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#### Reconciliation passes now - Biden PC is key to getting democratic skeptics on board, but it’s tentative

Cochrane & Weisman 11/05 [Emily Cochrane - correspondent based in Washington. She has covered Congress since late 2018, focusing on the annual debate over government funding and economic legislation, ranging from emergency pandemic relief to infrastructure, Jonathan Weisman - congressional correspondent, veteran Washington journalist and author of the novel “No. 4 Imperial Lane” and the nonfiction book “(((Semitism))): Being Jewish in America in the Age of Trump.” His career in journalism stretches back 30 years, “Live Updates: House Democrats Push Toward Votes on Biden’s Agenda”, 11-05-2021, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/11/05/us/biden-spending-infrastructure-bill]//pranav

At the White House, Mr. Biden called on lawmakers to pass the legislation. “I’m asking every House member, member of the House of Representatives, to vote yes on both these bills right now,” the president said. Spooked by Tuesday’s electoral drubbing, Democrats labored to overcome concerns among moderates about the cost and details of a rapidly evolving, $1.85 trillion social safety net and climate plan and push it through over unified Republican opposition. They also hoped to clear a Senate-passed $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill — the largest investment in the nation’s aging public works in a decade — for Mr. Biden’s signature. Top Democratic officials said they were confident they could complete both measures by day’s end, but Speaker Nancy Pelosi of California and her team continued to haggle with holdouts. Several moderates were pushing for more information about the cost of the sprawling plan, including a nonpartisan analysis from the Congressional Budget Office, the official scorekeeper responsible for calculating the fiscal impact of the 2,135-page legislation. “I think everyone’s waiting for the C.B.O. to do their job,” said Representative Jared Golden, Democrat of Maine, speaking to reporters on Friday morning as he left Ms. Pelosi’s office, where White House officials were also meeting on next steps. But Representative Steny H. Hoyer of Maryland, the majority leader, said the cost estimate would not be ready by the end of the day, and a person familiar with the discussions said a score from the budget office was weeks away from completion. “We’re working on it,” Mr. Hoyer said. Ms. Pelosi spent much of the day on Thursday buttonholing lawmakers on the House floor to try to corral support for the social policy bill, which includes monthly payments to families with children, universal prekindergarten, a four-week paid family and medical leave program, health care subsidies and a broad array of climate change initiatives. Mr. Biden and members of his cabinet worked the phones to win over Democratic skeptics. With Republicans united in opposition, Democrats could afford to lose as few as three votes from their side. As Democrats labored to unite their members behind the bill, Republicans sought to wreak procedural havoc on the House floor, forcing a vote to adjourn the chamber that leaders held open for hours to buy time for their negotiations. While the Senate approved the $1 trillion infrastructure bill in August, the measure has stalled as progressives have repeatedly refused to supply their votes for it until there is agreement on the other bill.

#### Labor reform saps PC – empirically prove with Obama, corporate opposition, and Democratic resistance

Leon 21 Luis Feliz Leon, 01-06-2021, “"If we want it, we’re going to have to fight like hell for it" - Labor faces an uphill battle to pass the PRO Act,” Strike Wave, https://www.thestrikewave.com/original-content/labor-faces-uphill-battle-to-pass-pro-act/SJKS

The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), which died in the Senate during President Barack Obama’s first term, had similar potential to increase union membership, as it would have enabled workers to get union representation if a majority signed union cards (“card check”) rather than through an election. It died because Obama was unwilling to put political capital behind it to overcome opposition from Republicans and center-right Democrats. “EFCA was very close to becoming law. At the end of the day, in my view, the Obama administration did not put the necessary political capital into securing its passage,” said EPI's McNicholas. “The Obama administration decided to focus on ‘bipartisan’ and ‘reach across the aisle’ type solutions to the 2008 financial crisis, and thus didn't care about EFCA in the face of the anti-EFCA mobilization by strong ‘antis’ like the Chamber of Commerce,” says Susan Kang, a professor of political science at John Jay College who studies political economy, labor, and human rights. “Basically, labor was swept aside by the Obama administration … at the exact moment when he had the strongest mandate and political capital.” Another issue, said Patrick Burke, an organizer with United Auto Workers Local 2322 in Massachusetts, was that EFCA's card-check provisions, when framed as a replacement for elections, “became very easy to demonize and difficult to explain to people not already familiar with labor law.” “The short story is that the EFCA was doomed from a few moderate Dems not being willing to go through with card check once actually in power to enact it. The long story is that the labor movement's disappearance from the ‘adult table’ of Democratic politics has cyclical downward effects. They're less able to convince Dems to go out on the limb for them and to prioritize their legislative requests,” said Brandon Magner, a labor lawyer in Indiana. Despite a history of betrayal and rejection, labor and immigrant rights organizations, [coalesced](https://progressive.org/dispatches/power-behind-win-feliz-leon-201123/) around Biden, a self-professed “[union guy](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/16/biden-holds-joint-meeting-with-union-leaders-and-retail-auto-tech-ceos.html),” after the primaries and [helped deliver](https://progressive.org/dispatches/bargaining-rights-with-that-feliz-leon-201229/) him to the White House in the hope that doing so would lead to [executive action](https://indypendent.org/2020/12/immigrants-rights-advocates-descend-on-delaware/) on immigration and labor law reform. “We call on Congress to pass and Biden to sign the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act early in 2021 to make sure every worker who wants to form or join a union is able to do so freely and fairly,” AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka said in a [statement](https://aflcio.org/press/releases/afl-cio-looks-forward-working-president-elect-joe-biden-0) after the election. But union organizers, researchers, and labor lawyers see dim prospects for winning significant labor reform during the Biden administration. “The PRO Act is obviously dead in the Senate unless Mitch McConnell gets knocked into the minority, but I don't see it being passed without full-throated support for gutting the filibuster from Biden, Harris, Schumer, Durbin, and more,” said Magner, the labor lawyer, adding that “the history of failed labor law reform efforts indicates you need 60 votes to pass anything.” That is particularly true of Democrats in “right-to-work” states like [South Carolina](https://www.postandcourier.com/politics/scs-rep-joe-cunningham-to-vote-against-pro-union-bill-in-break-with-democrats/article_426b38e2-4862-11ea-a0d9-77a96531c47e.html) where U.S. Rep. Joe Cunningham was a reliable opponent in the House. But the greatest liability might be Biden himself. “The few times that Biden met McConnell at the negotiating table during the Obama years, McConnell [left with Biden’s wallet](https://theintercept.com/2019/06/24/joe-biden-tax-cuts-mitch-mconnell/),” dryly [observed](https://theintercept.com/2020/12/28/mcconnell-trump-election/) The Intercept’s Ryan Grim. “Even if the Democrats capture the Georgia Senate seats, their margin will be too small to overcome a Republican filibuster or, if they change the rules, more than one Democrat will break ranks, and no Republicans will support the act,” said Friedman. Even if Biden were to somehow outmaneuver McConnell’s chicanery, there would be fierce opposition to contend with on the corporate side from the likes of Americans for Tax Reform, which has [used](https://www.atr.org/ab5) Georgia runoff elections as an opportunity to fearmonger on the PRO Act, and, when backed against the wall, Biden may revert to his timeworn moderate instincts and not go to bat for labor reform unless forced to. “Prospects for major labor law reform under the Biden administration are directly tied to unions’ and union federations’ willingness to hold the administration’s feet to the fire. They are not going to do it on their own – if we want it, we’re going to have to fight like hell for it,” said Pitkin, the former UNITE HERE organizer. “The biggest question is whether there is enough street heat and organizing to prioritize legislation like this," said Burke, the UAW organizer. “Workers in motion spur labor-law reforms, not the other way around.”

#### Business lobbying backlash ensures Sinema flips – empirics prove she doesn’t like similar bills

Duda ’21 [Jeremy, Prior to joining the Arizona Mirror, he worked at the Arizona Capitol Times, where he spent eight years covering the Governor's Office and two years as editor of the Yellow Sheet Report, “Business groups urge Kelly, Sinema to oppose pro-union PRO Act”, 08-30-2021, https://www.azmirror.com/2021/08/30/business-groups-urge-kelly-sinema-to-oppose-pro-union-pro-act/]//pranav

Business groups publicly called on Democratic U.S. Sens. Mark Kelly and Kyrsten Sinema to oppose a sweeping piece of pro-organized labor legislation that would wipe out Arizona’s “right-to-work” law that prohibits mandatory union membership. At a press conference at the office of the Arizona chapter of the Associated General Contractors near the state Capitol on Monday, leaders of several business groups warned that the Protecting the Right to Organize Act — or PRO Act, as it’s more commonly known — would undermine Arizona’s recovery from the economic slump it faced last year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, undermine the “gig economy,” jeopardize secret ballots in union organization votes, give unions access to confidential employee information and strip Arizonans of their right not to join a union. The bill would allow unions to override right-to-work laws and collect union dues from non-members who still benefit from collective bargaining. It would also prohibit company-sponsored meetings to urge employees against unionizing, define most independent contractors as employees, protect employees who are attempting to unionize from being fired and allow unions to engage in secondary strikes in support of other striking workers, among other provisions. “We want to thank and tell Senator Sinema and Senator Kelly that we appreciate them for not signing on as co-sponsors to the PRO Act, because if they were to change their opinions, New York Sen. Chuck Schumer will put this up for a vote,” said Danny Seiden, president and CEO of the Arizona Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Kelly and Sinema are two of only three Senate Democrats, along with Virginia’s Mark Warner, who haven’t co-sponsored the bill or thrown their public support behind it. Kelly last month told the Huffington Post that he opposes the independent contractor provision, but that he supports the “overall goals” of the legislation. Sinema is widely known as a holdout on the Democratic side and hasn’t supported the PRO Act, but spokesman Pablo Sierra-Carmona indicated that she hasn’t made up her mind, and that she won’t do so unless and until it comes up for a vote in the Senate.

