# 1ac r4 tfa state

## Framing

**[1] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions**

**Moen 16**, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value** and disvalue **is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” **are** here **understood inclusively**, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for**?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. **The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good**. 3 As Aristotle observes: “**We never ask** [a man] **what** his **end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself**.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that **if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad**. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue**, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

**[2] Actor Spec— States must use util. Any other standard dooms the moral theory**

**Goodin 90.** Robert Goodin 90, [professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences], “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142 //RS

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.

#### [3] Extinction First –

**[a] Forecloses future improvement – we can never improve society because our impact is irreversible**

**[b] Turns suffering – mass death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities**

**[c] Moral uncertainty – if we’re unsure about which interpretation of the world is true – we ought to preserve the world to keep debating about it**

## Plan

#### Resolved: In a democracy, objectivity ought to be prioritized over advocacy.

#### Definitionally objective news rejects fake news

**Kovach and Rosenstiel., 1** (Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel., Bill Kovach, a 1989 Nieman Fellow, was curator of the Nieman Foundation from 1989 to 2000. He is the co-author of “The Elements of Journalism.”, Tom Rosenstiel is executive director of the American Press Institute and co-author of “The Elements of Journalism.”, 6-15-2001, accessed on 2-19-2022, Nieman Reports, "The Essence of Journalism Is a Discipline of Verification | Nieman Reports", https://niemanreports.org/articles/the-essence-of-journalism-is-a-discipline-of-verification/)

“In the end, the discipline of verification is what separates journalism from entertainment, propaganda, fiction, or art…. Journalism alone is focused first on getting what happened down right…. Perhaps because the discipline of verification is so personal and so haphazardly communicated, it is also part of one of the great confusions of journalism— the concept of objectivity. The original meaning of this idea is now thoroughly misunderstood, and by and large lost. When the concept originally evolved, it was not meant to imply that journalists were free of bias. Quite the contrary…. Objectivity called for journalists to develop a consistent method of testing information—a transparent approach to evidence—precisely so that personal and cultural biases would not undermine the accuracy of their work…. In the original concept, in other words, the method is objective, not the journalist. The key was in the discipline of the craft, not the aim. The point has some important implications. One is that the impartial voice employed by many news organizations, that familiar, supposedly neutral style of newswriting, is not a fundamental principle of journalism. Rather, it is an often helpful device news organizations use to highlight that they are trying to produce something obtained by objective methods. The second implication is that this neutral voice, without a discipline of verification, creates a veneer covering something hollow. Journalists who select sources to express what is really their own point of view, and then use the neutral voice to make it seem objective, are engaged in a form of deception. This damages the credibility of the whole profession by making it seem unprincipled, dishonest, and biased. This is an important caution in an age when the standards of the press are so in doubt…. A more conscious discipline of verification is the best antidote to the old journalism of verification being overrun by a new journalism of assertion, and it would provide citizens with a basis for relying on journalistic accounts. 1.Never add anything that was not there. 2.Never deceive the audience. 3.Be transparent about your methods and motives. 4.Rely on your own original reporting. 5.Exercise humility. …we began to see a core set of concepts that form the foundation of the discipline of verification…. The willingness of the journalist to be transparent about what he or she has done is at the heart of establishing that the journalist is concerned with the truth…. Too much journalism fails to say anything about methods, motives, and sources.”

### Adv 1 – Democracy

#### Democracy is on a global decline and is set to collapse

**Zeleb 22**

[Zeleb.es is a south American site made to spread news across the world. This ranges from political to social to environmental news., 02 – 20 – 2022, “Democracy is in decline worldwide per the Global Democracy Index” MSN, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/democracy-is-in-decline-worldwide-per-the-global-democracy-index/ss-AAU147j]/SP

Less than half of the world lives in a democracy Global democracy is in decline, and less than half of the world's population lives under a form of democratic government. These are the results of the latest edition of the Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). A survey done in 167 countries The Democracy Index is an annual survey that ranks the level of democracy in 167 countries. Per The Economist, the Democracy Index uses a ranking system that measures five elements: electoral process and pluralism, the functioning of government, political participation, democratic political culture, and civil liberties. A priviledged 6.4% The latest edition of this study has found that only 6.4% of the world's population lives in a country with full democracy and a shocking 1/3 of the world lives under authoritarian rule. A less democratic world In 2020, 49.4% of the world population was considered to be living in a democracy of some kind or another. However, the number went down to just 45.7% in 2021. Threats to democracy Several threats to democracy were found by the EIU's report for 2022 and the coming years. The report claims that "the biggest challenge to the Western model of democracy over the coming years will come from China."

#### Lack of Objectivity cripples global democracy: ***fake news* and *government distrust***

**DROI 21**

[The Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union is responsible for organising the work of Parliament's committees and interparliamentary delegations in the field of external – that is, beyond the EU – policies, April 2021, “The Impact of Disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world” European Parliament DROI Subcommitee, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653635/EXPO\_STU(2021)653635\_EN.pdf]/SP](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653635/EXPO_STU(2021)653635_EN.pdf%5d/SP)

Disinformation has an impact on the basic health and credibility of democratic processes. This has become the core of recent positions taken by international organisations, such as Resolution 2326 (2020) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) expressing concern ‘about the scale of information pollution in a digitally connected and increasingly polarised world, the spread of disinformation campaigns aimed at shaping public opinion, trends of foreign electoral interference and manipulation’ 59. Information and shared narratives are a precondition for good quality democratic public discourse. In this context, the European Parliament views disinformation as an ‘increasing systematic pressure’ on European societies and their electoral stability60. The European Commission’s strategy Shaping Europe’s Digital Future61 considers that ‘disinformation erodes trust in institutions along with digital and traditional media and harms our democracies by hampering the ability of citizens to take informed decisions’. It also warns that disinformation is set to polarise democratic societies by creating or deepening tensions and undermining democratic pillars such as electoral systems. There are a number of ways in which disinformation weakens democratic institutions. These include the use of social media to channel disinformation in coordinated ways so as to undermine institutions’ credibility. As trust in mainstream media has plummeted62, alternative news ecosystems have flourished. Online platforms’ business model pushes content that generates clicks and this has increased polarisation. This favours the creation of more homogeneous audiences, undercuts tolerance for alternative views63. Figure 2 below suggests that around 80 % of people believe that disinformation has negative impacts in their own countries’ politics, in other countries’ politics and in political discussions among families and friends, which increases polarisation. Surveys also show that disinformation can sow distrust in different pillars of democratic institutions, including public institutions such as governments, parliaments and courts or their processes, public figures, as well as journalists and free media64. For example, a survey undertaken by Ipsos Public Affairs and Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) reports that, due to the spread of disinformation, many citizens have less trust in media (40 %) and government (22 %)65

