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**The 1ACs descriptions of a rising China repeat the racialized tropes of Yellow Peril through the lens of techno-Orientalism which frames Asians as sub-human, unfeeling aliens whose technological success, geographic location, or large population size pose a threat to Western political ordering – none of these threats are “real” but are instead self-produced Anglo-Anxiety**

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Yellow Peril and Techno-Orientalism

The term yellow peril emerged in the late nineteenth century in response to Japan’s arrival to the geopolitical stage as a formidable military and industrial contender to the Western powers of Europe and the United States.9 The concept was further elaborated and given a tangible racial form through Sax Rohmer’s series of novels and films that provided the early content for the social imaginary of “yellow peril” along with its personification in the character of Dr. Fu Manchu, the iconic supervillain archetype of the Asian “evil criminal genius,” and his cast of minions.10 Strikingly, Dr. Fu Manchu’s characterization as evil, criminal, and genius continues to inform the racial trope of the Asian scientist spy; and more recently, we may add to the list the bioengineer, the CFO, the international graduate student, to name just a few. Moreover, the notion of the non-differentiable “yellow” masses continues to function as a homogenizing and dehumanizing device of Asian racialization, which makes possible the transference of Sinophobia to Asian xenophobia.

In its inherent attempt to construct a racial other, “yellow peril” is more a projection of Western fear than a representation of an Asian object/subject, and in this sense, it may be better understood as a repository of racial affect that can animate a myriad of representational figures, images, and discourses, depending on context. Indeed, the images and discourses of yellow peril have surfaced multiple times throughout the twentieth century, capturing a multitude of ever-shifting perceived threats that range from the danger of military intrusion (i.e., Japanese Americans during WWII), economic competition (i.e., Chinese laborers in the late nineteenth century, Japan in the 1980s), Asian moral and cultural depravity (i.e., non-Christian heathens, Chinese prostitutes, opium smokers), to biological inferiority (i.e., effeminacy, disease carriers). As Colleen Lye observes, “the incipient ‘yellow peril’ refers to a particular combinatory kind of anticolonial [and anti-West] nationalism, in which the union of Japanese technological advance and Chinese numerical mass confronts Western civilization with a potentially unbeatable force.”11 Arguably, the yellow peril of today represents heightened Western anxieties around China’s combined forces of population size, global economic growth, and rapid technological-scientific innovation—all of which emerge from a political system that is considered ideologically oppositional to ours. The current context, we suggest, is best understood through the lens of techno-Orientalism.

When the idea of techno-Orientalism first appeared in David Morley and Kevin Robins’s analysis of why Japan occupied such a threatening position in Western imagination in the late 1980s, techno-Orientalism offered a framework to make sense of the technologically imbued racist stereotypes of Japan/the Japanese that were emerging within the context of Western fears and anxieties around Japan’s ascendancy as a technological global power. They proposed that if technological advancement has been crucial to Western civilizational progress, then Japan’s technological superiority over the West also signals a critical challenge to Western hegemony, including its cultural authority to control representations of the West and its “others.” They claimed that the shifting balance in global power—the West’s loss of technological preeminence—has induced an identity crisis in the West. In response, techno-Orientalism, in which “[idioms of technology] become structured into the discourse of Orientalism,” is produced in large part to discipline Japan and its rise to techno-economic power.12 The United States, for instance, externalized its anxiety into xenophobic projections of Japan as a “culture that is cold, impersonal, and machine-like” in which its people are **“sub-human”** and **“unfeeling aliens.”**13 Techno-Orientalism, born from the “Japan Panic,” was effectively consolidated through and around political-economic concerns that frame Japanese and, by extension, Asian techno-capitalist progress as **dangerous and dystopian.**

Extending Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism,14 techno-Orientalism marks a geo-historical shift where the West no longer has control over the terms that define the East—the “Orient”—as weak, inferior, and subordinate to the West. It marks a shift not only in political-economic power but also in cultural authority. Techno-Orientalism, then, is the expressive vehicle (cultural productions and visual representations) by which Western and Eastern nations articulate their fears, desires, and anxieties that are produced in their competitive struggle to gain technological hegemony through economic trade and scientific innovation.15

Analogous to Japan’s position in the late 1980s, China currently figures into the techno-Orientalist imaginary as a powerful competitor in mass production, a global financial giant, and an aggressive investor in technological, infrastructural, and scientific developments. At the same time, the increasing purchasing power of China provokes American fear of a future global market that is economically driven by Chinese consumptive desires and practices. It is this duality—the domination of both production and consumption across different sectors of the techno-capitalist global economy—that undergirds American anxieties of a sinicized future.16

Further amplifying these anxieties around Chinese techno-economic domination is our imagination of China/the Chinese as the ultimate yellow peril, whose state ideology is oppositional to that of the United States and whose unmatched population size combined with its economic expansion and technological advancements may actually pose a real challenge to U.S. global hegemony. We turn now to examine how the ideology of yellow peril is manifesting in the current context of techno-Orientalism, beginning first with an analysis of the racial trope of “Chinese as contagion” and its connection to anti-Asian aggression.

#### The implementation of the 1AC packaged through racist representations causes material violence which outweighs. The 1AR’s claims of “Our Threats Real” is not responsive to the criticism – its not a question about the truth value of the representations but rather the proximate impact embedded in power which extends into material violence

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In the early weeks of the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States, President Trump put out many mixed messages, but he remained consistent with one—that China was to blame for the spread of the virus. Repeatedly, he insisted on calling the novel coronavirus “the Chinese virus,” despite mounting public criticism against the racialization of the deadly pathogen. Many noted the inflammatory nature of this anti-Asian rhetoric. During this same period, reports ranging from verbal **abuse** to intimidation to **physical assault** against people of Asian descent documented the sudden rise of anti-Asian **hate crimes** in the United States and globally. According to Human Rights Watch, an Asian woman in Brooklyn, New York, suffered a racially motivated **acid attack**, and in Texas, a Burmese American man and his two children were **stabbed** by a man who claimed he thought the family was “Chinese and infecting people with the coronavirus.”1 The Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council in the United States reported over **one thousand cases** of anti-Asian incidents **in a two-week period** in March 2020.2 Outside the United States, a Singaporean student in the United Kingdom was violently **kicked** and **punched** by an angry group of men after they uttered, “we don’t want your coronavirus in our country” (my emphasis).3 In Australia, a survey taken by the community group Asian Australian Alliance recorded a total of 178 reports of anti-Asian incidents in two weeks, ranging from **racial slurs** to **physical assault.**4 Though President Trump has dropped the “Chinese virus” for “kung flu” and tweeted on March 23 that “It is very important that we totally protect our Asian American community . . . the spreading of the virus is NOT their fault,” it seems that Sinophobia and racial violence against Asian Americans have been unleashed.

Make no mistake, as long as President Trump continues to take a confrontational stance, using the **rhetoric of blame against China** with the intention to punish it with new sanctions, tariffs, and even the cancellation of U.S. debt obligations,5 the **racial aggressions against Asian Americans will continue to rise,** if not intensify. By now, it is widely accepted that the novel coronavirus emerged first in Wuhan, and scientists believe that the zoonotic disease might have jumped from animals to humans at Wuhan’s Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, a wet market where vegetables, seafood, meat, and a small number of exotic wildlife were sold. Despite this, on April 30, President Trump casually offered a new theory, which Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted: that COVID had originated in the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which houses a biosafety level-4 lab, and that the virus might have “leaked” from that lab. The implicit suggestion is that China had either intentionally bioengineered the novel coronavirus to cause massive destruction, thereby attributing malice, or carelessly leaked the virus due to scientific negligence, thereby attributing incompetence. In either case, these kinds of unsubstantiated speculations work to further stoke anger and disdain against the Chinese state. More disturbingly, they traffic in the idea of China as a biotechnology threat, resonating with pre-existing filmic representations of futuristic dystopian worlds.

