fully banalized into a game of idols and fans, the triumph of the celebrity culture.25 Schwarzenegger would have certainly become President if not for the bad luck of an antiquated clause in the Constitution which disqualified him a priori on xenophobic grounds. As we are now witnessing the probable end of the Trump presidency – and thinking with Baudrillard – I contemplate the contempt for the rest of the world which the Trump supporters feel and express through their allegiance to him. Those who identify the most with the simulacrum of America take revenge symbolically for the envy and scorn which the rest of the world feels for the American simulacrum. America exercises its power in the world through its mastery of images. Yet a certain desperation seems to have now set in. The Trump phenomenon is the marriage of that showman grifter narcissist and the desperation of the MAGA throngs worried about losing their standing.¶ Springtime for Hitler¶ For a long time, some Jewish theologians thought that showing images of the Holocaust should be taboo, since the event was the ultimate unrepresentable evil. Humanities theorists of photography have sometimes argued generally that historical truth cannot be depicted through visual images. Similarly, it was thought that Adolf Hitler and the Nazis in the 1930s were so morally reprehensible that parody or comedy or jokes about them should be taboo. In the 1967 film The Producers made by Mel Brooks, bankrupt Broadway producer Max Bialystock, played by Zero Mostel, needs to stage a musical that is guaranteed to be a flop in order to carry out a complex scam to save himself from financial ruin. Bialystock hits upon the apparently ingenious idea of producing a musical comedy about Hitler and the Nazis. It will be in such bad taste that the show is guaranteed to be panned by the public and the theatre critics and to close in disgrace on opening night. Yet to Bialystock’s astonishment, the show is a smashing success. The Broadway public finds Springtime for Hitler to be the funniest thing in the world. Adolf Hitler is unintentionally brilliantly parodied by deranged ex-Nazi Franz Liebkind. Due to the unexpected triumph, Bialystock now paradoxically faces financial ruin and even prison.26¶ Is Trump a fascist or is he the parody of fascism? Here is my answer: he is the parody of fascism. Yet he is also the self-parody of America and, at one step removed, of the celebrated values of the West. Trump is the self-parody of the most hyper-mediatized culture in the world: the culture of consumerism and shopping mall no-place ambient spaces; television and advertising; the media- and image-saturated society of the spectacle; and the hyper-real fantasy aesthetics of Disneyland. As both the parody of fascism and the self-parody of the post-World War II so-called American way of life, as the synthesis of both (self-)parodies, Donald Trump has brought us to the precipice, to the edge of the cliff, to the spot from where we are now standing and staring down into the abyss.¶ Classical fascism works according to the Führer principle and a strong and stable set of beliefs. There are territorial claims, hard nationalism, and theories of race. For Trump, these aspects become variable and anything goes. He changes his mind every day and has no goals or agenda other than greatness and freedom. The energetic force of fascism persists, but without the fixed ideological reference points. This parodies fascism since absolute truth is transferred to the double-system of the empty self-referential signifiers and the arbitrary signifieds.27

#### And Thus, I have taken the 1AC hostage.

#### My demand: the ballot, and 30 speaker points

#### The 1AC has NO ABILITY to respond because I took it, it’s mine, stolen away to defeat the system on its own terms, turning signs against signs and over-accelerating all symbolic distinctions between self and other as the distinction between terrorist and hostage becomes murkier and murkier. Only the negative is so radically other as to collapse the fundamental metastasis of affirmative and negative.

Baudrillard’76 |Jean, dead French philosopher, Symbolic Exchange and Death, pp. 36-38|KZaidi

We will not destroy the system by a direct, dialectical revolution of the economic or political infrastructure. Everything produced by contradiction, by the relation of forces, or by energy in general, will only feed back into the mechanism and give it impetus, following a circular distortion similar to a Moebius strip. We will never defeat it by following its own logic of energy, calculation, reason and revolution, history and power, or some finality or counter-finality. The worst violence at this level has no purchase, and will only backfire against itself. We will never defeat the system on the plane of the real: the worst error of all our revolutionary strategies is to believe that we will put an end to the system on the plane of the real: this is their imaginary, imposed on them by the system itself, living or surviving only by always leading those who attack the system to fight amongst each other on the terrain of reality, which is always the reality of the system. This is where they throw all their energies, their imaginary violence, where an implacable logic constantly turns back into the system. We have only to do it violence or counter-violence since it thrives on symbolic violence not in the degraded sense in which this formula has found fortune, as a violence 'of signs', from which the system draws strength, or with which it 'masks' its material violence: symbolic violence is deduced from a logic of the symbolic (which has nothing to do with the sign or with energy): reversal, the incessant reversibility of the counter-gift and, conversely, the seizing of power by the unilateral exercise of the gift. 25¶ We must therefore displace everything into the sphere of the symbolic, where challenge, reversal and overbidding are the law, so that we can respond to death only by an equal or superior death. There is no question here of real violence or force, the only question concerns the challenge and the logic of the symbolic. If domination comes from the system's retention of the exclusivity of the gift without counter-gift the gift of work which can only be responded to by destruction or sacrifice, if not in consumption, which is only a spiral of the system of surplus-gratification without result, therefore a spiral of surplus-domination; a gift of media and messages to which, due to the monopoly of the code, nothing is allowed to retort; the gift, everywhere and at every instant, of the social, of the protection agency, security, gratification and the solicitation of the social from which nothing is any longer permitted to escape then the only solution is to turn the principle of its power back against the system itself: the impossibility of responding or retorting. To defy the system with a gift to which it cannot respond save by its own collapse and death. Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide.¶ So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out, the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the 'terrorist' the hostage's death for the terrorist's. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. The stakes are death without any possibility of negotiation, and therefore return to an inevitable overbidding. Of course, they attempt to deploy the whole system of negotiation, and the terrorists themselves often enter into this exchange scenario in terms of this calculated equivalence (the hostages' lives against some ransom or liberation, or indeed for the prestige of the operation alone). From this perspective, taking hostages is not original at all, it simply creates an unforeseen and selective relation of forces which can be resolved either by traditional violence or by negotiation. It is a tactical action. There is something else at stake, however, as we dearly saw at The Hague over the course of ten days of incredible negotiations: no-one knew what could be negotiated, nor could they agree on terms, nor on the possible equivalences of the exchange. Or again, even if they were formulated, the 'terrorists' demands' amounted to a radical denial of negotiation. It is precisely here that everything is played out, for with the impossibility of all negotiation we pass into the symbolic order, which is ignorant of this type of calculation and exchange (the system itself lives solely by negotiation, even if this takes place in the equilibrium of violence). The system can only respond to this irruption of the symbolic (the most serious thing to befall it, basically the only 'revolution') by the real, physical death of the terrorists. This, however, is its defeat, since their death was their stake, so that by bringing about their deaths the system has merely impaled itself on its own violence without really responding to the challenge that was thrown to it. Because the system can easily compute every death, even war atrocities, but cannot compute the death-challenge or symbolic death, since this death has no calculable equivalent, it opens up an inexpiable overbidding by other means than a death in exchange. Nothing corresponds to death except death. Which is precisely what happens in this case: the system itself is driven to suicide in return, which suicide is manifest in its disarray and defeat. However infinitesimal in terms of relations of forces it might be, the colossal apparatus of power is eliminated in this situation where (the very excess of its) derision is turned back against itself. The police and the army, all the institutions and mobilised violence of power whether individually or massed together, can do nothing against this lowly but symbolic death. For this death draws it onto a plane where there is no longer any response possible for it (hence the sudden structural liquefaction of power in '68, not because it was less strong, but because of the simple symbolic displacement operated by the students' practices). The system can only die in exchange, defeat itself to lift the challenge. Its death at this instant is a symbolic response, but a death which wears it out.¶ The challenge has the efficiency of a murderer. Every society apart from ours knows that, or used to know it. Ours is in the process of rediscovering it. The routes of symbolic effectiveness are those of an alternative politics.¶ Thus the dying ascetic challenges God ever to give him the equivalent of this death. God does all he can to give him this equivalent 'a hundred times over', in the form of prestige, of spiritual power, indeed of global hegemony. But the ascetic's secret dream is to attain such an extent of mortification that even God would be unable either to take up the challenge, or to absorb the debt. He will then have triumphed over God, and become God himself. That is why the ascetic is always close to heresy and sacrilege, and as such condemned by the Church, whose function it is merely to preserve God from this symbolic face-to-face, to protect Him from this mortal challenge where He is summoned to die, to sacrifice Himself in order to take up the challenge of the mortified ascetic. The Church will have had this role for all time, avoiding this type of catastrophic confrontation (catastrophic primarily for the Church) and substituting a rule-bound exchange of penitences and gratifications, the impressario of a system of equivalences between God and men.¶ The same situation exists in our relation to the system of power. All these institutions, all these social, economic, political and psychological mediations, are there so that no-one ever has the opportunity to issue this symbolic challenge, this challenge to the death, the irreversible gift which, like the absolute mortification of the ascetic, brings about a victory over all power, however powerful its authority may be. It is no longer necessary that the possibility of this direct symbolic confrontation ever takes place. And this is the source of our profound boredom.¶ This is why taking hostages and other similar acts rekindle some fascination: they are at once an exorbitant mirror for the system of its own repressive violence, and the model of a symbolic violence which is always forbidden it, the only violence it cannot exert: its own death.

