### **T – Unconditional**

#### Interpretation: Unconditional means not conditional or limited. – to clarify, the affirmative must defend the right of all workers to strike at any time.

#### Merriam Webster (<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unconditional)//ww> pbj

not conditional or limited

#### Violation: they don’t because they defend only teacher’s unions which isn’t all workers – means it’s limited

#### Standards:

#### [1] Limits – allows an aff infinite permutations of arbitrary conditions like no striking for medical workers, not if it causes harm, or only for a certain duration. Explosion of aff ground makes neg prep burden impossible, either killing neg ground or forcing the neg to read generics that barely link, always letting aff win. Force the 1AR to read a definition card with a clear list of when its okay to put conditions and what they are – otherwise, its arbitrary and you should vote neg since they can’t put a clear limit on the topic. Our interp solves – it establishes a clear bright-line for that gives the neg a chance to predict and prepare for every aff ahead of time.

#### [2] Precision – not defending the text of the resolution justifies the affirmative doing away with random words in the resolution which a] means they’re not within the topic which is a voter for jurisdiction since you have an obligation to affirm the resolution – they don’t affirm, b] they’re unpredictable and impossible to engage in so we always lose

#### [3] Ground – kills neg ground since they can pre-empt all neg strategy which makes all condition PICs not competitive and kills all links to the DA since they’ll just condition it like the Health Workers DA, destroys engagement and advocacy skills. Evaluate the debate after the 1NC – k2 reciprocity because we both have 1 speech which is most quantifiable – reciprocity outweighs bc it’s the litmus test for fairness.

#### Drop the Debater –

#### [1] sets a precedent that debaters wont be abusive

#### [2] DTA is the same since you drop the aff

#### Voters:

#### [1] Fairness – constitutive to the judge to decide the better debater, only fairness is in your jurisdiction because it skews decision making

#### [2] Education – the only portable education from debate that we care about

#### Competing Interps:

#### [1] reasonability on t is incoherent: you’re either topical or you’re not – it’s impossible to be 77% topical, links to all limits offense

#### [2] functionally the same as reasonability – we debate over a specified briteline which is a counter interp

#### [3] judge intervention – judge has to intervene on what’s reasonable, creates a race to the bottom where debaters exploit judge tolerance for questionable argumentation.

#### No RVIs if I read 2 or less shells

#### [1] illogical for you to get offense just for being fair – it’s the 1ac’s burden

#### [2] baiting - rvi’s incentivize debaters to read abusive positions to win off theory

#### [3] discourages checking abuse since debaters will be afraid to lose on theory

### Offense External to Framework Bad

Interpretation: The 1AC may only read offense that links back to their framework

#### Violation: \_\_\_\_\_

#### Standards:

#### [1] Strat skew—arbitrarily putting offense kills neg strat bc they can pre-empt neg strategy. Neg already needs a competing framework since there are infinite affs, but theirs destroys strat bc neg already has to invest time on the framework debate and then can’t get to contention-level offense, conceding contention, so aff can just extend offense and win on strength of link

#### [2] Depth o/w Breadth- prevents the debate from being split over two issues i.e. the Kant and util offense which outweighs since in depth testing is necessary to refine ideas while vague debates result in inept clash.

### NC – Util

**I value morality.**

**The standard is minimizing material violence. [To clarify I defend utilitarianism].**

**[1] Personal identity reductionism is true – if the hemispheres of my brain were transplanted into 2 different people, neither would be me.**