The immediate and unqualified responses from the scientific community reveal the danger of these potentially incendiary speculations. Responding swiftly, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a press release the morning of April 30 stating that “The Intelligence Community . . . concurs with the wide scientific consensus that the COVID-19 virus was not manmade or genetically modified . . . ” (my emphasis).6 Within days, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease, Dr. Anthony Fauci, attested that the virus “could not have been artificially or deliberately manipulated.”7 These assertions sought to extinguish any attribution of malice to the Chinese state. Even with firm contestation, however, **the very invocation of** the idea of **biotechnology warfare has** tapped into and perhaps even **fueled** our existing **techno-Orientalist anxieties.**

As the COVID pandemic story transpires in real time, engulfing the entire global community, taking unexpected twists and turns, making divergences and transgressions, we have become increasingly aware that the layers of entanglements cannot be easily parsed out, nor will we know anytime soon how and when the story will end. We offer a query into how we might assess and make sense of the intensifying Sinophobia and xenophobia in this current context. To do so, we must resist the temptation to confine our analysis to the narrow parameters of the pandemic. Rather, we insist on examining the rise of anti-Asian aggression within the concomitant vectors of the **pandemic, the** escalation of the U.S.-China **trade war, and** the growing **concerns about cyber- and techno-security.** Here we assert that the **ideology of yellow peril set within a techno-Orientalist imaginary is powerfully animating the racial form and racial affect mediating the multiple terrains of public health, technology, global trade, and national security.** While it is tempting to treat this historical conjuncture as extraordinary, it is crucial that we situate the current unfolding within the long history of Asian racialization, one that indexes the abiding tension between the political impetus to define national belonging and the shifting economic imperatives of the nation-state.8

The Contemporary Racial Repertoire of the “China/Chinese” Threat

The outbreak of the pandemic could not have had worse timing (as if it could be timed), but timing is critically important here. Its emergence amid the ongoing intensive trade war between the United States and China is significant in that the prevailing tensions between the two countries and the discourses of Chinese unfair trade competition, scientific espionage, and technological surveillance frame the reception of the pandemic. One may argue that President Trump’s insistence on blaming China for the spread of the deadly virus is yet another tactic in his administration’s sustained attempt to quell China’s economic power at the same time that it provides a foil to distract from—and a scapegoat to blame for—the economic and public health crisis in which we find ourselves.

At this particular juncture, we unfortunately have been inundated with media coverage of a plethora of accusations and actions launched against China and Chinese Americans. Within the past two years, we have witnessed the implementation of trade sanctions and tariffs against China, the removal of prominent Chinese American scientists from research institutions, and the severing of nationwide economic transactions with certain China-based telecommunications corporations, with Huawei Technologies Company being the most notable. All these have been advanced in the name of national security. The discursive formation and the representational devices that have been used to justify these state directives play a critical role in constructing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as culprit and as America’s enemy number one. These constructions, some of which will be examined in this essay, are layered upon one another, each building and elaborating on the last, and each invoking and simultaneously inciting a different set of anxieties that lie within the broader repertoire of China/ Chinese as threat. Indeed, the inundation of media about China makes it difficult, if not impossible, to decipher truth from falsehood, myth from reality, rhetoric from evidence. Our task here is not to weigh the truth-value of these representations but to treat them as ongoing contests embedded in power and to draw out their material effects. It is worth noting that while the explicit target of U.S. state aggression has been the mainland Chinese state or the PRC, the actual effects are much more wide-ranging and extend into everyday aggressions against all those who present as East Asian American.

In our examination of the variegated representations of China/Chinese, we suggest that the longstanding ideology of “yellow peril” remains not just pertinent, but extremely forceful in constructing a multifaceted repertoire of Chinese state threat and, by extension, of Chinese/Asian American threat. What is particular about this recent iteration of yellow peril is its configuration through the lens of techno-Orientalism, a framework that is primarily used to examine the explicitly fictional genres of novels, videogames, and films but that we now assert as being actively deployed in this current historical conjuncture.

**The alternative is to reject the AFF in favor of an epistemic rejection of Area Studies that define knowledge production through mapping the external world as unstable, hostile and target. Only de-centering knowledge production from the self can solve inevitable conflict and orientalist violence**

**Chow 6** (Rey, Anne Firor Scott Professor of Literature at Duke University, April 2006, “Age of the World as Target”, Rey Chow Reader) APS recut aaditg

