## 1

#### Interpretation: the resolution should define the division of affirmative and negative ground. To clarify, the aff must defend a world where the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### Resolved” means to enact by law.

Words & Phrases ’64

(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Advocacy

UsLegal No date[ USLegal is the legal destination site for consumers, small business, attorneys, corporations, and anyone interested in the law, or in need of legal information, products or services. No Title, No date <https://definitions.uslegal.com/a/advocacy/#:~:text=Advocacy%20is%20the%20act%20of,or%20profession%20of%20an%20advocate>.] //aaditg

Advocacy is the act of pleading for or arguing in favor of something or actively supporting a cause or proposal. It can also refer to the work or profession of an advocate. For lawyers advocacy means representing the interests of the client in the best manner possible. Advocacy is considered an art in which lawyers are trained.

#### Democracy

**World Population Review 22** [Democracy Countries 2022, worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/democracy-countries.] // VS

The Democracy Index The Democracy Index is an annual report compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The index measures the state of democracy in 167 of the world's countries by tracking 60 indicators in five different categories: electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. The indicators are combined to give each category a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the five category scores are averaged to determine the overall index score. Countries with a total Democracy Index score between 8.01 and 10 (out of 10) are considered full democracies. Those whose score lands between 6.01 and 8.00 are classified as flawed democracies. While these countries have free and fair elections and basic civil liberties, there are faults in other aspects, such as low levels of participation in politics or an underdeveloped (or heavily partisan) political culture. The lower two categories of the index are reserved for countries that did not score well enough to be considered democracies. Nations that score between 4.01 and 6.0 earn the title of hybrid regime, and anything lower than 4 is labeled an authoritative regime. The 202 refe0 Democracy Index categorized 23 countries as full democracies, 52 as flawed democracies, 35 as hybrid regimes, and 57 as authoritarian regimes.

#### Free press

**European Liberties 21** [Platform, European Liberties. “Free Press: Definition and Role in Democracy I Liberties.eu.” Liberties.eu, November 09, 2021, [www.liberties.eu/en/stories/free-press/43809](http://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/free-press/43809).] // VS

What is free press? When we say a country has a free press, we mean that its news outlets and other publications, even individual citizens, have the right to communicate information without influence or fear of retribution from the state or other powerful entities or individuals. We often use the term “free press” and “independent journalism,” a subject we previously explored, more or less interchangeablyViolation:

Webster (Merriam Webster is America's leading and most-trusted provider of language information, accessed on 3-01-22, Merriam Webster, "Definition of MEDICINE,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/medicine)// ww ev

to list or rate (projects, goals, etc.) in order of priority

#### Violation:

#### Standards:

**[1] Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis – that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims which eviscerates the decision-making potential of debate**

**Steinberg & Freeley, 13**

David Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA, officer, American Forensic Association and National Communication Association. Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League, Masters in Communication, and Austin, JD, Suffolk University, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, *Argumentation and Debate Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition

**Debate is a means of settling differences,** **so there must be a** difference of opinion or a **conflict of interest** before there can be a debate. **If everyone is in agreement** on a tact or value or policy, **there is no need for debate**: **the matter can be settled by unanimous consent**. Thus, for example, **it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"** because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (**Controversy is an essential prerequisite** of debate. **Where there is no clash of ideas**, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, **there is no debate**. In addition, **debate cannot produce effective decisions** **without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered**. For example, **general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration**. **How many** illegal immigrants **are in the United States?** What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? **Do they take job**s from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? **Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration** by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? **Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?** Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? **Should we build a wall on the Mexican border**, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? **Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question** **and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy**. To be discussed and resolved effectively, **controversies must be stated clearly**. **Vague understanding** **results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions**, frustration, and emotional distress, as **evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007**.**Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job!** They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." **Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations**, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, **but without a focus for their discussions**, **they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions.** **A gripe session would follow**. **But if a precise question is posed**—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—**then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up** **simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step**. **One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.** The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. **They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making** **by** directing and **placing limits on the decision** to be made, **the basis for argument should be clearly defined**. **If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument**. For example, **the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation**. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

**Although we now have a general subject**, we have not yet stated a problem. **It is still too broad**, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. **What sort of writing are we concerned with**—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? **What does "effectiveness" mean** in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" **The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition** such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. **This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation** of the controversy by advocates, **or** **that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.**

**[5] Any alternative interpretation is bad because it is un-limiting. The impact is predictable limits---specific topics are key to reasonable expectations for 2Ns – open subjects create incentives for avoidance – that overstretches the negative and turns participation. Debate has unique potential to change attitudes and grow critical thinking skills because it forces pre-round internal deliberation on a of a focused, common ground of debate**

**[6] Extra-topicality – even if the affirmative claims to advocate the resolution, they skirt discussion of its instrumental intent by arguing the benefits derived from their contextualized advocacy outweigh. This is a voting issue because we’re forced to win framework just to get back to equal footing – extra topicality also proves the resolution insufficient and explodes aff ground.**

**[7] SSD is good – it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it. Its also violent to negate under things without a statis point like saying racism good or homophobia good.**

**[8] Small schools disad: under-resourced are most adversely effected by a massive, unpredictable caselist which worsens structural disparities. Inclusion is an independent voter – you can’t debate if you can’t participate which is a prerequisite to accessing their benefits and ensures everyone gains from the activity.**

**[9] Outweighs:**

**A. Even if their method is good, it isn’t valuable if it’s not procedurally debatable – they don’t get access to any of their offense. Even if their method is good for education there’s no reason you vote on it, just as even if exercise is good for soccer players you don’t vote for the team that ran most.**

**B. The best solutions are formed with critical contestation from multiple sides – it’s more likely we make a good liberation strategy if both debaters can engage and test it – link turns their offense.**

