# 2nr

## Drones

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### Terror

#### Terrorists get and detonate nuclear weapons – they have means, motive, and opportunity – most recent and predictive evidence that takes into account technological advances

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The risk that terrorists could get and use a nuclear bomb—turning the heart of a modern city into a smoldering radioactive ruin—remains very real. Sabotage of major nuclear facilities or dispersal of radioactive material in a disruptive “dirty bomb” also remain real risks.

Motive. Apocalyptic visions or global ambitions drove groups such as al Qaeda and the Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo to seek nuclear weapons. From the 9/11 attackers to Chechen rebels, who killed hundreds of children and their parents at a school in Beslan, Russia, to the Islamic State, which regularly televised its atrocities, it is clear that some terrorist groups seek to inflict as many casualties as possible, as cruelly as possible.

Means. There have been repeated cases of seizure of stolen HEU or plutonium. While there have been no such seizures since 2011, security assessments and tests continue to reveal important vulnerabilities, in the United States and elsewhere. Moreover, non-nuclear criminal thefts and terrorist attacks continue to occur that use tactics and capabilities that the security systems at many nuclear facilities would be hard-pressed to defend against—ranging from substantial teams of heavily armed, well-trained attackers, to insider conspiracies, to the use of vehicles such as helicopters to get past multiple layers of site security systems.

Opportunity. Government studies in multiple countries have concluded that sophisticated terrorist groups could plausibly make a crude nuclear device. Stopping such a device from being brought into a country and detonated remains a very challenging task, given the huge length of national borders, the immensity of normal traffic across them, and the small size and weak radiation of the materials needed for a nuclear bomb.

Since our last report in 2016:

• Al Qaeda and particularly the Islamic State have suffered numerous defeats which must necessarily make it more difficult for them to mount the organized effort necessary to perpetrate nuclear terrorism, although their intent to inflict massive damage abides;

• Rapid and clandestine radicalization of insiders has continued to present a threat that most personnel reliability programs have been unable to address successfully;

• The pace of seizures of fissile material outside of authorized control appears to have slowed, although what is known publicly about earlier cases offers little confidence that the leaks have been plugged;

• New technologies such as drones and cyber, expanded deployments of small, mobile nuclear weapons, and construction of bulk processing facilities will offer new opportunities for terrorists to strike and present new challenges for those attempting to defend against them.

On balance, the combination of nuclear terrorist means, motives, and opportunities presents somewhat less of a threat than it did two years ago. But as past experience makes clear, the future is highly uncertain; the world has likely not seen the last of powerful terrorist groups bent on mass destruction. And as adversaries make increasingly sophisticated use of technologies such as cyber and drones in the future, the threat to nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities could increase. To minimize risk in this uncertain future, continuous and determined efforts to improve security remain essential.

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#### C] Democratic peace is statistically disproven---it’s conflict driving

Dr. Daina Chiba 21, Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Ph.D. in Political Science from Rice University, LL.M in Jurisprudence and International Relations from Hitotsubashi University, and Dr. Erik Gartzke, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, PhD in Political Science from the University of Iowa, “Make Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: Endogenous Regime Type and the Democratic Peace”, 2/19/2021, https://dainachiba.github.io/research/make2dem/Make2Dem.pdf

The democratic peace—the observation that democracies are less likely to fight each other than are other pairings of states—is one of the most widely acknowledged empirical regularities in international relations. Prominent scholars have even characterized the relationship as an empirical law (Levy 1988; Gleditsch 1992). The discovery of a special peace in liberal dyads stimulated enormous scholarly debate and led to, or reinforced, a number of policy initiatives by various governments and international organizations. Although a broad consensus has emerged among researchers regarding the empirical correlation between joint democracy and peace, disagreement remains as to its logical foundations. Numerous theories have been proposed to account for how democracy produces peace, if only dyadically (e.g., Russett 1993; Rummel 1996; Doyle 1997; Schultz 2001).

At the same time, peace appears likely to foster or maintain democracy (Thompson 1996; James, Solberg, andWolfson 1999). A vast swath of research in political science and economics proposes explanations for the origins of liberal government involving variables such as economic development (Lipset 1959; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Przeworski et al. 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Epstein et al. 2006) and inequality (Boix 2003), political interests (Downs 1957; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), power hierarchies (Moore 1966; Lake 2009), third party inducements (Pevehouse 2005) or impositions (Peceny 1995; Meernik 1996), geography (Gleditsch 2002b), and natural resource endowments (Ross 2001), to list just a few examples. Each of these putative causes of democracy is also associated with various explanations for international conflict. Indeed, some as yet poorly defined set of canonical factors may contribute both to democracy and to peace, making it look as if the two variables are directly related, even if possibly they are not.

We seek to contribute to this literature, not by proposing yet another theory to explain how democracy vanquishes war, but by estimating the causal effect of joint democracy on the probability of militarized disputes using a quasi-experimental research design. We begin by noting that some of the common causes of democracy and peace may be unobservable, generating an endogenous relationship between the two. Theories of democracy and explanations for peace are at a formative state; it is not possible to utilize detailed, validated and widely accepted models of each of these processes to assess their interaction. Indeed, to a remarkable degree democracy and peace each remain poorly understood and weakly accounted for empirically, despite their central roles in international politics. We address the risk of spurious correlation by applying an instrumental variables approach. Having taken into account possible endogeneity between democracy and peace, we find that joint democracy does not have an independent pacifying effect on interstate conflict. Instead, our findings show that democratic countries are more likely to attack other democracies than are non-democracies. Our results call into question the large body of theory that has been proposed to account for the apparent pacifism of democratic dyads.

#### The Imai ev isn’t reverse causal – explicitly says you can’t draw a definitive conclusion from its model, and requires empirical testing which all of our ev proves concludes neg – here’s them admitting to their studies limitations

Imai 20 Kosuke Imai 20, PhD in Political Science @ Harvard, Professor in the Department of Government and the Department of Statistics at Harvard University, “Robustness of Empirical Evidence for the Democratic Peace: A Nonparametric Sensitivity Analysis”, https://imai.fas.harvard.edu/research/files/dempeace.pdf//pranav

Like any method for observational studies, the proposed application of the nonparametric sensitivity analysis has limitations. First, the nonparametric nature of the methodology implies that only a relatively small number of categorical variables can be used as covariates. The method cannot directly accommodate continuous variables without coarsening, and the use of many observed confounding variables requires a large sample size, as seen by some cells in our analysis having few observations, or none. This is often a common feature of nonparametric methodologies such as coarsened exact matching.51 As a result, dimension reduction may be required prior to the sensitivity analysis. An alternative is a parametric sensitivity analysis that can flexibly allow for many variables of different types but imposes strong modeling assumptions.52 Thus, there is a clear trade-off between the functional-form assumptions and the ability to handle a large number of variables.53

Second, although our focus has been the assessment of how robust the observed associations between regime types and conflicts are, such an analysis gives only a partial examination of the democratic peace debate. Indeed, one cannot draw a more definitive conclusion without understanding more micro-level causal mechanisms.54 Medical scientists have shown how cigarette smoking led to the formation of covalent bonds between the carcinogens and DNA, resulting in the accumulation of permanent somatic mutations in critical genes.55 Similarly, settling the democratic peace debate demands the empirical testing of possible causal pathways from democracy to peace.56

Finally, like any sensitivity analysis for omitted variable bias, the proposed methodology does not address the problem of causal simultaneity or reverse causation, which some refer to as “endogeneity”: democracy and peace might affect each other at the same time. In fact, causal effects are fundamentally unidentifiable in such situations. For example, the assumption of no simultaneity is explicitly made in causal directed acyclic graph models by excluding any cycles.57 Thus, to directly address this issue, we need alternative research designs and identification assumptions rather than different statistical methods.

Regimes war scenario is econ

#### COVID decreases likelihood of war

Walt 20---the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. (Stephen M., “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, Foreign Policy, May 13th, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/)//EL

But war could still be much less likely. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Barry Posen has already considered the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war, and he believes COVID-19 is more likely to promote peace instead. He argues that the current pandemic is affecting all the major powers adversely, which means it isn’t creating tempting windows of opportunity for unaffected states while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable. Instead, it is making all governments more pessimistic about their short- to medium-term prospects. Because states often go to war out of sense of overconfidence (however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be), pandemic-induced pessimism should be conducive to peace.

Moreover, by its very nature war requires states to assemble lots of people in close proximity—at training camps, military bases, mobilization areas, ships at sea, etc.—and that’s not something you want to do in the middle of a pandemic. For the moment at least, beleaguered governments of all types are focusing on convincing their citizens they are doing everything in their power to protect the public from the disease. Taken together, these considerations might explain why even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in winding down his brutal and unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen.

Posen adds that COVID-19 is also likely to reduce international trade in the short to medium term. Those who believe economic interdependence is a powerful barrier to war might be alarmed by this development, but he points out that trade issues have been a source of considerable friction in recent years—especially between the United States and China—and a degree of decoupling might reduce tensions somewhat and cause the odds of war to recede.

For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely?

# Case

### 1NC – 1AR Theory

DTA & reasonability on 1ar theory –

1] puts u ahead – lose a position sovles time skew

2] no infinite abuse – only 7 min nc

3] late breaking – only reasonability allows mechanism to check back against 2ar spin bc no 3nr

### 1NC – Democracy Top -- Diamond

**Democracy doesn’t solve war---it increases hostility.**

**Ghatak et al. 17**—Sam Ghatak is a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Tennessee Knoxville; Aaron Gold is a PhD Student in Political Science at UT Knoxville; Brandon C. Prins is a Professor and Director of Graduate Studies of Political Science at UT Knoxville [“External threat and the limits of democratic pacifism,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 141-159, Emory Libraries]

Conclusion It has become a **stylized fact** that dyadic democracy lowers the hazard of armed conflict. While the Democratic Peace has faced many challenges, we believe the most significant challenge has come from the argument that the pacifying effect of democracy is **epiphenomenal to territorial issues**, specifically the external threats that they pose. This argument sees the lower hazards of armed conflict among democracies **not** as a product of shared norms or institutional structures, but as a **result of settled borders**. Territory, though, remains only one geo-political context generating threat, insecurity, and a higher likelihood of armed conflict. Strategic rivalry also serves as an environment associated with fear, a lack of trust, and an expectation of future conflict. Efforts to assess democratic pacifism have largely **ignored rivalry** as a context conditioning the behavior of democratic leaders. To be sure, research demonstrates rivals to have higher probabilities of armed conflict and democracies rarely to be rivals. But fundamental to the Democratic Peace is the notion that even in the face of difficult security challenges and salient issues, dyadic democracy will associate with a lower likelihood of militarized aggression. But the presence of an **external threat**, be that threat disputed territory or strategic rivalry, may be the key mechanism by which democratic leaders, owing to **audience costs**, **resolve** and **electoral pressures**, **fail to resolve problems nonviolently**. This study has sought a ‘‘hard test’’ of the Democratic Peace by testing the conditional effects of joint democracy on armed conflict when external threat is present. We test three measures of threat: territorial contention, strategic rivalry, and a threat index that sums the first two measures. For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of our dependent variable: fatal MID onset, and event data from the Armed Conflict Database, which can be found in our Online Appendix. As most studies report, democratic dyads are associated with less armed conflict than mixed-regime and autocratic dyads. In every one of our models, when we control for each measure of external threat, joint democracy is strongly negative and significant and each measure of threat is strongly positive and significant. Here, liberal institutions maintain their pacific ability and external threats clearly increase conflict propensities. However, when we test the **interactive relationship** between democracy and our measures of external threat, the pacifying effect of democracy is **less visible**. Park and James (2015) find some evidence that when faced with an external threat in the form of territorial contention, the pacifying effect of joint democracy holds up. This study does not fully support the claims of Park and James (2015). Using a longer timeframe, we find more **consistent evidence** that when faced with an external threat, be it territorial contention, strategic rivalry, or a combination, **democratic pacifism does not survive**. What are the implications of our study? First, while it is clear that we do not observe a large amount of armed conflict among democratic states, if we organize interstate relationships along a continuum from highly hostile to highly friendly, we are probably observing what Goertz et al. (2016) and Owsiak et al. (2016) refer to as ‘‘lesser rivalries’’ in which ‘‘both the frequency and severity of violent interaction decline. Yet, the sentiments of threat, enmity, and competition that remain—along with the persistence of unresolved issues—mean that lesser rivalries still experience isolated violent episodes (e.g., militarized interstate disputes), diplomatic hostility, and non-violent crises’’ (Owsiak et al., 2016). Second, our findings show that the pacific benefits of **liberal institutions** or externalized **norms** are **not** always able to lower the likelihood of armed conflict when faced with external threats, whether those hazards are disputed territory, strategic rivalry, or a combination of the two. The structural environment clearly influences democratic leaders in their foreign policy actions more than has heretofore been appreciated. **Audience costs**, **resolve**, and **electoral pressures**, produced from external threats, are **powerful forces** that are present even in jointly democratic relationships. These forces make it difficult for leaders to **trust one another**, which **inhibits conflict resolution** and facilitates persistent **hostility**. It does appear, then, that there is a **limit** to the Democratic Peace.