**Parfit 84.** Derek Parfit 1984, “Reasons and Persons”, Oxford Paperbacks

It is in fact true that one hemisphere is enough. There are many people who have survived, when a stroke or injury puts out of action one of their hemispheres. With his remaining hemisphere, such a person may need to re-learn certain things, such as adult speech, or how to control both hands. But this is possible. In my example I am assuming that, as may be true of certain actual people, both of my hemispheres have the full range of abilities. I could thus survive with either hemisphere, without any need for re-learning.¶ I shall now combine these last two claims. I would survive if my brain was successfully transplanted into my twin's body. And I could survive with only half my brain, the other half having been destroyed. Given these two facts, it seems clear that I would survive if half my brain was successfully transplanted into my twin's body, and the other half was destroyed.¶ What if the other half was not destroyed? This is the case that Wiggins described: that in which a person, like an amoeba, divides.40 To simplify the case, I assume that I am one of three identical triplets. Consider¶ My Division. My body is fatally injured, as are the brains of my two brothers. My brain is divided, and each half is successfully transplanted into the body of one of my brothers. Each of the resulting people believes that he is me, seems to remember living my life, has my character, and is in every other way psychologically continuous with me. And he has a body that is very like mine.¶ This case is likely to remain impossible. Though it is claimed that, in certain people, the two hemispheres may have the same full range of abilities, this claim might be false. I am here assuming that this claim is true when applied to me. I am also assuming that it would be possible to connect a transplanted half-brain with the nerves in its new body. And I am assuming that we could divide, not just the upper hemispheres, but also the lower brain. My first two assumptions may be able to be made true if there is enough progress in neurophysiology. But it seems likely that it would never be possible to divide the lower brain, in a way that did not impair its functioning.¶ Does it matter if, for this reason, this imagined case of complete division will always remain impossible? Given the aims of my discussion, this does not matter. This impossibility is merely technical. The one feature of the case that might be held to be deeply impossible—the division of a person's consciousness into two separate streams—is the feature that has actually happened. It would have been important if this had been impossible, since this might have supported some claim about what we really are. It might have supported the claim that we are indivisible Cartesian Egos. It therefore matters that the division of a person's consciousness is in fact possible. There seems to be no similar connection between a particular view about what we really are and the impossibility of dividing and successfully transplanting the two halves of the lower brain. This impossibility thus provides no ground for refusing to consider the imagined case in which we suppose that this can be done. And considering this case may help us to decide both what we believe ourselves to be, and what in fact we are. As Einstein's example showed, it can be useful to consider impossible thought-experiments.¶ It may help to state, in advance, what I believe this case to show. It provides a further argument against the view that we are separately existing entities. But the main conclusion to be hdrawn is that personal identity is not what matters.¶ It is natural to believe that our identity is what matters. Reconsider the Branch-Line Case, where I have talked to my Replica on Mars, and am about to die. Suppose we believe that I and my Replica are different people. It is then natural to assume that my prospect is almost as bad as ordinary death. In a few days, there will be no one living who will be me. It is natural to assume that this is what matters. In discussing My Division, I shall start by making this assumption.¶ In this case, each half of my brain will be successfully transplanted into the very similar body of one of my two brothers. Both of the resulting people will be fully psychologically continuous with me, as I am now. What happens to me?¶ There are only four possibilities: (1) I do not survive; (2) I survive as one of the two people; (3) I survive as the other; (4) I survive as both.¶ The objection to (1) is this. I would survive if my brain was successfully transplanted. And people have in fact survived with half their brains destroyed. Given these facts, it seems clear that I would survive if half my brain was successfully transplanted, and the other half was destroyed. So how could I fail to survive if the other half was also successfully transplanted? How could a double success be a failure?¶ Consider the next two possibilities. Perhaps one success is the maximum score. Perhaps I shall be one of the two resulting people. The objection here is that, in this case, each half of my brain is exactly similar, and so, to start with, is each resulting person. Given these facts, how can I survive as only one of the two people? What can make me one of them rather than the other?¶ These three possibilities cannot be dismissed as incoherent. We can understand them. But, while we assume that identity is what matters, (1) is not plausible. My Division would not be as bad as death. Nor are (2) and (3) plausible. There remains the fourth possibility: that I survive as both of the resulting people.¶ This possibility might be described in several ways. I might first claim: ‘What we have called “the two resulting people” are not two people. They are one person. I do survive this operation. Its effect is to give me two bodies, and a divided mind.’¶ This claim cannot be dismissed outright. As I argued, we ought to admit as possible that a person could have a divided mind. If this is possible, each half of my divided mind might control its own body. But though this description of the case cannot be rejected as inconceivable, it involves a great distortion in our concept of a person. In my imagined Physics Exam I claimed that this case involved only one person. There were two features of the case that made this plausible. The divided mind was soon reunited, and there was only one body. If a mind was permanently divided, and its halves developed in different ways, it would become less plausible to claim that the case involves only one person. (Remember the actual patient who complained that, when he embraced his wife, his left hand pushed her away.)¶ The case of complete division, where there are also two bodies, seems to be a long way over the borderline. After I have had this operation, the two ‘products’ each have all of the features of a person. They could live at opposite ends of the Earth. Suppose that they have poor memories, and that their appearance changes in different ways. After many years, they might meet again, and fail even to recognise each other. We might have to claim of such a pair, innocently playing tennis: ‘What you see out there is a single person, playing tennis with himself. In each half of his mind he mistakenly believes that he is playing tennis with someone else.’ If we are not yet Reductionists, we believe that there is one true answer to the questionwhether these two tennis-players are a single person. Given what we mean by ‘person’, the answer must be No. It cannot be true that what I believe to be a stranger, standing there behind the net, is in fact another part of myself.

