# 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters must have a cite listing their contact information on the 2020-2021 NDCA LD wiki 30 minutes before their round if they have a wiki.

#### Violation:

A screenshot of a computer

Description automatically generated

#### Standards –

#### 1] Pre round prep – it would be impossible to contact you before round, since I don’t know who to or your preferred contact – destroys preround prep because you could be breaking new, or making changes to your aff and I wouldn’t even know. Outweighs, since preround prep is a gateway issue to engagement. Exacerbated by the fact you have a wiki but intentionally chose not to put contact info so it is impossible for me to engage.

#### 2] Clash – I could know more about your aff if I asked questions about it preround, which is key to indepth clash in round, otherwise you can get away with sneaky 1AR pivots. Prevents disclosing which solves predictability and allows debaters to prep for arguments before tournaments. Means, 1NC and 1AR blocks will become better because debaters can more easily form a coherent strategy. Strategy outweighs because it allows for in-depth argumentation and coherent rebuttals. Key to fairness because without strategy, debaters couldn’t win. Key to education because it creates better argumentation.

#### Fairness – [a] you assume the judge fairly evaluates arguments,

#### Education – [a] why schools fund debate only portable impact

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate c] indicts the debater/the whole aff - anything else is severance

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] Baiting – leads to debaters baiting the rvi with an abusive strategy which disinscnteiviizes checking abuse c] Substantive education, encourages going all in theory which kills substantive education

## 2

CP: **In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy except for indigenous media.**

External and internal pressures makes it impossible for indigenous media to give a truly unbiased perspective

#### Burrows 18

Elizabeth Burrows Griffith Centre for Social and Cultural Research, Griffith University, Australia The author thanks the many Indigenous media producers for generously giving their time and sharing their knowledge and experiences. Thanks also to my mentors Professor Susan Forde and Professor Andy Bennett for their help developing this article. Indigenous media producers’ perspectives on objectivity, balancing community responsibilities and journalistic obligations

Challenges impeding objectivity Regardless of their desire to produce objective, balanced content, Indigenous media producers face external and internal pressures that hinder their efforts. Limited access to politicians and mainstream organizations and threats of legal action or the withdrawal of funding or advertising have a chilling effect on Indigenous media producers’ ability to produce balanced news content. Interviewees were excluded from media conferences and experienced media blackouts and blacklisting (McNamara, 3 March 2005, telephone interview; McQuire, 20 February 2015, personal interview, Canberra, ACT, Australia). McQuire said the Indigenous Affairs Minister’s office had blacklisted her paper and that political sources ignored requests for comment, or she ‘received a three-line response’. ‘So the government weren’t given a proper hearing in our paper, but Aboriginal voices overwhelmingly were’ (McQuire, 20 February 2015, personal interview, Canberra, ACT, Australia). While former NIT journalist Tamara Giles (18 August 2004, telephone interview) said the NIT had received threats from government sources after it published content correcting inaccuracies or lies, ‘We’re such a small newspaper … sometimes you’ve got to weigh it up’. In 2004, the NIT offices and the editor’s home were raided after they published leaked information about the demise of ATSIC (The Age, 2004). While being raided improved the NIT’s credibility as a hardline political publication (Bousen, 2005), fear of such action impedes journalists’ ability or willingness to take on heavy political stories. For instance, the producers of Brisbane’s Kurbingui Star, a small Aboriginal publication run by community members with no journalistic experience, said they had received threats of legal action from sources, and this had left them wary of writing critical political stories (Parnell, 18 April 2005, personal interview, Brisbane, QLD, Australia; Warahai, 10 May 2005, personal interview, Brisbane, QLD, Australia). Indigenous media funding pressures can also shut down political debate. McQuire explained that the closure of the Tracker followed its publication of a front-page news story that criticized the Abbott government (McQuire, 20 February 2015, personal interview, Canberra, ACT, Australia; New Matilda, 2014). She said the Tracker’s funding body, the New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC), blamed financial pressures, but she believes it was ‘about politics, it really was about politics’. Consequently, while Indigenous media face criticism for their lack of objectivity and for producing one-sided content, blacklisting, media blackouts and political pressure can limit their ability to produce balanced political content. Blacklisting Indigenous media journalists, and applying funding, advertising and political pressure to publications, excludes Indigenous people from public sphere processes.

#### Indigenous Media’s first priority is to the community and the communities issues, objectivity is next. Objectivity is a standard that should be ignored as it stops indigenous media from being the key force it is.

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Elizabeth Burrows Griffith Centre for Social and Cultural Research, Griffith University, Australia The author thanks the many Indigenous media producers for generously giving their time and sharing their knowledge and experiences. Thanks also to my mentors Professor Susan Forde and Professor Andy Bennett for their help developing this article. Indigenous media producers’ perspectives on objectivity, balancing community responsibilities and journalistic obligations

Balancing community, journalistic obligations and conflicts of interest Rather than denying their lack of impartiality, some interviewees acknowledged and confronted their own bias. Condie (30 August 2004, telephone interview) argued that all journalists are biased and that his own bias was his indigeneity. He said his identity as a ‘proud Yidindji man’ informed his work. Similarly, Jake Keane explained, ‘I see myself as an Indigenous journalist, writing about Indigenous issues from the perspective of an Indigenous person. And at the same time I’m still an everyday person. I’m just a journalist and it’s all rolled into one’. Keane said his indigeneity provided awareness of and a responsibility to meet community expectations. Other interviewees cited conflicts of interest that occurred because of family connections. Finland’s Yle Sápmi journalist Aslak Pallto (6 July 2016, personal interview, Inari, Finland), whose family members are Sámi parliamentarians, acknowledged this and said his close community ties led to conflicts of interest. He explained that journalists manage such conflicts by having other people interview family members and ensuring ‘your name is not on the story; your voice is not heard’. Similarly, Condie (30 August 2004, telephone interview) said that Indigenous journalists ‘came into contact with family and relatives in positions of power [and that] could be problematic if you’re trying to do investigative journalism’. Trish McNamara (3 March 2005, telephone interview) said family members had expected family needs to come before her professional responsibilities. She described how one family member did not speak to her for 3months because they did not believe ‘she had the right to put the story to print’. McNamara explained that she did not cover sensitive news stories if all family members involved were not in agreement. Indigenous media producers are aware that their closeness to their community creates conflicts of interest, and they seek ways to manage such situations. Unlike mainstream media journalists, Indigenous media producers must balance their community commitments with their journalistic obligations. Solua Middleton (5 October 2004, telephone interview) and Tamara Giles (18 August 2004, telephone interview) suggested that building trust with community members was essential to reconciling competing responsibilities. Middleton said she was patient, gentle and not forceful, while Giles said she took great care to represent people accurately and read paraphrased quotes back to her sources to ensure she accurately reflected their point. Giles said, ‘There’s a trust there. I’ve still got to live amongst the community, and run into people, whereas mainstream media journalists I don’t think have that problem’. The Indigenous community is large but well connected (Middleton, 5 October 2004, telephone interview), and journalists rely on accessing Indigenous sources to do their jobs (McNamara, 3 March 2005, telephone interview). Middleton (5 October 2004, telephone interview) pointed out that ‘Someone will always know someone who’s related to someone’, so she is ‘gentler in her practices’. Working with a small, close-knit community means journalists feel a heightened responsibility to behave ethically, or they may find it hard to find sources in future. Reporting on protest situations creates challenges for Indigenous media producers, who must separate their personal views from their journalistic work. Sweden’s Samefolket magazine editor Asa Lindstrand (9 July 2016, personal interview, Jokkmokk, Sweden) explained that she avoided covering Sweden’s Gállok protest to prevent a conflict of interest. The Sámi people were protesting against the UK Beowulf Mining Company’s planned open-cut iron ore mine in the Jokkmokk area on Sámi land. As an active protestor and the Samefolket editor and journalist, Lindstrand (9 July 2016, personal interview, Jokkmokk, Sweden) said she ‘had a bit of a fight with myself, you know I’ve been to the Swedish University of Journalism, and I was, ‘Can I do this?’ Similarly, former NIT and Tracker editor Amy McQuire (20 February 2015, personal interview, Canberra, ACT, Australia) said she saw her role as being to ‘stand back and observe’ when attending Aboriginal protests in Australia. ‘I’m protesting, but I’m there for another purpose: to record it’. The lines between providing public relations support and operating in a journalistic capacity can also become blurred. Torres News editor and journalist Corey Bousen (24 February 2005, personal interview, Brisbane, QLD, Australia) said sometimes community organizations requested public relations help – for example, writing media releases – but since those organizations might be in conflict with the Torres Strait Regional Authority (TRSA), it could put him into a conflict of interest situation. Bousen (24 February 2005, personal interview, Brisbane, QLD, Australia) said he knew how to manage such conflicts and he helped when he could, but ‘it’s very difficult when you’re asked by six of the most widely recognized leaders’. Therefore, despite attracting criticism for their lack of objectivity, Indigenous media producers demonstrated their support for and recognition of the need for fact-based, unbiased journalism and for not reporting on events with which they were personally involved, and also their awareness of conflicts of interests and ways of acting to avoid them. Discussion and conclusion Applying a modified version of objectivity Conventional definitions relating to objectivity revolve around reporting facts in a fair, balanced, impartial and value-free manner while applying ‘good reporting methods and standards’ and avoiding bias (Schudson, 2001; Ward, 2004; Wien, 2005). While most interviewees do seek to utilize ethical, careful reporting methods and standards in order to produce factual, fair, balanced content, they acknowledge that their work is not unbiased and they are not impartial. Indigenous media producers – especially those who are Indigenous themselves – are torn between upholding community responsibilities and their professional obligations. They must negotiate the tension between being the deliverer and the receiver of news (el-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002; Iskandar and el-Nawawy, 2004). For Indigenous interviewees, their indigeneity is part of their identity. For ***Indigenous interviewees are advocate*s** for the Indigenous communities they represent. Interviewees did not try to divorce themselves from these realities; they acknowledged their own biases but challenged mainstream media claims of objectivity when reporting Indigenous affairs (Clayton-Dixon, 14 March 2017, telephone interview; McQuire, 20 February 2015, personal interview, Canberra, ACT, Australia; Moncrieff, 18 August 2014, personal interview, Darwin, Australia; Ruska, 29 January 2016, personal interview, Stradbroke Island, QLD, Australia). Consequently, while Indigenous media do demonstrate an Indigenous bias and do prioritize Indigenous voices, producers argue that these media offer a counterbalance to mainstream media’s exclusion of Indigenous voices and to stereotypical, inaccurate and discriminatory coverage of Indigenous affairs. Commitment to community versus professional values Individual Indigenous media perform unique roles, and their subsequent goals and motivations influence how producers apply journalistic values and conventions; however, a commonality is their commitment to Indigenous communities. While some Indigenous media perform public sphere roles and facilitate information-sharing between Indigenous communities, broader society and policy-makers, others operate at a local public sphere level only. Caspi and Elias (2011: 63) suggest that ethnic media can be media-by, media-for or media-about. Similarly, I differentiate Indigenous media as ‘inwards’- and/or ‘outwards’-focused media. However, regardless of whether Indigenous media content is focused inwards or outwards, interviewees in Australia, Canada, Sweden, Finland and New Zealand were all committed to serving their Indigenous communities. Indigenous media provide a ‘critical service’ for communities and are ‘about survival’ (Meadows et al., 2009: 133). They distribute essential community information regarding health, education and land rights; they are tools of resistance and empowerment and link absent community members (Meadows et al., 2009: 135). ‘Inwards’-focused Indigenous media provide unique content that prioritizes Indigenous voices and perspectives. Even ‘outwards’-focused Indigenous media that seek to influence broader national and international audiences have their Indigenous community’s needs at heart. Indigenous media challenge misrepresentations, inaccuracies and stereotypical reportage and disseminate Indigenous truth to a broader audience (Caspi and Elias, 2011: 63). Indigenous people require communication mechanisms through which to present their own truths, despite the risk of outsiders considering these Indigenous truths as ‘threatening’ because they ‘position the teller outside the realm of ‘objective commentary, and inside one of subjective action’ (Sium and Ritskes, 2013: IV). Sium and Ritskes (2013) argue that dominant powers have wielded the notion of objectivity against Indigenous people by dismissing Indigenous communication methods as lacking validity and rigour. While interviewees confirmed their commitment to Indigenous communities, they also acknowledged the challenge balancing community needs against journalistic conventions creates. For Indigenous people producing Indigenous media, their community responsibilities may override their commitment to their journalistic professionalism (Zandberg and Neiger, 2005). Most media producers discussed in this article have formal university qualifications or on-the-job training but face internal conflicts when balancing community, organizational, journalistic and public relations obligations. Debora Steel (Ha-Shilth-Sa editor) (22 July 2013, personal interview, Vancouver Island, BC, Canada) described grappling with the tension between reporting news and withholding information when the community was participating in treaty or fishing right negotiations with the Canadian Government. Similarly, journalists producing Land Rights News (Condie, 30 August 2004, telephone interview; Hodder, 26 August 2014, personal interview, Alice Springs, ACT, Australia; Moncrieff, 18 August 2014, personal interview, Darwin, Australia) and LRQ (Forde, 23 July 2004, personal interview, Brisbane, QLD, Australia; Howes, 21 July 2004, telephone interview) were required to promote their organization’s activities. Some struggled to balance their investigative journalistic work with their public relations obligations. Tracker editor Amy McQuire described editorial control battles between the Tracker editorial team and the publication’s funding organization, the NSWALC. In the end, their different priorities were insurmountable. Similarly, LRQ editor Susan Forde (23 July 2004, personal interview, Brisbane, QLD, Australia) found her funding organization’s demands that she stay on brief constrained her journalistic instincts. Consequently, community or organizational responsibilities can curtail Indigenous media producers’ journalistic freedoms. Furthermore, responsibility to maintain cultural or strategic sensitivities (for instance, land or treaty right negotiations) and external threats to funding can impede journalistic processes. Upholding journalistic or professional values is considered irrelevant for some media producers. Radical Indigenous media are designed to trenchantly challenge the status quo, societal attitudes, and government activity and processes. Downing (2001) defines radical media as ‘break[ing] somebody’s rules’, ‘small-scale’, ‘underfunded’, as generating movement support and solidarity and as communicating opposition against society’s power structures (pp. ix–xi). Fitting this schema, the WAR radical Indigenous publication Black Nations Rising (formerly Brisbane Blacks) is a decolonizing tool used to encourage resistance to colonial structures. Neither Pekeri Ruska (29 January 2016, personal interview, Stradbroke Island, QLD, Australia) nor Callum Clayton-Dixon (14 March 2017, telephone interview), who have both completed journalism degrees, felt obligated to produce content that mainstream media or audiences would consider objective. Their responsibility was to ‘tell stories of resistance and revival’ and produce an accurate Aboriginal historic record by publishing ‘firsthand accounts of what people are doing in their own words’ (Ruska, 29 January 2016, personal interview, Stradbroke Island, QLD, Australia). Clayton-Dixon (14 March 2017, telephone interview) explained that the goal of Black Nations Rising was to ‘give written and printed voice to some of the more marginalized Aboriginal political positions and views … that other publications may have been hindered to put out there’. Black Nations Rising embodies Sium and Ritskes’ (2013: iv) notion of Indigenous truth, and it makes no attempt to comply with journalistic objectivity or balance. Engaging with audience: impartiality and community commitment DeWerth-Pallmeyer (1997: 7, 10) argues that identifying news and publishing news stories are more important for mainstream media journalists than engaging with their audience; their audience is a saleable commodity used to entice advertisers. To address the resulting audience alienation, Batsell (2015) counsels journalists to be ‘courageous’ and expose themselves to ‘criticism and scepticism’ (p. x), while Davis Mersey (2010) suggests that they ‘listen, really listen, to the audience, reflect on what they hear, and respond’ (p. 126). In contrast to mainstream media’s audience detachment, alternative media journalists may be members of their target audiences and advocates for that community, and produce relevant, local content for their audience, as well as encouraging input into production processes (Atton, 2002: 16–17; Forde, 2011: 174; Traber, 1985). Alternative media producers ‘learn from’ their audiences as well as producing content for them (Rauch, 2007: 995). In this vein, Indigenous media producers prioritize their Indigenous audience and employ horizontal production practices to ensure that their audience feels connected to ‘their’ media. As has been discussed, Indigenous media producers’ community connections make impartiality impossible; however, those close connections also generate heightened levels of responsibility on producers to create content that is relevant to and valuable to their audiences. Indigenous media organizations, producers and communities encourage two-way communication that influence media producers’ journalistic processes and decision-making and demand that community engagement is undertaken with care and respect. Traber (1985) suggests alternative media espouse ‘a reversal of the news values of conventional journalism’ (p. 2). Interviewees support this notion through their reluctance to produce conflict-driven news (Howes, 21 July 2004, telephone interview; McQuire, 20 February 2015, personal interview, Canberra, ACT, Australia; Waharai, 10 May 2005, personal interview, Brisbane, QLD, Australia). Instead, interviewees expressed a preference for positive, empowering news content and described how audience members contacted them to share information about community and family events (Cheadle, 25 August 2004, telephone interview; McNamara, 3 March 2005, telephone interview; Steel, 22 July 2013, personal interview, Vancouver Island, BC, Canada). Former Koori Mail editor Barry Cheadle (25 August 2004, telephone interview) explained that the newspaper’s readers felt a sense of ownership over the publication – it is ‘their newspaper’. This perceived ownership imposes a unique level of responsibility for Indigenous media producers that demands they cannot afford to alienate their audience. Working with small, well-connected communities, Indigenous media producers must cultivate trusting, respectful relationships (McNamara, 3 March 2005, telephone interview; Middleton, 5 October 2004, telephone interview) to ensure that they can continue to access information and sources. For example, New Zealand’s Radio Raukawa FM’s project manager Andrew Paul (22 February 2017, personal interview, Tokoroa, New Zealand), who is developing the station’s future digital strategy, said the region’s kuia (their women elders) shared their perspectives on the station’s future direction during regular meetings held over a few months. Paul said their input provided the ‘genesis for this new digital strategy’. Similarly, Te Korimako O Taranaki FM’s station manager Tipene O’Brien (24 February 2017, personal interview, Welbourn, New Zealand) described the radio station’s core focus as ‘creating a hub for the local Māori community to be part of something that could help revive the culture’ as well as ‘rejuvenating Te Reo Māori’ (Māori language). Consequently, Indigenous media producers foster close community ties and encourage two-way communication processes that encourage community feedback and make remaining impartial impossible. **Indigenous media are biased** and they are partial. Attaining their raison d’être – to ‘exist for the community’ (Condie, 30 August 2004, telephone interview) – from a **detached, impartial position would be impossible**. However, their impartiality and community attachment do not diminish their value. Indigenous media are complex, multifaceted media with roles that extend beyond democratic functions and provide essential communication mechanisms for Indigenous peoples. They give voice to Indigenous people and perspectives, including those opposing dominant views and structures, and enhance democratic engagement and public sphere access. They are tools of decolonization and resistance, public relations mechanisms, strategic social movement aids, community hubs and sources of essential information about health, treaties, fishing rights, education and more. They inspire and support Indigenous youth; they protect, regenerate and uphold Indigenous languages; and they maintain family networks. Their producers cannot fulfil these functions from a detached, impartial position. Indigenous media producers are often qualified, professional journalists who produce quality, fact-driven journalism that draws on relevant, appropriate sources and provides valuable information to their audiences. However, producers are often torn between upholding their professional obligations, including objectivity, and meeting community responsibilities. While not operating in opposition to mainstream media, Indigenous media producers do strive to correct inaccurate, stereotypical, discriminatory, misleading and racist mainstream news portrayals of Indigenous issues, communities and people. Consequently, Indigenous media producers apply a modified version of objectivity that recognizes Indigenous community needs, values Indigenous truths and prioritizes Indigenous voices. Two-way communication flows between community members and producers allow community attitudes and needs to guide media directions, strategies, the interpretation of newsworthiness and source choice decisions. These media are critical communication mechanisms that provide audiences with alternative perspectives on issues affecting Indigenous peoples. They are essential conduits for Indigenous truth and resistance, and communication mechanisms through which Indigenous peoples can wage opposition to the status quo and existing hegemonic structures in society.