**BUT---pursuit of democracy now uniqely causes nuclear war with China, Russia, and Iran.**

**Miller 17** (Benjamin; 4/27/17; Professor of International Relations at the School of Political Sciences, The University of Haifa; The International Security Studies Forum; “Policy Series: Will Trumpism increase the Danger of War in the International System?: IR Theory and the Illiberal Turn in World Politics”; <https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5ag-war>; DOA: 12/6/17)

Some realists might, however, not see these recent developments as necessarily leading to more conflict, although they may not see them as leading to stable peace either.[22] In the eyes of these realists, the seemingly unconditional U.S. security umbrella for America’s allies has **allowed them to ‘free-ride’** on the U.S. commitment and to **avoid allocating** the **necessary resources** for their own national defense.[23] Moreover, some of the allies have been **provocative toward** their **opponents**, while relying on the U.S. security umbrella. This could **cause** **unnecessary conflict**. Especially provocative toward Russia, for example, was the enlargement of NATO to the east and the EU economic agreement with Ukraine in 2014. Such anti-Russian expansionist Western moves, in the realist view, compelled Moscow to **behave** more **assertively** and to **annex Crimea** and to **intervene in** Eastern **Ukraine**.[24] Somewhat similarly, it seems **less costly** for American allies in East Asia to engage in maritime conflicts with China so long they are under the U.S. protective shield. Realists believe that moving away from such ever-growing commitments will **stabilize the international system**, or at the very least **reduce** the likelihood of a **great-power conflict**. The realists are especially concerned about the American policies to shape the domestic character of other states, particularly by advancing democracy-promotion, “nation-building,” and the universal protection of human rights.[25] In this context they highlight what they see as **disastrous** American **military interventions**, notably, in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011 and also the continuously costly intervention in Afghanistan since 2001. In their eyes such military interventions are not necessary for the protection of American national interests. Moreover, such military engagements are **unlikely to succeed** and in many cases are **de-stabilizing** and are causing unnecessary conflicts. Such interventions simply **increase the perceived threat** posed by the U.S. to some other countries. Thus, lessening—if not **completely abandoning**—the U.S. commitment to advance these liberal values is likely, in realist eyes, to **stabilize the international system** and to **serve well** the American national security interests. Even though liberals see trade as a major pacifying mechanism, realists view trade—and economic interdependence more broadly—as potential sources for conflict.[26] They highlight the earlier U.S. trade conflicts with Japan and currently with Mexico and China. Thus, moving away from free trade might diffuse conflicts rather than accelerate them. Moreover, there is a growing populist opposition in the West to globalization. In this sense, it cannot work as a useful recipe for the promotion of peace. Similarly, despite the high levels of economic interdependence between Japan and China, for example, such interdependence does not prevent conflict between them and definitely does not result in stable peace even if it might have helped to prevent a shooting war between them, at least thus far. Realists are also skeptical about the ability of international institutions to advance stable peace.[27] Such institutions are not independent actors, which can influence the behavior of the member-states in important ways. International institutions just reflect the balance of power among states. States follow their national interests, and even more so in this age of rising nationalism. Thus we **cannot** expect much from the ability of international institutions to **pacify intense conflicts**, especially among the great powers. Even the most remarkable of international intuitions—the EU—has recently **failed in advancing cooperation** among its members with regard to the key issues of immigration, terrorism and the Euro financial crisis. Realists might be a bit skeptical about a potential reconciliation between the U.S. and Russia based on factors such as the personal friendship between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin or the supposedly common traditional/illiberal values of key figures in their respective administrations. Yet, the presence of a common enemy might be a good source of friendship. In this sense the Islamic State and perhaps even China create a potential basis for cooperation and avoidance of conflict between Moscow and Washington. But on the whole this will not advance a high-level ‘warm’ peace in Europe or elsewhere; rather it may, at most, lead to some kind of an unstable spheres-of-influence arrangement, which is unlikely to endure for an extended period. In sum, while liberals offer a menu of mechanisms for promoting peace, these mechanisms seem now **under assault** or in some process of weakening **under Trumpism** and the illiberal turn in quite a few other countries. Realists, for their part, do not believe in the far-reaching peace-producing effects of such liberal mechanisms. They tend to see some level of great-power competition as the natural order under international anarchy. Realists at most expect that there will be some stabilizing effects of deterrence, especially **nuclear deterrence**, and of the balance of power among the great powers. These kind of factors might — also under Trumpism—**maintain world stability** and **prevent war** even if some level of great-power conflict is expected to endure at any rate. The **most effective instrument** for cooperation—applicable even under the illiberal turn– is based on common threats faced by the great powers such as large-scale terrorism or risky behavior by a small nuclear power such as North Korea and potentially Iran. Evaluation of the Realist and the Liberal Views At this stage, less than three months into the Trump administration, it is quite difficult to determine which approach is right. Still, on the whole, we might be able to distinguish between short-term versus long-term effects and among different types of peace. In the short-term, **realists** may **have a point**: the avoidance of American interventions for democracy-promotion and humanitarian interventions might **stabilize the international system**. The key American adversaries—Russia, China, and Iran— will be **less troubled** by regime–change strategies or ‘color revolutions’ advanced by the U.S. that are **perceived to be posing major threats** to their regimes. The eastward expansion of NATO and the EU, which realists argue has provoked Russia, **will** also **stop**. Such reassurances are likely to **increase stability** in international politics and to produce at least a ‘cold peace’ in the international system and in key regions.

#### Democracy doesn’t solve war---leads to fractured states and perpetual intervention.

Michael Neiberg 18. Chair of War Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the United States Army War College. 06-19-18. “Predicting War.” Lawfare. [https://www.lawfareblog.com/predicting-war](about:blank)

Whether influenced by Hollywood or Santa Monica (the California headquarters of RAND), the history of war as Freedman relates it is essentially conceptual. The end of the dominant Cold War paradigm is a case in point. The ahistorical euphoria of the supposed “end of history” misled many western experts into predicting that an age of perpetual peace would at long last come into view because, as one specialist in this period wrote, the “absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations,” thus undergirding the rise of global governance ideals of liberal internationalism. The way forward in those early years after the fall of the Iron Curtain seemed therefore not technological, but conceptual. The key to peace lay in finding ways to help this one supposedly empirical historical law to take hold. Rather than bring peace, however, the pursuit of the concept of perpetual security through democracy only produced a new idea of war. It convinced western leaders of the need to advance the speed of historical progress through carefully managed military action against a select number of dictators. As prosecuted by George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and their advisers, the new paradigm not only made it possible for great powers to consider meddling in the domestic politics of smaller states, it impelled them to do so. By making more states democratic, through the use of force if necessary, these interventions would make the world safer. The idea was at least as old as Woodrow Wilson, but the eras of the world wars and the Cold War had made it too difficult to put in practice. After 1989, with the seemingly insurmountable dominance of western military organizations, the absence of a Soviet Union to balance western intervention, and the general post-Cold War hubris of western leaders, the environment was right for it to return. The result, of course, has not been an end of history and perpetual peace, but an extension of conflict and a reawakening of older grievances. The central problem, as “The Future of War” depicts it, was an all-too-eager willingness to accept the basic principle of democratic peace theory without thinking through the limits of the theory or fully examining alternatives. One clear alternative theory had already begun to emerge from the minds of theorists like Mary Kaldor and Rupert Smith. Their works essentially argued that war as once understood no longer existed. The future belonged to the side that could best exploit the disintegration of state authority, control the messaging, and work among the people in the new megacities. Anne-Marie Slaughter saw the inevitable splintering of the “sovereign state” into sub-sovereign centers of governance power, thereby squeezing out sovereignty in favor of power exercised by non-sovereign or less-than-sovereign institutions, on the one hand, and the ascendant rule of supra-national institutions, on the other. One might argue, although Freedman does not, that Hezbollah, FARC, Hamas, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and others have been able to survive against much more technologically sophisticated states because they have indeed made the intellectual shift to the kind of conflict that Kaldor and Smith described. The west has struggled against such adversaries not on the technological level but on the conceptual one. The west had two models on which to draw, neither of which helped them conceptualize the central problem. The “aid to civil power” model suggested building up the capabilities of local authorities so that they could care for their own security needs and maybe even become an exporter of regional security. The second model focused on “peacekeeping,” which required armies to act impartially even when, as in Yugoslavia, such a model indirectly empowered malicious actors like Slobodan Milosevic. Both models were frustrating, but they had just enough successes to keep them viable and allow them to survive intellectual challenges like the ones posed by Kaldor and Smith.

#### Their internal link is about strong I-law -- that fails – states *only abide by international law when it helps them* – the aff can’t create an effective enforcement mechanism that forces states to abide by international norms *when it doesn’t suit them.*

Patrick Porter 16, academic director of the Strategy and Security Institute at the University of Exeter., 8-28-2016, "Sorry, Folks. There Is No Rules-Based World Order.," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/sorry-folks-there-no-rules-based-world-order-17497?page=0%2C2>

