# 1NC

#### Interpretation: the resolution should define the division of affirmative and negative ground. To clarify, the aff must defend a world where the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### Resolved” means to enact by law.

Words & Phrases ’64

(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

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Advocacy is the act of pleading for or arguing in favor of something or actively supporting a cause or proposal. It can also refer to the work or profession of an advocate. For lawyers advocacy means representing the interests of the client in the best manner possible. Advocacy is considered an art in which lawyers are trained.

**World Population Review 22** [Democracy Countries 2022, worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/democracy-countries.] // VS

The Democracy Index The Democracy Index is an annual report compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The index measures the state of democracy in 167 of the world's countries by tracking 60 indicators in five different categories: electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. The indicators are combined to give each category a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the five category scores are averaged to determine the overall index score. Countries with a total Democracy Index score between 8.01 and 10 (out of 10) are considered full democracies. Those whose score lands between 6.01 and 8.00 are classified as flawed democracies. While these countries have free and fair elections and basic civil liberties, there are faults in other aspects, such as low levels of participation in politics or an underdeveloped (or heavily partisan) political culture. The lower two categories of the index are reserved for countries that did not score well enough to be considered democracies. Nations that score between 4.01 and 6.0 earn the title of hybrid regime, and anything lower than 4 is labeled an authoritative regime. The 202 refe0 Democracy Index categorized 23 countries as full democracies, 52 as flawed democracies, 35 as hybrid regimes, and 57 as authoritarian regimes.

**European Liberties 21** [Platform, European Liberties. “Free Press: Definition and Role in Democracy I Liberties.eu.” Liberties.eu, November 09, 2021, [www.liberties.eu/en/stories/free-press/43809](http://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/free-press/43809).] // VS

What is free press? When we say a country has a free press, we mean that its news outlets and other publications, even individual citizens, have the right to communicate information without influence or fear of retribution from the state or other powerful entities or individuals. We often use the term “free press” and “independent journalism,” a subject we previously explored, more or less interchangeablyViolation:

#### Objectivity requires news content to be true, NOT unbiased

**Kovach and Rosenstiel., 01** (Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel., Bill Kovach, a 1989 Nieman Fellow, was curator of the Nieman Foundation from 1989 to 2000. He is the co-author of “The Elements of Journalism.”, Tom Rosenstiel is executive director of the American Press Institute and co-author of “The Elements of Journalism.”, 6-15-2001, accessed on 2-19-2022, Nieman Reports, "The Essence of Journalism Is a Discipline of Verification | Nieman Reports", https://niemanreports.org/articles/the-essence-of-journalism-is-a-discipline-of-verification/)

“In the end, the discipline of verification is what separates journalism from entertainment, propaganda, fiction, or art…. Journalism alone is focused first on getting what happened down right…. Perhaps because the discipline of verification is so personal and so haphazardly communicated, it is also part of one of the great confusions of journalism— the concept of objectivity. The original meaning of this idea is now thoroughly misunderstood, and by and large lost. When the concept originally evolved, it was not meant to imply that journalists were free of bias. Quite the contrary…. Objectivity called for journalists to develop a consistent method of testing information—a transparent approach to evidence—precisely so that personal and cultural biases would not undermine the accuracy of their work…. In the original concept, in other words, the method is objective, not the journalist. The key was in the discipline of the craft, not the aim. The point has some important implications. One is that the impartial voice employed by many news organizations, that familiar, supposedly neutral style of newswriting, is not a fundamental principle of journalism. Rather, it is an often helpful device news organizations use to highlight that they are trying to produce something obtained by objective methods. The second implication is that this neutral voice, without a discipline of verification, creates a veneer covering something hollow. Journalists who select sources to express what is really their own point of view, and then use the neutral voice to make it seem objective, are engaged in a form of deception. This damages the credibility of the whole profession by making it seem unprincipled, dishonest, and biased. This is an important caution in an age when the standards of the press are so in doubt…. A more conscious discipline of verification is the best antidote to the old journalism of verification being overrun by a new journalism of assertion, and it would provide citizens with a basis for relying on journalistic accounts. 1.Never add anything that was not there. 2.Never deceive the audience. 3.Be transparent about your methods and motives. 4.Rely on your own original reporting. 5.Exercise humility. …we began to see a core set of concepts that form the foundation of the discipline of verification…. The willingness of the journalist to be transparent about what he or she has done is at the heart of establishing that the journalist is concerned with the truth…. Too much journalism fails to say anything about methods, motives, and sources.”

#### Violation:

#### Standards:

#### [1] procedural fairness – their interpretation eviscerates predictable limits – all negative strategy is premised off a stable reading of the resolution. The lack of a stable mechanism lets them radically re-contextualize their aff and erase neg ground via perms. Including their advocacy authorizes any methodology or orientation tangentially related to the topic, which renders research burdens untenable. That outweighs and precedes their offense – debate is a game that we’ve all chosen to participate in and requires effective negation. It makes no sense to skew a competitive activity in favor of one side. The frame for evaluating offense is that debate is a game and we’re all here to win – that means procedural questions come first.

#### [2] Movement Building -

#### [a] Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis – that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims which eviscerates the decision-making potential of debate

Steinberg & Freeley, 13

David Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA, officer, American Forensic Association and National Communication Association. Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League, Masters in Communication, and Austin, JD, Suffolk University, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, *Argumentation and Debate Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition

**Debate is a means of settling differences,** **so there must be a** difference of opinion or a **conflict of interest** before there can be a debate. **If everyone is in agreement** on a tact or value or policy, **there is no need for debate**: **the matter can be settled by unanimous consent**. Thus, for example, **it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"** because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (**Controversy is an essential prerequisite** of debate. **Where there is no clash of ideas**, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, **there is no debate**. In addition, **debate cannot produce effective decisions** **without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered**. For example, **general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration**. **How many** illegal immigrants **are in the United States?** What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? **Do they take job**s from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? **Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration** by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? **Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?** Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? **Should we build a wall on the Mexican border**, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? **Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question** **and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy**. To be discussed and resolved effectively, **controversies must be stated clearly**. **Vague understanding** **results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions**, frustration, and emotional distress, as **evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007**.**Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job!** They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." **Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations**, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, **but without a focus for their discussions**, **they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions.** **A gripe session would follow**. **But if a precise question is posed**—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—**then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up** **simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step**. **One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.** The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. **They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making** **by** directing and **placing limits on the decision** to be made, **the basis for argument should be clearly defined**. **If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument**. For example, **the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation**. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

**Although we now have a general subject**, we have not yet stated a problem. **It is still too broad**, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. **What sort of writing are we concerned with**—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? **What does "effectiveness" mean** in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" **The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition** such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. **This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation** of the controversy by advocates, **or** **that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.**

#### TVA – Use objective media as a method for communist uprising objective just means truth so only organizing media talking abt why cap is bad would be true and objective.

#### [c] Solvency deficits to the TVA are neg ground – it proves there’s a debate to be had

#### [d] SSD is good – it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it.

#### T first –

#### [1] T indicts your reading of the aff in the first place, so it’s an evaluative mechanism to adjudicating substance of the 1AC. It’s silly nonsensical to leverage the aff against T since it presupposes that the aff is being won.

#### [2] T is a question of jurisdiction- judges don’t have the jurisdiction to vote on a non-topical aff that hasn’t met the burden of proof of the resolution.

#### [3] Topic ed – we only have 2 months to talk about the topic, but we can learn about the K outside of debate

#### [4] Extra-topicality – even if the affirmative claims to advocate the resolution, they skirt discussion of its instrumental intent by arguing the benefits derived from their contextualized advocacy outweigh.

#### Drop the Debater – deters future abuse

#### Competing Interpretations -

#### [1] Reasonability causes a race to the bottom because debaters keep being barely reasonable

#### [2] reasonability collapses bc we debate ab the specified briteline anyway

#### No RVIs -

#### [1] Baiting—they’ll just bait theory and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse and results in a chilling effect

#### 2] Illogical—you don’t reward them for meeting the burden of being fair – logic outweighs since it determines whether an argument is valid.

#### Everything operates on the offense-defense paradigm so impact turns are not independent of the theory debate so if I win no rvi’s they cannot win on these arguments.

## 2

#### Interpretation: Debaters with access to internet that run critical impacts and a non topical aff must disclose all parts of their position when asked by their opponent .

#### Violation: they run a K-aff with a pre-fiat impact without disclosing it

Graphical user interface, text, application, email

Description automatically generated

#### Standards:

#### 1] My interp promotes higher quality clash: Disclosed arguments allow the aff to card responses increasing substantive engagement which is key to education because it’s the foundation for all debate. Also, disclosure encourages deep learning about arguments by incentivizing debaters to read articles and understand the context and entirety of arguments to formulate better responses. Turns the K because it allows for better discussion about the problem the K addresses.

#### 2] Pre-fiat impacts assume widespread knowledge about their impacts is important because they attempt to promote change. Debating this round won’t change the way their impact are perceived but disclosure widens the scope of access to their arguments and permits time for reflection and recognition of the significance of the issue, which is rarely done in round with time constraints and a sole incentive to win.

#### Voter:

#### Substantive engagement - A] Only reason we debate is for argument interaction, thus comes first. B] You can get education from school C] If debate were about being fair, we’d just flip a coin because that’d be the fairest scenario, but no one does that means fairness isn’t a voter.