**C. Debate is about process not content – we inevitably switch sides, even if it’s arguing against one method with another. The individual ideas we learn, like \_\_, aren’t as valuable as learning how to effectively apply those ideas outside of round by engaging in precise discussions instead of just asserting opinions.**

**[10] T is a procedural issue**

**A. T indicts your reading of the aff in the first place, so its an evaluative mechanism to adjudicating substance of the 1AC, thus it is nonsensical to leverage the aff against T since it presupposes that the aff is being won.**

**B. The AC is the starting point for the discussion and I win that that the AC is flawed, then it means that the starting point for evaluating substance is flawed. So, the T determines the value of the debate to begin with.**

**C. Fairness is the evaluative mechanism to determine the better debater regardless of the role of the ballot. Thus, the question is not should we use their role of the ballot, but rather whether or not the way that they presented their offense is good for debate. Absent fairness you don’t know who best met their burden under any role of the ballot.**

**D. T is a question of jurisdiction- judges don’t have the jurisdiction to vote on a non-topical aff that hasn’t met the burden of proof of the resolution.**

**E. That’s a voting issue – destroys advocacy skills – they don’t have to defend their proposal against well-researched objections. AND, tons of screwed up things in the world we can’t fix without advocating for solutions. Also kills fairness.**

**[12] Competing Interpretations**

**A. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom because debaters keep being barely reasonable**

**B. No briteline to reasonability**

## 2

**Focus on challenging norms surrounding queerness forecloses analysis of structural capitalism and its accompanying violence – that outweighs**

**Cornell and Seely 16** (Drucillia Cornell J.D., Professor of Political Science at Rutgers; Stephen D. Seely, PhD candidate in the Department of Women and Gender Studies at Rutgers, *The Spirit of Revolution: Beyond the Dead Ends of Man*, Polity Press, 15-18)

This form of sexual "politics" is largely a response to the perceived "sex negativity" of U.S. culture which, according to Gayle Rubin, views sex with an automatic suspicion and hostility (2011: 148). For us, however, the left-queer, feminist, and socialist-has, by and large, failed to adequately grapple with right-wing sexual moralism in the U.S., which is generally written off as merely a sign of ignorance and intolerance, and responded to by the proliferation and celebration of sexuality as a mode of resistance. For example, homosexuality has long been read by those on the right not only as a form of decadence, but as spreading a type of "infection" throughout society as a whole. One response to this within queer theory is that the transmission of a queer infection to the social body is all to the good because, through an identification with the death drive, queers have the power and possibility of disabling the heterosexist foundations of the social as a whole (a claim we address extensively in Chapter 3). The problem, for us, goes much deeper than this to something that most feminist and queer theorists seem loath to acknowledge: the legitimate fear of ethical collapse that precipitates such virulence against queer subjects, a fear that takes a ***tremendous toll*** on the ***majority of people*** living under conditions of ***neoliberal capitalism*** (see Cornell 2005). In the face of this, a "politics" of sexual acting out seems rather ***impotent***, if not itself ***part of the problem***. As a result, we want to "return" queer and feminist theory to revolution as the only ultimate solution to the rightful terror that comes with living in a dying empire, with all its violence (including sexual violence), its decadence, and the disintegration of anything like a shared ethical world that promotes what Michel Foucault called "the care of the self and others" (1988). To be sure, however, any revolution must include a profound confrontation with sexuality, or rather, something greater than "sexuality": the erotic. In this chapter, then, we assemble a genealogy of well-known thinkers to argue that a fundamental transformation in erotic life has "always" been a part of both feminist and socialist politics. Moreover, all of the thinkers in this long and important "tradition" also implicitly recognize that unless we completely undo the reign of Man-including phallocentric heterosexism and the reproduction of the species as it is currently configured-then communism will be nothing but an "empty signifier" (Laclau 1996) or "Idea" (Badiou 2010). As such, these thinkers highlight erotic transformation as a crucial dimension of what Paget Henry has identified as the "vertical dramas of consciousness" that are independent from but necessary to the "horizontal ... dramas of nationalism, proletarian liberation, and societal reorganization" (2000: 121). The "vertical" revolution, in Henry and other Africana and Caribbean philosophers, involves the deep transformations in the psyche that would enable one to live and engage differently with others in a world beyond colonialism, capitalism, and, as we are arguing here, phallocentric heterosexism. Throughout most of the genealogy we trace in this chapter, the "vertical" and "horizontal" revolutions-erotic restructuration and socialism-remain explicitly and inextricably linked. Erotic structuration, in other words, could never simply take the form of "sex," and there could be no autonomous "sexual revolution" independent from the struggle against capitalism. This is markedly different from much of the queer and postfeminist theory of our postrevolutionary times in which the erotic has been reduced almost entirely to sex, and the revolutionary struggle for a different way of living together has been almost entirely abandoned. Our central purpose here, then, is to review this "revolutionary tradition and its lost treasure," to borrow a phrase from Hannah Arendt (2006), and in doing so, to aim and fire at a branch of contemporary theory that has ***explicitly dissociated itself from revolution*** and, worse yet, from the ***life-affirming joy*** that lies at the very heart of what would motivate us to try to change the world together in the search for different forms of erotic relation beyond Man. Perhaps some of these recent theorists have it right, according to the tradition that we will discuss, given that within the constraints of advanced capitalism any affirmation of being sexual or sexuate otherwise will falter before the dictates of a dayto-day life under exploitation, leading us to believe that there is nothing "queer" we can possibly do other than embracing the death drive. Yet, of course, none of the writers in the revolutionary tradition would ever have thought that there could be any "freed" sexuality or different sexuation ***unless*** the dictates of modern capitalism were completely undone in the collective struggle to achieve communism. Simply put: if "pleasure" is defined merely by whatever quick fuck you can fit in while working 86 hours a week, then no wonder pleasure seems like an embrace of the death drive, because who can put in that kind of time? And yet, why is it that the death drive, melancholia, and the forms of "psychosis" that have been celebrated in the queer literature are so rarely linked directly to the brutalities of life under capitalist exploitation? This point is certainly not lost on any of the revolutionary thinkers that we will discuss, all of whom explicitly connect all forms of psychic collapse to the capture of our individual and collective lives by phallocentrism and capitalism. We thus want to strongly insist that the turn toward "anything goes" sexual pleasure-seeking found in both queer and postfeminist theory ***completely misses*** what was best in the thinkers who insisted that revolution must be thoroughgoing in all aspects of life-including the erotic-if it was to be at all worthy of the name of a communist life together. In other words, if part of capitalist exploitation includes the sexual commodification of what Foucault (1990a: 158) calls "bodies and pleasures," then the struggle for communism must include the undoing of that commodification. Therefore, to challenge the norms around sexuality-either in the name of being "anti-bourgeois" or in the name of "queerness"-cannot take place without a challenge to the commodifying grip of what we call "sexuality" itself, as well as to the intimate connection of sexuality with capitalism. True love and the transition to socialism, we argue, entails an insistence that there is simply nothing revolutionary about a blow-job.