It would be one thing if the “rules-based” cliché were harmless. It is not harmless. It suffers from three defects. Firstly, its claims about “how things are” is untrue, historically and today. Contrary to those nostalgic for a rule-based liberal order that the United States bound itself to after World War II, there was never a golden era of rule adherence to which we can return. As Stephen Walt observed, historically “we mostly made up the rules, and chucked them or ignored them when they got in our way. . . there are rules, but we don't define the system in this way. For starters, defining the system as ‘rule-based’ doesn’t make much sense if the leading state(s) can ignore the rules whenever they want to.” The United States was not an umpire above the fray. Umpires don’t overthrow governments, assassinate rulers or blockade countries. Every major power, past and present, including every permanent member of the Security Council, has on occasion significantly violated international law, or rejected the rulings of international courts, or even denied their authority. Jacques Chirac’s France, like Gerhard Schroeder’s Germany, opposed the invasion of Iraq on the grounds of opposing “unilateralism” and upholding the Security Council’s authority. Yet France itself flouted the same rule, participating in NATO’s unauthorized and illegal bombing of Serbia in 1999 to rescue Kosovo Albanians from genocide. As an American hawk observed, “if there ever was an international order of the kind they describe, then Europe undermined it in 1999, too.” In 1985, France sank the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior , agreeing to arbitration but refusing to submit to the International Court of Justice. The United States has not even ratified the international Law of the Sea that it urges China to observe. In the 1980s, when Nicaragua successfully sued America before the International Court of Justice over the mining of its harbors, Washington refused to pay reparations and refused to recognise the authority of the court. America’s UN ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick’s rationalization was inflammatory, and true: the ICJ, she claimed, is a “semi-legal” body that “nations sometimes accept and sometimes don’t.” Secondly, the “rules-based” ideal cannot be realized in future, because of the tragic nature of international life. There is no transcendental impartial authority that can enforce rules in a disinterested and consistent way. There may be global governance, but there is no global government, and when states feel enough pressure they will rely on themselves if they can. Rules themselves, like norms, can conflict. We have already noted a case in point: the collision between the authority of the Security Council and international humanitarian law against the targeting of civilians. Consider a provocative suggestion: sometimes states are right to act illegally. Our own Western states violate international law from time to time, and with justification. Though our preference is for international authorization, we have compelling interests that at times will be threatened, so compelling that we won’t hold them hostage to the cause of international consensus. Indeed, we may believe, with good conscience, that the welfare of world order itself obliges the occasional breaking of rules. The same President Obama who invokes the “rules-based order” carries out extrajudicial assassinations of Islamists, and not always with the prior consent of host countries or the Security Council, thus infringing both sovereignty and due process. In principle, he is right to do so. American citizens are not entitled to decamp to remote countries and, unmolested, urge their compatriots to slaughter other Americans. Armed Islamists from other countries, likewise, are not entitled to prepare aggression against American civilians without disruption. The states where they find sanctuary may be either too weak, or too passive, to apprehend them. In such circumstances, it is reasonable for America to treat armed adversaries as armed adversaries, without relying on others’ permission. “Rules-based,” however, is a stretch. The issue came into sharp focus for Britain’s former prime minister, David Cameron, who had urged China to buy in to the “rules-based world.” Confronted by the outrage of Syria’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, Cameron in the autumn of 2013 discovered powerful reasons to set formal rules aside. Making the case for punitive airstrikes against the regime, to punish and deter future WMD atrocities, Cameron insisted, “if we’re saying there can only be a response if the UN Security Council votes positively, we are in fact contracting out our foreign policy, our morality, to the potential of a Russian veto. Now I think that is a very misguided approach.” For a government that talks so often about the rule of law, all of a sudden morality and rules were distinct, and Britain could reject rules for the sake of other valued things. Neither is this apparent doctrine an isolated case. Unless we are claiming an Anglo-American privilege, if one major power can selectively refuse to submit to the Security Council or courts, why can’t others? Major states will invoke rules, and at their discretion, will break them. Theirs is a great-power privilege. This is the world we live in. Thirdly, attempting to bring about a world of consistent rules, enforced by an international authority, will harm the West’s ability to navigate its way ahead. It is not the case, as some argue , that better rules or reformed institutions will adequately address the problem. The problem is more intractable. The world is a tragic place, where not all good things go together, and cannot offer dilemma-free clarity and consistency. Even doing good or principled things may require accommodation with oppressive regimes. Recall the celebrated case of Chile’s dictator Augusto Pinochet, who was put under house arrest in London in 1999. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was widely condemned for her unyielding support for Pinochet. As her critics fail to note, when Thatcher’s Britain fought to recapture the Falkland Islands from Argentina in 1982, it relied on Chile’s covert assistance , in particular early warnings of air attacks on British naval forces, warnings provided by long-range radar. On the one day the radar were switched off for maintenance, two British transports were sunk. Pinochet played a vital role in Britain’s victory, and took grave risks to do so. Were we to take legalists’ advice, and commit to arresting and trying the leaders of oppressive regimes, how confident could we be of their help in future? At the dawn of the postwar era, Hans Morgenthau identified the legalist vision, that conceived of the world in absolute terms of peace, law and crime. This would make “compromise, the virtue of the old diplomacy, the treason of the new.” As Morgenthau’s critique implied, “rules” and “order” are distinct and conflicting concepts, just as “illegal” and “immoral” are concepts wrongly conflated. “Rules” suggest strictness, nonnegotiability and clarity, and above all a supreme umpire empowered to enforce the rules. Order, though, depends on compromise, negotiation and trade-offs, in the absence of a referee. Many of these require hard value judgements, in a world so messy that rules themselves can collide. My own experience is that, off the record, government officials agree that their master concept is a charade. Yet, they reason, it is still worth pursuing. Is it, though, wise to pursue the impossible? There is no value pretending the world is anything other than it manifestly is. Instead of wishfully invoking a fictitious order that even our own states are likely to reject at critical junctures, our decisionmakers should consider how to negotiate a rougher world, the compromises they are willing to make, the violations they will tolerate, the principles they will need to stretch. If there is a pathway to peace, it is not the competitive invocation of rules, or the lawyerizing of foreign policy. Neither can solve the inherent dilemmas of power and order. The alternative need not be “mere anarchy.” If there is a workable world order to be forged, it will be made primarily by diplomats who go beyond reading international documents. It will rely on compromise, adjustment, mutual concessions and a continually negotiated universe, backed by deterrence and material strength. That may not be an attractive world. It is at least a realistic one, in which prudent diplomacy has sometimes succeeded. It is also the only world we can have. It’s sad that it needs repeating, but we can’t have it all.

#### Internal to escalation in Diamond is prolif -- No impact to prolif

--aggression is rare, only in states with severe territorial threats

--most likely is expansion of existing disputes, but that has modest empirical effect

--accidents are disproven by seven decades of previous proliferation

--examples of accidents are all correlated with compellance, not prolif

--terrorism hasn’t happened, despite predictions

--no state would share weapons with non-state actors given obvious attribution

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Subsequent research has detailed the conditions under which new nuclear powers adopt these courses of action. Bell (2016) has argued that only those **few** new nuclear states who face **severe territorial threats**, such as Pakistan, opt for **aggress**ion, using their nuclear weapons as shields to deter nuclear and extensive conventional retaliation. Similarly drawing on Pakistan’s increased conflict propensity following its nuclear acquisition, Kapur’s (2007) research suggests that it is the **rare** combination of revisionist ambitions and conventional inferiority that leads new nuclear powers to pursue aggressive military policies toward their rivals. Importantly, while they offer different explanations, the two **studies concur** that aggression is a **fairly unlikely** effect of nuclear acquisition.

Meanwhile, according to Bell (2016), new nuclear states undertake an expansion of their foreign policy interests if their territory is not threatened and their relative material power is rising. Historically, such **expansions** have been **more** common than **aggression**: upon acquiring nuclear weapons, the US, South Africa, Israel and the Soviet Union all initiated several militarised disputes targeting states with whom they had no previous conflict (Bell and Miller, 2015: online appendix). Despite the mostly **low intensity** of these disputes, such **expansive** conflict behaviour can hardly be considered stabilising. Overall, then, new nuclear states seem to have a **moderately** destabilising influence on world politics: they initiate new disputes and take greater risks. At the same time, however, acquiring nuclear weapons **rarely** facilitates **severe** aggression.

Reconsidering nuclear accidents and nuclear terrorism

The notion that the spread of nuclear weapons would someday lead to tragic nuclear **accidents** or even nuclear **terrorism** has long been among proliferation pessimists’ foremost concerns. However, as reliable datasets on all (attempted) nuclear terrorism plots and on nuclear safety incidents in all nuclear states and proliferators have proved elusive, **empirical** scholarship has **not kept pace** with **theoretical** work. Hence, research has been limited to deductive analyses, buttressed by empirical illustrations. Even so, the **more sophisticated** of those **studies** have called the **pessimists**’ claims into question.

For instance, Cohen (2016, pp. 432–434) revealed that the vast majority of the gravest nuclear accidents that Sagan (1993, p. 9) points to as support for his logic occurred during global crises in 19**62** or 19**73**, when leaders sought to leverage their nuclear arsenals for **coercive bargaining**. It was, in other words, **not** organisational pathologies that raised the specter of accidental nuclear war, as Sagan holds, but rather the deliberate attempts at nuclear compellence. These accidents, then, represent the actual ‘effects’ of nuclear compellence: while the compellent threats did not affect the trajectory of either crises (Sechser and Fuhrmann, 2017, pp. 207, 220–224), they led to precarious nuclear safety incidents.

Other critics have rightly pointed out that, **seven decades** **in**to the nuclear age, the fact – however fortunate it is – that the world has **still no**t experienced a catastrophic fatal nuclear accident should **give proliferation pessimists pause** (Sechser, 2013, pp. 184–186). Obviously, the **bounded rationality** of such organisations alone does **not** make tragic nuclear accidents **nearly as likely** as the pessimists contend. Their fear, hence, seems to be **overstated**.

The **same** must probably be said about nuclear **terror**ism. Determinate predictions that a terrorist attack involving nuclear weapons was bound to occur **soon** (Allison, 2004, p. 15; Graham, 2008, p. VI) have **come and gone** without **anything** happening. Sceptical experts have argued that this outcome is **not surprising** at all, given the **formidable practical obstacles** such a terrorist scheme would encounter (Levi, 2009). Moreover, to the extent that fissile materials from nuclear weapons can now be **traced** back to specific state arsenals, the idea that a nuclear power could **willingly share** its arsenal with terrorists and hope to remain anonymous has been **challenged** as **lacking plausibility** (Lieber and Press, 2013).

#### Prolif deters and is key to cooperation with adversaries

Koch Foundation 17 (Charles Koch foundation, December 4, 2017, an American conservative and libertarian public policy think tank based in Chicago.) https://bigthink.com/charles-koch-foundation/a-safer-world-is-one-where-americas-enemies-hold-onto-their-nuclear-weapons

The United States tries hard to keep nuclear weapons away from countries it considers foes. Given how close the world came to nuclear armageddon during the Cold War, and recent threats from so-called “rogue states" like North Korea, it may seem like an essential goal. But America's strategy for thwarting nuclear proliferation may be reaching a point where the costs outweigh the benefits.

The first nuclear bomb was exploded the same year as the invention of the microwave. Nuclear technology is no longer new, and therefore more difficult to keep from spreading. (Imagine trying to keep microwave technology under wraps all these years.) Developing a nuclear bomb from scratch, however, is much more costly than reverse engineering a microwave.

But snuffing out a country's nuclear capabilities is perhaps even more costly. It requires [destroying]~~crippling~~ a country's economy so its government can't invest in nuclear research (of course, its innocent citizens bear the brunt of that burden). It requires destroying factories and laboratories

with aggressive bombing or cyber-sabotage campaigns. And it can even require kidnapping or killing scientists and engineers who conduct nuclear research.

Iran, for example, is seeking nuclear technology while coldly aware of the United States' military superiority. Likewise, the rest of the world is aware of America's massive nuclear arsenal—and of the fact that it's capable of annihilating any country on Earth at a moment's notice

This kind of behavior toward other countries, needless to say, won't engender kindness and cooperation. North Korea knows that developing a small nuclear arsenal has made the U.S. much more hesitant to invade its borders. It's a lesson Pyongyang learned recently from countries without nuclear weapons—Iraq, Libya, Syria—that were subsequently invaded by the U.S. So it makes perfect sense that America's enemies would be scrambling to develop nuclear weapons—not so they can fire them, but so they can also enjoy the benefits of deterrence.

So the question becomes: How often is the U.S. willing to wage preventive wars, and with how many countries does it really want this kind of relationship?

#### Their evidence is biased punditry---the empirical record disproves escalation

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Both the classic proliferation optimism-pessimism debate and the recent empirical scholarship have studied the spread of nuclear weapons largely through a systemic lens: they have focused on how further nuclear proliferation affects international stability. For the **world as a whole**, as we have seen, the effects of **prolif**eration must be described as **(only) moderately** destabilising.

Crucially, however, these moderate overall effects are distributed unequally across states in the international system. As Kroenig’s work (2009, 2010, 2014b) stresses, states that are capable of projecting conventional military power over long distances are most affected by the consequences of further proliferation, regardless of whether their rivals or allies build the bombs. If rivals get nuclear weapons, then such power-projecting states lose their ability to coerce and invade these rivals. If junior allies acquire an arsenal, power-projecting states lose sway over the ally’s policies because they can no longer manipulate its military dependence. In contrast, states with little or no power-projection capability are affected by proliferation only if it occurs in their own region, but have little to lose from proliferation in other parts of the world because they did not have the capability to intervene in far-away countries in the first place and do not extend security guarantees to nations in other regions.

Given these differential effects, it is no surprise that regional military powers like France, West Germany and China have often refused to sacrifice economic benefits to prevent proliferation (Kroenig, 2014b; Müller, 1990), whereas nonproliferation has been at the forefront of US grand strategy throughout the nuclear age (Gavin, 2015). Equipped with the strongest conventional forces and the ambition to make its influence felt in every corner of the globe, the US has had the most to lose from the spread of nuclear arsenals: rivals with nuclear weapons might be better able to resist pressure from Washington, bolster other US adversaries or engage in aggression against the US or its allies and partners, while nuclear-armed allies may act more independently of, or even thwart, American interests (Bell, 2016).

Facing such daunting scenarios, the US has consistently opposed proliferation by foes and friends alike. To prevent others from building nuclear weapons, Washington has wielded all tools of US statecraft, ranging from security guarantees (Gavin, 2015), vigorous bilateral diplomacy (Schneider, 2016; Miller, 2014a) and mandatory US sanctions (Miller, 2014b) to collective technology denial (Burr, 2014) and even sustained collusion with its chief adversary, the Soviet Union (Coe and Vaynman, 2015). Remarkably, when these preventive efforts failed, the US more than once cut secret deals committing the new nuclear power to forgo nuclear testing so as to avoid, at least, triggering further proliferation (Miller and Rabinowitz, 2015).

Today, virtually every policymaker, official and **pundit** in the US intuitively opposes the spread of nuclear weapons as extremely dangerous, no matter where it occurs (Carus, 2016; Gavin, 2012b). The same can be said about many officials and experts from states that are US allies or close partners (Gibbons, 2015; Schwartz, 2014). Yet as we have seen, such **alarmist appraisals** are **not borne out** by the **empirical record** about how nuclear weapons have influenced international stability, but appear to be a **consequence** of the **differential effects** of proliferation. Thus, these **excessively concerned** voices do **not** abstract themselves from the **specific policy interests** of their states (Betts, 2001, pp. 64–65): They see an international order underwritten by US military primacy and American political leadership as preferable to any alternative.