Among the most important elements in war, writes karl von Clausewitz, are the “moral elements.”32 From the United States’ point of view, this phrase does not seem at all ironic. Just as the bombings of Afghanistan and Iraq in the first few years of the twenty-first century were justified as benevolent acts to preserve the united States and the rest of the world against “the axis of evil,” “weapons of mass destruction,” and the like, so were the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki considered pacific acts, acts that were meant to save lives and save civilization in a world threatened by German Nazism. (Though, by the time the bombs were dropped in Japan, Germany had already surrendered.) even today, some of the most educated, scientifically knowledgeable members of U.S. society continue to believe that the atomic bomb was the best way to terminate the hostilities.33 And, while the media in the united States are quick to join the media elsewhere in reporting the controversies over Japan’s refusal to apologize for its war crimes in Asia or over France’s belatedness in apologizing for the Vichy government’s persecution of the Jews, no U.S. head of state has ever visited Hiroshima or Nagasaki, or expressed regret for the nuclear holocaust.34 In this—its absolute conviction of its own moral superiority and legitimacy—lies perhaps the most deeply ingrained connection between the foundation myth of the United States as an exceptional nation and the dropping of the atomic bombs (as well as all the military and economic interventions the united States has made in nationalist struggles in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle east since the Second World War).35 even on occasions such as Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) and September 11, 2001, when the united States had to recognize that it was just part of the world (and hence could be attacked like any other country), its response was typically that of reasserting U.S. exceptionalism—This cannot happen to us! We are unique, we cannot be attacked!—by ferociously attacking others. In the decades since 1945, whether in dealing with the Soviet union, the People’s republic of China, north korea, vietnam, and countries in Central America, or during the gulf Wars, the united States has been conducting war on the basis of a certain kind of knowledge production, and producing knowledge on the basis of war. **War and knowledge** enable and **foster each other** primarily through the collective fantasizing of some foreign or alien body that poses danger to the “self” and the “eye” that is the nation. once the monstrosity of this foreign body is firmly established in the national consciousness, the decision makers of the u.S. government often talk and behave as though they had no choice but war. **War**, then, **is acted out as a moral obligation to expel an imagined** dangerous **alienness** from the united States’ self-concept as the global custodian of freedom and democracy. Put in a different way, **the “moral element,”** insofar as it produces knowledge about the “self” and “other”—and hence the “eye” and its “target”—as such, **justifies war by its very dichotomizing logic**. Conversely, **the violence of war**, once begun, **fixes the other in its attributed monstrosity and affirms the idealized image of the self.** In this regard, the pernicious stereotyping of the Japanese during the Second World War—not only by u.S. military personnel but also by social and behavioral scientists—was simply a flagrant example of an ongoing ideological mechanism that had accompanied Western treatments of non-Western “others” for centuries. In the hands of academics such as geoffrey gorer, writes Dower, the notion that was collectively and “objectively” formed about the Japanese was that they were “a clinically compulsive and probably collectively neurotic people, whose lives were governed by ritual and ‘situational ethics,’ wracked with insecurity, and swollen with deep, dark currents of repressed resentment and aggression.”37 As Dower points out, such stereotyping was by no means accidental or unprecedented: The Japanese, so “unique” in the rhetoric of World War Two, were actually saddled with racial stereotypes that europeans and Americans had applied to nonwhites for centuries: during the conquest of the new World, the slave trade, the Indian wars in the united States, the agitation against Chinese immigrants in America, the colonization of Asia and Africa, the U.S. conquest of the Philippines at the turn of the century. These were stereotypes, moreover, which had been strongly reinforced by nineteenthcentury Western science. In the final analysis, in fact, these favored idioms denoting superiority and inferiority transcended race and represented formulaic expressions of Self and Other in general.38 The moralistic divide between “self” and “other” constitutes the production of knowledge during the U.S. occupation of Japan after the Second World War as well. As Monica Braw writes, in the years immediately after 1945, the risk that the united States would be regarded as barbaric and inhumane was carefully monitored, in the main by cutting off Japan from the rest of the world through the ban on travel, control of private mail, and censorship of research, mass media information, and other kinds of communication. The entire occupation policy was permeated by the view that “the united States was not to be accused; guilt was only for Japan”:39 As the occupation of Japan started, the atmosphere was military. Japan was a defeated enemy that must be subdued. The Japanese should be taught their place in the world: as a defeated nation, Japan had no status and was entitled to no respect. People should be made to realize that any catastrophe that had befallen them was of their own making. until they had repented, they were suspect. If they wanted to release information about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and nagasaki, it could only be for the wrong reasons, such as accusing the united States of inhumanity. Thus this information was suppressed.40 As in the scenario of aerial bombing, the elitist and aggressive panoramic “vision” in which the other is beheld means that **the sufferings of the other matters much less than the transcendent aspirations of the self**. And, despite being the products of a particular culture’s technological fanaticism, such transcendent aspirations are typically expressed in the form of selfless universalisms. As Sherry puts it, “The reality of Hiroshima and nagasaki seemed less important than the bomb’s effect on ‘[hu]mankind’s destiny,’ on ‘humanity’s choice,’ on ‘what is happening to men’s minds,’ and on hopes (now often extravagantly revived) to achieve world government.” On Japan’s side, as yoneyama writes, such a “global narrative of the universal history of humanity” has helped sustain **“a national victimology and phantasm of innocence throughout most of the postwar years**.” going one step further, she remarks: “The idea that Hiroshima’s disaster ought to be remembered from the transcendent and anonymous position of humanity . . . might best be described as ‘nuclear universalism.’ once the relations among war, racism, and knowledge production are underlined in these terms, it is no longer possible to assume, as some still do, **that the recognizable features of modern war**—its impersonality, coerciveness, and deliberate cruelty—are “divergences” from the “antipathy” to violence and to conflict that characterize the modern world.43 Instead, it would be incumbent on us to realize that the pursuit of war—with its use of violence—and the pursuit of peace—with its cultivation of knowledge—are the obverse and reverse of the same coin, the coin that I have been calling “the age of the world target.” rather than being irreconcilable opposites, **war and peace are coexisting, collaborative functions in the continuum of a virtualized world**. More crucially still, only the privileged nations of the world can afford to wage war and preach peace at one and the same time. As Sherry writes, “The united States had different resources with which to be fanatical: resources allowing it to take the lives of others more than its own, ones whose accompanying rhetoric of technique disguised the will to destroy.”44 From this it follows that, if indeed political and military acts of cruelty are not unique to the united States—a point which is easy enough to substantiate—what is nonetheless remarkable is the manner in which such acts are, in the united States, usually cloaked in the form of enlightenment and altruism, in the form of an aspiration simultaneously toward technological perfection and the pursuit of peace. In a country in which political leaders are held accountable for their decisions by an electorate, violence simply cannot—as it can in totalitarian countries—exist in the raw. even the most violent acts must be adorned with a benign, rational story. It is in the light of such interlocking relations among war, racism, and knowledge production that I would make the following comments about area studies, the academic establishment that crystallizes the connection between the epistemic targeting of the world and the ‘‘humane’’ practices of peacetime learning. From Atomic Bombs to Area Studies As its name suggests, area studies as a mode of knowledge production is, strictly speaking, military in its origins. Even though the study of the history, languages, and literatures of, for instance, ‘‘Far Eastern’’ cultures existed well before the Second World War (in what Edward W. Said would term the old Orientalist tradition predicated on philology), the systematization of such study under the rubric of special geopolitical areas was largely a postwar and U.S. phenomenon. In H. D. Harootunian’s words, ‘‘The systematic formation of area studies, principally in major universities, was . . . a massive attempt to relocate the enemy in the new configuration of the Cold War.’ As Bruce Cumings puts it: It is now fair to say, based on the declassified evidence, that the American state and especially the intelligence elements in it shaped the entire field of postwar area studies, with the clearest and most direct impact on those regions of the world where communism was strongest: Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia.’ In the decades after 1945, when the United States competed with the Soviet Union for the power to rule and/or destroy the world, these regions were the ones that required continued, specialized super-vision; to this list we may also add Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As areas to be studied, these regions took on the significance of **target fields—** **fields of information retrieval and dissemination** that **were necessary for the perpetuation of the United States’ political and ideological hegemony**. In the final part of his classic Orientalism, Said describes area studies as a continuation of the old European Orientalism with a different pedagogical emphasis: No longer does an Orientalist try first to master the esoteric languages of the Orient; he begins instead as a trained social scientist and ‘applies’ his science to the Orient, or anywhere else. This is the specifically American contribution to the history of Orientalism, and it can be dated roughly from the period immediately following World War II, when the United States found itself in the position recently vacated by Britain and France. Whereas Said draws his examples mainly from Islamic and Middle Eastern area studies, Cumings provides this portrait of the East Asian target field: The Association for Asian Studies (AAS) was the first ‘‘area’’ organization in the U.S., founded in 1943 as the Far Eastern Association and reorganized as the AAS in 1956. Before 1945 there had been little attention to and not much funding for such things; but now the idea was to bring coe ntemporary social science theory to bear on the non-Western world, rather than continue to pursue the classic themes of Oriental studies, often examined through philology. . . . In return for their severance, the Orientalists would get vastly enhanced academic resources (positions, libraries, language studies)—and soon, a certain degree of separation which came from the social scientists inhabiting institutes of East Asian studies, whereas the Orientalists occupied departments of East Asian languages and cultures. This implicit Faustian bargain sealed the postwar academic deal. A largely administrative enterprise, closely tied to policy, the new American Orientalism took over from the old Orientalism attitudes of cultural hostility, among which is, as Said writes, the dogma that ‘the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible).’Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the ‘‘scientific’’ and ‘‘objective’’ **production of knowledge during peacetime** about the various special ‘‘areas’’ **became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target**. In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war— if, for instance, the ability to translate a diffcult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes —is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to ‘‘know’’ the other cultures? **Can ‘‘knowledge’’ that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare**, or is such knowledge not simply warfare’s accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign ‘‘self ’’/‘‘eye’’—the ‘‘I’’—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that— a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber— such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter— will never receive the attention that is due to them. ‘‘Knowledge,’’ however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences. This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by ‘‘the absence of a definable object’’—and by ‘‘the problem of the vanishing object.’’

#### It’s not just Atlanta, Anti-Asian hate crimes continuing to spike – their rhetoric is literally killing people

Westervelt 2/21 – [Eric, “Anger And Fear As Asian American Seniors Targeted In Bay Area Attacks,” npr, 2/2 2021, <https://www.npr.org/2021/02/12/966940217/anger-and-fear-as-asian-american-seniors-targeted-in-bay-area-attacks>, DKP]

Business and civil rights groups in California are demanding action after a recent surge of xenophobic violence against Asian Americans in the San Francisco Bay Area left one person dead and others badly injured. The brazen, mostly daylight assaults have rattled nerves in communities ahead of Friday's Lunar New Year holiday. Just last week in San Jose, a 64-year-old grandmother [was assaulted](https://www.ktvu.com/news/asian-community-feels-targeted-by-crime-ahead-of-lunar-new-year-celebrations) and robbed of cash she'd just withdrawn from an ATM for Lunar New Year gifts. Surveillance cameras have captured many of the attacks, including one against [a 91-year-old man in Oakland's Chinatown](https://abc7news.com/man-pushed-to-ground-in-oakland-violence-chinatown-robberies/10311111/), who was hospitalized with serious injuries after being shoved to the ground by a man who walked up behind him. In January, a 52-year-old Asian American woman was shot in the head with a flare gun, also in Chinatown. Later in the month, 84-year-old Vicha Ratanapakdee was going for a morning walk in his San Francisco neighborhood. Surveillance cameras captured a man running at him full speed and [smashing his frail body to the pavement](https://www.ktvu.com/news/family-of-84-year-old-killed-in-sf-believe-attack-was-racially-motivated). Ratanapakdee died of his injuries two days later. A 19-year-old man has been charged with murder and elder abuse. "These attacks taking place in the Bay Area are part of a larger trend of anti-Asian American/Pacific Islander hate brought on in many ways by COVID-19, as well as some of the xenophobic policies and racist rhetoric that were pushed forward by the prior administration," says Manju Kulkarni, executive director of the [Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council](https://stopaapihate.org/about/), a coalition of California community-based groups.