**Capitalism culminates in extinction---warming, inter-state conflict, social unrest, resource wars, and lack of expansion ensures the system *can’t recover* and the system is on the brink now.**

**Robinson** **19**, February 2019, William I. Robinson, “Into the Tempest: Essays on the New Global Capitalism”, <https://www.powells.com/book/into-the-tempest-9781608469666/62-0> // dbw

Eighth, ***deep contradictions in emergent world society make entirely uncertain the very survival of our species***, much less the mid- to long-term stabilization and viability of global capitalism, and portend prolonged global social conflict. The structure of global production, distribution, and consumption increasingly reflects the skewed income pattern. For instance, under the new global social apartheid, tourism is the fastest growing economic activity and even the mainstay of many Third World economies. This does not mean that more people are actually enjoying the fruits of leisure and international travel; it means that 20 percent of humanity has more and more disposable income simultaneous to the contraction of consumption by the remaining 80 percent. This 80 percent is forced to provide all sorts of ever more frivolous services to, and to orient its productive activity toward, meeting the needs and satisfying the sumptuous desires of that 20 percent." By the turn of the century, private security forces and prisons had become the number one growth sector in the United States and the other Northern countries." Social apartheid spawns decadence. Militarized fortress cities and spatial apartheid are necessary for social control under a situation in which an ever-smaller portion of humanity can actually consume the essentials of life, much less luxury goods." As national capitalism matured in the late nineteenth century in the North, the tendency inherent in capital accumulation toward a concentration of income and productive resources, and the social polarity and political conflict this generates, was offset by two factors. The first was the intervention of states to regulate the operation of the free market, to guide accumulation, and to capture and redistribute surpluses. This intervention was itself the outcome of mass working class struggles from below that forced reform on the system. The second was the emergence of modern imperialism to offset the polarizing tendencies inherent in the process of capital accumulation in the North, thereby transferring global social conflict to the South. Both these factors therefore fettered, in the core of the world system, the social polarity generated by capitalism. But by reducing or eliminating the ability of individual states to regulate czsapital accumulation and capture surpluses, globalization is now bringing (at a worldwide level) precisely the polarization between a rich minority and a poor majority that Karl Marx predicted. ***Yet this time there are no "new frontiers," no virgin lands for capitalist colonization that could offset the social and political consequences of global polarization. Endemic to unfettered global capitalism, therefore, is intensified social conflict, which in turn engenders constant political crises and ongoing instability, both within countries and between countries.*** In the post-World War 11 period, the North was able to shift much social conflict to the South as a combined result of an imperialist transfer of wealth from South to North and the redistribution of this wealth in the North through Keynesian state intervention. No fewer than 160 wars were fought in the Third World from 1945 to 1990. However, globalization involves a distinct shift in global strife from interstate conflict (reflecting a certain correspondence between classes and nations in the stage of national capitalism) to global class conflict. The UNDP's 1994 report underscores a shift from "a pattern of wars between states to wars within states." Of the eighty-two armed conflicts between 1989 and 1992, only three were between states. "Although often cast in ethnic divisions, many have a political or economic character," states the report. Meanwhile, global military spending in 1992 was $815 billion ($725 billion of which corresponded to the rich Northern countries), a figure equal to the combined income of 49 percent of the world's people in that same year." By 2015, military spending worldwide had more than doubled, to nearly $1.7 trillion.28 The period of worldwide political instability we face ranged from the late twentieth into the early twenty-first centuries from civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and in numerous African countries to simmering social conflict in Latin America and Asia; major transnational wars in the Middle East; endemic civil disturbances, sometimes low-key and sometimes high profile, in Los Angeles, Paris, Bonn, Athens, and most metropoles of the Northern countries. Uncertain survival and insecurities posed by global capitalism induces diverse forms of fundamentalisms, localisms, nationalisms, and racial and ethnic conflict. These themes will be discussed in detail in later chapters. As the worldwide ruling class, the transnational bourgeoisie has thrust humanity into a crisis of civilization. Social life under global capitalism is increasingly dehumanizing and devoid of any ethical content. But our crisis is deeper: ***We face a species crisis.*** Well known structural contradictions analyzed a century ago by Marx, such as overaccumulation, underconsumption, and the tendency toward stagnation, are exacerbated by globalization, as many analysts have pointed out. However, while these "classic" contradictions cause financial turmoil, social crisis and cultural decadence, new contradictions associated with twenty-first-century capitalism-namely, ***the incompatibility of the reproduction of both capital and of nature-is leading to an ecological [disaster]*** ~~holocaust~~ ***that threatens the survival of our species and of life itself*** on our planet." Yet "most analyses of the environmental problem today are concerned less with saving the planet or life or humanity than saving capitalism -the system at the root of our environmental problem," note Foster and his colleagues. "Not only has this generated inertia with respect to social change-indeed a tendency to fiddle while Rome burns-but it has also led to the belief that the crisis can be managed by essentially the same social institutions that brought it into being in the first place."