**That justifies util.**

**Gruzalski 86.** Bart Gruzalski 86 [UChicago], “Parfit's Impact on Utilitarianism”, Ethics, Vol. 96, No. 4, July 1986.

Parfit concludes his discussion of distributive moral principles by claiming that, “when we cease to believe that persons are separately existing entities, the Utilitarian view becomes more plausible. Is the gain in plausibility great, or small? My argument leaves this question open” (p. 342). In contrast, I have argued that the Reductionist View strongly supports the utilitarian account of desert and distributive justice. The argument has two aspects. One is the recognition of the utilitarian emphasis on secondary rules, including principles of distributive justice and policies of desert. These rules, principles, and policies are treated within the utilitarian account as if they have self-standing, whereas in fact they are justified on the principle of utility which alone has self-standing within the utilitarian program. The other aspect of the argument involves the recognition that the utilitarian’s dual treatment of secondary principles dovetails with the dual account of the nature of persons on the Reductionist View: persons exist, yet their existence just involves bodies and interrelated mental and physical events, and a complete description of our lives need not claim that persons exist. Furthermore, a body, brain, and interrelated series of mental and physical events are more fundamental and basic than the person whose existence just consists in them, much as the citizens and the territory are more fundamental and basic than the nation whose existence just consists in them. This corresponds precisely with the utilitarian account, for utilitarianism treats persons as fundamental and separate existents, while grounding this treatment on the impersonal elements of pain, suffering, happiness, and contentment. Because util-itarianism accurately reflects in this way the true nature of persons, it is much more plausible than has been previously recognized. In addition, since many of the current competitors to utilitarianism presuppose that the person is separate from the body, brain, and interrelated mental and physical events, it follows that these views err by being too personal and are therefore implausible. It follows that when we cease to believe that persons are separately existing entities, utilitarianism becomes significantly more plausible than any of its person-centered theoretical competitors.

**[2] Actor Spec— States must use util. Any other standard dooms the moral theory and proves calc indicts false**

**Goodin 90.** Robert Goodin 90, [professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences], “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142 //RS

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.

**[3] No intent-foresight distinction — if we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen.**

**[4] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first.**

**[5] Extinction First –**

**[a] Forecloses future improvement – we can never improve society because our impact is irreversible**

**[b] Turns suffering – mass death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities**

**[c] Moral uncertainty – if we’re unsure about which interpretation of the world is true – we ought to preserve the world to keep debating about it**

#### [6] no calc indicts – just proves util is hard not impossible so obligations still exist

### DA – Reconciliation

#### Reconciliation passes now without further cuts – Holdouts tentatively say yes and our ev assumes every aff non-uq warrant

Reklaitis 12/02 [Victor, MarketWatch's Money & Politics reporter and is based in Washington, D.C. Prior to joining MarketWatch, he served as an assistant editor and reporter at Investor's Business Daily, “Biden’s big social-spending bill probably will pass Senate this month without many cuts to it, analysts say”, 12-02-2021, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/bidens-big-social-spending-bill-probably-will-pass-senate-this-month-without-many-cuts-to-it-analysts-say-11638466738]//pranav