## 4

**Standard is maximizing expected well being**

**Pleasure and pain are intrinsic value and disvalue**

#### Blum et al. 18

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**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10]. Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14]. Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals. Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it. It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring. Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health. Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage. Finding happiness is different between apes and humans As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure. Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even **produce the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered. Desire and reward centers It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation. In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41]. Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42]. Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans. In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45]. Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations. Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50] In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders. In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS. Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

**Actor Spec— States must use util. Any other standard dooms the moral theory**

#### Goodin 90.

Robert Goodin 90, [professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences], “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142 //RS

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.

**Extinction comes first under any framework.**

#### Pummer 15

[Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But ***that is a huge mistake.*** Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; ***it is not the view that the latter don’t matter***. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” ***Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good***, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. ***We should also take into account moral uncertainty.*** What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, ***all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world***. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

# Case

#### Psychological claim without a psychological warrant – We don’t know how we would act under the veil of ignorance since we’ve never been under it.

#### No briteline as to what constitutes a moral action under the veil since that begs the question of what it means to be moral.

#### Double-bind: Either A) We don’t know enough and can’t make a rational decision or B) We know too much and personal bias renders the veil useless.

#### Detaching normative claims from their real world applications erases sensitive consideration of the factors that make philosophy meaningful, creating a conception of morality that becomes monolithic and self-defeating

Ryerson 01. James Ryerson. THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY Lingua Franca, April 2001.

Treating moral claims as discoverable truths or the product of rational reasoning rather than social conditioning blocks avenues for change by reaffirming the status quo. Moral claims that describe what is have no force to promote what should be. Philosopher C.L. Stevenon famously encouraged fellow philosophers not to "take ethical stands" but merely to reflect "on the meaning of ethical terms."

#### Experience controls our perceptions of the world, the Veil of Ignorance demands we remove those experiences from our decision making calculus, rendering morality impossible. Individuals would not be able to imagine a just society without experience of that society.

#### No guarantee of equality behind the veil of ignorance – the person under the veil might be a risk taker and demand things that help the rich.

#### Veil of ignorance fails to weigh between competing interests—means it fails as a guide to action

Arnett 12. Jacob Brese Arnett ‘12, FMHS [“Rawl’s Veil of Ignorance: A Critique”, January, 2012]

Finally, the veil of ignorance can’t weigh between opposing interests. When behind the veil of ignorance, an individual is forced to take into account all interests that they have once they come out of the original position. However, even if an individual can imagine what someone’s interest may be, these interests can be incompatible and thus an individual would not be able to render a judgment that appeases both interests. For instance, someone might have an interest to kill someone, and someone else might have an interest not to kill. There would be no way reconcile these interests, because under the veil we have both interests. Thus, the veil of ignorance leads to action paralysis and fails to guide justice.

#### Media bias is good, locks in public trust

Robinson 2019. Nathan Robinson. Tue 10 Sep 2019. Media bias is OK – if it's honest. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/10/media-bias-is-ok-if-its-honest> [Nathan Robinson is the editor of Current Affairs and a Guardian US columnist]

Most people distrust the media, and most people are right. It’s healthy to question what you’re being told – that’s the mark of an intelligent and independent populace. And the media in the United States are, in fact, “biased” in many ways. Not always toward the left or right, but frequently toward reaffirming the worldview of an insular establishment, as Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky pointed out years ago in Manufacturing Consent. It should be obvious that there can’t be such a thing as a neutral journalist. We all have moral instincts and points of view. Those points of view will color our interpretations of the facts. The best course of action is to acknowledge where we’re coming from. If we show an awareness of our own political leanings, it actually makes us more trustworthy than if we’re in denial about them. Two recent controversies show how supposedly neutral journalists deny their biases. The Washington Post’s factchecker gave Bernie Sanders a “mostly false” rating for claiming that there are half a million medical-related bankruptcies a year. It was quite obvious that Sanders was relying on published research, and the claim was not in fact “mostly false”. But the Post has a history of these sorts of fact-free “factchecks” – when Sanders claimed that “millions of Americans” work multiple jobs, Glenn Kessler labeled the statement “misleading”, even though it was completely true. Ryan Grim has compiled a list of the appalling record of the Post’s unfair attacks on claims from the political left. Whatever this is, it isn’t factchecking. It’s not just an anti-Sanders bias. Donald Trump has some legitimate complaints about the press, too. Because he tells whopping lies all the time, journalists are predisposed to believe the worst about him and his administration. Recently, a Bloomberg Law reporter accused a labor department official of antisemitic Facebook posts. It was obvious the posts were sarcastic, and the reporter’s work was heavily criticized and the coverage amended. Because of past stories involving administration ties to antisemites, and Trump’s own use of language about Jewish people that would be considered scandalous if it came from Ilhan Omar, the reporter was inclined to think the worst. But if we automatically assume that Trump is the one in the wrong, we may end up with egg our faces. For example, when Trump claimed that millions of non-citizens voted illegally in the 2016 election, the Washington Post called him out in a “factcheck”. But it turned out the Washington Post itself had published an article making this very same claim. The factcheckers were so sure Trump invented the lie that they didn’t notice they had spread it themselves. I’m not inclined to defend Trump – I wrote a whole book about him called Anatomy of a Monstrosity that accused him of being one of the worst people in the world. But I also know that if my feelings about Trump lead to my making factual misstatements about him, his supporters will pounce, and claim that my bias destroys my credibility. If I state my prejudices up front, people will see me as more honest than if I pretend to be a mere “fact checker” when I’m clearly an opinion writer. My personal experience is that conservatives are far more open to leftwing arguments when they come from people who are honest about their politics, and don’t pretend not to have a point of view. I run a small mag

azine called Current Affairs, which operates from an unabashedly leftwing perspective. The letters we get from conservative readers indicate that many of them find the honesty refreshing, and it makes them more likely to hear us out. One reason conservatives hate the “mainstream media” is that it pretends to be something it isn’t. Conservatives think the press has a “liberal” bias; I tend to agree with Herman and Chomsky that it would be better described as a “corporate” bias reflecting the elitist centrism that has come to dominate the Democratic party. But few at MSNBC or CNN would admit that they’re partisan networks. That’s what they do in Great Britain, though – the major newspapers are open about having a political leaning. The Guardian, for example, is an explicitly left-leaning paper and everybody knows it. By contrast, the New York Times is clearly inclined toward Democratic centrism, but it won’t admit it. The editor of the op-ed page says that they strive for “viewpoint diversity”, but it’s clear that he doesn’t mean it. After all, they don’t have columnists from the far right, and they don’t have Marxist columnists. At least Fox News has been honest enough drop its old “Fair and Balanced” motto. If your paper is liberal, just embrace it – and then you can fire “viewpoint diversity” conservatives like Bret Stephens. Paradoxically, rebuilding trust requires embracing bias. Not embracing untruthfulness, but admitting your politics so that both writer and audience can be critical. I think the hope for media is in outlets like the Intercept, Jacobin and my own little magazine, because readers like transparency. (This is also one reason why people respect Bernie Sanders even when they disagree with him: they don’t think he’s trying to appear to be something he isn’t.) The salesman who tells you what he wants you to buy is more trustworthy than the one who insists he isn’t trying to sell you anything at all. It’s a perilous time for journalism, and small outlets need all the help we can get in order to survive. Corporate owners are shuttering great outlets all the time, and the only way we’re going to have viable media institutions is through an outpouring of popular support. Unfortunately, the public doesn’t trust us, and we need to think about how to slowly get people to see journalists as their allies instead of as duplicitous, faux-neutral propagandists. The first step is to be up front about where we’re coming from and how we see things. We’ve got to acknowledge that everyone is biased, and that it’s OK.