**Vote negative to endorse the form of the Party---our method is distinct and exclusive with the method of the 1AC---a negative ballot foregrounds political organization and commonality against capital.**

Jodi **Dean 16**, Professor of Political Theory at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 2016, “Crowds and Party.”

Crowds and Party comes out of this moment of collective de-subjectivation. Occupy Wall Street foundered against a contradiction at its core. The individualism of its democratic, anarchist, and horizontalist ideological currents undermined the collective power the movement was building. ***Making collective political action dependent on individual choice***, the “theology of consensus” ***fragmented the provisional unity of the crowd*** back into ***disempowered singularities***.3 The movement’s decline (which began well before Occupiers were evicted) exposes the impasse confronting the Left. The ***celebration of autonomous individuality prevents us from foregrounding our commonality and organizing ourselves politically***. At the same time and together with the global wave of popular unrest, the collective energy of Occupy at its height nevertheless points to an “idea whose time has come.” People are moving together in growing opposition to the ***policies*** and practices of states ***organized in the interest of capital as a class***. Crowds are forcing the Left to return again to questions of ***organization, endurance, and scale***. Through what political forms might we advance? For many of us, ***the party is emerging as the site of an answer***. ***Against the presumption that the individual is the fundamental unit of politics***, I focus on the crowd. Across the globe, crowds are pressing their opposition and ***rupturing the status quo***, the actuality of their movement displacing the politics of identity. Bringing together thinkers such as Elias Canetti and Alain Badiou, I highlight the “egalitarian discharge” of the crowd event as an intense experience of substantive collectivity. I make fidelity to this event the basis for a new theory of the communist party. Because global movements are themselves pushing us to consider the possibilities in and of the party form, we have to ***recommence imagining the party of communists***.4 Who might we be and become as an international revolutionary party again, in our time? To think clearly about these questions, we need to consider the party form unfettered by the false concreteness of specific parties in the contingency of their histories. Liberals and democrats are not the only political theorists who can reflect on their modes of association in the abstract. Communists must do this as well. As a means of breaking out of the binaries of reform or revolution, mass or vanguard party that historically have inflected discussions of the party form, I approach the function and purpose of the communist party psycho-dynamically. I draw from Robert Michels and Jacques Lacan to think through the affects the party generates and the unconscious processes it mobilizes. The role of the party isn’t to inject knowledge into the working class. Nor is it to represent the interests of the working class on the terrain of politics. Rather, the function of the party is to hold open a gap in our setting so as to ***enable a collective desire for collectivity***.5 “Through such a gap or moment,” Daniel Bensaïd writes, “can arise the unaccomplished fact, which contradicts the fatality of the accomplished fact.”6 The crowd’s breach of the predictable and given ***creates the possibility that a political subject might appear***. The party steps into that breach and fights to keep it open for the people. Canetti makes a point I return to throughout the book: ***crowds come together for the sake of an absolute equality*** felt most intensely in a moment he refers to as the “discharge.” Akin to Lacan’s notion of “enjoyment” (“jouissance,” the only substance known to psychoanalysis), the discharge provides a material ground for the party. The party is a body that can carry the egalitarian discharge after the crowds disperse, channeling its divisive promise of justice into ***organized political struggle***.

## 3

### Framing

**[1] Extinction First –**

**[a] Forecloses future improvement – we can never improve society if we’re dead**

**[b] Turns suffering – mass death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities**

**[c] Moral uncertainty**

**Bostrom 12** [Nick Bostrom, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. 2012. www.existential-risk.org/concept.html]

These reflections on ***moral uncertainty*** suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.

Our ***present understanding*** of ***axiology*** might well be ***confused***. We ***may not now know*** — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. ***If we are*** indeed profoundly ***uncertain*** about our ***ultimate aims***, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in ***preserving*** — and ideally improving — our ability to ***recognize value*** and to ***steer the future*** accordingly. ***Ensuring*** that there will be a ***future*** version of ***humanity*** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to ***increase*** the ***probability*** that the future ***will contain*** a lot of ***value***. To do this, ***we must prevent*** any ***existential catastrophe***.

### Presumption

#### Vote neg on presumption

#### [a] the aff doesn’t do anything to combat queer violence – it silences people in order to chalenge productive notions but – the violenc is still on going – some form of political solutions is key

**[b] Empirically Proven – everyone has been reading the exact same non T aff for years but it hasn’t resolved anything**

**[d] Queer Failure means vote neg – their demand for a ballot means they invest into the systems they critique, the only way to affirm Queer Failure is to vote neg.**

#### [e] the 1AC hasn’t provided you a reason why their educational model has proven some form of engagement – i.e you should ask yourself what pedagogical knowledge we have gained through engaging

**Materiality comes first – their critical lens won’t change our views on oppression, we know it’s bad – even if our method is bad, frame the debate through improving tangible conditions because abstract critiques lead to echo chambers and passivity.**

**They’ll say the state is bad but you don’t have to defend the state, defend that the state does something – key difference since you can still say the state is violent, but that material conditions matter – all we have to win is that the state can do actions with beneficial outcome – the zanotti ev exists**

**Pragmatic consequentialism is prerequisite to queer flourishing---their framework is a paranoid reading that interrupts queer becoming.**

Adam **Greteman 18**. Department of Art Education, School of the Art Institute of Chicago. “On Reading Practices: Where Pragmatism and Queer Meet,” Sexualities and Genders in Education pp 37-65, Springer.