### 1NC – K

#### Capitalism is the best explanation of the production of disability on a daily basis. The aff’s method cannot address the material consequences of trans-national capitalism.

Nirmala EREVELLES 14. Professor of Social and Cultural Studies in Education, University of Alabama. “Thinking with Disability Studies.” *Disability Studies Quarterly* 34(2). <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/4248/3587>.

As I pause in the writing of this essay and pay attention to the larger world that extends both within and beyond the boundaries of the United States of America, I am confronted by the unrelenting production of disability on a daily basis. The historical legacy of the actual act of colonizing an inhabited continent, slavery, indentured labor, Jim Crow laws and the involuntary commitment of indigenous people to boarding schools and reservations has produced physical and mental trauma that has persisted over multiple generations (Spillers, 1982; Smith, 2005; Erevelles, 2011). In contemporary contexts similar practices prevail. In public schools all over the U.S., low income students of color (most notably males), are indiscriminately labeled behaviorally disabled, language disabled, mildly mentally retarded, and emotionally disturbed and are then confined to segregated special education classrooms/alternative schools; often medicated; and punished more harshly than their white counterparts (Artiles et al, 2010) In some inner-city schools, entire classrooms of students (sometimes entire schools) labeled cognitively and behaviorally disabled are quite literally ushered via the school-to-prison pipeline to a lifetime of involuntary institutionalization in the prison industrial complex (Erevelles, in press). Undocumented workers cross the U.S./Mexico border dodging vigilantes, enduring dehydration and other heat-related diseases, and risking rape and sexual molestation to end up as laborers in fruit and vegetable farms, cattle ranches, chicken factories, and formal/informal service work for the lowest wages, unsafe working conditions, and little to no medical care. Toxic industrial and nuclear waste is dumped in rivers and/or buried underground in landfills in low-income rural areas where local residents acquire illnesses and disabilities that persist intergenerationally. Lack of access to affordable healthy food in inner-city neighborhoods, high employment, run-down housing, high crime rates, and inadequate care has access to medical also led to the proliferation of preventable illnesses that result in disabilities. And lest we forget, the everyday indignities of racial profiling, bullying, job discrimination, police brutality, homophobia in the school and in the workplace, domestic violence, and sexual abuse, among so many others also contribute to mental and physical health conditions that can bring one into the disability community.

Colonial occupation and its more contemporary manifestation of neocolonialism have also resulted in the proliferation of disability. The material conditions of colonial rule supported a violent police state to subdue its colonial subjects who rebelled against the oppressive conditions within which they lived. Even after colonial rule was overthrown, interventions by the former colonists in the internal affairs of the new postcolonial states continued to produce disability using the excuse of stemming the tide of communism to orchestrate assassinations, coups, and civil unrest (Erevelles, 2011). Additionally, the now well-established transnational capitalist exploitative machine has enabled capital to flow freely across international borders while at the same time ensuring that labor be confined within the nation states themselves, maintained as a cheap and docile force in obeisance to the dictates of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Many of their mandated economic policies have required the dismantling of the already skeletal economic safety nets in these nation states resulting in large shortages of food, inadequate access to health care, and deplorable living conditions that have continued the proliferation of disability. Global investment in the so-called 'Third World' has resulted in the relocation of multi-national factories from the neo-imperialist north where "third world" laborers in the global south work under sweat shop conditions to produce cheap and affordable goods for consumption by world markets. Just recently, a garment factory burned down in Bangladesh and while the newspaper reporters rushed to count the dead, very little was said about the under-paid women laborers who have undergone amputations, suffered burns, and who are working through post-traumatic stress. As if this kind of human exploitation is not enough, on a regular basis, the United States military deploys drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan that kill and injure civilian populations, the continuation of the U.S. dubbed "War on Terror" initiated via Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 that has generated its own class of casualties of war (dead as well as disabled) that even today have resisted accurate calculation.

This incomplete litany of the global proliferation of disability tentatively signals high noon in disability theorizing. I now sit uneasily amidst questions that lead to seemingly conflicting impasses. What does it mean to come to terms with the transgressive vagaries of queer/crip identity as assemblage—precarious/partial/body-without-organs/liminal/ affective/ molecular—within political economic contexts imbricated in colonial/neocolonial practices of unrelenting social, economic, and militarized violence? Can "lines of flight" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) intent on discombobulating the dreary stolidness of the normative subject serve as an effective means of deterritorializing subjectivity from its political-economic constraints? More importantly, what are the political implications of such discursive maneuvers in articulating the shifting bonds of queer/crip communities in global space? What happens if these bonds timidly marshaling transitory notions of community are animated by unequal relations of production and consumption in aid of transnational capitalist accumulation? How do such "toxic animacies" (Chen, 2011) complicate utopian notions of community where the enablement of some bodies is based on the oppressive dis-enablement of other bodies separated and yet connected by the material social relations of transnational capitalism? And most significantly, how would a disability-affirming queer/crip politic (McRuer, 2006; Stevens, 2011; Kafer, 2013) engage the material violence enacted in "becoming disabled?"

In the late afternoon, I watch as a passing shower forces the burning concrete to release a steamy haze and feel the torpid air ready to explode into a strangling humidity. This torpor is at odds with my own apprehension. Is my own work of theorizing disability as a historical materialist construct actually dangerous to a critical disability studies? How does the disability community engage with this rapid (almost incessant) proliferation of disability? Is it impossible to desire disability in these contexts? What are the ethical implications of preventing this proliferation of disability? What does it mean to say "no more disability" for those "becoming" disabled via violence and then compelled to live in deplorable social conditions? And what do these negations mean for disabled people who have struggled valiantly to convince the world at large that living with a disability "is an ingenious way to live" (Marcus, 1993) only to be told, "Enough!"? How does the disability community build alliances with those groups (located at the complex intersections of race, gender, and queer politics) who have historically tried to shake off the "stigma" of ableist notions of disability that have been used to justify their continued marginalization in capitalist economies? As a result, what allegiances do disabled people located at these crossroads of shifting identities have with a largely white middle/upper class disability rights movement in the Global North? When do our passions cohere in our collective struggle against oppressive practices that ultimately discount many of us in terms of our unique as well as collective humanity? And when does the complicated intertwining of our disparate yet collective histories become so frustratingly dense and depressing that we shrug off these material bonds impatiently to theorize in discursive spaces that celebrate (queer/crip) "desire" unmediated by the social?

#### Capitalism causes every impact—poverty, inequality, democratic decline, disease, climate change, women and worker exploitation, and nuclear war

Foster 19 (John, PhD from York University, Professor at the University of Oregon Department of Sociology, “Capitalism Has Failed—What Next?,” Monthly Review, 2/1/19, <https://monthlyreview.org/2019/02/01/capitalism-has-failed-what-next/>, JLin)