## 3

#### Nativeness is coterminous with savageness. Refuse the narrative arc of future redemption as demanded by the affirmative. The libidinal process of clearning and commodification brackets the possibility of any moment of plenitude for nativeness.

#### Juárez 14.

Native American studies scholar with a focus on the political ontology of Amerindians within the Western hemisphere, the settlerist politics of love, and the connections between racialization and psychopathology. My current research is focused on Lacanian psychoanalysis and Indigenous cosmology. ("To Kill an Indian to Save a (Hu)Man: Native Life through the Lens of Genocide," 2014,)

**The aim here is thus to engage in a paradigmatic analysis of Red bodies within the libidinal and political coordinates that, in line with Jared Sexton, I am inclined to call the world. This analysis focuses on how the ontological position of Redness is defined by its position and relationships in the political and libidinal economy and how it is expressed historically.** Drawing primarily from the economic works of Georges Bataille, I frame political economy in two ways: firstly, as a “general economy” that sees the production and consumption as an artificial divide between the total movement of energy across the global occurring on both molecular and molar scales; secondly, as intricately linked and intertwined with the libidinal economy. [[1]](#endnote-1) The libidinal economy follows Wilderson’s definition in *Red, White, and Black* in which he quotes **Jared Sexton as saying that the libidinal economy is “the economy, or distribution and arrangement, of desire and identification (their condensation and displacement), and the complex relationship between sexuality and the unconscious**.”[[2]](#endnote-2) Furthermore, this paradigmatic analysis seeks to interrogate and advance Leftist theorization of ontology and to reveal, in line with Jodi Byrd, how the “Indian errant” at the heart of theorization serves to articulate the coherence of the general economy.[[3]](#endnote-3) Whereas Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism or any number of (potentially intersecting) fields of thought may focus on the dispossession its chosen subject faces, these fields still have within themselves the ability to articulate that loss. The Marxist can name and locate their loss at the site of the wage relation in which the dispossession of labor-power creates alienation and exploitation as definitive grammars of suffering for the Human worker. The feminist and queer subject, even when subjected to the most profound suffering by heteropatriarchal violence, can articulate and locate their concern and loss within the political imagination: the equality of the wage, the destruction of the gender binary, the end of the objectifying male gaze. **Even the postcolonial subject, often the focus of contemporary Native Studies, can locate loss at the site of the dispossession of land, sovereignty, culture, or genealogy, something not afforded to the Red Native who not only serves as the model of possibility for settler colonialism, but through co-operative processes of clearing and civilization is transformed into a genocided object.[[4]](#endnote-4) The ability to speak of one’s loss - to mark it, to understand it, and to conceive of its absence–is, the privilege of Humanness, the ability to live—to exist—within the coordinates of the world. The implication of this and Afropessimism’s interrogation is unsettling to these fields of thought insofar as it troubles readings of the political and libidinal economy and negates the ability for theory to provide coherent solutions for the dead Indian who no longer contains within itself the ability to possess life, which is always already to say Humanness.** The focus of this critique then aims not at the politically conservative nor at the fields of political science and sociology, which seek to understand the experiences of Red life as purely empirical phenomena and attempts to articulate a solution to such problems within the structuring logic of the White Settler-Master. Given that Redness exists as non-Human, that is, if it exists as that which lacks relationality to Humanity, then the concern is not with empirics or conservative ideology, but with so-called “allies.” Fields of thought such as Marxism, Feminism, Postcolonialism, and their fellows are parasitic upon Redness as outside the exchange of loss that is alienation and exploitation in so far that the humanist structures within those fields must presume the continual, gratuitous, structural violence of Red non-Being. **There will of course be those who seek to cite successes made by the American Indian Movement, the political structures of treaties, and the mixture of White and Red societies as evidence against such claims. They will surely ask why I insist upon such a pessimistic understanding of Native American life throughout the Western hemisphere. One could reply to these claims by asking for an example of policy, social movements or anything else that has served to separate Redness from Savageness, to ask for a moment in which the genocide of Red bodies stopped.** **To speak of Red life is to always already be speaking of mass impoverishment, police brutality, mass incarceration, alcoholism, and mental illness. Ultimately, though, this empirical citation would fall under the rubric of gains and losses that defines alienation and exploitation – and we would find ourselves in an endless hall of mirrors that would leave us with contradictory and clashing sociological analysis that leads nowhere. While such empirical appeals may aid our understanding, they certainly cannot explain our predicament.** While a single article can hardly encapsulate and explicate the conditions of Redness to the extent which authors such as Frank B. Wilderson, III, Saidiya Hartman, and Jared Sexton have done for the Slave, it aims to provide a conceptual framework with which to understand Redness within the ontological triangulation provided by Wilderson in *Red, White, and Black*. Readers accustomed to the trend of intersectionality within academic discourse will surely criticize the usage of Human, Black and Red as essentialist and as paving over the unique differences amongst groups contained in each category, yet I would contend that Redness be understood as a structural position first and an identity second. [[5]](#endnote-5) To put it another way, Redness stands as a structural position in which identity is then formulated, but not as identity itself since the Beings occupying that position may not even be aware of their relationship to the world as a Being defined by clearing and civilization. It is here, with the ontological modalities of Red life, that Redness Studies must begin its interrogation. Killing the Indian In the first instance, the ontological modality of clearing must be examined in the ways it comes to shape and define Indigenous life. While meditations on Native life as a whole attempt to focus on the ways in which the potential for culture or sovereignty can resolve the problems of Redness, these meditations are disrupted by the raw violence that defines Native American life. That is, the violence of a genocidal clearing that has come to define what it means to be an Indian.[[6]](#endnote-6) Arising from the violence of never-ending genocide is a psychic burden that causes a sense of anxiety that must be constrained and managed in even the most radical Indigenist texts, forcing one to tease out the various moments in the theorization of Native American scholars in which the fires of their works overwhelm them and fail to be incorporated within the traditional solutions of postcolonial theory.[[7]](#endnote-7) Various authors touch upon this insolvable aspect of existence, and it is found most profoundly in the works of Jodi Byrd, Vine Deloria Jr., Ward Churchill, Frank B. Wilderson III, and Leslie Marmon Silko, all of whom will be used to supplement our understanding of Red life. [[8]](#endnote-8) Of these authors, only Wilderson deals with the conditions of Red life at the highest levels of abstraction and, thus, is the starting point for analysis. While Wilderson’s work on Red existence is unparalleled, there is a need for a restructuring of his framework. In his work, Wilderson compartmentalizes the Red ontological position of clearing into genocide and (the loss of) sovereignty, ultimately failing to recognize the nature of Red life as the condition of being cleared *a priori* to existence, what Wilderson articulates as the shift from clearing as a verb to clearing as a noun at the moment of the “discovery.”[[9]](#endnote-9) This understanding of clearing as the defining aspect of Redness is seen most profoundly in the Marshall rulings, particularly in *Johnson v. McIntosh*. Indigenous legal scholar Steven Newcomb remarks that: …Marshall noted that Cabot was authorized to take possession of lands, "notwithstanding the occupancy of the natives, who were heathens, and, at the same time, admitting the prior title of any Christian people who may have made a previous discovery." In other words, the Court affirmed that United States law was based on a fundamental rule of the "Law of Nations" - that it was permissible to virtually ignore the most basic rights of indigenous "heathens," and to claim that *the "unoccupied lands" of America rightfully belonged to discovering Christian European nations*. Of course, it's important to understand that, as Benjamin Munn Ziegler pointed out in The International Law of John Marshall, the term "unoccupied lands" referred to "the lands in America which, when discovered, were 'occupied by Indians' but 'unoccupied' by Christians" (emphasis mine).[[10]](#endnote-10) Essential here is that one understand the ontological structure—the grammar of suffering—necessary for such a ruling to make sense. The Marshall rulings ontologically determine Redness from the moment the Settler meets the Savage. For the concept that the United States had eminent domain over the land to gain coherence it must presume, in the *a priori*, that the *terra nullius* of the Americas always was. Here, Native Americans emerge barred from sovereignty at the ontological level, and thus can only be regarded as non-Human occupants. This *a priori* clearing becomes the necessary grounding for the Marshall ruling to make sense because the clearing of land must be scaled to the level of a hemisphere in order for colonial land-grabbing to even begin to play out within the Americas. What this also serves to highlight is the misdirection that authors such as Wilderson, Deloria, and others point us towards when they attempt to emphasize Indigenous sovereignty – that as far as the Settler is concerned, as far as the world is concerned, the Red Indian never had sovereignty, never had any claim to the land at all. Careful examination of the *Johnson v. McIntosh* ruling further clarifies this: While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves, and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil while yet in possession of the natives. *These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy* (emphasis mine).[[11]](#endnote-11) **Here Marshall makes clear that Native American sovereignty never existed, but rather the existence (and thus the sovereignty) of Native Americans is decided only within the prerogative of the White Settler. This ontological structuring echoes throughout history and into the present, reflected as a defining aspect of Redness at every level of spatial and temporal cartography. While the reservation may appear to be a moment in which the Savage is able to map space into place, that is, to imbue space with value and have that space resist Human interventions, it is an illusion. As the Marshall rulings show, there is never a moment in which the Indian is sovereign. Furthermore, the fungible locality of the reservation shown through the Indian Removal Act suggests that not only is the reservation not a moment in which Indians own land, but the reservation is subject to movement and displacement at the prerogative of the Settler. Whether it be forced removal or the gratuitous dumping of radioactive waste on reservations, the reservation has never been a safe-haven for Red bodies.