Every official who shares that outlook must view proliferation as a major threat because it sharply limits Washington’s global influence and undermines the US-led international security order. Scholars, however, should be transparent about the fact that this appraisal is **coloured by specific policy preferences**. In contrast, an **equidistant** assessment of the available scholarship on nuclear proliferation can only conclude that, for the world as a whole, the spread of nuclear weapons appears to be destabilising, but **only moderately so**.

### 1NC – DPT

#### Democratic peace is false and unsustainable - new tech, non-state actors, military autonomy, and eroding institutional constrains undermine DPT

Philip Potter, 16 - Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia, "Four Trends That Could Put the Democratic Peace at Risk," *Political Violence at a Glance*, 10-14-2016

The point is that it’s not democracy alone that matters. Rather it is the limits that these regimes can put on their leaders to force them to be careful and selective when doing things like making threats and starting fights. This also means it’s not a baked-in advantage that a democracy can take lightly – even well-meaning leaders in democracies have every incentive to figure out how to slip these constraints. Limits yield long-term advantages, but in the immediate term they tie leaders’ hands, preventing them from engaging with the international problems or opportunities that they feel they should.

There are four trends that indicate this process is well under way and is putting the “democratic advantage” at risk.

Militaries are less closely tied to voters

Democratic advantages in conflict are commonly traced to the nature of democratic militaries and their relationship with political power. Going all the way back to Kant, there has been the notion that societies with citizen soldiers and the vote are not going to support unnecessary wars when they are going to bear the costs. The problem is that Kant’s vision isn’t what modern armies look like, and they’re intentionally moving away from the target rather than toward it.

In the US, military service is all-volunteer, and the recruits are increasingly drawn from concentrated segments of society. This divorces the consequences of fighting from the day-to-day experience of most voters. Increasingly, this is a limited force supplemented by private sector contractors, placing even more distance between the individual with the gun and the democratic process.

The emphases on covert operations, Special Forces, and technological superiority further water down the link between society and soldiers. This was, in fact, part of the point of moving to an all-volunteer force and one of the rationales for investments in stealth, information technology, and precision guided munitions, e.g. the precision strike complex. By replacing bodies with dollars, planners have consistently sought to increase the flexibility that the US has in its use of force. In the immediate term, that goal makes sense – it allows policy makers to do what they believe needs to be done without having to worry about a fickle public. But over the long term, it has the potential to lead to less caution and selectivity when engaging in conflicts.

Adversaries are proliferating and changing

The emergence of non-state actors as a primary threat has further loosened constraints on leaders. The shift from the possibility of total war with the Soviet Union to myriad smaller-scale challenges accelerated the transition from a mass military to an elite, highly specialized force more isolated from society. Compounding the challenge, this type of adversary and conflict leads to more significant informational advantages for leaders, which make democratic constraints less binding. Citizens and political opposition are always playing catch-up with the executive when it comes to foreign policy information, but the challenge is harder when the adversaries are less familiar, the engagements shorter, and the issues more complex.

Technology is reducing constraint

New technologies are driving citizens and political opposition ever further out of the loop. The extraordinary rise of ~~unmanned—~~autonomous vehicles in combat reduce the risk of casualties and extends the range for projecting force. This has undeniable strategic advantages, but there is less visibility and, accordingly, less accountability associated with the use of this technology. This means leaders worry less about the ex-post constraints and costs that typically come with casualties.

Institutions and practices increasingly favor the president

The recent nuclear agreement with Iran was an executive agreement rather than a treaty. This is the norm – most international agreements are now unilateral actions of the president. A polarized Congress is ever more cautious in its exercise of what little foreign policy power it has; two years into the campaign against Islamic State and Congress still hasn’t weighed in one way or the other. In the US this is an expansion of the widely accepted argument that there are two presidencies – a constrained one in domestic politics and a relatively autonomous one abroad. What’s unappreciated is that this growing presidential autonomy (which may well be needed to run a Superpower) also decreases constraint and with it the foreign policy “advantages” we associate with democracy.

While these advantages are real, they are also fragile. Key institutional constraints – such as a robust political opposition and a knowledgeable citizenry – are susceptible to seemingly minor changes in institutions and/or practices that loosen the limits of leaders’ foreign policy decisions. As technologies advance, threats shift, and institutional constraints wax and wane, the foreign policy advantages embedded within democratic systems may begin to erode. The potential for such a shift is a possibility that should not be taken lightly.

#### Experiment based analysis and new regression stats prove there is no causal link between democracy and peace.

Bakker 20 (Femke E. Bakker, Femke E. Bakker is Assistant Professor Political Science. She studies politics and international relations from political psychological perspective. Her main areas of interest include microfoundations of IR theory, democratic peace theory, political behaviour, political leadership, beliefs systems, liberal values and meditation. She teaches in the field of political psychology, international relations and research methods, “The microfoundations of normative democratic peace theory: Experiments in the US, Russia and China, Political Research Exchange,” 2:1, DOI: 10.1080/2474736X.2020.1753084, 4-20-2020)//ILake-NC

The microfoundations, the essential building blocks of democratic peace theory, which are used untested as empirical facts, do not find any support when tested along with alternative hypotheses in a comparative framework. These are important findings for democratic peace theory. Earlier experimental studies of the democratic peace (Bell and Quek 2018; Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz 1993; Geva and Hanson 1999; Johns and Davies 2012; Maoz and Russett 1993; Mintz and Geva 1993; Rousseau 2005; Tomz and Weeks 2013) have instrumentally assumed liberal norms to be present and of influence within liberal democracies. They did not measure whether these were actually present, and they did not test whether they indeed influenced as hypothesized. Although it is assumed throughout the democratic peace literature that liberal norms are of influence on the willingness to attack, in particular among decision-makers of liberal democracies, this research shows that there is no evidence to support that assumption. The assumptions that liberal-democracy does something special with its citizens that makes them ‘morally more advanced’ (Doyle 1983a, 1983b, 1986; Kant [1795] 2013; Maoz and Russett 1993; Rawls 1999) and that would make them subsequently more peace prone, is empirically simply not supported. Also, regime-type showed to be of no influence on the willingness to attack, or the willingness for other relevant policy options, of decision-makers in all three samples alike. Regime-type did thus not influence decision-makers of liberal democracies significantly, as is expected by democratic peace theory.

#### DPT is a statistical artifact---empirical analysis.

Michael **Mousseau 18**. Professor @ UCF, PhD PoliSci @ Binghamton. Conflict Management and Peace Science, “Grasping the scientific evidence: The contractualist peace supersedes the democratic peace”, Vol 35(2) 175-192, SagePub.

A weighty controversy has enveloped the study of international conflict: whether the democratic peace, the observed dearth of militarized conflict between democratic nations, may be spurious and accounted for by institutionalized market ‘‘contractualist’’ economy. I have offered theory and evidence that economic norms, specifically contractualist economy, appear to account for both the explanans (democracy) and the explanandum (peace) in the democratic peace research program (Mousseau, 2009, 2012a, 2013; see also Mousseau et al., 2013a, b). Five studies have responded with several arguments for why we should continue to believe that democracy causes peace (Dafoe, 2011; Dafoe and Russett, 2013; Dafoe et al., 2013; Ray, 2013; Russett, 2010). Resolution of this controversy is fundamental to the study and practice of international relations. The observation of democratic peace is ‘‘the closest thing we have to an empirical law’’ in the study of global politics (Levy, 1988: 662), and carries the profound implication that the spread of democracy will end war. New economic norms theory, on the other hand, yields the contrary implication that universal democracy will not end war. Instead, it is market-oriented development that creates a culture of contracting, and this culture legitimates democracy within nations and causes peace among them. The policy implications could hardly be more divergent: to end war (and support democracy), the contractualist democracies should promote the economies of nations at risk (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2015; Meierrieks, 2012; Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013; Nieman, 2015). In the literature are five factual claims for why we should continue to believe that democracy causes peace: (1) an assertion that in three of the five studies that overturned the democratic peace (Mousseau, 2013; Mousseau et al., 2013a, b), the insignificance of democracy controlling for contractualist economy is due to the treatment of missing data for contractualist economy (Dafoe et al., 2013, henceforth DOR); (2) a claim of error in the measure for conflict (DOR) that appears in one of the five studies that overturned the democratic peace (Mousseau, 2013); (3) an alleged misinterpretation of an interaction term that appears in one of the five studies (Mousseau, 2009) that overturned the democratic peace, along with in inference of democratic causality from an interaction of democracy with contractualist economy (Dafoe and Russett, 2013; DOR); (4) a claim of reverse causality, of democracy causing contractualist economy (Ray, 2013); and (5) a report of multiple regressions with most said to show democratic significance after controlling for contractualist economy (DOR). This study investigates all five of these factual claims. I begin by addressing the issue of missing data by constructing two entirely new measures for contractualist economy. I then take up possible measurement error in the dependent variable by reporting tests using both my own (Mousseau, 2013) and DOR’s measures for conflict. Next, I disaggregate the data to investigate a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy. I then examine the evidence for reverse causality, and scrutinize the competing test models to pinpoint the exact factors that can account for differences in test outcomes. The results are consistent across all tests: there is no credible evidence supporting democracy as a cause of peace. Using DOR’s base model, the impact of democracy is zero regardless of how contractualist economy or interstate conflict is measured. There is no misinterpreted interaction term in any study that has overturned the democratic peace, and the disaggregation of the data yields no support for a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy. Ray’s (2013) evidence for reverse causality from democracy to contractualist economy is shown to be based on an erroneous research design. And of DOR’s 120 separate regressions that consider contractualist economy, 116 contain controversial measurement and specification practices; the remaining four are analyses of all (fatal and non-fatal) disputes, where the correlation of democracy with peace is limited to mixedeconomic dyads, those where one state has a contractualist economy and the other does not, a subset that includes only 27% of dyads from 1951 to 2001, including only 50% of democratic dyads. It is further shown that this marginal peace is a statistical artifact since it does not exist among neighbors where everyone has an equal opportunity to fight. The results of this study should not be surprising, as they merely corroborate the present state of knowledge. This is because, while DOR ardently assert that four alleged errors, when corrected, each independently save the democratic peace proposition—multiple imputation, the exclusion of ongoing dispute years, an interaction term, and their alternative measure for contractualist economy—they never actually report any clear-cut evidence in support of their claims. One issue not addressed is Dafoe and Russett’s (2013) challenge to Mousseau et al. (2013a) on the grounds that our reported insignificance of democracy is not significant. Like the four claims of error made by DOR addressed here, Dafoe and Russett (2013) made this charge without supporting it. Mousseau et al. (2013b) then investigated it and showed that it too has no support. This issue appears resolved, as Russett and colleagues (DOR) did not raise it again. Nor have DOR or anyone else disputed the overturning of the democratic peace as reported in Mousseau (2012a), which has not been contested with any assertion, supported or unsupported. The implications of this study are far from trivial: the observation of democratic peace is a statistical artifact, seemingly explained by economic conditions. If scientific knowledge progresses and the field of interstate conflict processes is to abide by the scientific rules of evidence, then we must stop describing democracy as a ‘‘known’’ cause or correlate of peace, and stop tossing in a variable for democracy, willy-nilly, in quantitative analyses of international conflict; the variable to replace it is contractualist economy. If nations want to advance peace abroad, the promotion of democracy will not achieve it: the policy to replace it is the promotion of economic opportunity The economic norms account for how contractualist economy can cause both democracy and peace has been explicated in numerous prior studies and need not be repeated here (Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013). An abundance of prior studies have also corroborated various novel predictions of the theory in wider domains (Ungerer, 2012), and no one has disputed the multiple reports that contractualist economy is the strongest non-trivial predictor of peace both within (Mousseau, 2012b) and between nations (Mousseau, 2013; see also Nieman, 2015). The only matter in controversy is whether democracy has any observable impact on peace between nations after consideration of contractualist economy. My investigation begins below with the allegation of measurement error.