#### They lash out against Reconciliation – it includes similar provisions

FURCHTGOTT-ROTH 10/09 [Diana, former acting assistant secretary for economic policy at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is adjunct professor of economics at George Washington University, “Democrats can't pass the PRO Act, so it's buried in the reconciliation bill”, 10-09-2021, https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/575992-dems-cant-pass-the-pro-act-so-its-buried-in-the-reconciliation-bill]//pranav

Union membership has been declining for decades as workers find better uses than union dues for their hard-earned dollars. But union bosses and their supporters are trying to change the law to force hard-working Americans into unions. How? Through the Protecting the Right to Organize Act (PRO Act), a bill that would expand the power of union leaders at the expense of workers. After sailing through the House, the PRO Act now appears stalled in the Senate and Democrats are trying to slip some PRO Act provisions into a massive reconciliation bill. American workers are wise to turn down union membership. Union pension plans are in trouble. In 2020, the Labor Department listed 121 union plans in critical status, defined as less than 65 percent funded, and 61 in endangered status, with less than 80 percent funded. Unions desperately need new workers to join, because they pay contributions for many years without withdrawing money. Most recently, Amazon workers in Alabama resoundingly rejected efforts by the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store International Union to organize their plant, with more than 70 percent of workers voting against the union. The union’s plan was in critical status between 2015 and 2019, and the Labor Department informed the plan’s administrators that it had to be reorganized by reducing benefits and increasing contributions. Union leaders and their allies on Capitol Hill believe the way to increase membership after decades of decline is to pass elements of the PRO Act through reconciliation. Unlike the PRO Act, which needs 60 votes in the Senate to enable it to move to President Biden’s desk for signature, the reconciliation bill, which deals with taxes and spending, needs only a simple majority. So via a massive reconciliation bill, congressional Democrats are trying to move some labor union provisions of the PRO Act by arguing they are actually revenue raisers.

#### Reconciliation is k2 stopping existential climate change – warming is incremental and every change in temperature is vital

Higgins 8/16 [Trevor, Senior Director, Domestic Climate and Energy, “Budget Reconciliation Is the Key to Stopping Climate Change”, 08-16-2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2021/08/16/502681/budget-reconciliation-key-stopping-climate-change/]//pranav

The United States is suffering acutely from the chaotic changes in climate that scientists now directly attribute to the burning of fossil fuels and other human activity. The drought, fires, extreme heat, and floods that have already killed hundreds this summer across the continent and around the world are a tragedy—and a warning of worsening instability yet to come. However, this week, the Senate initiated an extraordinary legislative response that would set the world on a different path. Enacting the full scope of President Joe Biden’s Build Back Better agenda would put the American economy to work leading a global transition to clean energy and stabilizing the climate. A look at what’s coming next through the budget reconciliation process reveals a ray of hope that is easy to miss amid the fitful negotiations of recent months: At long last, Congress is on the verge of major legislation that would build a more equitable, just, and inclusive clean energy economy. This is our shot to stop climate change. Building a clean energy future must start now Until the global economy stops polluting the air and instead starts to draw down the emissions of years past, the world will continue to heat up, blundering past perilous tipping points that threaten irreversible and catastrophic consequences. Stemming the extent of warming at 1.5 degrees Celsius rather 2 degrees or worse will reduce the risk of crossing such tipping points or otherwise exceeding the adaptive capacity of human society. Every degree matters. Stabilizing global warming at 1.5 degrees Celsius starts with cutting annual greenhouse gas emissions in the United States to half of peak levels by 2030. This isn’t about temporary offsets or incremental gains in efficiency—it’s about the rapid adoption of scalable solutions that will work throughout the world to eliminate global net emissions by 2050 and sustain net-negative emissions thereafter. Building this better future will tackle climate change, deliver on environmental justice, and create good jobs. It will give us a shot to stop the planet from continuously warming. It will alleviate the concentrated burdens of fossil fuel pollution, which are concentrated in systemically disadvantaged, often majority Black and brown communities. It will empower American workers to compete in the global clean energy economy of the 21st century. There is no time to lose in the work of building a clean energy future.

## Case

### Heg

#### Hegemony is a terminally unsustainable fantasy based in a revisionist strategy of American exceptionalism – pursuit causes numerous failed states, financial crises, widening inequality, worldwide proliferation, anti-western terrorism, and emboldens adversaries like Russia and China

Walt 19 Stephen Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. [“The End of Hubris,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 98, Iss. 3, (May/Jun 2019): 26-35, 4-16-2019, URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/end-hubris>] DTS

IF IT AIN'T BROKE . . . In the nineteenth century, when the United States was weak, leaders from George Washington to William McKinley mostly avoided foreign entanglements and concentrated on building power domestically, expanding the country's reach across North America and eventually expelling the European great powers from the Western Hemisphere. In the first half of the twentieth century, U.S. presidents such as Wood- row Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt used the country's newfound strength to restore the balance of power in strategically critical regions outside the Western Hemisphere. But they let other great powers do most of the heavy lifting, and thus the United States emerged relatively unscathed-and stronger than ever-from the world wars that devastated Asia and Europe. Letting other states shoulder the burden was not possible during the Cold War, so the United States stepped up and led the alliances that contained the Soviet Union. American leaders paid lip service to democracy promotion, human rights, and other idealistic concerns, but U.S. policy was realist at its core. Through the Bretton Woods system and its successors, the United States also helped foster a more open world economy, balancing economic growth against the need for financial stability, national autonomy, and domestic legitimacy. Put simply, for most of U.S. history, American leaders were acutely sensitive to the balance of power, passed the buck when they could, and took on difficult missions when necessary. But when the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States found itself, as the former national security adviser Brent Scowcroftput it in 1998, "standing alone at the height of power . . . with the rarest opportunity to shape the world," U.S. leaders rejected the realism that had worked well for decades and tried to remake global politics in accordance with American values. A new strategy-liberal hegemony-sought to spread democracy and open markets across the globe. That goal is the common thread linking President Bill Clinton's policy of "engagement and enlargement," President George W. Bush's "freedom agenda," and President Barack Obama's embrace of the Arab revolts of 2010-11 and his declaration that "there is no right more fundamental than the ability to choose your leaders and determine your destiny." Such thinking won broad support from both political parties, the federal bureaucracies that deal with international affairs, and most of the think tanks, lobbies, and media figures that constitute the foreign policy establishment. At bottom, liberal hegemony is a highly revisionist strategy. Instead of working to maintain favorable balances of power in a few areas of vital interest, the United States sought to transform regimes all over the world and recruit new members into the economic and security institutions it dominated. The results were dismal: failed wars, financial crises, staggering inequality, frayed alliances, and emboldened adversaries. HEGEMONIC HUBRIS When Clinton took office in 1993, the United States was on favorable terms with the world's other major powers, including China and Russia. Democracy was spreading, Iraq was being disarmed, and Iran had no nuclear enrichment capacity. The Oslo Accords seemed to herald an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Washington seemed well positioned to guide that process. The European Union was adding new members and moving toward a common currency, and the U.S. economy was performing well. Americans saw terrorism as a minor problem, and the U.S. military seemed unstoppable. The wind was at the country's back. Life was good. But those circumstances fueled a dangerous overconfidence among American elites. Convinced that the United States was "the indispensable nation," as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright famously put it in 1998, they believed they had the right, the responsibility, and the wisdom to shape political arrangements in every corner of the world. That vision turned out to be a hubristic fantasy. Repeated attempts to broker peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians all failed, and the two-state solution sought by three U.S. presidents is no longer a viable option. Al Qaeda attacked the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001, and Washington responded by launching a global war on terrorism, including invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Those campaigns were costly failures and shattered the U.S. military's aura of invincibility. Much of the Middle East is now embroiled in conflict, and violent extremists operate from Africa to Central Asia and beyond. Meanwhile, India, Pakistan, and North Korea tested and deployed nuclear weapons, and Iran become a latent nuclear weapons state. The collapse of the U.S. housing market in 2008 exposed widespread corruption in the country's financial institutions and triggered the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression-a calamity from which the global economy has yet to fully recover. In 2014, Russia seized Crimea, and it has interfered in a number of other countries since then-and its relations with the West are now worse than at any time since the Cold War. China's power and ambitions have expanded, and cooperation between Beijing and Moscow has deepened. The eurozone crisis, the United Kingdom's decision to withdraw from the eu, and energetic populist movements have raised doubts about the eu's future. Democracy is in retreat worldwide; according to Freedom House, 2018 was the 13th consecutive year in which global freedom declined. Illiberal leaders govern in Hungary and Poland, and the Economist Intelligence Unit's annual Demoracy Index has downgraded the United States from a "full" to a "flawed" democracy. The United States was not solely responsible for all these adverse developments, but it played a major role in most of them. And the taproot of many of these failures was Washington's embrace of liberal hegemony. For starters, that strategy expanded U.S. security obligations without providing new resources with which to meet them. The policy of "dual containment," aimed at Iran and Iraq, forced the United States to keep thousands of troops on the Arabian Peninsula, an additional burden that also helped convince Osama bin Laden to strike at the U.S. homeland. Nato expansion committed Washington to defend weak and vulnerable new members, even as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom let their military forces atrophy. Equally important, U.S. efforts to promote democracy, the open-ended expansion of nato, and the extension of the alliance's mission far beyond its original parameters poisoned relations with Russia. And fear of U.S.-led regime change encouraged several states to pursue a nuclear deterrent-in the case of North Korea, successfully. When the United States did manage to topple a foreign foe, as it did in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, the results were not thriving new democracies but costly occupations, failed states, and hundreds of thousands of dead civilians. It was delusional for U.S. leaders to expect otherwise: creating a functional democracy is a difficult process under the best of circumstances, but trying to do it in fractured societies one barely understands is a fool's errand. Finally, globalization did not deliver as promised. Opening up markets to trade and investment brought great benefits to lower and middle classes in China, India, and other parts of the developing world. It also further magnified the already staggering wealth of the world's richest one percent. But lower- and middle-class incomes in the United States and Europe remained flat, jobs in some sectors there fled abroad, and the global financial system became much more fragile. This sorry record is why, in 2016, when Trump called U.S. foreign policy "a complete and total disaster" and blamed out-of-touch and unaccountable elites, many Americans nodded in agreement. They were not isolationists; they simply wanted their government to stop trying to run the world and pay more attention to problems at home. Trump's predecessors seemed to have heard that message, at least when they were running for office. In 1992, Clinton's mantra was "It's the economy, stupid." In 2000, Bush derided Clinton's efforts at "nation building" and called for a foreign policy that was "strong but humble." Obama pledged to end foreign wars and focus on "nation building at home." These expressions of restraint were understandable, as surveys had repeatedly shown that a majority of Americans believed the country was playing the role of global policeman more than it should and doing more than its share to help others. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2013, 80 percent of Americans agreed that "we should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home," and 83 percent wanted presidents to focus more on domestic issues than on foreign policy. Clinton, Bush, and Obama all understood what the American people wanted. But they failed to deliver it. So has Trump. Although his Twitter feed and public statements often question familiar orthodoxies, the United States is still defending wealthy nato allies, still fighting in Afghanistan, still chasing terrorists across Africa, still giving unconditional support to the same problematic Middle Eastern clients, and still hoping to topple a number of foreign regimes. Trump's style as president is radically different from those of his predecessors, but the substance of his policies is surprisingly similar. The result is the worst of both worlds: Washington is still pursuing a misguided grand strategy, but now with an incompetent vulgarian in the White House.

