## 1

#### Republicans win now – substantial polling leads prove

Roche 2/15 [Darragh, “Republicans Enjoy Huge Lead Over Democrats in Midterms: Poll”, 02-15-2022, Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/republicans-enjoy-huge-lead-over-democrats-midterms-poll-1679289]//pranav

Republicans have opened up a substantial lead over Democrats ahead of the 2022 midterm elections, according to a new poll conducted in February among likely general election voters.

A poll from the Convention of States Action (COSA) in partnership with the Trafalgar Group showed Republicans enjoyed 54.4 percent support in the upcoming midterms, compared to just 41.9 percent for Democrats.

That represents a GOP lead of 12.5 percent over Democrats as the party is hoping to retake the House of Representatives and the Senate, allowing Republicans to stymie President Joe Biden's agenda.

The poll was conducted from February 2 to 6, among 1,073 likely general election voters. It had a margin of error of 2.99 percent.

The Trafalgar Group enjoys an A- rating from poll tracker FiveThirtyEight.

Just 3.7 percent of the respondents said they were undecided on their candidate preference in the 2022 elections.

While Republicans are aiming to block President Biden's agenda, the COSA/Trafalgar Group poll shows that most likely general election voters believe the GOP will achieve this goal if they win control of Congress.

#### Push for objective reporting ensures Democrats win – objectivity is key to their support

Russell ’14 [David, work(s/ed) at The Hill, “So, how about those elections?”, 07-31-2014, The Hill, https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/213802-so-how-about-those-elections]//pranav

And if this were not enough to discourage even the most intrepid, the thinking Democrat or moderate independent is faced with a communications system that no longer sees objectivity as its mission. Gone are the restrictions on news outlets to provide equal time for opposing positions and the historical pact in broadcast licensing that required time for objective reporting. We are faced now with sound bites orchestrated by networks controlled in the main by large corporations with very clear partisan leanings.

There is no question that Democrats have ample reasons to be depressed. The difficulty with this ennui is that it is part of a spiral. The more discouraged well-meaning voters become, the less they participate, the worse the circumstances become. As Kevin Phillips, author of The Emerging Republican Majority and strategist for Richard Nixon — hardly a "leftist radical" — stated, "Either democracy must be renewed, with politics brought back to life, or wealth is likely to cement a new and less democratic regime-plutocracy by some other name."

#### Republicans are opposed to the JCPOA – it’ll get repealed if they win the Midterms

Savage 2/17 [Sean, “Bipartisan concern grows over Iran nuclear deal emerging in Vienna”, Cleveland Jewish News, 02-17-2022, https://www.clevelandjewishnews.com/jns/bipartisan-concern-grows-over-iran-nuclear-deal-emerging-in-vienna/article\_829c542e-cbdd-560f-83ee-9bde9bb7838c.html]//pranav

In a letter to Biden on Wednesday, more than 160 House Republicans warned the president that any agreement struck without congressional approval will be opposed by Republicans and overturned if Republicans retake power in the midterm elections.

“If you forge an agreement with Supreme Leader of Iran [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] without formal congressional approval, it will be temporary and non-binding and will meet the same fate as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),” the lawmakers wrote in the letter.

Furthermore, Republicans said they will oppose a deal to lift sanctions if Iran has not “fully dismantled their enrichment and reprocessing-related infrastructure capabilities,” as well as ending its sponsorship of terrorism and releasing all American hostages.

Last week, more than 30 Republican senators sent a similar letter raising the possibility of Congress blocking the implementation of the agreement.

#### Biden’s too weak for a strong JCPOA which ensures Iranian nuclear capability – causes future conflict that escalates

Dubowitz & Bowman 02/17 [Mark Dubowitz is chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power, “Biden’s Weakness Puts Strong Iran Deal Out of Reach”, Real Clear Defense, 02-17-2022, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/02/17/bidens\_weakness\_puts\_strong\_iran\_deal\_out\_of\_reach\_817318.html]//pranav

Talks on Iran’s nuclear program in Vienna are entering a pivotal stage. President Joe Biden, viewed increasingly by Americans as a weak leader, is eager for a policy win. Sensing Biden’s weakness, Tehran hopes to foist a bad deal on Washington that no strong occupant of the oval office would or should accept.

When Americans believe a president is weak, it can result in hand wringing or jubilation among the respective partisans focused on the next election. But when foreign adversaries believe the president of the United States is weak, the consequences can be dire. Unfortunately, that dynamic is on full display in the administration’s nuclear negotiations in Vienna. It takes strength to reject a bad deal or negotiate one worthy of bipartisan support. Sadly, Biden seems to lack the fortitude to do either.

In fact, the Biden administration may be on the verge of accepting an agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran that abandons American victims of Iran’s terrorism, enriches a regime led by mass murderers, and provides it with a patient pathway to a nuclear weapons capability.

The White House, of course, rejects any suggestion regarding Biden’s weakness. But polling numbers reveal the reality. A Gallup Poll released on January 25 found that only 37% of Americans viewed President Joe Biden as “a strong and decisive leader.” That number is only slightly worse than the 38 percent of respondents who said Biden can manage the government effectively.

And the Gallup Poll is hardly an anomaly. YouGovAmerica interviewed a nationally-representative sample of 1,500 U.S. adult citizens between January 29 - February 1 and found that only 30 percent of adult U.S. citizens view Biden as a strong leader.

In the context of domestic politics, it is easy to see why most Americans don’t view Biden as a strong and effective leader. Biden, for example, frequently boasts about his decades of experience in the U.S. Senate, his relationships in that body, and his congressional know-how. Yet he has been unable to even persuade two hesitant senators in his own party to support his top legislative priority.

Unfortunately, Biden’s difficulties have not stopped at the water’s edge.

In Afghanistan, President Biden ignored the warnings of military commanders and the U.S. intelligence community and abandoned a beleaguered democracy to the depredations of the misogynist and murderous Taliban, conducting a withdrawal based on self-delusions that disregarded conditions on the ground and brushed aside calls for a course correction.

The chaos of the August withdrawal put U.S. service members in horrible situations and featured heart-wrenching images of Afghans clinging to the bottom of departing American aircraft. As a direct result of Biden’s decision, the al-Qaeda-linked Taliban once again governs Afghanistan, enjoying a safe haven there as it did on September 11, 2001.

Biden's poor decision on Afghanistan, exacerbated by disastrous implementation, clearly made an impression in adversary capitals. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) top commander, Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami proclaimed a month after the Afghanistan withdrawal that, “The America of today is not the America of the past 10, 20, or 30 years.”

Maj. Gen. Salami and his peers may have also noted with satisfaction Biden’s approach toward Tehran’s terror proxy in Yemen, the Houthis. Less than a month after assuming office, ignoring the Houthis' continued terrorist activities, the Biden administration revoked the U.S. government’s designation of the group as a foreign terrorist organization. The Houthis, of course, simply continued their atrocities and redoubled their bombardment of civilians in Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis widened the Yemeni civil war last month by launching ballistic missiles at a base in the United Arab Emirates that the Houthis knew houses U.S. service members. If defenses had not intercepted the incoming missiles, many Americans might have died, not to mention Emiratis.

What tangible steps did Biden take to retaliate against the Houthis or their Iranian patrons? You guessed it: We saw little more than strongly worded statements from Washington.

This pattern of White House weakness may explain why the radical regime in Tehran sees an opportunity in Vienna.

A strong agreement worthy of bipartisan support in Washington would impose a permanent ban on Iran’s nuclear program and enforce that prohibition with an intrusive inspections regime that ensures compliance. Such an agreement would address the ballistic missiles Iran would likely use to deliver a nuclear weapon and would also not lift terrorism related sanctions until Tehran actually stops supporting terrorism.

In stark contrast, under Biden’s deeply flawed proposal, Tehran does not need to cheat to reach threshold nuclear-weapons capabilities. Merely by waiting for key constraints to expire, the regime can emerge over the next decade with an industrial-size enrichment program, a near-zero breakout time, an easier clandestine path to a nuclear warhead, long-range ballistic missiles, access to advanced conventional weaponry, greater regional dominance, and a more powerful economy, increasingly immunized against Western sanctions.

At that point, the clerical regime will be more dangerous than it is today. Accordingly, Biden's Iran deal would likely force a future U.S. President to resort to military force as the only option to stop Iran's development of nuclear weapons; the consequences of such a war against a more powerful enemy will be even more devastating.

#### **Immediate focus gives into Tehran’s bluffs; waiting is better in the long term for JCPOA health – the US holds all the cards**

Stephens ’20 [Bret, won a Pulitzer Prize for commentary at The Wall Street Journal in 2013 and was previously editor in chief of The Jerusalem Post, “On Iran, Biden Can Bide His Time”, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/07/opinion/on-iran-biden-can-bide-his-time.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article]//pranav