Will President Joe Biden’s $2 trillion social-spending and climate package actually get the Senate’s OK this month, as that chamber’s leader has promised? Two analysts from opposite ends of the political spectrum said that looks likely, as they spoke on Wednesday with MarketWatch for a Barron’s Live episode. “I think the chances are very, very good that this bill will pass, and I wouldn’t bet the mortgage on it, but I would predict that it’s going to happen by this month,” said Seth Hanlon, a senior fellow at the liberal Center for American Progress. Kyle Pomerleau, a senior fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, concurred with Hanlon, as the analysts assessed Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer’s stated goal of passage by Christmas. The legislation already got the House’s approval last month, so Biden can sign it into law if the Senate acts and the two chambers reconcile their versions of the measure. “I think that the Build Back Better Act ultimately passes. I think before Christmas seems like a reasonable timeline,” Pomerleau said. “There are other political challenges involved, if this bleeds over into next year, and I think that the Democrats want to avoid that.” Democrats also could be motivated by not wanting a lapse in monthly child tax credit payments, according to Hanlon. Those payouts, which began over the summer and provide up to $300 per child to families, would get extended for another year in the current version of the Build Back Better Act. “The child tax credit payments — the last one would be done on Dec. 15, and so I think the Democrats are going to want to continue those into January and not have them cut off suddenly,” the Center for American Progress expert said. Hanlon and Pomerleau said they don’t expect huge changes to the Build Back Better Act’s overall price tag, even as moderate Democratic Sen. Joe Manchin of West Virginia has expressed opposition to some items in the House version of the bill, including a plan for paid leave and a $4,500 tax credit for electric vehicles made in unionized U.S. factories. Another issue that’s dividing Democratic lawmakers is a proposed lift to the SALT cap, which refers to a limit on deductions from federal income tax for state and local taxes. “I think that $2 trillion in spending, including the tax credits, is a reasonable place that they will end up,” Pomerleau said, referring to what’s a likely final price tag. Meanwhile, Hanlon noted that a lot of negotiating has happened this year to get to the current state of affairs, after Sen. Bernie Sanders, the Vermont independent who usually votes with Democrats and chairs his chamber’s budget committee, proposed a much larger spending package. “If you back up to where we started with President Biden’s agenda and Sen. Sanders’s budget, we’re down to a relatively narrow, limited set of issues and a pretty narrow band of a total price tag,” he said. “I might expect that to shrink somewhat because of Sen. Manchin, but not that much. I think 90% of the bill will stay the same.” Democrats can’t afford to lose the support of any senator who typically votes with them, as they advance the bill through a process known as budget reconciliation. That’s because the Senate is split 50-50, with the party in control only because Vice President Kamala Harris can break ties.

#### Business lobbying backlash ensures Sinema flips – empirics prove she doesn’t like similar bills

Duda ’21 [Jeremy, Prior to joining the Arizona Mirror, he worked at the Arizona Capitol Times, where he spent eight years covering the Governor's Office and two years as editor of the Yellow Sheet Report, “Business groups urge Kelly, Sinema to oppose pro-union PRO Act”, 08-30-2021, https://www.azmirror.com/2021/08/30/business-groups-urge-kelly-sinema-to-oppose-pro-union-pro-act/]//pranav

