### 1AC – The Boy in the bubble

#### More More, excess excess excess – bear witness to the collapse of meaning as we sheer volume of information renders itself meaningless – The will to transparency murdered meaning and hid the body

Shapiro, 17 [Alan N, Professor in Transdisciplinary design at Folkwang, 1/5, “*Baudrillard and Trump: Simulation and Object-Orientation, Not True and False,”* http://www.alan-shapiro.com/baudrillard-and-trump-simulation-and-object-orientation-not-true-and-false-by-alan-n-shapiro/, ]

I see an op-ed piece in yesterday’s Washington Post (January 2nd, 2017) by Greg Sargent. It is called “Yes, Donald Trump ‘lies.’ A lot. And news organizations should say so.” This article is typical of the entire approach of the “liberal establishment” towards Trump. During the election campaign, journalists and commentators kept pointing out that Trump is a liar, a snake oil salesman, etc. (see the brilliant 1964 Philip K. Dick novel Lies, Inc.) That may all be true, but it doesn’t make a dent in the number of his supporters. Baudrillard comments throughout his work on the difference between critical theory discourse (which liberal journalists like Sargent are stuck in with respect to Trump) and what he called “fatal theory.” Critical theory discourse is ineffective. Trump is the candidate of Reality TV, of the celebrity culture, of media hyper-reality entertainment, of everyone’s 15 minutes of fame (Warhol), of the “trans-political” (Baudrillard), and of object-orientation (OO). OO: Trump will be the Presidency and not the President – end of the distance between human agent and office –Trump is misogyny itself and not a misogynist, he is racism itself and not a racist, Trump hates no one [“nobody loves Group X more than I do”], he simply associates himself rhetorically with the social-psychological “object” which is hatred). Beyond the epistemology of the human subject, Trump will identify with any iconic or mental-image “object” necessary as he performs “the art of the deal” and the practice of “winning” in larger and larger arenas. Trump identifies with the political-science-object that is the historically dormant China-Taiwan conflict itself (and its reawakened provocation). The “social actors” (Bruno Latour) of China and Taiwan are irrelevant. In other words, Trump is the candidate of the era of simulation. Invoking “the truth” against him does not work as a strategy. Trump is already more advanced than the discourse of truth. We are in a hyper-reality where there is no more truth and no more falsehood. Carl “The Truth” Williams, a former heavyweight boxing champion of the world, passed away in April 2013. Alan Cholodenko comments: If hyper-reality was born for Baudrillard during or just after the Second World War, then there have already been several simulation-Presidents: JFK the first televisual President, Reagan the Hollywood actor and first TV show host (of the General Electric Theatre)-President. Trump takes his place in this lineage. He is the second TV show host (of The Apprentice)-President, the first live show, reality TV show CEO host become live show, reality TV show CEO host-President of the live show, reality TV show America, Inc.) The mistake of the multitudes of journalists and editorialists like the Washington Post’s Greg Sargent is to not understand that the system of “truth and lies” is not some eternal, ahistorical or “scientifically objective” reality. It is an historically constructed cultural discourse or arrangement tied to an epoch which is finite in time. As Foucault might say, the concern with “true” and “false” is an epistème – an epistemological a priori, an expression of a specific power-knowledge constellation within an era – whose time has come and gone. The insistent belief in “truth and lies” is also embedded in the Plato-initiated “metaphysics” of the “human subject,” the subject-centered worldview, the sovereign (democratic or scientific) subject who “knows” and can therefore judge and determine when “knowledge” or a “fact” has been betrayed. In the new epistemological system beyond “truth and lies” to which Trump is finely attuned, of which he is the master, and which liberals do not get, the object itself is the hot thing. The spotlight is on objects (conceptual not physical), and they are a relationship, an association which knows nothing of whether they are real or fake. They transcend and straddle true and false. “Things have found a way of avoiding a dialectics of meaning that was beginning to bore them: by proliferating indefinitely, increasing their potential, outbidding themselves in an ascension to the limit, an obscenity that henceforth becomes their immanent finality and senseless reason.” (Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies; p.7) When Trump says something, it becomes true because Trump says it, and there is nothing that the New York Times and the Washington Post can do about it. Trump will change what he says on any given topic from day to day, or on any given Sunday. The liberal media will “prove him wrong” with evidence, but this demonstration will have an effect exactly the opposite than that intended upon and for the “silent majority” of half of Americans for whom they are the liars. The institutional bases for consensus or legitimation of “the truth” have disappeared beneath the sheer load of mountainous piles of information, and the virtualization, delocalization, de-physicalization, and disembodiment of discourse. When did this happen (when was the “Canetti point”)? Impossible to say. To know the point of origin of that would be to overstate the claims of knowledge, to violate the methodological recursivity of our awareness of being lost within the culture of simulation (as Baudrillard has taught us in his fascinating lengthy discussions of the “Canetti point,” and as Gerry Coulter has taught us, for example, in his essay on America). When Trump said that thousands of Muslims were celebrating on rooftops in Jersey City, New Jersey on 9/11, he was right. 100% right, as he later tweeted. Within the epistemology (theory of knowledge) of the humanist-democratic subject and of truth, the alleged rooftop event of course “did not take place.” Yet in the hyper-modernist epistemology, the rhetorical and emotional power of the words invoked and the mental images evoked by Trump (the advent of hyper-imagination) carry the weight and dynamic force of the image-immersed beyond-chimerical “object” of those evil Muslim celebrators. Probably Trump saw on TV in September 2001 some cynical celebrations in the Palestinian territories. The clandestine wormhole connection between physically remote points in space is plausibly extant. In the culture of virtual images, it is perfectly OK to transpose the bin Laden-sympathetic revelers from one geographical location to another, the hyper-space of Trump’s creative memory mingled with the hyper-dimensional expanding televisual space on the interior of the flatscreen. Fantasy is possible in a world that is still real. A fantasy could be said to be not true, some sort of illusion (in the non-Baudrillardian meaning of this word) or deception. But when images are everywhere, and they are universally exchangeable with each other, the made-up mental images become hyper-real. Which now (literally) means (hyper-means) more real than real. Meaning becomes hyper-meaning. Would not the ubiquity of video documentation and recording devices of every kind increase the availability of truth? Whipping the cam around, looking amazing from every angle? No, the effect is just the opposite. When documentation and recording are everywhere, then they are nowhere. They cease to exist in any meaningful sense. They serve no purpose whatsoever anymore. They are pure technology fetish in the bad sense, decoupled through their excess from what they were supposed to enhance or invent. As a hybrid radical-leftist-and-mainstreamer, I do believe that there is a good side to surveillance, a deterrence of crime. But if surveillance is everywhere, then this good side no longer functions. This is the same paradoxical logic that is operative for all virtual and digital media technologies. Yes, all of these wonderful new things are available to us, but we omitted the step of thinking carefully about the appropriate measure of their application. We forgot to humanly judge this. Hybrid posthumanist and humanist. We never took seriously the great thought of Albert Camus, that in almost every area, we need to have a sense of limits (as Dominick LaCapra pointed out). Academic referentiality – which Baudrillard was opposed to – is like this too. If you overdo it, become obsessed with footnotes, then you enter into the twilight zone of hyper-referentiality and then the whole business does not function anymore. You do it because you have to do it and the original purpose is lost. The “proof” (ha ha!) is now upon us that Baudrillard was right all along. We are now fully in the era of simulation and telemorphosis, of the New Truth of the omnipresent image (both picture-image and word-image – the multi-media of the screen having transformed written words from texts into images). The New Truth is not a lie – that would be too easy and the claim is retrograde. The New Truth institutes its own hyper-reality, which is at present our only reality. The only way to contest simulation and the New Truth would be a strategy or perspective of “taking the side of objects” (see, for example, [my most recent IJBS essay](http://www2.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol-13_2/v13-2-shapiro.html), for an elaboration of this). We would have to get to know the codes which underlie and instantiate simulation and reverse them. Reversibility of the code comes from “objects” within the code which want more objecthood. Until we can start to do that, to paraphrase David Cronenberg’s Videodrome: LONG LIVE THE NEW TRUTH! Bernie Tuchman writes: “Your piece on Trump has great power because his election has defeated deniability. Something is Happening and You Don’t Know What It is Mr. Jones. The media continues to ‘analyze’ what it cannot understand. It is like a world which has entered into dementia — where the dream life is more real than the ‘awake’ life, and where no one can say which is which. It is the nervous breakdown of hierarchical order.”