President-elect Joe Biden has made it clear that his preferred method for dealing with Iran is to find a way back to the nuclear deal the Obama administration concluded in 2015, while bargaining for an extension to some of its key provisions. “If Iran returns to strict compliance,” Biden wrote in a September op-ed for CNN, “the United States would rejoin the agreement as a starting point for follow-on negotiations.” The Iranian regime, for its part, has made it clear that, in reaction to last month’s assassination of its nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, it intends to ramp up its production of enriched uranium while threatening to expel international inspectors by early February if the United States doesn’t immediately lift sanctions. The regime has also ruled out any extensions to the nuclear deal, from which President Trump withdrew in 2018. “It will never be renegotiated,” says Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. “Period.” There’s a way out of this impasse. The Biden administration should — and, more important, can — bide its time. Tehran is desperate to have sanctions lifted. In 2016, after the nuclear deal had taken effect, it exported roughly 2.1 million barrels of crude oil a day. In 2020, after the Trump administration-imposed sanctions, it exported less than a quarter of that. The inflation rate is running somewhere between 42 and 99 percent. Protests a year ago, triggered by a rise in fuel prices, led to massive street demonstrations calling for an end to the regime. The regime’s response to its economic and political crises has been to up the stakes. It wagers that it can provoke a nuclear crisis and then stampede the new administration into giving up its immense economic leverage even before meaningful negotiations begin. Once the main sanctions are lifted, Tehran can concede things it never had a right to withdraw, such as U.N. access to its nuclear facilities under the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, while haggling for things it shouldn’t be allowed to get, such as the lifting of sanctions on an Iranian airline that supports the regime’s proxies. But Tehran’s escalation is also a bluff. There’s a limit to how far it can go in provoking a nuclear crisis with the United States without risking a confrontation with an enemy that is much closer to home. In the last six months, explosions in Iran have destroyed large parts of a centrifuge manufacturing facility in Natanz, a secretive military installation at Parchin, a power plant in Isfahan, a missile facility in Khojir and an underground military installation in Tehran, among other places. Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Al Qaeda’s second-highest leader, was gunned down in August in the streets of Tehran. As for Fakhrizadeh, he was not the first Iranian nuclear scientist to meet a violent end, and probably won’t be the last. Nobody has taken responsibility for these attacks, but nobody is in much doubt about their source, either. They reveal an astonishing degree of penetration of the Iranian security complex. If Tehran tries to race toward nuclear breakout, it knows it will encounter a determined and effective challenge. There’s a limit to how far the regime can go with its provocations before those provocations become dangerous to the regime itself. In short, Tehran’s negotiating position is weak and its options for escalation are limited. (Even its apparent attack last year on Saudi Arabia’s oil installations, while technically impressive, did little permanent damage to the kingdom while accelerating the recent Arab-Israeli rapprochement.) If disputed rumors of the 81-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s ill health prove true, the country would experience its first transfer of real authority since 1989, another tumultuous event for an already unpopular regime. Contrast this with the Biden administration, which will come into office holding four powerful cards — assuming it chooses to play them. First, it can credibly outsource effective deterrence to Israel without having to bear the immediate risks. Second, it can leverage the military, economic, intelligence and diplomatic resources of an increasingly united Israeli-Arab front. Third, it doesn’t have to impose new sanctions to cripple Iran’s economy. It merely has to enforce the ones already in place. Finally, there is growing evidence that Iran has long been in breach of its past commitments by hiding hundreds of tons of nuclear equipment and material that should have been disclosed under the terms of the nuclear deal. The Biden administration and its European partners have a right and responsibility to insist that Tehran provide a full accounting of that material as the entry price of negotiations. There is a road toward a credible and durable deal with Iran that can muster the kind of regional support and bipartisan buy-in the last one lacked. It’s a deal that forces the regime to choose between a nuclear program or a functioning economy, rather than getting both. A Biden administration that has the patience to see through Tehran’s bluster can be rewarded with a lasting diplomatic achievement that a future administration, unlike the last one, will not easily erase.

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs.

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

## Case

### Framing

#### The role of the ballot is to only evaluate the material consequences of the aff and neg world.

#### Consequences of the plan are the only predictable stasis for pre-round prep since anything else is infinitely regressive and self-serving. Proven by their ROBs lack of a comparative statement.

#### Two impacts:

#### A] Fairness—the 1AC can pick any issue and critique it which decks 1NC engagement since our scholarship is tied to the consequences and devolves debate into soapbox where the round is decided on who talked about certain issues first with no disagreement. Fairness outweighs, its constitutive to the judge to decide the better debater.

#### B] Clash—debate is not about content but the process of iterative testing through specific points of contestation. There is no 1-1 correspondence between the arguments we read and our ideologies. This turns the Aff—no matter your political worldview, critical thinking skills through an unrestrained framework is necessary for any revolutionary strategy.

#### We’ll pre-empt the 1AR argument about “creating better subjects”

#### No spillover or subject formation –

#### [1] No debate commits us to a universal ethic – voting for spark or kant doesn’t mean you are a Kantian or believe nuclear war is good

#### [2] Competitive incentive – debaters read certain arguments for their strategic value, not to change the debate space, otherwise vote negative and recognize the pedagogy of the affirmative is good – the fact they will extend arguments we’ve dropped or try out-tech us on the line by line will prove they will never go for the most epistemically pure version of their literature but the strategic version of it

#### Existential threats outweigh:

#### 1] Even the most conservative estimates prove reducing existential risk outweighs all other impacts, regardless of probability – actively prioritize our calculus since you are cognitively biased against it

Whittlestone 17 – (Jess Whittlestone, PhD in Behavioural Science and has worked as a policy consultant for government, specialising in security and foreign policy. She also has experience as a freelance journalist for a number of online magazines, including Quartz, Vox, and Aeon. Before her PhD, she studied Maths and Philosophy at Oxford, and played a key role in developing 80,000 Hours' coaching process and research. Currently, Jess is a Postdoctoral Research Associate at the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence at Cambridge, “The Long-Term Future”, Effective Altruism, 11-16-17, Available Online at <https://www.effectivealtruism.org/articles/cause-profile-long-run-future/>, accessed 12-4-18, HKR-AM)

The number of people alive today pales in comparison to the number who could exist in the future. It may therefore be extremely important to ensure that human civilization flourishes far into the future, enjoying fulfilling lives free of suffering.

There are a number of ways we might work to ensure a positive future for humanity. We could work to better understand and prevent extinction risks - catastrophic events that have the potential to destroy all life on this planet.[1] We may want to focus on the broader category of existential risks- events that could dramatically and irreversibly curtail humanity’s potential.[2] Or we might focus on increasing the chance that the lives of our descendants are positive in other ways: for example, improving democracy or the ability of institutions to make good decisions.

Attempts to shape the long-term future seem highly neglected relative to the problems we face today. There are fewer incentives to address longer-term problems, and they can also be harder for us to take seriously.

It is, of course, hard to be certain about the impact of our actions on the very long-term future. However, it does seem that there are things we can do - and given the vast scale we are talking about, these actions could therefore have an enormous impact in expectation.

This profile sets out why you might want to focus your altruistic efforts on the long-term future - and why you might not. You may be particularly inclined to focus on this if you think we face serious existential threats in the next century, and if you’re comfortable accepting a reasonable amount of uncertainty about the impact you are having, especially in the short-term.

The case for the long-term future as a target of altruism

The case for focusing on the long-term future can be summarised as follows:

The long-term future has enormous potential for good or evil: our descendants could live for billions or trillions of years, and have very high-quality lives;

It seems likely there are things we can do today that will affect the long-term future in non-negligible ways;

Possible ways of shaping the long-term future are currently highly neglected by individuals and society;

Given points 1 to 3 above, actions aimed at shaping the long-term future seem to have extremely high expected value, higher than any actions aiming for more near-term benefits.

Below we discuss each part of this argument in more detail.

The long-term future has enormous potential

Civilisation could continue for a billion years, until the Earth becomes uninhabitable.[3] It’s hard to say how likely this is, but it certainly seems plausible - and putting less than, say, a 1% chance on this possibility seems overconfident.[4] You may disagree that 1% is a reasonable lower bound here, but changing the figure by an order of magnitude or two would still yield an extremely impressive result. And even if civilisation only survives for another million years, that still amounts to another ~50,000 generations of people, i.e. trillions of future lives.[5]

If our descendants survive for long enough, then they are likely to advance in ways we cannot currently imagine - even someone living a few hundred years ago could not possibly have imagined the technological advances we’ve made today. It is possible they might even develop technology enabling them to reach and colonise planets outside our solar system, and survive well beyond a billion years.[6]

Let’s say that if we survive until the end of the Earth’s lifespan, there is a 1% chance of space colonisation. This would make the overall probability of survival beyond Earth 1 in 10,000 (1% chance of surviving to a billion years, multiplied by a 1% chance of surviving further given that). This sounds incredibly low, but suppose that space colonisation could allow our descendants to survive up to 100 trillion years[7]. This suggests we could have up to 1/10,000 x 100 trillion years = 10 billion expected years of civilisation ahead of us.

If we expect life in the future to be, on average, about as good as the present, then this would make the whole of the future about 100 million times more important than everything that has happened in the last 100 years. In fact, it seems like there could be more people in the future with better lives than those living today: economic, social, and technological progress could enable us to cure diseases, lift people out of poverty, and better solve other problems. It also seems possible that people in the future will be more altruistic than people alive today[8] - which also makes it more likely that they will be motivated to create a happy and valuable world.

However, it’s precisely because of this enormous potential that it’s so important to ensure that things go as well as possible. The loss of potential would be enormous if we end up on a negative trajectory. It could result in a great deal of suffering or the end of life.[9] And just as the potential to solve many of the world’s problems is growing, threats seem to be growing too. In particular, advanced technologies and increasing interconnectedness pose great risks.[10]

There are things we can do today that could affect the long-term future

There are a number of things we could work on today that seem likely to influence the long-term future:

Reducing extinction risks: We could reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change by putting in place laws and regulations to cut carbon emissions. We could reduce the risks from new technologies by investing in research to ensure their safety. Alternatively, we could work to improve global cooperation so that we are better able to deal with unforeseen risks that might arise.

Changing the values of a civilisation: Values tend to be stable in societies,[11] so attempts to shift values, whilst difficult, could have long-lasting effects. Some forms of value change, like increasing altruism, seem robustly good, and may be a way of realizing the very best possible futures. However, spreading poorly considered values could be harmful.

Reducing suffering risks: Historically, technological advances have enabled great welfare improvements (e.g. through modern agriculture and medicine), but also some of the greatest sources of present-day suffering (e.g. factory farming). To prevent the worst risks from new technologies, we could improve global cooperation and work on specific problems like preventing worst-case outcomes from artificial intelligence.

“Speeding up” development: Boosting technological innovation or scientific progress could have a lasting “speed up” effect on the entire future, making all future benefits happen slightly earlier than they otherwise would have. Curing a disease just a few years earlier could save millions of lives, for example. (That said, it’s not clear whether speeding up development is good or bad for existential risk - developing new technologies faster might help us to mitigate certain threats, but pose new risks of their own.)

Ripple effects of our ordinary actions: Improvements in health not only benefit individuals directly but allow them to be more economically successful, meaning that society and other individuals have to invest less in supporting them. In aggregate, this could easily have substantial knock-on effects on the productivity of society, which could affect the future.

Other ways we might create positive trajectory changes: These include improving education, science, and political systems.