## 2

#### Interpretation: the affirmative must only defend that the appropriation of space by private entities is unjust.

#### China's "private" sector companies aren't private

Olson 20 [Stephen Olson, research fellow at the Hinrich Foundation. "Are Private Chinese Companies Really Private?" The Diplomat, 9-30-2020, accessed 1-14-2022, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/are-private-chinese-companies-really-private/] HWIC

China has often been criticized for a lack of transparency, especially with regard to its economic and trade policies. While in many cases these criticisms are valid, it belies the fact that in other instances, China is remarkably open and transparent about its intentions and ambitions.

Such is the case with China’s “Opinion on Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in the New Era,” recently released by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (and further elaborated on by President Xi Jinping himself). This document tells us in no uncertain terms that Chinese private companies will be increasingly called upon to conduct their operations in tight coordination with governmental policy objectives and ideologies. The rest of the world should take note.

A Different Vision of “Private” Business

The 5,000 word “opinion” aims to ratchet-up the role and influence of the CCP within the private sector in order “to better focus the wisdom and strength of the private businesspeople on the goal and mission to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The objective is to establish a “united front” between business and government and facilitate the “enhancement of the party’s leadership over the private economy.” According to the plan, “private economic figures are to be more closely united around the party,” thereby achieving “a high degree of consistency with the Party Central Committee on political stand, political direction, political principles, and political roads.”

All of this stands in stark contrast to long-accepted concepts of how private companies function in a free market. The overriding purpose of business, according to these traditional precepts, is to earn profits through the provision of value-added products and services, in response to marketplace signals and under the constraint of basic economic realities. Government ideology plays no role in that equation.

But China has a very different vision. Government officials and government ideologies are directly infused into business operations. Private sector employees are “educated” on government policies and ideologies, with the expectation that this “enlightenment” will help inform their business decisions. This government-business symbiosis is further cemented by the provision of massive government subsidies (estimated to be about 3 percent of China’s GDP) to Chinese companies.

#### OST proves it becomes national appropriation

Smith ’79 [Delbert D., Legal Advisor for the Space Science and Engineering Center of the University of Wisconsin, “Space Stations International Law and Policy”, October 30, 1979, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Space\_Stations\_International\_Law\_And\_Pol/4U2fDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0&kptab=overview]//pranav

Three potential limitations on these conclusions should be noted. First, the interpretation set forth above would not permit commercial or international organizations from claiming exclusive rights to a particular area of outer space in the absence of actual use. Thus, if such an organization had maintained a space station in a specific orbital slot for a substantial period of time and the station-keeping system subsequently failed, the organization would not be entitled to prevent any other entity from occupying that slot pending the orbiting to a replacement station by the original occupant. Second, if an entity were established that, although commercial in form, was essentially under the control of the government of the country in which it was organized, permanent use would constitute national, as distinguished from nonnational, appropriation. This is especially true in light of the Article VI provision that makes states responsible for acts of their nationals and for international organizations of which they are members. Third, dispute has arisen regarding the minimum standard of universality that would determine whether an international organization of relatively universal membership satisfies the minimum standard. However, some question remains regarding the exemption of an organization composed of a limited number of governments.

#### Negate – they skirt the core controversy of the topic which is national vs private space activities – kills stasis point and pre-round prep and means we lose access to generics that rely on the motives of private companies differing from national interest proven by the fact that their advantage is functionally China space good/bad – competing interps and DTD on T, it's a question of models and we indict their advocacy

## Case

### Framing

#### Extinction outweighs should be rejected as an impact framing – explicit in their utilitarian calculus is the death of billions of minorities to preserve a white future – it’s not the best of both worlds, it’s the protection of white futures in the name of human progress.

Mitchell & Chaudhury, ’20 (Audra, Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and Aadita, PhD candidate at the Department of Science and Technology Studies at York University, “Worlding beyond ‘the’ ‘end’ of ‘the world’: white apocalyptic visions and BIPOC futurisms,” International Relations, Research Article, pp. 7-9, ZW)

In addition, many authors working in this genre worry about the interruption of the perceived stadial progression of ‘humanity’, a narrative that celebrates the emergence of whiteness through the elimination of ‘inferior’ races or cultures.51 For example, Canadian settler scholar Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (italics ours) warns that the extinction of ‘humanity’, which she associates with ‘rational life’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘civilization’ (terms all deeply linked to Euro-centric and colonial subjectivities) would be ethically wrong ‘if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing’.52 In this vein, Bostrom idealizes a future in which the continued evolution of ‘(post)humanity’ culminates in a form of ‘technological maturity’ that adheres to mainstream norms of white maleness: deeply disembodied, unattached to place, and dominant over, or independent from, ‘nature’.53 Closely-linked to worries about the loss of potential ‘human progression’ is the fear of de-volution or back-sliding. In some cases, fears of demographic decline in ‘white-majority’ regions (see above) extend to worries about the biological ‘extinction’ of white people. For instance, a recent report asserts that there has been 59.3% decline in total sperm count in men from North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, but no comparable or significant decline in South America, Asia, and Africa, despite a paucity of studies in the latter regions (Ghosh 2017). While warning of a biological decline of whiteness, the articulation of these fears and the funding of research to address them undergirds a resurgence of whiteness formed in the perceived face of its destruction.54 Indeed, many contributors to ‘end of the world’ discourses offer strategies for the reconstruction and ‘improvement’ of existing power structures after a global catastrophe. For example, American settler economist Robin Hanson calculates that if 100 humans survived a global catastrophic disaster that killed all others, they could eventually move back through the ‘stages’ of ‘human’ development, returning to the ‘hunter-gatherer stage’ within 20,000 years and then ‘progressing’ from there to a condition equivalent to contemporary society (defined in Euro-centric terms).55 Other authors focus on social, political, and economic forms of regeneration through simplification, which Homer-Dixon56 calls ‘catagenesis’. ‘Western civilization is not a lost cause’, he insists, ‘using reason and science to guide decisions, paired with extraordinary leadership and exceptional goodwill, human society can progress to higher and higher levels of well-being and development. . . But that requires resisting the very natural urge. . .to become less cooperative, less generous and less open to reason’ (italics ours).57 In this vision, Western civilization – which, is elided here with ‘human society’ – can salvage the future using some of its trademark claims: the possession of reason, science, and cooperativeness. However, this requires assimilating all human communities into a Western liberal-cosmopolitan mode of civility and suppressing forms of resistance that threaten to knock this goal off course. If ‘humanity’ is able to achieve this goal and develop a ‘prospective mind’ capable of seeing opportunity in destruction, Homer-Dixon argues it will be able to ‘turn breakdown to our advantage’58 (italics ours). Recalling that the ‘us’ in this discourse actively interpellates whiteness, this discourse frames global catastrophe as an opportunity to consolidate white structures of domination, assimilate resistors, and ultimately increase their power. Other authors who foresee post-apocalyptic movement toward a dazzling future (for whiteness) are clear about its costs. In his seminal book on human extinction, Canadian settler philosopher John Leslie states that ‘misery and death for billions [caused by an ecological crisis] would be immensely tragic, but might be followed by slow recovery and then a glittering future for a human race which had learned its lesson’.59 Similarly**,** Bostrom argues even the fractional reduction of threats to the possibility of posthuman, techno-infused subjectivities, by any means, would be worth ‘at least a hundred times the value of a million [contemporary] human lives’.60 Although rarely explicitly stated, it is not difficult to discern whose lives these authors believe might be sacrificed for the ‘greater good’ of ‘learning lessons’ and rescuing ‘humanity’ as they see it. This can be gleaned from these authors’ assessments of the ‘winners and losers’ of previous global upheavals. For example, in assessing the tumult of the twentieth century, Homer-Dixon states that Western capitalist societies were amongst the ‘most adaptive’ – and therefore closest to his ideal of the ‘prospective mind’ – while ‘at the other end of the spectrum, we find societies, including many in sub-Saharan Africa and some in Asia and Latin America, that have much lower ability to manage or adapt. . . a few, like Haiti and Somalia, have completely succumbed.’61 While this statement refers historical patterns, it is presented as part of an analysis that explicitly analyzes historical trends as indicators of future scenarios. As such, it inscribes ongoing racial inequalities and stereotypes far into the future.