#### “Bias” is inevitable – it’s a question of its hidden under “false Objectivity” – that turns Media Credibility.

Taibbi 15 Matt Taibbi, 8-6-2015, "’Objective Journalism’ Is an Illusion", The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/08/06/did-jon-stewart-have-a-serious-lesson-for-journalists/objective-journalism-is-an-illusion, (A journalist and writer for Rolling Stone magazine, is the author, most recently, of "The Divide: American Injustice in the Age of the Wealth Gap.") //Miller

Jon Stewart started sixteen years ago as the host of a comedy talk show, and he walks away this week as maybe the most trusted news reporter in America. His success in stealing the thunder away from what we used to call the “straight news” business is the greatest and funniest joke he ever pulled off. Some object to the characterization of Stewart as a journalist, because he “has opinions” and “isn’t objective,” but those people aren’t to be taken seriously. Opinion can’t be extracted from reporting. The only question is whether or not it’s hidden. Everything journalists do is a subjective editorial choice, from the size of headlines to the placement of quotes and illustrations. Stewart kicked off "The Daily Show" just as Americans on both sides of the political aisle were becoming more conscious of editorial bias. Conservatives focused on who was doing the reporting (largely a blue-state bunch), while progressives focused on who owned the reporting (nihilistic profit-seeking corporations, mainly). Both audiences got tired of trying to sift through hidden biases. So they searched for new and more dependable sources in the hundreds of new cable channels and the millions of new web sites that were appearing at the time. Stewart told you who he was up front. And it wasn’t hard to figure out whether he was being honest. Jokes don’t lie. They’re either funny or they’re not. He was consistently funny, which meant he was consistently true. In an increasingly ridiculous world, that was something to hold onto. While the commercial media responded to the fracturing news landscape by creating ideologically slanted television channels like Fox and MSNBC that were designed to capture left or right demographics for profit, Stewart remained his own person, ripping both parties. He hit the Republicans more, but only because they were more entertainingly ridiculous. He attacked the less cinematic cynicism of the Democrats regularly, too. We live in a society now where people want to know who a journalist is before they decide whether or not to believe his or her reporting. Americans got to know Jon Stewart quickly and quickly learned to trust him even though he clearly had a point of view. It’s the highest praise a journalist can get, and he deserved all of it.

#### Arbitrarily including contrarian opinion for the sake of balance causes climate change denialism

Brüggemann and Engesser 17 [Michael Brüggemann, educator at the University of Hamburg, and Sven Engesser, educator at the Technical University of Dresden, 2017, “Beyond false balance: How interpretive journalism shapes media coverage of climate change,” Research Gate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312015168\_Beyond\_false\_balance\_How\_interpretive\_journalism\_shapes\_media\_coverage\_of\_climate\_change]/Kankee

22 1. Introduction 23 While scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change has been growing in recent 24 decades (Anderegg et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Oreskes, 2004), public opinion has also become 25 increasingly uncertain about the urgency of climate change as a problem (Patt and Weber, 2014; 26 Ratter et al., 2012). Citizens of the biggest carbon emitters of the world (the United States and China) 27 are even less concerned about climate change than people from other countries (PEW, 2015). 28 Outright denial of climate change persists among salient minorities in the United States, United 29 Kingdom, and Australia, and in small niche publics in other countries (Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014; 30 European Commission, 2014; Leiserowitz et al., 2013, 2013; Whitmarsh, 2011). One reason for this 31 entrenched denialism in public opinion may be the way the media portray the scientific consensus on 32 climate change as represented by the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 33 (IPCC). By providing a forum for contrarian views, the media “perpetuate the myth of a lack of 34 international scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change—and thereby succeed in 35 maintaining public confusion” (Antilla, 2005: 350). Various studies have shown the detrimental 36 effects of ‘balanced’ media coverage that depict climate change as an open debate between 37 ‘skeptics’ and ‘warners’ (with regards to public debates about vaccines, see: Dixon and Clarke, 2013; 38 Lewandowsky et al., 2013). Thus, the study of media content and its influencing factors is not only 39 relevant for scholars of journalism, but also for everyone seeking to understand how societies 40 struggle to deal with the challenge of climate change. 41 Our study tackles this challenge by analyzing how the IPCC stance on climate change and its 42 challengers are covered in different journalistic media. We seek to explain different patterns of 43 media content by taking into account the influence of different editorial and national contexts. The 44 study contributes to our understanding of how and why contrarian views remain salient in media 45 debates. It is based on a content analysis of articles (N = 936) published in four different types of 46 leading news outlets (left-leaning, right-leaning, regional, online) in five countries (Germany, India, 47 Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States), and is complemented by a survey of the authors of 48 these articles. We argue that a common explanation for the presence of climate change denial in 49 media coverage – adherence to the journalistic norm of balance (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004) – can no 50 longer be regarded as the most powerful driver of climate coverage. Instead we find a transnational 51 pattern of interpretive journalism that puts the denial of anthropogenic climate change into context. 52 2. Analytical framework and state of research: journalists’ role in the climate debate 53 To assess how journalists report on climate change and how they deal with its denial, it is 54 first necessary to describe what we call the climate change frame or IPCC view, as well as the 55 contrarian voices in public debates. The climate change frame or consensus as presented in IPCC 56 reports and in scientific journals may be summarized in four statements (Brüggemann and Engesser, 57 2014; Shehata and Hopmann, 2012): (1) Global warming represents an extraordinary rise in average 58 global temperatures since the industrial revolution. (2) It is mainly caused by human-induced 59 emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. (3) It creates problems for both ecosystems and 60 humanity. (4) Emissions need to be reduced to avoid future damage. These statements allow us to 61 identify four types of contrarianism or challenges to the climate change frame; they focus on 62 doubting: the trend (climate change), the attribution (anthropogenic), the impact (risks, severe 63 problems), and the treatment (reducing emissions) (see Rahmstorf (2004) for the first three types of 64 contrarianism). This framework does not capture all variants of contrarian claims (Capstick and 65 Pidgeon, 2014); it focuses on the challenges that attack the core of the consensus among the world’s 66 leading climate scientists.67 We call actors who challenge the climate change frame in public debates ‘contrarians’ rather 68 than ‘skeptics’ or ‘deniers,’ following a suggestion by McCright (2007) and O’Neill and Boykoff (2010). 69 There are few climate scientists among the contrarians; the group is comprised of people from 70 different backgrounds, many of whom are closely connected to professional lobbyists and the ‘denial 71 machine’ (Dunlap and McCright, 2011) – i.e., their professional activities are part of a strategy to 72 prevent pro-active climate policy-making (Boussalis and Coan, 2016). Contrarians as visible speakers 73 in public debates need to be distinguished from both individual citizens who may have doubts about 74 climate change and from actors who challenge more specific claims in the climate debate that are 75 not part of the basic consensus outlined above. 76 The journalistic practices of (1) giving disproportionate voice to contrarians and (2) 77 challenging the climate change consensus will be the focus of our study. The two practices are 78 interrelated but do not necessarily go together as the empirical analysis will show. First, we will 79 briefly sketch a conceptual framework of important factors that shape media content. Three levels of 80 influence can be distinguished: individual (journalist), organizational (newsroom), and external (e.g. 81 social institutions and culture) (cf. Shoemaker and Reese, 2014). In different contexts, the 82 ‘discretionary power’ (Semetko et al., 1991) of individual journalists varies: They are provided with 83 more or less leverage to set the frames of their coverage (Brüggemann, 2014). On all three levels of 84 influence, two main forces leave their imprint on media coverage: ideological biases and structural 85 media logics (Schulz, 2011: 68). Biases are preferences or inclinations to treat a topic in a certain way 86 (Lee and Grimmer, 2008) that stem from individual journalists, editors, external actors, and the wider 87 cultural context. ‘Media logic(s)’ include the professional norms and routines of journalists and 88 newsrooms, which Altheide (2004, p. 294) defines as “assumptions and processes for constructing 89 messages within a particular medium.” The most powerful media logics are news factors such as 90 novelty, elite actors, or proximity: editors look for these attributes when deciding which stories to 91 run, and journalists emphasize them in their coverage (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). 92 Past studies have found evidence that the power of bias and media logics at different levels 93 of influence explains the role of contrarians in climate coverage. Depending on ideological bias, 94 climate change is depicted as more or less uncertain, and climate policy is described as more or less 95 costly, depending on the policies of the respective national government (Grundmann, 2007). Below 96 the national level that introduces this kind of political/cultural bias, newsroom policies affect climate 97 coverage; right-leaning media are more likely to cite contrarian views (Carvalho, 2007; Feldman et 98 al., 2015; Feldman et al., 2011). There is also evidence that the ideological stance of the individual 99 author matters: right-wing columnists in the United States cultivate hard-core denialism of climate 100 change in their columns (Elsasser and Dunlap, 2013). Hence, different interpretations of climate 101 change, which are often strongly related to political ideology, influence the coverage of this issue. 102 Explanations drawing on media logics – particularly the professional norms of journalism – 103 are strongly connected to the work of Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) who emphasize the professional 104 norm of balance as an important influencing factor: "[...] journalists present competing points of 105 views on a scientific question as though they had equal scientific weight, when actually they do not’’ 106 (127). The norm of balance is part of the broader concept of objectivity (Westerstahl, 1983), which 107 calls on journalists to provide a ‘neutral’ account by giving equal voice to both sides in a conflict 108 (Hopmann et al., 2012). Journalists follow this practice as it allows them to demonstrate their 109 professional objectivity and to fend off accusations of one-sided coverage (Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 110 1972). Balance also serves as a "surrogate for validity checks" (Dunwoody and Peters, 1992: 129) if 111 journalists lack the time or expertise to assess the validity of conflicting statements from different 112 sources. Earlier research on environmental and science journalists in the United States cited evidence 113 of their lack of knowledge about what climate experts consider to be basic common in climate 114 research (Wilson, 2000). The norm of balance is particularly powerful in cases of contested 115 knowledge claims and a lack of expertise among the journalists who cover the respective issue. 116 Finally, conflicts create news value and thus stories that grasp audience attention. The presence of 117 contrarians in media coverage may therefore be explained by either bias (ideological fit) as outlined 118 above or as part of journalistic norms (objectivity/balance) and routines (news values). Yet applying 119 the norm of balance amplifies the views of contrarians (which may attract audience attention) and 120 distorts coverage of the issue. By quoting contrarian voices out of context, journalists give them 121 legitimacy and ‘media standing’ that might also translate into political power (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 122 1993). 123 Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) examined the coverage of climate change in US newspapers from 124 1988 to 2002, and found that half of the articles presented a balanced account of the issue; slightly 125 more than half of the television newscasts analyzed during that time did so (Boykoff, 2008). A 126 replication of the study found the share of balanced coverage reduced from more than a third of all 127 articles in 2003 to about three percent in 2006 in US newspapers (Boykoff, 2007). Thus, balanced 128 reporting may be retreating, but contrarians have not necessarily vanished from the media. Painter 129 and Gavin (2016) find that the British press quoted contrarians in every fifth article during the years 130 2007 to 2011. Schmid-Petri et al. (2015) find that almost a third of articles in the US press contain 131 contrarian voices. Have journalists therefore moved on to a one-sided promotion of denial of climate 132 change, which would be proof of ideological bias, rather than adhere to professional logics such as 133 the norm of balanced coverage? 134 A recent survey of journalists covering climate change in different countries found that most 135 of them strongly agreed with the climate change consensus (Brüggemann and Engesser, 2014). 136 Therefore, it seems that they quote contrarians despite being aware that their claims defy the 137 findings of climate science. A much earlier US study identified a journalistic tendency to amplify 138 outlier views and give ‘mavericks’ a forum: Dearing (1995) analyzed US newspaper coverage of three 139 maverick science stories (e.g., propagating an alternative theory on the cause of AIDS). Our study 140 follows his model of analyzing the content of coverage and then conducting a survey of the authors 141 of the articles. Dearing found that the surveyed journalists were aware that the ‘maverick scientists’ 142 did not represent credible science, yet the articles’ neutral coverage of their views gave the 143 mavericks credibility. Dearing explained this with news values such as conflict that attract larger 144 audiences as well as a general sympathy for mavericks in US public culture, which values 145 individualism expressed through outlier views (also see Gans (1979)). 146 Another trend in journalism should be considered for making sense of the finding that 147 balanced coverage may be gone, but not so, the quoting of contrarian voices. Studies find a trend 148 towards interpretive reporting among online science journalists (Fahy and Nisbet, 2011) and in 149 political journalism in different Western countries (Esser and Umbricht, 2014). Hiles and Hinnant 150 (2014) found a radically redefined understanding of objectivity among experienced climate 151 journalists that goes beyond ‘balanced coverage.’ They found that while these specialist journalists 152 still attempted to refrain from letting their biases influence their coverage, they followed “weight-of153 evidence reporting” (Dunwoody, 2005) in which stories reflect scientific consensus and are “written 154 with authority” (Hiles and Hinnant, 2014: 15), thereby distinguishing between views that represent 155 valid, peer-reviewed science and those that represent outliers with no backing from scientific 156 evidence or peers (Boykoff, 2011). Another qualitative interview study with science journalists in the 157 United States confirms this trend: journalists claim that they want to go “beyond balance” and even 158 ignore contrarian voices (Gibson et al., 2016). 159 Yet, whether these approaches are put into practice has not been comprehensively 160 investigated with regards to different media types in different cultural contexts. Most studies focus 161 on the US and British contexts or on the coverage of upmarket newspapers (Schäfer and Schlichting, 162 2014). Grundmann and Scott (2014) also include France and Germany from 2000 to 2010 and a great 163 number of newspapers using corpus linguistic methods. Their study shows that, overall, contrarians 164 are much less prominent in media discourses than speakers who support the climate change 165 consensus. They also show that countries consistently diverge on the salience of contrarians, with a 166 much stronger entrenchment of contrarian voices in the United States. This is in line with findings 167 from Painter and Ashe (2012), who also included quality papers from Brazil, China, France, and India 168 in their analysis. They compared the coverage in 2007 and 2009/2010 during the UN Climate summit 169 in Copenhagen and, at the same time, ‘Climategate’ (the pseudo scandal constructed around 170 personal e-mails between climate researchers that were published by contrarian bloggers in order to 171 discredit climate research, Holliman (2011)). Overall, these findings show that there is no linear 172 decline in contrarianism in the news, but rather that specific events (or staged pseudo events like 173 Climategate) provide ‘media opportunity structures’ (Adam et al., 2003) for contrarians to become 174 salient voices in media coverage. This explains why Shehata and Hopmann (2012), who focused on 175 media coverage between 1997 and 2007, did not find contrarians in the news. They studied UN 176 climate conferences, where contrarians have not managed to play a significant political role. This was 177 radically different in the context of the Climategate campaign: the content analysis of Painter and 178 Ashe (2012) found that contrarian views occurred in every third article in the United States, followed 179 by the United Kingdom, while contrarians played only a negligible role in all other countries. 180 Painter and Ashe also found that roughly the same number of articles raised doubts about 181 climate change in right-leaning and left-leaning papers. The only difference was that right-leaning 182 papers hosted contrarianism in their commentary pages, while these sources were quoted in the left183 leaning newspapers. This confirms the influence of editorial bias on climate coverage: in right-leaning 184 papers, it is part of the editorial opinion; in left-leaning papers, contrarianism is raised by external 185 voices. Thus, past research has identified the salience of contrarianism and the evaluation of 186 contrarians as an important case for studying the influence of both ideological biases (along the left187 right spectrum) and journalistic norms (e.g., balance, news values). While the studies mentioned 188 above have pushed the research in this area ahead, there are three main gaps in the literature. 189 The first concerns the role of contrarianism in post-Climategate coverage, after 2010. 190 Climategate was an extraordinary moment of success of political spin, but it remains to be seen 191 whether climate change denial retained a voice in transnational journalism afterwards. Grundmann 192 and Stock (2014) extended their analysis to 2010 and show that after the peak of attention to 193 contrarians, the levels declined, but remained somewhat higher than during earlier times. In Britain, 194 the level of contrarianism in media coverage remained high in 2011 (Painter and Gavin, 2016). 195 Second, Painter and Ashe’s finding that contrarians were equally prominent in right- and left196 leaning papers raises the question whether (and how) these quotes were evaluated in the coverage. 197 For example, it is not clear whether contrarians were mentioned in the context of how they continue 198 to make unsubstantiated claims with no backing in climate science, whether they were balanced with 199 other voices (as originally posited in the Boykoff and Boykoff study from 2004), or whether 200 unbalanced contrarianism is occurring (as Painter and Gavin (2016) show for parts of the right201 leaning press in Britain). In this regard, the study by Grundmann and Stock (2012) provides a first 202 hint, as the term Climategate in their co-location analysis linked with the terms ‘stolen’ and ‘hacked’ 203 in the US media, while the British media preferred ‘leaked,’ which indicates that journalists in 204 different countries framed Climategate quite differently. This shows that analysis of the frequency of 205 reporting contrarian viewpoints needs to also include whether and how they were evaluated in the 206 articles. 207 Third, it is unclear whether the quoting of contrarians is motivated by media logic through 208 adherence to journalistic norms (such as balance or news values) or by ideological biases (such as 209 genuine questioning of the validity of climate science). This can best be explored by connecting 210 content analysis data with survey data (following the model introduced in Dearing (1995)).

