# 1AC – Egypt

## 1AC – V1

### Advantage – Civil War

**New Egyptian laws are set in place to *silence* and *punish* workers for striking**

#### Boukhari 10/11

[Jamal Boukhari is an Egyptian journalist. Equal Times “A dangerous new law in Egypt allows for the dismissal of any public employee who opposes the regime” Oct 11 2021 <https://www.equaltimes.org/a-dangerous-new-law-in-egypt?lang=en#.YZVH3mDMJEY>] //aaditg

On 1 August, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi approved a law, previously approved by parliament, allowing for the non-disciplinary dismissal of public employees. Referred to in the media as the ‘Law on the Dismissal of Employees Belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood’, the **new legislation allows public administrations to dismiss any civil servant suspected of belonging to groups classified as ‘terrorist’ in Egypt, as well as those who ‘harm public services or the economic interests of the state’.** It began with a series of fatal railway accidents. On 26 March 2021, a train collision in the Sohag Governorate in Upper Egypt killed 20 people and injured 165. Twenty-two days later, another accident occurred in the north of the country, killing 11 and injuring 98. Faced with criticism of his management following the accidents, the minister of transport and former army general Kamel al-Wazir accused “extremist and rebel elements” allegedly belonging to terrorist groups including the Muslim Brotherhood, banned in the country since 2013, of being behind the “sabotage.” As proof of his charges, the Minister announced that he had identified 268 Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated “elements” within the transport sector, whom he could not sack as Egyptian law did not allow the dismissal of civil servants or employees of state-owned companies except for disciplinary reasons. On 5 May 2021, a member of parliament from the pro-regime Mostaqbal Watan party introduced the new law before parliament. While characterised in the media as primarily aimed at the dismissal of employees with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, the law’s ambiguous and wide-ranging provisions are raising fears that any slightly critical voice within the public sector could be targeted. “The dismissal of employees belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood is just the tip of the iceberg. This law targets any public employee who opposes the regime, regardless of their affiliation. The government is well aware that most of the Muslim Brotherhood are either in prison or in exile,” Kamal Abu Aita, the former minister of manpower, tells Equal Times. He argues that the law is being presented as anti-Muslim Brotherhood in order to gain public approval. According to Abu Aita: “The current regime always labels anyone who is not pro-regime as a member or sympathiser of the Muslim Brotherhood so that it can easily hunt down and punish them.” While the text of the law does not explicitly mention the Muslim Brotherhood, its second article authorises the dismissal of any public servant whose name appears on the terrorist list. But as Abu Aita argues, in a country where any opponent or trade unionist who is arrested can be charged without hesitation with belonging to a terrorist group or sharing the objectives of a terrorist group, “the circle of public employees targeted by the legislation exceeds those who belong to the Muslim Brotherhood. “I know several trade unionists and liberal labour activists who appear on the list of terrorist organisations due to their political affiliation, including the architect Mamdouh Hamza who was placed on the list for criticising the regime’s policies on social networks, and Yehia Hussein Abdel Hadi, who has been detained without trial since January 2019 for participating in an event commemorating the 8th anniversary of the 25 January Revolution. They could be targeted by this law,” adds the former minister. More than 60,000 political prisoners are currently behind bars in Egypt, including 30,000 in pre-trial detention, according to NGOs. According to Ahmed al-Naggar, former editor-in-chief of the government-owned daily Al-Ahram, the law aims to dismiss any official whom the regime finds undesirable, as it judges employees by “their political intentions and positions, not by their actions”. As al-Naggar warned in statements made to the local news website Daaarb: “The law constitutes a return of the inquisition in the public sector and will have very dangerous social consequences.” The new law could further increase workplace monitoring of employees’ political affiliations. “The law would turn employees of public authorities and administrations into informers who help the security apparatus to hunt down any opponent, as well as any honest employee who criticises corruption in the institution where he or she works,” Ammar Ali Hassan, professor of political science at Helwan University, tells Equal Times. “The regime wants employees who remain silent, who don’t complain about their working conditions and who don’t criticise power,” he says. After the law came into effect on 1 August, the government sent a copy to all state institutions in order to begin reviewing employee profiles, an unnamed official source told Sky News Arabia on 10 August. On 22 August, the ministry of transport announced that it had transferred 190 public servants allegedly belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood to positions unrelated to the operation of the railways, pending an investigation into their political affiliation, with a view to dismissing them. In a statement issued the same day the law came into force, the supreme council of universities announced that it had begun to draw up a list of university professors and staff who “belong to terrorist groups and who try in various ways to prevent universities from carrying out their educational mission”. **Targeting workers who call for strikes** But according to activists and members of opposition parties, article 1 of the law presents even greater danger. It stipulates that all public employees who have “failed to meet their duties, as part of a bid to harm public services or the economic interests of the state” will be dismissed. “This article represents a trap for employees. It paves the way for any public servant to be punished for calling for or participating in a strike or in any independent trade union activities. According to this law, they would be failing in their duties and hindering production or the functioning of state services,” warns Wael Tawfik, a member of the workers’ committee at the Socialist Popular Alliance Party (SPAP). While the law provides the state with a means for keeping in check the highly politicised working class, which has always been a key player in and even the driving force behind most of the uprisings in modern Egypt, it will also be a significant instrument for reducing the number of employees in the public sector, which the regime and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) consider to be bloated. According to official figures, the public sector and related services employ around six million people (not including the armed forces). “This new legislation gives the state new reasons to reduce the number of public sector employees. This is in line with the demands of the IMF, which granted Egypt a US$12 billion loan at the end of 2016,” adds Elhami al-Merghani, vice president of SPAP. Since 2020, thousands of employees have organised sit-ins in protest of the government’s policy of closing large companies and factories that it deems to be in debt. Seven thousand workers and employees of the Egyptian Iron & Steel Co took part in the most recent sit-in in January 2021 following the government’s decision to close the company and turn its six million square metre site into a residential development. According to certain analyses, this policy is also aimed at paving the way for the economic ambitions of the army, which is increasingly expanding its presence in civilian production. **“The regime has adopted a policy that is hostile to the working class. It has closed several companies and dismissed thousands of workers in recent years on the pretext that these companies are not profitable**,” says al-Merghani. While the government may be pleased with its hostile policy towards opponents and redundant public sector employees, this policy could have disastrous long-term effects as it risks increasing unemployment and unrest in a country where a large part of the population has long depended on the public sector for its income. As al-Merghani warns: “**The government can use the machinery of repressive laws to silence employees**, but this oppression always leads to disaster.”

#### Lack of right to strike kills al-Sisi’s popularity and devastates state legitimacy AND shuts down protests that confront injustice – the plan materializes that sentiment into movements.

#### Galal ’15

[Rami, contributor for Al-Monitor’s Egypt Pulse and works as an investigative reporter for the Rosa el-Youssef website, “Egypt outlaws workers’ right to strike”, 05-12-2015, [https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/05/egypt-court-ruling-strike-right-sharia-law-sisi-badawi-labor.html]//pranav](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/05/egypt-court-ruling-strike-right-sharia-law-sisi-badawi-labor.html%5d//pranav) \*BRACEKTS IN ORIGINAL\*