Business groups publicly called on Democratic U.S. Sens. Mark Kelly and Kyrsten Sinema to oppose a sweeping piece of pro-organized labor legislation that would wipe out Arizona’s “right-to-work” law that prohibits mandatory union membership. At a press conference at the office of the Arizona chapter of the Associated General Contractors near the state Capitol on Monday, leaders of several business groups warned that the Protecting the Right to Organize Act — or PRO Act, as it’s more commonly known — would undermine Arizona’s recovery from the economic slump it faced last year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, undermine the “gig economy,” jeopardize secret ballots in union organization votes, give unions access to confidential employee information and strip Arizonans of their right not to join a union. The bill would allow unions to override right-to-work laws and collect union dues from non-members who still benefit from collective bargaining. It would also prohibit company-sponsored meetings to urge employees against unionizing, define most independent contractors as employees, protect employees who are attempting to unionize from being fired and allow unions to engage in secondary strikes in support of other striking workers, among other provisions. “We want to thank and tell Senator Sinema and Senator Kelly that we appreciate them for not signing on as co-sponsors to the PRO Act, because if they were to change their opinions, New York Sen. Chuck Schumer will put this up for a vote,” said Danny Seiden, president and CEO of the Arizona Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Kelly and Sinema are two of only three Senate Democrats, along with Virginia’s Mark Warner, who haven’t co-sponsored the bill or thrown their public support behind it. Kelly last month told the Huffington Post that he opposes the independent contractor provision, but that he supports the “overall goals” of the legislation. Sinema is widely known as a holdout on the Democratic side and hasn’t supported the PRO Act, but spokesman Pablo Sierra-Carmona indicated that she hasn’t made up her mind, and that she won’t do so unless and until it comes up for a vote in the Senate.

#### They lash out against Reconciliation – it will includes similar provisions

FURCHTGOTT-ROTH 10/09 [Diana, former acting assistant secretary for economic policy at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is adjunct professor of economics at George Washington University, “Democrats can't pass the PRO Act, so it's buried in the reconciliation bill”, 10-09-2021, https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/575992-dems-cant-pass-the-pro-act-so-its-buried-in-the-reconciliation-bill]//pranav

Union membership has been declining for decades as workers find better uses than union dues for their hard-earned dollars. But union bosses and their supporters are trying to change the law to force hard-working Americans into unions. How? Through the Protecting the Right to Organize Act (PRO Act), a bill that would expand the power of union leaders at the expense of workers. After sailing through the House, the PRO Act now appears stalled in the Senate and Democrats are trying to slip some PRO Act provisions into a massive reconciliation bill. American workers are wise to turn down union membership. Union pension plans are in trouble. In 2020, the Labor Department listed 121 union plans in critical status, defined as less than 65 percent funded, and 61 in endangered status, with less than 80 percent funded. Unions desperately need new workers to join, because they pay contributions for many years without withdrawing money. Most recently, Amazon workers in Alabama resoundingly rejected efforts by the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store International Union to organize their plant, with more than 70 percent of workers voting against the union. The union’s plan was in critical status between 2015 and 2019, and the Labor Department informed the plan’s administrators that it had to be reorganized by reducing benefits and increasing contributions. Union leaders and their allies on Capitol Hill believe the way to increase membership after decades of decline is to pass elements of the PRO Act through reconciliation. Unlike the PRO Act, which needs 60 votes in the Senate to enable it to move to President Biden’s desk for signature, the reconciliation bill, which deals with taxes and spending, needs only a simple majority. So via a massive reconciliation bill, congressional Democrats are trying to move some labor union provisions of the PRO Act by arguing they are actually revenue raisers.

#### Reconciliation is k2 stopping existential climate change – warming is incremental and every change in temperature is vital

Higgins 8/16 [Trevor, Senior Director, Domestic Climate and Energy, “Budget Reconciliation Is the Key to Stopping Climate Change”, 08-16-2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2021/08/16/502681/budget-reconciliation-key-stopping-climate-change/]//pranav