I want to attend to the reading practices that inform my own work here to be transparent to my readers, but also provide lessons on the different ways in which “theory” informs reading as a practice. I first came to think about reading practices through pragmatism—not queer theory. For some this might seem rather unqueer. There has been little written looking at the ways in which pragmatism and queer theory could be productive together, although I’ve tried (Greteman & Wojcikiewicz, 2014). Nor have pragmatists in general taken up a queer project, despite pragmatism being a little queer. That’s neither here nor there. What is of interest to me in this chapter are reading practices. As Cleo Cherryholmes (1999) illustrated, reading is more than meets the eye. Pragmatism itself is, as well, more than meets the eye. Pragmatism presents a particular form of reading that attends to action. I dwell on pragmatism here to reveal my own pragmatic leanings. ***I like pragmatism***. I also tend to read things I like as I sense, as argued elsewhere, there are pedagogies and politics tied to liking (Greteman & Burke, 2017). Cherryholmes (1999) began Reading Pragmatism, noting that the reason to engage pragmatism was “that pragmatism ***looks to the consequences*** that we ***endlessly bump up against***” (p. 3). And we ***bump up against consequences all day***, ***every day***. Those consequences are the results of things we—ourselves and others—have done as well as things far outside of our control. “Pragmatists conceptualize the world where we, all of us,” Cherryholmes argued, “are constantly thrown forward as the present approaches but never quite reaches the future” (p. 3). It is, in his estimation, “a discourse that attempts to bridge where we are with where we might end up” (p. 3). A key word, of course, being “might,” as pragmatism ***cannot predict what will come***, but attends to ***contemplating conceivably what might come***. We don’t know what will come, but we suspect we will come in some way to a future. Pragmatism is less a theory. Instead, it is a ***way of doing things in the world*** attending to the ***conceivable consequences*** of our actions. Queers come in the world, and in coming they ***encounter consequences***, and ***not just theoretically***. I sense pragmatism’s attention to consequences is important decades into the existence of various queer theories that have offered readings of various types of objects—films, performances, novels, policies, experiences, and more. Those readings—once scandalous in the academy—have now become part of the academy. They have in infiltrating the institutions they once critiqued or parodied or subverted become practices that ***can inform work*** that more, now than ever, has the backing of the institution . And, with such institutionalization we can more, now than ever, contemplate the conceivable consequences of queer theory and its attendant practices. We might now be able to think about if and how queer theories ***have had*** and ***could continue to have consequences*** for the worlds we inhabit—through ***discourse***, ***material practices***, and ***more***. What are the ***conceivable consequences of various types of queer readings***? What do such readings do for readers as those readers encounter the daily work of living? This is a question I will hopefully provide responses to throughout the remainder of this book as I contemplate how queer theory—as I have read and encountered it—has allowed me to contemplate queer thriving. Reading is—this might seem obvious—contingent and contextual. It is informed by our time, objects we have encountered, relationships we have had, and much more. Our readings are not, nor can they be, ahistorical. They will become dated, outdated even, becoming instead signs of a time gone by. Such times gone by might be read—in the present—as a sign of progress. See, things have gotten better as texts written years ago show things were pretty shitty. However, such times might also be read nostalgically as a time one wished one had lived in. “Wow, the 1970s sound fabulous! What happened to us?” I will, I suspect fall into reading things as signs of progress and nostalgically. I hope you’ll forgive me, but I think progress and nostalgia can serve us in various ways. Theoretical traditions serve us in various ways as well. Different theoretical traditions have offered different ways of reading texts . Cherryholmes (1999) illustrated this by providing readings that take an “authoritative” perspective or are informed by deconstruction, new historicism, and, of course pragmatism. This move was pedagogical, providing readers with a strategy to distinguish between related, but different, reading practices. Reading practices, Cherryholmes illustrated, have different consequences for how a text impacts readers and beyond. In addition, his readings illustrated distinctions between particular critical traditions (under the banner of poststructuralism and postmodernism) and pragmatism . Cherryholmes argued: Poststructural and postmodern investigations tend to be investigatory, interpretive, critical, and analytic. They are ***not forward-looking***. They are oriented to ***commentary*** and ***criticism*** instead of ***consequences*** and ***action***. Poststructuralism and its postmodern relatives ***do not have a project that looks to action***, nor do they seek one. (p. 4) “Pragmatism,” as an alternative, “looks to results” (p. 4) but ***not just any results***. The products of pragmatic readings “are ***never finished***. They are ***interpreted***, ***reinterpreted***, and ***criticized indefinitely***” (p. 4). Continuing, Cherryholmes wrote, “as a result, [pragmatic readings] are ***continually open to new experiences*** and ***problems*** and ***opportunities***. Pragmatist productions deconstruct, they do indeed. And their deconstruction invites, indeed requires, revision and replacement” (p. 4). Pragmatism and its readings embrace the interpretive, analytic, critical options provided by poststructuralism. They are, I think, more alike than they are different. However, pragmatism ***moves beyond*** poststructuralism and postmodernism to ***contemplate action***, to ***roll with the punches*** in order to ***make decisions about how to do things in the world***. I have, I sense, quoted rather liberally from Cherryholmes above so let me provide my reading. Poststructural and postmodern theories—in which queer theory would be included—do interesting and important work. They deconstruct, interpret, provoke with their readings. They play with words and read against the grain. The work they do is critical since they seek, in part, to expose injustices. Additionally, their work is interpretive, as they do not propose Truth, but offer truths. They are also primarily backward looking. They look back at texts to expose or reveal in those texts their limitations or how the text deconstructs, or how texts illustrate the formation of things. What such ways of readings ***fail*** to do (and every reading does some things well and other things less well) is to ***look forward to the consequences*** of what they are doing. Deconstructionists or new historicists have not immediately been interested or concerned with contemplating the possible consequences of their readings, although I suspect they are not unconcerned with consequences; being “critical” would imply a certain interest in consequences. Pragmatism on the other hand is forward looking. It ***attends to the conceivable consequences*** of its readings. Reading—with a pragmatic bent—is an exercise in ***reading into the conceivable future*** that could be the result of actions. It ***gathers together***, ***assembles***, ***conceivable consequences*** of doing this, that, or another thing in the world. And this ***requires interpretive*** and ***imaginative thinking***. This generally seems rather wishy-washy. How do we determine conceivable consequences? What types of results are we looking for? And