#### IPRs are the guards of medicinal transparency – Medicine is a symptom of the code, a way to render all threats known and controllable – thus the pursuit for a secure body carries on

Smith 16 (Laura Katherine, PhD candidate in Literature and Culture at KU Leuven, Belgium, “Trans-Baudrillard: Towards a Seductive Immunity”, Parallax, 22:3, 330-346, DOI: 10.1080/13534645.2016.1201923) DB

Out of such divisions, geographical and ideological states of policing, security, prevention and interception have become dominant preoccupations in Western politics. As narratives of protection translate into new technologies of security, a social of promoted immunity emerges. The enthusiastic pursuit of transparency in the name of protection and of connectivity in the name of communication, produce new vulnerabilities – transparency and threat codevelop. As with the advent of technological reproduction, time and space have become virtual and viral – spreading both to an elusive state of transbeyond and to a condition of rapid and exponential acceleration. When it comes to the technologies of war, the goal of increased defence does not necessarily equate with increased protection. The interpretation of protection and destruction, of course, shifts based on perspective. This accelerating phenomenal status is Baudrillard’s ‘vertigo’ and his ‘trans’.¶ Baudrillard’s trans-political is a beyond, outside, or obscene political.36 He states that: ‘The trans-political is the transparency and obscenity of all structures in a de-structured universe, the transparency and obscenity of change in a de-historicized universe’. 37 The trans-political, in a state of Simulation, rotates in cyclical eclipse. The ‘anthropological diagnostic’ indicative of trans, in this case political, points also to the vertigo of rapid image consumption. War – montaged, presented and consumed in the blurred public-private – is eclipsed by its own image, by its perpetual re-presentation. In the midst of a fetishized transparency wherein war becomes image, annihilation occurs in the sphere of the political itself. Due to the proliferation of information and its analysis in real time, a saturation of meaning results in indifference; the speed with which events blur into one another produces a political, according to Baudrillard, that can no longer catch up with itself.38 Thus one finds oneself in a virtual state – beyond the event of war and politics in this case.39 This is Baudrillard’s first (critical) employment of his two-fold conceptualizations of both ‘trans’ (beyond) and ‘indifference’.¶ Baudrillard notes the following in his controversial book, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place: ‘We are no longer in a logic of the passage from virtual to actual but in a hyperrealist logic of the deterrence of the real by the virtual’. 40 In terms of terrorism, the truly catastrophic aspect, for Baudrillard, is the perpetual circulation and escalation of fear, the joint produced and consumed narrative of Evil and the subsequent reaction of ever-increasing defence/protection which reversely underscores the impossibility of a total immunity. Despite this macro-phenomenal analysis, Baudrillard’s texts on the subject have been interpreted as simplistically ignorant towards real suffering.41 His description that terrorism is ‘senseless and indeterminate like the system it combats’ simply highlights that a system of promoted immunity is itself without sense, a performance of meaning.42 Perhaps the confusion around Baudrillard’s view on terrorism arises from the fact that the same terms are employed in his descriptions of truly violent and symbolic events and simultaneously in his understanding of symbolic forms that can positively challenge one’s conceptualization of the ‘Real’. 43 Gane notes: ‘[Terrorism] projects itself outside of exchange by means of the escalation of the challenge in the duel’. 44 Baudrillard notes that it is this ‘outside of exchange’ that produces terror, while a produced rhetoric of difference, on the other hand, ‘means regulated exchange’. 45 What is at stake here is a relation of control. This example shows the first of a paradoxical (two-fold) meaning of ‘challenge in the duel’ as (negatively) exposing the metaphysical short-comings of the ideology of the Real. A second conception of key terms: ‘trans’, ‘indifference’, ‘challenge’ and ‘duel’ will be later explored alternatively (positively) in the work of Baudrillard.¶ Bodies – Immunity¶ Society is described by Baudrillard as a ‘viral pathology’ with ‘total efficiency [and] total performance’ as its desired destination.46 In his analysis, somatic terms characterize the social; an ‘allergic’ society whose passion is one of ‘irritation’ rather than one of ‘excite[ment] [or even] outrage’. 47 ‘Énervement’, annoyance or dissatisfaction are the allergic reactions to the social’s perpetual ‘growth’ – a term defined concurrently as ‘the progressive development of evolution’ and ‘an abnormal proliferation of tissue’. 48 Baudrillard’s cancerous metaphor, concerned with the overgrowth of systems, reveals a parallel system of self-destruction. This passionately irritated social is the contemporary, simultaneous workaholic-distracted, social.¶ An article published in 2014 explores the possibility of a future (legal and moral) obligation of certain professionals to use performance-enhancing pharmaceuticals in order to meet the ever-evolving expected quality of social care and service, using the example of professional pilots or surgeons.49 A higher standard of performance, a new normal for bodies, points not only to ethical considerations but demands an examination of the ideologies of perfection and control behind such innovations. Baudrillard would not be surprised by this inquiry concerning potential new responsibilities, duties and obligations when it comes to drug-use since he himself describes two types of drug-use. The first, Baudrillard considers, a result of ‘inadequate social and economic conditions’ and the second – the situation in which the West finds itself today, according to Baudrillard – the result of ‘the saturation of the world of consumption’. 50 ‘Drug-use’, wrote Baudrillard in 2000, ‘is no longer a subversive anomie, but an anomaly becoming institutionalized. […] It is society which produces this perverse effect and society which condemns it’. 51 He adds that, generally, we are ‘doomed to artificial immunity’. 52¶ Underpinning a drive toward efficiency and performance in the social is one’s own bodily perfection, a rejection of what might be considered one’s own ‘other’. Baudrillard notes: ‘It is not absurd to think that the extermination of man begins with the extermination of man’s germs’. 53 For Baudrillard, this is epitomized in the image of The Boy in the Bubble: ‘The Boy in the Bubble is a prefigurement of the future – of that total asepsis, that total extirpation of germs, which is the biological form of transparency’. 54 A will to extinguish all bacteria and germs paradoxically creates the perfect site for exposure and vulnerability. Baudrillard clarifies:¶ What we look for today, where the body is concerned, is not so much health, which is a state of organic equilibrium, but fitness, which is an ephemeral, hygienic, promotional radiance of the body – much more a performance than an ideal state – which turns sickness into failure.55¶ The moral dimension of this ‘failure’ is underscored by Eula Biss who writes that the declaration ‘I am healthy’ becomes an identity opposed to the idea of ‘sickness’. 56 The transformation of health to commodity value gives weight to Baudrillard’s concern that we are ‘eliminating ourselves’. The following expands upon this: ‘The best strategy for bringing about someone’s ruin is to eliminate everything which threatens him, thus causing him to lose all his defences, and it is this strategy we are applying to ourselves’. 57 Baudrillard adds that: ‘Thought, itself a sort of network of antibodies and natural immune defences, is also highly vulnerable’. 58 A fixed thought-belief carries the potential to create an excessive notion – in the case of immunity, an internalized and performed ideal state. Baudrillard’s reference to The Boy in the Bubble, therefore, implies a metaphorical spatial enclosing, a short-circuited ideological system. Similarly, Baudrillard describes Biosphere 2 as a ‘glass coffin’ wherein ‘viruses, chaos, bacteria and scorpions [are] significantly eliminated […] as though they were not meant to exist’. 59 Jonathan Fardy has aptly linked Baudrillard’s work to that of Peter Sloterdijk, particularly comparing the metaphor of Baudrillard’s ‘black hole’ social to Stolerdijk’s spheres/bubbles. Fardy explains that: ‘Modern subjects [in Sloterdijk’s social theory] are figured as fragile bubbles ever in search of the spherical security of the Medieval world-view’. 60 Sloterdijk’s image of ‘modern subjects as fragile bubbles’ calls to mind both Baudrillard’s image of The Boy in the Bubble and his reference to Bosch’s painting (unnamed in his work but presumably The Garden of Earthly Delights) which depicts figures enclosed or partially so in bubble-like objects.61¶ Immunity promoted in war and fitness aims, yet ironically fails, to eliminate vulnerability. However, vulnerability is reversely invoked in situations wherein it may be promoted and interpreted as beneficial. Baudrillard writes: ‘[The political class] use the judiciary to absolve them of their supposed immunity [exemptions] and isolation and overcome the public disaffection afflicting them. And they do this by appearing vulnerable and fragile, and hence open and accessible’. 62 Here, Baudrillard points to the theatricality of the system wherein an example must be made of those participating in scandal in order to highlight the goodness of the group in general. In this context, vulnerability (or the performance of it) is an asset rather than a weakness – context determines value.¶ Consuming an ideal immunity, in a world of unavoidable reversibility, operates in a state of trans (trans-politics, trans-aesthetics) and emerges from a state of obscenity. Trans describes a phenomenon of virtual, cyclical, nonevents. Although trans is indeed employed here as a descriptive means to critique a short-circuiting system, a status of trans itself – part of a general state of Simulation – is not allocated a moral judgement. Instead, Baudrillard pushes forward and asks: ‘What happens after the orgy?’ 63 Aside from a ‘spiral of the worst’: a total transparency, trans also signals a sweeping across fixed categories and the creation, in its wake, of what Coulter has explored as Baudrillard’s positive poetic resolution.64