Less than two decades into the twenty-first century, it is evident that capitalism has failed as a social system. The world is mired in economic stagnation, financialization, and the most extreme inequality in human history, accompanied by mass unemployment and underemployment, precariousness, poverty, hunger, wasted output and lives, and what at this point can only be called a planetary ecological “death spiral.”1 The digital revolution, the greatest technological advance of our time, has rapidly mutated from a promise of free communication and liberated production into new means of surveillance, control, and displacement of the working population. The institutions of liberal democracy are at the point of collapse, while fascism, the rear guard of the capitalist system, is again on the march, along with patriarchy, racism, imperialism, and war. To say that capitalism is a failed system is not, of course, to suggest that its breakdown and disintegration is imminent.2 It does, however, mean that it has passed from being a historically necessary and creative system at its inception to being a historically unnecessary and destructive one in the present century. Today, more than ever, the world is faced with the epochal choice between “the revolutionary reconstitution of society at large and the common ruin of the contending classes.”3 Indications of this failure of capitalism are everywhere. Stagnation of investment punctuated by bubbles of financial expansion, which then inevitably burst, now characterizes the so-called free market.4 Soaring inequality in income and wealth has its counterpart in the declining material circumstances of a majority of the population. Real wages for most workers in the United States have barely budged in forty years despite steadily rising productivity.5 Work intensity has increased, while work and safety protections on the job have been systematically jettisoned. Unemployment data has become more and more meaningless due to a new institutionalized underemployment in the form of contract labor in the gig economy.6 Unions have been reduced to mere shadows of their former glory as capitalism has asserted totalitarian control over workplaces. With the demise of Soviet-type societies, social democracy in Europe has perished in the new atmosphere of “liberated capitalism.”7 The capture of the surplus value produced by overexploited populations in the poorest regions of the world, via the global labor arbitrage instituted by multinational corporations, is leading to an unprecedented amassing of financial wealth at the center of the world economy and relative poverty in the periphery.8 Around $21 trillion of offshore funds are currently lodged in tax havens on islands mostly in the Caribbean, constituting “the fortified refuge of Big Finance.”9 Technologically driven monopolies resulting from the global-communications revolution, together with the rise to dominance of Wall Street-based financial capital geared to speculative asset creation, have further contributed to the riches of today’s “1 percent.” Forty-two billionaires now enjoy as much wealth as half the world’s population, while the three richest men in the United States—Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates, and Warren Buffett—have more wealth than half the U.S. population.10 In every region of the world, inequality has increased sharply in recent decades.11 The gap in per capita income and wealth between the richest and poorest nations, which has been the dominant trend for centuries, is rapidly widening once again.12 More than 60 percent of the world’s employed population, some two billion people, now work in the impoverished informal sector, forming a massive global proletariat. The global reserve army of labor is some 70 percent larger than the active labor army of formally employed workers.13 Adequate health care, housing, education, and clean water and air are increasingly out of reach for large sections of the population, even in wealthy countries in North America and Europe, while transportation is becoming more difficult in the United States and many other countries due to irrationally high levels of dependency on the automobile and disinvestment in public transportation. Urban structures are more and more characterized by gentrification and segregation, with cities becoming the playthings of the well-to-do while marginalized populations are shunted aside. About half a million people, most of them children, are homeless on any given night in the United States.14 New York City is experiencing a major rat infestation, attributed to warming temperatures, mirroring trends around the world.15 In the United States and other high-income countries, life expectancy is in decline, with a remarkable resurgence of Victorian illnesses related to poverty and exploitation. In Britain, gout, scarlet fever, whooping cough, and even scurvy are now resurgent, along with tuberculosis. With inadequate enforcement of work health and safety regulations, black lung disease has returned with a vengeance in U.S. coal country.16 Overuse of antibiotics, particularly by capitalist agribusiness, is leading to an antibiotic-resistance crisis, with the dangerous growth of superbugs generating increasing numbers of deaths, which by mid–century could surpass annual cancer deaths, prompting the World Health Organization to declare a “global health emergency.”17 These dire conditions, arising from the workings of the system, are consistent with what Frederick Engels, in the Condition of the Working Class in England, called “social murder.”18 At the instigation of giant corporations, philanthrocapitalist foundations, and neoliberal governments, public education has been restructured around corporate-designed testing based on the implementation of robotic common-core standards. This is generating massive databases on the student population, much of which are now being surreptitiously marketed and sold.19 The corporatization and privatization of education is feeding the progressive subordination of children’s needs to the cash nexus of the commodity market. We are thus seeing a dramatic return of Thomas Gradgrind’s and Mr. M’Choakumchild’s crass utilitarian philosophy dramatized in Charles Dickens’s Hard Times: “Facts are alone wanted in life” and “You are never to fancy.”20 Having been reduced to intellectual dungeons, many of the poorest, most racially segregated schools in the United States are mere pipelines for prisons or the military.21 More than two million people in the United States are behind bars, a higher rate of incarceration than any other country in the world, constituting a new Jim Crow. The total population in prison is nearly equal to the number of people in Houston, Texas, the fourth largest U.S. city. African Americans and Latinos make up 56 percent of those incarcerated, while constituting only about 32 percent of the U.S. population. Nearly 50 percent of American adults, and a much higher percentage among African Americans and Native Americans, have an immediate family member who has spent or is currently spending time behind bars. Both black men and Native American men in the United States are nearly three times, Hispanic men nearly two times, more likely to die of police shootings than white men.22 Racial divides are now widening across the entire planet. Violence against women and the expropriation of their unpaid labor, as well as the higher level of exploitation of their paid labor, are integral to the way in which power is organized in capitalist society—and how it seeks to divide rather than unify the population. More than a third of women worldwide have experienced physical/sexual violence. Women’s bodies, in particular, are objectified, reified, and commodified as part of the normal workings of monopoly-capitalist marketing.23 The mass media-propaganda system, part of the larger corporate matrix, is now merging into a social media-based propaganda system that is more porous and seemingly anarchic, but more universal and more than ever favoring money and power. Utilizing modern marketing and surveillance techniques, which now dominate all digital interactions, vested interests are able to tailor their messages, largely unchecked, to individuals and their social networks, creating concerns about “fake news” on all sides.24 Numerous business entities promising technological manipulation of voters in countries across the world have now surfaced, auctioning off their services to the highest bidders.25 The elimination of net neutrality in the United States means further concentration, centralization, and control over the entire Internet by monopolistic service providers. Elections are increasingly prey to unregulated “dark money” emanating from the coffers of corporations and the billionaire class. Although presenting itself as the world’s leading democracy, the United States, as Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy stated in Monopoly Capital in 1966, “is democratic in form and plutocratic in content.”26 In the Trump administration, following a long-established tradition, 72 percent of those appointed to the cabinet have come from the higher corporate echelons, while others have been drawn from the military.27 War, engineered by the United States and other major powers at the apex of the system, has become perpetual in strategic oil regions such as the Middle East, and threatens to escalate into a global thermonuclear exchange. During the Obama administration, the United States was engaged in wars/bombings in seven different countries—Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan.28 Torture and assassinations have been reinstituted by Washington as acceptable instruments of war against those now innumerable individuals, group networks, and whole societies that are branded as terrorist. A new Cold War and nuclear arms race is in the making between the United States and Russia, while Washington is seeking to place road blocks to the continued rise of China. The Trump administration has created a new space force as a separate branch of the military in an attempt to ensure U.S. dominance in the militarization of space. Sounding the alarm on the increasing dangers of a nuclear war and of climate destabilization, the distinguished Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved its doomsday clock in 2018 to two minutes to midnight, the closest since 1953, when it marked the advent of thermonuclear weapons.29 Increasingly severe economic sanctions are being imposed by the United States on countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua, despite their democratic elections—or because of them. Trade and currency wars are being actively promoted by core states, while racist barriers against immigration continue to be erected in Europe and the United States as some 60 million refugees and internally displaced peoples flee devastated environments. Migrant populations worldwide have risen to 250 million, with those residing in high-income countries constituting more than 14 percent of the populations of those countries, up from less than 10 percent in 2000. Meanwhile, ruling circles and wealthy countries seek to wall off islands of power and privilege from the mass of humanity, who are to be left to their fate.30 More than three-quarters of a billion people, over 10 percent of the world population, are chronically malnourished.31 Food stress in the United States keeps climbing, leading to the rapid growth of cheap dollar stores selling poor quality and toxic food. Around forty million Americans, representing one out of eight households, including nearly thirteen million children, are food insecure.32 Subsistence farmers are being pushed off their lands by agribusiness, private capital, and sovereign wealth funds in a global depeasantization process that constitutes the greatest movement of people in history.33 Urban overcrowding and poverty across much of the globe is so severe that one can now reasonably refer to a “planet of slums.”34 Meanwhile, the world housing market is estimated to be worth up to $163 trillion (as compared to the value of gold mined over all recorded history, estimated at $7.5 trillion).35 The Anthropocene epoch, first ushered in by the Great Acceleration of the world economy immediately after the Second World War, has generated enormous rifts in planetary boundaries, extending from climate change to ocean acidification, to the sixth extinction, to disruption of the global nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, to the loss of freshwater, to the disappearance of forests, to widespread toxic-chemical and radioactive pollution.36 It is now estimated that 60 percent of the world’s wildlife vertebrate population (including mammals, reptiles, amphibians, birds, and fish) have been wiped out since 1970, while the worldwide abundance of invertebrates has declined by 45 percent in recent decades.37 What climatologist James Hansen calls the “species exterminations” resulting from accelerating climate change and rapidly shifting climate zones are only compounding this general process of biodiversity loss. Biologists expect that half of all species will be facing extinction by the end of the century.38 If present climate-change trends continue, the “global carbon budget” associated with a 2°C increase in average global temperature will be broken in sixteen years (while a 1.5°C increase in global average temperature—staying beneath which is the key to long-term stabilization of the climate—will be reached in a decade). Earth System scientists warn that the world is now perilously close to a Hothouse Earth, in which catastrophic climate change will be locked in and irreversible.39 The ecological, social, and economic costs to humanity of continuing to increase carbon emissions by 2.0 percent a year as in recent decades (rising in 2018 by 2.7 percent—3.4 percent in the United States), and failing to meet the minimal 3.0 percent annual reductions in emissions currently needed to avoid a catastrophic destabilization of the earth’s energy balance, are simply incalculable.40 Nevertheless, major energy corporations continue to lie about climate change, promoting and bankrolling climate denialism—while admitting the truth in their internal documents. These corporations are working to accelerate the extraction and production of fossil fuels, including the dirtiest, most greenhouse gas-generating varieties, reaping enormous profits in the process. The melting of the Arctic ice from global warming is seen by capital as a new El Dorado, opening up massive additional oil and gas reserves to be exploited without regard to the consequences for the earth’s climate. In response to scientific reports on climate change, Exxon Mobil declared that it intends to extract and sell all of the fossil-fuel reserves at its disposal.41 Energy corporations continue to intervene in climate negotiations to ensure that any agreements to limit carbon emissions are defanged. Capitalist countries across the board are putting the accumulation of wealth for a few above combatting climate destabilization, threatening the very future of humanity. Capitalism is best understood as a competitive class-based mode of production and exchange geared to the accumulation of capital through the exploitation of workers’ labor power and the private appropriation of surplus value (value generated beyond the costs of the workers’ own reproduction). The mode of economic accounting intrinsic to capitalism designates as a value-generating good or service anything that passes through the market and therefore produces income. It follows that the greater part of the social and environmental costs of production outside the market are excluded in this form of valuation and are treated as mere negative “externalities,” unrelated to the capitalist economy itself—whether in terms of the shortening and degradation of human life or the destruction of the natural environment. As environmental economist K. William Kapp stated, “capitalism must be regarded as an economy of unpaid costs.”42 We have now reached a point in the twenty-first century in which the externalities of this irrational system, such as the costs of war, the depletion of natural resources, the waste of human lives, and the disruption of the planetary environment, now far exceed any future economic benefits that capitalism offers to society as a whole. The accumulation of capital and the amassing of wealth are increasingly occurring at the expense of an irrevocable rift in the social and environmental conditions governing human life on earth.43 Some would argue that China stands as an exception to much of the above, characterized as it is by a seemingly unstoppable rate of economic advance (though carrying with it deep social and ecological contradictions). Yet Chinese development has its roots in the 1949 Chinese Revolution, carried out by the Chinese Communist Party headed by Mao Zedong, whereby it liberated itself from the imperialist system. This allowed it to develop for decades under a planned economy largely free of constraints from outside forces, establishing a strong agricultural and industrial economic base. This was followed by a shift in the post-Maoist reform period to a hybrid system of more limited state planning along with a much greater reliance on market relations (and a vast expansion of debt and speculation) under conditions—the globalization of the world market—that were particularly fortuitous to its “catching up.” Through trade wars and other pressures aimed at destabilizing China’s position in the world market, the United States is already seeking to challenge the bases of China’s growth in world trade. China, therefore, stands not so much for the successes of late capitalism but rather for its inherent limitations. The current Chinese model, moreover, carries within it many of the destructive tendencies of the system of capital accumulation. Ultimately, China’s future too depends on a return to the process of revolutionary transition, spurred by its own population.44 How did these disastrous conditions characterizing capitalism worldwide develop? An understanding of the failure of capitalism, beginning in the twentieth century, requires a historical examination of the rise of neoliberalism, and how this has only served to increase the destructiveness of the system. Only then can we address the future of humanity in the twenty-first century.