**[[12]](#endnote-12) **The act of clearing is equally applicable to the level of the individual Red body. The gratuitousness of violence committed against Red bodies, that is, violence that is based not on a prior transgressive act within the social field, but rather a condition of existence is expressed over and over as the Indian Savage is murdered again and again across time and space. These converging “vectors of death” (Churchill, *A Little Matter of Genocide*) meet at the level of the Red body through co-operative processes of alcoholism, drug abuse, suicide, mental illness, and abject poverty which, in collusion with police brutality and violent victimization, work to wipe out Red bodies. How might one explain such violence? Can any empirical statistic explain this violence? Red bodies face the second highest rate of police brutality, the highest rate of violent victimization, they are more than three times more likely than the average person to die from alcohol abuse, they have triple the rate of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS), Native American men are the fastest dying group in the United States, suicide rates are triple the national rate – the statistics and the violence never end.[[13]](#endnote-13) This ontological clearing is never limited to the spatial, it bleeds into the temporal cartography of Red bodies**. Returning to the Marshall ruling, one is faced with the considerable notion of how Redness would have had to been conceptually conceived within the world. For Marshall’s ruling to make sense, Red bodies had to be cleared not only at the moment of the temporal present, but there would also have to be no Native ownership *prior* to colonization. The eminent domain of the United States is justified only through an understanding that no political subject had laid claim to the land, that there were no subjects in the Americas. This is not only the transformative moment that creates an aspect of Settler life as having the ability to transform time and space at the level of a hemisphere, but also displaces the Indian from time. The Indian must be cleared from time so that the *terra nullius* can create the plane upon which intra-settler discussions spatially and temporally play out. Such a condition echoes back to the question Byrd poses for us: “Do Indians live the ordinary life in the contemporary now?”[[14]](#endnote-14) Following Byrd, I read Tocqueville carefully when, in describing the displacement of the Chocktaw, he writes in 1835 that “[t]hese savages had left their country and were endeavoring to gain the right bank of the Mississippi, where they hoped to find an asylum that had been promised them by the American government.”[[15]](#endnote-15) Even here, at the moment Tocqueville is describing the Chocktaw being displaced in the present, they are past perfect: they *had* left, they *were* endeavoring, they *had been* promised. Byrd is explicit here in stating that the Indian is “always already past perfect”[[16]](#endnote-16). Deloria, thirty years earlier in 1973, would speak on this condition when speaking about the surge of activism in the American Indian Movement, remarking that “[s]incere but uninformed whites honestly asked Indians during the height of the activist movement if we still lived in tents, if we were allowed to leave the reservations, and other relevant questions, indicating that for a substantial number of Americans, we were still shooting at the Union Pacific on our days off.”[[17]](#endnote-17) Given this level of temporal absence, one is left wondering: can the Indian be said to even have a future, given that it lacks a past or a present? Building off of Judith Butler, Byrd writes that for a future to exist a life must first be grievable because: Grieving… calls people to acknowledge, to see, and to grapple with lived lives and the commensurable suffering, and in Butler’s frame apprehend – in the sense of both its definitions that include to understand and to stop – the policies creating unlivable, ungrievable conditions within the state-sponsored economies of slow death and letting die.[[18]](#endnote-18) This thus leaves us with the question: Do Indians lead grievable lives? Byrd goes on to explain that “[a]ccording to Butler, in order for life to be grievable, it needs to be faceable; to exist, it needs to ‘cast a face, a life, in the future anterior’” and that so long as the Indian lacks the capacity to exist within the future anterior, that is, so long as it is impossible for Indians to ever have the capacity to look back and say “this was,” there can never be a future in which Redness is not defined by clearing.[[19]](#endnote-19) Once again, Deloria speaks of this condition when he writes that “Americans simply refuse to give up their longstanding conceptions of what an Indian is. It was this fact more than any other that inhibited any solution of the Indian problems and *projected the impossibility of their solution anytime in the future*” (emphasis mine).[[20]](#endnote-20) It is here, in the work of Deloria and Byrd and in the rulings of Marshall that we are faced with the imbroglio of a Being that is defined through its clearing, a Being that not only never was, but isn’t and never will be. Saving the Man If one were only to account for the theoretical road blocks that clearing presents to Red bodies, one might be inclined to register Red suffering within a realm of violence that could, at some time, be stopped through reform, but this would fail to take into account the second modality of Redness, that of civilization. Emerging in the English language between 1765 and 1775, civilization originally meant “the act or process of bringing out of a savage or uneducated state.” [[21]](#endnote-21) Having a specifically settler colonialist connotation at its development, civilization was seen not as a place, but a process by which Savages would be rescued from their condemnation and ignorance. This process, the process of extracting the savageness from the Savage, is what will be examined here. Civilization as a grammar of suffering is multifaceted in its manner of manifestation within Red existence. Manifesting in three ways, the grammar of civilization transposes indigeneity from the Red body onto the Settler, commodifies the ontological resistance to whiteness found in indigenous lifeways to the point of no longer having any resistance to the ravishing of capitalist valuation and deracinates the Savage to the point of social death. [[22]](#endnote-22) A tri-operative process, the grammar of civilization hollows out the Indian, mines any cultural accouchements and values, and places them within the prerogative and definitions of value of the Settler. To understand how indigeneity is moved from the body of the Red Savage to the body of the White Settler, I will draw on the work of Jodi Byrd and Michael Yellow Bird. Yellow Bird notes that some Indigenous Peoples “[avoid] the label ‘Native American’ because [they have] encountered people without ‘American Indian ancestors’ who claim to be Native American because they were born in America.”[[23]](#endnote-23) Exploring this issue at a more theoretical level, Byrd writes that: At the most basic level, what Spivak identifies as the “worlding of a world” is the discursive work of colonialism that enters lands already inhabited by peoples with their own laws, customs, languages, and orderings of the world; declares said lands “uninhabited”; and then proceeds to establish another alien world as the dominant order. Key to this discursive work is the paradigmic uninscribed, uninhabited earth, the *terra nullius* convenient colonial construct that maintained lands were empty of meaning, of language, of presence, and of history before the arrival of the European. For a worlding to take place to such a degree that the native comes to cathect her/himself as other, the native must be rendered as an unknowable blankness that can then be used to reflect back the colonizer’s desires and fantasies. And such a worlding is accomplished by denying that an “originary” world or peoples exist.[[24]](#endnote-24) She continues, posing a guiding question: How does the emptying out and reinscription of [indigenous] referents facilitate the processes of colonization and racialization in the Americas, where the land had to be physically and psychically emptied of its prior inhabitants and refilled with newly arrived “natives” who compete for subjectivity within the emptied referent?[[25]](#endnote-25) What Byrd’s analysis and questions reveal are vital for they pierce the obscure veil that postcolonial studies creates when either it assumes complete knowledge of the machinations of settler colonialism within the Western hemisphere or attempts to frame the question of the Settler and the Savage as a conflictual relationship over land. The mechanism by which civilization hollows out indigeneity is co-operative with clearing in that once the Native is cleared on the symbolic level and the indigenous referent made empty, civilization transposes this referent upon the body of the Settler so that it secures the ontological position of the Settler as that which has *a priori* dominion over the Americas and justifies the infinite deferral of the Savage’s potential claim to indigeneity that could disrupt the cartographic capacity of the Settler in the “New World.” Following this, the process of civilization begins the commodification of indigeneity to the point of removing any ontological resistance that it might hold against the Settler’s regime of value. Drawing from indigenous activist John Trudell here, I am inclined to understand this specific process as a “mining of our spirit” that serves to hollow out the integrity of traditions and lifeways to the point at which they become unable to be claimed as indigenous.[[26]](#endnote-26) Examples in this are most explicitly seen in the mass commodification of dream catchers, headdresses, sage burning as an act of cleansing, and the appropriation of Native American artwork by the fashion industry. This application of civilization is most important in the understanding that proclamations of ownership are firstly met with surprise that Indians even exist and are secondly pushed aside as so old that there is no way any indigenous group can claim it. This formation mirrors aspects of Blackness in that at this moment, there is no longer indigenous culture that can be used as a safe haven away from the ravishes of capitalism, but must rather be understood in the context of a commodification of cultural accouchements so extreme that “Native American culture” becomes “tribal style.” This “mining” serves not only to sever Indigenous Peoples from any spiritual connection to any tradition or lifeway available to them, but works in tangent with other facets of civilization in which the lifeway and the tradition of the Native no longer belongs to them because they are no longer Native, but have been emptied into a blank referent transposed onto the Settler, ensuring that any cultural production of the Indian is always already the Settler’s to use and do with as they please.[[27]](#endnote-27) This object status, while not quite the fungiblity of the Slave, resounds with the Slave’s grammars of suffering in that the status of object leaves one open to the use of subjects within civil society. The last aspect of this civilization is the deracination of the Savage which echoes throughout the boarding school system in the United States, its mission summarized by Captain Richard Pratt’s Indian-hating maxim that the boarding school should “kill the Indian in him, and save the man.” Native American boarding schools were designed to do exactly as Captain Pratt intended – they were designed to strip Native children of their culture, language, genealogy, and lifeways. Even after the boarding school system was dismantled, this process of deracination was transmuted into adoption policies and the removal of Indian children by force from reservations in which state courts and welfare agencies had no jurisdiction. The deracination of foster care was so severe that before 1978, the rate of children in states with large Native American populations could see 25 to 35 percent of all Native American children in foster care, the majority ending up in non-Native American homes.