### Sino-Russia

#### No one’s going to war over a downed satellite

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.

#### Won’t go nuclear – seen as a normal conventional attack because of integration with ground forces

Firth 7/1/19 [News Editor at MIT Technology Review, was Chief News Editor at New Scientist. How to fight a war in space (and get away with it). July 1, 2019. MIT Technology Review]

Space is so intrinsic to how advanced militaries fight on the ground that an attack on a satellite need no longer signal the opening shot in a nuclear apocalypse. As a result, “deterrence in space is less certain than it was during the Cold War,” says Todd Harrison, who heads the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, a think tank in Washington, DC. Non-state actors, as well as more minor powers like North Korea and Iran, are also gaining access to weapons that can bloody the noses of much larger nations in space.

**Pursuit of dominance leads to Sino-Russia alliance**

**Porter, DPhil, 19**

(Patrick, ModernHistory@Oxford, ProfInternationalSecurityAndStrategy@Birmingham, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and **risk escalation on multiple such fronts** would court several dangers. It would **overstretch the country**. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more. Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in **the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself**, and the **failure to balance commitments** with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would **drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions**. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place. Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: **a hostile Eurasian alliance** leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### Space wars don’t cause escalation

James Pavur 19, Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science at Oxford University and Ivan Martinovic, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training at Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space”, 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle T. Minárik, S. Alatalu, S. Biondi, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky (Eds.), <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf>

A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit. Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

### Heg

Their propgranda ev is nonsensical and is only ab STATE jouranlists – make them explain which of our authors are Chinese state journalists

#### Unipolarity wil inevitably fall

Mearsheimer 19 [John J. Professor of IR @ Uchicago, “Bound to Fail.” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 4]

There is an additional problem linked to hyperglobalization that has little to do with the growing political opposition to the international order in liberal countries, and everything to do with the global balance of power. Until Trump came to power in 2017, Western elites, in keeping with their post–Cold War policy of engaging, not containing, China, were deeply committed to integrating China into the world economy, including all of its key economic institutions. An increasingly prosperous and wealthy China, they assumed, would eventually become a liberal democracy and an upstanding member of the liberal international order. What the architects of that policy did not realize, however, is that by helping accelerate Chinese growth, they were actually helping undermine the liberal order, as China has rapidly grown into an economic powerhouse with significant military capability. In effect, they have helped China become a great power, thus undercutting unipolarity, which is essential for maintaining a liberal world order. This problem has been compounded by the resurgence of Russia, which is once again a great power, although clearly a weak one. With the rise of China and Russia’s comeback, the international system has become multipolar, which is a death knell for the liberal international order. To make matters worse, neither China nor Russia has become a liberal democracy. Even if China and Russia had not become great powers and the world remained unipolar, the liberal order would still be falling apart today because of its intrinsic flaws. The election of Donald Trump, who sharply and frequently criticized all the key elements of the post–Cold War order during his presidential campaign, is evidence of how much trouble it was in by 2016. Thus, if the international system had remained unipolar, the liberal world order would have devolved into an agnostic order under President Trump, as realist orders have no place in unipolarity. There is certainly no evidence that he is committed to refashioning the existing liberal order. Indeed, he appears bent on wrecking it. With or without China, the liberal international order was destined to fail, because it was fatally flawed at birth

summary

The various causal processes described above have all played an important role in subverting the liberal international order. Although each one has a distinct logic, they have often operated synergistically. For example, the negative effects of hyperglobalization on the lower and middle classes have combined with the nationalist resentment over immigration and the sense of lost sovereignty to fuel a strong populist backlash against the principles and practices of the liberal order. Indeed, that anger has often been directed at the liberal elites who have benefitted from the order and who vigorously defend it. That resentment, of course, has had significant political consequences. It has caused deep political divisions in the United States and other Western democracies, led to Brexit, helped put Trump in the White House, and fueled support for nationalist leaders around the world.

Where Are We Headed?

One might acknowledge that the liberal international order is in terminal decline, but argue that it can be replaced with a more pragmatic version, one that avoids the excesses of the post–Cold War order.85 This more modest liberal order would pursue a more nuanced, less aggressive approach to spreading liberal democracy, rein in hyperglobalization, and put some significant limits on the power of international institutions. The new order, according to this perspective, would look something like the Western order during the Cold War, although it would be global and liberal, not bounded and realist. This solution is not feasible, however, because the unipolar moment is over, which means there is no chance of maintaining any kind of liberal international order for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, President Trump has no intention of pursuing a “liberal-lite” world order, and without his support, that option is a nonstarter. But even if Trump were not an obstacle and the international system were to remain unipolar, the United States would fail if it lowered its sights and attempted to construct a less ambitious liberal order. Indeed, it would end up building an agnostic international order instead. It is impossible to build a meaningful liberal global order with modest or more passive policies. The enterprise requires too much social engineering in too many places. If it has any chance of succeeding (I think it has none), the liberal unipole and its allies must relentlessly pursue highly ambitious global policies, which is why the United States and its liberal partners acted the way they did in the wake of the Cold War. That approach, however, is now politically infeasible because of past failures. Consequently, the liberal democracies have no choice but to take small steps here and there to remake the world in their own image, while adopting a live and let live approach toward most countries in the world. That humble approach would effectively produce an agnostic order. But that is not going to happen, because the system is multipolar and great power politics are once again at play. Thus, the key question is: What kinds of realist orders will dominate the landscape in the new multipolar world?

#### Heg encourages allies to reduce defense spending and encourages risky behavior – nuke war

Posen ’16 (Barry R; 8/7/2016; Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT, Director of the MIT Security Studies Program Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow; Rockefeller Foundation International Affairs Fellow; Guest Scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Woodrow Wilson Center Fellow; Smithsonian Institution; Transatlantic Fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and most recently Visiting Fellow at the John Sloan Dickey Center at Dartmouth College. "The High Costs and Limited Benefits of America’s Alliances," National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-high-costs-limited-benefits-americas-alliances-17273?page=show//)MBA> HBJ