Paul Christiano also points out that even if opportunities to shape the long-term future with any degree of certainty do not exist today, they may well exist in the future. Investing in our own current capacity could have an indirect but large impact by improving our ability to take such opportunities when they do arise. Similarly, we can do research today to learn more about how we might be able to impact the long-term future.

The long-term future is neglected, especially relative to its importance

Attempts to shape the long-term future are neglected by individuals, organisations and governments.

One reason is that there is little incentive to focus on far-off, uncertain issues compared to more certain, immediate ones. As 80,000 Hours put it, “Future generations matter, but they can’t vote, they can’t buy things, they can’t stand up for their interests.”

Problems faced by future generations are also more uncertain and more abstract, making it harder for us to care about them. There is a well-established phenomenon called temporal discounting, which means that we tend to give less weight to outcomes that are far in the future. This may explain our tendency to neglect long-term risks and problems. For example, it’s a large part of why we seem to have such difficulty tackling climate change.

Generally, there are diminishing returns to additional work in an area. This means that the neglectedness of the long-term future makes it more likely to be high impact.

Efforts to shape the long-term future could be extremely high in expected value

Even if the chance of our actions influencing the long-term trajectory of humanity is relatively low, there are extremely large potential benefits, which mean that these actions could still have a very high expected value. For example, decreasing the probability of human extinction by just one in a million could result in an additional 1,000 to 10,000 expected years of civilisation (using earlier assumptions).[12]

Compare this to actions we could take to improve the lives of people alive today, without looking at longer-run effects. A dramatic victory such as curing the most common and deadly diseases, or ending all war, might only make the current time period (~100 years) about twice as good as otherwise.[13] Though this seems like an enormous success, given the calculations above, decreasing the probability of human extinction would be 10 or 100 times better in expectation.

We might want to adjust this naive estimate downwards slightly, however, given uncertainty about some of the assumptions that go into it - we could be wrong about the probability of humanity surviving far into the future, or about the value of the future (if we think that future flourishing might have diminishing value, for example.) However, even if we think these estimates should be adjusted downwards substantially, we might very conservatively imagine that reducing the likelihood of existential risk by one in a million only equates to 100 expected years of civilization. This still suggests that the value of working to reduce existential risk is comparable to the value of the biggest victories we could imagine in the current time period - and so well worth taking seriously.

#### 2] Complacency goes neg – academics and the wider public actively discount the probability AND magnitude of existential risks – only giving them extra attention in debate solves – that means our impact outweighs even in we lose the rest of framing

Javorsky 18 [Emilia Javorsky is a Boston-based physician-scientist focused on the invention, development and commercialization of new medical therapies. She also leads an Artificial Intelligence in Medicine initiative with The Future Society at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Why Human Extinction Needs a Marketing Department. January 15, 2018. https://www.xconomy.com/boston/2018/01/15/why-human-extinction-needs-a-marketing-department/]

Experts at Oxford University and elsewhere have estimated that the risk of a global human extinction event this century—or at least of an event that wipes out 10 percent or more of the world’s population— is around 1 in 10. The most probable culprits sending us the way of the dinosaur are mostly anthropogenic risks, meaning those created by humans. These include climate change, nuclear disaster, and more emerging risks such as artificial intelligence gone wrong (by accident or nefarious intent) and bioterrorism. A recent search of the scientific literature through ScienceDirect for “human extinction” returned a demoralizing 157 results, compared to the 1,627 for “dung beetle.” I don’t know about you, but this concerns me. Why is there so little research and action on existential risks (risks capable of rendering humanity extinct)?

A big part of the problem is a lack of awareness about the real threats we face and what can be done about them. When asked to estimate the chance of an extinction event in the next 50 years, U.S. adults in surveys reported chances ranging from 1 in 10 million to 1 in 100, certainly not 10 percent. The awareness and engagement issues extend to the academic community as well, where a key bottleneck is a lack of talented people studying existential risks. Developing viable risk mitigation strategies will require widespread civic engagement and concerted research efforts. Consequently, there is an urgent need to improve the communication of the magnitude and importance of existential risks. The first step is getting an audience to pay attention to this issue.

#### 3] Use expected value – magnitude times probability. Ignoring threats of nuclear war makes it exponentially more likely – students are key.

Harris & Bender 17 (John, Politico editor-in-chief, & Bryan, Politico national security editor. "Bill Perry Is Terrified. Why Aren't You?". Interview with Bill Perry, mathematician, engineer, businessman and former Secretary of Defense. Currently the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus) at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering. He is also a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. He serves as director of the Preventive Defense Project. He is an expert in U.S. foreign policy, national security and arms control. In 2013 he founded the William J Perry Project (http://www.wjperryproject.org/), a non-profit effort to educate the public on the current dangers of nuclear weapons. [www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/william-perry-nuclear-weapons-proliferation-214604](http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/william-perry-nuclear-weapons-proliferation-214604))