#### A disproportionate contrarian presence in news compared to the scientific consensus on climate change prevents further climate action

Petersen et al. 19 [Alexander Michael Petersen, Associate Professor at UC Merced, Emmanuel M. Vincent, Research Scientist with a PhD at the University Pierre et Marie Curie and a post-doctoral fellowship at MIT, and Anthony LeRoy Westerling, professor at UC Merced with a PhD from UC San Diego, 2019, “Discrepancy in scientific authority and media visibility of climate change scientists and contrarians,” Nature Communications, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-09959-4]/Kankee

We juxtapose 386 prominent contrarians with 386 expert scientists by tracking their digital footprints across ∼200,000 research publications and ∼100,000 English-language digital and print media articles on climate change. Projecting these individuals across the same backdrop facilitates quantifying disparities in media visibility and scientific authority, and identifying organization patterns within their association networks. Here we show via direct comparison that contrarians are featured in 49% more media articles than scientists. Yet when comparing visibility in mainstream media sources only, we observe just a 1% excess visibility, which objectively demonstrates the crowding out of professional mainstream sources by the proliferation of new media sources, many of which contribute to the production and consumption of climate change disinformation at scale. These results demonstrate why climate scientists should increasingly exert their authority in scientific and public discourse, and why professional journalists and editors should adjust the disproportionate attention given to contrarians. Introduction Since the early 2000s there has been little disagreement among scientific experts over the fundamental evidence supporting the existence, origin, and societal significance of anthropogenic climate change (CC)1,2,3,4. Yet, while an anthropogenic cause is supported by an overwhelming majority of climate change scientists (CCS)5, climate change contrarians (CCC) have successfully organized a strong voice within politics and science communication in the United States6,7. Historians of science have detailed the political origins of the CCC movement, documenting how its strategic efforts succeeded in distorting the science-based narrative on multiple fronts, e.g., by promoting the idea that there is a lack of scientific consensus concerning anthropogenic CC6,8,9,10,11,12, despite the fact that objective research has found little evidence for such a claim. One study comparing consensus scientists with unconvinced scientists found that the 2–3% of researchers unconvinced by evidence for anthropogenic CC were not only small in group size but also had substantially lower levels of authority in the CC literature10. Another study surveying ∼3000 earth scientists found the highest levels of CC consensus to be among the most expert climatologists5. Public confusion over science affects various other domains13, in addition to CC communication14, and requires a better understanding of the human, social, and technological factors that facilitate widespread disinformation efforts15,16,17,18. One salient human factor that contributes to the public’s susceptibility to information manipulation is cognitive bias. A particularly relevant example is motivated reasoning—the tendency for individuals to bias their judgements according to personal- and group-level values, even when faced with documented facts19,20,21. Another class of factors are prominent external influences, owing to elite political cues22, ideological biases23,24, cultural worldviews25, and even personal weather experiences26,27. Not least among these external factors is the news media15, which has a longstanding and dominant role empowering cultural politics28. A third decisive technological factor is the paradigm of new media and the nearly boundless scalability of content distribution across the internet. Even in the case where individuals have complete control in choosing their sources of information, they are nevertheless susceptible to significant disparities in content production in addition to being susceptible to media coverage that is disproportionate to the authority and number of scientists holding the consensus viewpoint. Recent research highlights the ramifications of this problem, finding that the acceptance of CC increases (respectively decreases) with consumption of media content that acknowledges (respectively dismisses) CC realities, other factors being equal24. Susceptibility to information manipulation may continue to be a serious problem until society fully adapts to managing the sheer range and volume of new media sources. As such, addressing the opportunities and threats facing CC communication requires an integrated understanding of these human, social, and technological factors. Accordingly, the literature on CC communication is multi-disciplinary. Research efforts draw on a wide range of methods that typically target a single entry point—such as applying content and meta-analysis methods to select collections of scientific publications2,3,10,29, news media articles7,8,9,12,28,30,31,32,33,34, or surveys4,22,23 or by developing behavioral experiments and survey instruments5,11,19,24,25,35. For example, applying in-depth content analysis to select media article sets, researchers identified common factors among skeptical critics, estimated the percentage of CC articles that contain skeptical elements, and developed a typology of CC skeptics30. Building on this framework, another recent study reports that contrarians have strategically shifted away from their external narrative—initially based upon challenging fundamental tenets of CC science (e.g., its anthropogenic origins), thereby positioning themselves as skeptics with legitimate scientific motives for dissent—to instead challenging assessments of CC impacts in an effort to impede the development of proactive regulations33. However, a separate large-scale analysis of internal documents from 19 contrarian organizations shows that the inward contrarian narrative is still rather focused on CC science, with the relative frequency of science-related topics increasing relative to policy-related topics over the period 2009–201334. We complement these extensive efforts by investigating the degree to which socio-technical factors facilitate the visibility and emergence of authority among contrarian claims-makers36. To address this literature gap, we focus our analysis on a group of 386 prominent contrarians, denoted both individually and collectively by CCC. We compare these CCC with 386 prominent scientists active in CC research, denoted hereafter by CCS. These experts in CC science serve as an objective measurement baseline for juxtaposing visibility in the media with authority in the scientific domain. To operationalize this integrative comparison, we collected two large datasets through 2016, comprised of ∼200,000 CC research articles from the Web of Science (WOS) and ∼100,000 English-language CC media articles from the Media Cloud (MC) project37. By focusing on a fixed set of individuals, we leverage large-scale data-driven methods of computational social science38 in an effort to reveal individual-, pair-wise-, and group-level phenomena at the intersection of science and the media. In what follows, we characterize and compare these CC actors at various levels of aggregation: first, by comparing their scientific authority and media visibility at both the individual and group levels; and second, by mapping their associations that are manifest in media co-visibility networks and scientific co-citation networks. Our approach accounts for the variation in visibility across a wide range of sources, from main-stream to non-mainstream sources. By simultaneously accounting for each individual’s scientific authority, our quantitative analysis contributes to the CC communication literature by revealing the degree to which prominent contrarian voices benefit from the scalability of new media, in particular the large number of second-tier news sources and blogs that do not implement rigorous information quality assessment standards. Such disproportionate media visibility of contrarian arguments and actors not only misrepresents the distribution of expert-based beliefs28,36,39, it also manifestly undermines the credible authority of career CCS experts and reinforces the trend of CCC presiding over public scientific discourse40, which all together hinders prospects for rapid public action on CC41. Results

#### Warming causes extinction and guarantees every other impact—only total economic makeover solves.

Spratt and Dunplop 19, David Spratt [Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, Melbourne, and co-author of Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action] & Ian Dunlop [member of the Club of Rome. Formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, chief executive of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, and chair of the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading 1998-2000], “Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach,” Breakthrough - National Centre for Climate Restoration, May 2019, pg. 8-10, beckert. Brackets in original text

- Warming magnifies every other impact – econ collapse, nuclear war, political instability, poverty – this means case turns the DA

2020–2030: Policy-makers fail to act on evidence that the current ​Paris Agreement path — in which global human-caused greenhouse emissions do not peak until 2030 — will lock in at least 3°C of warming. The case for a global, climate-emergency mobilisation of labour and resources to build a zero-emission economy and carbon drawdown in order to have a realistic chance of keeping warming well below 2°C is politely ignored. As projected by Xu and Ramanathan, by 2030 carbon dioxide levels have reached 437 parts per million — which is unprecedented in the last 20 million years — and warming reaches 1.6°C.18 2030–2050: Emissions peak in 2030, and start to fall consistent with an 80 percent reduction in fossil-fuel energy intensity by 2100 compared to 2010 energy intensity. This leads to warming of 2.4°C by 2050, consistent with the Xu and Ramanathan “baseline-fast” scenario.19 However, another 0.6°C of warming occurs — taking the total to 3°C by 2050 — due to the activation of a number of carbon-cycle feedbacks and higher levels of ice albedo and cloud feedbacks than current models assume. [It should be noted that this is far from an extreme scenario: the low-probability, high-impact warming (five percent probability) can exceed 3.5–4°C by 2050 in the Xu and Ramanathan scheme.] 2050: By 2050, there is broad scientific acceptance that system tipping-points for the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and a sea-ice-free Arctic summer were passed well before 1.5°C of warming, for the Greenland Ice Sheet well before 2°C, and for widespread permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought and dieback by 2.5°C. The “hothouse Earth” scenario has been realised, and Earth is headed for another degree or more of warming, especially since human greenhouse emissions are still significant.20 While sea levels have risen 0.5 metres by 2050, the increase may be 2–3 metres by 2100, and it is understood from historical analogues that seas may eventually rise by more than 25 metres. Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, beyond the threshold of human survivability. The destabilisation of the Jet Stream has very significantly affected the intensity and geographical distribution of the Asian and West African monsoons and, together with the further slowing of the Gulf Stream, is impinging on life support systems in Europe. North America suffers from devastating weather extremes including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and inundation. The summer monsoons in China have failed, and water flows into the great rivers of Asia are severely reduced by the loss of more than one-third of the Himalayan ice sheet. Glacial loss reaches 70 percent in the Andes, and rainfall in Mexico and central America falls by half. Semi-permanent El Nino conditions prevail. Aridification emerges over more than 30 percent of the world’s land surface. Desertification is severe in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, inland Australia and across the south-western United States. Impacts: A number of ecosystems collapse, including coral reef systems, the Amazon rainforest and in the Arctic. Some poorer nations and regions, which lack capacity to provide artificially-cooled environments for their populations, become unviable. Deadly heat conditions persist for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, tropical South America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, contributing to more than a billion people being displaced from the tropical zone. Water availability decreases sharply in the most affected regions at lower latitudes (dry tropics and subtropics), affecting about two billion people worldwide. Agriculture becomes nonviable in the dry subtropics. Most regions in the world see a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods and storms. Food production is inadequate to feed the global population and food prices skyrocket, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutrition content of food crops, a catastrophic decline in insect populations, desertification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages, and conditions too hot for human habitation in significant food-growing regions. The lower reaches of the agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile are inundated, and significant sectors of some of the world’s most populous cities — including Chennai, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Manila — are abandoned. Some small islands become uninhabitable. Ten percent of Bangladesh is inundated, displacing 15 million people. Even for 2°C of warming, more than a billion people may need to be relocated and In high-end scenarios, the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model, with a high likelihood of human civilisation coming to an end.21 National security consequences: For pragmatic reasons associated with providing only a sketch of this scenario, we take the conclusion of the ​Age of Consequences ‘Severe’ 3°C scenario developed by a group of senior US national-security figures in 2007 as appropriate for our scenario too: Massive nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to ​massive nonlinear societal events.​ In this scenario, nations around the world will be ​overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, including in the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities.​ Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervor to ​outright chaos.​ In this scenario, climate change provokes ​a permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature​’.22 (emphasis added) DISCUSSION This scenario provides a glimpse into a world of “outright chaos” on a path to the end of human civilisation and modern society as we have known it, in which the challenges to global security are simply overwhelming and political panic becomes the norm. Yet the world is currently completely unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of catastrophic climate change.23 What can be done to avoid such a probable but catastrophic future? It is clear from our preliminary scenario that dramatic action is required this decade if the “hothouse Earth” scenario is to be avoided. To reduce this risk and protect human civilisation, a massive global mobilisation of resources is needed in the coming decade to build a zero-emissions industrial system and set in train the restoration of a safe climate. This would be akin in scale to the World War II emergency mobilisation. There is an increasing awareness that such a response is now necessary. Prof. Kevin Anderson makes the case for a Marshall Plan-style construction of zero-carbon-dioxide energy supply and major electrification to build a zero-carbon industrial strategy by “a shift in productive capacity of society akin to that in World War II”.24 Others have warned that “only a drastic, economy-wide makeover within the next decade, consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C”, would avoid the transition of the Earth System to the Pliocene-like conditions that prevailed 3-3.3 million years ago, when temperatures were ~3°C and sea levels 25 metres higher.25 It should be noted here that the 1.5° goal is not safe for a number of Earth System elements, including Arctic sea-ice, West Antarctica and coral reefs.