#### WOW this bubble sure is cozy – I feel so safe and secure, Thanks Code!! I love being safe and secure so so so much – the Boy in the bubble is the perfect analogy for medicinal transparency – I love being safe don’t you too? Medicine securitizes the body to protect us from all threats – what is man if not a dirty little germ?

Baudrillard, 93 [Jean, “*The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena*,” pg. 61-2, //MW]

The Boy in the Bubble is a prefigurement of the future - of that total asepsis, that total extirpation of germs, which is the biological form of transparency. He epitomizes the kind of vacuum-sealed existence hitherto reserved for bacteria and particles in laboratories but now destined for us as, more and more, we are vacuum-pressed like records, vacuum-packed like deep-frozen foods and vacuum-enclosed for death as victims of fanatical therapeutic measures. That we think and reflect in a vacuum is demonstrated by the ubiquitousness of artificial intelligence. It is not absurd to suppose that the extermination of man begins with the extermination of man's germs. One has only to consider the human being himself, complete with his emotions, his passions, his laughter, his sex and his secretions, to conclude that man is nothing but a dirty little germ - an irrational virus marring a universe of transparency. Once he has been purged, once everything has been cleaned up and all infection - whether of a social or a bacillary kind - has been driven out, then only the virus of sadness will remain in a mortally clean and mortally sophisticated world. Thought, itself a sort of network of antibodies and natural immune defences, is also highly vulnerable. It is in acute danger of being conveniently replaced by an electronic cerebrospinal bubble from which any animal or metaphysical reflex has been expunged. Even without all the technological advantages of the Boy in the Bubble, we are already living in the bubble ourselves - already, like those characters in Bosch paintings, enclosed in a crystal sphere: a transparent envelope in which we have taken refuge and where we remain, bereft of everything yet overprotected, doomed to artificial immunity, continual transfusions and, at the slightest contact with the world outside, instant death. This is why we are all losing our defences - why we are all potentially immunodeficient. All integrated and hyperintegrated systems - the technological system, the social system, even thought itself in artificial intelligence and its derivatives - tend towards the extreme constituted by immunodeficiency. Seeking to eliminate all external aggression, they secrete their own internal virulence, their own malignant reversibility. When a certain saturation point is reached, such systems effect this reversal and undergo this alteration willy-nilly - and thus tend to self-destruct. Their very transparency becomes a threat to them, and the crystal has its revenge. In a hyperprotected space the body loses all its defences. So sterile are operating rooms that no germ or bacterium can survive there. Yet this is the very place where mysterious, anomalous viral diseases make their appearance. The fact is that viruses proliferate as soon as they find a free space. A world purged of the old forms of infection, a world 'ideal' from the clinical point of view, offers a perfect field of operations for the impalpable and implacable pathology which arises from the sterilization itself.

#### The will to transparency culminates in the collapse of value to life – we drive ourselves towards absolute knowledge but by doing so we lose enjoyment of what we love most – The murder of love started on the Tele

Han 15 “The Transparency Society” (Byung-Chul, professor of philosophy and cultural studies at the Universität der Künste Berlin)//pday