The United States is suffering acutely from the chaotic changes in climate that scientists now directly attribute to the burning of fossil fuels and other human activity. The drought, fires, extreme heat, and floods that have already killed hundreds this summer across the continent and around the world are a tragedy—and a warning of worsening instability yet to come. However, this week, the Senate initiated an extraordinary legislative response that would set the world on a different path. Enacting the full scope of President Joe Biden’s Build Back Better agenda would put the American economy to work leading a global transition to clean energy and stabilizing the climate. A look at what’s coming next through the budget reconciliation process reveals a ray of hope that is easy to miss amid the fitful negotiations of recent months: At long last, Congress is on the verge of major legislation that would build a more equitable, just, and inclusive clean energy economy. This is our shot to stop climate change. Building a clean energy future must start now Until the global economy stops polluting the air and instead starts to draw down the emissions of years past, the world will continue to heat up, blundering past perilous tipping points that threaten irreversible and catastrophic consequences. Stemming the extent of warming at 1.5 degrees Celsius rather 2 degrees or worse will reduce the risk of crossing such tipping points or otherwise exceeding the adaptive capacity of human society. Every degree matters. Stabilizing global warming at 1.5 degrees Celsius starts with cutting annual greenhouse gas emissions in the United States to half of peak levels by 2030. This isn’t about temporary offsets or incremental gains in efficiency—it’s about the rapid adoption of scalable solutions that will work throughout the world to eliminate global net emissions by 2050 and sustain net-negative emissions thereafter. Building this better future will tackle climate change, deliver on environmental justice, and create good jobs. It will give us a shot to stop the planet from continuously warming. It will alleviate the concentrated burdens of fossil fuel pollution, which are concentrated in systemically disadvantaged, often majority Black and brown communities. It will empower American workers to compete in the global clean energy economy of the 21st century. There is no time to lose.

## Case

### UV

Overview—

#### Grant new 2NR responses to spikes extended in the 1AR – they’ll repurpose them, it’s impossible for me to answer them now, because they’ll shift later.

#### **1AR theory illegit—**

#### **[a] 2NR split – forces the 2NR to both sufficiently answer the shell and win substance which is impossible since it has to pre-empt a 3 minute extrapolation of a 15 second shell, making it impossible to win both – means we can never fairly arbitrate abuse and create norms and comes before infinite abuse**

#### **[b] You get a 6-minute AC to preempt negative abuse – read an underview**

These are also reasons to use reasonability

It’s DTA on 1AR theory

1. Drop the arg solves – using some of the 1AR means either a. neg loses an off-case or b. wastes time on theory and you’re even on substance
2. Infinite NC abuse means it’s impossible to theoretically defend and a 1:00 shell w/ drop the arg would check
3. Efficiency and speed solves time skew

### Fwk

#### Top Level – prefer a metaethic of pain and pleasure over freedom—

#### [1] Side Constraint – freedom is impact justified and begs the question of value to lie, which pleasure creates

#### [2] Weighability – pain and pleasure can be aggregated but a violation of freedom is unquantifiable without material utilitarian impacts. That freezes action – affirming or negating can’t happen under Kant if either causes a violation of freedom, so it can’t serve as a guide to action

#### [3] Culpability – wills are unverifiable – I can kill someone and lie and say my will was not that, but util gives material impacts you’re culpable for. Culpability outweighs – binds us to actions since ethics is a guide to action

#### [4] Begs the question of freedom – conceptions of what is freedom and domination require experience, such as evaluating the ethicality of hate speech as violence or freedom

#### [5] Hijack – we reflect on past violations of freedom to act morally in the future ie I reflect ont eh experience of stealing to change in the future, which is based off experience

#### ------------------------------

#### LBL -

#### On Reason—

#### [a] conflates reason – willing an action is different from conceptualizing your agency or action

#### [b] fallacy of origin – even if freedom is necessary, it’s not a reason to center it

#### [c] Parfit takes out – fluctuating personal identity means I cannot be a static agent that sets and pursues an end

On the TJF –

Off resource disparaties -

[1] OS disclosure solves – gives small schools access to prep which solves

[2] you’re worse – forces reading of literature which isn’t always accessible and often requires paywalls to access

[3] util’s more accessible – all topic lit is in the context of util – people can still read Ks like cap which has utilitarian impacts and doesn’t require cutting a ton of prep

Off Real world education -

[1] your evidence literally says it’s not in German Law

[2] Util’s better – governments make decisions based on maximizing well-being for their populations – proves util’s a side constraint

[3] turn – nazi germany used kant’s theory to justify their action – means your framework has only ever been used by states to justify genocide

#### On universality —

#### [1] Tailoring objection – I can make my maxim specific and add conditions which can justify any atrocity

#### [2] C/A no culpability – even if I can evaluate my will, it is unverifiable

#### [3] Begs the question of determining the maxim of an action, which collapses to util. Ie what is the definition of violence is it only physical or also discursive?