what limits help us “conceive” the conceivable? And how do we make choices about what results and consequences we want to help bring to fruition? These are, as Cherryholmes illustrated, important questions to ask and questions that are answered carefully. We seek results that are fulfilling, we decide inclusively, we expose our ideas to multiple interpretations and criticism so as to deal with the ever-changing realities we encounter. We do, in a sense, the work we often are already doing living in the world, except we do so attentively. Such answers are, to be clear, not “idealistic,” rather: At the beginning and end of the day pragmatists are realists because they value what happens. They are interested in results, in consequences. They understand that pragmatist experiments are social constructions. These constructions come from experience and ideas and knowledge and power. Proposed material/ideal and realistic/idealistic distinctions deconstruct because the material conditions in which we find ourselves contribute to and shape what we can conceptualize and enact. Pragmatists try to bring about beautiful results in the midst of power and oppression and ignorance . (Cherryholmes, 1999, p. 5) Pragmatism ***accepts the contingent realities*** that we face in our everyday lives where we ***have to make choices***. And those choices are ***informed*** and ***limited*** in all kinds of ways. We ***cannot base our decisions on some foundation*** or ***truth***. Pragmatism is “anti-foundational” since such foundations and “Truth” are ***already conditioned*** and ***constructed***. Rather, pragmatism makes its decisions attending to consequences that are ***satisfying*** and ***fulfilling*** within the ***complex milieu*** where we come to understand those very concepts themselves. It exists in the present, is informed by the past, with an eye toward a beautiful future. Reparative Readings Pragmatism—in looking forward —attends to contemplating pleasure and beauty as desired consequences of our actions. Pragmatism is, I suggest, an approach ***committed to bringing into existence positive affects*** and ***actions***. This is something ***decidedly different*** from most critical traditions. Most critical traditions, as Eve Sedgwick (2004) aptly argued, embrace a ***hermeneutics of suspicion*** and this embrace, by the start of the twenty-first century, had become a problem. Sedgwick was concerned that there was a wide spread habit within critical work to engage a hermeneutics of suspicion. And while such hermeneutics—what she calls “paranoid” reading—is an important reading practice, there is a ***side effect*** when such reading practices become ***habitual***. Critical theorists—variously situated in queer, feminist, race-conscious, and related theories—for Sedgwick , “may have made it ***less rather than more possible*** to unpack the ***local***, ***contingent relations*** between any given piece of knowledge and its narrative/epistemological entailments for the seeker, knower, or teller” (p. 124). Paranoid reading, while ***excellent at exposing things*** may, in becoming a “***mandatory injunction rather than a possibility*** among other possibilities,” ***limit encountering***, ***intervening***, and ***creating other possibilities***. Or put differently, if we are ***mandated to do particular types of readings to be considered critical***, we become ***limited in the work that we can do***. We find ourselves always looking over our shoulder, paranoid about what enemies are chasing us without looking ahead to things that could trip us up (a paranoid option) or provide us support against our enemies. Reading practices, I hope you see, are never neutral, but always bring with them assumptions and viewpoints about what counts and what does not count. Reading practices inform what we look at, how we look, and where we look. They inform why we look at all. Reading practices ***frame the world before us*** and, just as a “frame” does, it sets us up to see (or be seen) in particular ways. Frames—like our reading practices—limn the scene for better and for worse. There are ***always frames***, one task is to begin to ***see different frames*** and what they do for the objects they capture within the borders and what they, then, by definition, exclude. Sedgwick illustrated that queer reading practices, by and large, took up a paranoid position, which made sense. Within the history of sexuality, she argued, there was a clear relationship between homosexuality and paranoia. Homosexuality, as theorized by Freud, was connected to paranoia and anti-homophobic inquiries in a similar vein took up the paranoid position, in an attempt to expose the violence of, for instance, heteronormativity (Warner, 1991) or homonormativity (Duggan, 2002) or homonationalism (Puar, 2007). The paranoid position was critical to resistance as it assisted in recognizing and exposing the enemies to queer lives and practices not only at the interpersonal level, but at the cultural, institutional, and disciplinary levels.1 However, as Sedgwick aptly noted, “just because you have enemies doesn’t mean you have to be paranoid” (p. 127). “Indeed,” Sedgwick continued, “for someone to have an unmystified view of systemic oppression ***does not intrinsically*** or necessarily ***enjoin that person*** to any specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences” (p. 127). Recognizing the realities of oppressions—in their diversity—***does not require*** that one engage in a ***particular type of critical project***. In fact, ***limiting oneself to a particular type of project*** would ***eliminate the possibility of surprise***. Instead, it would leave readers over time with the sense that they are being ***beat over the head with a bat of the same information***. “There’s oppression. Do you see the oppression? Do you see the oppression? It is there, there is the oppression. Do you see it?” This type of exposure is, as Sedgwick noted, a central tenet of paranoid reading practices. However, as she noted “[paranoid strategies] represent a way, among other ways, of seeking, finding, and organizing knowledge” (p. 130). And to be clear, there are important things that paranoid strategies do. Pointing out and exposing oppression is important. However, there are also important things that such strategies fail to adequately address; this being a lesson the tunnel of oppression I addressed in the preface taught me early on. The tunnel of oppression was rooted in exposing, but the moment it sought to promote, to assemble objects that did different work, its work became contested. As an alternative to paranoid reading, but not as a replacement, Sedgwick developed what she called ***reparative reading***, arguing that “to read from a reparative position is to surrender the knowing, anxious paranoid determination that no horror, however apparently unthinkable, shall ever come to the reader as new” (p. 146). To read from a reparative position is to allow for the ***possibility of surprise*** and leave open space that ***things could be different***. This is “because the reader has ***room to realize*** that the future ***may be different from the present***” (p. 146). Additionally, she continued, “it is also possible for her to entertain such profoundly relieving, ethically critical possibilities as that the past, in turn, could have happened differently from the way it actually did” (p. 146). Reparative reading practices—embracing the contingent and positive—similarly to pragmatism, are concerned with how things could be different. There is with Sedgwick’s reparative readings, like Cherryholmes’s pragmatism, an opening for work looking forward done under the banner of queer theory. Queers ***do not have to maintain*** and ***be determined*** by their historical connection to paranoid positions, but can ***invent additional ways*** of positioning themselves in and against the world. Such a move makes sense as it recognizes the changing realities and needs of queers.

