## 1

#### The United States federal government should substantially improve training programs for allied militaries and partner sub-state groups with extreme vetting and have the president of the United States issue a public statement encouraging state and local officials to expand work with Muslim communities.

#### Improved training programs assist foreign countries in combatting global terrorism and Biden’s statement would decrease radicalism – assumes Trump policies

Byman 2-16. Daniel Byman is a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, where his research focuses on counterterrorism and Middle East security [“What Trump should do about terrorism (but probably won’t),” 2-16-2017, *Brookings Institute*, URL: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/what-trump-should-do-about-terrorism-but-probably-wont]//vikas

Since the start of his presidential campaign, Donald J. Trump has repeatedly warned about “a major threat from radical Islamic terrorism,” and he has tweeted (and Twitter is the forum used for all serious discussions of policy) as follows: And while foreign policy in general got little attention in his “America First” inaugural speech, **Trump did single out counterterrorism**, promising to “unite the civilized world against radical Islamic terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the Earth.” Since taking power, **Trump has justified an exclusionary executive order on visas and refugees (not, he claims, a Muslim ban) in the name of fighting terrorism**, and on his watch, the military conducted a raid in Yemen that led to the death of one U.S. Navy SEAL and more than 20 civilians, including children. So it is safe to say that under Trump, terrorism will remain at the top of the U.S. national security agenda. Assessing the danger of terrorism is difficult, because so much varies by region. At home, only 94 Americans have died from jihadist attacks since 9/11—far fewer than experts (including myself) anticipated in the scary weeks after 9/11. Indeed, although it often goes unmentioned, but before Omar Mateen killed 49 people at the Pulse gay nightclub in Orlando, right-wing terrorists had killed more Americans in the post-9/11 era than had violent Islamist radicals. **The public’s perception of the danger of terrorism is far worse than the reality.** Even after fifteen years of a relentless global counterterrorism campaign, 40 percent of Americans believe the ability of terrorists to launch a major attack on the United States is greater than it was at the time of the 9/11 attacks, and another 31 percent believe it is simply the same. There is no evidence for either of these propositions. Some of this misperception stems from the post-9/11 media environment. After the towers fell, reporting of terrorist plots, let alone actual attacks, has skyrocketed, particularly if the perpetrators have even weak connections to jihadist groups like al Qaeda or its even more evil spinoff, the Islamic State. **The globalization of media meant that Islamic State attacks in Dhaka or al Qaeda attacks in Bali receive considerable press coverage**, to say nothing of the attacks in even more relatable and accessible locales in Europe. All of this **makes Trump’s claim that the media have neglected terrorism seem bizarre to terrorism experts**, where the normal complaint is that the media do the terrorists’ job for them by giving them so much free publicity. Indeed, although the terrorism problem in Europe is more severe than that facing the United States, it too has not surged dramatically compared to past decades. The 1970s and 1980s saw many attacks. Recent years have seen bloody and horrific attacks, like the 2015 shootings and bombings in Paris that killed 130 people—but 1988 saw 440 people die, most of whom perished when Libyan agents bombed Pan Am 103. The political impact in Europe and the United States is far greater than the danger to citizens’ lives. Trump scored many points playing up the threat of Muslim immigrants and Syrian refugees, with the terrorism danger (despite being low to nil statistically) looming in the background. In Europe the politics are even nastier, and in a span of a few short years xenophobic movements have gained extraordinary popularity and influence almost everywhere. Across the continent and often regardless of domestic economic stability or even ethnic diversity, European nations have experienced a surge of anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, nationalism. While the American public has an exaggerated sense of the terrorism threat, there has been a real surge in violence outside the West**. Terrorism has exploded throughout much of South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.** Terrorist groups have eagerly exploited and exacerbated the security vacuum created by the civil wars that have killed more than one hundred thousand in Afghanistan, tens of thousands in Pakistan, tens of thousands in Nigeria, thousands in Yemen, thousands in Libya, and hundreds of thousands in Syria. Countries like Turkey, Mali, Lebanon, and others near these hotbeds have also suffered from spillover violence. Far more than domestic attacks, the real danger to U.S. interests is in Muslim parts of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. **Stability and governance in many countries have collapsed and they are under strain in others. This wave of instability** and the terrorist violence it **spawns have an impact beyond the immediate human cost. They have geopolitical implications as threatened states fearfully react, with countries like Saudi Arabia intervening** in the quagmire of Yemen’s civil war and as regional tension with Iran more generally escalate. The threat of terrorism also enables repressive U.S. partners to resist pressure for political reform—an example here being Egypt’s claim that all forms of religious opposition are linked to terrorism. The U.S. response focuses on part of these dangers, but only in part. The post-9/11 efforts developed by the Bush administration and continued under the Obama administration have resulted in an effective combination of global intelligence gathering, security service disruption, and targeted strikes (particularly by drones) that has taken a real toll on terrorist groups, especially al Qaeda. For partner countries with stable governments, the United States partners with local security services to monitor, detain, arrest, and jail suspected terrorists. In less stable places like Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, targeted killing of terrorist leaders eliminates critical bomb-makers and logisticians, while those that survive are forced into hiding. Indeed, the success of these counterterrorism efforts has contributed to the recent push by al Qaeda and now the Islamic State to encourage lone wolves. This approach, however, is less effective when jihadists control territory, and here is where the Obama administration often came up short. In areas where civil wars rage, **the United States will have to step up and improve training programs for allied militaries and partner sub-state groups. We need more competent good guys—or at least more competent less-bad guys—to push back the Islamic State and other groups on the ground and ideally hold the territory against any renewed attacks or guerrilla operations.