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CAIRO, Egypt — The ruling issued April 28 by the Supreme Administrative Court headed by Judge Labib Halim to criminalize strikes and penalize striking public workers by forcing them into retirement caused an uproar in legal circles and provoked the anger of those interested in labor and human rights. Labor and human rights activists considered the decision to be a violation of Egypt’s commitment to the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1967; in October 1981, Egypt signed the convention, which allows for the right to strike. Moreover, the ruling violates the Egyptian Constitution of 2014, which granted the right to peaceful strikes. The Supreme Administrative Court decision forces three officials in the local unit in Qarous, in al-Monufia governorate, into retirement. It also postponed the promotion of 14 others for a period of two years, after investigations carried out by the administrative prosecution showed that they went on strike and disrupted the facility’s ability to fulfill the interest of citizens. The three officials had participated in the strike and locked the door to the unit, barring the head of the unit from entering. The local unit handles the establishment and management of all public facilities in its constituency. The ruling noted that there were conditions on the implementation of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was signed by President Anwar Sadat. These conditions were put in place by Presidential Decree No. 537 of 1981, which requires taking into account the provisions of Islamic Sharia law when implementing the covenant and ensuring that it does not contradict Sharia law. The court added that the provisions of Sharia law confirm that if a strike leads to those benefiting from public services incurring damages, Islamic law does not permit striking because of the harm it causes citizens. This is considered erroneous jurisprudence of Sharia law. The gravity of this ruling lies in the fact that it is not merely a judgment concerning an individual incident. Rather, it has become a judicial principle that the prosecution will rely on in similar cases. This will deprive workers of the right to strike, which is generally recognized throughout the world. In this regard, Tharwat al-Badawi, a professor of constitutional law at Cairo University, told Al-Monitor, “The ruling violates Article 73 of the 2014 Egyptian Constitution that grants workers the right to strike.” Badawi pointed out that whenever the constitution grants a particular right, the administrative court is allowed to put in place mechanisms to regulate this right. However, according to Badawi, the court, by criminalizing the right to strike, has violated the right itself, which is not within its purview. Regarding the absence of a law governing the right to strike, Badawi said that since the constitution is the main source of all laws, if it grants a particular right, then this right must be allowed. Al-Monitor spoke with Karima al-Hafnawi, a leader in the Kefaya Movement — one of the largest protest movements that contributed to the ouster of the Mubarak regime — and a founder of the Hemaya Movement, which is concerned with the rights of workers and the public sector. “All the rights workers have obtained throughout the world have come through demonstrations and strikes. This ruling prevents Egypt’s workers from their right to peaceful expression in confronting the injustice, oppression and poverty inflicted upon them,” she said. Hafnawi warned that this obstinacy and restriction on workers, and robbing them of their right to peacefully strike, could set off waves of anger that may have dire consequences. Hafnawi attacked the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), which presented a “Labor Honor Code” to President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the occasion of Labor Day on May 1. The code emphasized the importance of working in the ushering in of Egypt’s future. The document said, “Egypt’s workers reject striking and confirm their commitment to social dialogue with the government and business owners as a mechanism to achieve social justice and stability and to entrench their concepts, and work to overcome the obstacles that prevent their implementation.” The honor code also stressed the importance of dialogue on all issues and levels, to ensure the stability of labor relations, security and social peace. “The ETUF does not express [the views] of Egyptian workers; rather it is loyal to the government. It follows the same path of hypocrisy and praise of the ruling regime that it did during the era of ousted President Hosni Mubarak, without acting in the interest of workers,” said Hafnawi. The deputy head of the ETUF, Magdy al-Badawi, told Al-Monitor that the federation is in a real predicament following this ruling. He said that while the ETUF believes that striking is a right for workers and a means of balance in negotiating workers’ rights, the initiative the ETUF presented to the state via the labor honor code — which rejected striking at the current time — came in light of the fact that the Egyptian state is in a stage of reconstruction, and strikes cause major losses to the economy. “Striking is a means, not an end; thus the ETUF has taken a first step toward achieving the stability required to build the nation. Now it is up to business owners and the state to take similar steps to create a mechanism for negotiating and maintaining workers’ rights, without losses being incurred by either side,” he said. Badawi called on Sisi, in his capacity as the one who currently holds legislative authority, to issue laws governing the right to strike. Negad al-Borai, a lawyer, human rights activist and chairman of the Group for Democratic Development, told Al-Monitor that “this ruling highlights the use of the judiciary for political purposes.” He added that there are a group of judges who use their personal ideas and beliefs in issuing rulings that violate the law and the constitution, which has led to the current confusion. He said that these rulings also adversely impact the image of the Egyptian state, as was evident in the rulings for mass execution and severe punishment for youths who participated in the revolution. Borai added, “President Sisi still enjoys a degree of popularity, and Egyptians accept some of these things on the basis that they are paving the way for improvement. However, if [citizens] don’t perceive any improvement, the situation could flip. Such rulings take away from [Sisi’s] popularity to a great extent, and if the situation persists in Egypt in the same manner, he will have no noticeable popularity six months from now.” Meanwhile, labor leader and former MP Abdul Rahman Khair told Al-Monitor, “This ruling is just the latest episode of terrorism against public employees, following the new civil service law that includes no provisions for negotiating or complaining. Even resorting to the judiciary must now be done through the competent entity. Thus, state employees cannot complain or strike, and must accept the status quo regardless of the injustice they face.” A violation of the constitution lays the foundation for a lack of rights in society, and constitutes a flagrant violation of rights and freedoms, providing a possible signal of impending popular anger.

#### That’s good – sustained Egyptian repression and brutal ‘counter-terror’ strategies *fuel* terrorism, conflict escalation, and will cause civil war – alternative readings get it *wrong*.

#### Saferworld ’17

[Saferworld is an international non-governmental organisation with conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes in over 20 countries and territories in the Horn of Africa, the African Great Lakes region, Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus, “We need to talk about Egypt: how brutal ‘counter-terrorism’ is failing Egypt and its allies”, October 2017, Saferworld, https://saferworld-indepth.squarespace.com/we-need-to-talk-about-egypt/]//pranav

On 24 July 2013, three weeks after Egypt’s army removed Muslim Brotherhood (MB) member Mohammed Morsi from the presidency, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, then defence minister, called on the Egyptian people to back the army and the police to fight terrorism across the country.[1] Seen as a way to create a mandate for continued military rule after the coup, this call to fight terror has defined Egypt ever since. Four years on, widespread repressive tactics by the Egyptian government are more severe than even during President Mubarak’s most desperate years in charge. President Sisi, who has ruled since 2014, has used the terror threat to justify intense repression: sweeping counter-terror (CT) laws to clamp down on dissent, a Stalin-style programme of mass incarceration overseen by military tribunals, widespread ‘assembly-line’ use of torture and extra-judicial killing. Egged on by state-controlled media, the strategy targets not only violent individuals but also journalists and dissenting citizens. In Sinai, Egypt’s hidden war has escalated, in part due to the collective punishment of local communities who have faced aerial bombardment, forced displacement and deprivation of essential services. Such repression typically foments further conflict and terror attacks.[2] In Egypt, the situation has unquestionably worsened: since 2013, violence by the state and non-state groups has caused the deaths of thousands of Egyptians, including civilians, members of armed groups, police and army personnel. The US, Britain and several other European governments have nevertheless cheered the regime on. For them, the mistaken idea that Egypt’s approach is an effective way to counter ‘terrorism’ is too convenient to challenge openly. For now it remains highly profitable to sell arms to Egypt and easier to avoid sending signals that could lead to Egypt playing a spoiler role on Western priorities such as Libya, Israel and Palestine, and maritime trade. Yet the regime’s behaviour is as cruel and counter-productive as Yemen’s and Syria’s were in the run-up to their devastating civil wars. It will likely fuel further terror, and could well provoke a deep, intractable crisis in the long term rather than stave off the threat posed by violent groups.

#### Egyptian civil war kills Israeli safety, causes middle eastern instability and devastates relationships with the US.

#### **Digital First Media and the Contra Costa times ’13**

(updated in 2016 though) [Digital First Media and the Contra Costa times, “Egyptian civil war would be a catastrophe”, 08-16-2013, The Denver Post, https://www.denverpost.com/2013/08/16/egyptian-civil-war-would-be-a-catastrophe/]//pranav

Once again, Egypt roils from a brutal crackdown by the interim military government and the turmoil renews our fear that the most populous country in the Arab world is poised for a disastrous civil war that would have worldwide implications. The violence that has already claimed more than 525 lives isn’t likely to subside as long as military leaders continue their crackdown on anti-government protesters who had been staging a weeks-long demonstration against last month’s military ouster of elected President Mohamed Morsi. The violence prompted President Barack Obama on Thursday to cancel joint military exercises planned for next month as a tangible protest to the military’s treatment of the people. For the time being, however, Obama did not revoke the $1.3 billion in aid the U.S. has committed to Egypt. But he did say, “Our traditional cooperation cannot continue as usual.” We think Obama was right to cancel the exercises and to send a message to the apparently tone deaf Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, Egypt’s de facto leader, that U.S. aid is at risk if the military continues its repression. An Egyptian civil war would be catastrophic for a country that only a few short months ago had been on a path to end decades of brutal dictatorial rule of ousted former President Hosni Mubarak as it moved, however haltingly, toward democracy. Aside from the obvious internal strife that a civil war would create, it is also important to note that Egypt is Israel’s most strategically important neighbor and that while not exactly cordial, the two nations have managed to coexist. Any change in that relationship should worry anyone who desires peace in the Middle East. We don’t mean to imply that Morsi was any bargain himself. He was not. But he was, after all, elected by the voters. He was the darling of the Muslim Brotherhood and as such he had hardly spent his year in office dedicated to the principles of democratic reform. In fact, he wasn’t very tolerant of differing viewpoints, either, which had cost him substantial support. It was that dwindling of support that created a leadership void that was filled — for better or for worse — by the military. Egypt is not just another country “over there” in the Mideast; it plays a vital stabilizing role in a very unstable region. What happens there will have impact throughout the globe.

#### Egypt specifically is key to negotiating treaties between Iran & Israel

France24 News ’21 [France24 News, “Gaza ceasefire takes effect after Egypt-brokered deal between Israel and Hamas”, 05-20-2021, France 24 News, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210520-israel-confirms-unconditional-gaza-ceasefire-agreed-with-hamas]//pranav

In the countdown to the 2am (23:00 GMT Thursday) ceasefire, whose timing Hamas had confirmed but Israel did not, Palestinian rocket salvoes continued and Israel carried out at least one air strike. Each side said it stood ready to retaliate for any truce violations by the other. Cairo said it would send two delegations to monitor the ceasefire. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office confirmed the “mutual and unconditional” ceasefire after a late-night meeting of the Security Cabinet, saying it had unanimously accepted an Egyptian proposal but that the two sides were still determining exactly when it was to take effect. A Hamas official told Reuters the ceasefire would be “mutual and simultaneous”. In a televised address on Thursday, Biden welcomed the ceasefire as “a genuine opportunity to make progress” towards lasting peace in the Middle East, and hailed Egypt’s role in brokering the agreement. He extended condolences to bereaved Israelis and Palestinians and said Washington would work with the United Nations “and other international stakeholders to provide rapid humanitarian assistance” for Gaza and its reconstruction.