The United States stands at the center of a far flung global alliance system, which commits it to defend the security of countries rich and poor, great and small, liberal and illiberal. The principal U.S. formal alliances are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the U.S.-Japan security treaty, the Republic of Korea Treaty, and the Australia-New Zealand (ANZUS) treaty. The United States has less formal relationships with Israel and several Arab states, and many others around the world. The foreign-policy establishment insists that all of these alliances are central to our security. The reasons offered since the end of the Cold War to support this judgment are seldom clear, and the costs are always buried, if acknowledged at all. The value of U.S. alliances should be judged on their contribution to U.S. security--the ability to defend the safety, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the United States. The combination of the inherent strengths of the U.S. economy, the nature of modern military technology--both nuclear and conventional, along with the American military's mastery of those technologies--and two vast ocean barriers, make it either unbelievably foolhardy or hugely difficult for others to constitute a major threat to the U.S. homeland. Given the relative ease of ensuring U.S. security without extensive help from others, it is a challenge to show that the security value of these alliances exceeds the costs and risks incurred for them. In no case do current allies directly "defend" the United States, though some do occupy important strategic geography, which contributes to our military power. At best, our allies defend themselves with vast assistance from the United States. What does this assistance cost? Costs The United States bears four principal costs for these alliances: 1) the direct military costs; 2) the costs of wars waged mainly for the purpose of reassuring these allies; 3) the nuclear risks necessary to "extend" nuclear deterrence to these allies and 4) the "moral hazard" consequences of security guarantees, which have the perverse effect of driving down the defense efforts of allies and further driving up U.S. military costs. Supporters of the present alliance system routinely minimize its military costs. The Department of Defense's accounting systems make the calculation of such costs difficult. One cannot find a clear official statement that apportions the DOD budget to Europe, the MIddle East, and Asia. If a lay person attempts such a calculation, they will be brought up short by the defining characteristic of U.S. post-Cold War force structure: the U.S. military is essentially a global strategic reserve that can concentrate in defense of whichever ally is most in need of assistance. Small numbers of U.S. troops live abroad in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, and these small numbers make the effort look tiny. We must therefore try to estimate the cost of the U.S. grand strategy that commits the country to defend all these places. I have argued that if the United States were more judicious in its promises abroad, perhaps a fifth of the defense budget could be cut (excluding the costs of actual wars), amounting to roughly one hundred billion dollars per year at current prices. This is a nontrivial sum with major opportunity costs: it could reduce the deficit; repair the country's crumbling infrastructure; retrain American workers to compete more effectively in the global economy, or simply be returned to the taxpayer. Instead it subsidizes the defense of prosperous allies, providing welfare for the rich. The "credibility" wars that the U.S. fights, or threatens are another cost of the alliance system. The Balkan Wars of the 1990s fall into this category. So far, the post-Cold War world has not seen very expensive wars of this kind, but there was nothing about the Balkan wars that threatened the United States. Currently, members of the foreign-policy establishment argue that the United States should be assisting Ukraine in its fight with Russia and subverting the brutal Assad regime, in part to convince others of U.S. credibility. Once committed to defend allies everywhere, a state becomes obsessed with its political and military prestige, and vulnerable to the claim that "small" wars must be fought in the hope of deterring large ones. This is especially true when the actual strategic value of these allies is modest.A third cost of these alliances is the commitment to nuclear war that they embody. We understood this during the Cold War, but no one discusses this anymore. Europe's principal potential challenger is Russia; Japan's is China; South Korea's is North Korea. To defend these regions or countries from their most plausible challengers, and to deter attack, the United States must convince those challengers that it would, if pressed, wage nuclear war on their behalf. (The difficulty of making its nuclear-escalation commitments plausible further tempts America to fight 'small' wars to build credibility.) Are these nuclear commitments strategically necessary? During the Cold War, at the margin, one could make the argument that they were. We did not want to see what the Soviet Union might extract from rich European states or Japan by way of extra resources, if it could cow or conquer them, and convert their economic assets into military power. Today, however, it is hard to argue that any of the challengers that these countries face today are capable of conquering these allies, or coercing them into making great contributions to the challenger's military war chest. The United States assumes nuclear risks in the absence of a clear case for doing so. To offer an extreme example, the Baltic states are members of NATO. The United States is committed to their defense if they are challenged by Russia. These states cannot defend themselves conventionally, and because of the peculiarities of their geography, neither can the United States (This was seldom discussed when these states were brought into NATO in the George W. Bush administration.) I believe that a full fledged Russian challenge over the Baltics is unlikely, but were it to occur the United States could face the alternative of a potentially irreversible military defeat or a dramatic and dangerous nuclear crisis. Finally, these alliance commitments create a special kind of "moral hazard." The extravagant insurance that we offer these countries encourages them to engage in risky behavior. For the Europeans and Japanese, this consists of buying too little military insurance for themselves. Their defense budgets are too small even to sustain their present force structures. U.S. defense secretaries from both parties dutifully chide allies for their shortfalls and then go on to ignore them as we move to provide more security welfare. In NATO, for example, all but four of the allies fail to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense, an alliance commitment, while the United States spends 3 percent excluding war costs. (Germany, the fourth-most-productive economy in the world and the NATO ally best placed to assist the Baltic states, spends barely 1.2 percent.) Yet in the face of European concerns about Russian adventurism, the United States has rushed into the breach with five billion dollars of additional spending on European security over the last three fiscal years, which the Pentagon smuggled into the budget for Overseas Contingency Operations, whose purpose is to pay for actual unexpected war costs, and which therefore escapes the scrutiny of normal budget politics.

#### China decline isn’t inevitable

Robert May 20, Postgraduate Masters’s student in International Relations at Queen Mary University of London. He is also the CEO of a non-profit multinational education provider (ABE) a member of the Royal Overseas League, a member of the Royal Institute for International Affairs, and a Friend of UNESCO, “Is War Inevitable Between the US and China?” Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 9/7/2020, https://www.internationalaffairshouse.org/is-war-inevitable-between-the-us-and-china/

Since 1500 C.E., when a rising power has challenged an established power it has ended in violent conflict 80 percent of the time.4 This indicates that war between America and China is not inevitable, but it is highly probable. The applicability of structural analysis to the changes in relative strength and privilege in world order generates the principle anxieties and pressures that lead to war, but classical realism instead stresses the historical processes and biases that determine political action. Policymakers should realise that China is not Nazi Germany; in 2019, Xi Jinping stated, “Civilisations don’t have to clash, what is needed are eyes to see the beauty in all civilisations”, implying China will not use its role or influence to change the ideologies or political practices of other societies (Cited in Mahbubani, 2020:254-255). Neither is China nor the USSR; ‘The Chinese Communist Party is far more capable and adaptable than the Soviet Communist Party’ (Ibid, 271). China does not seek to export its political system around the world, its objective is international respect, not conversion; the grandest expression of Chinese power, the Great Wall, also denotes a consciousness of its limitations and vulnerability (Kissinger, 2014:214). Nevertheless, America is convinced of an existential threat to its hegemony and the emergence of new world order, which arguably has more to do with the failure of the liberal international order, and the misguided belief system that ‘the end-point of development and modernisation is defined by the contemporary West’ (Barkawi& Laffey, 2006:331). Those under attack feel compelled ‘to defend not only their territory but their basic way of life’ (Kissinger, 2014:366).

A realist recalibration of U.S. foreign policy around current national interest and a reassessment of whether its grand strategy of primacy is worth bleeding for may conclude that the U.S. has no necessity to confront China. America’s borders are not in danger of being breached, U.S. defence spending is still more than the next 10 countries combined and it remains the only superpower capable of projecting a military presence globally5. China’s territorial sphere remains limited to the Indo-Pacific region, ‘with more neighbours than any other country, it is deeply embedded in the Asian economic system’ and must balance multiple threats with nuclear powers on many fronts (Khanna, 2019:147). America must remain mindful that ‘War does not always arise from wickedness or folly. It sometimes arises from mere growth and movement (Murray, cited in Carr, 1940: 191). Washington should replace an improvisational China attitude rooted in exceptionalism, with a strategy to accommodate legitimate Chinese interests. It must strengthen, rather than withdraw from its Asian balancing alliances ‘forcing China to focus most of its attention closer to home’ (Walt, 2020) whilst also rebuilding diplomatic capability with China, and abandoning the temptation to view every Chinese action as inherently aggressive, rather as based on legitimate historical and domestic designs; ‘exaggerating the threat posed by small changes to the status quo and rejecting adaptation to the new balance of power in East Asia… could encourage the U.S. to adopt overly competitive policies’ (Glaser, 2019:52).

#### No Taiwan invasion – geography, and no heg solves because it removes the US from the war which keeps it conventional

Michael A. Cohen, MA, 21 [Fellow @ The Century Foundation, Adjunct Lecturer in School of International and Public Affairs @ Columbia], "No, Neocons, China Is Not About to Invade Taiwan," New Republic, 11-19-2021 <https://newrepublic.com/article/164485/why-china-will-not-invade-taiwan> C.VC

Earlier this month, the Defense Department released its annual report to Congress on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” While the report lays out the ways in which China’s “People’s Liberation Army” is seeking to modernize its forces, the threat to Taiwan of armed invasion is still minimal at best:

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with the PRC’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk.

One might expect that a country intent on launching the largest and most difficult amphibious invasion in history would be making intense preparations. That’s not happening.

As the Pentagon report notes, Chinese naval investments have focused on building up the capacity to launch “regional and eventually global expeditionary missions rather than the large number of landing ship transports and medium landing craft that would be necessary for a large-scale direct beach assault.” The Pentagon also finds that while China is focusing on conducting joint operations that involve forces from the army, navy, and air force, as of present it currently lacks such capabilities.

That the Chinese military enjoys vast military superiority vis-à-vis Taiwan is not in doubt. But that such resources can be used to mount an amphibious assault is something else altogether. The Chinese military last fought a war in 1979 against Vietnam, and the PLA was badly bloodied. That means that the soldiers and officers who make up China’s military today have virtually no direct combat experience.

China’s own media outlets have, according to the Pentagon, noted the PLA’s shortcomings, which include that “commanders cannot (1) judge situations; (2) understand higher authorities’ intentions; (3) make operational decisions; (4) deploy forces; and, (5) manage unexpected situations.” These problems would be challenging enough in a conventional conflict. For a complex invasion of Taiwan, they would render such efforts virtually impossible.