#### Case ow – a. consent – not everyone consents to losing their future selfs b. prereq forecloses the possibility of overcoming queernesss c. mag – everyone would die

#### Queer progress is possible and has occurred – Obergefell resulted in a monumental and historic shift in public opinion proving legal methods are effective

Schmidt 19 (Samantha Schmidt is a reporter focused on gender and family issues for The Washington Post. She previously worked on The Post's Morning Mix team and as a reporting fellow for the New York Times. “Americans’ views flipped on gay rights. How did minds change so quickly?” The Washington Post. June 7, 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/americans-views-flipped-on-gay-rights-how-did-minds-change-so-quickly/2019/06/07/ae256016-8720-11e9-98c1-e945ae5db8fb_story.html> ) //WWJA

As recently as 2004, polls showed that the majority of Americans — 60 percent — opposed same-sex marriage, while only 31 percent were in favor, according to the Pew Research Center. Today, those numbers are reversed : 61 percent support same-sex marriage, while 31 percent oppose it. “You can’t find another issue where attitudes have shifted so rapidly,” said Don Haider-Markel, a political science professor at the University of Kansas who has studied public opinion of LGBT rights over the years. What’s perhaps most surprising is that support for same-sex marriage has increased among nearly all demographic groups, across different generations, partisan lines and religious faiths. Even among the most resistant religious group, white evangelical Protestants like the Augustine family, support for same-sex marriage has grown from 11 percent in 2004 to 29 percent in 2019, according to Pew. Fifty years after police raided the Stonewall Inn, a gay club in Manhattan, spurring days of riots that would become a catalyst for the gay rights movement, the leap in public opinion has been followed by leaps on the ground, even as work remains. A record number of LGBT candidates have been elected to Congress, Colorado elected the country’s first openly gay governor, Chicago has a lesbian mayor and the first openly gay Democratic candidate is running for president. But while it’s clear that the gay rights movement managed to change people’s minds faster than any other civil rights movement in memory, it’s less clear why. How, in 15 years, did Americans’ views flip on such a charged social issue? And why haven’t other groups that have also publicly fought discrimination managed to change public opinion as quickly? The answer lies in human behavior and demographic realities, as well as a winning strategy by gay rights activists that capitalized on both. In a study published earlier this year, Mahzarin Banaji, a psychology professor at Harvard University, investigated patterns of long-term changes in attitudes toward six social groups — the elderly, the disabled, the overweight, black people, people with darker skin tones and gay people — over a decade. The study, co-authored by Tessa Charlesworth, measured both explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes, through online implicit association tests. While people may consciously report positive feelings toward a group in self-reported surveys, their implicit — or automatic, subconscious — attitudes might reveal a different bias. It’s the difference between the values we profess and what we believe is socially acceptable to say, and what we actually feel. Between 2007 and 2016, Banaji found that explicit attitudes toward all groups became less biased. But implicit attitudes toward some groups stayed the same — including bias toward people with disabilities and the elderly. Implicit bias against people who are overweight actually became worse. Respondents became less biased in their attitudes toward race and skin tone. But of all of the groups, implicit attitudes toward sexuality changed, by far, the fastest. “Nobody expects implicit attitudes to change that rapidly over such a brief period of time,” Banaji said. This relatively recent acceleration came after decades of struggle. In 1978, almost a decade after Stonewall, gay rights activist Harvey Milk gave an impassioned plea: “Every gay person must come out.” In the decades that followed, more and more Americans started coming out to their loved ones, some galvanized by the pain of the AIDS epidemic. Then, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the growing visibility of gay people in popular culture began to trigger a major shift in attitudes, social scientists said. By then, comedian Ellen DeGeneres had come out as gay, the NBC sitcom “Will & Grace” had taken off and Americans started seeing more examples of gay people in popular culture. Most of these characters and the most visible leaders at the helm of the movement were white people with the power and privilege to help LGBT rights reach the mainstream. But there was something different about the gay and lesbian community, compared with other minority groups. They were in every socioeconomic and racial group, every generation, in small towns and big cities. Unlike other demographics, “sexuality is a dimension that is everywhere,” Banaji said. “It is not segregated.” The more connections Americans made with gay or lesbian people, the more positive their attitudes toward them became — a trend social scientists call “the contact hypothesis.” And families like the Augustines were forced to resolve an internal dilemma that social scientists call “cognitive dissonance.” “When two beliefs come into conflict in our minds, our brains are not good at just holding the conflict. We have to resolve the conflict,” Banaji said. “You can disown your child or you can change your attitudes toward gay people.” After conversion therapy failed to change their son’s sexuality, Teri and Steve Augustine resolved to understand it. Teri asked her children to invite gay Christians they knew to their home. Her daughter Bethany invited a gay colleague to come to dinner with his partner. Teri learned about the pain he endured when his church rejected him. “My husband and I looked at each other and were like, ‘Wow, we need to do some work here,’ ” Teri said. Then, during Peter’s junior year of college, his parents