#### Autocratic Peace Theory is true – reject your cognitive bias to think otherwise

Gartzke and Wesiger 13, Erik, and Alex Weisiger. "Permanent friends? Dynamic difference and the democratic peace." International Studies Quarterly 57.1 (2013): 171-185. (Professor at UPenn in Political Science)//Elmer

The “autocratic peace” involves a class of arguments about the conflictual consequences of regime similarity and difference. Theories disagree over whether demo- cratic and autocratic relations are distinct or equivalent. Early studies of the autocratic peace typically focused on certain geographic regions. Despite having little democracy, low levels of economic development, arbitrary national borders, and widespread civil conflict, Africa experiences surprisingly little interstate war. Several stud- ies attribute the “African peace” to historical norms and to the strategic behavior of insecure leaders who recog- nize that challenging existing borders invites continental war while encouraging secessionist movements risks reci- procal meddling in the country’s own domestic affairs (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989, 1990). 6 How- ever, these arguments fail to address tensions between individual (state, leader) interests and social goods. The security dilemma implies precisely that leaders act aggres- sively despite lacking revisionist objectives (Jervis 1978). Initial statistical evidence of an autocratic peace emerged in a negative form with the observation that mixed democratic – autocratic dyads are more conflict prone than either jointly democratic or jointly autocratic dyads (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre 1997). Studies have sought systematic evidence for or against an autocratic peace. Oren and Hays (1997) evalu- ate several data sets, finding that autocracies are less war prone than democracy – autocracy pairs. Indeed, they find that socialist countries with advanced industrialized econ- omies are more peaceful than democracies. Werner (2000) finds an effect of political similarity that coexists with the widely recognized effect of joint democracy. She attributes the result to shared preferences arising from a reduced likelihood of disputes over domestic politics. Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) break down the broad category of autocracy into multiple subgroups and find evidence that shared autocratic type (personalistic dictatorships, single-party regimes, or military juntas) reduces conflict, although the observed effects are less pronounced than for joint democracy. Henderson (2002) goes further by arguing that there is no empirically verifi able democratic peace. Instead, political dissimilarity causes conflict. Souva (2004) argues and finds that simi- larity of both political and economic institutions encour- ages peace. In the most sophisticated analysis to date, Bennett (2006) finds a robust autocratic peace, though the effect is smaller than for joint democracy and limited to coherent autocratic regimes. Petersen (2004), in con- trast, uses an alternate categorization of autocracy and finds no support for the claim that similarity prevents or limits conflict. Still, the bulk of evidence suggests that similar polities are associated with relative peace, even among nondemocracies. The autocratic peace poses unique challenges for demo- cratic peace theories. Given that the democratic peace highlights apparently unique characteristics of joint democracy, many explanations are predicated on attributes found only in democratic regimes. An autocratic peace implies that scholars should focus on corollaries or conse- quences of shared regime type, in addition to, or perhaps even instead of democracy. In this context, arguments about democratic norms (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), improved democratic signaling ability (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998, 1999, 2001), the peculiar incentives imposed on leaders by democratic institutions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003), and democratic learning (Cederman 2001a) all invite additional scrutiny. While it is theoretically possible that a democratic peace and an autocratic peace could arise from independent causal processes, logical ele- gance and the empirical similarities inherent in shared regime type provide cause to explore theoretical argu- ments that spring from regime similarity in general.

#### Collapse of democracy’s inevitable – transition to Chinese autocracy solves.

Schiavenza ’17 (Matt; 1/19/17; Senior Content Manager at Asia Society; Asia Society; “Could China's System Replace Democracy?”; <http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/could-chinas-system-replace-democracy>; DOA: 12/6/17)

Two decades later, this notion seems increasingly unfeasible. **Democracy is** **struggling**. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies has **fallen since** reaching a peak in **2006**. The world’s non-democracies, meanwhile, have become **more authoritarian**. Russia, once a tentative democracy, is now under the control of Vladimir Putin, a **nationalist leader** whose regime has centralized power, targeted opposition journalists, and seized sovereign territory of other countries. Then there’s China. For years, conventional wisdom stated that as the People’s Republic grew more prosperous, the country would naturally transition to a liberal democracy. But this prediction — dubbed the “China Fantasy” by the author James Mann — has not happened. If anything, China’s economic success has only **further solidified the C**hinese **C**ommunist **P**arty: The current ruler, Xi Jinping, is widely considered to be the country’s **most powerful** since Deng Xiaoping. Democracy’s ill health has also **infected the U**nited **S**tates **and Europe**. The president of Hungary, a formerly Communist state whose accession to the European Union in 2004 was a triumph for the West, has sought to “**end liberal democracy**” in his country by clamping down on press freedom and judicial independence. These trends are also evident in neighboring Poland. Far-right parties — like the United Kingdom Independence Party, the orchestrator of Brexit — have **gained popularity** across the continent. During his successful campaign for president of the United States, Donald Trump expressed, at best, an indifference toward democratic norms and ideals. Trump called for his opponent, Hillary Clinton, to be imprisoned, raised false accusations of voter fraud, threatened legal action against the media, and refused to commit to honoring the results of the election. Trump has repeatedly professed his **admiration for Putin**, Russia’s dictatorial leader, for being “**a strong leader**”; as president-elect, he **praised the Kazakh dictator** Nursultan Nazarbayev for “achieving a miracle” in his country. Where Did Democracy Go Wrong? According to Brian Klaas, author of the new book The Despot’s Accomplice: How the West Is Aiding and Abetting the Decline of Democracy, there are **three main reasons**. One is **American hypocrisy**, or, as Klaas puts it, the “Saudi effect.” President George W. Bush made democracy promotion an explicit centerpiece of American foreign policy during his second inaugural speech in 2005, yet the following year when Hamas won democratic elections to govern the Gaza Strip, the U.S. refused to honor the results. And as Washington invested billions of dollars and thousands of American lives to **impose democracy by force** in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government forged a military deal with Uzbekistan’s tyrannical regime and maintained a close relationship with Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s most repressive countries. A second reason for democracy’s decline is the **resurgence of China and Russia**. As China’s economic rise continued without interruption in the quarter-century after Tiananmen Square, observers began wondering whether the Chinese miracle was **because of**, rather than in spite of, **its autocratic government**. (The slower growth of India, a messy democracy, only seemed to strengthen this argument.) And while Russia’s economic fortunes in the Putin era have lived and died with the price of oil, there’s little question that the country is **wealthier and more stable** than it had been under Boris Yeltsin. The success of both countries, sustainable or not, seemed to indicate that democracy and growth were not necessarily co-dependent. Klaas’ third reason is the **weaknesses embedded in** modern **American democracy** itself. Last year’s presidential election was a multi-billion dollar, 18-month saga that resulted in the election of a candidate who had **never served in government** or the military and one, incidentally, who earned **three million fewer votes** than his main opponent. “Not many people looked at our election and thought that they were missing out,” Klaas told Asia Society. “I even heard a Thai general say that if ‘democracy means Donald Trump, **we don’t want it**.’” What About China's System? There’s **no doubt** that liberal democracy is in crisis. But the next question — whether plausible alternatives exist — is less certain. Consider China. The country’s ability to push through major infrastructure projects, such as a nationwide high-speed rail network, without political obstruction has dazzled Westerners frustrated at the gridlock endemic to American politics. In a 2010 episode of Meet the Press, the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman famously admitted to fantasizing that the U.S. “could be China for a day” simply as a means to get things done. Daniel Bell, a professor of political science at Shandong University in eastern China, has written extensively about the meritocratic advantages of China’s political system. Chinese leaders must pass a series of examinations and negotiate a complex bureaucracy before achieving national power. Xi Jinping may have benefited from nepotism: His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a key Mao-era official. But the Chinese president also accumulated experience as the governor of two major Chinese provinces and a stint as vice president. This, Bell argues, has given Xi legitimacy in spite of never having to face voters. “I disagree with the view that there’s only one morally legitimate way of selecting leaders: one person, one vote,” Bell said in an appearance at Asia Society in 2015. State-run media in China spun the chaotic outcome of the Arab Spring uprisings as an example of democracy’s inherent flaws. The election of Donald Trump only served to further reinforce this notion. “I remember talking to the Chinese ambassador, and he made a crack about how in the U.S. you can be a nobody one day and the next day rise to power,” said Isaac Stone Fish, a senior fellow at Asia Society, “and you can’t do that in China because you have to go through all these different levels and rise through the system.” Bell acknowledges that the Chinese system has serious drawbacks. The prohibition of free speech, ban on political opposition, and absence of an independent judiciary mean that there are no checks against official abuse of power, something that has emerged as a major crisis in the past decade in the country. The high-profile anti-corruption campaign launched by President Xi has reduced visible signs of excess, such as lavish banquets and fast cars. But critics believe that the campaign also serves as cover for Xi’s sidelining of rivals within the Communist Party. Defenders of China’s Communist Party point to the country’s near-four-decade run of economic growth as proof that the system works. But in structural terms, the modern Party is little different from the one that, under Chairman Mao, presided over widespread political persecution, a deadly famine, and a disastrous period of social upheaval known as the Cultural Revolution. Even after Deng Xiaoping reversed Mao’s policies and adopted a pragmatic economic approach, the Party has still implemented policies whose consequences threaten stability and prosperity. The One Child Policy, adopted in 1980 without public debate, created a demographic imbalance that, three decades later, has prematurely reduced China’s working-age population. Even the much-vaunted record of economic growth is built on a shaky foundation of debt-fueled investment. "There have been 30 instances in the postwar period when a country's debt increased by 40 percent over a 5-year horizon," Ruchir Sharma, an economics expert at Morgan Stanley, said of China in an appearance at Asia Society in December. “And in 100 percent of these instances, the country got into a deep economic trouble within the next five years." China has taken steps to systematize its government by introducing a mandatory retirement age for senior officials and establishing term limits for its leaders. The Communist Party’s Standing Committee of the Politburo, a seven-man body that stands atop China’s government pyramid, is designed to divide the responsibilities of government and ensure no one individual assumes too much power. The behavior of Xi Jinping over the past three years, though, has raised questions whether these norms are durable. Xi has assumed positions within the Chinese government once shared by fellow leaders and has weakened Li Keqiang, his prime minister, by denying him the office’s traditional stewardship of economic policy. Xi has abetted and re-established a cult of personality, something explicitly discouraged in China after the Maoist era, by encouraging the singing of songs in his name. And, as the Wall Street Journal recently reported, there are questions that Xi may not name a successor at this fall’s 19th Party Congress in order to continue as president beyond the customary 10-year term. The Consequences of Democracy's Decline China, for what it’s worth, has never claimed that its system of government was universally applicable. In contrast to the United States or the Soviet Union, Beijing has never tried to install its system in a foreign country by force. Even still, democracy’s decline may prove advantageous to China in other ways. For one, it would weaken the democratic movement in Hong Kong, which has vied with pro-Beijing elements for political control of the Chinese territory, and deter would-be Chinese dissidents from challenging Communist Party rule on the mainland. In addition, Klaas argues, the American absence of support for democracy leaves a vacuum in emerging states that Washington’s geopolitical rivals in Moscow and Beijing might fill. “The ‘America First’ mentality, or the mentality that it’s not our business, makes the mistake that thinking that the withdrawal of Western influence means there’s self-determination,” says Klaas. “ [But what it means is] that China and Russia control things. It’s not something where if the West leaves, then, say, Malawi will be free to choose. It’s a global foreign policy battle, and the West’s losses are China's and Russia’s gains.” Before the U.S. can promote democracy overseas, though the country may need to firm up support for it at home. A Harvard study conducted in November found that just 19 percent of American millennials believe that a military takeover is not legitimate in democracy compared to 45 percent of those older. 26 percent of millennials likewise feel that choosing leaders through free elections is “unimportant,” a sentiment shared by just 14 percent of Baby Boomers. “A lot of people growing up now don’t understand what it’s like not to live in a free society in the West,” says Klaas. “That, combined with the "end of history," assumed that democracy is the natural way of things. “In fact, democracy is the least organic and least natural way we’ve had."

### 1NC – Backsliding

#### Modeling fails and causes nuclear war – backsliding solves

Muller, director of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, professor of International Relations at Goethe University, 15

(Harald, Democracy, Peace, and Security, Lexington Books pp. 44-49)

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). turns the issue upside down: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to act aggressively against non-democracies. We note that—apart from self-defense where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——democratic states go to war—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold international law (or their own interpretation thereof), to prevent anarchy through state failure, to “save strangers” when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to promote democracy. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War other than for self-defense thus can only be fought by democracies against non-democracies because against a fellow democracy justification would fail. Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, major powers with the capability to project power into the region of concern. The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a fairly ambivalent relation with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, it is predictable that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct a multi- pronged nuclear arms race (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of Serbia in 1914— a ‘spoiler” state with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove Europe into World War I a century ago. and it contains a nuclear component. To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation needs quite a lot of optimism Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for a worsening of relationships. While democracy is useful in excluding certain conflict dyads in the whole complex, such as India and the United States. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies. To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less moral-emotional inclination to demonize non-democracies once they dis agree, and to feel a missionary drive to turn them democratic. This might exacerbate the existing, more interest-based conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, and it creates fears in the hearts of autocratic leaders that they might be up for democratization sooner or later. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace tends to produce, in turn, only exacerbate these fears as democracies tend to be rich, well organized, and powerful and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to exacerbate the security dilemma which exists between democracies and non-democracics an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in our political systems. But democratic militancy is the Siamese twin of democratic peace as the Bush Administration unambiguously taught us (Gels et al. 2013: Müllcr 2014b).