[[28]](#endnote-28) Though, even following the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, this form of deracination continues. One can find statistic after statistic displaying this, whether it be that in Canada there are more First Nations children in foster care at the height of the boarding school or that in the United States Native American children across the nation are more than twice as likely as white children to be taken from their homes.[[29]](#endnote-29) The process of removing Native children from their homes is part of a structure which not only seeks the physical death of Indians, but is also a structural deracination of culture and spirit that robs Natives not only of their family, but of all social life. This dispossession is the final mechanism by which civilization removes the Savage from time and space – it is the moment of absolute loss. Given that the modality of civilization gives coherence to the Settler world by animating the Settler’s ability to create civil society outside of empty space, it shifts the relationship between the Settler and the Savage into a purely antagonistic formation. The resolution to this problem is shifted into antagonism by the implications of parity for the ontological death secured through civilization. Parity would not only require the absolute destruction of a civilization/nature divide, but would obliterate the Settler as an ontological position through the complete destruction of that Settler’s civilized existence and civilization. This destruction of the spatio-temporal logics of Being for the Human would be one in which the Settler’s lifeways, the Settler’s culture, the Settler’s Being enter into the death space of the Indian. Understanding the fundamental antagonism between Settlers and Savages is one which not only revitalizes and raises the stakes of engagement, but is one that gives new meaning to Fanon’s maxim, “To work means to work for the death of the colonist.”[[30]](#endnote-30) Savage (Non)Life In his work, *Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms*, Wilderson takes a marked stance of articulating the Savage as Human (albeit a uniquely positioned Human) or, at worst, liminal to life and death (Humanness and Blackness).[[31]](#endnote-31) Writing about other Human positionalities, Wilderson writes that: Latinos and Asians stand in conflictual relation to the Settler/Master, that is, to the hemisphere and America writ large—they invoke a politics of culture, not a culture of politics. They do not register as antagonists. But this is only partially true of “Savage” position… [the differences between the “Savage” and the Settler] are not differences with an antagonistic structure, but differences with a conflictual structure; because articulation, rather than a void, makes the differences legible. In other words, “Savage” capacity is not obliterated by these differences.[[32]](#endnote-32) Wilderson’s claim here is simple enough; that while Savages and Settlers are surely irreconcilably different at every level, that irreconcilability does not (completely) obliterate the Savage’s capacity for life (i.e. Humanness). This belief is ultimately a product of a Lacanian psychoanalytic interpretation of the Lacanian analysand and its alienation into the field of Being, Wilderson explains that: Lacan’s analysand (meaning a subjective capacity for full or empty speech) does not *require* the Indian as its parasitic host, *despite the fact that the Indian was forcibly removed to clear a space for the analyst’s office* [emphasis original]. This is because alienation is essential to both the “Savage” and the Settler’s way of imagining structural positionality; to the way Native American meta-commentaries think ontology. Thus, the analysand’s essential capacity for *alienation from being* (alienation that takes place in language) is not parasitic on the “Savage’s” capacity to be *alienated from the spirit world or the land* (which for Indians are cosmologically inseparable) [emphasis original]. Whereas historically, the secular imperialism which made psychoanalytic imaginings possible wreaked havoc on the “Savage” at the level of Fanonian existence, that contact did not wipe out his/her libidinal capacity—or Native metaphysics.[[33]](#endnote-33) Surely embedded here is the potential for a critique of Wilderson’s (and much of Afropessimism’s) reliance on Lacanian psychoanalysis as a way of explaining the potential for antagonism, but the clearest way to respond is simply in the same psychoanalytic terms Wilderson uses here. Within the Lacanian framework Wilderson elaborates here, the conclusion is simple: that while the Indian’s death is needed for the analyst’s office to be built, it does not require the death of the Indian for analysis to function; that Indians are not Thanatos, they do not embody “the lethal action of the signifier on the subject.”[[34]](#endnote-34) Wilderson proceeds to then articulate multiple historical accounts by which the Native American is seen as having sovereignty by European colonizers and the differences in the Savage/Settler encounter and the Slave/Master encounter, relying heavily on missionary statements (primarily from Thomist ecclesiastics of the School of Salamanca). The problem with this theorization arises when there are contradictory historical accounts. How might one reconcile the Marshall rulings with the Thomist ecclesiastics? Furthermore, one might ask, as Byrd does, how “Indian naturalization and U.S. citizenship serve as the juridicial, legislative, and executive means to justify and legalize the subordination of other peoples within the imperial grasp of the United States.”[[35]](#endnote-35) In fact, as Wilderson articulates the Black Slave’s banishment from the Hegelian dialectic, he forgets Hegel’s own prescription of Native American life and its deracinating implications. As Hegel understands his own dialectic, there is a process of *geist*, a “spirit becoming aware of itself by manifesting itself in the real world” which drives Human history.[[36]](#endnote-36) This process, according to Hegel, began in Asia and found its completion in Europe, with Africa (and Africans) being in a perpetual state of unawareness that can serve as a stasis point by which to judge the progress of *geist*. This is surely Wilderson’s understanding, that the African *enabled* the dialectical process, but begs the question: “Where, in all this, is the Indian?” Hegel later goes on to understand that, given that the *geist* met its completion in Europe, Indigenous Americans are not only not a reference point for progress (such as the African) but are completely left out of the dialectic in any way, shape, or form.[[37]](#endnote-37) Hegel’s conception of the “off-the-map-ness” of Native Americans is so far reaching and absolute that when he articulates the condition of possibility to ability to enter into European law and be recognized he makes a noted exception for the Savage in that the Savage is just that: a savage that has not left the immediacy of nature and thus cannot be considered part of society any more than the buffalo and mountains that co-populated the region.[[38]](#endnote-38) This rejection is an absolute rejection in that it is not that the Savage is recognized and then rejected as conscious or seen as lacking self-awareness, but rather the Savage is rejected from the possibility of being judged as either. Where does this leave us with Wilderson’s pronunciation that the Indian is not over-determined in death in the libidinal framework of the analysand? Unlike the pronunciation of half-life given to the Indian by Wilderson, both the colonizing society (Europe) and the settler colony (the United States) proclaim the Indian not only non-sovereign, but denied the condition of possibility of sovereignty: Humanness. Within both the philosophizing discourse of Europe and the legal and social coding of the United States, the Indian *is* coded within the imaginative process of the analysand, but not as a contemporary nor as death personified. What Wilderson does is confuse the Savage with the Slave because, just as in Hegel, the Slave surely does represent death personified in the libidinal economy of the analysand and his contemporaries, **but the Savage is not death, nor is not life. It is nothingness. Whereas Humanity is directly parasitic on the Black body for coherence, the Indian is wiped out of time and space**. **The libidinal vampirism of Humanity is performed not in contradistinction but through the indirect parasitism performed in/on the Red body’s disappearance which, not only bars the Settler from the vertigo of gratuitous violence that is genocide, but also creates the space of relationality by which law, culture, and politics are formed (civilization) so as to mediate Human relationality**.[[39]](#endnote-39) The *a priori* necessity for Humanity to define its civilized/savage coordinates maintains the inside/outside of subjecthood and stands in contradiction to Wilderson’s claim that “the analysand’s essential capacity for alienation from being (alienation that takes place in language) is not parasitic on the “Savage’s” capacity to be alienated from the spirit world or the land(which for Indians are cosmologically inseparable).”[[40]](#endnote-40) The analysand’s existence as a Settler is sutured by “a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence… [that] is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler”[[41]](#endnote-41) This violence destroys the condition of possibility for an Indian world and is parasitic upon *the capacity to be alienated* in that this alienation is *a priori* to integration into the social field. **As the raw violence of Settler society demands that “the corpse of tribal society… [lay] its body down as a host on which White ethical aggrandizement can feed and through which the collective ego of Settler civil society can be monumentalized,” Natives are wretched out of their living cosmos and thrown into the dead world of the Indian Savage.[[42]](#endnote-42) This endless process of genocide obliterates traditional lifeways and deracinates the Native to the point where being Native means nothing more than an empty signifier defined through the eyes of the Settler**.[[43]](#endnote-43) The Native does not represent life (Humanity) or death (Slave), but rather fails to represent at all.[[44]](#endnote-44) This is to say that rather than act as a stasis point of death by which one’s progression into life can be judged, the Savage is not judged at all as living *or* dead. Wilderson does not recognize this and he continues this theoretical errant when he writes that: The “Savage” on the other hand, though s/he is a genocided object, is not a “genealogical isolate.” … Sovereignty… rescues the “Savage” from the genealogical isolation of the Slave. Sovereignty has the capacity to embrace the ethical dilemmas of both “social heritage of…ancestors” and “social relations with those who live.” Sovereignty, however battered or marginalized, is not a form of “borrowed institutionality,” it requires no structural adjustment. Therefore, the relation of negation between Red and White *cannot be sustained as an absolute*: While White exploitation and alienation can no more secure structural articulation between their modalities and those of Red genocide than they can with accumulation and fungibility, they can (and historically do) secure such articulation with Red Sovereignty [emphasis original].[[45]](#endnote-45) What occurs here is semantically confusing and requires some teasing out. Wilderson understands that the Slave is a genealogical isolate since the social relationships of the Slave are defined solely in relationship to the condition of being owned. This full disimbrication from all social relationality outside of being a Slave causes the Slave to lose its Being and become “being for the captor.”