#### Democracy *solves* climate change but we need an *increase* in pace of action

**Casas-Zamora 21** [Dr. Kevin Casas-Zamora is the Secretary-General of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), with over 25 years of experience in democratic governance as a researcher, analyst, educator, consultant and public official. Here he discusses the role that democracy plays in mitigating climate change. 06/29/2021 Why democracy is the key ingredient to battling climate change” <https://www.euronews.com/green/2021/06/29/why-democracy-is-the-key-ingredient-to-battling-climate-change> ] //aaditg

The recent court rulings tell us a lot, not just about the powerful assets that democracy can deploy in the struggle against climate change, but also the long-term robustness of the case for democracy as a political system. Democracies are under pressure from populism, disinformation, inequality and voter frustration, according to the Global State of Democracy report from the intergovernmental organisation International (IDEA). They are also afflicted by a crisis of self-confidence. Fairly or not, the current pandemic has helped cement a narrative portraying liberal democracies as lumbering and too divided to cope with big challenges, while extolling the presumed ability of authoritarian systems to act decisively. Andre Penner/AP2011 Deforestation in the Brazilian AmazonAndre Penner/AP2011 ‘Extremists and populists on the rise’: Why the EU needs a green prosecutor What are the vices to democracy? This narrative is not concocted out of thin air. Democracies do suffer from vices when it comes to slow-burning crises like global warming. Voters and politicians have short attention spans. **Balances** of power **mean reforms can be held hostage to obstinate US Senators or oil lobbyists.** Science can play second fiddle to voters if it entails higher taxes - France’s yellow vest protests, sparked by fuel price rises, are a case in point. And yet, despite all this, the facts are clear - **9 out of the 10 top performers in the 2021 Climate Change Performance Index are democracies.** Sweden tops the list of 57 countries. China is 30th. The reasons for this are not hard to fathom. **Democracies allow for the free flow of information that enables policy makers to debate and find solutions, and for civil society to mobilise**. It is no coincidence that youth campaigner Greta Thunberg helped spark a global movement from a lone street demonstration in Sweden, one of the world’s top performing democracies. It is no coincidence that youth campaigner Greta Thunberg helped spark a global movement from a lone street demonstration in Sweden, one of the world’s top performing democracies. Democracies are more effective against climate change for the same reasons that they don’t experience famines, as Nobel Laureate Indian economist **Amartya Sen suggested long ago - because in allowing freedom of expression, a vibrant civil society, regular elections and the workings of checks and balances, they increase the likelihood that crises will be met and destructive policies corrected.** Democracy is not simply elections - it is the often chaotic workings of myriad institutions and groups as well as a culture of open debate, where climate reform is nudged along by courts, free media, parliaments, and public protests. Democracy’s most powerful weapon against the challenges of this century is its ability to self-correct. And then there is the capacity of democratic systems to forge the social consensus required for long-term transformations to be sustainable. We know this story - participatory decision-making may be slower than executive decrees, but almost always yields outcomes that are more legitimate and accepted by society, and hence more durable. Canva Democracy is a key ingredient to fighting climate changeCanva This is vital for climate change. Decarbonisation is not something governments do by fiat, though act they must - it is something societies as a whole must do by conviction. Consumer habits will need to change, from reducing air travel to adjusting diets. Trillions of dollars will have to be invested in transforming the sources of energy that fuel economies. New social contracts will have to be devised so that the burden of these fiscal bills can be equitably shared. **There is no guarantee that democracies will succeed in building the consensus needed to save our species, but their odds are better than those of any other political arrangement.** Could decarbonising our cities be the answer to climate change? Kids are disappointed in grownups’ ‘un-green’ ways: Here are their plans for a cleaner future Democratic governance could slow down climate change This is, however, the key question – while it is clear that **the attributes of democracy are potentially superior to deal with climate change, it is much less clear that they will be actually deployed with the celerity required**. This is, precisely, what courts are doing in Germany and elsewhere - they are moving forward the deadlines that political systems and societies must meet if our species is to avoid disaster. Those deadlines are tight – a few decades, at most. But courts alone won’t do the trick. **Democratic governments, parliaments, and political leaders must also dramatically increase the pace of their actions.** This is why it is so vital to connect the discussion of climate change with debates on the quality of democratic governance. We must distill, disseminate, and design the institutions and practices that are more likely to allow democracies to build consensus, distribute burdens and make decisions effectively to meet the climate crisis. **Experimenting with new forms of political deliberation**, like citizens’ assemblies, enlarging the representation of young people by lowering the voting age and adopting some of the bargaining practices between industries, workers and governments that **have been** so **instrumental** in **building consensus** in Northern Europe - this is the stuff democratic governance agendas should be made of in the climate crisis era.