#### That goes nuclear.

#### Silverstein 4/23

“Iran-Israel tensions: The threat of nuclear disaster looms large,” Richard Silverstein [writes the Tikun Olam blog, devoted to exposing the excesses of the Israeli national security state], 23 April 2021 <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/iran-israel-tensions-threat-nuclear-war-looms-large> SM

Israel had a near-miss of potentially catastrophic proportions on Thursday. As it has done hundreds of times in the past decade, the Israeli air force attacked Iranian bases inside Syria. In response, Syrian forces fired anti-aircraft missiles of a rather primitive Soviet model, one of which overflew its target and landed some 30 kilometres from Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor. Israel said recently that it was bolstering its defences around Dimona for just such an eventuality. Although an Iranian general taunted Israel, implying that Iran had some responsibility for the attack, that doesn’t appear to be the case. But the missile landing inside Israel does show that if Iran wanted to attack Dimona, it has the capacity. And despite Israel’s best efforts, an Iranian missile could hit its target. With that, one of the worst nuclear disasters in the region’s history could unfold, including a Chernobyl-type radioactive leak that could endanger not only all of Israel, but also many of its neighbours.A US general has assured a Senate committee that the Syrians weren’t intending to attack Israel. Rather, a misguided missile meant to target an Israeli warplane overshot its target. He blamed it on “incompetence”, as if that was supposed to be somehow reassuring; rather, it only reinforces how easy it is even for a mistake to cause a nuclear disaster.Campaign of terror Certainly, if either Israel or Iran wanted to bomb each other’s nuclear facilities, they could do so successfully. An Israeli attack would probably cause less catastrophic damage, but only because Iran’s nuclear programme is not nearly as developed as Israel’s. An Iranian direct hit on Dimona would cause incalculable damage due to the plutonium reactor at the facility. Nor does this happen in a vacuum: Israel has maintained a decade-long campaign of terror attacks on Iranian military bases and nuclear scientists. Most recently, it bombed the Natanz nuclear facility, destroying the power generation source and damaging older-generation centrifuges. It also attacked an Iranian Revolutionary Guard spy ship off the Yemeni coast this month. Iran has responded in its own limited way, restrained by its need to maintain good relations with nuclear-deal signatories. For Israel, the attacks are a low-risk proposition. It defies US opposition (if there is any) with a wink and a nod, and the attacks look good on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s résumé. To weather his corruption trial and retain public support, he needs external enemies (and internal enemies, but that’s a different story). Iran provides these in spades.Eliminating Israeli leverage The US could exert control over this scenario by eliminating Israeli leverage. If it agreed to lift sanctions in exchange for Iran’s return to low levels of uranium enrichment, as designated in the nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration, Israel’s rejectionist approach would become moot. The problem is that US President Joe Biden is running scared from Republican opposition to any nuclear deal with Iran. Besides, he has designated the Middle East a low priority for his administration. There is some faint hope in the US announcement that it is ready to lift a partial set of sanctions. However, the list on offer is quite limited, and will certainly not satisfy the Iranians. Such half-measures present an example of the limitations of the Biden approach. He should instead make a full-throated commitment to end this dithering once and for all. Israel is mounting a full-court press this coming week as it sends its Mossad and military intelligence chiefs, along with its army chief of staff, to Washington in an attempt to influence nuclear negotiations as they enter what may be a final stage. According to Haaretz, army chief of staff Aviv Kochavi “will also raise other issues, including Iran’s military expansion in Syria and the instability of Lebanon. Israel is concerned about the possibility that Hezbollah will try to … [foment] conflict with Israel.” The hypocrisy of Israel’s refusal to acknowledge its own massive military interventions in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and even Iraq, while decrying Iran’s involvement in Syria, is almost breathtaking. There is next to no chance that any of this will enter into the considerations of negotiators in Vienna. Unlike Israel, they are interested in doing a nuclear deal, not engaging in wishful thinking. Combustible Middle East mix Returning to the Biden administration’s global goals, the Middle East doesn’t care about presidential priorities. It contains a combustible mix of corrupt elites and overbearing dictators who do not shirk from causing mayhem in their domains. And one of them, perhaps a desperate Israeli prime minister or an ageing ayatollah eager to preserve his honour and legacy, could inadvertently (or intentionally) set the entire region aflame. If Biden doesn’t act quickly and decisively, there is a sizeable risk that another missile from one country or the other will hit a target and cause devastation. That would mark a point of no return, like the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, which led to World War One. The difference is that in 1914, armies fought with guns, bayonets and artillery. Today, they will fight with F-35s, ballistic missiles and possibly nuclear weapons.

#### It’s uniquely likely now – sliding oil prices and COVID.

#### Wright ’20

[Robin, distinguished fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She has been a fellow at the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as well as at Yale, Duke, Dartmouth, and the University of California, Santa Barbara, “Can the Middle East Recover from the Coronavirus and Collapsing Oil Prices?”, 05-08-2020, The New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/can-the-middle-east-recover-from-the-coronavirus-and-collapsing-oil-prices]//pranav

The twin crises of sickness and sliding oil prices coincided with rumbling instability: three ongoing civil wars—lasting for five years in Yemen, six years in Libya, and nine years in Syria—plus months of deadly protests in Iraq; the implosion of Lebanon’s monetary system; the third Israeli election in a year; the presence of millions of refugees and displaced people in rudimentary camps in Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon; and the resurgence of suicide attacks and assassinations by isis. With the exception of Israel, most Middle Eastern countries don’t have the medical staff, hospitals, and equipment necessary to provide adequate care during a pandemic, nor the financial resources to bail out their economies. The crises have set the stage for the Middle East to become even more volatile. Roughly sixty per cent of the region’s population is under thirty, which may impact the number who survive the pandemic. But the young have also spearheaded the region’s protests—and may now express renewed fury because they will be the generation most impacted by soaring unemployment. In many countries, roughly a third of young people were jobless before the pandemic. In Lebanon, demonstrators violated quarantine in the northern city of Tripoli and burned down banks to protest the collapse of the national currency—and its impact on their lives. A twenty-six-year-old, Fawwaz al-Samman, died in a confrontation with the Lebanese Army. He was quickly dubbed the “Martyr of the Hunger Revolution.” “This is a critical turning point,” Maloney told me. “It’s going to have a long-standing political impact, fuelling populism and rage against governments by their own people.”

#### Nuke war causes extinction – Ice Age, famines, and war won’t stay limited

#### Edwards 17

[Paul N. Edwards, CISAC’s William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Being interviewed by EarthSky. How nuclear war would affect Earth’s climate. September 8, 2017. earthsky.org/human-world/how-nuclear-war-would-affect-earths-climate] Note, we are only reading parts of the interview that are directly from Paul Edwards -- MMG

In the nuclear conversation, what are we not talking about that we should be? We are not talking enough about the climatic effects of nuclear war. The “nuclear winter” theory of the mid-1980s played a significant role in the arms reductions of that period. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reduction of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, this aspect of nuclear war has faded from view. That’s not good. In the mid-2000s, climate scientists such as Alan Robock (Rutgers) took another look at nuclear winter theory. This time around, they used much-improved and much more detailed climate models than those available 20 years earlier. They also tested the potential effects of smaller nuclear exchanges. The result: an exchange involving just 50 nuclear weapons — the kind of thing we might see in an India-Pakistan war, for example — could loft 5 billion kilograms of smoke, soot and dust high into the stratosphere. That’s enough to cool the entire planet by about 2 degrees Fahrenheit (1.25 degrees Celsius) — about where we were during the Little Ice Age of the 17th century. Growing seasons could be shortened enough to create really significant food shortages. So the climatic effects of even a relatively small nuclear war would be planet-wide. What about a larger-scale conflict? A U.S.-Russia war currently seems unlikely, but if it were to occur, hundreds or even thousands of nuclear weapons might be launched. The climatic consequences would be catastrophic: global average temperatures would drop as much as 12 degrees Fahrenheit (7 degrees Celsius) for up to several years — temperatures last seen during the great ice ages. Meanwhile, smoke and dust circulating in the stratosphere would darken the atmosphere enough to inhibit photosynthesis, causing disastrous crop failures, widespread famine and massive ecological disruption. The effect would be similar to that of the giant meteor believed to be responsible for the extinction of the dinosaurs. This time, we would be the dinosaurs. Many people are concerned about North Korea’s advancing missile capabilities. Is nuclear war likely in your opinion? At this writing, I think we are closer to a nuclear war than we have been since the early 1960s. In the North Korea case, both Kim Jong-un and President Trump are bullies inclined to escalate confrontations. President Trump lacks impulse control, and there are precious few checks on his ability to initiate a nuclear strike. We have to hope that our generals, both inside and outside the White House, can rein him in. North Korea would most certainly “lose” a nuclear war with the United States. But many millions would die, including hundreds of thousands of Americans currently living in South Korea and Japan (probable North Korean targets). Such vast damage would be wrought in Korea, Japan and Pacific island territories (such as Guam) that any “victory” wouldn’t deserve the name. Not only would that region be left with horrible suffering amongst the survivors; it would also immediately face famine and rampant disease. Radioactive fallout from such a war would spread around the world, including to the U.S. It has been more than 70 years since the last time a nuclear bomb was used in warfare. What would be the effects on the environment and on human health today? To my knowledge, most of the changes in nuclear weapons technology since the 1950s have focused on making them smaller and lighter, and making delivery systems more accurate, rather than on changing their effects on the environment or on human health. So-called “battlefield” weapons with lower explosive yields are part of some arsenals now — but it’s quite unlikely that any exchange between two nuclear powers would stay limited to these smaller, less destructive bombs.