#### Hegemonic stability theory relies on a bloodless retelling of history that obscures countless violent conquests – their nostalgic investment in unipolarity is a product of neoconservative think-tank specialists with confirmation bias – means you should hold their evidence with suspicion

Porter 18 (Professor Patrick Porter is the Chair of Strategic Studies at the University of Exeter, Academic Director of Strategy and Security Institute and Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI, “A World Imagined: Nostalgia and Liberal Order,” POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 843, 6/5/2018, <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order>, sg)

The Claim: The Liberal Order Is under Assault The prospect of major change in the international system is attracting a new wave of literature about “world order.” Recent crises and political revolts have prompted security experts on both sides of the Atlantic to announce the coming of end times. The rise of pernicious “isms” — economic protectionism, authoritarian nationalism, political tribalism, superpower unilateralism — has triggered these fears, along with the gauntlets being thrown down by revisionist powers threatening U.S. hegemony in the Persian Gulf, Eastern Europe, and Asia. In the United States, the focal point of this eschatology is the presidency of Donald Trump. After the election of an erratic, coarse demagogue to the nation’s highest office in November 2016, security experts lamented the passing of a postwar structure that civilized international life, presided over by a benign American hegemon. What is being threatened? The objects of anxiety are a “liberal world order,” which allegedly held sway for 70 years, and even the end of “the West” itself. The life of this order is normally periodized from the end of World War II in 1945 to the recent past. As the storyline goes, the United States as benevolent hegemon designed and underwrote a “global, rules-based” economic and security order that transformed the world.6 After its chief competitor, the Soviet Union, collapsed in 1989-1991, it extended this strategy globally. Proponents of liberal order draw on the logic of hegemonic stability theory.7 According to that theory, one dominant state exercises such a preponderance of power that it lessens the insecurities that lead to arms races and spirals of alarm, enabling other states to ease their security competitions with neighbors and rivals, relax their arms programs, and focus on economic growth. More ambitiously, it not only reshapes institutions and markets but remakes the preferences of other states. To its admirers, this order, for all its imperfections, achieved unprecedented general peace and prosperity. It was based on a harmony of interests between the United States and the rest of the world. It made the world a single system or “whole,” as Council on Foreign Relations president Richard Haass claims.8 Revision of the order, and retreats by the hegemon, will lead to increased disorder. On the campaign trail Donald Trump explicitly threatened the status quo. He denounced allies as delinquent and threatened to shred alliances, tolerate nuclear proliferation, re-erect tariff walls, and abandon international agreements. To security traditionalists who oppose Trump, his revisionist challenge accelerates the collapse of a “liberal order” under a transnational assault by authoritarian forces. In a state of shock, they seek orientation in an ahistorical myth about the world before this dark age. As Princeton’s Aaron Friedberg tweeted, “After WWII US built a system of democratic states, tied together by trade, institutions and common values — a liberal order. Now it needs to defend that order against the illiberal powers it tried to incorporate after the Cold War.”9 Historian Jeremy Suri charges that Trump is plunging the world into a great regression by “launching a direct attack on the liberal international order that really made America great.” The elements of this order include “a system of multilateral trade and alliances that we built to serve our interests and attract others to our way of life.” Suri explains: Through the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World Trade Organization), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, among other institutions, the United States led a postwar capitalist system that raised global standards of living, defeated Soviet communism, and converted China to a market economy. Through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe and a web of alliances in Asia and the Middle East, the United States contained aggressive states, nurtured stable allies, and promoted democratic reforms when possible.10 **This** sunny “highlights package” **offers a strangely bloodless retelling of history**. It is a euphemistic rendering of the Cold War and the actual practice of anti-Soviet containment by the superpower and its proxies. **The Bay of Pigs, napalm, East Timor, the shah of Iran, and the Contras fade into the background**. That this pristine retelling should come from distinguished historians of American diplomacy like Friedberg and Suri suggests how seductive the vision of an earlier and better order has become. Trump, too, is complicit in this mythmaking. Like his opponents, he frames his own election in stark terms. Trump speaks of a dark prehistory of “globalism,” of open borders, predatory capitalism, futile wars, and general American victimhood, and a return to wholesome nationalism, industrial regeneration, civilizational rebirth, and, of course, making America “great.”11 What was the liberal order, as its defenders define it? If an “order” is a coming together of power with social purpose, a “world order” is an international design of institutions, norms, and patterned relationships that defines the global balance of power.12 Some commentators argue that for a viable world order to emerge in a time of turbulence, the United States may have to compromise. Amitav Acharya, Michael Mazarr, and Henry Kissinger seek to revive the concept of world order, but unlike those of other “world order” visionaries, their proposed designs are pluralistic and require the United States to temper its universalism for the sake of stability and negotiated coexistence in a polycentric world.13 By contrast, **the liberal order is a missionary project that looks to extirpate rival orders and demands the perpetuation of American dominance**. As an ideal type, the “liberal order” entails a copious number of norms and institutions, suggesting that good things go together. In accounts of the postwar liberal order, many or all of the following features appear, though with varying emphasis: the rule of law and the supremacy of “rules,” humanist globalism and humanitarian development, free trade, multilateral cooperation, the security provision of the United States (principally through its permanent alliances), and a commitment to liberal progress through the advocacy of democratic and market reforms. Its institutions span the United Nations, NATO, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (followed by the World Trade Organization), the IMF, and the World Bank. A commitment to protocols and the bridging of divides figure centrally. Hence phrases like “open, rule-based international economy” abound.14 The “order,” proponents argue, embodied also a pattern of behavior, or, as Jake Sullivan at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace explains, a “system of norms, institutions, and partnerships” whereby, under the hegemon’s stewardship, collective cooperation trumped competition for relative advantage, significant shares of sovereignty were ceded for the benefits of collective action, and a global consensus spread.15 An “illiberal order” would presumably be the opposite of these things: politically and economically divided and closed, authoritarian, uncooperative, coercive, and disrespectful of rules and norms. **The liberal order is necessarily hierarchical.** To speak of liberal order is to speak also of American primacy, with the former depending on the exercise of the latter. **Nostalgists** do not deny that the American superpower upheld it partly through overwhelming military strength. However, they **emphasize the nonbloody uses of force**, for example, deterring and dissuading adversaries, reassuring and uniting allies, and preventing conflict. And they stress the consensual, attractive quality of American hegemony. Postwar continental Europe therefore stands out as a favorite area of emphasis, as an “empire by invitation.”16 Most anxious observers agree that a significant “fall” is occurring.17 To explain it, they weigh heavily an alleged loss of political will within the West. Leading theorists of liberal order, such as Princeton’s G. John Ikenberry, have long warned that “the hallmarks of liberal internationalism — openness and rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism — could give way to a more contested and fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist networks, and regional rivalries.”18 Once optimistic that the order would withstand geopolitical challenges and prove resilient, Ikenberry now fears a different kind of insurgent threat, flowing not from hostile subversive states but from within. Working- and middle-class populations, he suggests, may lose faith in the order as democracy degenerates.19 Similar complaints have arisen across the Atlantic. Warnings against U.S. disengagement are a staple of rhetoric from security thinkers in allied countries.20 For Robin Niblett, director of the internationalist Chatham House, Trump replicates and feeds on the destructive forces that powered “Brexit,” forcing liberalism into retreat.21 For the University of Exeter’s Doug Stokes, as for Ikenberry and Niblett, domestic discontent may unravel the worldwide arrangements that best served America’s “globalized” interests. For the old order to reproduce itself, it must make a new settlement with the American working class.22 Most of these diagnoses have a common premise. **All offer an upbeat, potted history of the world** created in and after 1945. Many **then blame the crumbling of that world on agents or forces that are separate from it**.23 If the order is perishing, they argue, it is being assassinated rather than dying from its internal failures. **They have little to say about the significant reverses** that occurred while the order reigned. These included some of **America’s most disastrous wars, geopolitical chaos in the Persian Gulf** from the Iran-Iraq War to the present sectarian breakdown, **resurgent jihadi Islamism, the greatest act of urban terrorism** committed by a nonstate actor in history, **the eurozone crisis, the economic regression of Russia** under “shock therapy,” mounting and unsustainable debt, the global financial crisis, the entrenchment and immobility of wealth, and the growing underclass of working poor. Rather than attributing to the old order the failures that occurred on its watch, nostalgists blame mismanagement, or popular fatigue, or “populism” and demagogues that whipped up mass discontent. **They give credit to the order and U.S. primacy for benign developments, discounting other possible contributors such as the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons or the memory of World War II.** That the order may have been complicit in its own undoing is hardly considered. Nostalgia for a lost order is not just the complaint of self-styled liberal internationalists of any particular faction. It has a wider provenance among those who believe today’s choice lies between continuing American primacy and chaos. The strength of the consensus is reflected in a Brookings Institution paper, coauthored by former high-ranking officials in the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, urging the White House to revert to a traditional posture, upholding an order favoring openness, human rights, and peace, and claiming that this is the only viable grand strategy for the United States.24 The hawkish intellectual **Robert Kagan** argues that the order established after World War II was a “liberal enlightenment project” that is now “challenged by forces from within and without,” not only because of popular fatigue with the burdens of international leadership but because Americans have forgotten the reasons their country adopted the role as the world’s guarantor and stabilizer.25 Primacists such as **Robert Lieber, Thomas Wright, and Eliot Cohen issue similar warnings**.26 **The prominence of neoconservatives among this chorus is ironic**. Critics once accused neoconservatives of violating the principles of liberal order with their bellicose unilateralism, by agitating for preventive war in Iraq in March 2003 without an explicit UN mandate, and by justifying torture. But this reflects the paradoxical problem at the heart of liberal “world ordering.” On the one hand, under most popular visions of liberal order, the hegemon creates a world based on deference to institutions and rules. But actual international life includes hostile, noncooperative forces that refuse to defer. **Thus the liberal order includes conflicting rather than complementary rules and principles**. It contains “veto players” like Russia or China with different conceptions of order. The protection and enforcement of such an order, and the enforcer’s own preponderance, rests upon selection and the exercise of a hegemon’s privilege. Liberal world orders typically involve several impulses, namely, internationalism, integration, and imperialism.27 That last, imperialism, is the most contentious. Historically, world orders, with their trading protocols and monetary regimes, and control of sea lanes, commercial routes, and access to raw materials, are designed and imposed by the strong. The opening of Asian markets, a celebrated feature of liberal order, was also a pre-1945 byproduct of violent and imperial coercion, imposed on China by Great Britain through the Opium Wars and on Japan by American Commodore Matthew Perry with the threat of naval bombardment in 1853-1854. **Proponents of liberal order occasionally admit that** what is sometimes framed straightforwardly as **a rule-bound order is in fact a system of imperial power** (and vigilante privilege) **exercised by a hegemon.** Robert Cooper, the former diplomat and adviser to Prime Minister Tony Blair, argued that if the world had a civilized core that deserved lawful conduct, there was also a barbarous periphery that warranted “rougher methods of an earlier era.”28 “Among themselves,” he wrote, “the postmodern states operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security” but “in the jungle, one must use the laws of the jungle.”29 One-time advocate of American empire Michael Ignatieff admitted that being an imperial power “means enforcing such order as there is in the world and doing so in the American interest. It means laying down the rules America wants (on everything from markets to weapons of mass destruction) while exempting itself from other rules (the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the International Criminal Court) that go against its interest.”30 At the height of the war on terror, jurists advising the George W. Bush administration used a similar logic to justify the suspension of the rule of law and Geneva conventions.31 **One can defend these inconsistencies as necessary, or not. That they continually recur suggests that liberal “world ordering” is an inescapably compromised process. The United States is an imperial power,** even if it is distinct from former empires. It may lack the land hunger of empires past and look different from European or Asian imperialisms. It was averse to formal annexation, refused to claim the mantle of empire, and made a succession of retreats, from Vietnam, Lebanon, and Iraq. But it still throws its weight around in imperial ways: through coercion, subversion, or patronage, it penetrates the sovereign autonomy of other states to constrain their choices. The political economy underlying American interventions was at times coercive, as in the structural-adjustment programs visited on developing countries from Eastern Europe to Latin America. Leading primacists who speak up for liberal world ordering have earlier acknowledged that the American project overseas must be necessarily imperial, albeit in this case of a distinctively informal “American” kind, involving the forceful suppression of revolt, hard-nosed enforcement of parameters around other states’ policies, and the exercise of unequal bargaining influence.32 But for the most part, **today’s lamentations for a dying liberal order do not acknowledge the necessarily imperial component. This is the imperialism that does not know itself.** Invocations of the liberal world order have become the ritualized language of the foreign policy establishment. In the academy, there is a well-established scholarly study of “world orders.”33 But too often, especially among **think-tank specialists and the foreign policy commentariat**, the liberal order’s admirers **assert what they ought to prove.** In that respect, President Trump’s former deputy assistant for strategic communications at the National Security Council, Michael Anton, was right to argue that the foreign policy establishment has become a “priesthood,” fonder of recapitulation than argumentation.34 It repeats its axioms but neglects to ground its vision in a careful reading of history or the present. A good example is an article by Edward Luce in June 2017, mourning the internal defeat of Western liberalism and a new world “disorder.” To demonstrate the imminence of disorder under Trump, Luce did not examine what Trump was actually doing beyond the decision to withdraw from the Paris climate change agreement, which is not an unprecedented pullback. The many Trump administration moves that have affronted Moscow go unmentioned: for example, the reinforcement of NATO through increased funding of the European Reassurance Initiative; and the bombing of the Assad regime, Putin’s ally, in April 2017. Instead, Luce cited the statements of two allies who were wondering where Trump’s behavior would lead, gossip about personality clashes in Trump’s court, and corroborating statements from other **figures in the foreign policy establishment** who **take the “liberal order” as an article of faith, betraying a confirmation bias**. Without evidence, he then accused President Obama of “global retrenchment.”35 Typical of the genre, Luce contrasted these recent failures with the postwar internationalism and institution building of President Harry Truman. To be reprimanded for violating established norms of American “global leadership,” against the exalted standards of Truman, is an occupational burden that comes with the presidency. Before Trump, critics had accused presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama of retreating from a long-standing commitment to a liberal world order. The charge that Washington is abandoning a noble Trumanite diplomatic past is less an observation than a political predisposition, substantively shallow yet part of the framework within which debate is conducted. International history after 1945 is more fraught.