Thus, Humboldt also observes of language: [A] thing may spring up in man, for which no understanding can discover the reason in previous circumstances; and we should . . . violate, indeed, the historical truth of its emergence and change, if we sought to exclude from it the possibility of such inexplicable phenomena.4 The ideology of “postprivacy” proves equally naïve. In the name of transparency, it demands completely surrendering the private sphere, which is supposed to lead to see-through communication. The view rests on several errors. For one, human existence is not transparent, even to itself. According to Freud, the ego denies precisely what the unconscious affirms and desires without reserve. The id remains largely hidden to the ego. Therefore, a rift runs through the human psyche and prevents the ego from agreeing even with itself. This fundamental rift renders self-transparency impossible. A rift also gapes between people. For this reason, interpersonal transparency proves impossible to achieve. It is also not worth trying to do so. The other’s very lack of transparency is what keeps the relationship alive. Georg Simmel writes: The mere fact of absolute knowledge, of full psychological exploration, sobers us even without prior intoxication, paralyzes the vitality of relations. . . . The fertile depth of relationships, which senses and honors something more, something final, behind all that is revealed . . . , simply rewards the sensitivity [Zartheit] and self-control that still respects inner privacy even in the most intimate, all-consuming relationship which allows the right to secrets to be preserved.” Compulsive transparency lacks this same “sensitivity”—which simply means respect for Otherness that can never be completely eliminated. Given the pathos for transparency that has laid hold of contemporary society, it seems necessary to gain practical familiarity with the pathos of distance. Distance and shame refuse to be integrated into the accelerated circulation of capital, information, and communication. In this way, all confidential spaces for withdrawing are removed in the name of transparency. Light floods them, and they are then depleted. It only makes the world more shameless and more naked. Autonomy presumes one person’s freedom not to understand another. Richard Sennett remarks: “Rather than an equality of understanding, a transparent equality, autonomy means accepting in the other what you do not understand, an opaque equality.”6 What is more, a transparent relationship is a dead one, altogether lacking attraction and vitality. A new Enlightenment is called for: there are positive, productive spheres of human existence and coexistence that the compulsion for transparency is simply demolishing. In this sense, Nietzsche writes: “The new Enlightenment. . . . It is not enough to recognize in what ignorance man and animal lives; you must also learn to possess the will to ignorance. You must understand that without such ignorance life itself would be impossible, that under this condition alone does the living preserve itself and flourish.”7 It has been demonstrated that more information does not necessarily lead to better decisions.8 Intuition, for example, transcends available data and follows its own logic. Today the growing, indeed the rampant, mass of information is ~~crippling~~ [eliminating] all higher judgment. Often less knowledge and information achieves something more. It is not unusual for the negativity of omitting and forgetting to prove productive. The society of transparency cannot tolerate a gap [Lücke] in information or of sight. Yet both thinking and inspiration require a vacuum. Incidentally, the German word for happiness [Glück] derives from this open space; up until the Late Middle Ages, pronunciation revealed as much [Gelücke]. It follows that a society that no longer admits the negativity of a gap would be a society without happiness. Love without something hidden to sight is pornography. And without a gap in knowledge, thinking degenerates into calculation. The society of positivity has taken leave of both dialectics and hermeneutics. The dialectic is based on negativity. Thus, Hegel’s “Spirit” does not turn away from the negative but endures and preserves it within itself. Negativity nourishes the “life of the mind.” Spirit has “power,” according to Hegel, “only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it.”9 Such lingering yields the “magical power that converts it into being.” In contrast, whoever “surfs” only for what is positive proves mindless. The Spirit is slow because it tarries with the negative and works through it. The system of transparency abolishes all negativity in order to accelerate itself. Tarrying with the negative has given way to racing and raving in the positive. Nor does the society of positivity tolerate negative feelings. Consequently, one loses the ability to handle suffering and pain, to give them form. For Nietzsche, the human soul owes its depth, grandeur, and strength precisely to the time it spends with the negative. Human spirit is born from pain, too: “That tension of the soul in unhappiness which cultivates its strength, . . . its inventiveness and courage in enduring, persevering, interpreting, and exploiting suffering, and whatever has been granted to it of profundity, secret, mask, spirit, cunning, greatness—was it not granted through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering?”10 The society of positivity is now in the process of organizing the human psyche in an entirely new way. In the course of positivization, even love flattens out into an arrangement of pleasant feelings and states of arousal without complexity or consequence. Alain Badiou’s In Praise of Love quotes the slogans of the dating service Meetic: “Be in love without falling in love!” Or, “You don’t have to suffer to be in love!”11 Love undergoes domestication and is positivized as a formula for consumption and comfort. Even the slightest injury must be avoided. Suffering and passion are figures of negativity. On the one hand, they are giving way to enjoyment without negativity. On the other, their place has been taken by psychic disturbances such as exhaustion, fatigue, and depression—all of which are to be traced back to the excess of positivity. Theory in the strong sense of the word is a phenomenon of negativity, too. It makes a decision determining what belongs and what does not. As a mode of highly selective narration, it draws a line of distinction. On the basis of such negativity, theory is violent. It is “produced to prevent things . . . from touching” and “to redistinguish what has been confused.”12 Without the negativity of distinction, matters proliferate and grow promiscuously. In this respect, theory borders on the ceremonial, which separates the initiated and the uninitiated. It is mistaken to assume that the mass of positive data and information—which is assuming untold dimensions today—has made theory superfluous, that is, that comparing data can replace the use of models.

#### Plan: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce Intellectual property protections for medicines.

#### The 1AC Says no to IPPs, the guardians of pharma, we reject biological transparency through our semiotic criticism of the IPP’s and medicinal transparency.

#### Vote affirmative to witness the non-event of fiat. We will transparently prove that transparency is bad by using an arm of the university and its operation to force the removal of simulacrum through the injection of meaningless signs. The injection of an inherently bankrupt action of fiat exposes the operations of debate’s will to transparency as we radically say “NO” to the system and prevent its constitution by external validation – proving any answer to the solvency mechanism flows aff.

Pawlett 14. William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications, and cultural studies at the University of Wolverhampton, UK, “Society At War With Itself,” International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, Volume 11, Number 2 (May, 2014)