### Advantage - USAid

**Status quo US military aid is *declining* because of human rights violations *exacerbating* US– Egypt tensions**

#### Pamuk 9/15

[ Humeyra Pamuk is a senior correspondent and a writer for Reuters, currently covering U.S. foreign policy and the State Department. Reuters “U.S. to hold $130 mln of Egypt's military aid over human rights -State Dept” 9/.15/2021(article was published 9/14 but updated 9/15) <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-hold-130m-egypts-military-aid-over-human-rights-sources-2021-09-14/> ] //aaditg

WASHINGTON, Sept 14 (Reuters) - **The Biden administration will withhold $130 million worth of military aid to Egypt until Cairo takes specific steps related to human rights,** a State Department spokesperson said on Tuesday. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's move is a break with his predecessors' policy of overriding a congressional check on military aid to Egypt. In the past, an exception was granted to free up Foreign Military Financing for Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's government, worth $300 million this fiscal year, on the basis that it was in the interest of U.S. national security. But rights groups, which had called on the administration to block the entire $300 million aid, expressed disappointment at the decision, saying it was a "betrayal" of the U.S. commitment to promote human rights. The State Department spokesperson said in an emailed statement: **"We are continuing to discuss our serious concerns about human rights in Egypt".** Blinken "will move forward with the use of $130 million if the Government of Egypt affirmatively addresses specific human-rights related conditions," the statement added. **There was no immediate response** to a request for comment from Egypt's state press centre. Earlier, a U.S. official speaking on the condition of anonymity said the administration would approve $170 million but would put a hold on the remaining $130 million, making that available in future fiscal years **if Egypt improves its record.** "What the Biden administration has really done is waive the minimal human rights conditions imposed by Congress on a fraction of U.S. aid, while keeping a small portion of $130 million blocked on even more watered down conditions," said Sarah Leah Witson, executive director of advocacy group Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN). **The United States has provided around $1.3 billion in foreign assistance to Egypt annually since the 2017 fiscal year, according to a congressional research report.** Sisi, who ousted the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013, has overseen a crackdown on dissent that has tightened in recent years. **Rights groups say tens of thousands have been detained**, including Brotherhood leaders and secular activists.

**Aid void causes Russia pivot**

#### Wood 18

[ David Wood is a professor of practice at Seton Hall University's School of Diplomacy and International Relations.8/28/2018 “ Egypt Loves China’s Deep Pockets

Cairo is an old hand at playing the East and West off each other—for its own profit.” <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/28/egypt-loves-chinas-deep-pockets/> ]//aaditg

Gamal Abdel Nasser, former president of Egypt and Cold War schemer, was not averse to playing hardball with powerful countries. In 1955, Nasser grew tired of dallying from Washington on a long-stalled arms deal. He shocked the West by approaching the Soviet Union, buying military equipment through Czechoslovakia, and igniting fears of a Middle Eastern arms race. Six decades later, Cairo is looking for the best political bargain it can get once again, making diplomatic overtures to Moscow and Beijing while maintaining its crucial U.S. and Persian Gulf backers As under Nasser, the Egyptian leadership has become frustrated with the United States. The relationship grew frosty during the presidency of Barack Obama, who refused to invite President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to Washington amid accusations of human rights violations. Sisi has since made a state visit to Donald Trump’s White House, but the administration’s long-term Egypt strategy remains unclear. **Congress has complained about a perceived lack of benefit for the United States** from the billions it has provided to Cairo over decades. It denied almost $100 million in military aid last August, citing concerns about a repressive new law restricting nongovernmental organizations’ work. These **tensions have created new openings for both Russia and China**. Moscow responded to the Sisi-Obama impasse by entering into eyebrow-raising military cooperation accords and large-scale arms deals with Cairo. With less fanfare, **Chinese money is increasingly pouring into the Egyptian economy**, suggesting that the “comprehensive strategic partnership” agreed between the countries in 2014 could now develop some real teeth. **Egyptian-Russian relations have developed a stronger military tint under Sisi,** the former field marshal who led the July 2013 overthrow of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi. The **two started holding joint naval and military exercises in June 2015.** Reports circulated **in late 2017 that the two countries were negotiating an agreement for reciprocal use of each other’s air force bases.** Sisi has also lent a welcome source of Arab support to some of Putin’s dicier foreign-policy exploits in the Middle East. Cairo has given diplomatic cover to Russia’s backing of the beleaguered dictator Bashar al-Assad in Syria and allegedly provided a base for Russian troops to reinforce the maverick, anti-Islamist commander Khalifa Haftar in Libya. At times, the Sisi regime has actively snubbed its long-standing allies in pursuing closer ties with the Russian military establishment. Egypt infuriated Saudi Arabia in October 2016 by voting in favor of draft United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria that was drafted by Moscow and opposed by Riyadh. This May, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov praised Egypt for rebuffing a U.S. request to deploy soldiers to Syria. **Egypt’s reward has been the series of Russian arms sales**, which Mordechai Chaziza, a political science specialist at Israel’s Ashkelon Academic College, argues have become crucial to Cairo’s Moscow strategy. **As the United States has shown a greater reluctance to provide military aid, the Kremlin has stepped into the void**. **Russia signed a $3.5 billion weapons deal with Egypt back in 2014, and it delivered more than $1 billion worth of military equipment last year alone**. Economic ties have also grown. Russia and Egypt pledged to develop a “Russian industrial zone” at the Suez Canal, where the plan is for a glut of investment from Russia on favorable terms. During Putin’s state visit to Cairo last year, Russia agreed to finance and oversee the construction of a $21 billion nuclear power plant near El Alamein. The project remains at a very early stage, but the Egyptian government predicts that the facility will begin operating from 2026. Despite these grand designs, Russia’s strained finances limit its ability to wield decisive economic influence in Egypt. Timothy Kaldas, a nonresident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, argues that any attempt to chasten the United States by reaching out to Putin has failed.

**Increased Russian Sales creates multipolar competition , promotes authoritarianism in the Middle East and expands Russian influence throughout the region**

#### Borshchevskaya 17

, Ira Weiner Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on Russia’s policy toward the Middle East, **2017** (Anna, “The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East.” The Jamestown Foundation, 12/20/17, <https://jamestown.org/program/tactical-side-russias-arms-sales-middle-east/>, Accessed 5/30/19, JMoore) recut aaditg

Russia is one of the world’s top arms exporters, second only to the United States since at least 1999.[i] In recent years, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region emerged as Russia’s second most important arms market after Asia. From 2000 to 2016, almost a fifth of Russia’s arms exports went to the MENA region.[ii] To put this in perspective, in 2009, Moscow sold approximately $9 billion worth of arms to this region. In 2016, it sold $21.4 billion.[iii] Many of these sales are upgrades to existing packages.[iv] Since 2000, Moscow also diversified from traditional Soviet-era regional clients. Since officially coming to power in May 2000, if not before, Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to restore Russia’s image as a Great Power in the context of zero-sum anti-Westernism— for Russia to win, the West had to lose. His approach to the Middle East is the extension of former Russian prime minister Evgeniy Primakov’s vision of a “multipolar world,” driven by desire to prevent the West from dominating any region, and curb Western support for democratization efforts in other countries. For the last 17 years, Putin worked to regain political influence and raise Russia to the status of a competitor to the United States by increasing emphasis on Russia’s business interests—primarily arms, energy and high-tech goods such as nuclear reactors.[v] Russia’s economy remains over-reliant on raw materials and natural resources, but the defense industry is one technology-intensive sector where Russia holds an international leadership position. Domestically, Russia’s defense industry is a major source of employment. Russian President Vladimir Putin renewed his emphasis on modernizing the armed forces, especially the navy, on May 7, 2012, on the same day as he took office as president for a third time.[vi] Internationally, the Russian defense industry is a source of important revenue. Thus, Putin lamented in February 2012 about Iraq and countries undergoing the Arab Spring, “Russian companies are losing their decades-long positions in local commercial markets and are being deprived of large commercial contracts.”[vii] As Sergei Chemezov, chief of the powerful state industrial holding Rostec, said in February 2015, “As for the conflict situation in the Middle East, I do not conceal it, and everyone understands this, the more conflicts there are, the more they [clients] buy weapons from us. Volumes are continuing to grow despite sanctions. Mainly, it is in Latin America and the Middle East.”[viii] Yet, arms sales entail far more to the Kremlin than mere financial gains. They are also Moscow’s tactical foreign policy tool for wielding political influence and changing power balance dynamics. Indeed, in July 2012, Putin said that arms exports are “an effective instrument for advancing [Moscow’s] national interests, both political and economic.”[ix] In December 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said that Russia’s arms sales are the most important element of Moscow’s relations with other countries.[x] And Moscow’s chief goal—regime survival, which it hopes to achieve through reduction of Western influence—runs counter to Western interests and values. Thus, in the MENA region, Moscow courts virtually everyone, and competes with the West whenever an opportunity arises. Arms exports are a major component of these efforts.

**A multipolar system and increased Russian influence escalate to nuclear great power war**

#### Brand and Edel 19

**Brands**, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, **AND Edel**, senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, **2019** (Hal Brands and Charles Edel, “The End of Great Power Peace.” The National Interest, 3/6/19, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/end-great-power-peace-46282>, Accessed 5/31/19, JMoore) //recut aaditg

Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and naval exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post-Cold War era. The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history. Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation. The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers.