#### The alternative to democracy is violent civil wars, ethnic cleansing, and genocide---the best research confirms

**Cortright 13**, David Cortright is the director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute for Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, Chair of the Board of Directors of the Fourth Freedom Forum, and author of 17 books, Kristen Wall is a Researcher and Analyst at the Kroc Institute, Conor Seyle is Associate Director of One Earth Future, Governance, Democracy, and Peace How State Capacity and Regime Type Influence the Prospects of War and Peace, http://oneearthfuture.org/sites/oneearthfuture.org/files//documents/publications/Cortright-Seyle-Wall-Paper.pdf

The classic statement of **Kantian peace** theory applies to interstate conflict and focuses on dyadic relations between states. This **leaves out the most common form of armed violence in the world today, civil conflicts and one-sided violence within states. In recent years, researchers** have **found evidence** that the **democratic peace** phenomenon **applies within states as well as between them**. Regime type matters not only externally but internally. **Mature democratic governments** are not only less likely to wage war on each other, they also **experience fewer armed uprisings and major civil wars and are more reluctant to use armed violence against** their own **citizens. As the studies** below **indicate**, the **evidence of a democratic peace phenomenon within states is strong and compelling**. Walter observes a direct relationship between levels of democracy and the likelihood of internal armed conflict. In her examination of the problem of war recurrence, she finds that **countries characterized by open political systems and economic well-being—i.e., developed democracies— have a much lower probability of renewed civil war than autocratic countries with low levels of economic development**.91 Walter measures the degree of political openness and democratic ‘voice’ by using Polity and Freedom House indicators. High scores on these indices correlate directly with a reduced risk of civil war. She notes**, as other scholars have observed**, that **major civil wars do not occur in mature democratic states.** She concludes: It may be that **liberal democracies are really the only types of regimes that can truly insulate themselves from violent internal challenges**. This suggests that **citizens who are able to express their preferences about alternative policies and leaders, who are guaranteed civil liberties in their daily lives and in acts of political participation, are less likely to become soldiers. Offering citizens a real outlet for** their **concerns and having** a **government** that is **open to democratic change considerably reduces the likelihood of** a **civil war**.92 **Civil conflicts within mature democracies are not only less frequent but also less lethal.** Bethany **Lacina assesses the severity of civil conflicts by measuring casualty levels according to several variables: regime type, state capacity, ethnic and religious diversity, and the impact of foreign military intervention. She finds** that the **political characteristics of a regime correlate significantly with differing casualty levels and are the strongest predictor of conflict severity. Democratic governments experience much lower casualty levels during civil conflict than autocratic states**. Lacina’s analysis finds that civil wars occurring within democratic states have less than half the battle deaths of conflicts in non-democracies.93 **State-sponsored violence against civilians is also less likely to occur in democracies than in autocracies**. In his important book, Death by Government, Rudolph **Rummel assembles mind numbing data and numerous examples demonstrating the myriad ways governments kill** their **citizens**—directly **through genocide and mass terror and indirectly through starvation and repression. He finds a stark contrast between the behavior of autocracies and democracies. Autocratic governments readily “slaughter their people by the tens of millions; in contrast**, many **democracies can barely bring themselves to execute even serial murderers**.”94 **Through statistical analysis, Rummel shows** that **genocidal killing is directly associated with the absence of democracy**, holding constant other variables such as regime type, ethnic diversity, economic development level, population density, and culture.95 The **lack of democracy is the most significant indicator of the likelihood of mass repression again the civilian population**. As Rummel documents the appalling litany of governments murdering their own people, he is unequivocal about what he considers the necessary remedy—“The solution is democracy. The course of action is to foster freedom.”95 Barbara **Harff’s** **research** on genocidal violence **comes to similar conclusions. She examines 126 cases of internal war and regime collapse between** 1955 and 1997 **to identify** the **factors that led to genocidal violence in 35 of these cases. Her results match the findings of other studies. Autocratic regimes facing state failure are three and a half times more likely to experience genocidal violence than democratic regimes facing such failure**.97 She finds that **genocidal violence is more likely in regimes that advocate exclusionary ideologies, an approach that is rare in mature democratic states**. Harff observes that the **lowest levels of mass killing occur in states with a high degree of economic interdependence, which is characteristic of mature democratic regimes**.98 Her conclusion is that states are less likely to employ genocidal violence when they have inclusive democratic systems and trade extensively with other countries. As Steven Pinker notes, these findings fit well with the Kantian triad of democracy, cosmopolitanism and trade— “another trifecta” for liberal peace theory.99

#### Democratic governance stops nuclear transition wars with Russia and China AND drives global technological innovation---extinction.

**Kolodziej ’17** [Edward; May 19; Emeritus Research Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; EUC Paper Series, “Challenges to the Democratic Project for Governing Globalization,” https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/96620/Kolodziej Introduction 5.19.17.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y]