### 1NC – Nigeria

#### Democracy causes Nigerian state collapse and civil war

Dr. Moses E. Ochonu 19, Cornelius Vanderbilt Chair in History and Professor of African History at Vanderbilt University, PhD and MA in African History from the University of Michigan, BA in History from Bayero University, Graduate Certificate in Conflict Management from Liscomb University, “Why Liberal Democracy is a Threat to Nigeria’s Stability”, Logos: A Journal of Modern Society & Culture, May 2019, http://logosjournal.com/2019/liberal-democracy-is-a-threat-to-nigerias-stability/

In 2015, Nigeria, a country of about 190 million, spent $625 million to conduct federal and local elections. By comparison, India, with a population of 1.2 billion, spent $600 million on its 2015 election, according to figures released by the Electoral Commission of India (ECI).[1]

In 2019, the election budget of Nigeria’s Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) rose to $670 million. This represents about 2.5 percent of Nigeria’s $28.8 billion budget for 2019, a portion of which is being financed through borrowing. To put the electoral spending in context, more than half of the country subsists on about a dollar a day, and the country recently acquired the dubious distinction of being named the poverty capital of the world, with more people living in extreme poverty there than in any other country.[2] Key infrastructures and services such as roads, railway, electricity, water supply, healthcare, and education are severely inadequate, requiring urgent investments and interventions.

Election-related expenditure is expected to rise in the near future as INEC implements a wider slate of digital technologies to combat manipulation and improve the integrity of the electoral process. For comparison, Nigeria typically devotes about 7 percent of its budget to education. And yet Nigeria continues to maintain a four-year election cycle, with smaller by-elections occurring in between. This electoral calendar guarantees that about $1 billion is spent on elections every four years. As the electoral price tag has grown, democratic dividends have plummeted.

Nigeria’s predicament is a microcosm of the phenomenon of rising financial costs of elections in Africa and diminishing returns on democracy. Across the continent, the cost of electoral democracy is increasing and threatens the delivery of social goods. As African countries battle myriad socioeconomic challenges, the question needs to posed: is it wise for these countries to continue to spend a large percentage of their revenue every four or five years on a political ritual with fewer and fewer positive socioeconomic consequences for their populations? Is this expensive, periodic democratic ritual called election worth its price?

It is not only the monetary cost of elections that now threatens to defeat their purpose and engender disillusionment and, along with disillusionment, the erosion of trust in the state and its ability to produce and distribute public goods. The social cost of periodic elections has been arguably greater, depleting, with each election cycle, the residual stability of the state and the credibility of its institutions.

Elections conducted in Nigeria since the return of civilian rule in 1999 have brought with them anxiety, tension, death, violence, and dangerous rhetoric that, taken together, have frayed the national political and social fabric. Elections have widened fissures and intensified preexisting primordial cleavages.

I can recall no electoral cycle since at least 2003 that was not been accompanied by fears of Nigeria’s disintegration or at the very least the acceleration of its demise. In 2007 and 2011, post-election violence claimed hundreds of lives in Northern Nigeria as supporters of then candidate Muhammadu Buhari rioted after his loss. In the 2019 presidential and national assembly elections, at least 46 people were reported to have died from election-related violence. In the state assembly and governorship elections two weeks later on March 9, 2019, another 10 people died across five states in what the Sunday Tribune newspaper described in its headline as “another bloody election.”[3]

Two riders below the same Sunday Tribune headline encapsulate the turbulent character of Nigerian elections. One was “Thugs, vote buyers, arsonists take over on election day”; the other was “Nigerians condemn militarization of elections in Rivers, Bayelsa, Kwara, Akwa Ibom, Benue,” a reference to the government’s deployment of soldiers and other military assets to opposition strongholds before and during the election. The involvement of soldiers and other military personnel in the election was a brazen violation of Nigeria’s Electoral Act, an action which many observers interpreted as the incumbent administration’s effort to use its might to manipulate the election in states held by the opposition.

Every election cycle in Nigeria sees massive, fear-induced demographic mobility as members of different ethnic groups and religions relocate to areas considered dominated by their kinsmen and co-religionists to await the conclusion of elections that often degenerate into communal clashes especially in the volatile north of the country.

Periodic national elections have thus worsened Nigeria’s notoriously frail union and caused apathy and discontent. The Nigerian people, the major stakeholders in Nigeria’s democracy, have grown weary of being periodically endangered and rendered pawns in an elaborate elite ritual with little or no consequence for their lives.

Electoral aftermaths have not improved economic conditions or strengthened the capacity of citizens to hold elected leaders accountable. Moreover, as I shall discuss shortly, the familiar abstract freedoms that democracy, lubricated by periodic elections, can confer on citizens who participate in such exercises, have eluded Nigerians.

The result has been noticeable apathy represented most poignantly by voter turnout, which declined from a peak of 69.1 percent in 2003 to 46.3 percent in 2015 and to about 35 percent in 2019. In the same 2019 election cycle, turnout declined to less than 20 percent in the governorship and state assembly elections, with many Nigerians on social media stating that they had lost faith in the electoral process and that the official results of the presidential elections two weeks earlier had shown that their votes would not count towards the declared outcome.

Voter apathy alone is not an indication of democratic disillusionment but it can portend or indicate something more devastating: diminishing trust in the state, its institutions, and its processes.

Such a trust deficit exists already and it predated the return of civilian rule in 1999 after about two decades of military dictatorship. However, by all theoretical formulations, such a cumulative loss of confidence in the transactional sociopolitical contract between the state and citizens should be corrected by the democratic ideals of voting, representation, and accountability. This has not happened in Nigeria. In fact, the opposite scenario is visible: a negative correlation between successive electoral cycles and citizens’ trust in the Nigerian state. Therein lay the paradoxical consequences of democratic practice in Nigeria.

If elections are increasingly burdensome as they have become in Nigeria, the corrective potential of democracy, broadly speaking, is lost. Citizens consequently lose faith in the state and resort to self-help, including criminal self-help. That is how states collapse. Nigeria is not far off this possibility.

In Nigeria, recent political realities reveal a blind spot of pro-democracy advocacy: without the modulating effect of decentralization, sustained economic growth, a growing, secure middle class, and a literate, hopeful poor, liberal democracy can do and has done more damage than good. Liberal democracy has ironically become both an incubator and protector of mediocrity, corruption, and bad governance. The overarching casualty has been Nigeria’s very stability.

#### Nigerian instability escalates to global great power war

Charles A. Ray 21, Member of the Board of Trustees and Chair of the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Former U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Zimbabwe, “Does Africa Matter to the United States?”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1/11/2021, https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/01/does-africa-matter-to-the-united-states/

Africa matters in terms of size, population, and rate of population growth. It is the continent currently most affected by climate change but is also a continent that can have a devastating impact on climate change globally because of the importance of the Congo Basin rainforest, which is the second-largest absorber of heat after the Amazon rainforest. The destruction of this important ecosystem could further accelerate global warming. As residents of the region come into increasing contact with the animals of the rainforest, this region could be the origin of the world’s next viral pandemic. Violent extremism and terrorism are increasing in Africa, and while now mostly localized, the danger has the potential to spread beyond the continent. Crises—natural and man-made—cause massive relocations of populations, both on the continent and abroad, which can have negative economic, social, and political impacts.

Why Africa Matters

The African continent is the world’s second-largest, with the second-fastest growth rate after Asia. With 54 sovereign countries, four territories, and two de facto independent states with little international recognition, the continent has a current population of 1.3 billion. By 2050, the continent’s population is predicted to rise to 2.4 billion. By 2100, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, will have a population of one billion, and half the world’s population growth will be in Africa by then.

The population of African countries is also overwhelmingly young. Approximately 40% of Africans are under 15, and, in some countries, over 50% is under 25. By 2050, two of every five children born in the world will be in Africa, and the continent’s population is expected to triple. These developments have positive and negative potential impacts on the United States and the rest of the world. Young Africans have, for the most part, completely skipped the analog age and gone directly digital. Comfortable with technology, they form a huge potential consumer and labor market. If, on the other hand, the countries of Africa fail to develop economically and do not create gainful employment for this young population, then there is the risk that they will become a huge potential source of recruits to extremist and terrorist movements, which currently target disadvantaged and disenchanted youth.

Lack of economic opportunity, increased urbanization, and climate-fueled disasters will also contribute to movement of people seeking better lives, which will impact economies and security not only on the continent of Africa, but also the economic and security situations around the world. Nations, lacking adequate critical infrastructure, education, and job opportunities are ripe for internal unrest and radicalization. In particular, inadequate health delivery systems, when coupled with natural disasters, such as droughts or floods that limit food production, cause famine and mass movements of populations.

The Challenges for U.S. Policy

Prior to World War II, the U.S. policy towards Africa was not as active as it was toward Europe, Asia, or Latin America. During the Cold War, Africa policy was primarily viewed from a perspective of super-power competition. The end of the Cold War and the rise of international terrorism introduced this as a major component in U.S. Africa policy along with competition with a rising China and increased Chinese engagement in Africa.

Before his first official trip to Kenya, U.S. President Barack Obama said, “Africa had become an idea more than an actual place . . . with the benefit of distance, we engaged Africa in a selective embrace.” This is probably an apt description of U.S. policy towards African nations despite the bipartisan nature of that policy. The United States, with the many domestic and international issues it has to cope with, can ill afford to continue to ignore Africa. Going forward, U.S. policy must include a hard-headed look at where Africa fits in policy priorities.

The incoming Biden administration will face a number of important issues and challenges as it develops its Africa policy. The most pressing issues are the following:

Climate Change: Climate change is an existential problem that affects the entire globe, but Africa has probably suffered more from the effects of climate change than other continents—and the problem will only get worse with time. In an October 2020 article, World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Secretary-General Petteri Taalas said,

Climate change is having a growing impact on the African continent, hitting the most vulnerable hardest, and contributing to food insecurity, population displacement and stress on water resources. In recent months we have seen devastating floods, an invasion of desert locusts and now face the looming specter of drought because of a La Nina event. The human and economic toll has been aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Climate change impacts water quality and availability, and millions in Africa will likely face persistent increased water stress due to these impacts. A multi-year drought in parts of South Africa, for instance, threatened total water failure in several small towns and had livestock farmers facing financial ruin. Another pressing climate-change issue is the need for protection of the Congo Basin rainforest. This 178-million-hectare rainforest is the world’s second largest after the Amazon and is currently threatened by agricultural activities in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Countries in the Congo Basin need to address the preservation issue, while also enabling sustainable agricultural activities to ensure food security for the region’s population. In addition to the impact on global climate caused by destruction of the rainforest, such destruction also brings human populations into closer contact with the region’s animals, creating the risk of future animal-to-human transmission of new and possibly more virulent viruses similar to COVID-19, which will have a global impact. In a January 2021 CNN report, Dr. Jean-Jacques Muyembe Tamfum, who as a researcher helped discover the Ebola virus in 1976, warned of possible new pathogens that could be as infectious as COVID-19 and as virulent as Ebola.

Rule of Law/Mitigation of Corruption: A key to African development, given the increasing urbanization, population increases, and youthfulness of the continent’s population, will be an increase in domestic and international investment to build the industries that can provide meaningful employment and improved standards of living. In order for this to be successful, African nations will need to address the issues of rule of law and corruption. Investors will not risk money if the business climate comes with a level of political risk that is too high. Government leaders throughout Africa need to establish legislation that provides an acceptable level of security for investments and take action to curb the endemic corruption that currently discourages investment. Corruption in Africa ranges from wholesale political corruption on the scale of General Sani Abachi’s looting of $3-5 billion of state money during his five years as Nigeria’s military ruler to the bribes paid by businessmen to police and customs officials. The “tradition” of having to pay bribes, or “sweeteners,” drives away domestic investment and scares away foreign investment, leaving many countries mired in poverty.