** It is easy to recommend this policy; the difficulty inevitably lies in its execution. Military training programs in Syria and Iraq have often failed disastrously. In both countries, despite months or even years of training, U.S.-trained forces repeatedly fled before the enemy (or, in Syria, sometimes even before). When the Islamic State took Mosul in June 2014, it only took perhaps 1,000 fighters to force 30,000 well-armed Iraqi forces to abandon the city, leaving behind massive stockpiles of sophisticated equipment, small arms, and ammunition for their jihadist foes. Starting small is vital. From small unit leaders through to senior officers, **the United States will need to carefully vet—here’s a place where “extreme vetting” may be a good idea—the personnel in its training programs. The second critical factor is improving governance.** Instead of funding large financial aid packages or pushing expansive democratization programs, **the U.S. should first focus on minimizing corruption and assisting in basic service provision.** At the same time as the Trump administration should try to rectify past failures, it must also be willing to exploit the Obama administration’s quite real successes. **The United States must also be prepared for the full collapse of the so-called caliphate, which has steadily lost ground and seen its recruitment of foreign fighters and funding dry up. Assuming it continues to lose territory, many of its local fighters will go underground or return home.** For the thousands of foreigners returning home or moving somewhere else, at least some among them will decide to continue the fight at home or wherever the opportunity arises. As it suffers further losses, the Islamic State itself will encourage more lone wolves to maintain its image and remain relevant to both its supporters and enemies. The fall of Raqqa, albeit an important accomplishment, will not mark final victory. The United States, however, cannot and should not be everywhere. It will be crucial that the new president delineates between areas of strong interest and interests that are peripheral. Some areas are often better left to allies (and yes, allies are important): France, for example, can continue to take the lead in much of North and West Africa. In an ironic twist, it could prove more challenging for the new president to navigate domestic waters than the shoals of the Middle East, and here I worry that the new president will make things worse. The first problem is institutionalization. Under both Bush and Obama, new and controversial counterterrorism instruments—targeted killings, increased domestic surveillance, aggressive FBI sting operations, detention without trial, and so on—are at the heart of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. In addition, the United States is bombing the Islamic State in Iraq and definitely in Syria with only less than clear legal justification. Since 9/11, counterterrorism policy has been largely the province of the executive branch, with some modification by the courts and some by Congress. Despite its interventions in the interrogation and detention debates, Congress, perhaps the most important branch in the long-term, has been conspicuously absent under both parties’ leadership. The dearth of public debate and legislation, regardless of your opinion about the policies in question, has created the current environment where either government lawyers can be forced into legalistic gymnastics trying to justify programs or operations become unnecessarily restricted for lack of clear authority. The proper participation of Congress in the policy process will put the executive branch and the courts on a sounder footing and ensure longer-term planning necessary for programs develops properly. Trump, however, so far seems skeptical on divided government and the separation of powers. The unrealistic domestic assessment of the terrorism threat reflects another serious counterterrorism failure: resilience. President Obama had tried repeatedly to talk down the threat, starting with a landmark speech in 2013 in which he described al Qaeda as on “the path to defeat” and noting that another 9/11 is unlikely. He was right. But **the rise of the Islamic State and its high-profile atrocities have fostered the perception that the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland has skyrocketed.** Public polling and the election rhetoric seem to demonstrate definitively that Obama’s efforts to build resilience failed. It remains easy for a terrorist group, or even some lucky amateurs, to sow fear and disrupt the nation with even minor attacks—the Boston Marathon bombings, which killed three people, resulted in the shutdown of an entire metropolitan area and impacted the whole country. Another unfortunate consequence of this election is the real risk to one of America’s greatest counterterrorism successes: integration of immigrant communities. In contrast to Europe, the American Muslim community is remarkably well integrated and regularly cooperates with law enforcement. Ideally, **the new president would press state and local officials to continue and expand their work with Muslim communities, not just to stop radicalism in their ranks but also to protect them from right-wing extremists.** Besides being the right thing to do, good law enforcement relations with Muslim Americans, especially in an atmosphere in which many face daily security threats, **will help ensure that radicalization remains low and that if and when it occurs, the community is comfortable with and motivated to cooperate with law enforcement**. We all know this is unlikely, and in fact Trump is likely to further alienate this community. Nor will the damage go away once Trump leaves office. Regrettably, **the demonization of the American Muslim community Trump has unleashed—and which is so unlike the behavior of President Bush—will endure with potentially serious counterterrorism** (and more broadly social and moral) implications. Now that this door is open (or maybe off its hinges) it seems likely other politicians will be tempted to walk through.