**On the deont topicality-**

**[a] we are topical actor spec doesn’t mean we don’t defend the resolution**

**[b] nebel s wrong accepting a tournament invite doesn’t mena consent to debate the topic rather its consent to debate the other debaters at the tournament**

**[c] check grapevines tournament invite on tab it says nothing about the topic**

**[d] no contradiction in conception no topic still means we have debate space plus ndca will still make topics u hv no i/l why that leads to topics not being made any more**

### Heg

#### Hegemony is a terminally unsustainable fantasy based in a revisionist strategy of American exceptionalism – pursuit causes numerous failed states, financial crises, widening inequality, worldwide proliferation, anti-western terrorism, and emboldens adversaries like Russia and China

Walt 19 Stephen Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. [“The End of Hubris,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 98, Iss. 3, (May/Jun 2019): 26-35, 4-16-2019, URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/end-hubris>] DTS

IF IT AIN'T BROKE . . . In the nineteenth century, when the United States was weak, leaders from George Washington to William McKinley mostly avoided foreign entanglements and concentrated on building power domestically, expanding the country's reach across North America and eventually expelling the European great powers from the Western Hemisphere. In the first half of the twentieth century, U.S. presidents such as Wood- row Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt used the country's newfound strength to restore the balance of power in strategically critical regions outside the Western Hemisphere. But they let other great powers do most of the heavy lifting, and thus the United States emerged relatively unscathed-and stronger than ever-from the world wars that devastated Asia and Europe. Letting other states shoulder the burden was not possible during the Cold War, so the United States stepped up and led the alliances that contained the Soviet Union. American leaders paid lip service to democracy promotion, human rights, and other idealistic concerns, but U.S. policy was realist at its core. Through the Bretton Woods system and its successors, the United States also helped foster a more open world economy, balancing economic growth against the need for financial stability, national autonomy, and domestic legitimacy. Put simply, for most of U.S. history, American leaders were acutely sensitive to the balance of power, passed the buck when they could, and took on difficult missions when necessary. But when the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States found itself, as the former national security adviser Brent Scowcroftput it in 1998, "standing alone at the height of power . . . with the rarest opportunity to shape the world," U.S. leaders rejected the realism that had worked well for decades and tried to remake global politics in accordance with American values. A new strategy-liberal hegemony-sought to spread democracy and open markets across the globe. That goal is the common thread linking President Bill Clinton's policy of "engagement and enlargement," President George W. Bush's "freedom agenda," and President Barack Obama's embrace of the Arab revolts of 2010-11 and his declaration that "there is no right more fundamental than the ability to choose your leaders and determine your destiny." Such thinking won broad support from both political parties, the federal bureaucracies that deal with international affairs, and most of the think tanks, lobbies, and media figures that constitute the foreign policy establishment. At bottom, liberal hegemony is a highly revisionist strategy. Instead of working to maintain favorable balances of power in a few areas of vital interest, the United States sought to transform regimes all over the world and recruit new members into the economic and security institutions it dominated. The results were dismal: failed wars, financial crises, staggering inequality, frayed alliances, and emboldened adversaries. HEGEMONIC HUBRIS When Clinton took office in 1993, the United States was on favorable terms with the world's other major powers, including China and Russia. Democracy was spreading, Iraq was being disarmed, and Iran had no nuclear enrichment capacity. The Oslo Accords seemed to herald an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Washington seemed well positioned to guide that process. The European Union was adding new members and moving toward a common currency, and the U.S. economy was performing well. Americans saw terrorism as a minor problem, and the U.S. military seemed unstoppable. The wind was at the country's back. Life was good. But those circumstances fueled a dangerous overconfidence among American elites. Convinced that the United States was "the indispensable nation," as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright famously put it in 1998, they believed they had the right, the responsibility, and the wisdom to shape political arrangements in every corner of the world. That vision turned out to be a hubristic fantasy. Repeated attempts to broker peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians all failed, and the two-state solution sought by three U.S. presidents is no longer a viable option. Al Qaeda attacked the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001, and