#### Chinese pursuit of heg inevitable – already happening

Wagner 19 – Daniel Wagner, founder and CEO of Country Risk. He has three decades of experience assessing cross-border risk, is an authority on political risk insurance and analysis, and has worked for some of the world’s most respected and best-known companies, such as AIG, GE, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank Group. He is the author of six books — "China Vision," "AI Supremacy," "Virtual Terror," "Global Risk Agility and Decision-Making," "Managing Country Risk" and "Political Risk Insurance Guide" — as well as more than 600 articles on current affairs and risk management. “The Coming Chinese World Order”, 2,19,19, (<https://www.fairobserver.com/region/asia_pacific/china-rising-new-world-order-us-trade-war-news-16521)> // JQ

China and the United States remain engaged in the most serious trade dispute the world has seen in generations. Today, English remains the world’s predominant language, the US is the world’s largest economy and the dollar its reserve currency, Google is the world’s primary search engine and Facebook the largest social media platform. But in 30 years, **once China’s Belt and Road Initiative is completed, Beijing’s ability to project its soft and hard power will be greatly enhanced. If predictions prove correct, China will in a few years become the world’s largest economy, and parents around the world will ensure that their children speak Mandarin (if they do not already).** Once the Chinese government makes the yuan fully convertible, it could well become the world’s reserve currency, and given the growth in Chinese speakers, it could well be Baidu that becomes the world’s predominant search engine, and Weibo that supplants Facebook. **The growth in the Chinese middle class,** already larger than the US, will help ensure that **China weans itself of overdependence on exports to sustain growth and becomes increasingly self-reliant for economic development.** If President Xi Jinping has his way, it will be China that is the world’s center of gravity. The coming Chinese world order is likely to be devoid of the kinds of checks and balances we take for granted in the post-World War II system. Rather, **it is more likely to be akin to a transaction-driven landscape where the strongest party rules, and the weak are considered collateral damage. This transformation has already begun**, and as it is occurring, the US and many other countries are essentially asleep at the wheel. As domestic crisis upon crisis piles up, the world’s leading **Western economies continue to turn their attention inward**, preoccupied with political and economic issues at home and functioning with unipolar blinders on. **Many of the world’s leaders fail to see all that Beijing is doing and fail to appreciate the implications for the future.** Not since the modern liberal order was born in the 1940s has the world had to grapple with the possibility of its demise — at the hands of a rising China. Just at a time when the world is in need of the stability and good governance it has had the luxury of relying upon for decades, it must contemplate transitioning to a world order not of the West’s choosing. **Clearly, the era of US hegemony is coming to an end.** Will the global institutions it was so instrumental in creating become less relevant and influential with time? Will Beijing be successful in crafting new institutions derived from a Chinese footprint? If so, will good governance and rule of law be consistent with such organizations? Only time will tell, of course. What is certain is that Beijing’s realization of the Chinese century is sure to be infused with precepts and applications that are uniquely Chinese. The world has yet to fully contemplate all that this portends, but **President Xi wants to achieve a pathway that guarantees the supremacy of China throughout this century and beyond**. He is likely to do just that, for he has a vision not only for how China reigns supreme in the economic, political, diplomatic, technological and, eventually, military arena, but also how it gets there. That is certainly more than can be said for the United States at this juncture, much less of other Western powers that appear to be sitting on the sidelines as Beijing smashes barrier after barrier for how things get done. **Xi deserves credit for having a vision of the future and for acting swiftly and decisively to achieve it** — whether in the **area of technology** (where China is outspending Silicon Valley to achieve AI supremacy), **building the world’s largest navy** by number of ships (currently in second place behind North Korea), landing a probe on the dark side of the moon as evidence of its growing strength in the field of science, or seeking to influence the world’s media. **China is engaged in a multi-pronged effort to become influential in a wide spectrum of areas** of global importance.

#### Warming — it ensures debt accumulation and collapse of overseas basing — adapting is too expensive.

Walt, 18 — Stephen M. Walt; Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. (11-28-2018; "Global Warming Is Setting Fire to American Leadership;" *Foreign Policy*; https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/03/global-warming-will-set-fire-to-american-leadership/; //GrRv) \*The word “be” was added to preserve grammatic integrity, brackets denote a change

One of the side effects of climate change will be the end of U.S. hegemony.