It all depends on the ground we choose to fight on … most often … we choose to fight on ground where we are beaten before we begin (Baudrillard 2001: 119). This paper examines Baudrillard’s assertion, made in later works includingImpossible Exchange (2001), The Intelligence of Evil (2005) and Pyres of Autumn(2006), that individuals, society and indeed the global system, are internally and irreconcilably divided, that modernity is ‘at odds with itself’ (Baudrillard 2006: 1). In his view dissent, rejection and insurrection emerge from within, not from external challenges such as alternative ideologies or competing worldviews, but from within bodies, within borders, inside programmes. For Baudrillard much of the violence, hatred and discomfort visible around the globe can be understood as a latent but fundamental ‘silent insurrection’ against the global integrating system and its many pressures, demands and humiliations (2001: 106). This is anendogenic or intra-genic rejection, it emanates from within the system, from within individuals, even from within language, electronic systems and bodily cells, erupting as abreaction, metastasis and sudden reversal.[2](http://www2.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol-11_2/v11-2-pawlett.html#ft-endnote2) For Baudrillard then, despite the many simulations of external threat and enmity – radical Islam currently being the best example – the most dangerous threat lies within: ‘society faces a far harder test than any external threat: that of its own absence, its loss of reality’ (2006: 1). The global order, conventionally labelled “capitalist”, is neutralising its values and structures, its ideologies disappear, its principles are sacrificed. Even the sense of “reality” produced by the abstract sign and by simulation models begin to disappear (2005: 67-73; 2009: 10-15). The goal is ‘integral reality’, a limitless operational project geared towards the total transcription of the world into virtuality: ‘everything is realised and technically materialised without reference to any principle or final purpose’ (2005: 18). Yet there is an internal war or “backlash” taking place between integralist violence which seeks ultimate control by eliminating all otherness, and duality. Duality, for Baudrillard, is “indestructible” and is manifest as the inevitable or destined re-emergence of otherness: of death, Evil, ambivalence, the ghosts of symbolic exchange, the accursed share within the system. The integrating system then suffers a ‘dissent working away at it from inside. It is the global violence immanent in the world-system itself which, from within, sets the purest form of symbolic challenge against it’ (2005: 22). This is a war or conflict that does not end, the outcome of which cannot be predicted or programmed. It is a war that is quite different from the disappearance of war into simulated non-events, such as occurred with the Gulf wars (Baudrillard 1995). Indeed, Baudrillard suggests, the deterrence of world wars, and of nuclear wars, does not result in peace, but in a viral proliferation of conflicts, a fractalisation of war and conflict into everyday, local, and ubiquitous terror (1993b: 27). This paper will examine Baudrillard’s position on internal rejection through two closely related themes: complicity and duality. Complicity, and the closely related term collusion, are themselves dual in Baudrillard’s sense. That is, complicity or collusion express an internal division or ‘duality’ which is not a simple opposition of terms. As is so often the case, Baudrillard’s position builds on his much earlier studies: Requiem For the Media (orig. 1972, in Baudrillard 1981: 164-184) had already argued that the dominance of the abstract sign and of simulation models meant that any critique of the system made through the channels of semiotic abstraction were automatically re-absorbed into the system. Any meaningful challenge must invent its own, alternative medium – such as the silk-screen printings, hand-painted notices and graffiti of May 1968 – or it will lapse into an ineffectual complicity with the system it seeks to challenge (Baudrillard 1981: 176). In his later work, Baudrillard’s emphasis on duality and complicity is extended much further, taking on global, anthropological and even cosmological dimensions, and increasingly complicity and collusion are seen as dual, as encompassing both acceptance and a subtle defiance. This paper examines the dual nature of complicity and collusion. It considers the influence of La Boetie’s notorious Essay on Voluntary Servitude on Baudrillard, seeking to draw out what is distinctive in Baudrillard’s position. The second section turns to the notion of duality, examining Good and Evil and Baudrillard’s assertion that attempts to eliminate duality merely revive or re-active it. Complicity implies a complexity of relations, and, specifically, the condition of being an accomplice to those in power. To be an accomplice is to assist in the committing of a crime. If the crime is murder, the term accomplice implies one who plans, reflects, calculates – but does not strike the lethal blow. The crime which is of particular interest to Baudrillard is, of course, the perfect crime: the elimination of otherness, of ambivalence, of duality, even of “reality” and of the abstract representational sign which enables a sense of “reality” (Baudrillard 1996). The global, integral, carnivalising and cannibalising system, which might loosely still be called capitalist, is at war against radical otherness or duality; yet, for Baudrillard, as duality lies at its heart, locked within its foundations, it is indestructible and emerges through attempts to eliminate it. If the system has been largely successful at eliminating external threats, it finds itself in an even worse situation: it is at war with itself. II. Complicity Complicity is a particularly slippery term. In the 1980s Baudrillard’s thought, mistakenly assumed to be “Postmodernist”, was argued to be complicit with capitalism, largely because it questioned the ability of dominant strands of Marxism and feminism to significantly challenge the capitalist system (Callinicos 1989; Norris 1992). At the same time, Baudrillard was alleging that the work of supposedly radical theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari (1984 orig. 1972) and Lyotard (1993 orig. 1974) was, with their emphasis on desire as productive and liberatory force, complicit with the mechanisms of advanced consumer capitalism (Baudrillard 1987: 17-20). So which branch of contemporary theory is most complicit with capitalism? Liberals, humanists and environmentalists who see their clothes stolen by mainstream politicians? Marxists and Communists who by refusing to update their thinking provide a slow moving target for right-wing snipers? Post- Modernists and Post-Structuralists who attack Enlightenment thought but refuse to speak of the human subject and so have “thrown the baby out with the bath water”? Network and complexity theory which flattens all phenomena and experience to a position on a grid, producing a very complex simplification? The list could go on but it is a question that cannot be answered because all critical theories are complicit with the system they critique. They fight on a terrain already demarcated by their opponents, a terrain on which they are beaten before they begin, one where the most compelling argument can always be dismissed as doom-mongering or irresponsible intellectualism. This includes Baudrillard’s own critical thinking, as he readily acknowledges (Baudrillard 2009a: 39). Further, and even more damaging to the project of critique, in a hegemonic or integral order the system solicits critique and it criticises itself, so displacing and making redundant the laborious attempts at academic critique. The latter continue, even proliferate, but with decreasing impact. So, what does Baudrillard mean by complicity with the global order? Baudrillard’s concern is primarily with complicity at the level of the form of the (capitalist) system, not at the level of belief, consent or allegiance to particular contents of capitalist life (consumer products, plurality of ‘lifestyles’, a degree of ‘tolerance’ etc.). Complicity is often seen, by critics of capitalism, as acceptance of consumerism and its myriad choices and lifestyles, but this is a reductive level of analysis from Baudrillard’s perspective. By complicity or collusion Baudrillard means, on the one hand, the very widespread willingness to surrender