#### Solving warming is not all-or-nothing – every additional fraction of a degree is irreversible and costs millions of lives—prefer IPCC assessments that are the gold standard for warming consensus

David Wallace-Wells 19 [National Fellow at New America. He is deputy editor of New York Magazine, where he also writes frequently about climate and the near future of science and technology, including his widely read and debated 2017 cover story on worst-case scenarios for global warming], *The Uninhabitable Earth: A Story of the Future* (Kindle Edition: Allen Lane, 2019), pg. 8-30, beckert

* Every degree key – each bit 🡪 hundreds of millions of lives
* IPCC🡪 best ev b/c conservative estimate + still really big impact
* Now key – not reversible, feedback loops 🡪 speeds up later

There is almost no chance we will avoid that scenario. The Kyoto Protocol achieved, practically, nothing; in the twenty years since, despite all of our climate advocacy and legislation and progress on green energy, we have produced more emissions than in the twenty years before. In 2016, the Paris accords established two degrees as a global goal, and, to read our newspapers, that level of warming remains something like the scariest scenario it is responsible to consider; just a few years later, with no single industrial nation on track to meet its Paris commitments, two degrees looks more like a best-case outcome, at present hard to credit, with an entire bell curve of more horrific possibilities extending beyond it and yet shrouded, delicately, from public view.28 For those telling stories about climate, such horrific possibilities—and the fact that we had squandered our chance of landing anywhere on the better half of that curve—had become somehow unseemly to consider. The reasons are almost too many to count, and so half-formed they might better be called impulses. We chose not to discuss a world warmed beyond two degrees out of decency, perhaps; or simple fear; or fear of fearmongering; or technocratic faith, which is really market faith; or deference to partisan debates or even partisan priorities; or skepticism about the environmental Left of the kind I’d always had; or disinterest in the fates of distant ecosystems like I’d also always had. We felt confusion about the science and its many technical terms and hard-to-parse numbers, or at least an intuition that others would be easily confused about the science and its many technical terms and hard-to-parse numbers. We suffered from slowness apprehending the speed of change, or semi-conspiratorial confidence in the responsibility of global elites and their institutions, or obeisance toward those elites and their institutions, whatever we thought of them. Perhaps we felt unable to really trust scarier projections because we’d only just heard about warming, we thought, and things couldn’t possibly have gotten that much worse just since the first Inconvenient Truth; or because we liked driving our cars and eating our beef and living as we did in every other way and didn’t want to think too hard about that; or because we felt so “postindustrial” we couldn’t believe we were still drawing material breaths from fossil fuel furnaces. Perhaps it was because we were so sociopathically good at collating bad news into a sickening evolving sense of what constituted “normal,” or because we looked outside and things seemed still okay. Because we were bored with writing, or reading, the same story again and again, because climate was so global and therefore nontribal it suggested only the corniest politics, because we didn’t yet appreciate how fully it would ravage our lives, and because, selfishly, we didn’t mind destroying the planet for others living elsewhere on it or those not yet born who would inherit it from us, outraged. Because we had too much faith in the teleological shape of history and the arrow of human progress to countenance the idea that the arc of history would bend toward anything but environmental justice, too. Because when we were being really honest with ourselves we already thought of the world as a zero-sum resource competition and believed that whatever happened we were probably going to continue to be the victors, relatively speaking anyway, advantages of class being what they are and our own luck in the natalist lottery being what it was. Perhaps we were too panicked about our own jobs and industries to fret about the future of jobs and industry; or perhaps we were also really afraid of robots or were too busy looking at our new phones; or perhaps, however easy we found the apocalypse reflex in our culture and the path of panic in our politics, we truly had a good-news bias when it came to the big picture; or, really, who knows why—there are so many aspects to the climate kaleidoscope that transforms our intuitions about environmental devastation into an uncanny complacency that it can be hard to pull the whole picture of climate distortion into focus. But we simply wouldn’t, or couldn’t, or anyway didn’t look squarely in the face ﻿of the science. This is not a book about the science of warming; it is about what warming means to the way we live on this planet. But what does that science say? It is complicated research, because it is built on two layers of uncertainty: what humans will do, mostly in terms of emitting greenhouse gases, and how the climate will respond, both through straightforward heating and a variety of more complicated, and sometimes contradictory, feedback loops. But even shaded by those uncertainty bars it is also very clear research, in fact terrifyingly clear. The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) offers the gold-standard assessments of the state of the planet and the likely trajectory for climate change—gold-standard, in part, because it is conservative, integrating only new research that passes the threshold of inarguability. A new report is expected in 2022, but the most recent one says that if we take action on emissions soon, instituting immediately all of the commitments made in the Paris accords but nowhere yet actually implemented, we are likely to get about 3.2 degrees of warming, or about three times as much warming as the planet has seen since the beginning of industrialization—bringing the unthinkable collapse of the planet’s ice sheets not just into the realm of the real but into the present.29, 30 That would eventually flood not just Miami and Dhaka but Shanghai and Hong Kong and a hundred other cities around the world.31 The tipping point for that collapse is said to be around two degrees; according to several recent studies, even a rapid cessation of carbon emissions could bring us that amount of warming by the end of the century.32 The assaults of climate change do not end at 2100 just because most modeling, by convention, sunsets at that point. This is why some studying global warming call the hundred years to follow the “century of hell.”33 Climate change is fast, much faster than it seems we have the capacity to recognize and acknowledge; but it is also long, almost longer than we can truly imagine. In reading about warming, you will often come across analogies from the planetary record: the last time the planet was this much warmer, the logic runs, sea levels were here. These conditions are not coincidences. The sea level was there largely because the planet was that much warmer, and the geologic record is the best model we have for understanding the very complicated climate system and gauging just how much damage will come from turning up the temperature by two or four or six degrees. Which is why it is especially concerning that recent research into the deep history of the planet suggests that our current climate models may be underestimating the amount of warming we are due for in 2100 by as much as half.34 In other words, temperatures could rise, ultimately, by as much as double what the IPCC predicts. Hit our Paris emissions targets and we may still get four degrees of warming, meaning a green Sahara and the planet’s tropical forests transformed into fire-dominated savanna.35 The authors of one recent paper suggested the warming could be more dramatic still—slashing our emissions could still bring us to four or five degrees Celsius, a scenario they said would pose severe risks to the habitability of the entire planet. “Hothouse Earth,” they called it.36 Because these numbers are so small, we tend to trivialize the differences between them—one, two, four, five. Human experience and memory offer no good analogy for how we should think of those thresholds, but, as with world wars or recurrences of cancer, you don’t want to see even one. At two degrees, the ice sheets will begin their collapse, 400 million more people will suffer from water scarcity, major cities in the equatorial band of the planet will become unlivable, and even in the northern latitudes heat waves will kill thousands each summer.37, 38 There would be thirty-two times as many extreme heat waves in India, and each would last five times as long, exposing ninety-three times more people.39 This is our best-case scenario. At three degrees, southern Europe would be in permanent drought, and the average drought in Central America would last nineteen months longer and in the Caribbean twenty-one months longer. In northern Africa, the figure is sixty months longer—five years. The areas burned each year by wildfires would double in the Mediterranean and sextuple, or more, in the United States. At four degrees, there would be eight million more cases of dengue fever each year in Latin America alone and close to annual global food crises.41 There could be 9 percent more heat-related deaths.40 Damages from river flooding would grow thirtyfold in Bangladesh, twentyfold in India, and as much as sixtyfold in the United Kingdom. In certain places, six climate-driven natural disasters could strike simultaneously, and, globally, damages could pass $600 trillion—more than twice the wealth as exists in the world today. Conflict and warfare could double. Even if we pull the planet up short of two degrees by 2100, we will be left with an atmosphere that contains 500 parts per million of carbon—perhaps more. The last time that was the case, sixteen million years ago, the planet was not two degrees warmer; it was somewhere between five and eight, giving the planet about 130 feet of sea-level rise, enough to draw a new American coastline as far west as I-95.42 Some of these processes take thousands of years to unfold, but they are also irreversible, and therefore effectively permanent. You might hope to simply reverse climate change; you can’t. It will outrun all of us. This is part of what makes climate change what the theorist Timothy Morton calls a “hyperobject”—a conceptual fact so large and complex that, like the internet, it can never be properly comprehended.43 There are many features of climate change—its size, its scope, its brutality—that, alone, satisfy this definition; together they might elevate it into a higher and more incomprehensible conceptual ﻿category yet. But time is perhaps the most mind-bending feature, the worst outcomes arriving so long from now that we reflexively discount their reality. Yet those outcomes promise to mock us and our own sense of the real in return. The ecological dramas we have unleashed through our land use and by burning fossil fuels—slowly for about a century and very rapidly for only a few decades—will play out over many millennia, in fact over a longer span of time than humans have even been around, performed in part by creatures and in environments we do not yet even know, ushered onto the world stage by the force of warming. And so, in a convenient cognitive bargain, we have chosen to consider climate change only as it will present itself this century. By 2100, the United Nations says, we are due for about 4.5 degrees of warming, following the path we are on today.44 That is, farther from the Paris track than the Paris track is from the two-degree threshold of catastrophe, which it more than doubles. As Naomi Oreskes has noted, there are far too many uncertainties in our models to take their predictions as gospel.45 Just running those models many times, as Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman do in their book Climate Shock, yields an 11 percent chance we overshoot six degrees.46 Recent work by the Nobel laureate William Nordhaus suggests that better-than-anticipated economic growth means better than one-in-three odds that our emissions will exceed the U.47N.’s worst-case “business as usual” scenario. In other words, a temperature rise of five degrees or possibly more. The upper end of the probability curve put forward by the U.N. to estimate the end-of-the-century, business-as-usual scenario—the worst-case outcome of a worst-case emissions path—puts us at eight degrees. At that temperature, humans at the equator and in the tropics would not be able to move around outside without dying.48 In that world, eight degrees warmer, direct heat effects would be the least of it: the oceans would eventually swell two hundred feet higher, flooding what are now two-thirds of the world’s major cities; hardly any land on the planet would be capable of efficiently producing any of the food we now eat; forests would be roiled by rolling storms of fire, and coasts would be punished by more and more intense hurricanes; the suffocating hood of tropical disease would reach northward to enclose parts of what we now call the Arctic; probably about a third of the planet would be made unlivable by direct heat; and what are today literally unprecedented and intolerable droughts and heat waves would be the quotidian condition of whatever human life was able to endure.49, 50, 51, 52 We will, almost certainly, avoid eight degrees of warming; in fact, several recent papers have suggested the climate is actually less sensitive to emissions than we’d thought, and that even the upper bound of a business-as-usual path would bring us to about five degrees, with a likely destination around four.53 But five degrees is nearly as unthinkable as eight, and four degrees not much better: the world in a permanent food deficit, the Alps as arid as the Atlas Mountains.54 Between that scenario and the world we live in now lies only the open question of human response. Some amount of further warming is already baked in, thanks to the protracted processes by which the planet adapts to greenhouse gas. But all of those paths projected from the present—to two degrees, to three, to four, five, or even eight—will be carved overwhelmingly by what we choose to do now. There is nothing stopping us from four degrees other than our own will to change course, which we have yet to display. Because the planet is as big as it is, and as ecologically diverse; because humans have proven themselves an adaptable species, and will likely continue to adapt to outmaneuver a lethal threat; and because the devastating effects of warming will soon become too extreme to ignore, or deny, if they haven’t already; because of all that, it is unlikely that climate change will render the planet truly uninhabitable. But if we do nothing about carbon emissions, if the next thirty years of industrial activity trace the same arc upward as the last thirty years have, whole regions will become unlivable by any standard we have today as soon as the end of this century. ﻿A few years ago, E. O. Wilson proposed a term, “Half-Earth,” to help us think through how we might adapt to the pressures of a changing climate, letting nature run its rehabilitative course on half the planet and sequestering humanity in the remaining, habitable half of the world.55 The fraction may be smaller than that, possibly considerably, and not by choice; the subtitle of his book was Our Planet’s Fight for Life. On longer timescales, the even-bleaker outcome is possible, too—the livable planet darkening as it approaches a human dusk. It would take a spectacular coincidence of bad choices and bad luck to make that kind of zero earth possible within our lifetime. But the fact that we have brought that nightmare eventuality into play at all is perhaps the overwhelming cultural and historical fact of the modern era—what historians of the future will likely study about us, and what we’d have hoped the generations before ours would have had the foresight to focus on, too. Whatever we do to stop warming, and however aggressively we act to protect ourselves from its ravages, we will have pulled the devastation of human life on Earth into view—close enough that we can see clearly what it would look like and know, with some degree of precision, how it will punish our children and grandchildren. Close enough, in fact, that we are already beginning to feel its effects ourselves, when we do not turn away. ﻿It is almost hard to believe just how much has happened and how quickly. In the late summer of 2017, three major hurricanes arose in the Atlantic at once, proceeding at first along the same route as though they were battalions of an army on the march.56 Hurricane Harvey, when it struck Houston, delivered such epic rainfall it was described in some areas as a “500,000-year event”—meaning that we should expect that amount of rain to hit that area once every five hundred millennia.57 Sophisticated consumers of environmental news have already learned how meaningless climate change has rendered such terms, which were meant to describe storms that had a 1-in-500,000 chance of striking in any given year. But the figures do help in this way: to remind us just how far global warming has already taken us from any natural-disaster benchmark our grandparents would have recognized. To dwell on the more common 500-year figure just for a moment, it would mean a storm that struck once during the entire history of the Roman Empire. Five hundred years ago, there were no English settlements across the Atlantic, so we are talking about a storm that should hit just once as Europeans arrived and established colonies, as colonists fought a revolution and Americans a civil war and two world wars, as their descendants established an empire of cotton on the backs of slaves, freed them, and then brutalized their descendants, industrialized and postindustrialized, triumphed in the Cold War, ushered in the “end of history,” and witnessed, just a decade later, its dramatic return. One storm in all that time, is what the meteorological record has taught us to expect. Just one. Harvey was the third such flood to hit Houston since 2015.58 And the storm struck, in places, with an intensity that was supposed to be a thousand times rarer still. That same season, an Atlantic hurricane hit Ireland, 45 million were flooded from their homes in South Asia, and unprecedented wildfires tilled much of California into ash.59, 60 And then there was the new category of quotidian nightmare, climate change inventing the once-unimaginable category of obscure natural disasters—crises so large they would once have been inscribed in folklore for centuries today passing across our horizons ignored, overlooked, or forgotten. In 2016, a “thousand-year flood” drowned small-town Ellicott City, Maryland, to take but one example almost at random; it was followed, two years later, in the same small town, by another.61 One week that summer of 2018, dozens of places all over the world were hit with record heat waves, from Denver to Burlington to Ottawa; from Glasgow to Shannon to Belfast; from Tbilisi, in Georgia, and Yerevan, in Armenia, to whole swaths of southern Russia.62 The previous month, the daytime temperature of one city in Oman reached above 121 degrees Fahrenheit, and did not drop below 108 all night, and in Quebec, Canada, fifty-four died from the heat.63 That same week, one hundred major wildfires burned in the American West, including one in California that grew 4,000 acres in one day, and another, in Colorado, that produced a volcano-like 300-foot eruption of flames, swallowing an entire subdivision and inventing a new term, “fire tsunami,” along the way.64, 65, 66 On the other side of the planet, biblical rains flooded Japan, where 1.2 million were evacuated from their homes.67 Later that summer, Typhoon Mangkhut forced the evacuation of 2.45 million from mainland China, the same week that Hurricane Florence struck the Carolinas, turning the port city of Wilmington briefly into an island and flooding large parts of the state with hog manure and coal ash.68, 69, 70 Along the way, the winds of Florence produced dozens of tornadoes across the region.71 The previous month, in India, the state of Kerala was hit with its worst floods in almost a hundred years.72 That October, a hurricane in the Pacific wiped Hawaii’s East Island entirely off the map.73 And in November, which has traditionally marked the beginning of the rainy season in California, the state was hit instead with the deadliest fire in its history—the Camp Fire, which scorched several hundred square miles outside of Chico, killing dozens and leaving many more missing in a place called, proverbially, Paradise.74 The devastation was so complete, you could almost forget the Woolsey Fire, closer to Los Angeles, which burned at the same time and forced the sudden evacuation of 170,000. It is tempting to look at these strings of disasters and think, Climate change is here. And one response to seeing things long predicted actually come to pass is to feel that we have settled into a new era, with everything transformed. In fact, that is how California governor Jerry Brown described the state of things in the midst of the state’s wildfire disaster: “a new normal.”75 The truth is actually much scarier. That is, the end of normal; never normal again. We have already exited the state of environmental conditions that allowed the human animal to evolve in the first place, in an unsure and unplanned bet on just what that animal can endure. The climate system that raised us, and raised everything we now know as human culture and civilization, is now, like a parent, dead. And the climate system we have been observing for the last several years, the one that has battered the planet again and again, is not our bleak future in preview. It would be more precise to say that it is a product of our recent climate past, already passing behind us into a dustbin of environmental nostalgia. There is no longer any such thing as a “natural disaster,” but not only will things get worse; technically speaking, they have already gotten worse. Even if, miraculously, humans immediately ceased emitting carbon, we’d still be due for some additional warming from just the stuff we’ve put into the air already. And of course, with global emissions still increasing, we’re very far from zeroing out on carbon, and therefore very far from stalling climate change. The devastation we are now seeing all around us is a beyond-best-case scenario for the future of warming and all the climate disasters it will bring. ﻿What that means is that we have not, at all, arrived at a new equilibrium. It is more like we’ve taken one step out on the plank off a pirate ship. Perhaps because of the exhausting false debate about whether climate change is “real,” too many of us have developed a misleading impression that its effects are binary. But global warming is not “yes” or “no,” nor is it “today’s weather forever” or “doomsday tomorrow.” It is a function that gets worse over time as long as we continue to produce greenhouse gas. And so the experience of life in a climate transformed by human activity is not just a matter of stepping from one stable ecosystem into another, somewhat worse one, no matter how degraded or destructive the transformed climate is. The effects will grow and build as the planet continues to warm: from 1 degree to 1.5 to almost certainly 2 degrees and beyond. The last few years of climate disasters may look like about as much as the planet can take. In fact, we are only just entering our brave new