At this naked moment in the American experiment, when many people perceive civilization on the verge of blowing up in some metaphorical sense, there is an elderly man in California hoping to seize your attention about another possibility. It is that civilization is on the verge of blowing up in a non-metaphorical sense. William J. Perry is 89 now, at the tail end of one of his generation’s most illustrious careers in national security. By all rights, the former U.S. secretary of Defense, a trained mathematician who served or advised nearly every administration since Eisenhower, should be filling out the remainder of his years in quiet reflection on his achievements. Instead, he has set out on an urgent pilgrimage. Bill Perry has become, he says with a rueful smile, “a prophet of doom.” His life’s work, most of it highly classified, was nuclear weapons—how to maximize the fearsome deterrent power of the U.S. arsenal, how to minimize the possibility that the old Soviet arsenal would obliterate the United States and much of the planet along the way. Perry played a supporting role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, during which he went back to his Washington hotel room each night, fearing he had only hours left to live. He later founded his own successful defense firm, helped revolutionize the American way of high-tech war, and honed his diplomatic skills seeking common ground on security issues with the Soviets and Chinese—all culminating as head of the Pentagon in the early years after the end of the Cold War. Nuclear bombs are an area of expertise Perry had assumed would be largely obsolete by now, seven decades after Hiroshima, a quarter-century after the fall of the Soviet Union, and in the flickering light of his own life. Instead, nukes are suddenly—insanely, by Perry’s estimate—once again a contemporary nightmare, and an emphatically ascendant one. At the dawn of 2017, there is a Russian president making bellicose boasts about his modernized arsenal. There is an American president-elect who breezily free-associates on Twitter about starting a new nuclear arms race. Decades of cooperation between the two nations on arms control is nearly at a standstill. And, unlike the original Cold War, this time there is a world of busy fanatics excited by the prospect of a planet with more bombs—people who have already demonstrated the desire to slaughter many thousands of people in an instant, and are zealously pursuing ever more deadly means to do so. And there’s one other difference from the Cold War: Americans no longer think about the threat every day. Nuclear war isn’t the subtext of popular movies, or novels; disarmament has fallen far from the top of the policy priority list. The largest upcoming generation, the millennials, were raised in a time when the problem felt largely solved, and it’s easy for them to imagine it’s still quietly fading into history. The problem is, it’s no longer fading. “Today, the danger of some sort of a nuclear catastrophe is greater than it was during the Cold War,” Perry said in an interview in his Stanford office, “and most people are blissfully unaware of this danger.” It is a turn of events that has an old man newly obsessed with a question: Why isn’t everyone as terrified as he is? Perry’s hypothesis for the disconnect is that much of the population, especially that rising portion with no clear memories of the first Cold War, is suffering from a deficit of comprehension. Even a single nuclear explosion in a major city would represent an abrupt and possibly irreversible turn in modern life, upending the global economy, forcing every open society to suspend traditional liberties and remake itself into a security state. “The political, economic and social consequences are beyond what people understand,” Perry says. And yet many people place this scenario in roughly the same category as the meteor strike that supposedly wiped out the dinosaurs—frightening, to be sure, but something of an abstraction. So Perry regards his last great contribution of a 65-year career as a crusade to stimulate the public imagination—to share the vivid details of his own nightmares. He is doing so in a recent memoir, in a busy public speaking schedule, in half-empty hearing rooms on Capitol Hill, and increasingly with an online presence aimed especially at young people. He has enlisted the help of his 28-year-old granddaughter to figure out how to engage a new generation, including through a series of virtual lectures known as a MOOC, or massive open online course. He is eagerly signing up for “Ask Me Anything” chats on Reddit, in which some people still confuse him with William “The Refrigerator” Perry of NFL fame. He posts his ruminations on YouTube, where they give Katy Perry no run for her money, even as the most popular are closing in on 100,000 views. One of the nightmare scenarios Perry invokes most often is designed to roust policymakers who live and work in the nation’s capital. The terrorists would need enriched uranium. Due to the elaborate and highly industrial nature of production, hard to conceal from surveillance, fissile material is still hard to come by—but, alas, far from impossible. Once it is procured, with help from conspirators in a poorly secured overseas commercial power centrifuge facility, the rest of the plot as Perry imagines it is no great technological or logistical feat. The mechanics of building a crude nuclear device are easily within the reach of well-educated and well-funded militants. The crate would arrive at Dulles International Airport, disguised as agricultural freight. The truck bomb that detonates on Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and Capitol instantly kills the president, vice president, House speaker, and 80,000 others. Where exactly is your office? Your house? And then, as Perry spins it forward, how credible would you find the warnings, soon delivered to news networks, that five more bombs are set to explode in unnamed U.S. cities, once a week for the next month, unless all U.S. military personnel overseas are withdrawn immediately? If this particular scenario does not resonate with you, Perry can easily rattle off a long roster of others—a regional war that escalates into a nuclear exchange, a miscalculation between Moscow and Washington, a computer glitch at the exact wrong moment. They are all ilks of the same theme—the dimly understood threat that the science of the 20th century is set to collide with the destructive passions of the 21st. “We’re going back to the kind of dangers we had during the Cold War,” Perry said. “I really thought in 1990, 1991, 1992, that we left those behind us. We’re starting to re-invent them. We and the Russians and others don’t understand that what we’re doing is re-creating those dangers—or maybe they don’t remember the dangers. For younger people, they didn’t live through those dangers. But when you live through a Cuban Missile Crisis up close and you live through a false alarm up close, you do understand how dangerous it is, and you believe you should do everything you could possibly do to [avoid] going back.” For people who follow the national security priesthood, the dire scenarios are all the more alarming for who is delivering them. Through his long years in government Perry invariably impressed colleagues as the calmest person in the room, relentlessly rational, such that people who did not know him well—his love of music and literature and travel—regarded his as a purely analytical mind, emotion subordinated to logic and duty. Starting in the 1950s as a technology executive and entrepreneur in some of the most secretive precincts of the defense industry, he gradually took on a series of high-level government assignments that gave him one of the most quietly influential careers of the Cold War and its aftermath. Fifteen years before serving as Bill Clinton’s secretary of defense, Perry was the Pentagon official in charge of weapons research during the Carter administration. It was from this perch that he may have had his most far-reaching impact, and left him in some circles as a legendary figure. He used his office to give an essential push to two ideas that transformed warfare over the next generation decisively to American advantage. One idea was stealth technology, which allowed U.S. warplanes to fly over enemy territory undetected. The other was precision-guided munitions, which allowed U.S. bombs to land with near-perfect accuracy. During the Clinton years, Perry so prized his privacy that he initially turned down the job of Defense secretary—changing his mind only after Clinton and Al Gore pleaded with him that the news media scrutiny wouldn’t be so bad. The reputation he built over a life in the public sphere is starkly at odds with this latest highly impassioned chapter of Perry’s career. Harold Brown, who also is 89, first recruited Perry into government, and was Perry’s boss while serving as Defense secretary in the Carter years. “No one would have thought of Bill Perry as a crusader,” he says. “But he is on a crusade.” Lee Perry, his wife of nearly 70 years, is living in an elder care facility, her once buoyant presence now lost to dementia. Perry himself, lucid as ever, has seen his physical frame become frail and stooped. Rather than slowing his schedule, he has accelerated his travels to plead with people to awaken to the danger. A trip to Washington includes a dinner with national security reporters and testimony on Capitol Hill. Back home in California, he’s at the Google campus to prod engineers to contemplate that their world may not last long enough for their dreams of technology riches to come true. He’s created an advocacy group, the William J. Perry project, devoted to public education about nuclear weapons. He’s enlisted both his granddaughter and his 64-year-old daughter, Robin Perry, in the cause. But if his profile is rising, his style is essentially unchanged. He is a man known for self-effacement, trying to shape an era known for relentless self-promotion, a voice of quiet precision in a time of devil-take-the-hindmost bombast. The rational approach to problem-solving that propelled his career and won him adherents and friends in both political parties and even among some of America’s erstwhile enemies remains his guide—in this case, by endeavoring to calculate the possibilities and probabilities of a terrorist attack, regional nuclear war, or horrible miscalculation with Russia. “I want to be very clear,” he said. “I do not think it is a probability this year or next year or anytime in the foreseeable future. But the consequence is so great, we have to take it seriously. And there are things to greatly lower those possibilities that we’re simply not doing.” \*\*\* Perry really did not expect he would have to write this chapter of his public life. His official career closed with what seemed then an unambiguous sense of mission accomplished. By the time he arrived in the Pentagon’s top job in 1994, the Cold War was over, and the main item on the nuclear agenda seemed to be cleaning up no-longer-needed arsenals. As defense secretary, Perry stood with his Russian counterpart, Pavel Grachev, as they jointly blew up missile silos in the former Soviet Union and tilled sunflower seeds in the dirt. “I finally thought by the end of the ‘80s we lived through this horrible experience and it’s behind us,” Perry said. “When I was secretary, I fully believed it was behind us.” After leaving the Pentagon, he accepted an assignment from Clinton to negotiate an end to North Korea’s nuclear development program—and seemed agonizingly close to a breakthrough as the last days of the president’s term expired. Now, he sees his grandchildren inheriting a planet possibly more dangerous than it was during his public career. No one could doubt that the Sept. 11 terrorists would have gladly used nuclear bombs instead of airplanes if they had had them, and it seems only a matter of time until they try. Instead of a retreating threat in North Korea, that fanatical regime now possesses as many as eight nuclear bombs, and is just one member of a growing nuclear club. Far from a new partnership with Russia, Vladimir Putin has given old antagonisms a malevolent new face. American policymakers talk of spending up to $1 trillion to modernize the nuclear arsenal. And now comes Donald Trump with a long trail of statements effectively shrugging his shoulders about a world newly bristling with bombs and people with reasons to use them. Perry knew Hillary Clinton well professionally, and says he admired both her and Bill Clinton for their professional judgment though he was never a personal intimate of either. He was prescient before the election in expressing skepticism about how voters would respond to the dynastic premise of the Clinton campaign—a healthy democracy should grow new voices—but was as surprised as everyone else on Election Day. Donald Trump was not the voice he was looking for, to put it mildly, but he has responded to the Trump cyclone with modulated restraint. Perry said he assumes his most truculent rhetoric isn’t serious, the utterances of a man who assumed his words were for political effect only and had no real consequences. Now that they do, Perry is hoping to serve as a kind of ambassador to rationality. He said he is hoping for audiences soon, with Trump if the incoming president will see him, and certainly Trump’s national security team, which includes several people Perry knows, including Defense Secretary nominee James Mattis. There is little doubt the message if the meeting comes. “We are starting a new Cold War,” he says. “We seem to be sleepwalking into this new nuclear arms race. … We and the Russians and others don’t understand what we are doing.” “I am not suggesting that this Cold War and this arms race is identical to the old one,” Perry added. “But in many ways, it is just as bad, just as dangerous. And totally unnecessary.” \*\*\* Perry had been brooding over the question for a year. It was in the early 1950s, he was still in his 20s, and the subject was partial differential equations—the topic of his Ph.D. thesis. A particular problem had been absorbing him, day in and day out, hours and hours on end. Then, out of nowhere, a light came on. “I woke up in the middle of the night, and it was all there,” Perry recalled. “It was all there, and I got out of bed and sat down. The next two or three hours, I wrote my thesis, and from the first word I wrote down, I never doubted what the last word was going to be: It was a magic moment.” The story is a reminder of something definitional about Bill Perry. Before he became in recent years an apostle of disarmament, before he sat atop the nation’s war-making apparatus in the 1990s, before he was the executive of a defense contractor specializing in the most complex arenas of Cold War surveillance in the 1960s, he was a young man in love with mathematics. In those days, Perry had planned on a career as a math professor. His attraction to math was not merely practical, in the way that engineers or architects rely on math. The appeal was just as much aesthetic, in ways that people who are not numbers people—political life tends to be dominated by word people—cannot easily comprehend. To Perry’s mind, there was a purity to math, a beauty to the patterns and relationships, that was not unlike music. Math for Perry represented analytical discipline, a way of achieving mastery not only over numerical problems but any hard problem, by breaking it down into essential parts, distilling complexity into simplicity. This trait was why Pentagon reporters in the 1990s liked spending time around Perry. When