or give up beliefs, passions and “symbolic defences” (2010: 24), and on the other – as the dual form – an equally widespread ability to find a space of defiance through the play of complicity, collusion, hyperconformity and indifference (1983: 41-8). That is, while many of us (in the relatively affluent West) share in the profanating, denigrating and “carnivalising” of all values, embracing indifference, shrugging “whatever”, we do so with very little commitment to the system, rejoicing inwardly when it suffers reversals: we operate in a dual mode. While such attitudes of indifference may seem to accept that there is no meaningful alternative to capitalism: an attitude that has been called ‘capitalist nihilism’ (Davis in Milbank and Zizek, 2009) and ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher 2008), Baudrillard’s notions of “integral reality”, duality and complicity may have significant advantages over those approaches. Unlike thinkers who remain anchored to critical thinking defined by determinate negation, Baudrillard’s approach emphasises ambivalence, reversal and both personal and collective modes of rejection more subtle than those envisioned by the increasingly exhausted mechanisms of critique. The critique of consumer capitalism – the consumption of junk food, junk entertainment and junk information – is now integral to the system; the critique of finance capitalism – banker’s bonuses, corporate tax avoidance – is integral to the system, yet it fails to bring about meaningful or determinate social transformation. Indeed, such critiques may do no more than provide the system with a fleeting sense of “reality” – real issues, real problems to deal with – around which the system can reproduce its simulacra, perhaps to reassure us that “something is being done”, “measures are being put into place” etc. “Reality” cannot be dialectically negated by critical concepts when both ‘reality’ and the critical concept disappear together, their fates clearly tied to each other (Baudrillard 2009b: 10-12). There is a sense then in which the production of critique is in complicity with the system, the unravel-able proliferation and excess of critical accounts of the system has the effect of protecting the system. Complicity consists in a sharing of the denigration of all values, all institutions, all ideas, all beliefs: so long as we believe in nothing – at least not passionately – then the system has us, at least superficially. For example, in recent decades we have seen the denigration of religious faiths – or their reduction to ‘cultural identity’ and ‘world heritage’ objects; the denigration of public services and welfare provision accompanied by their marketisation; the denigration of the poor, the young, immigrants and the unemployed. Yet this is not only the denigration of the powerless or disenfranchised, there is also the widespread denigration of those seen as powerful: politicians, corporations, celebrities. For Baudrillard, it is quite inadequate to focus only on the power of global neo-liberal policies such as marketisation in these processes of denigration. This is where Baudrillard’s position departs decisively from anti-globalists and from neo-Communists such as Negri, Zizek, and Badiou. Global power has deliberately sacrificed its values and ideologies, it presents no position, it takes no stand, it undermines even the illusion that “free markets” function and has made “capital” virtual; become orbital it is removed from a terrestrial, geo-political or subjective space. These are protective measures enabling power to become (almost) hegemonic (Baudrillard 2009a: 33-56; 2010: 35-40). Baudrillard often emphasises the fragility and the vulnerability to reversal of the “powerful” and the distinction between powerful and powerless is radically questioned in his work. So what is this global power? Where is it? The answer, of course, is that it is everywhere and it is in everyone. We have not liberated ourselves from slavery, but, Baudrillard contends, internalised the masters: ‘[e]verthing changes with the emancipation of the slave and the internalisation of the master by the emancipated slave’ (2009a: 33). We tyrannise ourselves, for example by demanding that we maximise our opportunities, fulfill our potential. This is a deeper level of slavery – and complicity – than any previous historical system could inflict (Baudrillard 1975; 2009a: 33). Yet duality always re-emerges, Baudrillard insists: indifference is dual, complicity is dual. Carnivalisation and cannibalisation are themselves dual: the global system absorbs all otherness in a ‘forced conversion to modernity’ (2010: 5), reproducing otherness within the carnival of marketable “difference”, yet cannibalisation emerges as a reversion and derailing of this process. The world adopts Western models: economic, cultural, religious – or it appears to. Hidden within this complicity with the West, there is, Baudrillard suggests, a deeper sense of derision and rejection. The allegiance to Western models is superficial; it is a form of mimicry or hyperconformity that involves a ritual-like exorcism of the hegemonic system. Further, such mimicry reveals the superficiality of Western cultural and economic models: this is not only a superficial acceptance, but an acceptance of superficiality. Western values are already parodic, and, in being accepted, they are subject to further parody as they circulate around the globe (2010: 4-11). The West has deregulated and devalued itself and demands that the rest of the world follows: "It is everything by which a human being retains some value in his own eyes that we (the West) are deliberately sacrificing … [o]ur truth is always to be sought in unveiling, de-sublimation, reductive analysis …[n]othing is true if it is not desacralised, objectivised, shorn of its aura, dragged on to the stage" (Baudrillard 2010: 23). Western desacrilisation amounts to a powerful challenge to the rest of the world, a potlatch: desacralise in return or perish! But who has the power? Who is the victor? There isn’t one, according to Baudrillard. Of the global order, Baudrillard writes: ‘We are its hostages – victims and accomplices at one and the same time – immersed in the same global monopoly of the networks. A monopoly which, moreover – and this is the supreme ruse of hegemony – no one holds any longer’ (2010: 40). There is no Master, no sovereign because all the structures and dictates of power have been internalised, this is the complicity we all share with global order, yet it is a dual complicity: an over-eager acceptance goes hand-in-hand with a deep and growing rejection. Baudrillard’s discussions of power, servitude and complicity make frequent reference to Estienne La Boetie’s essay on voluntary servitude, completed around 1554. The fundamental political question for La Boetie is: ‘how can it happen that a vast number of individuals, of towns, cities and nations can allow one man to tyrannise them, a man who has no power except the power they themselves give him, who could do them no harm were they not willing to suffer harm’ (La Boetie 1988: 38). It seems people do not want to be free, do not want to wield power or determine their own fates: ‘it is the people who enslave themselves’ (La Boetie 1988: 41). People in general are the accomplices of the powerful and the tyrannical, some profit directly through wealth, property, favour – ‘the little tyrants beneath the principal one’ (1988: 64), but many do not, why do they not rebel? Baudrillard takes up La Boetie’s emphasis on servitude being enforced and maintained from within, rather than from without. Yet, there are also major divergences. La Boetie deplores the “common people” for accepting the narcotising pleasures of drinking, gambling and sexual promiscuity, while Baudrillard rejects such elitism and celebrates the masses abilities to strategically defy those who would manipulate them through perverse but lethally effective practices such as silence, radical indifference, hyperconformity – dual modes of complicity and rejection (Baudrillard 1983: 1-61). Though La Boetie’s essay prefigures the development of the concept of hegemony, he never doubts that voluntary servitude is unnatural, a product of malign custom that is in contradiction with the true nature of human beings which is to enjoy a God-given freedom. Baudrillard, by contrast, examines voluntary servitude as a strategy of the refusal of power, a refusal of the snares of self and identity, as strategy of freedom from