U.S. President Donald Trump has said, “I don’t believe” climate change is real. Guess what? The global environment doesn’t care. The condition of the planet will be determined by the laws of physics and chemistry, not by Trump’s tweets, denials, bluster, or relentlessly head-in-the-sand approach to a rapidly warming planet. Trump will no longer be with us by the time the worst effects are realized, of course; it is future generations who will suffer the consequences.

And make no mistake: Those consequences are going to [be] significant. As reported over Thanksgiving weekend, the latest U.S. government “National Climate Assessment” report makes it abundantly clear that rising average temperatures are going to have far-reaching and damaging effects. The report was a collaborative effort by 13 federal agencies, and it offers a sobering portrait of our likely future. Storms will be more intense and dangerous. Agricultural productivity will decline. Certain diseases and pests will be more numerous and bothersome, and heat-related deaths will increase significantly. Trump may not believe it, but what he does or does not believe is irrelevant, except as it affects what we do (or don’t do) today and thus how serious the problem is down the road.

The direct consequences of climate change will be harmful enough—even if we respond to them more energetically than we have to date—but I believe it will also have profound effects on U.S. foreign policy. Some of the consequences have already been catalogued—including in a landmark U.S. Defense Department study in 2015—but the long-term impact could be even more far-reaching. To be deliberately provocative: Climate change could do more to limit America’s global ambitions than all the books, articles, op-eds, and other advocacy undertaken by apostles of restraint.

Why? Because adapting to a warmer planet is going to be really expensive.

For starters, climate change is already having an impact on military facilities in the United States and will force the Department of Defense to undertake costly remedial measures. Hurricane Michael caused millions of dollars of destruction at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida this fall (including damage to some of the costly F-22s stationed there), and the vast U.S. naval shipyard at Newport News is already prone to flooding and will require costly adaptive actions if it is to remain operational as sea levels rise. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, a three-foot increase in sea levels (which is well within the range of current estimates), could jeopardize the use of 128 U.S. military bases. Protecting these facilities or building new ones will not be cheap, and the money spent on these measures is money that cannot be spent on force structure, personnel, or overseas contingency operations.

Second, as noted above, climate change will impose significant costs on the U.S. economy. According to the recent National Climate Assessment, the costs associated with climate change could reduce U.S. GDP by as much as 10 percent by the end of the century. (That’s roughly twice the impact of the 2008 recession, by the way.) The United States will still be a relatively wealthy country, of course, but not as rich as it would be otherwise.

Third, adapting to climate change won’t be cheap either. Low-lying areas are going to need dikes, seawalls, storm sewers, and other major infrastructure investments. Some densely populated areas may have to be abandoned, which means the need for new housing for tens of thousands of people (if not more). Power grids will have to be strengthened or replaced, while bridges and causeways will need to be elevated. No one knows precisely what all this will cost, but consider that the climate change adaptation plan proposed by then-New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg after Hurricane Sandy hit in 2013 was budgeted at $20 billion. It probably wasn’t ambitious enough, the true costs would probably be higher, and that’s just one city (albeit a big and important one).

To be sure, some of this new infrastructure would need to be built anyway, even if the planet wasn’t getting warmer and sea levels weren’t rising. And spending on infrastructure can boost productivity and provide lots of lower-to-middle-class employment. Even so, the full cost of adapting to the environment of the late 21st century easily runs into hundreds of billions of dollars over the next few decades.

So we are facing a potential double whammy: Climate change will reduce economic growth in various ways, even as we need to spend a lot of money trying to adapt to its effects. This problem might not be too serious if the United States had a big sovereign wealth fund, or if the government were running recurring budget surpluses that could be used to pay for these costs. But the opposite is true: It has a ballooning budget deficit and level of public debt, and recurring political gridlock has turned the budget process into an annual exercise in political posturing and brinkmanship.

My point, in short, is that the costs of adapting to climate change are going to put enormous pressure on an already squeezed federal budget, and at a time when the U.S. population is getting older, health care costs are rising, and tax cuts have become the norm. My question, therefore, is simple: Where’s the money going to come from?

If this scenario is even partially true, then maintaining a defense budget and a national security establishment that dwarfs those of all other states is going to be increasingly difficult if not politically impossible. Persuading the American people to fund wars of choice, to protect distant allies of questionable strategic value, or even to wage far-flung counterterrorism operations is going to be a hard sell. The foreign-policy “Blob” may continue to resist a strategy of restraint, but fiscal realities may gradually impose one on it anyway.

#### We’ll go to war with Russia and China because of entrapment

Edelstein 2018 – Prof in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Dept. of Government @ Georgetown  
David M and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “It’s a trap! Security commitments and the risks of entrapment” in *US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case for Restraint*, Routledge Press, p. 32

The preceding discussion (summarized in Table 2.1) has large implications for the United States. During the Cold War, bipolarity constrained the importance of allies, limiting the risk of entrapment. Moreover, the prospect of nuclear war discouraged risky behavior by the superpowers and their allies. Today, however, the risk of entrapment born of moral hazard and states' search for security is larger and possibly increasing. As long as the US continues to make commitments overseas and fear the emergence of a peer competitor, American partners will be tempted to act in risky ways, expecting that Washington will feel compelled to come to their rescue should they get into trouble. Insofar as the United States opposes Chinese or Russian aggression, smaller states will be tempted to provoke China or Russia to garner growing American support. If the United States is opposed to the emergence of great power peer competitors, then it may well opt to come to the aid of smaller states threatened by those potential competitors. This also means that countries that have limited or no explicit security commitments from the United States may try to profit from the insurance policy offered by the United States by provoking conflicts and expecting the United States - whose interests are clear - to ride to their defense. In the next section, we take a preliminary look at some evidence to test these claims. We focus on events in East and Southeast Asia over the last few years. Some have characterized Chinese aggression in recent years as reactionary. That is, China has felt compelled to respond to perceived provocations from smaller Asian nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Even though the US does not have formal security commitments to either country, Washington subsequently feels compelled to signal to these countries that it will stand up to Chinese aggression.

#### Because of US security, our allies have been increasingly challenging China – risks miscalc

Edelstein & Shifrinson 18 [David M. Edelstein - Associate Professor of International Affairs in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Center for Security Studies, and Department of Government at Georgetown University; Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson - BA Brandeis University, PhD Massachusetts Institute of Technology, He has special expertise in great power politics since 1945 and U.S. engagement in Europe and Asia; *U.S. Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case for Restraint*; “Chapter 2: It’s a Trap”; pg. 35-36; Published by *Routledge* // Brower]

The second driver of entrapment comes from the response by East Asian countries themselves. It will be some time before we have detailed evidence on what was said to whom that convinced the Obama administration to pivot to East Asia. Nevertheless, the East Asian response since 2010--2011 suggests that moral hazard is increasing risks for the United States. One of the most striking trends in East Asia since the pivot is the renewed assertiveness of East Asian states in dealing with China (Johnston 2013; Associated Press 2015). This trend includes independent action by the Japanese, Filipino, Vietnamese, and other military forces to take a forward-leaning stance on maritime disputes that, at minimum, helps to justify a Chinese response. Japan, Korea, and others lobbied for the pivot for the express purpose of having the United States help them manage the rise of China - the implication being that, without an active American role, they would either bandwagon with China or engage in increasingly aggressive policies with a large risk of war. As things stand, East Asia is already witness to an arms race and militarized interstate disputes: Japan is taking increasing military measures to confront Chinese incursions into the disputed Senkakus, including regularly confronting Chinese aircraft flying over the disputed region (Gady 2015; Reuters 2016a; Kazianis 2016; Reynolds 2015);Vietnam and the Philippines have grown increasingly willing to confront China in the South China Sea while deepening military ties with other countries challenged by China (Torode 2015;Vietnam Right Now 2015; Bowcott 2015; Reuters 20166); and even Australia - which has no maritime disputes with China - has taken to militarily challenging Chinese maritime claims (Defense News 2015; News.com.au 2015). Independently, none of these countries (except perhaps Japan) has the wherewithal to defeat China. These actions are almost certainly born of the expectation that the United States will come to their aid if a dispute escalates to war.4Thus, unless the pivot has had no effect on allied behavior, then its main influence has been to (1) avoid bandwagoning, but (2) allow the very assertiveness the United States nominally sought to avoid in the first place! To put the issue differently, the claims employed by Asian allies and partners to push what became the pivot strongly suggest that it encouraged their over-assertiveness. This is moral hazard: take away the United States' post-pivot policy, and the East Asian allies would almost certainly not be tilting with China to the same extent. Some smaller allies, in fact, might bandwagon altogether. If so, this suggests the extent to which entrapment dynamics are at play. In sum, entrapment is alive and well in terms of both the arguments employed and the policies adopted by the United States and its allies since the late 2000s. No war has occurred, but crises are ongoing, and the intensity of American backing for its East Asian clients is growing. This is a recipe for miscalculation. As American forces continue to move into the region, as American diplomacy continues to take an anti-China flavor, and as allies simultaneously spur and build upon these trends, the United States is approaching active involvement in the wrong conflicts, at the wrong time, and in the wrong place. The United States has an interest in maintaining japan and other major states as independent actors friendly to the United States, noting their particular island disputes with China. Entrapment is alive and well as the United States mistakes the latter for the former. And, importantly, even if the United States decides at some point that conflict with China is necessary to protect its national interests, the US could still be entrapped by its allies into fighting that conflict at an unwelcome time with unattractive goals and using extraordinary means. In short, the US need not be drawn into a wholly unwelcome war for entrapment to nonetheless occur.