world, one that collapses below us as soon as we set foot on it. Many of these new disasters arrived accompanied by debate about their cause—about how much of what they have done to us comes from what we have done to the planet. For those hoping to better understand precisely how a monstrous hurricane arises out of a placid ocean, these inquiries are worthwhile, but for all practical purposes the debate yields no real meaning or insight. A particular hurricane may owe 40 percent of its force to anthropogenic global warming, the evolving models might suggest, and a particular drought may be half again as bad as it might have been in the seventeenth century. But climate change is not a discrete clue we can find at the scene of a local crime—one hurricane, one heat wave, one famine, one war. Global warming isn’t a perpetrator; it’s a conspiracy. We all live within climate and within all the changes we have produced in it, which enclose us all and everything we do. If hurricanes of a certain force are now five times as likely as in the pre-Columbian Caribbean, it is parsimonious to the point of triviality to argue over whether this one or that one was “climate-caused.” All hurricanes now unfold in the weather systems we have wrecked on their behalf, which is why there are more of them, and why they are stronger. The same is true for wildfires: this one or that one may be “caused” by a cookout or a downed power line, but each is burning faster, bigger, and longer because of global warming, which gives no reprieve to fire season. Climate change isn’t something happening here or there but everywhere, and all at once. And unless we choose to halt it, it will never stop. Over the past few decades, the term “Anthropocene” has climbed out of academic discourse and into the popular imagination—a name given to the geologic era we live in now, and a way to signal that it is a new era, defined on the wall chart of deep history by human intervention. One problem with the term is that it implies a conquest of nature, even echoing the biblical “dominion.” But however sanguine you might be about the proposition that we have already ravaged the natural world, which we surely have, it is another thing entirely to consider the possibility that we have only provoked it, engineering first in ignorance and then in denial a climate system that will now go to war with us for many centuries, perhaps until it destroys us. That is what Wally Broecker, the avuncular oceanographer, means when he calls the planet an “angry beast.”76 You could also go with “war machine.” Each day we arm it more. The assaults will not be discrete—this is another climate delusion. Instead, they will produce a new kind of cascading violence, waterfalls and avalanches of devastation, the planet pummeled again and again, with increasing intensity and in ways that build on each other and undermine our ability to respond, uprooting much of the landscape we have taken for granted, for centuries, as the stable foundation on which we walk, build homes and highways, shepherd our children through schools and into adulthood under the promise of safety—and subverting the promise that the world we have engineered and built for ourselves, out of nature, will also protect us against it, rather than conspiring with disaster against its makers. Consider those California wildfires. In March 2018, Santa Barbara County issued mandatory evacuation orders for those living in Montecito, Goleta, Santa Barbara, Summerland, and Carpinteria—where the previous December’s fires had hit hardest. It was the fourth evacuation order precipitated by a climate event in the county in just three months, but only the first had been for fire.77 The others were for mudslides ushered into possibility by that fire, one of the toniest communities in the most glamorous state of the world’s preeminently powerful country upended by fear that their toy vineyards and hobby stables, their world-class beaches and lavishly funded public schools, would be inundated by rivers of mud, the community as thoroughly ravaged as the sprawling camps of temporary shacks housing Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in the monsoon region of Bangladesh.78 It was. More than a dozen died, including a toddler swept away by mud and carried miles down the mountainslope to the sea; schools closed and highways flooded, foreclosing the routes of emergency vehicles and making the community an inland island, as if behind a blockade, choked off by a mud noose.79 Some climate cascades will unfold at the global level—cascades so large their effects will seem, by the curious legerdemain of environmental change, imperceptible. A warming planet leads to melting Arctic ice, which means less sunlight reflected back to the sun and more absorbed by a planet warming faster still, which means an ocean less able to absorb atmospheric carbon and so a planet warming faster still. A warming planet will also melt Arctic permafrost, which contains 1.8 trillion tons of carbon, more than twice as much as is currently suspended in the earth’s atmosphere, and some of which, when it thaws and is released, may evaporate as methane, which is thirty-four times as powerful a greenhouse-gas warming blanket as carbon dioxide when judged on the timescale of a century; when﻿ judged on the timescale of two decades, it is eighty-six times as powerful.80, 81 A hotter planet is, on net, bad for plant life, which means what is called “forest dieback”—the decline and retreat of jungle basins as big as countries and woods that sprawl for so many miles they used to contain whole folklores—which means a dramatic stripping-back of the planet’s natural ability to absorb carbon and turn it into oxygen, which means still hotter temperatures, which means more dieback, and so on. Higher temperatures means more forest fires means fewer trees means less carbon absorption, means more carbon in the atmosphere, means a hotter planet still—and so on. A warmer planet means more water vapor in the atmosphere, and, water vapor being a greenhouse gas, this brings higher temperatures still—and so on. Warmer oceans can absorb less heat, which means more stays in the air, and contain less oxygen, which is doom for phytoplankton—which does for the ocean what plants do on land, eating carbon and producing oxygen—which leaves us with more carbon, which heats the planet further. And so on. These are the systems climate scientists call “feedbacks”; there are more.82 Some work in the other direction, moderating climate change. But many more point toward an acceleration of warming, should we trigger them. And just how these complicated, countervailing systems will interact—what effects will be exaggerated and what undermined by feedbacks—is unknown, which pulls a dark cloud of uncertainty over any effort to plan ahead for the climate future. We know what a best-case outcome for climate change looks like, however unrealistic, because it quite closely resembles the world as we live on it today. But we have not yet begun to contemplate those cascades that may bring us to the infernal range of the bell curve. Other cascades are regional, collapsing on human communities and buckling them where they fall. These can be literal cascades—human-triggered avalanches are on the rise, with 50,000 people killed by avalanches globally between 2004 and 2016.83 In Switzerland, climate change has unleashed a whole new kind, thanks to what are called “rain-on-snow” events, which also caused the overflow of the Oroville Dam in Northern California and the 2013 flood of Alberta, Canada, with damages approaching $5 billion.84 But there are other kinds of cascade, too. Climate-driven water shortages or crop failures push climate refugees into nearby regions already struggling with resource scarcity. Sea-level rise inundates cropland with more and more saltwater flooding, transforming agricultural areas into brackish sponges no longer able to adequately feed those living off them; flooding power plants, knocking regions offline just as electricity may be needed most; and crippling chemical and nuclear plants, which, malfunctioning, breathe out their toxic plumes. The rains that followed the Camp Fire flooded the tent cities hastily assembled for the first disaster’s refugees. In the case of the Santa Barbara mudslides, drought produced a state full of dry brush ripe for a spark; then a year of anomalously monsoonish rain produced only more growth, and wildfires tore through the landscape, leaving a mountainside without much plant life to hold in place the millions of tons of loose earth that make up the towering coastal range where the clouds tend to gather and the rain first falls. Some of those watching from afar wondered, incredulously, how a mudslide could kill so many. The answer is, the same way as hurricanes or tornadoes—by weaponizing the environment, whether “man-made” or “natural.” Wind disasters do not kill by wind, however brutal it gets, but by tugging trees out of earth and transforming them into clubs, making power lines into loose whips and electrified nooses, collapsing homes on cowering residents, and turning cars into tumbling boulders. And they kill slowly, too, by cutting off food delivery and medical supplies, making roads impassable even to first responders, knocking out phone lines and cell towers so that the ill and elderly must suffer, and hope to endure, in silence and without aid. Most of the world is not Santa Barbara, with its Mission-style impasto of infinite-seeming wealth, and in the coming decades many of the most punishing climate horrors will indeed hit those least able to respond and recover. This is what is often called the problem of environmental justice; a sharper, less gauzy phrase would be “climate caste system.” The problem is acute within countries, even wealthy ones, where the poorest are those who live in the marshes, the swamps, the floodplains, the inadequately irrigated places with the most vulnerable infrastructure—altogether an unwitting environmental apartheid. Just in Texas, 500,000 poor Latinos live in shantytowns called “colonias” with no drainage systems to deal with increased flooding.85 The cleavage is even sharper globally, where the poorest countries will suffer more in our hot new world. In fact, with one exception—Australia—countries with lower GDPs will warm the most.86 That is notwithstanding the fact that much of the global south has not, to this point, defiled the atmosphere of the planet all that much. This is one of the many historical ironies of climate change that would better be called cruelties, so merciless is the suffering they will inflict. But disproportionately as it will fall on the world’s least, the devastation of global warming cannot be easily quarantined in the developing world, as much as those in the Northern Hemisphere would probably, and not to our credit, prefer it. Climate disaster is too indiscriminate for that. In fact, the belief that climate could be plausibly governed, or managed, by any institution or human instrument presently at hand is another wide-eyed climate delusion. The planet survived many millennia without anything approaching a world government, in fact endured nearly the entire span of human civilization that way, organized into competitive tribes and fiefdoms and kingdoms and nation-states, and only began to build something resembling a cooperative blueprint, very piecemeal, after brutal world wars—in the ﻿form of the League of Nations and United Nations and European Union and even the market fabric of globalization, whatever its flaws still a vision of cross-national participation, imbued with the neoliberal ethos that life on Earth was a positive-sum game. If you had to invent a threat grand enough, and global enough, to plausibly conjure into being a system of true international cooperation, climate change would be it—the threat everywhere, and overwhelming, and total. And yet now, just as the need for that kind of cooperation is paramount, indeed necessary for anything like the world we know to survive, we are only unbuilding those alliances—recoiling into nationalistic corners and retreating from collective responsibility and from each other. That collapse of trust is a cascade, too. ﻿Just how completely the world below our feet will become unknown to us is not yet clear, and how we register its transformation remains an open question. One legacy of the environmentalist creed that long prized the natural world as an otherworldly retreat is that we see its degradation as a sequestered story, unfolding separately from our own modern lives—so separately that the degradation acquires the comfortable contours of parable, like pages from Aesop, aestheticized even when we know the losses as tragedy. Climate change could soon mean that, in the fall, trees may simply turn brown, and so we will look differently at entire schools of painting, which stretched for generations, devoted to best capturing the oranges and reds we can no longer see ourselves out the windows of our cars as we drive along our highways.87 The coffee plants of Latin America will no longer produce fruit; beach homes will be built on higher and higher stilts and still be drowned.88 In many cases, it is better to use the present tense. In just the last forty years, according to the World Wildlife Fund, more than half of the world’s vertebrate animals have died; in just the last twenty-five, one study of German nature preserves found, the flying insect population declined by three-quarters.89, 90 The delicate dance of flowers and their pollinators has been disrupted, as have the migration patterns of cod, which have fled up the Eastern Seaboard toward the Arctic, evading the communities of fishermen that fed on them for centuries; as have the hibernation patterns of black bears, many of which now stay awake all winter.91, 92, 93 Species individuated over millions of years of evolution but forced together by climate change have begun to mate with one another for the first time, producing a whole new class of hybrid species: the pizzly bear, the coy-wolf.94 The zoos are already natural history museums, the children’s books already out of date. Older fables, too, will be remade: the story of Atlantis, having endured and enchanted for several millennia, will compete with the real-time sagas of the Marshall Islands and Miami Beach, each sinking over time into snorkelers’ paradises; the strange fantasy of Santa and his polar workshop will grow eerier still in an Arctic of ice-free summers; and there is a terrible poignancy in contemplating how desertification of the entire Mediterranean Basin will change our reading of the Odyssey, or how it will discolor the shine of Greek islands for dust from the Sahara to permanently blanket their skies, or how it will recast the meaning of the Pyramids for the Nile to be dramatically drained.95, 96, 97 We will think of the border with Mexico differently, presumably, when the Rio Grande is a line traced through a dry riverbed—the Rio Sand, it’s already been called.98 The imperious West has spent five centuries looking down its nose at the plight of those living within the pale of tropical disease, and one wonders how that will change when mosquitoes carrying malaria and dengue are flying through the streets of Copenhagen and Chicago, too. But we have for so long understood stories about nature as allegories that we seem unable to recognize that the meaning of climate change is not sequestered in parable. It encompasses us; in a very real way it governs us—our crop yields, our pandemics, our migration patterns and civil wars, crime waves and domestic assaults, hurricanes and heat waves and rain bombs and megadroughts, the shape of our economic growth and everything that flows downstream from it, which today means nearly everything. Eight hundred million in South Asia alone, the World Bank says, would see their living conditions sharply diminish by 2050 on the current emissions track, and perhaps a climate slowdown will even reveal the bounty of what Andreas Malm calls fossil capitalism to be an illusion, sustained over just a few centuries by the arithmetic of adding the energy value of burned fossil fuels to what had been, before wood and coal and oil, an eternal Malthusian trap.99, 100 In which case, we would have to retire the intuition that history will inevitably extract material progress from the planet, at least in any reliable or global pattern, and come to terms, somehow, with just how pervasively that intuition ruled even our inner lives, often tyrannically. Adaptation to climate change is often viewed in terms of market trade-offs, but in the coming decades the trade will work in the opposite direction, with relative prosperity a benefit of more aggressive action. Every degree of warming, it’s been estimated, costs a temperate country like the United States about one percentage point of GDP, and according to one recent paper, at 1.5 degrees the world would be $20 trillion richer than at 2 degrees.101, 102 Turn the dial up another degree or two, and the costs balloon—the compound interest of environmental catastrophe. 3.7 degrees of warming would produce $551 trillion in damages, research suggests; total worldwide wealth is today about $280 trillion.103, 104 Our current emissions trajectory takes us over 4 degrees by 2100; multiply that by that 1 percent of GDP and you have almost entirely wiped out the very possibility of economic growth, which has not topped 5 percent globally in over forty years.105 A fringe group of alarmed academics call this prospect “steady-state economics,” but it ultimately suggests a more ﻿complete retreat from economics as an orienting beacon, and from growth as the lingua franca through which modern life launders all of its aspirations.106 “Steady-state” also gives a name to the creeping panic that history may be less progressive, as we’ve come to believe really only over the last several centuries, than cyclical, as we were sure it was for the many millennia before. More than that: in the vision steady-state economics projects of a state-of-nature competitive scramble, everything from politics to trade and war seems brutally zero-sum. For centuries we have looked to nature as a mirror onto which to first project, then observe, ourselves. But what is the moral? There is nothing to learn from global warming, because we do not have the time, or the distance, to contemplate its lessons; we are after all not merely telling the story but living it. That is, trying to; the threat is immense. How immense? One 2018 paper sketches the math in horrifying detail. In the journal Nature Climate Change, a team led by Drew Shindell tried to quantify the suffering that would be avoided if warming was kept to 1.5 degrees, rather than 2 degrees—in other words, how much additional suffering would result from just that additional half-degree of warming. Their answer: 150 million more people would die from air pollution alone in a 2-degree warmer world than in a 1.1075-degree warmer one. Later that year, the IPCC raised the stakes further: in the gap between 1.1085 degrees and 2, it said, hundreds of millions of lives were at stake. Numbers that large can be hard to grasp, but 150 million is the equivalent of twenty-five Holocausts. It is three times the size of the death toll of the Great Leap Forward—the largest nonmilitary death toll humanity has ever produced. It is more than twice the greatest death toll of any kind, World War II. The numbers don’t begin to climb only when we hit 1.5 degrees, of course. As should not surprise you, they are already accumulating, at a rate of at least seven million deaths, from air pollution alone, each year—an annual Holocaust, pursued and prosecuted by what brand of nihilism? This is what is meant when climate change is called an “existential crisis”—a drama we are now haphazardly improvising between two hellish poles, in which our best-case outcome is death and suffering at the scale of twenty-five Holocausts, and the worst-case outcome puts us on the brink of extinction.109 Rhetoric often fails us on climate because the only factually appropriate language is of a kind we’ve been trained, by a buoyant culture of sunny-side-up optimism, to dismiss, categorically, as hyperbole. Here, the facts are hysterical, and the dimensions of the drama that will play out between those poles incomprehensibly large—large enough to enclose not just all of present-day humanity but all of our possible futures, as well. Global warming has improbably compressed into two generations the entire story of human civilization. First, the project of remaking the planet so that it is undeniably ours, a project whose exhaust, the poison of emissions, now casually works its way through millennia of ice so quickly you can see the melt with a naked eye, destroying the environmental conditions that have held stable and steadily governed for literally all of human history. That has been the work of a single generation. The second generation faces a very different task: the project of preserving our collective future, forestalling that devastation and engineering an alternate path. There is simply no analogy to draw on, outside of mythology and theology—and perhaps the Cold War prospect of mutually assured destruction. Few feel like gods in the face of warming, but that the totality of climate change should make us feel so passive—that is another of its delusions. In folklore and comic books and church pews and movie theaters, stories about the fate of the earth often perversely counsel passivity in their audiences, and perhaps it should not surprise us that the threat of climate change is no different. By the end of the Cold War, the prospect of nuclear winter had clouded every corner of our pop culture and psychology, a pervasive nightmare that the human experiment might be brought to an end by two jousting sets of proud, rivalrous tacticians, just a few sets of twitchy hands hovering over the planet’s self-destruct buttons. The threat of climate change is more dramatic still, and ultimately more democratic, with responsibility shared by each of us even as we shiver in fear of it; and yet we have processed that threat only in parts, typically not concretely or explicitly, displacing certain anxieties and inventing others, choosing to ignore the bleakest features of our possible future and letting our political fatalism and technological faith blur, as though we’d gone cross-eyed, into a remarkably familiar consumer fantasy: that someone else will fix the problem for us, at no cost. Those more panicked are often hardly less complacent, living instead through climate fatalism as though it were climate optimism. Over the last few years, as the planet’s own environmental rhythms have seemed to grow more fatalistic, skeptics have found themselves arguing not that climate change isn’t happening, since extreme weather has made that undeniable, but that its causes are unclear—suggesting that the changes we are seeing are the result of natural cycles rather than human activities and interventions. It is a very strange argument; if the planet is warming at a terrifying pace and on a horrifying scale, it should transparently concern us more, rather than less, that the warming is beyond our control, possibly even our comprehension. That we know global warming is our doing should be a comfort, not a cause for despair, however incomprehensively large and complicated we find the processes that have brought it into being; that we know we are, ourselves, responsible for all of its punishing effects ﻿should be empowering, and not just perversely. Global warming is, after all, a human invention. And the flip side of our real-time guilt is that we remain in command. No matter how out-of-control the climate system seems—with its roiling typhoons, unprecedented famines and heat waves, refugee crises and climate conflicts—we are all its authors. And still writing.