The Rise of a Global Society Let me first sketch the global democratic project for global governance as a point of reference. We must first recognize that globalization has given rise to a global society for the **first time** in the evolution of the human **species**. We are now **stuck with each other**; **seven and half billion** people today — nine to **ten** by **2050**: all **super connected** and **interdependent**. In greater or lesser measure, humans are mutually dependent on each other in the pursuit of their most salient values, interests, needs, and preferences — concerns about personal, community, and national **security**, sustainable economic **growth**, protection of the **environment**, the equitable **distribution** of the globe’s material wealth, human **rights**, and even the validation of their personal and social identities by others. Global **warming** is a metaphor of this morphological social change in the human condition. **All** humans are **implicated** in this looming Anthropogenic-induced **disaster** — the exhausts of billions of automobiles, the methane released in fracking for natural gas, outdated U.S. coal-fired power plants and newly constructed ones in China. Even the poor farmer burning charcoal to warm his dinner is complicit. Since interdependence surrounds, ensnares, and binds us as a human society, the dilemma confronting the world’s diverse and divided populations is evident: the **expanding scope** as well as the **deepening**, **accumulating**, and **thickening** interdependencies of globalization urge global government. But the Kantian ideal of universal governance is beyond the reach of the world’s disparate peoples. They are **profoundly divided** by religion, culture, language, tribal, ethnic and national loyalties as well as by class, social status, race, gender, and sexual orientation. How have the democracies responded to this dilemma? How have they attempted to reconcile the growing interdependence of the world’s disputing peoples and need for global governance? What do we mean by the governance of a human society? A working, **legitimate government** of a human society requires simultaneous responses to three competing imperatives: Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy. While the forms of these OWL imperatives have differed radically over the course of human societal evolution, these constraints remain predicable of all human societies if they are to replicate themselves and flourish over time. The OWL imperatives are no less applicable to a global society. 1. Order refers to a society’s investment of awesome material power in an individual or body to arbitrate and resolve value, interest, and preference conflicts, which cannot be otherwise resolved by non-violent means — the Hobbesian problematic. 2. The Welfare imperative refers to the necessity of humans to eat, drink, clothe, and shelter themselves and to pursue the full-range of their seemingly limitless acquisitive appetites. Responses to the Welfare imperative, like that of Order, constitute a distinct form of governing power and authority with its own decisional processes and actors principally associated either with the Welfare or the Order imperative. Hence we have the Marxian-Adam Smith problematic. 3. Legitimacy is no less a form of governing power and authority, independent of the Order and Welfare imperatives. Either by choice, socialization, or coerced acquiescence, populations acknowledge a regime’s governing authority and their obligation to submit to its rule. Here arises the Rousseaunian problematic. The government of a human society emerges then as an evolving, precarious balance and compromise of the ceaseless struggle of these competing OWL power domains for ascendancy of one of these imperatives over the others. It is against the backdrop of these OWL imperatives — Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy — that we are brought to the democratic project for global governance. The Democratic Project For Order, open societies constructed the global democratic state and, in alliance, the democratic global-state system. Collectively these initiatives led to the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union to implement the democratic project’s system of global governance. The democratic global state assumed all of the functions of the Hobbesian Westphalian security state — but a lot more. The global state became a Trading, Banking, Market, and Entrepreneurial state. To these functions were added those of the Science, Technology and the Economic Growth state. How else would we be able to enjoy the **Internet**, **cell phones** and iPhones, or **miracle cures**? These are the products of the **iron triangle** of the global democratic state, academic and non-profit research centers, and corporations. It is a **myth** that the Market System did all this **alone**. Fueled by increasing material wealth, the democratic global state was afforded the means to become the **Safety Net** state, providing **ed**ucation, **health**, **social security**, leisure and recreation for its population. And as the global state’s power expanded across this broad and enlarging spectrum of functions and roles, the global state was also constrained by the social compacts of the democracies to be bound by popular rule. The ironic result of the expansion of the global state’s power and social functions and its obligation to accede to popular will was a Security state and global state-system that vastly outperformed its principal authoritarian rivals in the Cold War. So much briefly is the democratic project’s response to the Order imperative. Now let’s look at the democratic project’s response to the Welfare imperative. The democracies institutionalized Adam Smith’s vision of a global Market System. The Market System trucks and barters, Smith’s understanding of what it means to be human. But it does a lot more. The Market System facilitates and fosters the free movement of people, goods and services, capital, ideas, values, scientific discoveries, and best technological practices. Created is a vibrant global civil society oblivious to state boundaries. What we now experience is De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America on global steroids. As for the imperative of Legitimacy, the social compacts of the democracies affirmed Rousseau’s conjecture that all humans are free and therefore equal. Applied to elections each citizen has one vote. Democratic regimes are also obliged to submit to the rule of law, to conduct free and fair elections, to honor majority rule while protecting minority rights, and to **promote** human rights at home and **abroad**. The Authoritarian Threat to the Democratic Project The **democratic project** for **global governance** is now at **risk**. Let’s start with the challenges posed by authoritarian regimes, with Russia and China in the lead. Both Russia and China would **rest global governance** on Big Power spheres of influence. Both would assume **hegemonic status** in their respective regions, asserting their versions of the **Monroe Doctrine**. Their regional hegemony would then **leverage** their claim to be global **Big Powers**. Moscow and Beijing would then have an equal say with the United States and the West in sharing and shaping global governance. **The** Russo-Chinese global **system** of Order would ascribe to Russia and China governing privileges not accorded to the states both aspire to dominate. Moscow and Beijing would enjoy **unconditional** recognition of their state **sovereignty**, territorial integrity, and non-interference in their domestic affairs, but they would reserve to themselves the right to **intervene** in the domestic and foreign affairs of the states and peoples under their tutelage in pursuit of their hegemonic interests. President Putin has announced that Russia’s **imperialism** encompasses the **millions** of Russians living in the former republics of the Soviet Union. Russia contends that Ukraine and Belarus also fall under Moscow’s purported claim to historical sovereignty over these states. Forceful re-absorption of **Crimea** and control over eastern **Ukraine** are viewed by President Putin as Russia’s historical inheritances. Self-determination is not extended to these states or to other states and peoples of the former Soviet Union. Moscow rejects their right to freely align, say, with the European Union or, god forbid, with NATO. In contrast to the democratic project, universal in its reach, the Russo-Chinese conception of a stable global order rests on more **tenuous** and **conflict-prone ethno-national foundations**. Russia’s proclaimed enemies are the United States and the European Union. Any means that undermines the unity of these entities is viewed by Moscow as a gain. The endgame is a **poly-anarchical** interstate system, potentially as **war-prone** as the Eurocentric system **before** and **after World War I**, but now populated by states with **nuclear weapons.** Global politics becomes a **zero-sum game**. Moscow has **no compunctions** about **corrupting** the **electoral processes** of democratic states, conducting threatening **military exercises** along NATO’s east border, or violating the more than 30-year old treaty to ban the deployment of Intermediate-Range **missile launchers**, capable of **firing nuclear weapons**. Nothing less than the **dissolution** of the democratic project is Moscow’s solution for global Order. China also seeks a revision of the global Order. It declares sovereignty over the **South China Sea**. Rejected is The Hague Tribunal’s dismissal of this claim. Beijing continues to build artificial islands as military bases in the region to assert its control over these troubled waters. If it could have its way, China would decide which states and their naval vessels, notably those of the United States, would have access to the South China Sea. Where Moscow and Beijing depart sharply are in their contrasting responses to the Welfare imperative. Moscow has **no solution** other than to use its oil and gas resources as instruments of **coercive diplomacy** and to weaken or **dismantle** existing Western **alliances** and international economic **institutions**. China can ill-afford the dismantling of the global market system. In his address to the Davos gathering in January of this year, Chinese President Xi asserted that “any attempt to cut off the flow of capital, technologies, products, industries and people between economies, and channel the waters in the ocean back into isolated lakes and creeks is simply not possible.” Adam Smith could not have said it better. Both Moscow and Beijing have been particularly assiduous to legitimate their regimes. President Putin’s case for legitimacy is much broader and deeper than a pure appeal to Russian nationalism. He stresses the spiritual and cultural unity of Russianspeaking populations spread across the states of the post-Soviet space. A central core of that unity is the Russian Orthodox Church, a key prop of the regime. Reviled is Western secularism, portrayed as corrupt and decadent, viewed by Putin as an existential threat to the Russian World. The Chinese regime, secular and atheistic, can hardly rely on religion to legitimate the regime. Beijing principally rests its legitimacy on its record of economic development and nationalism. The regime’s success in raising the economic standards of hundreds of millions of Chinese reinforces its claim to legitimacy in two ways. On the one hand, the Communist Party can rightly claim to have raised hundreds of millions of Chinese from poverty within a generation. On the other hand, the Communist Party insists that its model of economic growth, what critics scorn as crony capitalism, is superior to the unfettered, market-driven model of the West. Hence capitalism with Chinese characteristics is more effective and legitimate than the Western alternative. Where Moscow and Beijing do **converge** is in fashioning their responses to the Legitimacy imperative. They **repudiate Western liberal democracy**. Both reject criticisms of their human rights abuses as interventions into their domestic affairs. Dissidents are harassed, incarcerated, or, in some instances, assassinated. Journalists are co-opted, selfcensored, silenced, or imprisoned. Social media is state controlled. Both the Putin regime and the Chinese Communist Party monopolize the public narratives evaluating governmental policy. Transparency and accountability are hostage to governmental secrecy. Civil society has few effective avenues to criticize governmental actions. Moscow adds an ironic twist to these controls in manipulating national elections to produce an elected authoritarian regime. Whether either of these authoritarian responses to the Legitimacy imperative will survive **remains to be seen**. Beijing’s use of economic performance and nationalism to underwrite its legitimacy is a double-edged sword. If economic performance falters, then legitimacy suffers. Whether top-down nationalism will always control nationalism from the bottom-up is also problematic. In resting legitimacy on nationalism, dubious historical claims, and crypto-religious beliefs, Moscow is spared Beijing’s economic performance test. That said, there is room for skepticism that in the long-run Russians will exchange lower standards of living for corrupt rule in pursuit of an elusive Russian mission antagonistic to the West. The implosion of the Soviet Union, due in no small part to its retarded economic and technological development, suggests that the patience of the Russian people has limits. Demonstrations in March 2017 against state corruption in 82 Russian cities, led largely by Russian youth, reveal these limits. They are an ominous omen for the future of the Putin kleptocracy. Meanwhile, neither Russia nor China offers much to solve the Legitimacy imperative of global governance.