One big reason is that Taiwan is about as inhospitable an environment as can be imagined for an amphibious invasion. Ian Easton, a defense expert who has written extensively about Taiwan defense strategy, wrote earlier this year that the country’s “coastal terrain … is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are bordered by cliffs and urban jungles.” Easton also notes that “many of Taiwan’s outer islands bristle with missiles, rockets, and artillery guns. Their granite hills have been honeycombed with tunnels and bunker systems.”

#### China rise is peaceful

* China seeks limited predation not outright competition
* Strategy and policy moves show coop over conflict
* Care most about stability
* No evidence they are focused on heg – leaders understand risks of competition

Shifrinson 19 [Joshua Shifrinson is an Assistant Professor of International Relations with the Pardee School of Global Affairs at Boston University. Should the United States Fear China’s Rise? Winter 2019. www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2019/01/Winter-2019\_Shifrinson\_0.pdf]

In short, limited predation—not an overt and outright push to overtake and challenge the United States—is the name of China’s current and highly rational game. As significantly, it appears Chinese leaders are aware of the structural logic of the situation. Despite ongoing debate over the extent to which China has departed from its long-standing “hide strength, bide time” strategy first formulated by Deng Xiaoping in favor a more assertive course seeking to increase Chinese influence in world affairs, Chinese leaders and China watchers have been at pains to point out that Chinese strategy still seeks to avoid provoking conflict with the United States.49 As one analyst notes, China’s decision to carve out a more prominent role for itself in world politics has been coupled with an effort to reassure and engage the United States so as to avoid unneeded competition while facilitating stability.50 Chinese leaders echo these themes, with one senior official noting in 2014 that Chinese policy focused on “properly addressing] conflicts and differences through dialogue and cooperation instead of confrontational approaches.”51 Xi Jinping himself has underlined these currents, arguing even before taking office that U.S.-Chinese relations should be premised on “preventing conflict and confrontation,” and more recently vowing that “China will promote coordination and cooperation with other major countries.”52 Ultimately, as one scholar observes, there is “hardly evidence that [... China has] begun to focus on hegemonic competition.”53 Put another way, China’s leaders appear aware of the risks of taking an overly confrontational stance toward a still-potent United States and have scoped Chinese ambitions accordingly.

#### Framing issue – their authors have been marred by imperialist propaganda.

Fettweis ‘17 (Christopher J, \*Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, Ph.D. from the University of Maryland, College Park, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” Security Studies 26:3, 423-451)//cmr