### Plan

#### Plan: The Arab Republic of Egypt should recognize an unconditional right for workers to strike.

#### Constitutional amendment is normal means.

#### Brudney 20

Brudney, J. J. (2020). The Right to Strike is Recognised as Customary International Law. *Yale Law*, 10–11. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509933587.ch-011/SJKS

Recognition of the right to strike as fundamental by two key ILO supervisory bodies is reinforced by affirmation of the right within a broad framework of international covenants, transnational conventions and judicial decisions, and national constitutions. The right to strike is recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the United Nations (ICESCR).47 It has been incorporated into the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by that Covenant’s Human Rights Committee, which supervises the Covenant’s implementation.48 Although these two treaties are more familiar starting points for international human rights analysis than the ILO Conventions, the Article focuses primarily on the Convention 87 applications because of their extensive in-depth nature. In this regard, it is notable that the two U.N. Covenants declare a specific commitment to Convention 87, which is the only other international convention they even mention, and the two treaty bodies regularly apply their relevant articles in terms that are consistent with ILO application of that convention.49

#### Right to strike key to political and economic stability and human rights

#### Ramadan, 15

 (Fatima Ramadan, Fatima Ramadan is a researcher on labor issues. She has authored many articles and papers on the evolution of Egypt’s labor movement, unions, and social protests., 9-17-2015, accessed on 11-17-2021, Carnegie Middle East Center, "Low-Cost Authoritarianism: The Egyptian Regime and Labor Movement Since 2013", https://carnegie-mec.org/2015/09/17/low-cost-authoritarianism-egyptian-regime-and-labor-movement-since-2013-pub-61321)