### Adv 2 – Climate

#### Climate change is increasing and at its tipping point

**Cho 21** [Renee Cho, “How Close Are We to Climate Tipping Points?” State of the Planet, 10 Nov. 2021, news.climate.columbia.edu/2021/11/11/how-close-are-we-to-climate-tipping-points/.] // VS

* Really good card – if you have time, can cut it longer – has good statistics about tipping points

As world leaders gather at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) in Glasgow, Scotland, to take bolder action against climate change, human activity has already warmed the planet 1.1°C above pre-industrial levels. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned that exceeding 2°C of warming could have catastrophic consequences and that we need to keep global warming to 1.5°C. The world is currently on track to surpass both of those limits. Under the most optimistic scenario, if all 140 countries that have announced net zero targets or are considering them actually reach these goals, as well as their more ambitious 2030 commitments under the Paris Agreement, warming could be limited to 1.8°C by 2100. But will overshooting 1.5°C push us over climate tipping points, triggering irreversible and abrupt changes? The IPCC’s latest report warned of that possibility, and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres recently said, “…time is running out. Irreversible climate tipping points lie alarmingly close.” What are the tipping points? And how close are they? A tipping point is the point at which small changes become significant enough to cause a larger, more critical change that can be abrupt, irreversible, and lead to cascading effects. The concept of tipping points was introduced by the IPCC 20 years ago, but then it was thought they would only occur if global warming reached 5°C. Recent IPCC assessments, however, suggested that tipping points could be reached between 1°C and 2°C of warming. Here are the major climate tipping points (include). Greenland ice sheet The Greenland ice sheet contains enough water to raise global sea levels by over 20 feet and its melting is accelerating. From 1992 to 2018, it lost close to four trillion tons of ice. While its disintegration is not likely to be abrupt, there could come a point beyond which its eventual collapse is irreversible for millennia. A new study found that ice-sheet height and melting rates in the Jakobshavn basin, one of the fastest melting basins in Greenland, are destabilizing the ice sheet. Most of the melting occurs on the ice surface because of warming temperatures, but as the height of the ice sheet is reduced, the surface is exposed to warmer air at lower altitudes, which further speeds melting. In addition, less snowfall leaves the ice surface darker so it absorbs more of the sun’s heat and warms faster. Scientists are not sure if a tipping point has been passed but the study found that there would likely be more melting in the near future. In other research, scientists speculated that the critical temperature range at which the Greenland ice sheet would go into irreversible disintegration is between 0.8°C and 3.2°C of warming above pre-industrial levels. The West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) The WAIS is vulnerable to collapse (right now) because it sits on bedrock below sea level and is affected by the ocean’s warming. A 2018 study found that the WAIS went from ice loss of almost 58.5 billion tons a year between 1992 and 1997 to 175 billion tons from 2012 to 2017. The Thwaites Glacier on West Antarctica’s Amundsen Sea has lost a trillion tons of ice since the early 2000s, and some scientists believe it could be headed for an irreversible collapse, which could threaten a large part of the WAIS and raise global sea levels by two feet or more. The Pine Island glacier, also on the Amundsen Sea, is thinning rapidly as well. A new study found that current policies, heading for almost 3°C of warming, would result in an abrupt hastening of Antarctic ice loss after 2060, while other research suggests that the tipping point for the WAIS lies between 1.5°C and 2.0°C of warming. Another new study found that if the WAIS melted, it could raise sea levels three feet more than previous projections of 10.5 feet; Antarctica as a whole contains enough ice to raise global sea levels by over 200 feet. Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) The AMOC is one of the main global ocean currents and is critical to regulating climate. Cold salty water, which is dense and heavy, sinks deep into the ocean in the North Atlantic, and moves along the bottom until it rises to the surface near the equator, usually in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Heat from the sun then warms the water, and evaporation leaves the water saltier. The warm salty water travels up the coast via the Gulf Stream, warming the U.S. East Coast and Western Europe. Once the water releases its heat and reaches the North Atlantic, it becomes cold and dense again, and the cycle, which can take water 1,000 years to complete, continues. But as glaciers and ice sheets melt, they add fresh, less dense water to the North Atlantic, which prevents the water from sinking and impedes circulation. This may be why AMOC has slowed 15 percent since the 1950s. A recent study found that the AMOC is in its weakest state in 1,000 years. Moreover, the latest climate models project that continued global warming could weaken the AMOC by 34 to 45 percent by 2100. If the AMOC shuts down, it would cause significant cooling along the east coast of the U.S. and Western Europe. This, in turn, would alter rainfall patterns, make sea levels rise, cause more drying, and reduce agriculture in the U.K. It could also potentially set off other tipping points. And even if global warming is reversed, once shut down, the AMOC would not switch back on for a long time. Scientists believe this occurred during the last ice age when a glacial lake burst and poured freshwater into the Atlantic. As the AMOC shut down, the Northern Hemisphere entered a cold spell that lasted 1,000 years. While there are still many uncertainties, some studies suggest that the AMOC’s tipping point could be reached between 3°C and 5.5°C of warming. Amazon rainforest The Amazon rainforest, the world’s largest tropical rainforest, stores 200 billion tons of carbon—equal to about five years of global carbon emissions from the burning of fossil fuels—and is home to millions of species of plants and wildlife. The moisture from the Amazon’s rainfall returns to the atmosphere from the soil through evaporation and from plants through transpiration. This self-sustaining process creates clouds and more rainfall. Because of logging, ranching, mining, agriculture, and fires, the Amazon has lost about 17 percent of its tree cover and at the current rate of deforestation, could reach a loss of 27 percent by 2030. The policies of Brazil’s pro-development president, Jair Bolsonaro, have led to widespread clear-cutting and the rate of deforestation in Brazil is the highest since 2008. If 20-25 percent of the Amazon were deforested, its tipping point (close) could be crossed, according to one study. Fewer trees would mean less evapotranspiration, and without enough rainfall to sustain itself, the Amazon could start to die back. In other words, parts of the rainforest could transition into a savannah, a drier ecosystem characterized by grasslands and few trees. In the process, it would potentially release 90 gigatons of CO2, exacerbating climate change. Crossing this tipping point would also result in the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services, affect global weather patterns, and threaten the lives of 30 million people, many Indigenous, who depend on the rainforest to survive. One study found that dieback would occur if we reach 3°C of warming. The Amazon is already feeling the effects of climate change, as over the last century, temperatures in the region have increased 1°C to 1.5°C. The