[[46]](#endnote-46) Wilderson claims that then, given that sovereignty is based in the ethical obligation to one’s ancestors and in one’s social relationship with others, while genocide may be a modality of genealogical isolation, the ontological modality of (the loss of) sovereignty is not and prevents the Savage from being a genealogical isolate. This, however, is fallacious given the intricate nature of civilization and its method of deracination. Given that Native Americans are never formally recognized as sovereign in either legal or philosophical discourse (treaties being seen as “privileges” granted to Savages by the colonizing nation), this claim is already called into question at the level of (the loss of) sovereignty even being an ontological modality of Native American existence. Rather than understand sovereignty as an ontologically prior condition by which the Savage is granted genealogical coherence, one should first understand that co-operative processes of civilization and clearing make any knowledge of one’s genealogy unlikely (the loss of a heritage *and* a past), but that also social formations are within Native American communities founded primarily on the condition of being Native American. While there is the potential for intra-tribal social relations, these relations are not legitimized within the eyes of the Settler when all Indigenous Peoples are categorized under a single racial group defined by a blood quantum as exemplified by the Cherokee Nations declaration that “you have to be Indian to be Indian.”[[47]](#endnote-47) The social formations created by Red bodies is founded upon this deracination and, perhaps, this is something that was not so obvious to the older theorists Wilderson cites. Leslie Marmon Silko, in her novel *Ceremony*, describes this disjunction between older and younger generations of Native Americans when she writes that: He [Tayo] had heard Auntie talk about the veterans—drunk all the time, she said. But he knew why. It was something the old people could not understand. Liquor was medicine for the anger that made them hurt, for the pain of the loss, medicine for tight bellies and choked-up throats.[[48]](#endnote-48) Later in the story Silko goes on to describe how this pain, dealt with through drunkenness, would be the catalyst for the telling of stories and social invitation into discussion. The pain and anger over a loss without name is the formation of the social group, it transforms all narratives into narratives of surviving, every act of “culture” by Native Americans becomes a survival strategy in which the dualism between the overwhelming violence of being a Being of nothingness and the deathly comfort of alcoholism and drug use is put off. Wilderson’s concern with the irreconcilable “worlds” of the Settler and the Savage is far too reductionist in the intricacy of the violence inflicted against Red bodies. It is not that there is a Savage world that stands in irreconcilable opposition to the world of the Settler, but rather that Red life (as far as it can be called life) is a survival strategy that no longer possesses the potential for world creation.[[49]](#endnote-49) Whether it is the absolute loss of entire tribes, the cultural deracination of Indigenous groups in Latin America, or just massive, unending violence, the “world” of Redness is lost to the gratuitous violence of being Savage. Thus, when Wilderson seeks to push the Savage into the fold of the human writing that the Settler and the Savage share: ….a capacity for time and space coherence. At every sale – the soul, the body, the group, the land, and the universe – they can both practice cartography, and although at every scale their maps are radically incompatible, their respective “mapness” is never in question. This capacity for cartographic coherence is the thing itself, that which secures subjectivity for both the Settler and the “Savage” and articulates them to one another in a network of connections, transfers and displacements.”[[50]](#endnote-50) He ignores that the violence Red face extends far beyond the reservation into time and space because it is a violence that silenced languages, burned books, obliterated people, erased history, and shattered families. His belief that even in the midst of the loss of sovereignty and genocide Red bodies have maintained a “capacity for cartographic coherence” (something which would grant them subjectivity) occurs because the theorists Wilderson cites in the context of the loss of sovereignty are all Indigenous Peoples who know their culture, who were born into a world that granted them cartographic coherence and, on a psychic level, are motivated to disavowal their status as a non-Being. The concept of “having maps at every scale” only makes sense if one were to assume that the Native American who has avoided the pure horror of genocide is the same as the Indian stolen from their people and shot in the street. This would be as if one analyzed the condition of Black existence in the Americas by the ability for native Africans to map time and space; if one did that, of course one would be led to believe that while the condition of Blackness is one in which while Black bodies may face colonialist violence they had surely maintained culture and subjectivity – which is surely false and would lead one to any and all manner of mistheorization. To fully understand the condition of social life or death faced by Native Peoples one would have to examine whether or not American Indians exist within the same conditions that afropessimists themselves articulate as creating social death. Beginning with Saidiya Hartman, **she defines social death as the condition by which “[t]he everyday practices of the enslaved occur in the default of the political, in the absence of the rights of mean or the assurances of the self-possessed individual, and perhaps even without a ‘person’ in the usual meaning of the term.”[[51]](#endnote-51) Through the eyes of the Savage, there is a relationality here in a common condition between the enslaved and the savage in that Redness exists in the default of the political insofar as the “Indian Savage” exists outside of and defines through contradistinction the warm glow of Human civilization, forever denied access and entrance into that civilization.[[52]](#endnote-52) Furthermore, the vectors of death which converge upon Redness from the individual body to the reservation places Indians in a constant state of emergency which not only clears their personhood through defining them as non-Humans, but also rids them of their ability to map time and space – things which are assured to the existent and civilized individual.** When Wilderson articulates this condition, he issues multiple overlapping definitions of social death, concluding that “[social death] means that our existence is not *our* existence, but is embedded in ‘the master’s prerogative’” (Emphasis original).[[53]](#endnote-53) He goes further in describing social death in the historical sense writing that: “…the Black position, is indeed a position, not an identity; and that its constituent elements are coterminous with and inextricably bound to the constituent elements of social death which is to say, that for Blackness, there is no narrative moment prior to slavery.[[54]](#endnote-54) Applying this historical perspective to what culture might mean for Black bodies, Wilderson writes that: [c]ulture emanates from a social formation of human beings. As such they have the capacity to transform space into place and time into event or chronology. Language and genealogical coherence are effects of the later; homeland is an effect of the former. Such are the necessary currency for the “purchase” of culture. The Slave forfeits both forms of currency at the moment s/he is given social death (natal alienation) as a substitute for real death.[[55]](#endnote-55) Likewise, in Wilderson’s understand of social death and its manifestations we find relationality between the Savage and the Slave. Firstly, our existence is not ours, but rather exists within the Settler’s prerogative, as exemplified by the Marshall opinion. C**learing and civilization as grammars of suffering exemplify this quite well, showing that the Savage has no ontological resistance in the face of Whiteness and as such is endlessly open to the whim of the Settler which decides the Savage’s fate.** In the second quote, the Marshall decisions once again show us that at the moment of “discovery,” at the moment the Settler meets the Indian, the Red body is structured as Indian, with no prior moment of existence outside of the Settler’s recording of it. The **Indian is always already defined by the referents and signifiers of the Settler**.[[56]](#endnote-56) Furthermore, as Wilderson defines culture, it is necessary that one understand a group’s capacity for cartography following their grammars of suffering in order to judge its cultural capacity. This interpretation would then ask: Following the simultaneous processes of clearing and civilization, can the Savage map time and space**? The Indian is left with no language, no genealogical coherence or even knowledge of where their homeland is as the civilizing of the Settler obliterates and deracinates all traces of it. As for homeland, not only does clearing potentially negate the concept that Turtle Island was ever home for Native Americans within the conception of the world, the process of civilization prevents access to knowledge of that homeland** at any scale smaller than that of a hemisphere and, as Wilderson himself writes, “‘homeland’ implies a cartographic scale much smaller and more intimate than a continent.”[[57]](#endnote-57) Finally, in Jared Sexton’s work he writes that: *Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society*, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—the modern world system. Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space. …black life is not social, or rather that black life is lived in social death (emphasis mine).[[58]](#endnote-58) **Sexton’s articulation suggest that in order for Indians to be said to face social death one is obliged not to prove that there is no Red (social) life at all, but rather that Red life is not considered life within the codes and mores of the Settler. In fact, Wilderson does this work for us when he explains that “at every scale [the Settler and the Savage’s] maps are radically incompatible.”[[59]](#endnote-59) While the colonized may have things in common with the colonizer (i.e. Israel and Palestine), this is not the case between the Savage and the Settler. For the Savage, there is no life within the codes of civil society because any cultural accouchements are simply markers of “primitiveness” and reify that savagery and that marking**.[[60]](#endnote-60) Conclusion **I am inclined to agree with Wilderson that the Leninist question of “what is to be done” is in the wrong direction. The question itself fails to grasp the severity of the problem we face. To ask “what is to be done” is to first understand the problem one faces and secondly presumes that the problem one faces can be articulated, that one is deprived of something that can be named rather than deprived of being able to lose. To address this, what is needed is a radical shift in orientation in our scholarship and ethics that focuses on the question of understanding and ending the structures that make our, Red and Black, existence impossible rather than asking what is to be done within the epistemologies and ethics of those structures.** When Subcomandante Marcos asks Presidente Salinas why do we need to be pardoned, when he asks what are we to be pardoned for, and when he asks who should ask for pardon, and who can grant it, he is not merely exposing the gratuitous violence of the Settler upon Red bodies, he is revealing the impossibility of an answer. **If this paper is forced to offer a solution, however meager, it is for Red bodies to relinquish their desire to be structurally adjusted into the Human fold, a fold which will never solve or relieve our problems because our problems are the condition of possibility for that fold’s existence. In realizing how our desire is structured not only as a fear of Slaveness, but of Savageness, we can better come to form survival strategies for our communities and, as Fanon suggests, set to work.**