Violent Extremism and Terrorism: A number of African nations are currently plagued with rising extremist movements. While primarily a domestic issue, the mass movement of people fleeing violence and the disruption of economic activity have the potential to negatively impact the rest of the world. African nations need regional responses to curb extremist and terrorist organizations, many of which are supported by international terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and al Qaeda. In addition, the underlying conditions that helped to create these movements must be addressed. Terrorist groups in Africa range from relatively large and dangerous groups, such as Boko Haram, a group in Nigeria that has received support from al Qaeda and that aims to implement sharia law in the country; Al-Shabab, an al Qaeda affiliate aiming to overthrow the government in Somalia and to punish neighboring countries for their support of the Somali regime; and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army, a fundamentalist Christian group. Terrorist groups in the fragile political climate of Libya also pose a threat to sub-Saharan Africa.

Great Power Competition: As the world’s second-largest economy, and with its increasing participation in international activities, China will continue to be a factor in Africa for the foreseeable future. This, however, is more a problem for the nations of Africa than it is for the rest of the world. The West can compete best by outperforming China in areas of strength by providing those goods and services that are unquestionably superior, and let African governments decide how to deal with China and its often-predatory lending practices and the Chinese tendency to import Chinese workers for its projects and investments rather than hiring locals. At the same time, Russia, which did not completely turn away from Africa at the end of the Cold War as many in the West sometimes believe, must still be considered a significant factor on the African landscape. In an effort to compensate for Western sanctions and to counter U.S. and Western influence, Russia is once again increasing its presence on the continent. Russian mercenaries, in exchange for diamond mining rights, have trained military forces in the Central African Republic, raising concerns about human rights abuses. Of particular concern is the presence of the Wagner Group, a private military company associated with Yevgeny Progozhin, a Russian oligarch with close ties to Vladimir Putin, who was indicted in the United States for trying to disrupt the 2016 U.S. elections. To date, Russia has, in addition to seeking basing rights, signed military cooperation agreements with 28 African nations. Russian activity is a combination of military and commercial, with Progozhin at the center of both. From 2010 to 2018, Russia nearly tripled its trade with African countries. While the activities of both Russia and China in Africa are of concern, and should be closely monitored, neither is of critical importance to U.S. national security.

With climate change, disease outbreaks, famine, extremism, and inter-ethnic violence, Africa will still experience crises in the foreseeable future that will be beyond the capacity of most nations on the continent to deal with. Climate change is probably the greatest cause of humanitarian crises in Africa, but mainstream media outside the continent either fail to notice or under-report them. Some of the crises, like Ebola or the next viral infection, can impact the rest of the world. These crises will cause starvation, mass movement of people, and increase internal and regional instability. Africa matters to the United States and the rest of the world. Its impacts can be felt far beyond the continent’s borders, but if approached as a partner rather than as a patron—with a focus on assisting African nations to improve governance, build critical infrastructure, boost domestic economies, and provide essential services to all—then Africa can be a positive contributor on the global stage.

#### The U.S. model is the key driver of Nigerian democracy

Dr. Moses E. Ochonu 20, Cornelius Vanderbilt Chair in History and Professor of African History at Vanderbilt University, PhD and MA in African History from the University of Michigan, BA in History from Bayero University, Graduate Certificate in Conflict Management from Liscomb University, “Liberal Democracy Has Failed in Nigeria”, Africa Is a Country, 2/7/2020, <https://africasacountry.com/2020/02/liberal-democracy-has-failed-in-nigeria>

More than twenty years later, I am ashamed to admit that I was duped. I am not the only one. Backed by millions of dollars from Western pro-democracy foundations and governments, Nigeria’s civil society and pro-democracy activists sheepishly adopted the rhetorical claims of liberal democracy. We all assumed that liberal democracy was the only form of democracy and that any modification of or deviation from its proclaimed ideals was sacrilegious. Twenty years later, civilian rule in Nigeria has not brought the vaunted benefits of democracy—development, accountability, and civic freedoms.

The legitimizing rhetoric of post-Cold War democratization was that even if democracy fails to improve the lives and civic freedoms of Nigerians and other African peoples, there is a consolation prize: the electoral mechanism of voting out nonperforming governments, which would, over time, entrench a culture of accountability. This claim has floundered spectacularly in Nigeria. As bloody and manipulated presidential, legislative, and governorship elections since 1999—and especially the violent sham elections of February 2019—have shown, Nigerians’ votes count for little. Failed incumbents endure in office by brazenly subverting the electoral will of the people. The violent, chaotic gubernatorial elections in Kogi and Bayelsa States in November 2019 were another chapter in this grim history, demonstrating that Nigeria’s crisis of electoral legitimacy is deepening rather than abating.

Since 1999, Nigeria’s civic arena has also constricted under the weight of increased state repression. The recent arrest, detention, and courtroom re-arrest of journalist and activist, Omoyele Sowore, in defiance of court orders and ongoing judicial proceedings signify the recent descent into the raw, unabashed tyranny of military rule. Mr. Sowore was released last December, along with former National Security Adviser, Sambo Dasuki, who had spent more than four years in detention, but only after US senators wrote a strongly worded letter to the Nigerian government on the matter.

The truth is as compelling as it is bitter: the dreams and promises of democratization have morphed into an elaborate, haunting mirage. Did Nigerians make a mistake by uncritically adopting liberal democracy, and if so should they heed the counsel of their country’s acclaimed novelist, Chinua Achebe, and go back to when the proverbial rain started beating them and make amends?

The adoption of liberal democracy in Nigeria was not an organic product of homegrown political struggles. Nor did it emanate from the deliberative and ideological disputations of Nigeria’s vibrant civic public sphere. Instead, democratization was predetermined by a toxic mix of three crosscutting phenomena: the post-Cold War search for a new logic of neocolonial control and domination; the suffocating global ubiquity of a pro-democracy slush fund disbursed strategically by governmental and non-governmental Western actors; and the ideological certitude and arrogance of a unipolar political formation located in the Global North.

As with other democratization projects in Africa, Nigeria’s democratization was birthed by and remains beholden to the Washington Consensus, which posited economic and political liberalization as an all-purpose solution to Africa’s developmental and governance challenges. Proponents claimed it had a universal applicability, and was the endpoint of human political evolution, suitable for all times and all places. The ideological factor proved particularly decisive as a catalyst for the spread of liberal democratic claims and assumptions to Nigeria and the rest of Africa. Nigeria’s democratization was coextensive with the neoliberal fetishization of liberalization as the preeminent organizing idiom of the new global order.

### 1NC – CCP

#### Democracy causes CCP collapse.

Chen & Kinzelbach ’15 (Dingding Chen- assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Katrin Kinzelbach- associate director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, March 2015, “Democracy promotion and China: blocker or bystander?” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2014.999322>)

The People's Republic of China is both a decisive blocker as well as an indifferent bystander of democratization. In this article, we looked at whether and how China countervails EU and US democracy promotion at home and in its immediate neighbourhood. In terms of domestic politics, the CCP is clearly determined to withstand, repress, outperform, and outsmart home-grown as well as external pressures for democratization. It is impossible to predict how long this approach will be sustainable. With regard to China's foreign policy, we tested the hypothesis that geostrategic interests or a perceived risk of regime survival at home will lead the People's Republic to countervail democracy promotion outside its own borders as well. The case of Hong Kong confirms that a perceived risk of regime survival leads Beijing to countervail US and EU democracy support outside the Chinese mainland. Although the scope of this article did not allow for additional case studies, we consider it likely that the CCP's focus on regime-survival at home does not only trump the “one country, two systems” doctrine, but ultimately also Beijing's declared non-interference principle in foreign policy. Yet, the fact that Beijing does not seem to use its significant leverage over Myanmar to hinder democracy support is an empirical challenge to the common proposition that authoritarian China is likely to export or protect autocracy, especially in its near-abroad. Given that we view Myanmar as the most likely case with respect to strategic interests, we suggest with considerable certainty that Beijing will only counteract democratization, including US and EU democracy support, where it perceives a challenge to the CCP's survival. Where this is not the case, Beijing is likely to focus on protecting its economic and strategic interests abroad, regardless of regime type. While this finding might be taken to suggest that a focus on China's international influence should not be a priority for democracy supporters, we remain more cautious. China's economic performance has not only granted the CCP legitimacy domestically, it has also made China's development path – economic liberalization without political reform – appear desirable further afield. And the recent economic troubles in Europe and the US, in turn, have challenged the thus far common perception that democracy was required for prosperity. As democracy promoters, both the US and the EU should therefore ensure that the very real governance shortcomings in China, beyond as well as within the economic sphere, are publicly identified for what they are. Without such concerted efforts, it is likely that authoritarian China will continue to be looked at as an alternative development model, thereby challenging democracy's power of attraction.

#### The aff prevents Chinese political leadership, which causes extinction via CCP collapse and nuclear lash-out.

Jing 15 (Jing, director of the Institute of International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University, 15, Lu, China’s rise will restore history of peaceful benefits for its neighbors, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/907832.shtml)

The "China threat" theory has been widely circulated and constantly hyped by Western countries during China's rise and is often cited by China's neighboring countries. It typically reflects the Western thinking of realpolitik in international relations. In fact, be it in history or in the current stage, a powerful China has never posed a threat to the peace and stability of its neighboring countries or the whole world, but instead it has created a positive influence. People may infer that a mighty China will manifest its identity by all means based on their memory of the Middle Kingdom or the tributary system. However, looking back, China in its powerful times was always favorable to others in economic ties, adhered to the principle of benevolence in political relations and was cautious about resorting to force. Having been through harsh humiliation in recent history, today's China holds firmly that one should not impose his or her beliefs on anyone else. Today, a rising China is determined to guide and exercise its relations with the outside world by using new diplomatic mind-set focused on win-win cooperation. China has realized that if a country wants to seek development, security and well-being, it has to allow others to have them. It is out of this concept that China has taken on more and more duties as a big power to safeguard the prosperity and stability in the region and the world. While China has proposed to build a new type of major power relationship, it also adopts the principles of closeness, sincerity, sharing in prosperity and inclusiveness in fostering neighborhood relations to make neighbors benefit from China's development. China has become the largest trade partner and export destination and exporter of many neighboring countries. China has proactively joined the efforts to address global issues that range from the UN peacekeeping missions, prevention and treatment of infectious diseases, climate change, non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons to a series of regional hot-spot issues. Its roles are highly recognized. China remains a developing country faced with arduous development problems and needs a stable international environment. It means a lot for China to prevent the world from falling into violence and tumult. A weak China will actually serve as a threat to the neighborhood stability. China's feebleness in recent history not only invited a century-long humiliation for itself, but it also drew in the countries around. If China with its more than 1.3 billion population is still mired in poverty and turbulence or even undergoes internal collapse, the resulting problems of refugees and emigrants will pose a threat to the neighborhood and the rest of the world. As President Xi Jinping noted in his speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 2013, a well-developed China with over 1.3 billion people will bring tangible benefits to the world. On the contrary, if China becomes feeble, it will be a matter of grave concern for the world.

### 1NC – Drones

#### Western democracy necessitates drone warfare – democratic risk aversion frames killings from thousands of miles away as a means to transfer the risks of war further.

Demmers & Gould ’20 [Joelle Demmers - Full Professor in Conflict Studies, co-founder of the Centre for Conflict Studies and the director of the History of International Relations section of Utrecht University. She is the author of Theories of Violent Conflict (Routledge, second edition, 2017). Together with Lauren Gould she is the founder of The Intimacies of Remote Warfare programme, among their recent publications is An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare (Security Dialogue, 2018), Lauren Gould is Assistant Professor in Conflict Studies at the Centre for Conflict Studies at the History of International Relations section of Utrecht University. Together with Jolle Demmers she is the founder and the project leader of The Intimacies of Remote Warfare programme. “The Remote Warfare Paradox: Democracies, Risk Aversion and Military Engagement”, 06-20-2020, https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/85426]//pranav

Democratic risk-aversion

Authors grouped within this genre point at the appeal of remote technologies of warfare. They argue that democracies, in particular, turn to remote warfare as a way of risk-aversion. Simply put, decision makers in democracies fear losses among their own constituencies more than authoritarian leaders, because rising numbers of casualties will have adverse effects on public support and decrease their chance of re-election (Freedman 2006, 7). For one, remote technologies such as unmanned systems give human soldiers the best possible force protection: they are not exposed to the enemy at all. Grounded in classic liberal thought, and often referring to Immanuel Kant’s notion of perpetual peace, this strand of thinking sees the ‘no body bags’ call of the electorate in liberal democratic societies as restraining politicians from engaging in high-risk warfare. In his famous treatise, Kant ([1795] 1957, 12-13) provided an important insight on the risk aversion of democracies. Here he argued that when those who decide to wage war are obliged to fight and bear the costs:

(…) they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future (our emphasis).