Amazon is experiencing longer and hotter dry seasons that make it more vulnerable to wildfires, reduced evapotranspiration in response to higher levels of CO2, and there are now more drought-tolerant tree species. Scientists are unsure whether the Amazon has a single overall tipping point, or when exactly it might be reached, and the ecosystem has some ability to adapt to changing conditions. But fires and drought could cause local changes that spread drying conditions to other regions because of an overall reduction of moisture. Twenty-eight percent of the eastern part of the Amazon is already losing more carbon than it is absorbing due to deforestation. And some climate models predict that by 2035, the Amazon will be a permanent source of carbon. Thawing permafrost Permafrost is ground that remains frozen for two or more consecutive years and is composed of rock, soil, sediments, and ice. Some permafrost has been frozen for tens or hundreds of thousands of years. It is found in northern hemisphere lands without glaciers, including parts of Siberia, Alaska, northern Canada and Tibet. In the Southern Hemisphere, there is permafrost in parts of Patagonia, Antarctica and the Southern Alps of New Zealand. Fourteen hundred billion tons of carbon are thought to be frozen in the Arctic’s permafrost, which is twice as much carbon as is currently in the atmosphere. But the Arctic is warming two times faster than the rest of the planet—it has already warmed 2°C above pre-industrial levels. As it warms and thaws the permafrost, microbes come out of hibernation and break down the organic carbon in the soil, releasing CO2 and methane, which then trigger even more warming and melting. The 2019 Arctic Report Card from NOAA found that the Arctic’s thawing permafrost could be releasing 300 to 600 million tons of carbon per year into the atmosphere. Methane stored in ice-like formations called hydrates are also found in permafrost in ocean sediments. This methane may be released as hydrates are thawed by warming seawater. Scientists recently discovered methane leaking from a giant ancient reservoir of methane below the permafrost of the Laptev Sea in the East Siberian Arctic Ocean. Scientists don’t know exactly how much carbon could ultimately be released by thawing permafrost or when. According to one report, 2°C of warming could mean the loss of 40 percent of the world’s permafrost. ENSO El Niño and La Niña are the warm and cool, naturally occurring weather patterns across the tropical Pacific—the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, or ENSO. Every two to seven years, the pattern alternates, bringing disruptions in temperature and precipitation. El Niño causes impacts around the world, such as more drought in India, Indonesia and Brazil, and flooding in Peru. As the ocean warms, it could push ENSO past a tipping point, which would make El Niño events more severe and frequent and could increase drought in the Amazon. Tipping point interactions A recent study of the WAIS, the Greenland ice sheet, the AMOC, ENSO, and the Amazon rainforest tipping points found that they could interact with one another before temperatures reach 2°C. This interaction would enable tipping to occur at lower thresholds than previously expected. The risk analysis found that a cascade could potentially begin with the melting of the ice sheets because their critical thresholds are lower. For example, as the Greenland ice sheet releases fresh water into the North Atlantic, the AMOC could slow. This would result in less heat being transported towards the north. As the North got colder, it could potentially help stabilize the Greenland ice sheet. However, it would also result in warmer water in the Southern Ocean and this could lead to more drought in some parts of the Amazon while others get more rainfall. Changes in the AMOC could also trigger changes in ENSO, leading to a more permanent El Niño state, whose impacts could lower the critical threshold for Amazon dieback. The scientists say that these changes would occur over long time scales, and that the limits of computing power make it impossible to represent each climate system’s tipping point or their interactions exactly. Can we avoid the climate tipping points? Seventy-three percent of people in G20 countries think Earth is close to climate tipping points, according to a Global Commons Alliance poll. And much research indicates that if we do not curb our carbon emissions immediately to keep global warming below 2°C, we are headed for irreversible and catastrophic conditions. But some experts are more sanguine. Robin Bell, a polar scientist at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, who specializes in ice sheet dynamics, doesn’t believe the ice sheets are at a tipping point yet. “The most recent science is suggesting that maybe some of the runaway mechanisms we were worried about, might not occur,” she said. “For example, in terms of the WAIS, pressure on the giant river of ice could keep it from flowing. It means either we just need to keep icebergs in the way, or maybe it’s something we can think about engineering. It’s not that we have to hold the whole thing back, we just have to put a little pressure on it, and it will possibly not collapse—the ice sheet may not be as bad as we thought and maybe we have some time to get our act together.” Bell worries more about the social tipping points than the physical ones. Will they occur fast enough to forestall climate tipping points? Social tipping points are the points where many members of society quickly and dramatically change their behavior or thinking. A 2020 study proposed six social tipping points that could help stabilize Earth’s climate: removing fossil-fuel subsidies and incentivizing decentralized energy generation, building carbon-neutral cities, divesting from assets linked to fossil fuels, clarifying the moral implications of fossil fuels, expanding climate education and engagement, and making greenhouse gas emissions transparent. ”The real question is: Is there the social will to act?” Bell said. “And it appears that the social will is emerging. We really are starting to have serious conversations. People from the individual scale to the government scale are taking action, and that’s what needs to happen.” Steve Cohen, senior vice dean of Columbia University’s School of Professional Studies and a professor in the Practice of Public Affairs at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, places his hope in technology. “The most important driver of change in the modern world has been technology,” he said. “And it’s a pretty simple equation: technological change leads to economic change, leads to social and cultural change, which leads to political change.” Technological change can be difficult to predict but can sometimes lead to rapid changes, said Cohen, citing the ubiquitous and indispensable smart phone as a prime example. “The phone is the most important thing you take when you leave the house because it’s a portable computer that you bring around with you. Would anybody have predicted that 25 years ago?” He also puts great hope in young people. “If you look at polling data, young people by a huge margin understand the climate issue. And it cuts across ideology, cuts across everything. It you’re under 30, you know, there’s a climate crisis.” The pledges countries make in Glasgow at COP26 and the policies they implement afterwards will ultimately determine how close the world will come to climate tipping points. Greta Thunberg, the 18-year-old Swedish climate activist with millions of young followers, went to Glasgow to join a climate strike and put pressure on politicians to get them to make real commitments to curb climate change. “We know that change is possible because we can look back in history and see that there have been massive changes in society that have been unprecedented,” Thunberg said. “If we felt like there wasn’t any hope, we wouldn’t be activists.”