#### The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only the Party can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct chauvinist tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation

**Escalante 18**  
(Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/> cVs)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: **in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party.** It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for **holding party members accountable**, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, **party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions.** It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct **chauvinist** ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such **accountability is crucial**. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. **The party model** remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that **a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement.** Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

#### We must push anti-neoliberal pedagogy into the debate space – it is the only way to produce new ideas and escape the military-industrial-academic-cultural complex – Thus the ROB is to affirm for the best method for challenging global capitalism

Giroux 14—(Henry A. Giroux, Chair for Scholarship in the Public Interest​, The Paulo Freire Distinguished Scholar in Critical Pedagogy, April 15, 2014, "Neoliberalism and the machinery of disposability," Philosophers for Change, https://philosophersforchange.org/2014/04/15/neoliberalism-and-the-machinery-of-disposability/, 6-28-2019)//don

Such movements are not simply about reclaiming space but also about producing new ideas, generating new conversations, and introducing a new political language. While there has been considerable coverage in the progressive media since 2001 given to the violence being waged against the movement protesters in Brazil, the United States, Greece and elsewhere, it is important to situate such violence within a broader set of categories that enables a critical understanding of not only the underlying social, economic and political forces at work in such assaults, but also makes it possible to reflect critically on the distinctiveness of the current historical period in which they are taking place. For example, it is difficult to address such state-sponsored violence against young people without analyzing the devolution of the social state, emergence of a politics of disposability, and the corresponding rise of the warfare and punishing state. The merging of the military-industrial-academic-cultural complex and unbridled corporate power points to the need for strategies that address what is specific about the current warfare state and the neoliberal project and how different interests, modes of power, social relations, public pedagogies, and economic configurations come together to shape its politics of domestic terrorism, cruelty, and zones of disposability. Such a conjuncture is invaluable politically in that it provides a theoretical opening for making the practices of the neoliberal revolution visible to organize resistance to its ideologies, policies and modes of governance. It also points to the conceptual power of making clear that history remains an open horizon that cannot be dismissed through appeals to the end of history or end of ideology.[20] It is precisely through the indeterminate nature of history that resistance becomes possible and politics refuses any guarantees and remains open. A number of neoliberal societies, including the United States, have become addicted to violence. War provides jobs, profits, political payoffs, research funds, and forms of political and economic power that reach into every aspect of society. As war becomes a mode of sovereignty and rule, it erodes the distinction between war and peace. Increasingly fed by a moral and political frenzy, warlike values produce and endorse shared fears as the primary register of social relations. Shared fears and the media-induced panics that feed them produce more than a culture of fear. Such hysteria also feeds the growing militarization of the police, who increasingly use their high-tech scanners, surveillance cameras and toxic chemicals on anyone who engages in peaceful protests against the warfare and corporate state. Images abound in the mainstream media of such abuses. As a mode of public pedagogy, a state of permanent war needs willing subjects to abide by its values, ideology and narratives of fear and violence. Such legitimation is largely provided through a market-driven culture addicted to production of consumerism, militarism, and organized violence, largely circulated through various registers of popular culture that extend from high fashion and Hollywood movies to the creation of violent video games and music concerts sponsored by the Pentagon. The market-driven spectacle of war demands a culture of conformity, quiet intellectuals and a largely passive republic of consumers. But it also needs subjects who find intense pleasure in the spectacle of violence.

## Case

### AT Culp 16

#### 1] This ev is not in the context of the 1ac method – its just a generic dark deleuze war machine solves cap arg – don’t allow a 1ar extrapolation – rapid recontextualization makes it impossible for me too win

#### 2] Even If they can somehow bullshit their way to being able to solve cap, the alternative will solve better insofar as we are winning that class focus is key to revolution and the 1ac would distract from that through abstraction of the root cause of capital exploitation

#### 3] Culp commodified black studies for his work – his work should be rejected on principle and is an IVI to insure that deabte is a safe space for all types

### Top level

#### Psychoanalysis is infinitely regressive, not falsifiable, and too abstract

Gordon 1 – Paul Gordon, accomplished psychotherapist, “Psychoanalysis and Racism: The Politics of Defeat,” RACE & CLASS v. 42 n. 4, 2001, pp. 17-34.