The Political Psychology of Unipolarity Evidence supporting the notion that US power is primarily responsible for the New Peace is slim, but belief in the connection is quite strong, especially in policy circles. The best arena to examine the proposition is therefore not the world of measurable rationality, but rather that of the human mind. Political psychology can shed more light on unipolarity than can any collection of data or evidence. Just because an outcome is primarily psychological does not mean that it is less real; perception quickly becomes reality for both the unipolar state and those in the periphery. If all actors believe that the United States provides security and stability for the system, then behavior can be affected. Beliefs have deep explanatory power in international politics whether they have a firm foundation in empirical reality or not. Like all beliefs, faith in the stability provided by hegemony is rarely subjected to much analysis.79 Although they almost always have some basis in reality, beliefs need not pass rigorous tests to prove that they match it. No amount of evidence has been able to convince some people that vaccines do not cause autism, for example, or that the world is more peaceful than at any time before, or that the climate is changing due to human activity. Ultimately, as Robert Jervis explains, “we often believe as much in the face of evidence as because of it.”80 Facts may change, but beliefs remain the same. When leaders are motivated to act based on unjustified, inaccurate beliefs, folly often follows. The person who decides to take a big risk because of astrological advice in the morning’s horoscope can benefit from baseless superstition if the risk pays off. Probability and luck suggest that successful policy choices can sometimes flow from incorrect beliefs. Far more often, however, poor intellectual foundations lead to suboptimal or even disastrous outcomes. It is worthwhile to analyze the foundations of even our most deeply held beliefs to determine which ones are good candidates to inspire poor policy choices in those who hold them. People are wonderful rationalizers. There is much to be said for being the strongest country in the world; their status provides Americans both security and psychological rewards, as well as strong incentives to construct a rationale for preserving the unipolar moment that goes beyond mere selfishness. Since people enjoy being “number one,” they are susceptible to perceiving reality in ways that brings the data in line with their desires. It is no coincidence that most hegemonic stability theorists are American. 81 Perhaps the satisfaction that comes with being the unipolar power has inspired Americans to misperceive the positive role that their status plays in the world. Three findings from political psychology can shed light on perceptions of hegemonic stability. They are mutually supportive, and, when taken together, suggest that it is likely that US policymakers overestimate the extent to which their actions are responsible for the choices of others. The belief in the major US contribution to world peace is probably unjustified. The Illusion of Control Could 5 percent of the world’s population hope to enforce rules upon the rest? Would even an internationally hegemonic United States be capable of producing the New Peace? Perhaps, but it also may be true that believers in hegemonic stability may be affected by the very common tendency of people to overestimate their ability to control events. A variety of evidence has accumulated over the past forty years to support Ellen J. Langer’s original observations about the “illusion of control” that routinely distorts perception.82 Even in situations where outcomes are clearly generated by pure chance, people tend to believe that they can exert control over events.83 There is little reason to believe that leaders are somehow less susceptible to such illusions than subjects in controlled experiments. The extensive research on the illusion of control has revealed two further findings that suggest US illusions might be even stronger than average. First, misperceptions of control appear to be correlated with power: individuals with higher socioeconomic status, as well as those who are members of dominant groups, are more likely to overestimate their ability to control events.84 Powerful people tend to be far more confident than others, often overly so, and that confidence leads them to inflate their own importance.85 Leaders of superpowers are thus particularly vulnerable to distorted perceptions regarding their ability to affect the course of events. US observers had a greater structural predisposition than others, for example, to believe that they would have been able to control events in the Persian Gulf following an injection of creative instability in 2003. The skepticism of less powerful allies was easily discounted. Second, there is reason to believe that culture matters as well as power. People from societies that value individualism are more likely to harbor illusions of control than those from collectivist societies, where assumptions of group agency are more common. When compared to people from other parts of the world, Westerners tend to view the world as “highly subject to personal control,” in the words of Richard Nisbett.86 North Americans appear particularly vulnerable in this regard.87 Those who come from relatively powerful countries with individualistic societies are therefore at high risk for misperceiving their ability to influence events. For the United States, the illusion of control extends beyond the water’s edge. An oft-discussed public good supposedly conferred by US hegemony is order in those parts of the world uncontrolled by sovereign states, or the “global commons.” 88 One such common area is the sea, where the United States maintains the only true blue-water navy in the world. That the United States has brought this peace to the high seas is a central belief of hegemonic-stability theorists, one rarely examined in any serious way. Indeed the maritime environment has been unusually peaceful for decades; the biggest naval battles since Okinawa took place during the Falklands conflict in 1982, and they were fairly minor.89 If hegemony is the key variable explaining stability at sea, maritime security would have to be far more chaotic without the US Navy. It is equally if not more plausible to suggest, however, that the reason other states are not building blue-water navies is not because the United States dissuades them from doing so but rather because none feels that trade is imperiled.90 In earlier times, and certainly during the age of mercantilism, zero-sum economics inspired efforts to cut off the trade of opponents on occasion, making control the sea extremely important. Today the free flow of goods is vital to all economies, and it would be in the interest of no state to interrupt it.91 Free trade at sea may no longer need protection, in other words, because it essentially has no enemies; the sheriff may be patrolling a crime-free neighborhood. The threat from the few remaining pirates hardly requires a robust naval presence, and is certainly not what hegemonic-stability advocates mean when they compare the role played by the US Navy in 2016 to that of the Royal Navy in 1816. It is at least possible that shared interest in open, free commons keeps the peace at sea rather than the United States. Oceans unpatrolled by the US Navy may be about as stable as they are with the presence of its carriers. The degree to which 273 active-duty ships exert control over vast common parts is not at all clear. People overestimate the degree to which they control events in their lives. Furthermore, if these observations from political psychology are right about the factors that influence the growth of illusions of power, then US leaders and analysts are particularly susceptible to misperception. They may well be overestimating the degree to which the United States can affect the behavior of others. The rest of the world may be able to get along just fine, on land and at sea, without US attempts to control it. Ego-Centric and Self-Serving Biases in Attribution It is natural for people, whether presidents or commoners, to misperceive the role they play in the thinking process of others. Jervis was the first to discuss this phenomenon, now known as the “ego-centric bias,” which has been put to the test many times since he wrote four decades ago. Building on what was known as “attribution theory,” Jervis observed that actors tend to overestimate their importance in the decisions of others. Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be.92 This is not merely ego gratification, though that plays a role; actors are simply more conscious of their own actions than the other factors central to the internal deliberations in other capitals. Because people are more likely to remember their contributions to an outcome, they naturally grant themselves more causal weight.93 Two further aspects of the ego-centric bias make US analysts even more susceptible to its effects. First, the bias is magnified when the behavior of others is desirable. People generally take credit for positive outcomes and deflect responsibility for negative ones. This “self-serving bias” is one of the best-established findings in modern psychology, supported by many hundreds of studies.94 Supporters of Ronald Reagan are happy to give him credit for ending the Cold War, for instance, even though evidence that the United States had much influence on Premier Gorbachev’s decision making is scant at best.95 Today, since few outcomes are more desirable than global stability, it stands to reason that perceptions of the New Peace are prime candidates for distortion by ego-centric, self-serving biases. When war breaks out, it is not the fault of US leaders; when peace comes to a region, Washington is happy to take credit. There was for some time a debate among psychologists over just how universal self-serving biases were, or whether their effects varied across cultures. Extensive research has essentially settled the matter, to the extent that academic questions can ever be settled: a direct relationship appears to exist between cultural individualism and susceptibility to the bias, perhaps because of the value individualistic societies place on self-enhancement (as opposed to self-effacement).96 Actors from more collectivist societies tend to have their egos rewarded in different ways, such as through contributions to the community and connections to others. People from Western countries are far more likely to take credit for positive outcomes than those from Eastern, in other words, and subjects in the United States tower over the rest of the West. US leaders are therefore more culturally predisposed to believe that their actions are responsible for positive outcomes like peace. Second, self-perception is directly related to egocentric attributions. Individuals with high self-esteem are more likely to believe that they are at the center of the decision-making process of others than those who think somewhat more modestly. 97 Leaders of any unipolar state may well be more likely to hold their country in high regard, and therefore are more vulnerable to exaggerated egocentric perceptions, than their contemporaries in smaller states. It might not occur to the lead diplomat of other counties to claim, as did Madeleine Albright, that “if we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future.”98 It is not unreasonable to suspect that the US security community may be even more vulnerable to this misperception than the average group of people. For example, many in that community believed that the United States played a decisive role in Vladimir Putin’s decisions regarding Crimea and eastern Ukraine. President Obama’s various critics argued that perceptions of American weakness inspired or even invited Russian aggression. The refusal to act in Syria in particular emboldened Moscow (despite the fact that in 2008, in the face of ample displays of US action in the Middle East, Moscow had proven sufficiently bold to invade Georgia). Other critics suggested that a variety of provocative US behaviors since the end of the Cold War, especially the expansion of NATO and dissolution of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, poisoned US–Russian relations and led to an increase in Kremlin paranoia and eventually to the invasion.99 So, either through provocative weakness or bullying, we were responsible for their actions. Egocentric misperceptions are so ubiquitous and pervasive that they generate something of a law of political psychology: we are probably less influential in others’ decision making than we think we are. This extends to their decisions to resolve contentious issues peacefully. While it may be natural for US policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, it is very likely that Washington exaggerates its importance in the decision making of others, and in the maintenance of international stability. The effect of the ego-centric bias may be especially difficult for the unipolar United States to resist, because other countries do regularly take Washington’s position into account before acting. But US leaders—and the people who analyze them—should keep in mind that they are still probably less important to calculations made in other capitals than they believe. They may well be especially unlikely to recognize the possibility that hegemony is epiphenomenal, that it exists alongside, but does not affect, global stability and the New Peace. Overestimated Benevolence After three years in the White House, Ronald Reagan had learned something surprising: “Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans,” he wrote in his autobiography. He continued: “Perhaps this shouldn’t have surprised me, but it did…I’d always felt that from our deeds it must be clear to anyone that Americans were a moral people who starting at the birth of our nation had always used our power only as a force for good in the world…. During my first years in Washington, I think many of us took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them.”100 Reagan is certainly not alone in believing in the essential benevolent image of his nation. While it is common for actors to attribute negative motivations to the behavior of others, it is exceedingly difficult for them to accept that anyone could interpret their actions in negative ways. Leaders are well aware of their own motives and tend to assume that their peaceful intentions are obvious and transparent. Both strains of the hegemonic-stability explanation assume not only that US power is benevolent, but that others perceive it that way. Hegemonic stability depends on the perceptions of other states to be successful; it has no hope to succeed if it encounters resistance from the less powerful members of the system, or even if they simply refuse to follow the rules. Relatively small police forces require the general cooperation of large communities to have any chance of establishing order. They must perceive the sheriff as just, rational, and essentially nonthreatening. The lack of balancing behavior in the system, which has been puzzling to many realists, seems to support the notion of widespread perceptions of benevolent hegemony.101 Were they threatened by the order constructed by the United States, the argument goes, smaller states would react in ways that reflected their fears. Since internal and external balancing accompanied previous attempts to achieve hegemony, the absence of such behavior today suggests that something is different about the US version. Hegemonic-stability theorists purport to understand the perceptions of others, at times better than those others understand themselves. Complain as they may at times, other countries know that the United States is acting in the common interest. Objections to unipolarity, though widespread, are not “very seriously intended,” wrote Kagan, since “the truth about America’s dominant role in the world is known to most observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world’s population.” 102 In the 1990s, Russian protests regarding NATO expansion—though nearly universal—were not taken seriously, since US planners believed the alliance’s benevolent intentions were apparent to all. Sagacious Russians understood that expansion would actually be beneficial, since it would bring stability to their western border.103 President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were caught off guard by the hostility of their counterparts regarding the issue at a summit in Budapest in December 1994.104 Despite warnings from the vast majority of academic and policy experts about the likely Russian reaction and overall wisdom of expansion itself, the administration failed to anticipate Moscow’s position. 105 The Russians did not seem to believe American assurances that expansion would actually be good for them. The United States overestimated the degree to which others saw it as benevolent. Once again, the culture of the United States might make its leaders more vulnerable to this misperception. The need for positive self-regard appears to be particularly strong in North American societies compared to elsewhere.106 Western egos tend to be gratified through self-promotion rather than humility, and independence rather than interdependence. Americans are more likely to feel good if they are unique rather than a good cog in society’s wheel, and uniquely good. The need to be perceived as benevolent, though universal, may well exert stronger encouragement for US observers to project their perceptions onto others. The United States almost certainly frightens others more than its leaders perceive. A quarter of the 68,000 respondents to a 2013 Gallup poll in sixty-five countries identified the United States as the “greatest threat to world peace,” which was more than three times the total for the second-place country (Pakistan).107 The international community always has to worry about the potential for police brutality, even if it occurs rarely. Such ungratefulness tends to come as a surprise to US leaders. In 2003, Condoleezza Rice was dismayed to discover resistance to US initiatives in Iraq: “There were times,” she said later, “that it appeared that American power was seen to be more dangerous than, perhaps, Saddam Hussein.”108 Both liberals and neoconservatives probably exaggerate the extent to which US hegemony is everywhere secretly welcomed; it is not just petulant resentment, but understandable disagreement with US policies, that motivates counterhegemonic beliefs and behavior. To review, assuming for a moment that US leaders are subject to the same forces that affect every human being, they overestimate the amount of control they have over other actors, and are not as important to decisions made elsewhere as they believe themselves to be. And they probably perceive their own benevolence to be much greater than do others. These common phenomena all influence US beliefs in the same direction, and may well increase the apparent explanatory power of hegemony beyond what the facts would otherwise support. The United States is probably not as central to the New Peace as either liberals or neoconservatives believe.