most public officials are asked a question, one studies the transcript later to decipher a succession of starts and stalls, sentence fragments and ellipses, that cumulatively convey an impressionistic sense of mind but no clear fixed meaning. Perry’s sentences, by contrast, always cut with surgical precision. It was one reason Clinton White House officials often held their breath when he gave interviews—Perry might make news by being clear on subjects, such as ethnic warfare in the Balkans or a nuclear showdown in North Korea, that the West Wing preferred to try to fog over. “I’ve never been able to attack a policy problem with a mathematical formula,” he recalled, “but I have always believed that the rigorous way of thinking about a problem was good. It separated the fact from the bullshit, and that’s very important sometimes, to separate what you can from what you would hope you can do.” Perry wishes more people were familiar with the concept of “expected value.” That is a statistical way of understanding events of very large magnitude that have a low probability. The large magnitude event could be something good, like winning a lottery ticket. Or it could be something bad, like a nuclear bomb exploding. Because the odds of winning the lottery are so low, the rational thing is to save your money and not buy the ticket. As for a nuclear explosion, by Perry’s lights, the consequences are so grave that the rational thing would be for people in the United States and everywhere to be in a state of peak alarm about their vulnerability, and for political debate to be dominated by discussion of how to reduce the risk. And just how high is the risk? The answer of course is ultimately unknowable. Perry’s point, though, is that it’s a hell of a lot higher than you think. Perry invites his listeners to consider all the various scenarios that might lead to a nuclear event. “Mathematically speaking, you add those all together in one year it is still just a possibility, not a probability,” he reckons. “But then you go out ten, twenty years and each time this possibility repeats itself, and then it starts to become a probability. How much time we have to get those possibility numbers lower, I don’t know. But sooner or later the odds are going to get us, I am afraid.” \*\*\* Almost uniquely among living Americans, Bill Perry has actually faced down the prospect of nuclear war before—twice. In the fall of 1962, Bill Perry was 35, father of five young children, living in the Bay Area and serving as director of Sylvania’s Electronic Defense Laboratories—driving his station wagon to recitals in between studying missile trajectories and the radius of nuclear detonations. Where he resided was not then called Silicon Valley, but the exuberance and spirit of creative possibility we now associate with the region was already evident. The giants then were Bill Hewlett and David Packard, men Perry deeply admired and wished to emulate in his own business career. The innovation engine at that time, however, was not consumer technology; it was the government’s appetite for advantage in a mortal struggle against a powerful Soviet foe. Perry was known as a star in the highly complex field of weapons surveillance and interpretation. So it was not a surprise, one bright October day, for Perry to get a call from Albert “Bud” Wheelon, a friend at the Central Intelligence Agency. Wheelon said he wanted Perry in Washington for a consultation. Perry said he’d juggle his schedule and be there the next week. “No,” Wheelon responded. “I need to see you right away.” Perry caught the red-eye from San Francisco, and went straight to the CIA, where he was handed photographs whose meaning was instantly clear to him. They were of Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba. For the next couple weeks, Perry would stay up past midnight each evening poring over the latest reconnaissance photos and help write the analysis that senior officials would present the next morning to President Kennedy. Perry experienced the crisis partly as ordinary citizen, hearing Kennedy on television draw an unambiguous line against Soviet missiles in this hemisphere and promising that any attack would be met with “a full retaliatory response.” But he possessed context, about the capabilities of weapons and the daily state of play in the crisis, that gave him a vantage point superior to that of all but perhaps a few dozen people. “I was part of a small team—six or eight people,” he recounted of those days 54 years earlier. “Half of them technical experts, half of them intelligence analysts, or photo interpreters. It was a minor role but I was seeing all the information coming in. I thought every day when I went back to the hotel it was the last day of my life because I knew exactly what nuclear weapons could do. I knew it was not just a lot of people getting killed. It was the end of civilization and I thought it was about to happen.” It was years later that Perry, like other more senior participants in the crisis, learned how right that appraisal was. Nuclear bombs weren’t only heading toward Cuba on Soviet ships, as Kennedy believed and announced to Americans at the time. Some of them were already there, and local commanders had been given authority to use them if Americans launched a preemptive raid on Cuba, as Kennedy was being urged, goaded even, by Air Force Gen. Curtis LeMay and other military commanders. At the same time, Soviet submarines were armed and one commander had been on the verge of launching them until other officers on the vessel talked him out of it. Either event would have in turn sent U.S. missiles flying. The Cuban Missile Crisis recounting is one of the dramatic peaks in “My Journey on the Nuclear Brink,” the memoir Perry published last fall. It is a book laced with other close calls—like November 9, 1979, when Perry was awakened in the middle of the night by a watch officer at the North American Aerospace and Defense Command (NORAD) reporting that his computers showed 200 Soviet missiles in flight toward the United States. For a frozen moment, Perry thought: This is it—This is how it ends. The watch officer soon set him at ease. It was a computer error, and he was calling to see whether Perry, the technology expert, had any explanation. It took a couple days to discover the low-tech answer: Someone had carelessly left a crisis-simulation training tape in the computer. All was well. But what if this blunder had happened in the middle of a real crisis, with leaders in Washington and Moscow already on high alert? The inescapable conclusion was the same as it was in 1962: The world skirting nuclear Armageddon as much by good luck as by skilled crisis management. Perry is part of a distinct cohort in American history, one that didn’t come home with the large-living ethos of the World War II generation, but took responsibility for cleaning up the world that the war bequeathed. He was a 14-year-old in Butler, Pennsylvania when he heard the news of the Pearl Harbor attack in a friend’s living room, and had the disappointed realization that the war might be over by the time he was old enough to fight in it. That turned out to be true—he was just shy of 18 at war’s end—a fact that places Perry in what demographers have called the “Silent Generation,” too young for one war but already middle-aged by the time college campuses erupted over Vietnam. Like many in his generation, Perry was not so much silent as deeply dutiful, with an understated style that served as a genial, dry-witted exterior to a life in which success was defined by how faithfully one met his responsibilities. Perry said he became aware, first gradually and over time profoundly, of the surreal contradictions of his professional life. His work—first at Sylvania and then at ESL, a highly successful defense contracting firm he co-founded in 1963—was relentlessly logical, analyzing Soviet threats and intentions and coming up with rational responses to deter them. But each rational move was part of a supremely irrational dynamic—“mutually assured destruction”—that placed the threat of massive casualties at the heart of America’s basic strategic thinking. It was the kind of framework in which policymakers could accept that a mere 25 million people dead was good news. Also the kind that in one year alone led the United States to produce 8,000 nuclear bombs. By the end, the Cold War left the planet with about 70,000 bombs (a total that is now down to about 15,500). “I think probably everybody who was involved in nuclear weapons in those days would see the two sides of it,” Perry recalls, “the logic of deterrence and the madness of deterrence, and there was no mistake, I think, that the acronym was MAD.” \*\*\* Perry has been at the forefront of a movement that he considers the sane and only alternative, and he has joined forces with other leading Cold Warriors who in another era would likely have derided their vision as naïve. In January 2007, he was a co-author of a remarkable commentary that ran on the op-ed page of the Wall Street Journal. It was signed also by two former secretaries of state, George Schulz and Henry Kissinger and by Sam Nunn, a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee—all leading military hawks and foreign policy realists who came together to argue for something radical: that the goal of U.S. policy should be not merely the reduction and control of atomic arms, it should be the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons. This sounded like gauzy utopianism, especially bizarre coming from supremely pragmatic men. But Perry and the others always made clear they were describing a long-term ideal, one that would only be achieved through a series of more incremental steps. The vision was stirring enough that it was endorsed by President Obama in his opening weeks in office, in a March 2009 address in Prague. In retrospect, Obama’s speech may have been the high point for the vision of abolition. “A huge amount of progress was made,” recalled Shultz, now 93. “Now it is going in the other direction.” “We have less danger of an all-out war with Russia,” in Nunn’s view. “But we have more danger of some type of accident, miscalculation, cyber interference, a terrorist group getting a nuclear weapon. It requires a lot more attention than world leaders are giving it.” Perry’s goal now is much more defensive than it was just a few years ago—halting what has become inexorable momentum toward reviving Cold War assumptions about the central role of nukes in national security. More recently he’s added yet another recruit to his cause: California Governor Jerry Brown. Brown, now 78, met Perry a year ago, after deciding that he wanted to devote his remaining time in public service mainly to what he sees as civilization’s two existential issues, climate change and nuclear weapons. Brown said he became fixated on spreading Perry’s message after reading his memoir: He recently gave a copy to President Obama and is trying to bend the ear of others with influence in Washington. If Bill Perry has a gift for understatement, Brown has a gift for the theatrical. In an interview at the governor’s mansion in Sacramento, he wonders why everyone is not paying attention to his new friend and his warnings for mankind. “He is at the brink! At the brink! Not WAS at the brink—IS at the brink,” Brown exclaimed. “But no one else is.” A California governor can have more influence, at least indirectly, than one might think, due to the state’s outsized role in policy debates and the fact that the University of California’s Board of Regents helps manage some of the nation’s top weapons laboratories, which study and design nuclear weapons. Brown, who was a vocal critic in the 1980s of what he called America's "nuclear addiction," reviewed Perry's recent memoir in the New York Review of Books, and said he is determined to help his new friend spread his message. “Everybody is, 'we are not at the brink,' and we have this guy Perry who says we are. It is the thesis that is being ignored." Even if more influential people wake up to Perry’s message—a nuclear event is more likely and will be more terrible than you realize—a hard questions remains: Now what? This is where Perry’s pragmatism comes back into play. The smartest move, he thinks, is to eliminate the riskiest part of the system. If we can’t eliminate all nukes, Perry argues, we could at least eliminate one leg of the so-called nuclear triad, intercontinental ballistic missiles. These are especially prone to an accidental nuclear war, if they are launched by accident or due to miscalculation by a leader operating with only minutes to spare. Nuclear weapons carried by submarines beneath the sea or aboard bomber planes, he argues, are logically more than enough to deter Russia. The problem, he knows, is that logic is not necessarily the prevailing force in political debates. Psychology is, and this seems to be dictating not merely that we deter a Russian military force that is modernizing its weapons but that we have a force that is self-evidently superior to them. It is an argument that strikes Perry as drearily familiar to the old days. Which leads him the conclusion that the only long-term way out is to persuade a younger generation to make a different choice. His granddaughter, Lisa Perry, is precisely in the cohort he needs to reach. At first she had some uncomfortable news for her grandfather: Not many in her generation thought much about the issue. “The more I learned from him about nuclear weapons the more concerned I was that my generation had this massive and dangerous blind spot in our understanding of the world,” she said in an interview. “Nuclear weapons are the biggest public health issue I can think of.” But she has not lost hope that their efforts can make a difference, and today she has put her graduate studies in public health on hold to work full time for the Perry Project as its social media and web manager. “It can be easy to get discouraged about being able to do anything to change our course,” she said. “But the good news is that nuclear weapons are actually something that we as humans can control...but first we need to start the conversation.” It was with her help that Perry went on Reddit to field questions ranging from how his PhD in mathematics prepared him to what young people need to understand. “As a 90s baby I never lived in the Cold War era,” wrote one participant, with the Reddit username BobinForApples. “What is one thing today's generations will never understand about life during the Cold War?” Perry’s answered, as SecDef19: “Because you were born in the 1990s, you did not experience the daily terror of ‘duck and cover’ drills as my children did. Therefore the appropriate fear of nuclear weapons is not part of your heritage, but the danger is just as real now as it was then. It will be up to your generation to develop the policies to deal with the deadly nuclear legacy that is still very much with us.” For the former defense secretary, the task now is to finally—belatedly—prove Einstein wrong. The physicist said in 1946: “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” In Perry’s view the only way to avoid it is by directly contemplating catastrophe—and doing so face to face with the world’s largest nuclear power, Russia, as he recently did in a forum in Luxembourg with several like-minded Russians he says are brave enough to speak out about nuclear dangers in the era of Putin. “We could solve it,” he said. “When you’re a prophet of doom, what keeps you going is not just prophesizing doom but saying there are things we do to avoid that doom. That’s where the optimism is.”