#### The 1AC’s analysis of Marxism is grounded in Eurocentric thought reifying colonialism

Robinson 20 [Rowland Robinson is a PhD holder at the University of Waterloo. “Settler Colonialism + Native Ghosts: An Autoethnographic Account of the Imaginarium of Late Capitalist/Colonialist Storytelling” 2020 <https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/15632/Robinson_Rowland.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>] // aaditg

The very last of these points, the question of universality, also opens up a door onto what has become my primary issue with so most of Marxism, of almost any variant—Althusserian, Gramscian, Jamesonian, Fisherian, Leninist, Maoist etc.—which is quite often and quite simply that it is profoundly eurocentric. What Marxism tends to miss in this regard—whether Althusserian, Gramscian, Jamesonian, Fisherian, Leninist, Maoist—is that this is a problem that Marxism is not really equipped to grapple with because, at the heart of things, Marxism, or at least orthodox Marxism, deeply holds to 54 the abstractly “progressive” powers and qualities of this thing that we call modernity precisely because it is a product of modernity, born at the necrotic heart of the colonial order of things. In this regard, I do not believe that there has been a meaningful shift away from eurocentrism, though certainly efforts have been made. Indeed, in my experience outside of academia, in on the ground activist work, in interactions with leftists of a myriad of different Marxist tendencies (Marxism-Leninism, Trotskyism, Maoism, various “leftcommunisms” etc.), the apparent default response amongst many to any attempted critique of eurocentrism within Marxism is to assume that those of us making the critique are saying that Marxism is a “white thing.” On the surface, this is quite obviously not the case, based purely on the historical record of 20th-Century revolutionary Marxist movements, nor do I think it is what anyone putting out a real analysis of the issue means to imply either. Regardless, watching an endless parade of Twitter arguments, the fact that that is not what I or others are saying does little to stop Marxists, in particular Marxist-Leninists from parading out images of their favourite “Revolutionaries of Colour”: Hồ Chí Minh, Thomas Sankara, José María Sison, Huey P. Newton, Mao Zedong, Kim Il Sung etc. This, because no one who is really thinking through these issues is calling Marxism a white thing, does not actually do anything to diffuse the critique of eurocentrism. In reality, what these two things are—the claim that people are saying Marxism is white”, and the parade of images of ROC as a supposed counter-point—is actually, simply put, an ideologically placed thought terminator designed to short-circuit critique. This, of course, is far from the only thought terminator used by many Marxist activists and theorists to diffuse attempts at critique. A popular one, and one which I have had levelled at myself more than once over the years, is the proposition that critique of Marxism represents the work of some nefarious apparatus of the colonial-capitalist state, such as COINTELPRO12, the CIA, FBI, or, for those of us up here in Canada, the RCMP or CSIS. For example, as I write this a quite popular claim, bordering on conspiracy theory, amongst certain segments of the cyberspace left is the american CIA, via its Paris-based front organization the Congress for Cultural Freedom, had a hand in translating into the Anglophone world the writings of certain postmodern/poststructuralist theorists, such as Derrida and Foucault, in the hopes that this would coax the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist rightwards and away from radical critique (Rockhill 2017). While I cannot speak to the role that the CIA may actually have had in this, the assumption seems to be that other scholars, theorists, and, also, activists would not have reached a point of critiquing Marxist assumptions without the cynical 56 guiding hand of the CIA. This functions as a thought terminator by allowing those Marxists who choose to deploy it to simply point at a source of critique and yell “agent!” That said, working within the Marxist tradition, there have been a number of important attempts to think again and beyond eurocentrism. I believe that amongst these various efforts, Robert Biel in his text Eurocentrism and the Communist Movement (2015) is absolutely correct when he says, speaking of Marxism, or what he thinks should be its “more neutral name” historical materialism, that: The reality is that it is embodied in a particular movement which originated and developed in a definite set of geographical and historical conditions. These inevitably influenced, and imposed limitations upon, the concrete form in which the theory was first put forward (2015:4). Here Biel’s assessment of the geo-historical location and timing of Marxism’s birth, and the marks that it has left on its body of theory, cleaves quite closely to what the late Cedric J. Robinson much more expansively noted in his classic text Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Speaking of what he identifies as Marxism’s “ominous limitations, Robinson says: However, it is still fair to say that at base, that is at its epistemological substratum, Marxism is a Western construction—a conceptualization of human affairs and historical development which is emergent from the historical experiences of European peoples mediated, in turn, through their civilization, their social orders, and their cultures. Certainly its philosophical origins are indisputably Western. But the same must be said of its analytical presumptions, its historical perspectives, its points of view. This most natural consequence though has assumed a rather ominous significance since European Marxists have presumed more frequently than not that their project is identical with world-historical development. Confounded it would seem by the cultural zeal which accompanies ascendant civilizations, they have mistaken for universal verities the structures and social dynamics retrieved from their own distant and more immediate pasts. Even more significantly, the deepest structures of ‘historical materialism’ … have tended to relieve European Marxists from the obligation of investigating the profound effects of culture and historical experience on their science. The ordering ideas which have persisted in Western civilization … have little or no theoretical justification in Marxism for their existence (1983:2) However, even the best-case examples of contemporary Marxist attempts to confront their school of thought’s congenital eurocentrism, such as in Biel’s important work, I have issues with the accounting of the problem. For example, Biel ultimately largely boils the endemic issue of eurocentrism in Marxism down to a question of its political economy (2015:171). While in a sense I do agree that the political economy of most Marxists is somewhere between one hundred and one hundred fifty years out of date, the question of eurocentrism is not simply one that can be solved by the correct reading and application of dependency theory or world-systems analysis. While certainly taking up that theoretical line—updated as it should be for the early 21st century, is important, and especially when paired with a serious concern for the question of imperialist parasitism— the manner in which it is focused upon by Biel actually, in my opinion, obscures the other, often deeper ways that Marxism has been marked by a profound eurocentrism since its original formulations. Indeed, despite the recent efforts of the canadian Maoist philosopher Joshua Moufwad-Paul, working through the late Samir Amin, to portray Marxism as a “modernity critical of modernity,” and leaning heavily on the concluding pages of Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth in order to declare “the need to establish a new Enlightenment that will be free from the predations of Europe” I find little hope for this within the onto-epistemological framing of the Marxist project (2018). Indeed, elsewhere Moufwad-Paul falls back on old Marxist tropes I have no taste for in order to circumvent Black theorist Alexander G. Weheliye’s criticism of all theoretical traditions of european origin as “white European thinkers [who] are granted a carte blanche” (2014:6). Namely, Moufwad-Paul consciously falls back on that old Marxist claim that “it is only the Marxist tendency that can account for and surmount this carte blanche, thus necessarily generating theoretical offspring critical of its erroneous aspects, because of what it is: a science” [emphasis original] (2019). As I have said already, I am critical of the claims to not only Marxism’s longrunning project of positioning itself as a science, as well as generally scientistic outlooks in general, a lingering remnant of my Gramscianism. However, the claim to Marxism’s scientificity, made explicit in Moufwad-Paul’s body of work, brings into quite clear focus the problems of Marxism’s onto-epistemological eurocentrism. Take for instance this paragraph, in which he quite boldly writes: Moreover, claims that there are other knowledges that have been excluded by the dominant scientific narrative does not prove that science-qua-science is incorrect––as the artefacts the latter produces immediately demonstrates. At best such claims only demonstrate that the colonial-capitalist monopoly on scientific investigation has excluded just as much as it has appropriated and that it could stand to learn more from the research of others: we know this is correct since environmental scientists have discovered that there are indeed suppressed knowledges of numerous Indigenous populations that prove the possibility of living sustainable lives. At worst, however, claims about excluded knowledge traditions can lead to unqualified endorsements of culturalist mystification. Just because a truth claim is made by a colonized or formerly colonized population does not make it correct, no more than the various anti-scientific truth claims made by colonizing populations (i.e. Six Day Creationism, anti-vaccination, “chem-trails”, ethnonationalism, conservative conceptions of gender and sex, etc.), and thus it is not always wrong that science excludes some knowledges. Indeed, science necessarily has to exclude those truth claims that are proven wrong regardless of their origin. This does not mean that scientific investigation, because of the influence of the ideological instance, might not wrongly exclude truths due to a scientist’s devotion to various social dogma, only that other times the exclusion is correct. Only Christian fundamentalists would argue that we are not better off for the exclusion of Six Day Creationism from the discipline of biology (2019). In a single arch here Moufwad-Paul concedes that primitive Savages, such as Indigenous populations, may actually have some sort of useful knowledge about the world in the form of Traditional Ecological Knowledge, or TEK—a currently buzzworthy area of discussion within philosophy, the social sciences and environmental studies—yet, in a stunningly oblivious move demonstrating the deep eurochauvinist and racial-colonialist contours of his own Marxist “science”, simultaneously colours non-european traditional knowledges and epistemologies with the same brush of “culturalist mystification” as conservative christian supremacists seeking to overturn the current liberal-bourgeois secular order to replace it with their own. In labelling traditional Indigenous knowledges, epistemologies, and methodologies “culturalist mystification” MoufwadPaul not just side-steps, but actively pushes to the side, the fact that “science,” as a “structured and systematic production of knowledge,” is, by most accounts, something that “all societies and all groups, everywhere and anytime, are engaged in” although “not all of them are institutionalized to the same degree” (Reiter 2018:3). Moufwad-Paul’s characterization of non-european knowledges, epistemologies, and methodologies is, I think it is safe to argue, deeply problematic. This is because, as Bernd Reiter notes, colonialism “erased many local scientific traditions by declassifying them as primitive and folklore and substituting what was perceived as Southern superstition with Northern science” (2018:3). However, this is, as I have already noted, something which Moufwad-Paul appears to not even notice, much less concern himself with. Indeed, in labelling traditional Indigenous knowledges, epistemologies, and methodologies “culturalist mystification” he commits the very same colonial error that Reitmer speaks of, saying: To some authors, the very power of colonialism rested on its ability to name and categorize the world according to its heuristic schemata and interest, thus inventing, and enforcing, such binaries as modern/traditional, progressive/backward, and civilized/primitive (2018:3). “Culturalist mystification” is a labelling of traditional Indigenous knowledges, epistemologies, and methodologies that can only arise from the imperial gaze of modernity/coloniality, and thus invests in, constructs, and reifies a colonial epistemological hierarchy and binary, and by extension implies other imperial hierarchies and binaries, and core-periphery like relationship (Escobar 2011; Lugones 2007). Given his philosophical commitment to epistemologically and methodologically situating Marxism as a science, and demonstrated euro-colonial myopia, I suspect that even if these problems were presented to him, he would not be able to recognize that the knowledge production of euro-western science, much less that of Marxism’s supposedly scientific outlook and methodology, is made possible by the coloniality of power/knowledge (Dussel 2002; Quijano 2008)