#### American primacy in space exploration makes conflict inevitable – rogue nations & space rivalries

Funnell 18 [Antony Funnell, Walkley award-winning journalist, author, and broadcaster for ABC, “War in space 'inevitable' because there's so much money to be made, expert warns,” 8/23/18, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-24/conflict-in-space-is-inevitable-expert-warns/10146314>] sg

A very crowded space The US Government and American firms continue to play a dominant role in more traditional space technology development and deployment. SpaceX, for example, is a major private supplier of rockets, while the US Air Force currently coordinates international satellite traffic, providing advanced warnings about potentially dangerous space debris. Listen to the episode Are we moving away from the notion that space is for all humankind? And **is conflict in space inevitable**? But the number of players is rapidly increasing. The OECD's Space Forum says more than 80 countries now have some form of space program, mostly concentrated on rockets, satellites and satellite-related services and technology. They estimate the global industry is worth somewhere around $US400 billion and growing quickly. And that figure could skyrocket if, and when, asteroid mining kicks off. Eric Stallmer, the president of the US-based Commercial Spaceflight Federation, a consortium of 85 space-related organisations and businesses, believes that moment is fast approaching. "I think we are looking at a five to 10-year timetable for developing that technology. It makes for an exciting time," he said. The new frontier **Despite the growing international competition, US officials continue to refer to space in hegemonic terms.** Earlier this month US Vice-President Mike Pence spoke of outer space as the "next great American frontier", while Defence Secretary James Mattis described it as one of America's "vital national interests". He then went on to warn that **it was becoming a "contested war fighting domain".** "We have got to adapt to that reality," he said. "**It's on par with the air, land, sea and cyberspace domains in terms of it being contested**. And we've got to be able to compete, to deter and to win." America's new Space Force — a separate and independent arm of the military — is set to be established by 2020. Sorry, this video has expired VIDEO: 'I've always said that rich guys seem to like rockets': Trump is launching a space military (ABC News) There's also to be a Space Command and a Space Development Agency, tasked with the creation of future space technologies. America's main space-related military activity — such as the deployment of defence satellites — is currently undertaken by the US Air Force on behalf of other branches of the military. Much of that role is likely to be given over to this new entity, but exactly how the Space Force will operate, and the broad nature of its brief, still remains a mystery. The Pentagon has been tasked with finalising the details, which will then be put before Congress for final approval. Only last year, the Congress rejected the need for such a service. "I think people have very different ideas about what this Space Force might look like," Professor de Zwart said. "Is it intended to do capacity building, to train up astronauts, for example, or are you talking about something more science fiction oriented, like placing forces in space? "I think what people are worried about is the sense that **the establishment of a Space Force** **means** that **we would immediately have something that looks like war fighting in space."** An arms race in space? Artist concept of a spacecraft over Psyche PHOTO: An artist's concept of a spacecraft over the Psyche asteroid. (NASA/JPL: Peter Rubin) Dr Gbenga Oduntan, a reader in international commercial law at Kent University, also worries about a "weaponisation" of space. He believes the precedent set by the Space Force decision could backfire on the US, **if non-democratic rivals secretly begin developing their own space weapons programmes in response.** "A Western country like the United States ought to present leadership and not be the one that is running in the direction of an arms race," he said. "We know for sure that **the Russians have reacted to the Space Force plan announced by Trump**, they have promised that they are going to step up their own and take it seriously." But fears about the weaponsation of space have long pre-dated Donald Trump's Space Force initiative. Space Force logos PHOTO: The six logo options proposed for the US Space Force, which is set to be established by 2020. (Trump 2020) In early 2007 China was criticised by the international community for testing an anti-satellite missile system against one of its own surplus weather satellites. The test resulted in the destruction of the satellite and the creation of thousands of pieces of space debris. Beijing claimed the incident was not intended to be threatening, but it's possible the test may have influenced American military thinking as a result. In February this year the office of the US Director of National Intelligence named both China and Russia as potential military rivals in space. The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community report stated: "We assess that, if a future conflict were to occur involving Russia or China, either country would justify attacks against US and allied satellites as necessary to offset any perceived US military advantage derived from military, civil or commercial space systems." An end to multilateralism Associate Professor Oduntan believes the US and other countries may be violating international law by developing weapons for space, and by encouraging the possibility of commercial asteroid mining. He says both the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Moon Agreement of 1979 were designed to prevent the "unilateral and unbridled commercial exploitation of outer-space resources". But, he acknowledges that while the United States is a signatory to the 1967 Treaty, it has never ratified the Moon Agreement. Will people return to the Moon? It's inevitable that mankind will return to the Moon, but the arguments for going there have changed dramatically since the Apollo missions, experts say. For more than a decade now, the UN-aligned Conference on Disarmament has been discussing a possible update or accompaniment to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, a new multilateral agreement. As part of those ongoing negotiations, both the Russians and the Chinese have proposed an agreement called the PPWT, essentially a treaty that would ban the placement of military weapons in outer space. The treaty negotiations have repeatedly been criticised by the US. Dr Oduntan believes such an agreement could be effective if the United States was persuaded to come onboard. "They have announced that they are not part of it, they are being cool towards it," he said. "And therefore we have the bizarre situation where it is China and Russia that are making joint proposals and joint presentations as to what this treaty should contain. "A lot of states, from Sri Lanka to Nigeria to the Netherlands, they've all made contributions, working papers, ideas on what this treaty should contain, and even United Kingdom. However, the US Senate is extremely careful on what it ratifies, and that's not very good for the progress of international law." YOUTUBE: The Moon offers resource deposits and China recently launched the Magpie Bridge satellite to help with exploration. Professor de Zwart says the Outer Space Treaty served a specific purpose during the Cold War in preventing an escalation of military activity on both sides of the Iron Curtain. "The two superpowers of the day were capable and had sent people and objects into space," she said. "So, it was a recognition of the fact that they knew that if you placed a weapon of mass destruction in space, it could cause harm to the entire Earth. It was an enormously valuable treaty." However, **she now believes the days of multilateral space treaties are over.** "It doesn't have any teeth now. What you have now is a greater number of space-faring nations and, of course, you have that very unanticipated explosion of commercial uses of space," she said. Instead, she's part of an international project called the Woomera Manual, that has seen dozens of experts come together to draft a "definitive document" on security law as it applies to space. The hope is that the manual might make it easier to persuade nation states to comply with existing international agreements. Listen to the podcast Listen to the podcast Future Tense explores new ideas and new technologies. However, Professor de Zwart concedes that getting all players to act responsibly could prove impossible. "**You may have rogue nations who would be prepared to allow launches from their states**, for example. **Launches that don't comply with any environmental law regulations**," she said. "But the fear of the rogue actor is something that we have in all walks of life and not just in the space environment." The Woomera Manual is expected to be completed in 2020, the same year America's new Space Force is due to come into effect.

#### Multipolarity accelerates the relevance of multilateral institutions. It creates a platform for geopolitical and economic dispute resolution and sends concrete diplomatic and economic signals which ensures stability

Rosenberg 19 Mark Y. Rosenberg is the CEO of Geoquant and an adjunct professor at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs and the University of California, Berkeley’s Haas School of Business. [“Experts Get Multipolarity All Wrong,” *Foreign Affairs*, 6-24-2019, URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/24/experts-get-multipolarity-all-wrong/>] DTS

In our multipolar era, G-20 meetings have taken on growing importance as a forum to air and negotiate conflicts. Witness the upcoming summit this week among the group of leading rich and developing nations in Osaka, Japan, where deep threats to the existing world order will be addressed head-on: rising tensions between the United States and Iran, a growing trade war between the world’s two largest economies, the state and strength of NATO, unpredictability in the relationship between the world’s top two nuclear powers, and a lack of rules governing increasingly borderless tech companies. At the end of June, the world’s major players could make substantial progress addressing all of them. If they do, it will fly in the face of punditry dismissing summits as increasingly pointless diplomatic exercises, evidence of a rudderless international system following the decline of Pax Americana. In the “G-Zero” world, according to this line of thinking, power has been spread too wide and thin. And too many competing participants have been invited into too many multilateral decision-making bodies, diluting their impact and importance—to the detriment of the global economy and global markets. It is certainly true that a more diffuse distribution of power reduces stability, makes anarchy more likely, and undermines the provision of global public goods—indeed, that is effectively an axiom of international relations. But that doesn’t mean that institutions like the G-20 are obsolete. In fact, the more multipolarity accelerates, the more meaningful and relevant multilateral institutions will become. This is true for two main reasons. First, given the United States’ decreased appetite for providing public goods (including trade regimes, shipping lanes, and security guarantees), other powers such as China, Japan, Russia, and even the European Union are stepping in to fill the void. And even if the body is flawed, the G-20 can provide critical coordination and conflict resolution mechanisms for such efforts. Second, and relatedly, such forums provide business and markets with critical information about how alliances and power dynamics are shifting in a more fluid international system. That’s true even if global policymaking itself is less efficient. The upcoming Osaka summit should prove an excellent example. It offers a timely opportunity to gather together every key external player in the Iran imbroglio, for example. Although formal progress toward better U.S.-Iran relations is unlikely, the summit will provide important signals on the potential for war and peace. In addition, expect host and new G-20 president Japan to coordinate anti-protectionist nations at the summit, exploiting its star role in sustaining the (now sans-United States) Trans-Pacific Partnership and its new EU-Japan trade deal to do so. At the very least, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe can provide positive atmospherics for a much-anticipated summit meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, the outcome of which could determine the fate, at least in the near-to-medium term, of the global economy. At the same time, Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin are also scheduled to meet, which is relevant not only in light of the breakdown of U.S.-Russian arms treaties but also in terms of growing conflict over Russia between the White House and the U.S. Congress. Meanwhile, G-20 finance ministers appear to have made significant progress in agreeing to a new digital tax on multinational firms, a major development in the growing conflict between tech companies and the state that will likely be reinforced at the approaching summit. Recent trends in U.S. and global markets help reinforce these points. First, increasing geopolitical risk has actually accompanied a boom in U.S. and global equity markets, suggesting that declining U.S. hegemony and growing multipolarity is not necessarily bad for business—or at least for stock prices. At the same time, markets have often turned downward around the time of recent G-20 summits. At the very least, this pattern indicates the G-20 events are important to markets, suggesting that developments at G-20 meetings may wake up the market to otherwise discounted or mispriced geopolitical risks. The importance of the G-20 and bodies like it will only grow in a more multipolar world. As rare but institutionalized gatherings of major global political economies and their leaders, G-20 forums will be the place to understand shifting alliances and power dynamics. They will provide information about major geopolitical and geoeconomic uncertainties. Political and economic deals will be done and undone; conflicts revived and resolved; grievances accelerated and appeased. The result will not be order, per se. But it will certainly be more order—and more information about that order. In short: something far greater than zero.