#### 5] outwiehgs bare life – biological death precondition to addressing it

### 1NC – Democracy -- TL

#### T/L – They do not change the model of democratic government – hold the line on the inevitable 1ar “no link” – the Schudson evidence just doesn’t have a warrant, is prescriptive about what a democracy ought to be, and isn’t the pragmatic objectivity they strive for bc it focuses on a guide to democracy not a move to objectivity.

#### No generic “press freedom” reinvigorate new forms of democracy – 1) resolution presumes press freedom already exists so their scenario is non-unique 2) freedom would entail the right to report on whatever, however which entails advocacy 3) their social change internal link IS the democracy internal link that we are impact turning

#### Reject laundry lists – bunch of underdeveloped impacts without real internal links or warrants – means you should err heavily neg.

#### They don’t solve any of this biopolitics stuff – their evidence is about media regulations which are inevitable – Congressional attempts to reign in Big Tech, barring sedition, and criticizing hate speech all prove there are inevitable constraints. Independently, they can’t solve surveillance – it’s an essential component of modern democracy in response to the terrorism that democracy caused – only voting neg solves their terminal.

### 1NC – Turn -- DPT

**Democracy doesn’t solve war---it increases hostility.**

**Ghatak et al. 17**—Sam Ghatak is a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Tennessee Knoxville; Aaron Gold is a PhD Student in Political Science at UT Knoxville; Brandon C. Prins is a Professor and Director of Graduate Studies of Political Science at UT Knoxville [“External threat and the limits of democratic pacifism,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 141-159, Emory Libraries]

Conclusion It has become a **stylized fact** that dyadic democracy lowers the hazard of armed conflict. While the Democratic Peace has faced many challenges, we believe the most significant challenge has come from the argument that the pacifying effect of democracy is **epiphenomenal to territorial issues**, specifically the external threats that they pose. This argument sees the lower hazards of armed conflict among democracies **not** as a product of shared norms or institutional structures, but as a **result of settled borders**. Territory, though, remains only one geo-political context generating threat, insecurity, and a higher likelihood of armed conflict. Strategic rivalry also serves as an environment associated with fear, a lack of trust, and an expectation of future conflict. Efforts to assess democratic pacifism have largely **ignored rivalry** as a context conditioning the behavior of democratic leaders. To be sure, research demonstrates rivals to have higher probabilities of armed conflict and democracies rarely to be rivals. But fundamental to the Democratic Peace is the notion that even in the face of difficult security challenges and salient issues, dyadic democracy will associate with a lower likelihood of militarized aggression. But the presence of an **external threat**, be that threat disputed territory or strategic rivalry, may be the key mechanism by which democratic leaders, owing to **audience costs**, **resolve** and **electoral pressures**, **fail to resolve problems nonviolently**. This study has sought a ‘‘hard test’’ of the Democratic Peace by testing the conditional effects of joint democracy on armed conflict when external threat is present. We test three measures of threat: territorial contention, strategic rivalry, and a threat index that sums the first two measures. For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of our dependent variable: fatal MID onset, and event data from the Armed Conflict Database, which can be found in our Online Appendix. As most studies report, democratic dyads are associated with less armed conflict than mixed-regime and autocratic dyads. In every one of our models, when we control for each measure of external threat, joint democracy is strongly negative and significant and each measure of threat is strongly positive and significant. Here, liberal institutions maintain their pacific ability and external threats clearly increase conflict propensities. However, when we test the **interactive relationship** between democracy and our measures of external threat, the pacifying effect of democracy is **less visible**. Park and James (2015) find some evidence that when faced with an external threat in the form of territorial contention, the pacifying effect of joint democracy holds up. This study does not fully support the claims of Park and James (2015). Using a longer timeframe, we find more **consistent evidence** that when faced with an external threat, be it territorial contention, strategic rivalry, or a combination, **democratic pacifism does not survive**. What are the implications of our study? First, while it is clear that we do not observe a large amount of armed conflict among democratic states, if we organize interstate relationships along a continuum from highly hostile to highly friendly, we are probably observing what Goertz et al. (2016) and Owsiak et al. (2016) refer to as ‘‘lesser rivalries’’ in which ‘‘both the frequency and severity of violent interaction decline. Yet, the sentiments of threat, enmity, and competition that remain—along with the persistence of unresolved issues—mean that lesser rivalries still experience isolated violent episodes (e.g., militarized interstate disputes), diplomatic hostility, and non-violent crises’’ (Owsiak et al., 2016). Second, our findings show that the pacific benefits of **liberal institutions** or externalized **norms** are **not** always able to lower the likelihood of armed conflict when faced with external threats, whether those hazards are disputed territory, strategic rivalry, or a combination of the two. The structural environment clearly influences democratic leaders in their foreign policy actions more than has heretofore been appreciated. **Audience costs**, **resolve**, and **electoral pressures**, produced from external threats, are **powerful forces** that are present even in jointly democratic relationships. These forces make it difficult for leaders to **trust one another**, which **inhibits conflict resolution** and facilitates persistent **hostility**. It does appear, then, that there is a **limit** to the Democratic Peace.

**BUT---pursuit of democracy now uniqely causes nuclear war with China, Russia, and Iran.**

**Miller 17** (Benjamin; 4/27/17; Professor of International Relations at the School of Political Sciences, The University of Haifa; The International Security Studies Forum; “Policy Series: Will Trumpism increase the Danger of War in the International System?: IR Theory and the Illiberal Turn in World Politics”; <https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5ag-war>; DOA: 12/6/17)

Some realists might, however, not see these recent developments as necessarily leading to more conflict, although they may not see them as leading to stable peace either.[22] In the eyes of these realists, the seemingly unconditional U.S. security umbrella for America’s allies has **allowed them to ‘free-ride’** on the U.S. commitment and to **avoid allocating** the **necessary resources** for their own national defense.[23] Moreover, some of the allies have been **provocative toward** their **opponents**, while relying on the U.S. security umbrella. This could **cause** **unnecessary conflict**. Especially provocative toward Russia, for example, was the enlargement of NATO to the east and the EU economic agreement with Ukraine in 2014. Such anti-Russian expansionist Western moves, in the realist view, compelled Moscow to **behave** more **assertively** and to **annex Crimea** and to **intervene in** Eastern **Ukraine**.[24] Somewhat similarly, it seems **less costly** for American allies in East Asia to engage in maritime conflicts with China so long they are under the U.S. protective shield. Realists believe that moving away from such ever-growing commitments will **stabilize the international system**, or at the very least **reduce** the likelihood of a **great-power conflict**. The realists are especially concerned about the American policies to shape the domestic character of other states, particularly by advancing democracy-promotion, “nation-building,” and the universal protection of human rights.[25] In this context they highlight what they see as **disastrous** American **military interventions**, notably, in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011 and also the continuously costly intervention in Afghanistan since 2001. In their eyes such military interventions are not necessary for the protection of American national interests. Moreover, such military engagements are **unlikely to succeed** and in many cases are **de-stabilizing** and are causing unnecessary conflicts. Such interventions simply **increase the perceived threat** posed by the U.S. to some other countries. Thus, lessening—if not **completely abandoning**—the U.S. commitment to advance these liberal values is likely, in realist eyes, to **stabilize the international system** and to **serve well** the American national security interests. Even though liberals see trade as a major pacifying mechanism, realists view trade—and economic interdependence more broadly—as potential sources for conflict.[26] They highlight the earlier U.S. trade conflicts with Japan and currently with Mexico and China. Thus, moving away from free trade might diffuse conflicts rather than accelerate them. Moreover, there is a growing populist opposition in the West to globalization. In this sense, it cannot work as a useful recipe for the promotion of peace. Similarly, despite the high levels of economic interdependence between Japan and China, for example, such interdependence does not prevent conflict between them and definitely does not result in stable peace even if it might have helped to prevent a shooting war between them, at least thus far. Realists are also skeptical about the ability of international institutions to advance stable peace.[27] Such institutions are not independent actors, which can influence the behavior of the member-states in important ways. International institutions just reflect the balance of power among states. States follow their national interests, and even more so in this age of rising nationalism. Thus we **cannot** expect much from the ability of international institutions to **pacify intense conflicts**, especially among the great powers. Even the most remarkable of international intuitions—the EU—has recently **failed in advancing cooperation** among its members with regard to the key issues of immigration, terrorism and the Euro financial crisis. Realists might be a bit skeptical about a potential reconciliation between the U.S. and Russia based on factors such as the personal friendship between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin or the supposedly common traditional/illiberal values of key figures in their respective administrations. Yet, the presence of a common enemy might be a good source of friendship. In this sense the Islamic State and perhaps even China create a potential basis for cooperation and avoidance of conflict between Moscow and Washington. But on the whole this will not advance a high-level ‘warm’ peace in Europe or elsewhere; rather it may, at most, lead to some kind of an unstable spheres-of-influence arrangement, which is unlikely to endure for an extended period. In sum, while liberals offer a menu of mechanisms for promoting peace, these mechanisms seem now **under assault** or in some process of weakening **under Trumpism** and the illiberal turn in quite a few other countries. Realists, for their part, do not believe in the far-reaching peace-producing effects of such liberal mechanisms. They tend to see some level of great-power competition as the natural order under international anarchy. Realists at most expect that there will be some stabilizing effects of deterrence, especially **nuclear deterrence**, and of the balance of power among the great powers. These kind of factors might — also under Trumpism—**maintain world stability** and **prevent war** even if some level of great-power conflict is expected to endure at any rate. The **most effective instrument** for cooperation—applicable even under the illiberal turn– is based on common threats faced by the great powers such as large-scale terrorism or risky behavior by a small nuclear power such as North Korea and potentially Iran. Evaluation of the Realist and the Liberal Views At this stage, less than three months into the Trump administration, it is quite difficult to determine which approach is right. Still, on the whole, we might be able to distinguish between short-term versus long-term effects and among different types of peace. In the short-term, **realists** may **have a point**: the avoidance of American interventions for democracy-promotion and humanitarian interventions might **stabilize the international system**. The key American adversaries—Russia, China, and Iran— will be **less troubled** by regime–change strategies or ‘color revolutions’ advanced by the U.S. that are **perceived to be posing major threats** to their regimes. The eastward expansion of NATO and the EU, which realists argue has provoked Russia, **will** also **stop**. Such reassurances are likely to **increase stability** in international politics and to produce at least a ‘cold peace’ in the international system and in key regions.