Authoritarianism under military auspices has been reimposed in Egypt since mid-2013. The state has outlawed protests, strikes, and sit-ins in the public sphere and has subjected public spaces and private media to tight surveillance. It also has mounted repression of the independent labor movement. When taken together, these factors suggest that the labor movement is likely to wane in the near future. Whether this will last over the long term remains uncertain. After having made some gains for several years starting in the mid-2000s, neit The state is appropriating the public sphere (by outlawing protests, strikes, and sit-ins, and by subjecting public spaces, universities, civil society, and the private media to tight legal and security surveillance) in tandem with growing suppression of dissidents from the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies in the Islamist movements, as well as some other groups and activists that were involved in the January 2011 revolution. The labor movement has not been spared in this drive to quash protest. Successive legal restrictions were slapped on strikes and industrial action in general. More measures were adopted to place restrictions on independent trade unions and to delegitimize them in favor of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), the state-affiliated organization that has a legal monopoly on representing workers.1 Many independent trade unionists have also been arrested, tried, and dismissed from their jobs arbitrarily. The ETUF was established in the 1950s as a way for the state to control workers while purporting to represent their interests. The relationship between the state and the working class under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956–1970) was based on a trade-off between freedoms and political rights on one hand, and economic privileges on the other. The state banned industrial action and imposed strict security surveillance on the labor movement, outlawing pluralistic trade unions. In their place, the state created the ETUF, a government-controlled trade union framework that was little more than an extension of the administrative and security apparatus of the state. At the same time, the working class was able to secure many economic privileges, from job security to representation in boards, wages, and appointments in the public sector following waves of “Egyptianization” and nationalization, and the expansion of the public sector, which observed legally binding guarantees to provide employment to university graduates. But developments concerning the relationship between the state and the working class in the aftermath of the July 2013 ouster of Mohamed Morsi from the presidency suggest that the new regime backed by the army is adamant about reimposing the structures of the old Nasserist state, in relation to unifying trade unions under a state-dominated federation of unions, while placing extraordinary restrictions on industrial action. At the same time, the state wants to liberalize the economy at the expense of workers, which would mean upholding political Nasserism but ignoring economic Nasserism. In this way, political authoritarianism no longer offers economic privileges. In other words, it is a right-wing form of Nasserism, or what might be called “low-cost authoritarianism.” In conjunction with the denial of political rights, and unlike what happened under Nasser, the current military-backed regime did not give the working class any economic privileges. Instead, it proceeded to reduce government support for this class, giving wage hikes to no one except administrative civil servants. Workers in state-owned enterprises did not benefit from this, nor did civil servants. A new civil service law was passed, greatly reducing the work benefits that the state had granted to civil servants for decades. Meanwhile, there are plans to pass a new labor law that would give employers greater leverage to use against workers and would increase restrictions on strikes and trade union activity. The labor movement in Egypt played a role in the uprising that led to the ouster of longtime president Hosni Mubarak in 2011, but state-labor conditions have not improved since then. Indeed, through a concerted state strategy of repression, particularly since the army returned to dominate politics in summer 2013, conditions for the labor movement in Egypt and its working-class constituency have deteriorated. Underlying grievances over wages, job security, and trade union freedoms, including the right to strike, persist. But the state’s increasingly harsh tactics cracking down on protests and leaving protesters with little legal recourse have taken a toll. Today it cannot be stated with certainty that the Egyptian labor and trade union movement has the influence or even public support to sustain itself in the near term. Over the long term, lessons learned and not forgotten during this period could give rise to real trade unions that stand up for the rights of the workers. The Egyptian state has steadily pursued the same strategy vis-à-vis the labor movement for more than a decade. This strategy may be summed up as not offering any concessions in laws and institutional arrangements related to the labor movement, whether with regard to allowing pluralism in trade unions and freedom of association, legalizing the right to strike, or agreeing to a minimum wage. The goal has unabashedly been to preserve the institutional framework of the state-dominated trade union organization and authoritarian state corporatism, in which a single state-controlled and strictly hierarchical organization monopolizes the representation of labor interests. This was Mubarak’s approach to dealing with the labor movement prior to the revolution, particularly following the eruption of labor protests from 2004 onward. It remained the state’s approach after Mubarak’s ouster in the 2011 revolution, and it continues to the present day. The state’s strategy so far has been successful; even through multiple regime changes since the revolution, the legal and institutional labor framework has remained unchanged, with no concessions proffered to the labor movement. Egypt underwent a wave of labor strikes and protests between 2004 and 2010 that was unprecedented since the late 1940s. The labor protest movement was driven by many factors, including intensifying privatization since 2004, soaring oil and food prices, and other developments that led to the virtual erosion of the real incomes of millions of laborers and middle-class Egyptians. On April 6, 2008, what started as a labor strike in the strong industrial center of al-Mahalla al-Kubra soon developed into riots in which for the first time Mubarak’s picture was captured on tape being burned. The confluence of economic and political protests happened again in 2011 when massive nationwide strikes on February 10 delivered the final blow, forcing the longtime leader to step down. Workers began to establish their independent trade unions a few years before the January 2011 revolution. Beginning in 2008, four independent unions were formed (for real-estate tax collectors, teachers, health technicians, and laborers), but the Ministry of Manpower and Migration rejected their articles of association.2 They were thus denied recognition by the authorities as union representatives. While the state’s strategy against the labor movement stayed consistent, its tactics changed after the revolution. During the interim rule of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) between February 2011 and June 2012, the main approach to dealing with the labor movement was based on prevarication and stalling tactics. This was evident in the negotiations with independent labor activists and unionists over a new bill on trade union freedoms, which still has not been passed four years after being introduced. Even temporary concessions made in the form of ministerial decrees recognizing independent unions were later repealed, with no legal or constitutional guarantees proffered. The state maintained the same legal framework, which practically bans strikes except after obtaining permission from the ETUF—an extremely unlikely prospect given the state’s domination of the federation. This is despite the fact that, practically speaking, the state was too weak during SCAF rule to repress the growing strikes, even though a law was enacted criminalizing industrial action. During the short tenure of the Brotherhood-backed Mohamed Morsi (June 2012–June 2013), that same strategy continued. The constitution of 2012 theoretically opened the door to labor freedoms, with workers having the right to establish unions freely. However, the constitution did not give guarantees for trade union pluralism. Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood administration sought to preserve the state-dominated trade union federation as well. The stalling persisted with regard to passing a law on trade union freedoms. The Muslim Brotherhood soon reached a deal with the old labor aristocracy affiliated with the former ruling party, the National Democratic Party. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood were brought into the ETUF board pursuant to decrees issued by the Brotherhood-aligned minister of labor. At the same time, the ETUF sought to put an end to strikes, on the pretext of needing to jump-start the economy.3 However, despite the legal restrictions on strikes, labor protests continued to grow and expand, as the state was generally unable to repress them. The tactics pursued by the state changed greatly after June 30, 2013. This phase began with the army ruling the country indirectly, after Morsi’s ouster, and was followed by the election of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the current president, in June 2014. This phase was marked by the continuation of some old tactics in maintaining and preserving the ETUF, but with more stringent measures in relation to banning strikes and protests, including labor protests, in general. The security services were given the freedom to arrest labor and trade union leaders. During this post–June 30 phase, the state went on the offensive against the independent trade union movement by delegitimizing it and confining labor representation to the ETUF, in the boards of the Social Insurance Commission, the Emergency Fund, and the National Wages Council. A new tactic was also pursued to contain the leaders of the independent trade union movement. Two of them were even coaxed into joining the new government of then prime minister Hazem el-Beblawi. All Egyptian governments, starting with Mubarak and continuing under his successors, have opposed legalizing workers’ right to strike. Law No. 12 of 2003 contains many restrictions on industrial action. For example, Article 192 requires the approval of two-thirds of the general trade union’s board members to strike, even if no union is active in the enterprise in question. It also requires notifying the employer and other relevant parties fifteen days prior to the strike. Strikes are banned outright in strategic institutions that are listed in government Decree No. 1185 of 2003, which covers almost all enterprises. The law stipulates in Article 96 that violation of these conditions would be grounds for dismissal. After the protests succeeded in ousting Mubarak, Ahmed Hassan el-Borai, the minister of manpower and migration in the SCAF interim government, recognized workers’ right to freely establish trade unions. He issued a decree on trade union freedoms, which was also signed by the director-general of the International Labor Organization in March 2011. Afterward, the Ministry of Manpower and Migration started accepting articles of associations filed by independent trade unions. However, the decree never translated into full recognition of the unions. They were thus not allowed to build their organizational bases or exercise the traditional role of a trade union in defending their members’ rights. Nor did the decree lead to the government changing its decisions with regard to the representation of trade unions in various councils and commissions, including in the National Wages Council, which was created under Law No. 12 of 2003 (Article 34). Although the council was reestablished under a decree issued by the cabinet ministers (No. 1133, on September 6, 2011), representation of the workers remained the exclusive prerogative of the ETUF. Furthermore, independent unions were not represented in other councils and boards such as the Emergency Fund and the boards of state-owned enterprises. State labor officials also set their sights on negotiating directly with independent unions on behalf of workers. Nahed al-Ashri, the current manpower and migration minister who at the time was chairman of the Central Administration for Collective Bargaining, successfully reduced the representation of independent unions in any state negotiations with workers. The grounds, once again, were that the labor law limits this right to unions affiliated with the ETUF. Bureaucracy in state-owned enterprises has had a key role in obstructing the work of trade unions from the beginning. Applications by members to pay their contributions to the independent unions to which they belonged were rejected, and subscriptions by members of independent unions continued to be forwarded to unions affiliated with the state-dominated ETUF. Furthermore, many employers refused to even recognize the independent unions. All laws organizing labor relations still confined worker representation to the ETUF and the affiliated union. Indeed, Law No. 35 of 1976, which remains in place, does not recognize any unions except those affiliated to the ETUF. The lack of a new trade union law helped the administrations of both private and state-owned enterprises to place restrictions on independent unions and unionists. Despite having been discussed more than three times in negotiations attended by all sides, and despite being approved by the cabinet ministers in late 2011, the draft of this law was not approved by the SCAF during its tenure. It has yet to be issued as of September 2015. In the absence of any official legal protection for independent unions, the clampdown on independent unionists in the private sector expanded. Law No. 12 of 2003 contains no effective protections for unionists or union freedoms. Those who tried to establish independent unions or demand more rights for workers were subjected to arbitrary dismissals from the outset. Efforts to establish independent unions in some industrial cities with a low number of ETUF-affiliated unions were effectively halted when private-sector employers fired the unions’ leaders. One of those cities was 6th of October City just outside Cairo. Arbitrary actions were taken against strike leaders in the city, and independent trade union leaders in many factories and companies were harassed. After the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, the government’s attempts to end labor strikes began in earnest, first by launching smear campaigns accusing striking workers of disrupting production,4 and then by issuing more laws criminalizing industrial action such as Military Decree No. 34 (later Law No. 34) of 2011. Because the state was in disarray after the January revolution, these restrictions were not translated into systematic repression of labor strikes. Labor protests in Egypt are not new, especially since the turn of the millennium. They increased markedly in the wake of the January revolution, with the opening up of the public sphere and the paralysis (which later proved to be temporary) of the police state. Workers in state-owned enterprises increasingly rejected the consequences of privatization policies, which had led to more layoffs and forced retirements and to reduced labor rights and benefits. Protests ramped up throughout the latter years of Mubarak’s tenure, especially with increased privatization under then prime minister Ahmed Nazif (2004–2011), and peaked in 2012 (see figure 1). They have run the gamut from assemblies and sit-ins to walkouts and full-blown strikes. Protesters’ demands were varied and included calling for raises or permanent contracts, increasing overtime hours, and ending arbitrary dismissals or transfers. The workers also called for accountability for renationalization of certain enterprises and criticized the outdated trade union system, which they said did not represent them. In general, the state no longer had the ability to engage in comprehensive repression of strikes and other protests, despite their being illegal. At the same time, however, the state did not offer concessions that could have legitimized or legalized strikes. Rather, things proceeded in the opposite direction, with the state tightening legal restrictions on industrial action even as it was unable to implement them. This made the freedom to strike arbitrary and vulnerable to state repression in the future. Demand for a minimum wage began in 2008, when several political and labor groups sought to calculate a minimum wage, and it occupied the forefront of labor demands prior to the January 2011 revolution. In March 2010, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled to force the government to raise the minimum wage to 1,200 Egyptian pounds ($153) a month for all workers in state-owned enterprises and the private sector.5 The ruling did not include civil servants, which the court said were subject to another law. In the aftermath of the January revolution as well, setting a minimum wage was at the top of the labor movement’s agenda. The state, however, stalled and did not immediately act on the court’s ruling. In October 2011, the government did implement a minimum wage, but only for a subset of state-owned-enterprise workers. The National Wages Council issued a decision imposing a minimum wage of 700 Egyptian pounds a month for state-owned-enterprise workers in companies employing more than ten people, provided that no insurance contributions are paid out of this sum. The law exempted workers in some sectors whose competitiveness would otherwise be affected. After June 30, 2013, the state went on the offensive against trade union freedoms and labor protests. On trade union freedoms, the state grew increasingly heavy-handed against independent unions. The head of the General Federation of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce even publicly said the goal was to scatter and weaken workers.6 Employers said explicitly that they would not negotiate except with the ETUF. At the same time, negative media coverage of independent unions was on the upswing, with pro-regime media outlets accusing them of treason and collaboration.7 As Ibrahim Mahlab became the premier on June 9, 2014, the government’s intentions appeared clear, in terms of limiting the representation of labor interests to the ETUF and revoking any representative capacity granted in the past to independent trade unions. Independent trade union representatives were completely excluded from the National Wages Council (in the Beblawi government, from July 2013 to April 2014, they were not permitted to vote on the council but at least they were represented). The same thing happened in the board of the National Insurance Commission. Originally, only the head of the ETUF was allowed to represent workers. Under Beblawi, a decree allowed workers to be represented by four members chosen by the most prominent unions. After the sacking of the Beblawi government, however, Mahlab issued a new decree reinstating the head of the ETUF as the sole representative of workers. As part of the same drive, the Civil Service Law No. 18, passed in 2015, restricts the right of workers to organize in general and does not guarantee the appointment of representatives of civil servants to the National Civil Service Council. The law was passed without input from any trade union, be it state-controlled or independent. Furthermore, none of the civil servants were consulted on how funds raised through fines should be disbursed. The law did not take into account pluralism in trade unions in many government administrations either. It came as no surprise that on the most recent Labor Day (May 2015), the state invited only the head of the ETUF to attend the celebrations with the president and the prime minister at the National Police Academy.8 Leaders of many independent unions, labor rights organizations, and leftist groupings had already decided there was nothing to celebrate on Labor Day.9 Labor protests declined sharply after June 30. This may have to do with the carte blanche given to the police and the army to suppress strikes and protests in general. It was especially apparent as penalties were stepped up under Law No. 107 of 2013 for protesting without a permit from the authorities. The following year, Law No. 136 on Securing Public Installations declared roads and bridges to be “strategic institutions”; any trespassing on them, such as conducting protests there, became grounds for military tribunals. Meanwhile, calls for rallying around the state were intensified. After June 30, the state used the ETUF and loyalist independent unionists who had become supportive of the government to claim that workers were opposed to strikes. In May 2014, the ETUF launched an initiative to end all strikes in Alexandria for one year, a move that many independent trade unionists denounced as a disgrace.10 A year later, the head of the ETUF once again presented the initiative to the president in a show of support for the government. At about the same time, the Supreme Administrative Court ordered the retirement of three employees who had exercised their right to strike and postponed the promotion of fourteen others accused of the same charges. Unrest in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen all had an impact. Instability in the region made the Egyptian government nervous and prompted a more severe crackdown on political activists, including independent labor unionists and protesters. By the second half of 2013, worker protests declined suddenly and sharply (see figure 2). In the last six months of the year, the number of protests was only 18 percent of the total number for the year. Among the tactics used by the state with the independent trade union movement after June 30 was assimilating a number of its figures into the government. Kamal Abu Eita, head of the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions, became minister of manpower and migration in the Beblawi government after Morsi’s ouster. Kamal Abbas, another independent trade unionist, was appointed to the National Council for Human Rights, as part of deals between the military and some liberal and Nasserist political forces. The authorities after June 30 reaped many benefits from these deals, weakening resistance after dissidents defected to the loyalist camp. Opportunistic elements as such were recognized by the regime in return for supporting it. This explains the presence of independent trade union leaders in conferences calling on workers to vote “yes” on the constitution of 2014, despite the huge controversy surrounding its clauses related to workers’ rights. And the flip side of the government’s use of some trade union leaders is that those who defected to the government lost credibility in the eyes of the labor movement. After June 30, the Beblawi government tried to cajole the Egyptian people by answering one of the labor movement’s long-held demands: a minimum wage for civil servants. After a debate that lasted more than two months, during which ministers made many conflicting statements regarding the minimum wage, the government approved a minimum wage of 1,200 Egyptian pounds a month for civil servants on September 18, 2013. By doing this, the state sought to segment the demands of the labor movement. It implemented a minimum wage only with respect to civil servants and did not adhere to the Supreme Administrative Court’s 2010 ruling that a minimum wage should be set at 1,200 Egyptian pounds a month for all workers in state-owned enterprises and the private sector. After the government approved the minimum wage for civil servants, the prime minister issued Decree No. 22 of 2014 implementing the 1,200 figure as a raise rather than setting it as the minimum wage. Furthermore, it is known that a decree is weaker than a law and can be easily repealed by another decree. In addition, the government did not implement the minimum wage rise for all civil servants, excluding those employed in economic and service authorities, and workers at state-owned enterprises. The exclusions led to further protests in those sectors and to strikes in vital sectors such as the mail service and public transport. The government was forced to appease some sectors separately, including teachers and doctors, by issuing specific decrees for them. The state’s move to placate the administrative civil servants specifically can be understood in light of their high participation in labor protests (see figure 3). In addition, the government did not implement the minimum wage rise for all civil servants, excluding those employed in economic and service authorities, and workers at state-owned enterprises. The exclusions led to further protests in those sectors and to strikes in vital sectors such as the mail service and public transport. The government was forced to appease some sectors separately, including teachers and doctors, by issuing specific decrees for them. The state’s move to placate the administrative civil servants specifically can be understood in light of their high participation in labor protests (see figure 3). After the minimum wage decision was issued for the administrative departments of the state, the National Wages Council held several meetings to study the possibility of implementing a minimum wage for private-sector workers, who account for 71 percent of the national workforce. The meetings did not lead to any outcome, however, and ended when Beblawi left office in 2014. The post–June 30 period saw a steady decline in workers’ gains vis-à-vis both private and public employers. This was evident in the Civil Service Law, the 2014 constitution’s abolition of the political representation of workers, and the leaked draft of the new labor law. The Civil Service Law No. 18 of 2015, which replaces Civil Service Law No. 47 of 1976, was issued without consulting any of the relevant stakeholders. The law enables the regime to control those who occupy senior and executive administrative posts by allowing these high-tier positions to be filled by appointment. The new law also makes it easier to fire civil servants by making them accountable to directors of their department. Under the previous law, firing was the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Administrative Court. In addition, the law encourages early retirement and places the burden of workers’ pension payments on the National Insurance Commission. As for the constitution of 2014, it did away with the 50 percent quotas set aside for representatives of workers and peasants in the National Assembly, which was one of the gains of the Nasserist era. The constitution of 2012 had kept the quota for one time only, in the subsequent elections as stipulated in Article 229. At the time, the justification used by the regime was that a permanent quota was included in the Economic and Social Council under Article 207. The council, however, is advisory, and in any case, the 2014 constitution abolished it. The representation of workers in the committees that drafted both constitutions was weak. For the constitution of 2012, only three out of one hundred members of the drafting committee represented workers; for the constitution of 2014, the share was one out of fifty. And in both instances, labor’s representatives were chosen from among those close to the regime or loyalists. The decline of workers’ gains in the public and private sectors was also evident in the labor law draft to replace Law No. 12 of 2003. The drafting of the law was marked by the absence of transparency under the Mahlab government and the current minister of manpower and migration. Social dialogue over the law was halted, with no drafts of the law being publicized. At the end of the dialogue, journalists were barred from attending, and the talks ended with independent trade unions withdrawing from the dialogue, claiming that their opinions were ignored. The Egyptian Trade Union Federation and the Egyptian Federation of Industries representing employers also objected to the draft law, but to no avail; as of this writing, it has been referred to the government for approval. The draft law would allow employers to dismiss workers arbitrarily without bringing the matter to the court, as is the case under the current law, and without any guarantees. It also would increase the number of violations that constitute grounds for dismissal. As for the all-important right to strike, the draft law would place further restrictions. Other forms of worker protests would be banned and criminalized. The draft law follows the example of the current law with regard to having no clauses compelling employers to negotiate or to abide by anything that had previously been agreed to. In general, the draft law’s penalties are not deterrent enough to employers and do not guarantee implementation of the provisions. This is not to mention that the draft law continues to deny legal protection to domestic workers and children employed in farming. The Egyptian government since June 2013 has pursued an economic policy of liberalizing the markets and encouraging investors. Part of that approach seeks to eliminate the remnants of the Nasserist economic legacy in relation to state ownership of the public sector by pressing ahead with privatization, including services. However, neither the regime nor employers are playing a role in achieving the kind of real economic development that creates jobs and reduces poverty. Therefore, there is no clear path to achieve stability in this manner, because the causes that led to the 2011 revolution remain extant if not also more entrenched. And in the process of charting economic change, the state has chosen to eliminate any state guarantees won by workers over the years, by altering laws organizing labor relations in all sectors and allowing employers to freely hire without adhering to longtime binding guarantees of workers’ rights. The regime has gone to new lengths in restricting the labor movement, by denying workers the right to organize freely and denying unions the right to be present in the general social dialogue, whether with the government or employers. It is coming up with new obstacles seemingly every day, passing legislation, for example, that makes it an offense for workers to strike. And even when workers resort to a strike, the police intervene to break it. Where workers were ensured a quota of representation in the legislature, that time-honored part of the Nasserist legacy has been scrapped. Ever since June 2013, the wind has run decidedly against the labor movement. The state has mounted its repression of labor protest and strikes. Hundreds and even thousands of labor activists and unionists have been arbitrarily fired in the past two years. The rising repression has gone hand in hand with calling for national unity against terrorism and in support of the current regime. The effect of this nationalist overtone is to render calls for social protest or labor strikes as acts of treason. Most of the repressive measures aimed at the labor movement have been implemented amid general popular consent or at least passivity and apathy. All of these factors combined suggest that the labor movement is likely to wane in the near future. The long-term future of the labor and trade union movements is not at all clear, but there is no doubt that workers in the past decade have gained firsthand experience that the instruments of repression cannot erase from their minds. Moreover, despite the distorted early experience of independent trade unions, such unions still exist on the ground and are still fighting in many places. These could become the nuclei for future real trade unions that defend the rights of their members and whose loyalty lies solely with their bases, the workers, rather than the state.