Remote warfare, in many ways, helps overcome this problem of ‘costs’, both in terms of human lives and expenditure. The end of conscription in Western democracies, with Vietnam as an important turning point, already formed a first step of transferring risks to military professionals. But with the emergence of remote technology wars can now be fought from a distance: allowing for zero-risk warfare. Soon after the invasion of Iraq, Martin Shaw (2005) in his book on the ‘new western way of war’ argued that liberal democracies aim to ‘transfer the risks of war’ even further: away from their own professional soldiers to the civilians and armed actors of ‘the enemy’. In liberal democracies, warfare has become primarily an exercise in risk-management. For Shaw, this explains the strong preference for long-distance air strikes and drones, instead of military interventions with ground troops. In a similar vein, Coker (2009) and, more critically, Sauer and Schörnig (2012) refer to ‘war in an age of risk’, and ‘democratic warfare’ to highlight how democratic institutions and their publics are the central factors constituting the turn to remote warfare.

#### Uniqueness goes neg – Western democratic troop withdrawals, increased drone strikes, and decreasing stability result in asymmetrical *terrorist backlash* and proves democracies cause *MORE* war, not less.

Demmers & Gould ’20 [Joelle Demmers - Full Professor in Conflict Studies, co-founder of the Centre for Conflict Studies and the director of the History of International Relations section of Utrecht University. She is the author of Theories of Violent Conflict (Routledge, second edition, 2017). Together with Lauren Gould she is the founder of The Intimacies of Remote Warfare programme, among their recent publications is An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare (Security Dialogue, 2018), Lauren Gould is Assistant Professor in Conflict Studies at the Centre for Conflict Studies at the History of International Relations section of Utrecht University. Together with Jolle Demmers she is the founder and the project leader of The Intimacies of Remote Warfare programme. “The Remote Warfare Paradox: Democracies, Risk Aversion and Military Engagement”, 06-20-2020, https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/85426]//pranav

Conclusion

Let us be clear: we do not argue for more Western body bags or more boots on the ground. What we emphasise in this chapter is the need to ‘make strange’ the evolving normalisation of remote warfare as the lesser evil: as precise, efficient wars of necessity. Western democracies have largely removed their military from the theatres of war. And as we saw in the opening vignettes, Western soldiers thereby no longer engage in ‘hostilities’ directly. But this does not make them any less violent.

Apart from ‘making visible’ the direct suffering caused by remote warfare, we aim to think through the transformative effects and moral and political challenges that this new way of war has given rise to. Key to the continuation of remote warfare, in addition to the secrecy of its operations, and the sophisticated propaganda of precision and care, is its asymmetrical distribution of death and suffering. As we have seen in the above, zero-risk warfare is compelling to those not at the receiving end of the violence. Altogether, we conjecture this to translate into liberal democracies becoming not less, but more, war-prone. That is the paradox of ‘democratic warfare’, and herein, we argue, lies its transformative effect. The violence is executed so remotely, that it becomes invisible, uncared for, and even ceases to be defined as such.

A second concern is blowback. The challenges that remote killings present to the logic of warfare also have serious political implications. As pointed out by Ignatieff (2000) and Sauer and Schörnig (2012), the riskless setup of remote warfare could very well justify a mirroring of ‘remote’ ways of fighting in the form of terrorist attacks by the enemy as the only possible way to retaliate in the absence of a ‘fair’ fight. As for the secrecy of remote violence, one thing is clear: in this age or digital media everything is seen, filmed, and shared. Violence always has a boomerang effect.

In sum, outsourcing the violent act to robotic, private or surrogate others has silently taken political deliberation out of contemporary warfare. As a consequence, this has lowered the threshold for military engagement in liberal democracies. We need to bring politics, and the public, back in. Although this evidently entails a much wider and more profound discussion, we here conclude by making two suggestions. What we can detect from our opening vignettes, is that, for a start, the new strategies for military engagement that come with remote warfare have to find a reflection in new political decision-making procedures. Any form of military intervention, whether offensive or defensive, that results in acts of physical harm on the ground should eventually be put through careful parliamentary scrutiny (such as, for the case of the US, the War Powers Resolution). This is what ‘engaging in hostilities’ should mean: inflicting harm to enemy combatants or civilians. Second, more analysis, dissemination and debate on the intimate realities of remote warfare is needed. Hopefully, this contribution has provided some useful insights into that direction.

And finally, Western democracies’ claims to the moral high ground in respect to the brutality of war are uncalled for. All war is terrible, whether it is executed by a soldier piloting a weaponised drone or an insurgent’s improvised explosive device. There is no such thing as sophisticated violence.

#### That causes hotspots to go nuclear

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The inherent advantages of drones will not alone make traditional interstate warfare more likely—such conflicts are relatively rare anyway, with only one active interstate conflict in both 2012 and 2013.20 Nor will the probable type, quantity, range, and lethality of armed drones that states possess in coming decades make a government more likely to attempt to defeat an opposing army, capture or control foreign territory, or remove a foreign leader from power. However, misperceptions over the use of armed drones increase the likelihood of militarized disputes with U.S. allies, as well as U.S. military forces, which could lead to an escalating crisis and deeper U.S. involvement. Though surveillance drones can be used to provide greater stability between countries by monitoring ceasefires or disputed borders, armed drones will have destabilizing consequences. Arming a drone, whether by design or by simply putting a crude payload on an unarmed drone, makes it a weapon, and thereby a direct national security threat for any state whose border it breaches. Increased Frequency of Interstate and Intrastate Force For the United States, drones have significantly reduced the political, diplomatic, and military risks and costs associated with the use of military force, which has led to a vast expansion of lethal operations that would not have been attempted with other weapons platforms. Aside from airstrikes in traditional conflicts such as Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan—where one-quarter of all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) airstrikes in 2012 were conducted by drones—the United States has conducted hundreds in non-battlefield settings: Pakistan (approximately 369), Yemen (approximately 87), Somalia (an estimated 16), and the Philippines (at least 1, in 2006).21 Of the estimated 473 non-battlefield targeted killings undertaken by the United States since November 2002, approximately 98 percent were carried out by drones. Moreover, despite maintaining a “strong preference” for capturing over killing suspected terrorists since September 2011, there have been only 3 known capture attempts, compared with 194 drone strikes that have killed an estimated 1,014 people, 86 of whom were civilians.22 Senior U.S. civilian and military officials, whose careers span the pre– and post–armed drone era, overwhelmingly agree that the threshold for the authorization of force by civilian officials has been significantly reduced. Former secretary of defense Robert Gates asserted in October 2013, for example, that armed drones allow decision-makers to see war as a “bloodless, painless, and odorless” affair, with technology detaching leaders from the “inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain” consequences of war.23 President Barack Obama admitted in May 2013 that the United States has come to see armed drones “as a cure-all for terrorism,” because they are low risk and instrumental in “shielding the government” from criticisms “that a troop deployment invites.”24 Such admissions from leaders of a democratic country with a system of checks and balances point to the temptations that leaders with fewer institutional checks will face. President Obama and his senior aides have stated that the United States is setting precedents with drones that other states may emulate.25 If U.S. experience and Obama’s cautionary words are any guide, states that acquire armed drones will be more willing to threaten or use force in ways they might not otherwise, within both interstate and intrastate contexts. States might undertake cross-border, interstate actions less discriminately, especially in areas prone to tension. As is apparent in the East and South China Seas, nationalist sentiments and the discovery of untapped, valuable national resources can make disputes between countries more likely. In such contested areas, drones will enable governments to undertake strike missions or probe the responses of an adversary—actions they would be less inclined to take with manned platforms. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there are approximately 430 bilateral maritime boundaries, most of which are not defined by formal agreements between the affected states.26 Beyond the cases of East Asia, other cross-border flashpoints for conflict where the low-risk proposition of drone strikes would be tempting include Russia in Georgia or Ukraine, Turkey in Syria, Sudan within its borders, and China on its western periphery. In 2013, a Chinese counternarcotics official revealed that his bureau had considered attempting to kill a drug kingpin named Naw Kham, who was hiding in a remote region in northeastern Myanmar, by using a drone carrying twenty kilograms of dynamite. “The plan was rejected, because the order was to catch him alive,” the official recalled.27 With armed drones, China might make the same calculation that the United States has made—that killing is more straightforward than capturing—in choosing to target ostensibly high-threat individuals with drone strikes. China’s demonstrated willingness to employ armed drones against terrorists or criminals outside its borders could directly threaten U.S. allies in the region, particularly if the criterion China uses to define a terrorist does not align with that of the United States or its allies. Domestically, governments may use armed drones to target their perceived internal enemies. Most emerging drone powers have experienced recent domestic unrest. Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, and China all have separatist or significant opposition movements (e.g., Kurds, Chechens, the Taliban, Tibetans, and Uighurs) that presented political and military challenges to their rule in recent history. These states already designate individuals from these groups as “terrorists,” and reserve the right to use force against them. States possessing the lower risk—compared with other weapons platforms—capability of armed drones could use them more frequently in the service of domestic pacification, especially against time-sensitive targets that reside in mountainous, jungle, or other inhospitable terrain. Compared with typical methods used by military and police forces to counter insurgencies, criminals, or terrorists—such as ground troops and manned aircraft— unmanned drones provide significantly greater real-time intelligence through their persistent loiter time and responsiveness to striking an identified target. Increased Risk of Misperception and Escalation Pushing limits in already unstable regions is complicated by questions raised regarding rules of engagement: how would states respond to an armed drone in what they contend is their sovereign airspace, and how would opposing sides respond to counter-drone tactics? Japanese defense officials claim that shooting down Chinese drones in what Japan contends is its airspace is more likely to occur than downing manned aircraft because drones are not as responsive to radio or pilot warnings, thereby raising the possibility of an escalatory response.28 Alternatively, Japan might misidentify a Chinese manned fighter as an advanced drone and fire on it, especially if the aircraft’s radar signature is not sufficiently distinctive or if combat drones routinely fly over the disputed area. Thus, the additional risks associated with drone strikes, combined with the lack of clarity on how two countries would react to an attempted downing of a drone, create the potential for miscalculation and subsequent escalation. As U.S. Air Force commanders in South Korea noted, a North Korean drone equipped with chemical agents would not have to kill many or even any people on the peninsula to terrorize the population and escalate tensions.29 This scenario points to the spiraling escalatory dynamic that could be repeated—likely intensified in the context of armed drones—in other tension-prone areas, such as the Middle East, South Asia, and Central and East Africa, where the mix of low-risk and ambiguous rules of engagement is a recipe for escalation. Not all of these contingencies directly affect U.S. interests, but they would affect treaty allies whose security the United States has an interest in maintaining. Compared with other weapons platforms, current practice repeatedly demonstrates that drones make militarized disputes more likely due to a decreased threshold for the use of force and an increased risk of miscalculation. Increased Risk of Lethality The proliferation of armed drones will increase the likelihood of destabilizing or devastating one-off, high-consequence attacks. In March 2013, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) observed of drones: “In some respects it’s a perfect assassination weapon. . . . Now we have a problem. There are all these nations that want to buy these armed drones. I’m strongly opposed to that.”30 The worst-case contingency for the use of armed drones, albeit an unlikely circumstance, would be to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Drones are, in many ways, the perfect vehicle for delivering biological and chemical agents.31 A WMD attack, or even the assassination of a political leader, another troubling though unlikely circumstance, would have tremendous consequences for regional and international stability. Deterring such drone-based attacks will depend on the ability of the United States and other governments to accurately detect and attribute them. Technical experts and intelligence analysts disagree about the extent to which this will be possible, but the difficulties lie in the challenges of detecting drones (they emit small radar, thermal, and electron signatures, and can fly low), determining who controlled it (they can be programmed to fly to a preset GPS coordinate), or assigning ownership to a downed system (they can be composed of commercial, off-the-shelf components).32 It is equally noteworthy that civilian officials or military commanders have almost always used armed drones in ways beyond their initially intended applications. Drones do not simply fulfill existing mission requirements; they create new and unforeseen ones, and will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore, U.S. officials would be misguided to view future uses of armed drones solely through the prism of how the United States has used them—for discrete military operations in relatively benign air-defense environments. The potential for misperception is compounded by the fact that few governments seeking or acquiring armed drones have publicly articulated any strategy for how they will likely use them. Conversely, the uncertainty about how other countries will use drones provides the United States with an opportunity to shape drone doctrines, especially for U.S. allies interested in procuring drones from U.S. manufacturers.