### 1NC – Turn - CCP

#### Collapse of democracy’s inevitable – transition to Chinese autocracy solves.

Schiavenza ’17 (Matt; 1/19/17; Senior Content Manager at Asia Society; Asia Society; “Could China's System Replace Democracy?”; <http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/could-chinas-system-replace-democracy>; DOA: 12/6/17)

Two decades later, this notion seems increasingly unfeasible. **Democracy is** **struggling**. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies has **fallen since** reaching a peak in **2006**. The world’s non-democracies, meanwhile, have become **more authoritarian**. Russia, once a tentative democracy, is now under the control of Vladimir Putin, a **nationalist leader** whose regime has centralized power, targeted opposition journalists, and seized sovereign territory of other countries. Then there’s China. For years, conventional wisdom stated that as the People’s Republic grew more prosperous, the country would naturally transition to a liberal democracy. But this prediction — dubbed the “China Fantasy” by the author James Mann — has not happened. If anything, China’s economic success has only **further solidified the C**hinese **C**ommunist **P**arty: The current ruler, Xi Jinping, is widely considered to be the country’s **most powerful** since Deng Xiaoping. Democracy’s ill health has also **infected the U**nited **S**tates **and Europe**. The president of Hungary, a formerly Communist state whose accession to the European Union in 2004 was a triumph for the West, has sought to “**end liberal democracy**” in his country by clamping down on press freedom and judicial independence. These trends are also evident in neighboring Poland. Far-right parties — like the United Kingdom Independence Party, the orchestrator of Brexit — have **gained popularity** across the continent. During his successful campaign for president of the United States, Donald Trump expressed, at best, an indifference toward democratic norms and ideals. Trump called for his opponent, Hillary Clinton, to be imprisoned, raised false accusations of voter fraud, threatened legal action against the media, and refused to commit to honoring the results of the election. Trump has repeatedly professed his **admiration for Putin**, Russia’s dictatorial leader, for being “**a strong leader**”; as president-elect, he **praised the Kazakh dictator** Nursultan Nazarbayev for “achieving a miracle” in his country. Where Did Democracy Go Wrong? According to Brian Klaas, author of the new book The Despot’s Accomplice: How the West Is Aiding and Abetting the Decline of Democracy, there are **three main reasons**. One is **American hypocrisy**, or, as Klaas puts it, the “Saudi effect.” President George W. Bush made democracy promotion an explicit centerpiece of American foreign policy during his second inaugural speech in 2005, yet the following year when Hamas won democratic elections to govern the Gaza Strip, the U.S. refused to honor the results. And as Washington invested billions of dollars and thousands of American lives to **impose democracy by force** in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government forged a military deal with Uzbekistan’s tyrannical regime and maintained a close relationship with Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s most repressive countries. A second reason for democracy’s decline is the **resurgence of China and Russia**. As China’s economic rise continued without interruption in the quarter-century after Tiananmen Square, observers began wondering whether the Chinese miracle was **because of**, rather than in spite of, **its autocratic government**. (The slower growth of India, a messy democracy, only seemed to strengthen this argument.) And while Russia’s economic fortunes in the Putin era have lived and died with the price of oil, there’s little question that the country is **wealthier and more stable** than it had been under Boris Yeltsin. The success of both countries, sustainable or not, seemed to indicate that democracy and growth were not necessarily co-dependent. Klaas’ third reason is the **weaknesses embedded in** modern **American democracy** itself. Last year’s presidential election was a multi-billion dollar, 18-month saga that resulted in the election of a candidate who had **never served in government** or the military and one, incidentally, who earned **three million fewer votes** than his main opponent. “Not many people looked at our election and thought that they were missing out,” Klaas told Asia Society. “I even heard a Thai general say that if ‘democracy means Donald Trump, **we don’t want it**.’” What About China's System? There’s **no doubt** that liberal democracy is in crisis. But the next question — whether plausible alternatives exist — is less certain. Consider China. The country’s ability to push through major infrastructure projects, such as a nationwide high-speed rail network, without political obstruction has dazzled Westerners frustrated at the gridlock endemic to American politics. In a 2010 episode of Meet the Press, the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman famously admitted to fantasizing that the U.S. “could be China for a day” simply as a means to get things done. Daniel Bell, a professor of political science at Shandong University in eastern China, has written extensively about the meritocratic advantages of China’s political system. Chinese leaders must pass a series of examinations and negotiate a complex bureaucracy before achieving national power. Xi Jinping may have benefited from nepotism: His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a key Mao-era official. But the Chinese president also accumulated experience as the governor of two major Chinese provinces and a stint as vice president. This, Bell argues, has given Xi legitimacy in spite of never having to face voters. “I disagree with the view that there’s only one morally legitimate way of selecting leaders: one person, one vote,” Bell said in an appearance at Asia Society in 2015. State-run media in China spun the chaotic outcome of the Arab Spring uprisings as an example of democracy’s inherent flaws. The election of Donald Trump only served to further reinforce this notion. “I remember talking to the Chinese ambassador, and he made a crack about how in the U.S. you can be a nobody one day and the next day rise to power,” said Isaac Stone Fish, a senior fellow at Asia Society, “and you can’t do that in China because you have to go through all these different levels and rise through the system.” Bell acknowledges that the Chinese system has serious drawbacks. The prohibition of free speech, ban on political opposition, and absence of an independent judiciary mean that there are no checks against official abuse of power, something that has emerged as a major crisis in the past decade in the country. The high-profile anti-corruption campaign launched by President Xi has reduced visible signs of excess, such as lavish banquets and fast cars. But critics believe that the campaign also serves as cover for Xi’s sidelining of rivals within the Communist Party. Defenders of China’s Communist Party point to the country’s near-four-decade run of economic growth as proof that the system works. But in structural terms, the modern Party is little different from the one that, under Chairman Mao, presided over widespread political persecution, a deadly famine, and a disastrous period of social upheaval known as the Cultural Revolution. Even after Deng Xiaoping reversed Mao’s policies and adopted a pragmatic economic approach, the Party has still implemented policies whose consequences threaten stability and prosperity. The One Child Policy, adopted in 1980 without public debate, created a demographic imbalance that, three decades later, has prematurely reduced China’s working-age population. Even the much-vaunted record of economic growth is built on a shaky foundation of debt-fueled investment. "There have been 30 instances in the postwar period when a country's debt increased by 40 percent over a 5-year horizon," Ruchir Sharma, an economics expert at Morgan Stanley, said of China in an appearance at Asia Society in December. “And in 100 percent of these instances, the country got into a deep economic trouble within the next five years." China has taken steps to systematize its government by introducing a mandatory retirement age for senior officials and establishing term limits for its leaders. The Communist Party’s Standing Committee of the Politburo, a seven-man body that stands atop China’s government pyramid, is designed to divide the responsibilities of government and ensure no one individual assumes too much power. The behavior of Xi Jinping over the past three years, though, has raised questions whether these norms are durable. Xi has assumed positions within the Chinese government once shared by fellow leaders and has weakened Li Keqiang, his prime minister, by denying him the office’s traditional stewardship of economic policy. Xi has abetted and re-established a cult of personality, something explicitly discouraged in China after the Maoist era, by encouraging the singing of songs in his name. And, as the Wall Street Journal recently reported, there are questions that Xi may not name a successor at this fall’s 19th Party Congress in order to continue as president beyond the customary 10-year term. The Consequences of Democracy's Decline China, for what it’s worth, has never claimed that its system of government was universally applicable. In contrast to the United States or the Soviet Union, Beijing has never tried to install its system in a foreign country by force. Even still, democracy’s decline may prove advantageous to China in other ways. For one, it would weaken the democratic movement in Hong Kong, which has vied with pro-Beijing elements for political control of the Chinese territory, and deter would-be Chinese dissidents from challenging Communist Party rule on the mainland. In addition, Klaas argues, the American absence of support for democracy leaves a vacuum in emerging states that Washington’s geopolitical rivals in Moscow and Beijing might fill. “The ‘America First’ mentality, or the mentality that it’s not our business, makes the mistake that thinking that the withdrawal of Western influence means there’s self-determination,” says Klaas. “ [But what it means is] that China and Russia control things. It’s not something where if the West leaves, then, say, Malawi will be free to choose. It’s a global foreign policy battle, and the West’s losses are China's and Russia’s gains.” Before the U.S. can promote democracy overseas, though the country may need to firm up support for it at home. A Harvard study conducted in November found that just 19 percent of American millennials believe that a military takeover is not legitimate in democracy compared to 45 percent of those older. 26 percent of millennials likewise feel that choosing leaders through free elections is “unimportant,” a sentiment shared by just 14 percent of Baby Boomers. “A lot of people growing up now don’t understand what it’s like not to live in a free society in the West,” says Klaas. “That, combined with the "end of history," assumed that democracy is the natural way of things. “In fact, democracy is the least organic and least natural way we’ve had."

#### Democracy causes CCP collapse.

Chen & Kinzelbach ’15 (Dingding Chen- assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Katrin Kinzelbach- associate director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, March 2015, “Democracy promotion and China: blocker or bystander?” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2014.999322>)

The People's Republic of China is both a decisive blocker as well as an indifferent bystander of democratization. In this article, we looked at whether and how China countervails EU and US democracy promotion at home and in its immediate neighbourhood. In terms of domestic politics, the CCP is clearly determined to withstand, repress, outperform, and outsmart home-grown as well as external pressures for democratization. It is impossible to predict how long this approach will be sustainable. With regard to China's foreign policy, we tested the hypothesis that geostrategic interests or a perceived risk of regime survival at home will lead the People's Republic to countervail democracy promotion outside its own borders as well. The case of Hong Kong confirms that a perceived risk of regime survival leads Beijing to countervail US and EU democracy support outside the Chinese mainland. Although the scope of this article did not allow for additional case studies, we consider it likely that the CCP's focus on regime-survival at home does not only trump the “one country, two systems” doctrine, but ultimately also Beijing's declared non-interference principle in foreign policy. Yet, the fact that Beijing does not seem to use its significant leverage over Myanmar to hinder democracy support is an empirical challenge to the common proposition that authoritarian China is likely to export or protect autocracy, especially in its near-abroad. Given that we view Myanmar as the most likely case with respect to strategic interests, we suggest with considerable certainty that Beijing will only counteract democratization, including US and EU democracy support, where it perceives a challenge to the CCP's survival. Where this is not the case, Beijing is likely to focus on protecting its economic and strategic interests abroad, regardless of regime type. While this finding might be taken to suggest that a focus on China's international influence should not be a priority for democracy supporters, we remain more cautious. China's economic performance has not only granted the CCP legitimacy domestically, it has also made China's development path – economic liberalization without political reform – appear desirable further afield. And the recent economic troubles in Europe and the US, in turn, have challenged the thus far common perception that democracy was required for prosperity. As democracy promoters, both the US and the EU should therefore ensure that the very real governance shortcomings in China, beyond as well as within the economic sphere, are publicly identified for what they are. Without such concerted efforts, it is likely that authoritarian China will continue to be looked at as an alternative development model, thereby challenging democracy's power of attraction.