But in the thirty years since Kovel wrote, that attempt to relate mind and society has been fractured by the advent of postmodernism, with its subsumption of the material/historical, of notions of cause and effect, to what is transitory, contingent, free-¯oating, evanescent. Psychoanalysis, by stepping into the vacuum left by the abandonment of all metanarrative, has tended to put mind over society. This is particularly noticeable in the work of the Centre for New Ethnicities Research at the University of East London, which purports to straddle the worlds of the academy and action by developing projects for the local community and within education generally.28 But**,** in marrying **psychoanalysis** and postmodernism, on the basis of claiming to be both scholarly and action oriented, it **degrades scholarship and** undermines **action, and ends in discourse analysis a language** in which metaphor passes for reality**.** Cohen's work unavoidably raises the question of the status of psycho- analysis as a social or political theory, as distinct from a clinical one. Can psychoanalysis, in other words, apply to the social world of groups, institutions, nations, states and cultures in the way that it does, or at least may do, to individuals? Certainly there is now a considerable body of literature and a plethora of academic courses, and so on, claim- ing that psychoanalysis is a social theory. And, of course, in popular discourse, it is now a commonplace to hear of nations and societies spoken of in personalised ways. Thus `truth commissions' and the like, which have become so common in the past decade in countries which have undergone turbulent change, are seen as forms of national therapy or catharsis, even if this is far from being their purpose. Nevertheless, the question remains: does it make sense, as Michael Ignatieff puts it, to speak of nations having psyches the way that individuals do? `Can a nation's past make people ill as we know repressed memories sometimes make individuals ill? . . . Can we speak of nations ``working through'' a civil war or an atrocity as we speak of individuals working through a traumatic memory or event?' 47 The problem withthe application ofpsychoanalysis to social institutionsis that **there can be no testing** of the claims made. If someone says, for instance, that nationalism is a form of looking for and seeking to replace the body of the mother one has lost, or that the popular appeal of a particular kind of story echoes the pattern of our earliest relationship to the maternal breast, how can this be proved? The **pioneers** of psychoanalysis, from Freud onwards, all **derived their ideas in the context of** theirwork with individual **patients** and their ideas can be examined in the everyday laboratory of the therapeutic encounter where the validity of an interpretation, for example, is a matter for dialogue between therapist and patient**. Outside** of the consulting room, **there can be no such verification process**, and the further one moves from the individual **patient,** the less purchase psychoanalyticideas canhave**.** Outside the therapeutic encounter, anything and everything can be true, psychoanalytically speaking. Butif everything is true, then nothing can be false and therefore nothing can be true. An example of Cohen's method is to be found in his 1993 working paper, `Home rules', subtitled `Some re¯ections on racism and nation- alism in everyday life'. Here Cohen talks about taking a `particular line of thought for a walk'. While there is nothing wrong with taking a line of thought for a walk, such an exercise is not necessarily the same as thinking. One of the problems with Cohen's approach is that a kind of free association, mixed with deconstruction, leads not to analysis, not even to psychoanalysis, but to . . . well, just more free association, an endless, indeed one might say pointless, play on words. This approach may well throw up some interesting associations along the way, connections one had never thought of but it is not to be confused with political analysis. In `Home rules', anything and everything to do with `home' can and does ®nd a place here and, as I indicated above, even the popular ®lm Home Alone is pressed into service as a story about `racial' invasion.

#### **Ontological understandings of disability rely on reductionist understandings of groups and leads to elitism – their position risks a fear of the unknowable which destroys value to life – micro events can’t shape the way that macro structures function**

Beaudry 16 (Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry; April 2016; The Journal of Medical Philosophy; *“Beyond (Models of) Disability?”*; accessed 7/23/21; <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4886464/#s5title>; Professor Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry has taught in the areas of health and disability law, jurisprudence, applied ethics as well as international and domestic human rights at McGill University) HB \*Brackets in original\*