went to a Gay Christian Network conference, where they worshiped alongside hundreds of gay, lesbian and transgender Christians. “I grew up with a concept that those two words were mutually exclusive,” he said. He had already begun to believe that Peter could be both gay and Christian, “but Peter is only one person. I saw it in 1,500 people. . . . That was the closest thing I had to a lightbulb.” The family continued to organize monthly dinners in their home for gay Christians, many of whom were rejected from their own churches or families. What began as a group of four people has grown to nearly 20 — sharing a meal, praying and singing together. If the relationships gay and lesbian people have with those close to them were so crucial in building support for the gay rights movement, why haven’t those connections been as instrumental in changing attitudes about African Americans, the elderly or overweight people? What might be different about the gay community, Banaji speculated, is that even before a person came out, “love was in place.” A parent or a co-worker already knows and loves a gay person, and then discovers a person’s sexuality, which is often not obvious right away. “That, I think, is very different from something like age, or race, or body weight that just presents itself immediately upon seeing a person for the first time.” Geographic and social segregation play roles, too. It’s hard for bias-challenging, face-to-face contact to take place when African Americans and the elderly, for example, are not well integrated into neighborhoods or social spaces due to both present-day and historic discrimination. The gay rights movement was also helped along by the exposure Americans received through leaders in their own communities. Researchers found that participants were more likely to express support for marriage equality when they had been exposed to that message from an “in-group” leader, such as an athlete on their favorite sports team, a politician or a pastor. Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio) and Vice President Richard B. Cheney, who both spoke in favor of gay rights after their children came out as gay, helped build support among Republicans, said political scientist Melissa Michelson of Menlo College, who co-wrote a book with Brian Harrison of the University of Minnesota about their findings. Among those who changed their opinion on same-sex marriage after President Barack Obama announced his support, blacks were more likely than whites to shift toward supporting it. But for much of the United States , the tipping point in the gay rights movement was something more obvious: marriage equality itself. Before the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that bans on same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, several states had already begun legally recognizing same-sex marriages. A 2015 study found that residents of states with a same-sex marriage policy had the greatest reduction of anti-gay attitudes, when compared with residents of states where same-sex marriage was illegal.

**Their thesis is wrong—queerness requires futurity to combat heteronormativity—turns the links**

**Muñoz 6** [José Esteban, Associate Professor of Performance Studies at NYU], PMLA, v121, n3, May, p. 825-826

I have chosen to counter polemics that argue for antirelationality by insisting on the essential need for an understanding of queerness as collectivity. At the 2005 MLA panel, in recent essays, and in my forthcoming book Cruising Utopia, I respond to the assertion that there is no future for the queer by arguing that queerness is primarily about futurity. Queerness is always on the horizon. Indeed, for queerness to have any value whatsoever, it must be considered visible only on the horizon. **My argument is therefore interested in critiquing the ontological certitude that I understand to accompany the politics of presentist and pragmatic contemporary gay identity.** This certitude is often represented through a narration of disappearance and negativity that boils down to another game of fort-da. My conference paper and the forthcoming book it is culled from have found much propulsion in the work of Ernst Bloch and other Marxist thinkers who did not dismiss utopia. Bloch found strident grounds for a critique of a totalizing and naturalizing idea of the present in his concept of the no-­longer-­conscious. A turn to the no-longerconscious enabled a critical hermeneutics attuned to comprehending the not yet here. This temporal calculus deployed the past and the future as armaments to combat the devastating logic of the here and now, in which nothing exists outside the current moment and **which naturalizes cultural logics like capitalism and heteronormativity**. Concomitantly, Bloch has also sharpened our critical imagination’s emphasis on what he famously called “a principle of hope.” Hope is an easy target for antiutopians. But while antiutopians might understand themselves as critical in the rejection of hope, they would, in the rush to denounce it, miss the point that hope is spawned of a critical investment in utopia that is nothing like naive but, instead, profoundly resistant to the stultifying temporal logic of a broken-down present. My turn to Bloch, hope, and utopia challenges theoretical insights that have been stunted by the lull of presentness and by various romances of negativity and that have thus become routine and resoundingly anticritical. This antiutopian theoretical faltering is what I referred to earlier, almost in jest, as poststructuralist pieties. I have learned quite a bit from critical practices commonly described as poststructuralist and have no wish to denounce them. The corrective I want to make by turning to utopia is attuned to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s critique of the way in which paranoid reading practices have become so nearly automatic in queer studies that they have, in many ways, ceased to be critical. In queer studies, antiutopianism, more often than not intertwined with antirelationality, has led many scholars to an impasse wherein they cannot see futurity for the life of them. Utopian readings are aligned with what Sedgwick would call reparative hermeneutics.