#### Independently, Egyptian “Right to Strike” legitimizes peaceful pro-democracy movements which empirically cause political change.

#### Beinin ’12

[Joel, Donald J. McLachlan Professor of History and Professor of Middle East History at Stanford University. He received his A.B. from Princeton University in 1970, his M.A. from Harvard University in 1974, and his A.M.L.S. and Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1978 and 1982. He also studied at the American University of Cairo and and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He lived in Egypt in 1969, 1980-81, 1985, 1986, 1994, 2004-05, and 2006-08 and in Israel in 1965-66, 1970-73, 1987, 1988, 1993, and 1993. He has taught Middle East history at Stanford University since 1983. From 2006 to 2008 he served as Director of Middle East Studies and Professor of History at the American University in Cairo. His research and writing focuses on workers, peasants, and minorities in the modern Middle East and on Israel, Palestine, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Beinin has written or edited nine books, most recently Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa; co-edited with Frédéric Vairel (Stanford University Press, forthcoming, May 2011) and The Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt (Solidarity Center, 2010). His articles have been published in leading scholarly journals as well as The Nation, Middle East Report, The Los Angeles Times, The San Francisco Chronicle, Le Monde Diplomatique, and others. He has appeared on Al-Jazeera TV, BBC radio, National Public Radio, and many other TV and radio programs throughout North America, and in France, Egypt, Singapore, and Australia, and has given frequent interviews to the global media. In 2002 he served as President of the Middle East Studies Association of North America, “The Rise of Egypt’s Workers”, 06-28-2012, https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/28/rise-of-egypt-s-workers-pub-48689]//pranav

Although they received far less attention than middle-class pro-democracy movements like Kifaya, workers were by far the largest component of the burgeoning culture of protest of the 2000s that undermined the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime. But until 2010 only a small minority of workers advanced democratization as a strategic objective. Striking or protesting workers commonly sought to co-opt rather than openly contest the regime’s power by calling on Mubarak or a cabinet minister to visit them and hear their grievances. Only in rare instances, like the September 2007 strike of 22,000 workers at Misr Spinning and Weaving Company (known as Ghazl al-Mahalla), did workers raise overtly political demands. During the strike, Sayyid Habib, a member of the elected strike committee, told Voice of America Radio, “We are challenging the regime” (September 28, 2007). Another strike committee member, Muhammad al-‘Attar, told a mass meeting of workers, “Politics and workers’ rights are inseparable. Work is politics by itself. What we are witnessing here right now, this is as democratic as it gets.”6 Building on this success, the Ghazl al-Mahalla strike committee called a strike for April 6, 2008, to demand a national minimum monthly basic wage of EGP 1,200 (about $200; a huge increase over the prevailing rate of about $23). Security forces thwarted the strike through a combination of co-optation and violent repression. The regime drew a red line at linking local grievances and national policy and temporarily succeeded in maintaining it.7 However, the struggle for a living wage continued. Khalid ‘Ali, the founding director of the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, was a key personality in linking workers’ economic demands to political demands toward the very end of the Mubarak era. He represented Nagi Rashad, a worker at the South Cairo Grain Mill, in a suit resulting in a March 2010 court order requiring the government to establish a “fair” minimum wage. The National Council on Wages proposed increasing the minimum monthly basic wage to EGP 400 (about $67). Although far from adequate, this would have been a substantial increase if the government had enacted the proposal; but it did not. On May 1, 2010, hundreds of workers and supporters gathered in front of parliament demanding that the government implement the court order and set a minimum basic monthly wage of EGP 1,200—a figure popularized since the aborted 2008 Ghazl al-Mahalla strike. They chanted, “A fair minimum wage, or let this government go home” and “Down with Mubarak and all those who raise prices!” Khalid ‘Ali told the press, “The government represents the marriage between authority and money—and this marriage needs to be broken up. . . . We call for the resignation of Ahmad Nazif’s government because it works only for businessmen and ignores social justice.”8 Due to a combination of repression and the limited capacities of the local networks that enabled collective action at the workplace level, explicitly political demands emerged only episodically late in the 2000s. This prevented the workers’ movement from developing a national leadership or a political program. Because workers typically mistrusted the opposition intelligentsia as outsiders who sought to impose their own agenda, there were only fragile and intermittent linkages between these two forces. Therefore, when Mubarak departed, workers could not provide political leadership for the nation, as the Polish Solidarity union movement did in 1989. Despite their inability to take the lead, workers were quick to mobilize in the early stages of the groundswell that eventually unseated President Hosni Mubarak, and they deserve more credit for his ouster than they are typically given. One of the less noticed events of the popular uprising was the formation of the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU)—the first new institution to emerge from the revolt. Its existence was announced on January 30, 2011, at a press conference in Cairo’s Tahrir Square—the epicenter of the popular movement to depose Mubarak. Because establishing EFITU violated ETUF’s legal monopoly on trade union organization, it was a revolutionary act—one in which a crime becomes the basis for a new legality. IGURETA and the independent unions of health-care technicians and teachers initiated the new federation with support from the Center for Trade Union and Workers’ Services (CTUWS)—a grassroots NGO focused on labor issues established in 1990. They were joined by the recently established 8.5 million member retirees’ association and representatives of textile, pharmaceutical, chemical, iron and steel, and automotive workers from industrial zones in Cairo, Helwan, Mahalla al-Kubra, Tenth of Ramadan City, and Sadat City. Facilitated by the government’s closure of all workplaces in early February, many workers participated in the popular uprising as individuals. On February 6 they returned to their jobs; just two days later, EFITU called for a general strike demanding that Hosni Mubarak relinquish power. Tens of thousands of workers—including those employed at large and strategic workplaces like the Cairo Public Transport Authority, Egyptian State Railways, the subsidiary companies of the Suez Canal Authority, the state electrical company, and Ghazl al-Mahalla—answered the call, engaging in some 60 strikes and protests in the final days before Mubarak’s fall on February 11. As Khalid ‘Ali explained, “The workers did not start the January 25 movement because they have no organizing structure. . . . [But] one of the important steps of this revolution was taken when they began to protest, giving the revolution an economic and social slant besides the political demands.”9 According to the Sons of the Land Center for Human Rights, the economic paralysis created by this strike wave, “was one of the most important factors leading to the rapidity of . . . Mubarak’s decision to leave.”10 The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) pushed Mubarak aside in what was as much a soft military coup as a revolution. This satisfied the majority of demonstrators, at least during the first half of 2011. But workers continued to protest. At least 150,000 participated in 489 strikes and other actions during February 2011. EFITU leaders and labor activists used this momentum to advocate substantive democracy not merely changing the face of the regime. Forty of them met on February 19 and adopted a proclamation of “Demands of the Workers in the Revolution,” including the right to form independent trade unions, the right to strike, and the dissolution of ETUF, “one of the most important symbols of corruption under the defunct regime.” Reflecting a widespread sentiment among workers and the poor, they asserted:

#### Unconditionality is key – conditional strikes cause circumvention and allow for state crackdowns which destroys efficacy

#### Crépon ‘19

[Marc Crépon, Professor of Philosophy at the Ecole Normale Superieure and director of research at the Archives Husserl, National Center for Scientific Research, “The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin’s ‘Toward the Critique of Violence’.” Translation by Micol Bez. Critical Times (2019) 2 (2): 252–260, https://read.dukeupress.edu/critical times/article/2/2/252/141479/The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter]//pranav

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Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class struggle. To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is, in fact, the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike. Thus, the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles. We might consider this to be the perfect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of questioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider. First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested inter‑ est in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivo‑ cal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider non‑ violent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinc‑ tion established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benjamin dedicates a set of com‑ plementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (the proletarian gen‑ eral strike) to exceed the limits of the right to strike— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against the possible violence of class struggles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law. The difference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The valid‑ ity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing that the right to strike is granted and guaranteed unconditionally. Rather, it is structurally subjected to a conflict of in‑ terpretations, those of the workers, on the one hand, and of the state on the other. From the point of view of the state, the partial strike cannot under any circumstance be un‑ derstood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting (and verifiable) violence: that of the employer. In this sense, the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action, what Benjamin named a “pure means.” The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the al‑ leged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. The political game is thus the following: the state legislated the right to strike in order to contain class struggles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason” to strike. However, it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with (and accomplice to) employers will ever recog‑ nize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will therefore be seen as abusing a right granted by the state, and in so doing transforming it into a violent means. On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of governments confronted with a strike (in education, transporta‑ tion, or healthcare, for example) who, after claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, deny that the arguments constitute sufficient reason for a strike that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. They deny, in other words, that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic vio‑ lence that justifies the strike. Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) left once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insufficient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of sufficient rationale, allowing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situation, or of a new policy. And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support.

### Framing

#### The standard is minimizing material violence.

Prefer:

**[1] Pleasure and pain are intrinsic value and disvalue**

#### Blum et al. 18

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**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10]. Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14]. Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals. Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it. It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring. Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health. Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage. Finding happiness is different between apes and humans As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure. Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even **produce the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered. Desire and reward centers It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation. In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41]. Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42]. Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans. In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45]. Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations. Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50] In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders. In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS. Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

**[2] Actor Spec— States must use util. Any other standard dooms the moral theory**

#### Goodin 90.

Robert Goodin 90, [professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences], “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142 //RS

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.

#### [3] Focus on large scale catastrophes is good and they outweigh –2020 is living proof

#### Weber 20

(ELKE U. WEBER is Gerhard R. Andlinger Professor in Energy and the Environment and Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs at Princeton University.), November-December 2020 Issue, "Heads in the Sand," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-10-13/heads-sand> mvp

We are living in a time of crisis. From the immediate challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic to the looming existential threat of climate change, the world is grappling with massive global dangers—to say nothing of countless problems within countries, such as inequality, cyberattacks, unemployment, systemic racism, and obesity. In any given crisis, the right response is often clear. Wear a mask and keep away from other people. Burn less fossil fuel. Redistribute income. Protect digital infrastructure. The answers are out there. What’s lacking are governments that can translate them into actual policy. As a result, the crises continue. The death toll from the pandemic skyrockets, and the world makes dangerously slow progress on climate change, and so on. It’s no secret how governments should react in times of crisis. First, they need to be nimble. Nimble means moving quickly, because problems often grow at exponential rates: a contagious virus, for example, or greenhouse gas emissions. That makes early action crucial and procrastination disastrous. Nimble also means adaptive. Policymakers need to continuously adjust their responses to crises as they learn from their own experience and from the work of scientists. Second, governments need to act wisely. That means incorporating the full range of scientific knowledge available about the problem at hand. It means embracing uncertainty, rather than willfully ignoring it. And it means thinking in terms of a long time horizon, rather than merely until the next election. But so often, policymakers are anything but nimble and wise. They are slow, inflexible, uninformed, overconfident, and myopic. Why is everyone doing so badly? Part of the explanation lies in the inherent qualities of crises. Crises typically require navigating between risks. In the COVID-19 pandemic, policymakers want to save lives and jobs. With climate change, they seek a balance between avoiding extreme weather and allowing economic growth. Such tradeoffs are hard as it is, and they are further complicated by the fact that costs and benefits are not evenly distributed among stakeholders, making conflict a seemingly unavoidable part of any policy choice. Vested interests attempt to forestall needed action, using their money to influence decision-makers and the media. To make matters worse, policymakers must pay sustained attention to multiple issues and multiple constituencies over time. They must accept large amounts of uncertainty. Often, then, the easiest response is to stick with the status quo. But that can be a singularly dangerous response to many new hazards. After all, with the pandemic, business as usual would mean no social distancing. With climate change, it would mean continuing to burn fossil fuels. But the explanation for humanity’s woeful response to crises goes beyond politics and incentives. To truly understand the failure to act, one must turn to human psychology. It is there that one can grasp the full impediments to proper decision-making—the cognitive biases, emotional reactions, and suboptimal shortcuts that hold policymakers back—and the tools to overcome them. AVOIDING THE UNCOMFORTABLE People are singularly bad at predicting and preparing for catastrophes. Many of these events are “black swans,” rare and unpredictable occurrences that most people find difficult to imagine, seemingly falling into the realm of science fiction. Others are “gray rhinos,” large and not uncommon threats that are still neglected until they stare you in the face (such as a coronavirus outbreak). Then there are “invisible gorillas,” threats in full view that should be noticed but aren’t—so named for a psychological experiment in which subjects watching a clip of a basketball game were so fixated on the players that they missed a person in a gorilla costume walking through the frame. Even professional forecasters, including security analysts, have a poor track record when it comes to accurately anticipating events. The COVID-19 crisis, in which a dystopic science-fiction narrative came to life and took everyone by surprise, serves as a cautionary tale about humans’ inability to foresee important events. Not only do humans fail to anticipate crises; they also fail to respond rationally to them. At best, people display “bounded rationality,” the idea that instead of carefully considering their options and making perfectly rational decisions that optimize their preferences, humans in the real world act quickly and imperfectly, limited as they are by time and cognitive capacity. Add in the stress generated by crises, and their performance gets even worse. Because humans don’t have enough time, information, or processing power to deliberate rationally, they have evolved easier ways of making decisions. They rely on their emotions, which serve as an early warning system of sorts: alerting people that they are in a positive context that can be explored and exploited or in a negative context where fight or flight is the appropriate response. They also rely on rules. To simplify decision-making, they might follow standard operating procedures or abide by some sort of moral code. They might decide to imitate the action taken by other people whom they trust or admire. They might follow what they perceive to be widespread norms. Out of habit, they might continue to do what they have been doing unless there is overwhelming evidence against it. Not only do humans fail to anticipate crises; they also fail to respond rationally to them. Humans evolved these shortcuts because they require little effort and work well in a broad range of situations. Without access to a real-time map of prey in different hunting grounds, for example, a prehistoric hunter might have resorted to a simple rule of thumb: look for animals where his fellow tribesmen found them yesterday. But in times of crisis, emotions and rules are not always helpful drivers of decision-making. High stakes, uncertainty, tradeoffs, and conflict—all elicit negative emotions, which can impede wise responses. Uncertainty is scary, as it signals an inability to predict what will happen, and what cannot be predicted might be deadly. The vast majority of people are already risk averse under normal circumstances. Under stress, they become even more so, and they retreat to the familiar comfort of the status quo. From gun laws to fossil fuel subsidies, once a piece of legislation is in place, it is hard to dislodge it, even when cost-benefit analysis argues for change.

### 1AC – Underview

#### [1] 1AR theory –

#### A. AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible.

#### B. Drop the debater – the short 1AR irreparably skewed from abuse on substance and time investment on theory.

#### C. No RVIs – the 6-minute 2nr can collapse to a short shell and get away with infinite 1nc abuse via sheer brute force and time spent on theory.

#### D. No new 2NR theory, paradigm issues, or recontextualizations – allows them to spam frivolous shells in the 2NR and prove why theirs outweighs which gives them a 6-3 structural skew where they can always win on uplayering or outspreading