IV. CAN THE DICHOTOMY CRITICISM BE CONCEPTUALLY SUBSTANTIATED? To sum up, social modelists do not deny that impairments exist or matter. However, they do deny that impairments should in any way be called, or seen as causing, disabilities. As we saw, criticisms of that view (the Dichotomy Criticism) take some tautological or speculative forms that are dead-ends. The critics hold that disability is at least partly due to impairment or biological conditions. The social view holds that disability is wholly caused by socially constructed barriers. The social model could limit itself to a strictly pragmatic claim: we ought to reserve the name of “disability” for social oppression alone because of the bad consequences that doing otherwise would have. We will examine this claim afterward. However, social modelists are (or at least many of them sound) ontologically bolder and reserve the term of “disability” to connote a “social situation” (UPIAS, 1976, 3–4) out of politico-semantic opportunism. For instance, social modelists traditionally use a historical-materialist line of argument to argue that disability is a “social relationship.” To understand disability, they claim, is to understand “a definite relationship to the way in which the material conditions of life are created and recreated” (Finkelstein, 1980, 9; Oliver, 1990). The immediate answer to that claim is a counterexample: many individuals who would uncontroversially be said to qualify as “disabled” in society would still be “disabled” if a Utopian discrimination-free society came about (Terzi, 2004). Blindness, for instance, would still constitute a biological dysfunction that would cause, independently of social structures, many experienced limitations. The social modelist’s counter-answer is that the blind person is only disabled when society disables her. Otherwise, she is impaired or limited, but not disabled. These claims and counter-claims make it look like both sides to the debate are emitting a semantic fiat. This is a natural place to already state my conclusion: they are, but their attempt to justify it would be better served by political rather than ontological arguments. Both sides have important but distinct concerns, and their war over naming their respective concern “disability” is doomed to fail. Here is how it could have succeeded. Their fundamental dissension has to do with the causal dimension of disability (whether it is caused by biology or society). In order for the ontological disagreement to progress, we need a benchmark definition that does not include a prior commitment to either view, that is, a definition of “disability” that is neutral on the causality issue. The party who comes up with (1) the most convincing causality-neutral definition of disability that (2) then is best matched by their causality-committed definition of disability will have provided a valid argument for integrating their view of causality in the definition of disability. A neutral definition of disability could look like this one: Disability is not only a (1) limitation (e.g., like not being able to read minds), but (2) a limitation that one has which most people around one do not have (it would have statistical and species-related features). (3) It is a long-lasting or recurrent state and (4) it affects people with an impairment, understood as a biological dysfunction.7 However, it turns out that any such definition will be incomplete because all sides agree that disability has a normative component, in that it calls for a response, medical, social, or otherwise. To know how to respond to disability, one must know the roots of disability: one must know, therefore, what causes the aspects of disability that must be addressed. A thinner concept is imaginable but would be unhelpful. If the idea of causality is key to the notion of disability, disability would be an essentially contested concept.8 If disability is a relational, comparativist, normative notion, an uncontested notion of disability would be a holy grail. It would provide clear answers to a plethora of difficult moral questions concerning whether and how stringently society must attend to the needs of disabled people. We must examine my claim that an axiologically neutral concept of disability would not do much work in solving these difficult questions: is it really the case? Anita Silvers was perceptive to the problem of different theorists or practitioners speaking at cross-purposes when using the concept of disability. This essay also unmasks some confusions typical of this mutual misunderstanding. I am, however, skeptical that conceptual disagreements about the ontology of disability can, or should, be overcome (although I believe that political and empirical disagreement about the consequences of the use of a specific definition of disability might be). Silvers, however, appears more optimistic and proposes a neutral concept of disability. She suggests “some constituents of, and constraints upon the adequacy of, [a neutral notion of disability],” that is, a notion of disability that is not value-laden (Silvers, 2003, 473). Silvers is particularly interested in suspending the assumption of neutral or positive value associated with being disabled.9 (She is particularly interested in the conceptual clashes between bioethicists and disability advocates, just as I am interested in the conceptual disagreement between proponents of individualist and social disability models.) According to her neutral view of disability, one should assume neither that being disabled makes one’s life worse off (she associates this view with the bioethicists) nor that it is neutral (she associates this view with disability theorists). To say that “disability” can connote both positively and negatively valued states does not necessarily translate into a neutral notion of disability. It can just as well translate into two categories of disabilities: those that have (a) no negative impact on the person and those that are (b) negatively value-laden. That seems plausible, if not evident. Silvers suggests that we take “disability” to mean (c) a neutral notion that has not yet fallen into either category (a) or (b). Surely that is good advice for theorists who assume that all disabilities are to be negatively valued and for theorists who assume that all negative value of disability is medically and socially constructed. These two sides appear sometimes unduly to generalize what only holds for some cases of disability. However, I wonder how much philosophical work this neutral notion of disability is supposed to accomplish. My worry is that it is limited to allowing heated debates to cool down. If so, it would contribute to a discursive ethics between proponents of the medical and of the social models, or between (most) (utilitarian) bioethicists and (most) disability theorists. As such, a proto-axiological (i.e., yet to be qualified in terms of value) version of disability is useful but only plays the role of a modest, tactful, peaceful, explicitly ontologically fallible way to engage with contrary views. My concern is that it does not help us otherwise. To put my point more forcefully, Silvers’s proposal could be read as a proposal to abandon the notion of “disability” altogether from ethical discussions and deal with more specific value-laden elements––such as pain, loss of options, limitations (including particular socially-caused limitations), oppression, etc.––instead of the blanket, ambiguous notion of disability, which could, or not, imply all, some, or none of these other notions. This is undoubtedly one of Silvers’s explicit ambitions: that we do not conflate disability with these. What to make, then, of her proposal to develop a “theory” based on a neutral account of disability (Silvers, 2003, 485)? I am not sure that this idea qualifies as a theory as much as a call to keep existing social/medical/normalizing theories in their proper places. It reminds us not to jump the gun by assuming that disability is a bad thing or by assuming that it can never be intrinsically bad but that only social failures create (it and) its badness. However, disability becomes ethically interesting as a phenomenon when it is value-laden, and so it seems that we will quickly have to drop the general proto-axiological/neutral conception of disability as the moral and political discussion about any particular case progress. I note that the neutral conception of disability may still have an identity-building use; this use might helpfully remain value-neutral. Silvers’s analogy with the “construction of a neutral conceptualization of women’s differences” as “one of the great conceptual achievements of the twentieth century” points in this direction (Silvers, 2003, 483). A space for women and disabled people to say “I am neither better or worse off; I am just different” seems desirable, but that kind of claim may be more profitable within identity-building endeavors or claims for recognition than within the kind of moral and political discussions that Silvers has in mind (notably, on issues of inclusion and redistribution).10 To be potentially valued (or associated with more specific notions that are valued) in positive, negative, and neutral ways does not make a concept neutral: it makes it pluralistic value-wise. This is why I find that Silvers’s argument, while pointing to the “possibility and desirability of constructing a neutral conception of disability,” actually buttresses the case for letting go of the essentially contested concept of “disability” in ethical discussions and using more specific items of discussion, such as “oppression” or “physical pain and discomfort.” “Disability” could still be used as a shorthand for these notions: disability qua oppression, disability qua medical condition, etc. It could be that some of these understandings of disability would be wrongheaded (such as disability qua tragedy or disability qua punishment for sinful former lives), but one would then criticize these specific notions (such as being punished for a sinful former life) for their own wrongheadedness, rather than for not matching an objective concept of “disability.” I conclude that (1) the concept of “disability” cannot be used as an objective ontological benchmark because disability is too contested a concept and (2) a neutral version of this conception would not take us far enough to settle substantial disagreements. In light of this discussion, we can understand my suggestion to altogether abandon the concept of “disability” as far as ethical considerations are concerned. The debate around the causes of disability is not an empirical debate about what the factual cause of disability is, but rather a normative disagreement about the nature of disability. In fact, more often than not, it seems to be a disagreement about which problem ethicists, disability activists, and policymakers ought be looking at or prioritizing (for instance: social oppression versus medical care). The concept of “disability” is used to raise irreducibly different ethical problems, and I see no good reason why we should not look at them all––and why we should not seriously question the helpfulness of a concept that is preventing us from doing just that. It seems unproductive when debates around “disabilities” have the effect of confusing the ethical problem that one means to examine. Spending too much time discussing whether we could give the additional name of “disability” to this problem (or answering someone who says we could not) is time not spent on the problem itself. One could echo Oliver’s impatience to that effect as he repeats that his model is meant to be used against oppression, and that theorists should deal with that, rather than saying that he is misusing the concept of “disability” when referring to that problem and no others. I could not agree more, but would also urge social modelists, in turn, not to blame others for calling a medical condition a “disability,” as long as they are making progress in their examination of this medical condition and its ethical implications.11 Let me illustrate how an open-ended view of disability would prove more fruitful than any reductionist conceptual monopoly over “disability.” Consider the debates around cochlear electronic implants that are designed to enable deaf persons to hear sounds and yield a range of successful results from being aware of environmental sounds to engaging in conversations as hearing people would (National Institute of Deafness and Other Communication Disorders [NIDCD], 2013). The debate has often been posed in terms of culture versus medicine and on whether deafness was considered to be a culture or a disability (e.g., Davis, 1997; Lane and Grodin, 1997). Since the 1980s, members of “deaf culture” have mobilized against cochlear implants, comparing it to a form of genocide, as they were not seen as “curing” a “disability” but as erasing a culture (Sparrow, 2005). Others held that refusing cochlear implants for children in the name of “deaf pride” amounts to child neglect (Savulescu, 2009). However, an attentive look at the various issues related to cochlear implants reveals that medical research to improve