#### Err on the side of caution – models underestimate warming, and significant climatic changes make fast runaway warming likely – the tipping point could sneak up on us

* Warming is not linear – certain combos of events might speed it up unexpectedly 🡪 fast, extreme action is necessary to solve

Wuebbles et al. 17, D.J., D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, B. DeAngelo, S. Doherty, K. Hayhoe, R. Horton, J.P. Kossin, P.C. Taylor, A.M. Waple, and C.P. Weaver, 2017: Executive summary. In: *Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume I* [Wuebbles, D.J., D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J. Dokken, B.C. Stewart, and T.K. Maycock (eds.)]. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA, pp. 12-34, doi: 10.7930/J0DJ5CTG. Pg. 32-33, beckert

There is a Significant Possibility for Unanticipated Changes Humanity’s effect on the Earth system, through the large-scale combustion of fossil fuels and widespread deforestation and the resulting release of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere, as well as through emissions of other greenhouse gases and radiatively active substances from human activities, is unprecedented. There is significant potential for humanity’s effect on the planet to result in unanticipated surprises and a broad consensus that the further and faster the Earth system is pushed towards warming, the greater the risk of such surprises. There are at least two types of potential surprises: compound events, where multiple extreme climate events occur simultaneously or sequentially (creating greater overall impact), and critical threshold or tipping point events, where some threshold is crossed in the climate system (that leads to large impacts). The probability of such surprises—some of which may be abrupt and/or irreversible—as well as other more predictable but difficult-to-manage impacts, increases as the influence of human activities on the climate system increases. (Ch. 15) Unanticipated and difficult or impossible-to-manage changes in the climate system are possible throughout the next century as critical thresholds are crossed and/or multiple climate-related extreme events occur simultaneously. (Ch. 15) • Positive feedbacks (self-reinforcing cycles) within the climate system have the potential to accelerate human-induced climate change and even shift the Earth’s climate system, in part or in whole, into new states that are very different from those experienced in the recent past (for example, ones with greatly diminished ice sheets or different large-scale patterns of at- mosphere or ocean circulation). Some feedbacks and potential state shifts can be modeled and quantified; others can be modeled or identified but not quantified; and some are probably still unknown. (Very high confidence in the potential for state shifts and in the incompleteness of knowledge about feedbacks and potential state shifts). (Ch. 15) • The physical and socioeconomic impacts of compound extreme events (such as simultaneous heat and drought, wildfires associated with hot and dry conditions, or flooding associated with high precipitation on top of snow or waterlogged ground) can be greater than the sum of the parts (very high confidence). Few analyses consider the spatial or temporal correlation between extreme events. (Ch. 15) • While climate models incorporate important climate processes that can be well quantified, they do not include all of the processes that can contribute to feedbacks (Ch. 2), compound ex- treme events, and abrupt and/or irreversible changes. For this reason, future changes outside the range projected by climate models cannot be ruled out (very high confidence). Moreover, the systematic tendency of climate models to underestimate temperature change during warm paleoclimates suggests that climate models are more likely to underestimate than to overestimate the amount of long-term future change (medium confidence). (Ch. 15)

#### False balance decreases trust in media and causes misinformation

Benham 19 [Janelle Benham, Adjunct Professor at Abilene Christian University and former reporter with a master’s degree in journalism from Ball State University, 2019, “Best Practices for Journalistic Balance: Gatekeeping, Imbalance and the Fake News Era,” Journalism Practice, https://sci-hub.se/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17512786.2019.1658538]/Kankee

Zelizer (2004) said journalism prides itself on its respect for truth and facts. However, public opinion of U.S. news outlets has an increasingly different view on if journalism truly reflects a truthful picture. In a 2016 Pew Research Center survey, 74% of U.S. adults surveyed said they believe news media tend to favor one side when reporting on political or social media issues, with only 24% saying media deal fairly with both sides (Mitchell et al. 2016). In the same year, a Gallup Poll revealed that trust in U.S. news organizations sunk to an all-time low, with only 32% saying that had a great or fair amount of trust in the news media “to report the news fully, accurately, and fairly” (2016, 1). In their most recent joint poll, Gallup and the Knight Foundation (2018) found that only 44% of respondents could name a news organization which they believe reports the news objectively. For institutions tracking public perception of US journalists’ bias and fairness there has been a steady decline over the last four decades (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2004). In 1985 the Pew Research Center found 45% of those U.S. adults surveyed thought news organizations to be politically biased, by 2002, that number jumped to 59% (Project for Excellence in Journalism 2004). Considering Pew’s latest survey has nearly three-fourths of respondents doubting the fairness of reports, the trajectory of U.S. journalism in the truth perception spectrum is grim. While the numbers are starkest in the U.S. this issue is relevant globally as well. In a 2017 Pew Research Center survey 75% of those surveyed in 38 nations said media bias, specifically favoring one political party over others while reporting, is not permissible (Mitchell et al. 2018). Globally 52% think their news media are doing a good job at fairly reporting different positions on political issues (Mitchell et al. 2018). These numbers indicated the audience’s decreasing perception of journalistic fairness in relation to bias. However, the problem does not lie in just bias perception but in the balance conundrum itself, Kovach and Rosenstiel said that balance is inherently subjective: Balancing a story by being fair to both sides may not be fair to the truth if both sides do not, in fact, have equal weight. And in those many cases where there are more than two sides to a story, how does one determine which side to honor? Balance, if it amounts to false balance, becomes distortion. (2014, 63) As a part of that, there should be a greater examination into this journalistic concept of balance, how it can be more concretely defined, and how to obtain balance within storytelling while avoiding the pitfalls of imbalance. A qualitative examination into this concept of balance is essential to frame this issue within the communication research profession. In her study on the impact of the Internet on news organizations, Robinson offered this support for qualitative research, “In-depth interviews with news producers would offer a chance to explore the nature of the press as an institution in the latest emergentmedia environment”(2007, 308). A qualitative approach will be enlightening for this topic of study as it allows for open-format discovery and expands beyond the content analysis approach of past balance and objectivity studies (Lazarfield, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Schaefer and Fordan 2015). Stavitsky and Dvorkin explained the historic difficulties of quantitative measurement for the concept of balance in journalism particularly with relation to campaign or candidate reporting: Quantitative analysis of balance—sometimes referred to as ‘stop-watch studies’—may point to important discrepancies in coverage and signal a lack of fair treatment. However, stopwatch analysis alone does not address questions of whether coverage favored a particular candidate or, for that matter, a political party or interest group. (2008, 6) Hearns-Branaman also utilized a qualitative approach in part for his work on the philosophy of truth in journalism practice: Unlike many philosophical discussions around truth and journalism, I will also use the discourse of journalists interviewed by myself to inform the discussion. This is not to take their statements at face value nor to associate their talk with their ‘beliefs.’ It is simply talk, talk that, however, illustrates how they are situated in the field of journalism. (2016, 4–5)

#### Regulatory capture and media co-option by the fossil fuel industry manufactures public consent in favor of devastating climate change inaction – media presupposes “objective facts” and reports them as news

MacLean 19 [Jason MacLean, educator at University of Saskatchewan’s College of Law, 12-1-2019, “Manufacturing Consent to Climate Inaction: A Case Study of The Globe and Mail ’s Pipeline Coverage,” DALHOUSIE LAW JOURNAL, https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1450&context=dlj]/Kankee