### Teachers

#### **Climate Change Education is super ineffective**

Kwuak 11/5[ Christina Kwauk Nonresident Fellow - Global Economy and Development, Center for Universal Education 11/5/2021 Brookings “Who’s making the grade on climate change education ambition?” <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/whos-making-the-grade-on-climate-change-education-ambition/> ] //aaditg

\*cce = climate change eduction

\*\*Nationally Determined Contributions = NDCs

Overall, education and CCE ambition, are poor. Of the 95 countries with updated, revised, or new NDCs, 76% are referencing education (up from 68% of 160 first NDCs in the 2019 analysis). While this may sound good initially, it is important to note that the majority of these references position education in general terms: 1) as a generic pathway to success of a non-education sector’s climate action strategy (e.g. education about recycling to strengthen a country’s waste management strategy); 2) as a positive outcome from the success of another sector’s contribution (e.g. electrification helps increase educational opportunities); 3) as collateral damage (e.g. hurricane damage to schools); or 4) as a demographic variable to describe the country’s population. Only 24% of NDCs specifically mention the education of children and youth (down from 26% in the 2019 analysis). Meanwhile, only 21% of NDCs mention CCE; none are calling for compulsory CCE as a climate strategy. In terms of the quality of CCE, a few countries are leading the charge. However, the overall progress in CCE remains stagnant (see Table 1). For instance, none of the countries calling for CCE in their NDCs are calling for CCE that is based on science, leaving room for the co-optation of CCE by vested interests, even when climate change is already being taught in science classrooms. Although more countries (11) referenced the need to create educational pathways to careers in the green economy, actors invested in seeing a just transition to a green economy—including the United Kingdom and the United States—should be concerned that NDCs are not seriously attending to the education and training needs of the present or future workforce.

* No briteline on how much education is good
* No warrant in last ev – didn’t get to it
* Other countries solve
* Current education good enough – innovators like Tesla, apple, etc

### AI Deterrence

#### AI control of nuclear weapons makes escalation more likely by removing humanity from decisions

Rodriguez 19

(Jonathan, Bachelor of Arts/Science, Stanford University. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-04/features/keep-human-control-over-new-weapons)

Michael T. Klare’s article “Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War” (ACT, March 2019) highlights important issues, but omits enormous strategic risks inhearent to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in a role of command. In a war between major powers, both sides’ AI systems would be able to outperform humans in the application of game theory, similar to state-of-the-art poker-playing AI, which can now readily defeat the top human players. Nation-states would be tempted to endow these genius-level autonomous killing systems with the authority to escalate, bringing the risk of bad luck causing misunderstandings that lead to uncontrolled escalation. Exacerbating the risk of near-instant autonomous escalation is the risk of an AI system deciding that it, unlike a human, may have nothing to lose. A human commander might be a father or mother who might choose to put the preservation of the human race above nationalistic warmongering. Recall how Soviet air defense officer Stanislav Petrov (a father of two) saved the world in 1983 by choosing to disbelieve a computerized system that claimed a U.S. nuclear first strike was in progress. His decision may have included a desire to put mercy over patriotism and not to participate in the annihilation of the human race. Unfortunately, an AI system would have no such qualms. An AI system might or might not be trained with a self-preservation instinct. If not, it would not care if it is destroyed, and it could take needless risks, carelessly bluffing and escalating, seeking to make the adversary back down through suicidal brinksmanship. One might think, therefore, that it is important to endow battlefield AI systems with a self-preservation instinct, but the consequences of doing so could be even worse. Once a weaponized AI system is given a self-preservation instinct, it may become impossible to shut down, as it would kill anyone who tried to shut it off, including its own country’s military or government leaders. These killings might play out in several ways. On a small scale, the system could limit its “self-defense” killings by targeting only the officials trying to disable the AI system. Worse, the AI system could try to preserve itself by threatening mutually assured destruction: if it ever suspected, even incorrectly, that its shutdown was imminent, the AI system could retaliate with the launch of nuclear weapons. A dying AI system, still energized for a few milliseconds by the last electrical charge remaining in its internal capacitors, could even nuke not just its own nation but the entire surface of Earth.

**AI increases the risk of nuclear conflict: spoofing, dataset bias, overconfidence, escalation cycles, secrecy**

#### Klare, 20

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There are many reasons to be wary of increasing the automation of nuclear command and control, especially when it comes to computer-assisted decision-making. Many of these technologies are still in their infancy and prone to malfunctions that cannot easily be anticipated. Algorithms that have developed through machine learning, a technique whereby computers are fed vast amounts of raw data and are “trained” to detect certain patterns, can become very good at certain tasks, such as facial recognition, but often contain built-in biases conveyed through the training data. These systems also are prone to unexplainable malfunctions and can be fooled, or “spoofed,” by skilled professionals. No matter how much is spent on cybersecurity, moreover, NC3 systems will always be vulnerable to hacking by sophisticated adversaries.16 AI-enabled systems also lack an ability to assess intent or context. For example, does a sudden enemy troop redeployment indicate an imminent enemy attack or just the normal rotation of forces? Human analysts can use their sense of the current political moment to help shape their assessment of such a situation, but machines lack that ability and may tend to assume the worst. This aspect of human judgment arose in a famous Cold War incident. In September 1983, at a time of heightened tensions between the superpowers, a Soviet nuclear watch officer, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, received an electronic warning of a U.S. missile attack on Soviet territory. Unsure of the accuracy of the warning, he waited before informing his superiors of the strike and eventually told them he believed it was a computer error, as proved to be the case, thus averting a possible nuclear exchange. Machines are not capable of such doubts or hesitations.17 Another problem is the lack of real world data for use in training NC3 algorithms. Other than the two bombs dropped on Japan at the end of World War II, there has never been an actual nuclear war and therefore no genuine combat examples for use in devising reality-based attack responses. War games and simulations can be substituted for this purpose, but none of these can accurately predict how leaders will actually behave in a future nuclear showdown. Therefore, decision-support programs devised by these algorithms can never be fully trusted. “Automated decision-support systems … are only as good as the data they rely on. Building an automated decision-support tool to provide early warning of a preemptive nuclear attack is an inherently challenging problem because there is zero actual data of what would constitute reliable indicators of an imminent preemptive nuclear attack.”18 An equal danger is what analysts call “automation bias,” or the tendency for stressed-out decision-makers to trust the information and advice supplied by advanced computers rather than their own considered judgment. For example, a U.S. president, when informed of sensor data indicating an enemy nuclear attack and under pressure to make an immediate decision, might choose to accept the computer’s advice to initiate a retaliatory strike rather than consider possible alternatives, such as with Petrov’s courageous Cold War action. Given that AI data systems can be expected to gain ever more analytical capacity over the coming decades, “it is likely that humans making command decisions will treat the AI system’s suggestions as on a par with or better than those of human advisers,” a 2018 RAND study noted. “This potentially unjustified trust presents new risks that must be considered.”19 Compounding all these risks is the likelihood that China, Russia, and the United States will all install automated NC3 systems but without informing each other of the nature and status of these systems. Under these circumstances, it is possible to imagine a “flash war,” roughly akin to a “flash crash” on Wall Street, that is triggered by the interaction of competing corporate investment algorithms. In such a scenario, the data assessment systems of each country could misinterpret signs of adversary moves and conclude an attack is imminent, leading other computers to order preparatory moves for a retaliatory strike, in turn prompting the similar moves on the other side, until both commence a rapid escalatory cycle ending in nuclear catastrophe.20

### Econ

**No war from decline**

**Clary 15**. Cristopher Clary has a PhD in political science from MIT, MA in national security affairs, postdoctoral fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University [“Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries”, 4/25/15, *MIT Political Science*, URL: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712>]