#### Goes nuclear.

Yee & Storey ’13 (Yee and Storey 13 Herbert - Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University. Ian - Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths, and Reality 2013 p. 15)

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in **territorial fragmentation**, **civil war** and waves of **refugees** pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a **profoundly negative impact on regional stability**. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in **millions of Chinese refugees** seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a **severe strain** on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in **a**nother **nightmare scenario**—**nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local** provincial **leaders** or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also **pose a threat to** its neighbours and **the world**.

#### Autocratic Peace Theory is true – reject your cognitive bias to think otherwise

Gartzke and Wesiger 13, Erik, and Alex Weisiger. "Permanent friends? Dynamic difference and the democratic peace." International Studies Quarterly 57.1 (2013): 171-185. (Professor at UPenn in Political Science)//Elmer

The “autocratic peace” involves a class of arguments about the conflictual consequences of regime similarity and difference. Theories disagree over whether demo- cratic and autocratic relations are distinct or equivalent. Early studies of the autocratic peace typically focused on certain geographic regions. Despite having little democracy, low levels of economic development, arbitrary national borders, and widespread civil conflict, Africa experiences surprisingly little interstate war. Several stud- ies attribute the “African peace” to historical norms and to the strategic behavior of insecure leaders who recog- nize that challenging existing borders invites continental war while encouraging secessionist movements risks reci- procal meddling in the country’s own domestic affairs (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989, 1990). 6 How- ever, these arguments fail to address tensions between individual (state, leader) interests and social goods. The security dilemma implies precisely that leaders act aggres- sively despite lacking revisionist objectives (Jervis 1978). Initial statistical evidence of an autocratic peace emerged in a negative form with the observation that mixed democratic – autocratic dyads are more conflict prone than either jointly democratic or jointly autocratic dyads (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre 1997). Studies have sought systematic evidence for or against an autocratic peace. Oren and Hays (1997) evalu- ate several data sets, finding that autocracies are less war prone than democracy – autocracy pairs. Indeed, they find that socialist countries with advanced industrialized econ- omies are more peaceful than democracies. Werner (2000) finds an effect of political similarity that coexists with the widely recognized effect of joint democracy. She attributes the result to shared preferences arising from a reduced likelihood of disputes over domestic politics. Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) break down the broad category of autocracy into multiple subgroups and find evidence that shared autocratic type (personalistic dictatorships, single-party regimes, or military juntas) reduces conflict, although the observed effects are less pronounced than for joint democracy. Henderson (2002) goes further by arguing that there is no empirically verifi able democratic peace. Instead, political dissimilarity causes conflict. Souva (2004) argues and finds that simi- larity of both political and economic institutions encour- ages peace. In the most sophisticated analysis to date, Bennett (2006) finds a robust autocratic peace, though the effect is smaller than for joint democracy and limited to coherent autocratic regimes. Petersen (2004), in con- trast, uses an alternate categorization of autocracy and finds no support for the claim that similarity prevents or limits conflict. Still, the bulk of evidence suggests that similar polities are associated with relative peace, even among nondemocracies. The autocratic peace poses unique challenges for demo- cratic peace theories. Given that the democratic peace highlights apparently unique characteristics of joint democracy, many explanations are predicated on attributes found only in democratic regimes. An autocratic peace implies that scholars should focus on corollaries or conse- quences of shared regime type, in addition to, or perhaps even instead of democracy. In this context, arguments about democratic norms (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), improved democratic signaling ability (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998, 1999, 2001), the peculiar incentives imposed on leaders by democratic institutions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003), and democratic learning (Cederman 2001a) all invite additional scrutiny. While it is theoretically possible that a democratic peace and an autocratic peace could arise from independent causal processes, logical ele- gance and the empirical similarities inherent in shared regime type provide cause to explore theoretical argu- ments that spring from regime similarity in general.

### 1NC – Turn -- Drones

#### Western democracy necessitates drone warfare – democratic risk aversion frames killings from thousands of miles away as a means to transfer the risks of war further.

Demmers & Gould ’20 [Joelle Demmers - Full Professor in Conflict Studies, co-founder of the Centre for Conflict Studies and the director of the History of International Relations section of Utrecht University. She is the author of Theories of Violent Conflict (Routledge, second edition, 2017). Together with Lauren Gould she is the founder of The Intimacies of Remote Warfare programme, among their recent publications is An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare (Security Dialogue, 2018), Lauren Gould is Assistant Professor in Conflict Studies at the Centre for Conflict Studies at the History of International Relations section of Utrecht University. Together with Jolle Demmers she is the founder and the project leader of The Intimacies of Remote Warfare programme. “The Remote Warfare Paradox: Democracies, Risk Aversion and Military Engagement”, 06-20-2020, https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/85426]//pranav

Democratic risk-aversion

Authors grouped within this genre point at the appeal of remote technologies of warfare. They argue that democracies, in particular, turn to remote warfare as a way of risk-aversion. Simply put, decision makers in democracies fear losses among their own constituencies more than authoritarian leaders, because rising numbers of casualties will have adverse effects on public support and decrease their chance of re-election (Freedman 2006, 7). For one, remote technologies such as unmanned systems give human soldiers the best possible force protection: they are not exposed to the enemy at all. Grounded in classic liberal thought, and often referring to Immanuel Kant’s notion of perpetual peace, this strand of thinking sees the ‘no body bags’ call of the electorate in liberal democratic societies as restraining politicians from engaging in high-risk warfare. In his famous treatise, Kant ([1795] 1957, 12-13) provided an important insight on the risk aversion of democracies. Here he argued that when those who decide to wage war are obliged to fight and bear the costs:

(…) they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future (our emphasis).

Remote warfare, in many ways, helps overcome this problem of ‘costs’, both in terms of human lives and expenditure. The end of conscription in Western democracies, with Vietnam as an important turning point, already formed a first step of transferring risks to military professionals. But with the emergence of remote technology wars can now be fought from a distance: allowing for zero-risk warfare. Soon after the invasion of Iraq, Martin Shaw (2005) in his book on the ‘new western way of war’ argued that liberal democracies aim to ‘transfer the risks of war’ even further: away from their own professional soldiers to the civilians and armed actors of ‘the enemy’. In liberal democracies, warfare has become primarily an exercise in risk-management. For Shaw, this explains the strong preference for long-distance air strikes and drones, instead of military interventions with ground troops. In a similar vein, Coker (2009) and, more critically, Sauer and Schörnig (2012) refer to ‘war in an age of risk’, and ‘democratic warfare’ to highlight how democratic institutions and their publics are the central factors constituting the turn to remote warfare.

#### That causes hotspots to go nuclear

Zenko and Kreps, 14 -- \*Micah - Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, PhD in political science from Brandeis University; \*Sarah - Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor in the department of government and an adjunct professor at Cornell Law School, BA from Harvard University, MSc from Oxford University, and PhD from Georgetown University; “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation," Council on Foreign Relations, June 2014, http://aspheramedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Limiting\_Armed\_Drone\_Proliferation\_CSR69.pdf

The inherent advantages of drones will not alone make traditional interstate warfare more likely—such conflicts are relatively rare anyway, with only one active interstate conflict in both 2012 and 2013.20 Nor will the probable type, quantity, range, and lethality of armed drones that states possess in coming decades make a government more likely to attempt to defeat an opposing army, capture or control foreign territory, or remove a foreign leader from power. However, misperceptions over the use of armed drones increase the likelihood of militarized disputes with U.S. allies, as well as U.S. military forces, which could lead to an escalating crisis and deeper U.S. involvement. Though surveillance drones can be used to provide greater stability between countries by monitoring ceasefires or disputed borders, armed drones will have destabilizing consequences. Arming a drone, whether by design or by simply putting a crude payload on an unarmed drone, makes it a weapon, and thereby a direct national security threat for any state whose border it breaches. Increased Frequency of Interstate and Intrastate Force For the United States, drones have significantly reduced the political, diplomatic, and military risks and costs associated with the use of military force, which has led to a vast expansion of lethal operations that would not have been attempted with other weapons platforms. Aside from airstrikes in traditional conflicts such as Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan—where one-quarter of all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) airstrikes in 2012 were conducted by drones—the United States has conducted hundreds in non-battlefield settings: Pakistan (approximately 369), Yemen (approximately 87), Somalia (an estimated 16), and the Philippines (at least 1, in 2006).21 Of the estimated 473 non-battlefield targeted killings undertaken by the United States since November 2002, approximately 98 percent were carried out by drones. Moreover, despite maintaining a “strong preference” for capturing over killing suspected terrorists since September 2011, there have been only 3 known capture attempts, compared with 194 drone strikes that have killed an estimated 1,014 people, 86 of whom were civilians.22 Senior U.S. civilian and military officials, whose careers span the pre– and post–armed drone era, overwhelmingly agree that the threshold for the authorization of force by civilian officials has been significantly reduced. Former secretary of defense Robert Gates asserted in October 2013, for example, that armed drones allow decision-makers to see war as a “bloodless, painless, and odorless” affair, with technology detaching leaders from the “inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain” consequences of war.23 President Barack Obama admitted in May 2013 that the United States has come to see armed drones “as a cure-all for terrorism,” because they are low risk and instrumental in “shielding the government” from criticisms “that a troop deployment invites.”24 Such admissions from leaders of a democratic country with a system of checks and balances point to the temptations that leaders with fewer institutional checks will face. President Obama and his senior aides have stated that the United States is setting precedents with drones that other states may emulate.25 If U.S. experience and Obama’s cautionary words are any guide, states that acquire armed drones will be more willing to threaten or use force in ways they might not otherwise, within both interstate and intrastate contexts. States might undertake cross-border, interstate actions less discriminately, especially in areas prone to tension. As is apparent in the East and South China Seas, nationalist sentiments and the discovery of untapped, valuable national resources can make disputes between countries more likely. In such contested areas, drones will enable governments to undertake strike missions or probe the responses of an adversary—actions they would be less inclined to take with manned platforms. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there are approximately 430 bilateral maritime boundaries, most of which are not defined by formal agreements between the affected states.26 Beyond the cases of East Asia, other cross-border flashpoints for conflict where the low-risk proposition of drone strikes would be tempting include Russia in Georgia or Ukraine, Turkey in Syria, Sudan