#### Fake news *decimates* climate goals – assumes thumpers and adaptation

IANS ’21 [Indo-Asian News Service or IANS is a private Indian news agency, “Fake news is stopping us from achieving climate goals, claim scientists”, 03-23-2021, https://www.freepressjournal.in/science/fake-news-is-stopping-us-from-achieving-climate-goals-claim-scientists]//pranav

London: While technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) could help the world deal with dangerous climate and environmental change, fake news on social media about global warming and biodiversity loss has emerged as a barrier in the climate change mitigation efforts, a group of scientists has warned. The report, published in Ambio, a journal of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, concludes that inequality and environmental challenges are deeply linked. Reducing inequality will increase trust within societies. Trust is essential for governments to make long-term decisions, the report argues. Social media and access to reliable knowledge is also highlighted as a barrier to progress. "As the pressure of human activities accelerates on Earth, so too does the hope that technologies such as artificial intelligence will be able to help us deal with dangerous climate and environmental change," said Co-author Victor Galaz, Deputy Director of the Stockholm Resilience Centre. "That will only happen however, if we act forcefully in ways that redirects the direction of technological change towards planetary stewardship and responsible innovation." Human actions are threatening the resilience and stability of Earth's biosphere -- the wafer-thin veil around Earth where life thrives, according to the report published for the first Nobel Prize Summit, a digital gathering to be held in April to discuss the state of the planet in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. "In a single human lifetime, largely since the 1950s, we have grossly simplified the biosphere, a system that has evolved over 3.8 billion years. Now just a few plants and animals dominate the land and oceans," said lead author Carl Folke, Director of the Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics and Chair of the Stockholm Resilience Centre at Stockholm University. "Our actions are making the biosphere more fragile, less resilient and more prone to shocks than before."

#### Fake news *weakens* perception of climate change – misinformation *uniquely* targets climate science.

Drummond & Woods ’20 [Interview of Caitlin Drummond with questions asked by Taylor Woods, Caitlin Drummond - assistant professor at ASU's​ ​School of Human Evolution and Social Change​, teaching courses within the school’s environmental social science program, “Study finds brief exposure to 'fake news' can affect beliefs on climate change”, 08-31-2020, https://news.asu.edu/20200831-study-finds-brief-exposure-fake-news-can-affect-beliefs-climate-change]//pranav

Question: What is the overall goal of this research?