#### The impact is pornotroping - Nativeness is rendered as the raw material for settler vitality — refuse the re-scripting of Native life and death onto settler landscapes and colonial cartographies

#### Urbanski 16.

Claire Urbanski is a doctoral candidate in Feminist Studies with a designated emphasis in Critical Race and Ethnic Studies. As a scholar and social justice activist invested in collective liberation, her work considers how settler colonial ideologies of Indigenous dispossession and gendered violence structure and inform relationships between place, identity, and land. Her doctoral research examines how knowledges of spiritual afterlife have shaped ongoing material structures of United States settler colonial empire ("Genocidal Intimacies: Settler Desire and Carceral Geographies," 2016, *American Studies Association*) vikas

**Connecting Kim TallBear and Philip Deloria’s work**, **we can understand how** Western colonial scientific frameworks render ‘Nativeness’ into a material resource, already belonging to settler society, which can be mined for value; its imaginary, raw, authentic qualities are desired to make settler identity meaningful **and to construct intimate belongings** with landscape. Thinking about **desires to consume and own flesh** (or bone), **and rendering** bone **into personal property**, Alexander Weheliye’s concept of ‘pornotroping’ gets at the ways that the captive body is a “source of an irresistible, destructive sensuality” **and at the same time is** “reduced to a thing, to being for the captor” (90). Orlando Patterson also discusses the imagined intimacy between enslavers and captive bodies, **as well as a fear of danger waiting in the spiritual realm for the enslaver because of his actions**; which is assuaged through **imagining a ‘benevolent enslavement,’ thus** assuring a salvation for the enslaver. I do not mean to collapse the very differing racializing projects of antiBlackness and Indigenous dispossession into being the same thing, while also recognizing their inseparable entanglements in the mutual constitution of settler colonialism, and also acknowledging that perhaps my easy comparison here is very problematic; I do want to think about the space of settler sexualized desire for captive bodies, and connect it to a sexualized and intimate desire for captured dead bodies. How do settlers form (imagined) belongings through imagined intimacies with Indigenous dead? How does anti-Black consumption facilitate white settler intimacies with landscapes? What kinds of sexualized and intimate fantasies are being enacted through the dissection and hoarding of corpses, or the extraction of energy from human bones? When does the researcher, or witch, imagine and perform a fabricated emotional intimacy with the dead, and when is the dead body simply an object from which to extract, or dismember? I’m **reflecting on Audra Simpson’s comments** on yesterday’s panel “Colonial Unknowing and Biopolitics,” which speaking on the ruse of consent **that** settler society depicts in its relations with Indigenous peoples, I **call attention to the coercive intimacy researchers**, and perhaps witches, enforce onto the dead. I do acknowledge and hesitate at my oversimplification of histories and meanings of witchcraft, and at the same time, I do take seriously the settler colonial fantasies that very much inform the increasing popularity of witchcraft particularly amongst white queer identified settlers. To conclude, **I have begun to consider the historical and ongoing extractive projects that seek to render Indigenous bones into material resources** - **to be excavated, consumed, dismembered, and** the particular **logics of containment projected onto the dead through settler imaginaries.** I ask how are the bones of the dead consumed in order to enact queer settler belongings imagined to be subversive to the state, yet ultimately naturalizing of, and thus reinforcing to, a settler colonial project? Thinking with the work of Sylvia Wynter and Jodi Byrd, **projects of settler colonial grave excavation** reveal an important process in how meanings of ‘symbolic life and death’ are mapped onto landscape **through their centrality in establishing the normative standards of ‘Western Man’ as ‘human’ and as foundational to the parameters of US legal personhood**, furthermore, genocidal intimacies draws attention to the sexualized productions of colonial carceral geographies. Settler **belonging is** accessed through genocidal intimacies, which are both **informed by and reproductive of the carceral grounds from which** militarized settler space and racializing technologies of social death can be erected and enacted.

#### The alternative is refusal – a political depression that recognizes reconciliation will never be enough and creates harmful optimism to the political. Instead, embrace an affective pessimism that grounds alternative futures. The question is not whether Native people want the world, but if the world wants Native people

Belcourt 2016 (Billy-ray Belcourt is from the Driftpile Cree Nation. He is a 2016 Rhodes Scholar and is reading for an M.St. in Women's Studies at the University of Oxford. He was named by CBC Books as one of six Indigenous writers to watch,Political Depression in a Time of Reconciliation, Jan 15, 2016, <http://activehistory.ca/2016/01/political-depression-in-a-time-of-reconciliation/)//NotJacob//recut> anop

It’s tough: knowing that you might not get the world you want and the world that wants you back, that your bones might never stop feeling achy and fragile from the wear and tear of mere existence, from the hard labour of getting through the day. Ours are bodies that have been depleted by time, that have been wrenched into a world they can’t properly bend or squirm into because our flesh is paradoxically both too much and not enough for it. In the wake of both eventful and slowed kinds of premature death, what does it mean that the state wants so eagerly to move Indigenous bodies, to touch them, so to speak? Reconciliation is an affective mess: it throws together and condenses histories of trauma and their shaky bodies and feelings into a neatly bordered desire; a desire to let go, to move on, to turn to the future with open arms, as it were. Reconciliation is stubbornly ambivalent in its potentiality, an object of desire that we’re not entirely certain how to acquire or substantiate, but one that the state – reified through the bodies of politicians, Indigenous or otherwise – is telling us we need. In fact, Justice Murray Sinclair noted that the launch of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report on December 15, 2015, puts us at the “threshold of a new era in this country.”[1] I am interested in how life might be lived willfully and badly in the face of governmental forms of redress when many of us are stretched thin, how reconciliation, though instantiating a noticeable shift in the national affective atmosphere,[2] doesn’t actually remake the substance of the social or the political such that we’re still tethered to scenes of living that can’t sustain us. What I am trying to get at is: reconciliation works insofar as it is a way of looking forward to being in this world, at the expense of more radical projects like decolonization that want to experiment with different strategies for survival.[3] This way of doing things isn’t working and, because of that, optimism is hard to come by. According to cultural theorist Ann Cvetkovich, political depression emerges from the realization “that customary forms of political response, including direct action and critical analysis, are no longer working either to change the world or to make us feel better.”[4] It is the pestering sense that whatever you do, it won’t be enough; that things will continue uninterrupted, teasing you because something different is all you’ve wanted from the start. To be politically depressed is to worry about the temporal reach of neoliberal projects like reconciliation, to question their orientation toward the future because the present requires all of your energy in order to feel like anything but dying. Political depression is of a piece with a dispossessory enterprise that remakes the topography of the ordinary such that the labour of maintaining one’s life becomes too hard to keep up. We have to wait for the then and there in the here and now; how do we preserve ourselves until then? As Leanne Simpson points out, reconciliation has been reparative for some survivors, encouraging them to tell their stories, to keep going, so to speak.[5] But, what of the gendered and racialized technologies of violence that created our scenes of living, scenes we’ve been forced to think are of our own choosing? Optimism for the work of reconciliation disappeared in the face of multiple crises: of Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, of HIV infection rates, of mass incarceration, of diabetes, of suicide. Reconciliation, at once a heuristic and a form of statecraft, fakes a political that doesn’t actually exist as such, one that not only presupposes that we – Indigenous peoples, that is – are willing to stay attached to it, but that we are already folded into it, that we’ve already consented to it. What does it mean, for example, to consent to a nation-to-nation relationship if there are no other options to choose from? Reconciliation wants so badly to be a keyword of sorts, to contain so much inside its semantic confines, to be “wide-reaching in its explanatory power.”[6] I’m not surprised things have started to leak all over the place. Decolonization might need something of an affective turn: I think there are ways of being attuned to our bodies such that we can gauge if our visceral responses are trained or not, parasitic or not. In short: what do our tears signal, what do his – Justin Trudeau’s – signal? We cry because pain holds our world together. I don’t want pain to hold our world together anymore. Perhaps admitting we are politically depressed is one of the most important things we could do in this day and age. When survival becomes radical and death becomes part and parcel of the ordinary itself, political depression might be our only point of departure. But, political depression is also about dreaming up alternatives that can sustain your attachments to life. Cvetkovich reminds us that we need “other affective tools for transformation” because hope and blind allegiance have failed too many of us too often.[7] I am interested in the generative work of pessimism, how being fed up propels us onward, and keeps us grounded in the now, such that we can make it to the future, even if that’s just tomorrow. As Kim TallBear put it, we’ve been living in a post-apocalyptic world (in its ecological ruins and in the face of its crisis-making politics) for quite some time,[8] one that exhausts our bodies to the point of depression and death and one that slowly removes us from the non-normative or the astray.[9] We are stuck in the thick of things, left clinging to an impasse without an exit strategy. We might need reconciliation today, but Indigenous peoples need a more capacious world-building project for tomorrow, one that can bear all of us and the sovereignties built into our breathing. We should not be asked: do you want the world today? Instead, we should be asking: does the world want us?