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with **conciliatory policies** between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the **biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation** is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on **data from 109 distinct rival dyads** since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately **twice as likely** to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true **controlling for all of the main alternative explanations** for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry. Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. **Collectively**, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice. **Economic Crisis Leads to Austerity** Economic crises generate pressure for austerity. Government revenues are a function of national economic production, so that when production diminishes through recession, revenues available for expenditure also diminish. Planning almost invariably assumes growth rather than contraction, so the deviation in available revenues compared to the planned expenditure can be **sizable**. When growth slowdowns are prolonged, the cumulative departure from planning targets can grow even further, even if no single quarter meets the technical definition of recession. Pressures for austerity are felt most acutely in governments that face difficulty borrowing to finance deficit expenditures. This is especially the case when this borrowing relies on international sources of credit. Even for states that can borrow, however, intellectual attachment to balanced budgets as a means to restore confidence—a belief in what is sometimes called “expansionary austerity”—generates incentives to curtail expenditure. These incentives to cut occur precisely when populations are experiencing economic hardship, making reductions especially painful that target poverty alleviation, welfare programs, or economic subsidies. As a result, mass and elite constituents strongly resist such cuts. Welfare programs and other forms of public spending may be especially susceptible to a policy “ratchet effect,” where people are very reluctant to forego benefits once they have become accustomed to their availability.6 As Paul Pierson has argued, “The politics [of welfare state] retrenchment is typically treacherous, because it imposes tangible losses on concentrated groups of voters in return for diffuse and uncertain gains.”7 Austerity Leads to Cutbacks in Defense Spending At a minimum, the political costs of pursuing austerity through cutbacks in social and economic expenditures alone make such a path unappealing. In practice, this can spur policymakers to curtail national security spending as a way to balance budgets during periods of economic turmoil. There is often more discretion over defense spending than over other areas in the budget, and it is frequently distantly connected to the welfare of the mass public. Many militaries need foreign arms and foreign ammunition for their militaries, so defense expenditures are doubly costly since they both take up valuable defense budget space while also sending hard currency overseas, rather than constituencies at home. Pursuing defense cuts may also conform to the preferences of the financial sector, which shows a **strong aversion** to military conflict even if that means policies of appeasement and conciliation.8 During periods of economic expansion, the opportunity costs associated with defense expenditure—the requirement for higher taxes or foregone spending in other areas—are real but acceptable. Economic contraction heightens the opportunity costs by forcing a choice between different types of spending. There is a constituency for defense spending in the armed services, intelligence agencies, and arms industries, but **even in militarized economies** this constituency tends to be numerically much smaller than those that favor social and economic expenditures over military ones. Defense Cutbacks Encourage Rapprochement An interest in defense cutbacks can lead to conciliatory behavior through two paths. **First**, the cutbacks themselves serve as a **concrete signal** to adversaries that the military threat posed by the economically distressed state is declining. This permits the other state to halt that portion of defense spending dedicated to keeping up, **breaking the back of ongoing arms races** through reciprocated, but non-negotiated moves. Unilateral conventional force reductions were a major element of Gorbachev’s foreign policy in the late 1980s, alongside negotiated strategic arms control, and diplomatic efforts to achieve political understandings with the United States.9 Gorbachev similarly used force reductions in Afghanistan, Mongolia, and the Soviet Far East to signal to China in 1987 that he was serious about political negotiations.10 Elsewhere, non-negotiated, tit-for-tat military redeployments facilitated Argentina-Brazil rapprochement.11 **Second**, leaders may believe cutbacks are necessary, but would be dangerous in the absence of negotiated improvements with traditional foes. Economic downturns can serve as **motivation to pursue arms control** or political settlement. During periods of normalcy, such outcomes would be positives, but are viewed as “too hard” by political leaders that move from one urgent problem to the next. During periods of economic crisis, however, arms control or political improvements might allow for much needed cuts in defense spending, and are **pursued with greater vigor**. The Johnson administration attempted both unilateral and negotiated arms limitations because of budgetary concerns as President Johnson and Secretary McNamara struggled to pay for the “Great Society” domestic programs and the increasingly costly Vietnam War. They first attempted unilateral “caps” on costly nuclear forces and anti-ballistic missile defenses and when this failed to lead to a reciprocal Soviet response they engaged in formal arms control talks. Détente continued in the Nixon administration, accelerating in 1971 and 1972, simultaneous with rising budget deficits and inflation so serious that Nixon instituted price controls. Nixon’s decision to sharply limit anti-ballistic missile defenses to enable arms control talks was **contrary to his strategic views, but necessitated by a difficult budgetary environment** that made paying for more missile defense emplacements unrealistic.12 As Nixon told his national security advisor Kissinger in an April 1972 discussion of ballistic missile and anti-ballistic missile developments: “You know we've got a hell of a budget problem. We've got to cut it down, we've got to cut 5 billion dollars off next year's defense budget. So, I don't want to [inaudible: do it?] unless we've got some settlement with the Russians.”13 In practice, unilateral defense cuts and force reductions are frequently combined with negotiated political agreements in a sequential, iterative fashion, where a unilateral reduction will **signal seriousness** that opens the way for political agreement, which in turn permits **even deeper reductions**. Defense cuts and force reductions are not only a means to achieve rivalry termination, but also a goal in and of themselves that rivalry termination helps secure. Leaders are seeking resources from defense they can use elsewhere. Thus when Argentine leader Raul Alfonsín campaigned for the need for drastic budgetary austerity, his specific “platform was the reduction of military spending to use it for the other ministries, connected with the concept of eliminating the hypothesis of conflict” with Argentinian rivals, according to Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini, who served in Alfonsín’s ministry of defense (and later was Argentina’s foreign minister).14 Similarly, Gorbachev was motivated to reduce arms in the late 1980s because he determined it was necessary to cut Soviet defense spending and defense production, and repurpose part of the defense industry to make consumer and civilian capital goods, according to contemporary U.S. Central Intelligence Agency classified assessments.15 Thus the “**main reason**” why strategic arms control breakthroughs occurred from 1986 to 1988 and the Soviet Afghan intervention concluded in 1989 was a realization within the Politburo of “excessively high expenditures on defense,” according to Nikolai Ryzhkov, Gorbachev’s prime minister.16 **Economic Downturns Provoke Strategic Reassessment**: Threat Deflation and Prioritization Economic downturns encourage leaders to seek new ideas to use to frame their policy problems. During periods of economic difficulty, elites can come to realize that their problems are not amenable to old solutions, and search for new ideas.17 During an economic crisis, politics and policy are “**more fluid**,” as old answers seem stale and insufficient.18 An ideational entrepreneur that can link economic **lemons** to foreign policy **lemonade** can find a patron when leaders are casting about for ways to reframe the world in acceptable ways to their peers and publics. The behavior of an old foe is often ambiguous, and can be viewed as either injurious to one’s interests or neutral toward them. During periods of normalcy, the motivation of defense establishments is tilted toward threat and danger. During periods of economic crisis, national leaders have a counteracting motivation to **downplay such dangers**, so that the threats faced by a nation are manageable through available resources. Economic difficulties provide a motivation for leaders to view equivocal signals from the international system in a way that is benign. To the extent that rivalries are perpetuated because of threat inflation, economic downturns provide incentives to deflate the threat, potentially **disrupting cycles of competition and enmity**. South Korean president Kim Dae-jong came to power in the aftermath of the 1998 Asian economic crisis, pursued a “sunshine policy” toward the North, cut South Korean defense spending in nominal and real terms, and pursued a policy toward North Korea that political scientist Dong Sun Lee called “threat deflation” despite the growing North Korean nuclear weapons threat.19 Economic crises can also spur strategic reassessment through another channel. If leaders view economic problems as structural, rather than a temporary gale, they may come to question whether available national resources are sufficient to confront all of the national threats identified in the past. This creates incentives to economize threats, seeking political settlements where possible in order to focus remaining resources on competitions that can be won. A concrete example: in 1904, the chancellor to the Exchequer wrote his cabinet colleagues: “[W]e must frankly admit that the financial resources of the United Kingdom are inadequate to do all that we should desire in the matter of Imperial defense.”20 The result was a British decision to minimize political disagreement with the United States and focus on other defense challenges. While such a decision is in line with realist advice, it occurred not when the power trajectories were evident to British decisionmakers but when the budget situation had reached a crisis that could no longer be ignored. Economic Downturns Increase Incentives for International Economic Cooperation Economic downturns not only create incentives to cut spending, they encourage **vigorous pursuit** of opportunities for economic cooperation. This, too, can engender conciliatory behavior. Economic downturns can **increase motives to pursue trade** and investment. Rivalries with old foes often directly impinge on trade and investment with the adversary and may indirectly impinge on trade and investment with third parties, especially if the rivalry is viewed as being likely to generate disruptive military conflict. Additionally, economic aid is sometimes used as an inducement for adversaries to set aside a political dispute. This aid can either serve as a side payment from one rival to another, or it can be offered by a third party to one or both rivals as an incentive to set aside lingering disputes. Such aid is more attractive during periods of economic turmoil than during periods of comparative normalcy. In South Asia, India and Pakistan struggled from 1947 to 1960 with how to manage water resources in the Indus Rivers basin, inheriting a canal system meant to service pre-partitioned India. Pakistan, suffering an economic downturn, and India, reliant on foreign aid to avert economic crisis, agreed to an Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 to resolve the lingering dispute, made possible in substantial part because of World Bank financing that was especially attractive to the struggling economies. In the Middle East, Egypt and Israel made the hard choices necessary for the Camp David accord in 1979 precisely because the Sadat and Begin governments faced difficult economic situations at home that made the U.S. aid guarantee in exchange for a peace agreement especially attractive.21 In 1982, the Yemen’s People’s Republic agreed to stop its attempts to destabilize Oman, because otherwise Yemen would not receive economic assistance from Arab oil producing states that it desperately needed.22 In the late 1990s, El Niño-induced flooding devastated Ecuador and Peru, spurring reconciliation as leaders sought to increase trade, secure investment, and slash military expenditures so they could be used at home.23 As one Western diplomat assessed at the time, Ecuador and Peru “have decided it's better to see reason…. They see foreign companies eager to invest in South America, and if Peru and Ecuador are in conflict, it makes them less attractive than, say, Argentina or Brazil or Chile for investment purposes. That's the last thing either country wants.”24 **Economic Downturns Can Cause Meaningful Leadership Change** The above mechanisms have identified how economic difficulties can alter the preferences of an incumbent leader. Additionally, economic crises can lead to leadership turnover and, during periods of difficulty, the selection process that determines new leadership can **loosen ideological strictures** that relate to extant rivalries. Leaders may be selected based on judgments about their ability to cope with economic problems, with greater elite acceptance of ideological heterogeneity in foreign policy beliefs than in periods of normalcy.25 In Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth’s words, “If everything is going well or is stable, then why select leaders who might subvert the triedand-true identity? But if that identity is leading to increased material difficulties, pressure for change will likely mount. In these circumstances, those who are willing to alter or adjust the hallowed precepts of the existing identity and its associated practices are more likely to assume power.”26 Economic crisis, then, can spur incumbent leaders to either **abandon the “baggage” of rivalry** or facilitate the selection of new leaders that do not carry such baggage. The most well-known example of an incumbent selectorate looking for a reformer, even one without much foreign policy experience, involves Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascension to the Soviet premiership. In political scientist Jerry Hough’s words, “If the rate of economic growth continued to decline, if administrative and labor efficiency continued to fall, if corruption was not punished, these conditions would have dangerous consequences for the [Soviet Union in the] 1980s and 1990s…. Gorbachev’s promotion was an answer to these concerns.”27

#### No impact to economic decline – prefer best studies

**Drezner 14** Daniel, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple **analysts asserted** that **the** financial **crisis would lead states to** increase their **use of force** as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether **through** greater internal repression, **diversionary wars, arms races, or** a ratcheting up of **great power conflict**. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. **The aggregate data suggest otherwise**, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "**the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is** approximately **the same as** it was in **2007**."43 **Interstate violence** in particular has **declined** since the start of the financial crisis, **as have military expenditures** in most sampled countries. Other **studies confirm** that **the** Great **Recession has not triggered** any increase in **violent conflict**, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "**the crisis has not** to date **generated** the surge in **protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion** that might have been expected