Answer: Our research sought to better understand how exposure to fake news that casts doubt on the existence of climate change might influence people's subsequent beliefs. People’s beliefs, such as whether or not they believe in climate change or whether or not they trust scientists, are important to the decisions they make around climate change. Q: What is fake news? A: Fake news is false information that doesn't occur through the same journalistic processes as regular news but mimics regular news. It can be difficult to identify fake news because online, it's relatively easy to mimic the formatting and the style associated with real news. Q: What did you find in this study? A: People who are exposed to fake news about climate change report slightly lower levels of belief in climate change and slightly weaker perceptions of the scientific consensus on changes in our climate. But overall, those effects are small. What seems to be the bigger driver of people's belief in climate change is their political ideology, which has been widely studied before. Q: How did your team conduct this research? A: We recruited a nationally representative sample of people to take an online survey, and each participant was randomly assigned to a different experimental condition. Some people were assigned to read fake news headlines about pop culture topics, and that was our control group. The other people were randomly assigned to see fake news on climate change. The second part of the experiment included questions about a participant’s beliefs, values and attitudes on different sociocultural issues. Among those were questions about whether or not someone believed in climate change. Q: Are there implications for future research? A: This study suggests to me that there is a lot more work to be done to better understand how exposure to misinformation actually affects people's decision-making.​ ​In terms of fake news specifically about climate change, there's been a lot of concern that exposure to fake news, and holding scientifically inaccurate beliefs regarding climate change, might lead people to not support climate policy or make decisions that are not in the best interests of the climate. Q: Is climate change more of a “target” for fake news than other political topics? A: There has been a concerted effort to promote misinformation on climate change by a variety of different parties. But I think it’s important to separate overall trust in science as a whole from trust in subgroups of scientists, like climate scientists, who have been the target of misinformation and disinformation campaigns. There are specific controversial areas of science, but there are also many other areas of science where we see a healthier relationship between the public and scientists.

#### Objectivity solves – checks back against misinformation and lets awareness spillover into action.

Biddlestone & van der Linden ’21 [Mikey Biddlestone - Postdoctoral Research Associate, Social Decision-Making Lab, University of Cambridge, Sander van der Linden - Professor of Social Psychology in Society and Director, Cambridge Social Decision-Making Lab, University of Cambridge, “Climate change misinformation fools too many people – but there are ways to combat it”, 10-28-2021, https://theconversation.com/climate-change-misinformation-fools-too-many-people-but-there-are-ways-to-combat-it-170658]//pranav

Despite widespread awareness of the problems caused by fake news, many people we surveyed didn’t recognise their own role in this process. While large majorities worried about the effects of climate change misinformation and said that they didn’t share it themselves, 24% reported hardly ever fact-checking the information they read. This could suggest the public aren’t sure which sources are reliable, making them more vulnerable to the very misinformation they see as damaging to the cause of tackling climate change. Clearly, more can be done to educate people on how to distinguish real from fake climate change information. One way to do this is through a process called inoculation, or prebunking. Just as vaccines train cells to detect foreign invaders, research has shown that stories which pre-emptively refute short extracts of misinformation can help readers develop mental antibodies that allow them to detect misinformation on their own in the future. Recent work has even used games to help people detect the larger strategies that are used to spread misinformation about climate change. Although social media companies such as Facebook have started to debunk climate myths on their platform, politicians and social media outlets appear to have an untrustworthy reputation. This was not the case for sources with perceived expertise on the topic, such as scientists. We therefore recommend that the trust held towards experts should be harnessed, by more frequently disseminating their views on social media and in traditional media outlets. In our survey, only 21% of people understood that between 90% and 100% of climate scientists have concluded that humans are causing climate change (99% according to a recent paper). Decades-long campaigns by fossil fuel companies have sought to cast doubt on the scientific consensus. Media messages should therefore continue to communicate the overwhelming scientific consensus on climate change. Through years of research on the topic, we have identified several ingredients for trustworthy science communication. These include prebunking myths and falsehoods, reliably informing people (don’t persuade), offering balance but not false balance (highlight the weight of evidence or scientific consensus), verifying the quality of the underlying evidence, and explaining sources of uncertainty. If communicators want to earn people’s trust, they need to start by displaying trustworthy behaviour.

**Warming causes extinction & turns every impact – no adaptation & each degree is worse**

**Krosofsky ’21** [Andrew, Green Matters Journalist, “How Global Warming May Eventually Lead to Global Extinction”, Green Matters, 03-11-2021, https://www.greenmatters.com/p/will-global-warming-cause-extinction]//pranav

Eventually, yes. **Global warming will invariably result in the mass extinction of millions of different species,** humankind included. In fact, **the Center for Biological Diversity says that global warming is currently the greatest threat to life on this planet**. **Global warming causes a number of detrimental effects on the environment that many species won’t be able to handle long-term**. Extreme weather patterns are shifting climates across the globe, eliminating habitats and altering the landscape. **As a result, food and fresh water sources are being drastically reduced**. Then, of course, **there are the rising global temperatures themselves, which many species are physically unable to contend with**. Formerly frozen arctic and antarctic regions are melting, increasing sea levels and temperatures. Eventually, **these effects will create a perfect storm of extinction conditions**. The melting glaciers of the arctic and the searing, **unmanageable heat indexes being seen along the Equator are just the tip of the iceberg, so to speak.** **The species that live in these climate zones have already been affected by the changes caused by global warming.** Take polar bears for example, whose habitats and food sources have been so greatly diminished that they have been forced to range further and further south. **Increased carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere and oceans have already led to ocean acidification**. **This has caused many species of crustaceans to either adapt or perish and has led to the mass bleaching of more than 50 percent of Australia’s Great Barrier Reef**, according to National Geographic. According to the Center for Biological Diversity, the current trajectory of global warming predicts that more than 30 percent of Earth’s plant and animal species will face extinction by 2050. By the end of the century, that number could be as high as 70 percent. We won’t try and sugarcoat things, humanity’s own prospects aren’t looking that great either. According to The Conversation, **our species has just under a decade left to get our CO₂ emissions under control. If we don’t cut those emissions by half before 2030, temperatures will rise to potentially catastrophic levels. It may only seem like a degree or so, but the worldwide ramifications are immense.** The human species is resilient. We will survive for a while longer, even if these grim global warming predictions come to pass, **but it will mean less food, less water, and increased hardship across the world — especially in low-income areas and developing countries. This increase will also mean more pandemics, devastating storms, and uncontrollable wildfires**.