this technology is not as antithetical to cultural criticisms of the social construction of language and hearing as one may think. Heated public debates too often reduce the multifaceted complexity of a situation into a dichotomic caricature that eclipses specific issues that are important to the lives of those people who are actually grappling with this situation. For instance, biomedical engineers (Eshraghi et al., 2012) and developmental biologists (Duncan and Fritzsch, 2012) will focus on improving the functionality of cochlear implants. Jurists will analyze legal and policy matters such as informed consent, the best interests of children, and the boundaries of surrogate decision-making (Brusky, 1995). One might object that the very fact of recognizing the value of scientific research and of legal or policy work in relation to the use of cochlear implants already takes a normative stand in favor of these projects. In a trivial sense, much of what we do or say carry some normative weight, simply because the author of an action or a statement often implicitly suggests that she endorses or values her own endeavor or decision. I do not deny that specific public policies, laws or widespread individual choices can have a damaging impact on some disabled people or feed an ableist ideology. This has been called the "expressivist objection" in the context of assessing the morality of prenatal testing for instance (Parens and Ash, 2000; Klein, 2011). However, identifying such "expressive harms" is tricky: there is a risk that the fear of such alleged harm would be unfounded just like there is a risk that insidious, ideological harms go unnoticed because complainants have trouble identifying a concrete victim or a clear causal connection between the "expression" and the harm. In any case, detecting elusive forms of harm requires more than an a priori claim that punctual, microscopic events or work done within a specific field of expertise to improve the situation of people with disabilities, necessarily entails a macroscopic normative stand on disability and disabled people. Short of a more substantial description of harms, vague cultural allegations hardly constitutes an argument against the worth of these endeavors to the people who undertake, desire, or benefit from them. Although cultural criticisms of the normalizing effects of cochlear implants on the deaf community is also desirable, it is hard to say that research about, for example, the correlation between meningitis and cochlear implants (Cohen et al., 2005) is worthless to parents considering whether cochlear implants are in the best interests of their child. It would be undemocratic or paternalistic on the part of the deaf community to deny the voice of their members, especially on the ground of lofty comparisons of medical treatments with a genocidal project. People who received cochlear implants may choose to use it or not for primarily physical rather than cultural reasons. For instance, one research indicated that children who did not use cochlear implants were “not necessarily against them in principle, admitting that they had friends for whom an implant proved to be helpful,” but rather disliked the discomfort or pain that it caused (Watson and Gregory, 2005, 53). As time passed, the dichotomic caricature slowly dissolved as tenants of a reductionist understanding of the function and implications of cochlear implants came to acknowledge that this medical intervention had multiple dimensions that called for multiple accounts and professional competences, rather than a single response. Psychologists Leigh and Paludneviciene wrote in 2011 that: It took decades of struggle before culturally Deaf adults who decided on cochlear implantation began to be viewed by opponents of the procedure no longer as automatic traitors, guilty of betraying their Deaf culture values but rather as individuals who wanted exposure to different sensory experiences, in this case auditory stimulation, while holding on to the use of their signed language. (Leigh and Paludneviciene, 2011, vii) I conclude that the concept of disability is better left open-ended and broad enough to encompass the possibility that different cases of “disability” could have very different ethical implications: the could be evaluated negatively or neutrally, call for various solutions from, and translate into different kinds of moral blames or moral demands made to various social actors. To emphasize that I do not think that we can make great theoretical use of this “ethically neutral” concept, I would rather call it “ethically open” or “proto-axiological” and suggest we think of it as an umbrella concept, or a shorthand, for a group of phenomena categorized as statistically abnormal limitations and associated with (though not necessarily caused by) atypical modes or levels of human functioning.12 However, some experts from various fields (medicine, disability theory, sociology, bioethics, and policymaking or activists) would resist these suggestions, because they think it would result in politically harmful consequences. This set of considerations is external to the individual or social theories or models: they are concerns about the badness of the consequences that using a theory or model within particular social contexts will bring about. These are the important but essentially distinct considerations to which we now turn. Go to: V. THE REAL DEBATABLE ISSUE: THE COSTS OF THE SOCIAL MODEL There are practical costs for using individual or social models of disability, both in and out of the academic sphere. Calculating these is largely an empirical issue, and a hard, perhaps partly insurmountable task easily biased by one’s normative stand. I only wish to briefly present these costs here and suggest that they are the only reason why the definitional disagreements about disability should keep going. First, from a political viewpoint, it starts making sense to conflate the dichotomy criticism with the “denying/denigrating impairments” criticism. This conflation may be the result of a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the social model and nonetheless have real, harmful effects. As Tom Shakespeare puts it, while prudently acknowledging that this is a criticism about the use of the theory rather than the theory itself: The social model so strongly disowns individual and medical approaches, that it risks implying that impairment is not a problem. … The social model suggests that people are disabled by society not by their bodies. Rather than simply opposing medicalization, it can be interpreted as rejecting medical prevention, rehabilitation or cure of impairment, even if this is not what either UPIAS, Finkelstein, Oliver, or Barnes intended. (Shakespeare, 2010, 269–70) Similarly, the criticism that the social model is not looking at the most urgent problem, or the most fixable one, also starts making sense as an empirical claim.13 For instance, some theorists have criticized the social model for “the privileging of sociological or any other expertise to replace medical or psychological expertise,” because the “experience” of disability thus contemplated is too incomplete; they suggest that “when it comes to mundane technological intervention what is needed is a [more individualist] position from which to understand disability,” one that considers “how individuals practically understand it and how it practically affects their everyday life” (Dewsbury et al., 2004, 156). I find it telling that their main concern is “with why it is that the various commitments and concerns of what we class as the social model are proving of little help to us” (Dewsbury et al., 2004, 145). Leaving the “why” aside, we can simply read that the social model is not helping them to deal with the particular problem with which they are concerned. Why not opt for another model? Many of these theorists do not feel that they can put the “why” question aside and embark on a further endeavor to debunk the social model, rather than using another one better suited to the issue at hand. In my opinion, the philosophical quest to establish either (1) that the social model is useless or mistaken in the abstract, or (2) that individual problems are the only one with which theorists of “disability” should be concerned is a questionable preliminary step, at best theoretically immodest and distracting, and at worst doomed to fail. Their insistence may be due to the fact that the social model has become such an important paradigm that there is a real fear that alternative models would be discarded as not heeding the social model’s insights and therefore have to position themselves either as an incrementation to the social model or as a substantial refutation of it. That this apprehension is caused by factors external to the model itself does not make it irrational. For instance, Tom Shakespeare and Nicholas Watson (2001, 12) reported a tendency “to evaluate ideas on the basis of their conformity to social model orthodoxy” reflected in the international journal Disability and Society (see, however, Oliver’s answer, 2009, 50). Analyzing the experience and needs of a particular group of disabled people and finding that the social model “explicitly undergirds the discourses and practices of this group,” another author reported the dangers that the social model can be interpreted in a way which privileges some impaired identities over others, sanctions a separatist ghetto which cannot reach out to other groups of disabled and disadvantaged people, and weaves a tangled web around researchers who adhere to the emancipatory paradigm. (Humphrey, 2000, 63) The most convincing claim that can be levied against the social model is not that it does not care about the right thing or has a bad metaphysics––something it never tried having. It is that as a mainstream paradigm, it marginalizes some people and some important problems by indirectly discrediting their claims. How much it does that (and how much would getting rid of the social paradigm help) is a difficult empirical question. For one thing, I note that while most disability theorists find that the social model is the undefeated paradigm of disability (Pfeiffer, 2001; Shakespeare and Watson, 2001), the dominant view in bioethics remains an individualist framework (Silvers, 2003; Vehmas, 2004, 34).14 Hence, one may worry that experts misevaluate the political influence of using one framework or another, given their own fields of practice, teaching, and research. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, social modelists have good reasons for wanting to keep “disability” a public matter and to insist that we think of “being disabled” as being disabled by society, rather than by our body or natural misfortune. Finkelstein and Oliver think that “the limitations that our functional impairments impose upon us are an inadequate basis for building a political movement” (Oliver, 2009, 48). Furthermore, Oliver argues that a theoretical and political “[focus] on impairments and difference will only de-politicise the social model and will not lead to the development of [useful alternative models]” (Oliver, 2013, 1025).15 This is a controversial claim, considering the various proposals of alternative models.16 Whether or not Oliver’s claim about the negative social costs of using a model of disability other than the social one is correct, however, is an empirical claim.17 Certainly, there is a clear political advantage in vindicating the idea that disabilities are a social failure, because this conceptualization would help individuals not to interpret their disabled status as a natural misfortune they have to put up with, or one for which they cannot ask help, at least not with the sense of entitlement generally underlying right claims rather than charity. It would also improve individuals’ self-respect and confidence: they are not the problem, society is.18 As someone working in and promoting the nascent field of “disability ethics,” my own leaning is to focus on specific ethical problems, to get semantic confusion out of the way, and to put rhetorical and political questions back in their place. I am also generally skeptical when political interests cross over to the conceptual side to criticize a theory because of its uses, and even its misuses. That said, my main argument is not to side with either view about the political costs of defending an exclusively social or a partly medical model of disability. There are clearly sound empirical arguments to be made on both sides. Rather, I want to suggest that these questions are the only ones needing to be settled as far as using the term “disability” in ethical issues. It seems to me that it is very hard, or not particularly productive, to criticize disability theorists for their choice of models based on theoretical grounds. Of course, conceptual frameworks can create or perpetuate as many problems as they solve. But, if that is the charge, I would encourage a closer criticism of a particular theoretical oversight or failure rather than a global rejection or defense of a universal model, especially since we are dealing with a profoundly contested concept.