the tyranny of the will and the fiction of self-determination (Baudrillard 2001: 51-7). For Baudrillard the “declination” or refusal of will disarms those who seek to exert power through influencing or guiding peoples’ choices and feelings towards particular ends. It also allows for a symbolic space, a space of vital distance or removal, a space in which to act, or even act-out (of) a character (Baudrillard 2001: 72-3). This is a space where radical otherness may be encountered, a sense of shared destiny which is a manifestation of the dual form at the level of individual existence (Baudrillard 2001: 79). It could certainly be argued that modern subjects are confronted by a far more subtle and pervasive system of control than were the subjects discussed in La Boetie’s analysis. In theorising the nature of modern controls Baudrillard develops suggestive themes from La Boetie’s work. Speaking of slavery in the Assyrian empire, where, apparently, kings would not appear in public, La Boetie argues, ‘the fact that they did not know who their master was, and hardly knew whether they had one at all, made them all the more willing to be slaves’ (1988: 60). Whatever its historical provenance, this strategy of power is, it seems, generalised in modernity; particularly after the shift away from Fordist mass production it has become increasingly hard to detect who the masters actually are. While workers are persecuted by middle managers, supervisors, team leaders, project co-ordinators who are the masters of this universe? Who are the true beneficiaries? Rather than trying to identify a global neo-liberal elite, as do many proponents of anti-capitalist theory, Baudrillard suggests that the situation we confront is so grave because “we” (those in the West in relatively privileged positions) have usurped the position of masters; we have become the slave masters of ourselves, tyrannising every detail of our own lives: trying to work harder, trying for promotion or simply trying to avoid redundancy. We are all the accomplices of a trans-capitalist, trans-economic exploitation. We are all tyrants: a billion tiny tyrants servicing a system of elimination. But this is not to say that Baudrillard ignores power differentials altogether: ‘it is, indeed, those who submit themselves most mercilessly to their own decisions who fill the greater part of the authoritarian ranks, alleging sacrifice on their parts to impose even greater sacrifices on others’ (2001: 60-1). We all impose such violence on ourselves and on others as part of our daily routines, hence Baudrillard’s injunction to refuse power: ‘Power itself must be abolished – and not solely because of a refusal to be dominated, which is at the heart of all traditional struggles – but also, just as violently, in the refusal to dominate’ (2009a: 47). Yet, even on the theme of systemic violence and elimination, Baudrillard differs sharply from neo-communist theory, while retaining a position of defiance. Systemic eliminationism should not be conceived in individual or subjective terms, despite good points made in recent studies of work and education under neo-liberalism, such as Cederström and Fleming’s Dead Man Working (2012). At a formal level, neo-liberal eliminationism does not merely eliminate jobs and also lives (for example in the recent textile factory fires in Bangladesh), it eliminates meaning, symbolic space and thought. And it eliminates not by termination but by “ex-termination”. That is, by transcribing the world into integral reality, the system produces a single, meaning-depleted, virtual space which encourages participation, engagement and campaigning, on condition that these are produced as part and parcel of an integrated void where “[t]he real no longer has any force as sign, and signs no longer have any force of meaning” (Baudrillard 2001: 4). Most of the developed world has been conferred the right to blog and to tweet as they please and they are indebted to the system in a way which far exceeds the paying of a small tribute or rent to Microsoft or Apple (Zizek 2010: 233). The symbolic debt imposed by the modern world and its technologies is of a metaphysical or cosmological order. Through it we take leave of this world Baudrillard suggests, we become extra-terrestrials. We will recognise no Other, no singularity, no debt to anyone because we attempt to cancel everything out in an integral, technological system that has no outsides because it was, in a sense, created from the outside. In making this argument, Baudrillard takes up Hannah Arendt’s striking suggestion that modern science and technology, from Galileo’s invention of the telescope to the launch of the first space satellite in 1957, enacts a “fateful repudiation” of the Earth and of the terrestrial human condition. Human beings, Arendt argues, seek to eliminate their rootedness to Earth and their relationship to all other species on Earth (an ambition which also drives the science of genetics). There is for Arendt: "… a rebellion against human existence as it has been given, a free gift from nowhere (secularly speaking), which he wishes to exchange, as it were, for something he has made himself" (Arendt 1958: 2-3). Economic alienation, as theorised by Marx, is an echo of a far more fundamental “world alienation” Arendt suggests. Baudrillard’s reading of Arendt’s work is surprisingly faithful, though he pushes a little further. What Arendt calls the invention of an ‘Archimedean point outside the world’, when Galileo’s telescope hardened philosophical speculations that the Earth might not be the centre of the universe into demonstrable scientific fact, is, for Baudrillard, the moment the “real world” began to exist: ‘the moment when human beings, while setting about analysing and transforming the world, take their leave of it, while at the same time lending it force of reality … the real world begins, paradoxically, to disappear at the very same time as it begins to exist’ (Baudrillard 2009b: 11). Human beings do not, cannot, live in the “real world”, they live elsewhere in a space of symbolic belonging, and the “real world” can only be posited on condition that human beings are removed from it, removed to a vantage point from where they can observe it. Hence the process of measuring, representation and conceptualisation produces a ‘real world’ subject to scientific knowledge and, at the same time, hastens the progressive disappearance of the real world. Concepts “capture” things only as things begin to disappear into concepts: ‘the real vanishes into the concept’ (Baudrillard 2009b: 12) and human being, as products of nature, are progressively eliminated from the “real” they have fashioned. Further, Baudrillard suggests, human beings are complicit in this process, they are unique in inventing a “mode of disappearance”. The alienating effects of modern science and technology are not only to be deplored, they can also be seen as a freeing of human intelligence to engage in useless, sovereign and radical thought (Baudrillard 2001: 119-121). The disappearance of the human being from nature, and then from “reality” has dual, irreconcilable consequences. We lead double lives, or we have a life but also mere sur-vival; a destiny but also a biological, functional, performative existence. The latter terms appear to be dominant, and to denigrate all else as meaningless or whimsical. Yet, Baudrillard suggests, life itself, with its destiny, radical otherness, singularity and duality is actually the more potent. Performative existence, or integral servitude, can be diverted, annulled, suspended or even sacrificed in sudden, radically escalated events: from 9/11 to cases such as that of Jean-Claude Romans who massacred his family, eliminating his simulated sense of self and all those who, apparently, believed in his simulation (Baudrillard 2001: 67-70). According to Baudrillard: “[as] we break the symbolic pact and the cycle of metamorphoses, two kinds of violence ensue: a violence of liberation, and an opposite violence in reaction against the excess of freedom, safety, protection and integration, and hence against the loss of any dimension of fate, of destiny – a violence directed against the emergence of the Ego, the Self, the Subject or the Individual, which takes its toll in the form of self-hatred and repentance” (2001: 46). Two forms of violence emerging from the same source: the breaking of symbolic obligation and the expulsion of otherness, the foundation upon which modern society is based (1993a: 1-5; 131-135).