Washington responded by launching a global war on terrorism, including invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Those campaigns were costly failures and shattered the U.S. military's aura of invincibility. Much of the Middle East is now embroiled in conflict, and violent extremists operate from Africa to Central Asia and beyond. Meanwhile, India, Pakistan, and North Korea tested and deployed nuclear weapons, and Iran become a latent nuclear weapons state. The collapse of the U.S. housing market in 2008 exposed widespread corruption in the country's financial institutions and triggered the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression-a calamity from which the global economy has yet to fully recover. In 2014, Russia seized Crimea, and it has interfered in a number of other countries since then-and its relations with the West are now worse than at any time since the Cold War. China's power and ambitions have expanded, and cooperation between Beijing and Moscow has deepened. The eurozone crisis, the United Kingdom's decision to withdraw from the eu, and energetic populist movements have raised doubts about the eu's future. Democracy is in retreat worldwide; according to Freedom House, 2018 was the 13th consecutive year in which global freedom declined. Illiberal leaders govern in Hungary and Poland, and the Economist Intelligence Unit's annual Demoracy Index has downgraded the United States from a "full" to a "flawed" democracy. The United States was not solely responsible for all these adverse developments, but it played a major role in most of them. And the taproot of many of these failures was Washington's embrace of liberal hegemony. For starters, that strategy expanded U.S. security obligations without providing new resources with which to meet them. The policy of "dual containment," aimed at Iran and Iraq, forced the United States to keep thousands of troops on the Arabian Peninsula, an additional burden that also helped convince Osama bin Laden to strike at the U.S. homeland. Nato expansion committed Washington to defend weak and vulnerable new members, even as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom let their military forces atrophy. Equally important, U.S. efforts to promote democracy, the open-ended expansion of nato, and the extension of the alliance's mission far beyond its original parameters poisoned relations with Russia. And fear of U.S.-led regime change encouraged several states to pursue a nuclear deterrent-in the case of North Korea, successfully. When the United States did manage to topple a foreign foe, as it did in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, the results were not thriving new democracies but costly occupations, failed states, and hundreds of thousands of dead civilians. It was delusional for U.S. leaders to expect otherwise: creating a functional democracy is a difficult process under the best of circumstances, but trying to do it in fractured societies one barely understands is a fool's errand. Finally, globalization did not deliver as promised. Opening up markets to trade and investment brought great benefits to lower and middle classes in China, India, and other parts of the developing world. It also further magnified the already staggering wealth of the world's richest one percent. But lower- and middle-class incomes in the United States and Europe remained flat, jobs in some sectors there fled abroad, and the global financial system became much more fragile. This sorry record is why, in 2016, when Trump called U.S. foreign policy "a complete and total disaster" and blamed out-of-touch and unaccountable elites, many Americans nodded in agreement. They were not isolationists; they simply wanted their government to stop trying to run the world and pay more attention to problems at home. Trump's predecessors seemed to have heard that message, at least when they were running for office. In 1992, Clinton's mantra was "It's the economy, stupid." In 2000, Bush derided Clinton's efforts at "nation building" and called for a foreign policy that was "strong but humble." Obama pledged to end foreign wars and focus on "nation building at home." These expressions of restraint were understandable, as surveys had repeatedly shown that a majority of Americans believed the country was playing the role of global policeman more than it should and doing more than its share to help others. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2013, 80 percent of Americans agreed that "we should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home," and 83 percent wanted presidents to focus more on domestic issues than on foreign policy. Clinton, Bush, and Obama all understood what the American people wanted. But they failed to deliver it. So has Trump. Although his Twitter feed and public statements often question familiar orthodoxies, the United States is still defending wealthy nato allies, still fighting in Afghanistan, still chasing terrorists across Africa, still giving unconditional support to the same problematic Middle Eastern clients, and still hoping to topple a number of foreign regimes. Trump's style as president is radically different from those of his predecessors, but the substance of his policies is surprisingly similar. The result is the worst of both worlds: Washington is still pursuing a misguided grand strategy, but now with an incompetent vulgarian in the White House.