# Case

#### [1] Perf con – they have made a serious perf con in the AC because they make this arg about how the world is just 1s and 0s but by demanding the ballot, they make a perf con because inputting the ballot furthers the society made of 1s and 0s

#### Also the 1AC is the worst form of ivory tower academia citing a problem and giving the vaguest description to fix it with no specifics avoiding any material solution Voter for shiftiness as the aff can constantly change meaning being negative is impossible and forces a 1AR restart.

1. For more explanation and explication on the term “general economy,” see Georges Bataille’s *The Accursed Share: An Essay on the General Economy (Volume 1: Consumption)*. Terms “molecular” and “molar” here pay homage to Deleuze and Guattari and are used to signify both the micro and the macro. The specific usage here is preferred in that it signifies the group nature of activity even at the level of the individual. For more on these terms, see Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 7. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), xxxv. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. For more on the American Indian as the model and condition of possibility for settler colonial struggles, see Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor.” [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. “Intersectionality” is used here as it is understood by Kimberlé Crenshaw to indicate the study of intersections between forms or systems of oppression, domination or discrimination. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. For more work on this, see Ward Churchill’s *A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust And Denial In The Americas 1492 To The Present*. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. The nature of this never-ending genocide is described at length by Jared Sexton in “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism” when he writes: “Some may chafe at the notion of permanence here, because it seems not to admit of historicity or, more radically, of a certain impossibility of permanence. But we are talking about permanence in the pedestrian sense that something ‘lasts or remains without essential change.’ It is the logic of change as permutation.” [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. It should be noted at this point that of the following authors to be listed as primary understandings of Native American life, only Jodi Byrd, Vine Deloria Jr, and Leslie Marmon Silko. are Indigenous Peoples. Frank B. Wilderson III is Black and Ward Churchill, while they falsely claim Native American ancestry, are White and used as historians for the purpose of this work. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 146-47. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Steve Newcomb, "Five Hundred Years of Injustice: The Legacy of Fifteenth Century Religious Prejudice," Shaman's Drum (1992): 18-20. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 21, Marshall, 1823. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Andrea Smith, "Not an Indian Tradition: The Sexual Colonization of Native Peoples," *Hypatia* 18.2 (2003): 81-82. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. United States Bureau of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Criminal Victimization, 2013 (Revised)*, By Jennifer L. Truman and Lynn Langton (2013), 9; United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *Fatal Injury Reports, National and Regional, 1999 – 2013* by the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (2013); Vanessa Ho, "Native American Death Rates Soar as Most People Are Living Longer," *Seattle PI*,11 Mar. 2009, <http://www.seattlepi.com/> (accessed 27 Apr. 2015); Sari Horwitz, "The Hard Lives — and High Suicide Rate — of Native American Children on Reservations," *The Washington Post*, 9 Mar. 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/> (accessed 27 Apr. 2015); Kathleen L. Irwin, Salvatore Mannino, and Janet Daling, "Sudden Infant Death Syndrome in Washington State: Why Are Native American Infants at Greater Risk than White Infants?" *The Journal of Pediatrics* 121.2 (1992): 242-47; "1 in 10 Native American Deaths Alcohol Related," *MSNBC*, 28 Aug. 2008, <http://www.nbcnews.com/> (accessed 27 Apr. 2015). The rate of police brutality for Native Americans is .01 per 100,000 behind Black Americans. Violent victimization includes rape or sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 37. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Alexis De Tocqueville, "The Present and Probable Future Condition of the Three Races That Inhabit the Territory of the United States," *Democracy in America*, Ed. Phillips Bradley, Trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1945). [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 37. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Vine Deloria Jr, *God Is Red: A Native View of Religion* (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Pub., 2003), 25. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 38. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid., 38. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Vine Deloria Jr, *God Is Red: A Native View of Religion* (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Pub., 2003), 29-30. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. “civilization,” *Online Etymology Dictionary*, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=civilization (accessed 30 April 2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. “Lifeway” is opposed to “Lifestyle” in that it first implies a group’s traditional way of living and also indicates a more ecologically centered understanding, one in which the human animal is understood as part of a larger ecosystem. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Michael Yellow Bird, “What We Want to Be Called: Indigenous Peoples' Perspectives on Racial and Ethnic Identity Labels,” *American Indian Quarterly* 23.2 1999: 13. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 64-65. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Ibid., 69 [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. John Trudell, “John Trudell Speaks at Judi Bari Memorial” (Speech, Judi Bari Memorial Fundraiser, Berkley, California, 26 April 1997). [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 63. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Kelly Gaines-Stoner, Billy Joe Jones, and Mark Tilden, *The Indian Child Welfare Act Handbook: A Legal Guide to the Custody and Adoption of Native American Children* (Chicago: American Bar Association Publishing, 2008), 1. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Adrian Humphreys, “‘A lost tribe': Child welfare system accused of repeating residential school history,” *National Post*, 15 Dec. 2014, http://news.nationalpost.com/ (accessed 30 Apr. 2015); Laura Sullivan and Amy Walters, “Incentives And Cultural Bias Fuel Foster System,” *National Public Radio*, 25 Oct. 2011 [www.npr.org/](http://www.npr.org/) (accessed 30 Apr. 2015); Joshua Padilla and Alicia Summers, “Disproportionality Rates for Children of Color in Foster Care,” *The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges*, May 2011, <http://www.ncjfcj.org/> (accessed 30 Apr. 2015); The rate of this deracination is surprisingly high, with some states, such as South Dakota, failing to put Native American children in Native American homes over 90 percent of the time. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Fanon Franz, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 44. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. It is in this section that I sustain my most in depth and prolonged critique of Wilderson’s work. I am truly forever indebted to his work both personally and scholastically. Much like Fred Moten, I hope that we can still be friends. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Frank B. Wilderson, III, Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 45. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Ibid., 46 [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Massimo Recalcati, “The Empty Subject: Un-Triggered Psychoses in the New Forms of the Symptom,” Trans. Jorge Jauregui, *Lacanian Ink* 26 2005: n. pag. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 169. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Scott L. Pratt, *Native Pragmatism: Rethinking the Roots of American Philosophy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002), 4 [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Ibid., 5-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. William E. Conklin, “The Legal Culture of Civilization: Hegel and His Categorization of Indigenous Americans” in *Europe in Its Own Eyes, Europe in the Eyes of the Other*, ed. David B. McDonald and Mary-Michelle DeCoste (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2014), 56. The term “off the map” is borrowed from Frank B. Wilderson, III. For more on this term and its meaning, see his “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal.” [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1.1 2012: 6, 18. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 46. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1.1 2012: 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 168; Vine Deloria, Jr., *The World We Used to Live in: Remembering the Powers of the Medicine Men* (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 2006), xviii. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 63. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. Ibid., 63. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 51. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. Hortense Spillers, *Black , White and in Color: Essays on American Literature and*

    *Culture* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 206. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 139. Quoted in Byrd, the endnote for that quotation reads “This is one of the memes circulating as the Cherokee nation and its spokespeople respond to the media and question regarding their March 3, 2007, vote.” While the quotation is used to justify the racist exclusion of Cherokee Freedmen from tribal enrollment, it does exemplify the racializing (and therefore racist) logic that pervades throughout the Americas. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Leslie Marmon Silko, *Ceremony* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006). [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Vine Deloria Jr. describes this most directly when in his book *The World We Used to Know* when he writes that “Wrenched from a free life where the natural order had to be understood and obeyed, confined within a foreign educational system where memorization and recital substitute for learning and knowledge, each generation of Indians has been moved farther and farther away from the substance of the spiritual energy that once directed our lives. We no longer have the testimony of eyewitnesses who saw the spectacular feats of our spiritual leaders and understood that there were much larger boundaries than the life of accumulating goods. We no longer depend on the presence and wisdom of elders who can consult with the spirits and give or their counsel when making important decisions. Most of us cannot even fathom how living in that manner would be.” [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 181. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Saidiya Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 65. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), xviii. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
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