#### Reject Mollow’s understandings of disability – they paper over material violence that happens to disabled people, upholds a violent system and only upholds the systems they criticize

Bailey 19 (Courtney Bailey; 2019; Disability Studies Quarterly; *“On the Impossible: Disability Studies, Queer Theory, and the Surviving Crip”*; accessed 7/23/21; <https://dsq-sds.org/article/view/6580/5463>; Courtney Bailey is an Associate Professor of Communication Arts with a Ph.D. in Communication & Culture from Indiana University-Bloomington and a BSC in Interpersonal Communication from Ohio University-Athens. Specializing in rhetorical studies, media studies, and feminist/queer theory, her teaching and research emphasize visual imagery and representations of the body in U.S. popular culture.) HB

Queer Theory: Disability and the Embrace of the Death Drive My critique of anti-cure politics arises from my personal experiences described in other parts of this essay. Those experiences include chronic pain, depression, and abuse and participation in feminism, anti-racism, queer theory, disability studies, and other critical-political projects. Drawing on my experiences assists me in engaging analytic concepts, and vice versa. The personal and theoretical are thus inseparable from, if not reducible to, each other. Yet academia, with its love of the View from Nowhere, typically treats personal experience with suspicion. It purportedly cannot meet academic criteria for adequate evidence because it is imagined as too particular, too embodied, and too subjective. Even critical-political fields often view personal experience with skepticism and wariness, a defensive reflex against attempts to discredit them by conflating them with the personal alone. Indeed, appeals to personal experience sometimes shut down critique, especially within a confessional and therapeutic culture that demands performances of authenticity to justify the exercise of power (Mollow and McRuer 8). Although personal experience never speaks for itself and must always be theorized, this discomfort risks cordoning the two off from one another, rather than teasing out their entanglements. Although this suspicion of personal experience is endemic to most academic fields, I turn here to a particular preference for the abstract and the theoretical at the expense of the material and experiential: the anti-relational strand of queer theory influenced by psychoanalysis and represented by work like Lee Edelman's No Future and Leo Bersani's "Is the Rectum a Grave?" Unlike the work of Halberstam, Warner, Ahmed, and Muñoz, this strand gives up on the tension between positivity and negativity altogether in favor of the strictly negative (as one might gather from the titles of Edelman's and Bersani's pieces). I read Bersani's piece in graduate school and Edelman's book when it was originally published, but I became reacquainted with them through Anna Mollow's essay "Is Sex Disability? Queer Theory and the Disability Drive" in the anthology Sex and Disability. Reading them now, with experiences like those chronicled in this essay under my belt, their complicity with the View from Nowhere comes sharply into view. Just as the disabled normate haunts Brilliant Imperfection, a desire for the "purity of sexuality as a singular trope of difference," not contaminated by "race, gender, and other particularities," haunts anti-relational work (Muñoz 11). Edelman's book critiques reproductive futurism, a pro-natalist ideology that conflates futurity with procreation, upholds heteronormativity, and abjects queerness in the name of the Child (2). Following Edelman, Mollow critiques rehabilitative futurism, a pro-cure ideology that conflates futurity with the eradication of disability and upholds compulsory able-bodied/mindedness in the name of the Child (288). Mollow draws on Bersani's and Edelman's articulations of the death drive to theorize what she calls the disability drive. She contends, "to foreground associations between disability and the death drive means theorizing disability in terms of identity disintegration, lack, and suffering… I critique politics of disability that emphasize identity formation and pride, exploring instead the benefits of highlighting those aspects of sex and disability that undercut and perhaps even preclude assertions of humanity" (287). In some ways, then, Mollow, Edelman, and Bersani argue for an embrace of negativity not entirely different from what I call for in the above section. However, their work relies on the ahistorical language of psychoanalysis, a closed symbol system that feigns universality and casts material and personal experience as irrelevant to abstract theorizing. I call queer theory's anti-relational strand "a closed system" because of its explicit rejection of both politics and history. Edelman contends that queer theory represents "the 'side' outside all political sides" (7). Mollow nuances such sentiments, but ultimately agrees with Edelman that reproductive and rehabilitative futurism structure the "only politics we're permitted to know" (134). This sweeping claim ignores feminist, queer, antiracist, and crip critical-political projects, dismissing them as mere identity politics, too wrapped up in dominant notions of the human and therefore not ideologically pure enough to provide a real alternative to futurism. What is that "real" alternative that only queer theory and psychoanalysis can offer? The implosion/explosion of the self into nothingness. This type of self-annihilation also requires a detachment from history. Edelman, for instance, distinguishes the rhetorical figure of the Child from "the lived experiences of any historical children" (11). He makes a comparable move with the death drive, arguing that it does not denote literal death, but rather a metaphoric or symbolic death of the sovereign subject via the self-shattering nature of sex. Similarly, Bersani's famous piece "Is the Rectum a Grave?" redeems penetrative (anal) sex as the space for the destruction of the sovereign subject, revels in its "anti-communal, anti-egalitarian, anti-nurturing, and anti-loving" qualities, and praises the metaphoric "suicidal ecstasy of being a woman" (22; 18). It's important to note that this recuperation only applies to penetrative sex, leaving other forms of sexual intimacy unaccounted for and bereft of any radical potential. Although I understand Bersani's piece as an intervention in homophobic discourses around gay men and the AIDS epidemic, he comes perilously close to reinforcing the vision of sex at the heart of U.S. rape culture. He argues for the appeal of "powerlessness" and "loss of control" during sex, a white masculinist fantasy given that Western culture always already positions femininity and black/brownness in these very terms (23-24). My own experiences illustrate how a sexual breach of subjecthood can play out differently for members of marginalized groups than they might for those with more privilege. On one level, I get the appeal of the sort of surrender discussed by Bersani. In fact, I once asked my partner to tie me up on my stomach and blindfold me. In the process, she violated me via unwanted anal penetration, an "anti-loving" breach of trust and interdependence on both physical and emotional levels. On Bersani's view, this breach is the whole point of sex, the moment when the self loses autonomy, integrity, and control (as if I ever enjoyed such subjecthood in the first place). If we take this line of thinking to its logical conclusion, we come dangerously close to the familiar heteropatriarchal apology for rape, buttressed by a theoretical apparatus that claims universality: regardless of my explicitly stated wishes, I subconsciously wanted to be violated. Situating the self-annihilating queer as the site of revolution obscures these kinds of problematic echoes, dismissing them from the start as too personal, particular, and material. The turn to the self-annihilating queer animates Mollow's essay, as well. She postulates queerness and disability as structuring positions that raise important questions about "self-disintegration" (305). Far more attentive to history and lived experiences, her piece grapples directly with challenges to the anti-relational strand, much like Clare reckons with challenges to anti-cure politics in Brilliant Imperfection. Yet, also like Clare's book, her essay is haunted by the disabled normate and the naturally impaired body-mind; instead of celebrating it, she wants to destroy it, but still remains within its terms. She notes that "disability is fantasized in terms of a loss of self, of mastery, integrity, and control, a loss that … is indissociable from sexuality" (297; emphasis in original). She wants us to lean into this fantasy, which requires that we accept the conflation of the self with mastery, integrity, and control in the first place. Through the grammatical slippage of the dependent clause, any other visions of the self (e.g., based on interdependence, care, or empathy) vanish. If we accept the sovereign self, then, yes, the death and disability drives might be resources for exploding or imploding it and the systems of oppression it enables. But such explosions and implosions need not lead to self-annihilation, which seems to me just another instantiation of the disembodied View from Nowhere wherein death represents transformation into pure soul and thus ultimate freedom from the located-ness of the body. If we're going to explode or implode sovereign subjectivity, then let's clear space for other notions of the self, rather than glorifying nothingness. Moreover, what happens if we take literal death (biological and/or social) seriously? What happens if we take material violence, which can and does end lives, seriously? In that case, it should become clear that reproductive futurism is the domain of only some children. This ideology values children only insofar as they themselves can further reproduce whiteness, heterosexuality, the gender binary, able-bodied/mindedness, and so forth. In Muñoz's words, in a world where queer youths of color too often do not get a chance to grow up, "racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity" (95-96). The fact that the anti-relational strand pretends such questions can or should be set aside speaks to the normative positions it upholds. I therefore read these anti-relational pieces with interest, but also with growing anger. I am in the process of healing from over a decade's worth of chronic pain, depression, and abuse. I am not over these things. I learn to survive with them, maybe even learn from them and integrate them into my self-perception, even as I refuse to romanticize or celebrate them as keys to enlightenment and transcendence. I haven't overcome my disabilities in some Herculean display of willpower and sovereign subjecthood. I haven't overcome them at all, but I do embrace the value of my own survival as part of my critical-political orientation toward the world. I respect attempts to identify the excessive, the very thing that cannot be resolved, captured, or made to signify in any coherent way, and to think beyond the human. Yet the anti-relational strain reads very differently now that I have emerged from a kind of living death. It angers me given how hard I fight to believe in my right to survive and exist, not as a lone self with mastery and control, but as an interdependent self fumbling towards compassion, justice, and care. I'm not interested in being a figurehead for the revolution if that revolution depends on my erasure, absence, and self-sacrifice. I've come too close to actual suicide to see anything ecstatic about it; I've existed too long in chronic pain to see anything liberatory about that, either. I know that psychoanalysis often takes bodily pain and pleasure as one of its starting points, typically imagined as the acute, extraordinary experience of orgasm. It is not the daily slog of chronic pain that inhibits not only mastery and control, but also care, compassion, and survival. Queer versions of psychoanalysis claim to pay attention to sexual pain and pleasure, but then do their best to escape and transcend material embodiment. They focus so narrowly on the symbolic destruction of the sovereign self that they end up treating it as if it's detached from the body, as if it's "just" metaphor. But metaphors live in actual suicidal women; they are more than abstracted playthings for academic bad boys, their closed symbolic systems, and their "white gay male crypto-identity politics" that reproduce the mind/body dualism (Muñoz 95). This dualism contributes to the fact that the anti-relational strand of queer theory enjoys circulation and currency within the academy. Despite decades of critique of the disembodied academic voice with its white bourgeois norms, that voice still commands respect and authority. 5 It is still the lingua franca of the realm, even in (or especially in) humanities-based fields that otherwise reject universality, objectivity, and impartiality for their complicity in dominant systems of knowledge production and circulation. Our anxieties over rigor and legitimacy often bubble up in our adherence to the very academic norms of writing that disallow certain things from being sayable or legible as anything other than gibberish, noise, or confession. And, of course, our publishing and reward structures enforce these norms by treating the disembodied style as an ineffable sign of political commitment, even as they render that style itself apolitical. Or arhetorical, we might say instead, over and against the supposed rhetorical trickery of appeals to personal experience, which smuggle ideology in under the disguise of authenticity. But my graduate school advisor taught me that the most powerful rhetoric is precisely that which seems arhetorical, above the fray, outside the muck and mire that ensnare only those without access to the Truth (Theory).