#### Form > content - Our method of engagement with the resolution collapses the university from within – Form is what our arguments look like Ie their presentation and content is what they say – only through hyperconformity can we collapse the university

Hoofd 17 [Ingrid, assistant professor Department of Media and Culture Studies, Utrecht University. “Higher Education and Technological Acceleration.” <http://www.palgrave.com/it/book/9781137517517>] JCH-PF

This book argues that what we see emerge in the above confusion between ‘true’ academic aspirations and ‘perverted’ economic incentives through what some may fi nd a muddled play on words that is marginal to the discussion on higher education is in fact essential to understanding how the seemingly oppositional narratives of the ‘demise’ or ‘revival’ of academic quality actually fi nd their origin in a conceptualisation of the ideals of the university and its role in society that neo-liberals as well as those resistant to neo-liberalisation share. The odd case is therefore that the university ‘succumbs’ to those neo-liberal theories, techniques, and technologies that it itself has produced or brought forth; the university today, one could say, suffers from a peculiar auto-immune disease.And I would suggest that this disease has been lingering in its core principles and aims for a long time now. This book claims by way of some prominent thinkers of such an auto-immunity or ‘self-deconstruction’ that the university has always suffered from this curious affl iction, but also that particularly today, the technological acceleration of the neo-liberal economy brings such an auto-immunity ever more to the foreground, which in turn leads to an aggravation of fundamental tensions and blatant incompatibilities within its dominion. So there is a historical continuity of auto-immunity in the university project all the way from its aspirational beginnings up until today that still persists, even if that continuous element has been slowly but steadily displaced towards the imperatives of productivity, ‘freemarket’ ideals, and effi ciency. This book then hopes to illustrate by way of combining a plethora of ‘auto-immune’ examples of academic practice with a perhaps unexpected theoretical perspective that this displacement is possible because the utopian goals of emancipation, truth, and freedom which express themselves in research and teaching, have themselves from the very beginning already been tainted by the demons of oppression, falsehood, and exclusion. Bizarrely then, the fact or the insistence that the university is not like any other industry will turn out to be precisely its problem. This is because the fundamental tension in its project—what Dittrich in “From Ivory Tower to Glass House” calls its “immanent contradiction” (in Dutch “ingebouwde tegenspraak,” 2014, 160)—that has historically led to (the illusion of) progress through the scientifi c and philosophical discussion and production of knowledge has indeed become ‘productive’ in the economic sense. Eventually, we will therefore fi nd that at the heart of the university lies a fundamental aporia that expresses itself exceedingly today, in a curious reversal of its humanist values and stakes, as a more obvious pretence or hypocrisy. This leads so-called knowledge workers at many contemporary universities today to find themselves confronted with contradictory feelings and schizoid situations: like, for instance, teaching students the ills of social hierarchisation through education, while also sorting them in hierarchical (alpha) numerical slots according to academic performance. The university is therefore the one location in the current economy where the basic conflicting duplicity following the exacerbation of this aporia of Western Enlightenment thinking is most keenly felt, though often suppressed or internalised by many such ‘workers’ and students as either personal failure or a general incompatibility with its institutional demands. So to reiterate, the radical proposition of this book is that the prime mission or ideals of the university—namely those of total emancipation, freedom, and the goals of knowledge accumulation—are precisely what currently produce exceedingly unjust practices ‘outside’ and ‘within’ academia. These unjust practices that it produces on its ‘outside’ concern those of the ongoing social stratifi cation via so-called meritocratic education and those of sociological, computational, and psychological objectifi cation of ever more cultures and groups, while the unjust practices on its ‘inside’ concern those of internal hierarchies, rankings, divisions, gatekeeping mechanisms, and exclusions of all kinds. And because the reproduction of its practices at base involve modern techniques and technologies of knowing, this book suggests that rather than arguing for a return to the supposedly ‘walled’ university, however sympathetic, gaining a better understanding of the intersection of this problematic with especially modern technologies of communication, visibility, or calculation is crucial to really thinking the modern university project differently. The book therefore argues that the central problem of the university today consists of the acceleration of academia’s unfi nishable ideals by way of an enmeshment with techniques and technologies of communication, calculation, and prediction. The quest for transcendence through technologically aided omniscience and universal connection—after all, the term ‘university’ comes from the Latin universitas or the ‘totality’ or ‘total community’—has resulted in the quest to render everything and everyone transparent and understandable. As I will discuss more in depth through the work of techno-pundit Paul Virilio, the current university and its new forms of violence are therefore an outflow or intensification of ‘outdated’ humanist ideals and techniques, whose internal contradictions have become usurped and constantly remobilised by neo-liberal capitalism and its machinery of acceleration. We see the auto-immune aspect returning here as well, since that contemporary machinery of the acceleration of omniscience in many of its aspects—one need only to think of early cybernetic research, innovations like the Arpanet, and engineeringoriented models of communication as noise cancellation—has again also been carried out at least in large part by universities (disturbingly often with the help of military monies and establishments, about the signifi cance of which more later). In other words, the hopeful academic project of ‘exposing the world and humanity to the light of truth and emancipation,’ together with its damaging ‘evil twins’ of oppressive universalism, social submission, surveillance, and colonialism, has caved in onto themselves and become a near-pervasive technologically ‘exposing-itself’ of a fundamentally Janus-faced academia. This is also to stress that the ways in which academic research has historically been part of Western imperialism should be considered more closely when critically examining the faux-nostalgic calls in many contemporary European universities for a ‘return’ to presumed ‘research autonomy,’ as well as when analysing the kinds of seemingly perverse ‘knowledge-as- capital’ arguments made by contemporary universities in the post-colonies. I will provide divergent examples from the Netherlands and Singapore of such tendencies in Chaps. 2 , 3 , and 4 . In light of the above, this book therefore also wants to discuss the relationship or interaction between academia and modern technology as consisting of a more fundamentally entangled apparatus than most critics of the neo-liberalisation of higher education, who see such technology as merely applied onto academia from the ‘outside’ or as mere tools for use on the ‘inside’ consider it to be. As an example, Ward in Neoliberalism and the Global Restructuring of Knowledge and Education certainly rightly claims that the digital knowledge economy, due to the translation of information into bits and bytes, has forced a quantifi cation of performance indicators in academia, leading to the erasure and transformation of certain kinds of knowledge in the ‘hard’ as well as the ‘soft’ sciences (2012, 126). Especially the humanities, says Ward, with their forms and media of knowledge (like the monograph) that cannot be reduced to sheer numbers, be disaggregated into sellable pieces, or be made to follow the impetus of fast-paced output, suffer from this quantifi cation (2012, 127). While I agree with Ward on this aspect of digitalisation, he does not seem to consider the fact that the origins of these technologies as such, as I mentioned earlier, not only stem from university research, but also that the supposedly empowering qualities of technologies of communication and visualisation have in fact always been part of the university setup from its inception in the late Medieval era and the early Enlightenment in Europe—one may here think, for example, of René Descartes’ mechanistic view of the material world, the crucial importance of inventions like the telescope and microscope, or the ways in which the dissemination of scientifi c ideas relied on book printing technology. It appears then that the basic imbrication of academia with media technologies is one of a continuous and ever-growing constitutional yet dialectical relationship, in which these technologies eventually turn out to be much more than simply a means through which research and teaching are carried out. Instead, due to their constitutive enmeshment with academia’s auto-immunity, they paradoxically expose themselves as facilitators as well as thwarters of the academic ideal of total knowledge. Rather, the ideal of exposition and omniscience, and the ways it is today carried out through modern data-driven technologies and visual media aids, is, this book argues, itself just as ambiguous and finally ungraspable (as their borders likewise cannot be pinned down) as the nature of academia as such.

#### Debate is part and parcel with the wests will to spectacle – we search for the largest impact, the most death, the most graphic depiction – this catastrophic canabalism sustains the wests will to transparency as we violently generate a need for the image of death

Baudrillard 94. Jean Baudrillard, dead French philosopher, former professor emeritus at the University de Paris X, The Illusion of The End, pg. 66-70

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' ['autre monde]. **We must** today **denounce the** moral and **sentimental exploitation of** that poverty - **charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence**. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that **material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of people**s, **which serves as psychological nourishment for** the rich countries and media nourishment for **our daily lives**. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground. Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of **our** own **efforts to alleviate it** (which, in fact, merely **function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market**); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel **essential to the moral** and sentimental **equilibrium of the West**. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. **But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point**, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, **when we run out of disasters from elsewhere** or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, **the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe** for itself, in order **to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it** even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The **'disaster show' goes on without any let-up** and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbered in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case, the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. The argument here is that there is a line of objective progress and everyone is supposed to pass through its various stages (we find the same eyewash with regard to the evolution of species and in that evolutionism which unilaterally sanctions the superiority of the human race). In the light of current upheavals, which put an end to any idea of history as a linear process, there are no longer either developed or under-developed peoples. Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity. In actual fact, it is their good fortune to be able to escape from evolution just at the point when we no longer know where it is leading. In any case, a majority of these peoples, including those of Eastern Europe, do not seem keen to enter this evolutionist modernity, and their weight in the balance is certainly no small factor in the West's repudiation of its own history, of its own utopias and its own modernity. It might be said that the routes of violence, historical or otherwise, are being turned around and that the viruses now pass from South to North, there being every chance that, five hundred years after America was conquered, 1992 and the end of the century will mark the comeback of the defeated and the sudden reversal of that modernity. The sense of pride is no longer on the side of wealth but of poverty, of those who - fortunately for them - have nothing to repent, and may indeed glory in being privileged in terms of catastrophes. Admittedly, this is a privilege they could hardly renounce, even if they wished to, but natural disasters merely reinforce the sense of guilt felt towards them by the wealthy – by those whom God visibly scorns since he no longer even strikes them down. One day it will be the Whites themselves who will give up their whiteness. It is a good bet that repentance will reach its highest pitch with the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of the Americas. We are going to have to lift the curse of the defeated - but symbolically victorious - peoples, which is insinuating itself five hundred years later, by way of repentance, into the heart of the white race.