The normative dimension of the public interest in respect of any given area of regulation remains equally complex and difficult to establish even in statutory regimes where regulators are subject to a legal “public interest” standard. As the Supreme Court of Canada recently observed, the “public interest is a broad concept and what it requires will depend on the particular context.”10 For these reasons, the mainstream news media are attracting increasing scrutiny both as a means and as strategic sites in and of themselves of regulatory reform in the public interest. The media play a significant role in manufacturing public opinion, including public opinion about what constitutes the “public interest,”11 the starting point of regulatory analysis, including regulatory reform. A growing number of studies and commentaries, for example, are paying attention to how—and how often—the news media are covering climate change science and policy for precisely this purpose12: climate policy reform requires a sufficiently informed public motivated to press elected representatives and public decisionmakers to act in the public interest. Growing attention is also being paid to the ways in which powerful industry interests influence the media to shape public discourse and attitudes about climate change and climate change policy options. There is an intersection between the public interest in meaningful and effective climate change action and the mainstream news media as a mechanism of regulatory capture employed by entrenched special interests. Two US climate change commentators have described this intersection in the following terms: To save civilization, most of us would need to supplement our standard daily practices—eating, caring for family and community, faith—with a steady push on the big forces that are restraining progress, the most prominent being the fossil fuel industry’s co-option of government, education, science, and media. 13 To understand what such a “steady push” should consist of, it is necessary not only to identify media co-optation and distortion generally but also to shine a light on specific instances of such distortion with a view to exposing how they contribute to reshaping—and redirecting—the public interest. There has, for example, recently been a proliferation of educational initiatives designed to improve individuals’ evaluation of the quality of information presented by the news media and other information platforms.14 While such longer-term initiatives are laudable, it is also important to better understand how the media influence the construction and perception of the public interest in respect of regulatory issues that are pressing and urgent in the short-term, especially climate change mitigation, given the nature and degree of the threat posed by climate change. Moreover, because even well-educated individuals are susceptible to media bias and tend to default to pre-committed political ideologies, improved media literacy in itself is not a panacea.15 Research on the nature of how the media distort the public interest and that informs how best to respond to and counter such distortions is urgently required. With these broad and challenging considerations in mind, I critically examine how Canada’s leading newspaper, The Globe and Mail, has constructed the “public interest” in respect of the controversial Trans Mountain oil pipeline expansion project. My central argument is that The Globe and Mail’s coverage of the Trans Mountain pipeline serves to legitimize and sustain climate change policy inaction in Canada, to the short-term benefit of Canada’s oil and gas sector, and at the expense of the public and the environment. The article unfolds as follows: In the first section I briefly discuss the political economy of the mainstream news media in democratic societies, and describe the media “propaganda model” as a useful analytical lens to read The Globe and Mail’s coverage of the Trans Mountain project, specifically its editorial characterization of the “national interest” in approving and completing the project as soon as possible. I proceed in the second section by briefly introducing The Globe and Mail as Canada’s newspaper of record along with the history thus far of the Trans Mountain project, and then provide a critical account of The Globe and Mail’s editorial coverage of the project vis-à-vis Canada’s interests and obligations in respect of mitigating climate change. In the third section of the article I discuss the difficulties inherent in seeking to reform the news media as a means of countering this form of regulatory capture. I conclude by discussing the limitations of the analysis and suggesting avenues of future research.

I. Democracy dies in darkness: The political economy of the fourth estate “Democracy dies in darkness” is the motto of the Washington Post newspaper.16 The motto signals the foundational public-interest role that a free and independent press plays in democratic societies by shining a light on the special interests and workings of power. As Edmund Burke reportedly remarked, “there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than them all.”17 And yet, the press and mass communications media more generally have always been bound up in the exercise of political-economic power, so much so that neither can be understood in isolation from the other.18 There is an apparent and abiding tension between the news media as watchdog and the news media as lapdog.19 Arguably the most powerful explanatory model of the media’s role in shaping democratic discussion and debate about public policy is the “propaganda model” developed by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky.20 Propaganda is a provocative term, but in its more nuanced formulation it has considerable explanatory power. Herman and Chomsky argue that the mainstream news media in democratic societies do not play an overtly oppressive function as they do in totalitarian states. The news media in democratic societies “permit—indeed, encourage—spirited debate, criticism, and dissent as long as these remain faithfully within the system of presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a system so powerful as to be internalized largely without awareness.”21 In contrast to the popular perception that propaganda is exclusively state-based and operates principally through the use of intimidation and fear-mongering, the news media in democratic societies tend not to explicitly proclaim a particular party line (i.e. the narrow spectrum of debate acceptable to the political-economic elite), but rather they presuppose it, “thus helping to establish it even more deeply as the very precondition of discussion, while also providing the appearance of lively debate.”22 In the United States, for example, the Federal Communications Commission maintained an official policy from 1949 to 1987 requiring broadcast news providers to present controversial public interest topics in a “balanced” manner.23 Known as the “Fairness Doctrine,” this policy had the effect of ensuring that roughly equal time was accorded to each side of controversial subjects, independent of merit.24 The “Fairness Doctrine” has subsequently come to be understood by media and policy scholars as a vehicle of propaganda, one that has been effectively deployed by the tobacco industry and the fossil fuels industry.25 The following factors account for the news media’s distortional propaganda role in otherwise democratic societies: (a) concentrated corporate ownership of the news media; (b) advertising as the primary revenue source for media outlets; (c) political-economic elite perspectives as the predominant sources of news; (d) “flak,” or government efforts to suppress views critical of political-economic elites; and (e) “anticommunism” via the promotion of capitalism as an economic system, including the promotion of market-based governance and regulatory measures.26 Given these prevailing conditions of media ownership, concentration, and composition, perhaps it should not be surprising—let alone controversial—that the mainstream news media “serve to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity” through the strategic use of “choices, emphases, and omissions”.27 Subsequent empirical work on US news media bias strongly supports the media propaganda model.28 While Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model is based on the US news media, Canadian analyses have, mutatis mutandis, consistently arrived at substantially similar findings. Mainstream news journalism in Canada, according to one study focused on the relationship between the media and the prevailing normative order, “is concerned primarily with communications among elite, authorized knowers.”29 “We can begin to understand how news media circulate and reinforce dominant values and meanings,” another study explains, “by examining ownership of Canadian media, their dependence on advertising revenue and its implications, and some typical patterns of news presentation.”30 According to the Kent Commission, Canada’s Royal Commission on Newspapers, “it was leftwing viewpoints that tended to be under-represented as commercialism increased its hold.”31 And as Globe and Mail columnist Jeffrey Simpson observed in 1996, “more [news media] commentators than ever are ideologues of the right.”32 Given the political and economic importance of the news media generally, a growing number of researchers based in democratic societies are investigating mainstream media representations of climate change, the most pressing public interest issue of our time.33 Of course, climate change is not a discrete public policy issue that can be meaningfully discussed in isolation from other public policy concerns, including issues of economic competitiveness, growth, and inequality. It follows that media representations of a number of important business and economic issues —e.g. domestic and foreign investment, international trade, job growth, natural resources extraction, infrastructure, energy costs, commodity prices, and many more—may have significant climate change implications, even if those implications are not always framed as such. This may help explain the curious finding that scholarly research on Canadian media representations of climate change appears to be declining. 34 While analyses of media representations of climate change are interesting and important in and of themselves,35 such analyses do not always directly connect the form and substance of those representations to the critically important issue of climate policy action (or inaction, as is more often the case) in political and economic context.36 This is particularly problematic in light of recent integrated assessment modeling suggesting that rapid and widespread changes in both individual behaviour and socioeconomic systems are urgently required to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial norm.37 Utilizing Herman and Chomsky’s media propaganda model, I analyze a contextually-important set of media representations in relation to a particular climate policy outcome. In the next section, I provide an account of The Globe and Mail’s editorial coverage of the controversial Trans Mountain oil pipeline expansion project. The analytical aim of this account is to conceptualize and expose mainstream media representations of climate policy as a means of fossil fuels industries’ capture of climate change policymaking, with the regrettable result being the legitimization of climate policy inaction in Canada. Before proceeding, however, a brief discussion of the article’s methodology, including an important methodological caveat, is in order.

#### Journalistic objectivity undermines climate action by framing established science as undecided, evenly balanced debates

Stecula and Merkley 19 [Dominik A. Stecula, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University with a PhD from the University of Columbia, and Eric Merkley, Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, 2-26-2019, "Framing Climate Change: Economics, Ideology, and Uncertainty in American News Media Content From 1988 to 2014," Frontiers, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2019.00006/full]/Kankee

Uncertainty and Risk in Climate Change A final set of important frames in climate news coverage involves the communication of uncertainty and risk in climate change. Scientific uncertainty exists when there is a lack of scientific knowledge or disagreement over the knowledge that exists at a given point in time (Friedman et al., 1999). Researchers understand that all forms of scientific endeavors involve such uncertainty. In the context of climate change, discussion of uncertainty can focus on conflicting claims or a lack of knowledge about the existence or cause of climate change, its present-day effects, and the difficulty with assessing probabilities of specific outcomes and their consequences in the future (Patt and Schrag, 2003; Renn et al., 2011). Journalists covering scientific issues, such as climate change, are also routinely confronted with uncertainty, since controversy and debate are important criteria for the “newsworthiness” of a story (Friedman et al., 1999). As a result, how journalists present and describe scientific uncertainty affects how the public interpret such uncertainty. Communicating this uncertainty, however, is notoriously difficult (Fischhoff and Davis, 2014). Scientific discourse often involves an amount of details that can overwhelm even seasoned experts. It can also leave out crucial uncertainties that are commonly understood by the experts within the field, but need to be communicated to the broader public (Fischhoff and Davis, 2014). Finding the right balance is difficult, yet essential, considering the important role that uncertainty plays in human decision making (Curley et al., 1986; Sword-Daniels et al., 2018). Psychological research shows that uncertainty generally has a negative effect on prosocial behaviors, since it tends to enable people to adopt self-serving narratives about their actions and limit their capacity to cooperate in social dilemma situations (Hine and Gifford, 1991; Dannenberg et al., 2015; for a review of the literature, see Kappes et al., 2018). Experimental work highlights that uncertainty framing also matters for climate change related behaviors, such as decreasing one's energy consumption (Morton et al., 2011). A focus on uncertainty in news coverage can potentially reduce the public's support and engagement in climate action because of the unclear outcomes of such actions. Uncertainty can take several forms in climate change coverage. On a wide range of climate impacts and long-range forecasts of future warming there is uncertainty that is appropriately acknowledged by experts in the media's coverage of climate science. More problematic is if uncertainty is used in a way that casts doubt on the well-established tenants of the climate consensus of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—that climate change is happening, is predominantly man-made through the production of greenhouse gas emissions, and will result in severe environmental and human harm. The persuasive power of uncertainty in this context is its implicit justification and reification of the status quo, especially as it pertains to fossil-fuel usage and carbon emissions (Feygina et al., 2010). One way in which this type uncertainty enters the media coverage of climate change has been through the journalistic engagement of so-called “false balance.” Reporters frequently treat topics as debates in which they present “both sides” in order to adhere to a journalistic norm of objectivity. This norm exists, in part, because both journalists and the general public prize it (Schudson, 1978; Giannoulis et al., 2010), but also because it acts as a mechanism to protect journalists from attacks on their credibility and to preserve access to sources on both sides of a given political debate (Hallin, 1989; Shoemaker and Reese, 2013). The desire for balance also serves the media's tendency toward drama and conflict in news coverage (Bennett, 2007). In many contexts it is important for journalists to be fair and evenly balanced in their presentation of different sides of a story, but it quickly becomes awkward when discussing the existence or causes of climate change where the credibility of each side does not have equal weight. And, the consequences of this coverage are troubling. Presenting a scientific consensus as a debate confuses the public on the state of the science and, in the case of climate change, possibly reduces support for climate action (Friedman et al., 1999; Corbett and Durfee, 2004; Koehler, 2016; McCright et al., 2016). Newsroom norms of objectivity will only contribute to a balanced presentation of a political debate if another side presents itself. Journalists ultimately rely on easily accessible sources when reporting on the news. And, because of the activism of the fossil fuel industry and conservative movement, there have been no shortage of sources ready and willing to use a platform provided by journalists to cast doubt on climate science—the so-called “Merchants of Doubt” (Oreskes and Conway, 2011). Scholars have noted that these groups have made a concerted effort to mobilize opposition to climate mitigation policy by undermining trust in foundations of climate science for both the public and policy makers (Jacques et al., 2008; Dunlap and McCright, 2011; Dunlap and Jacques, 2013; Farrell, 2016a,b). While these groups are likely not as active in the media as conventional wisdom might suggest (Merkley and Stecula, 2018), it is still possible that the press, and in particular conservative media, pick up on their message of uncertainty in their coverage of climate science even if they don't explicitly cite these actors. As the broader research on misinformation has shown, various myths surrounding climate science, including those pertaining to certainty of different outcomes, tend to be “sticky,” and hence very difficult to correct (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Efforts to correct such information tend to be ineffective, and, in some circumstances might even result in what is called a backfire effect, when people get more entrenched in their original position (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Some promising work suggests that exposing people to correct information prior to misinformation might be an effective way to “inoculate” them from the perils of misinformation, at least in some contexts, but the broader point remains that, if the press disseminates uncertainty frames about climate change, such information might play a negative role in people's attitudes about climate change and climate change mitigation policies (Cook et al., 2017; Jolley and Douglas, 2017). The themes of uncertainty have been analyzed in the context of climate change news coverage. Some research has shown that coverage of climate change in the 1990s and early 2000s was characterized by scientific inaccuracy and uncertainty, which was driven by an adherence to balanced reporting and resistance to a growing body of scientific evidence. More recently, however, balance nearly disappeared from the press (Zehr, 2000; Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004, 2007; Boykoff, 2007). The scope of this work, however, has been fairly limited in terms of the time dimension as well as the amount of news coverage examined, as was highlighted in the previous section. However, scholars who have been examining this feature of news coverage of climate change in the comparative context, have highlighted that the U.S. coverage features substantially more climate skeptic voices pushing doubt about climate science, compared to countries like India or France (Painter and Ashe, 2012). Furthermore, contrary to the findings in the U.S.-centric literature, the authors found that skeptics voicing climate increased their media presence between 2007 and 2010 (Painter and Ashe, 2012). In a separate analysis, Painter (2013) also found that uncertainty was the second most common frame used in climate change coverage, appearing in 76 percent of American articles, however it was the salient frame in only 13 percent of the coverage. It is important to note that this analysis, however, was based only on a total of 55 articles. This disparity in findings highlights the need to systematically examine uncertainty in the context of American news coverage and examine degrees of uncertainty, not just whether the frame is present or not.