## 2

#### Reconciliation passes now – it’s in the senate, but Manchin and Sinema are tentative about the legislation that passed the House.

Snell 11/19 [Kelsey, Congressional correspondent for NPR, “The House passes a $2 trillion spending bill, but braces for changes in the Senate”, 11-19-2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/11/19/1056833510/the-house-passes-a-2-trillion-spending-bill-but-braces-for-changes-in-the-senate]//pranav

The House voted on near-party lines Friday morning to approve a roughly $2 trillion social and climate spending package, ending months of squabbles among Democrats over the details of the far-reaching measure. The vote was 220-213, with one Democrat, Rep. Jared Golden of Maine, joining all Republicans in opposition. The legislation is meant to fulfill many of President Biden's promises during the 2020 campaign, including plans to address climate change and provide a stronger federal safety net for families and low-income workers. "We have the Built Back Better bill that is historic, transformative and larger than anything we have ever done before," House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., said on the House floor. "If you're a parent, a senior, a child, a worker, if you are an American ... this bill's for you and it is better." House Democrats overcame internal divisions over the cost and scope of the spending package, but the fight will continue as the bill heads to the Senate for revisions. The vote was delayed after House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., spoke all through the night — for more than eight hours. His speech decried Democrats' spending plans, but also veered to subjects including China and border security. "Never in American history has so much been spent at one time," he said. "Never in American history will so many taxes be raised and so much borrowing be needed to pay for all this reckless spending." Biden praised House passage of the bill, noting it was the second time in two weeks that the chamber moved two "consequential" pieces of his legislative agenda, referencing the new infrastructure law. He described the vote as a "giant step forward in carrying out my economic plan to create jobs, reduce costs, make our country more competitive, and give working people and the middle class a fighting chance." What's in the measure The legislation includes: $550 billion to address climate change through incentives and tax breaks; funding to extend the expanded, monthly child tax credit for one year; housing assistance, including $150 billion in affordable housing expenditures; expansions to Medicaid and further assistance to reduce the cost of health care premiums for plans purchased under the Affordable Care Act; four weeks of paid family and medical leave; funding for universal pre-K for roughly 6 million 3- and 4-year-olds; a provision to allow Medicare Parts B and D to negotiate prices directly with drug manufacturers on certain drugs and cap out-of-pocket spending for seniors at $2,000 per year; a $35 cap on monthly insulin expenses. The spending is mostly offset with taxes on the wealthy and corporations, including: a 5% surtax on taxpayers with personal income above $10 million, and an additional 3% added on income above $25 million; a 15% minimum tax on corporate profits of large corporations that report more than $1 billion in profits; a 1% tax on stock buybacks; a 50% minimum tax on foreign profits of U.S. corporations. House Democrats unite after months of fighting Moderate Democrats ultimately voted for the legislation after concerns that estimates from the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office would show the measure to be more costly than leaders have projected. Ultimately, the CBO found the bill would cost the federal government $367 billion over the next decade, "not counting any additional revenue that may be generated by additional funding for tax enforcement." Many Democrats, including the White House, argue that when that is taken into account, the measure would pay for itself. Members of the fiscally moderate New Democrat Coalition endorsed the legislation ahead of the final cost estimates. Rep. Brad Schneider, D-Ill., said the official estimates don't take into account extra revenue from increased tax enforcement — or the broader economic benefits of the legislation. "When discussing the importance of the bill, we also have to talk about the costs that would be incurred if we don't pass this bill," Schneider said on a call with reporters. "The cost of inaction is simply too high, and it can only be headed off if we act now." For progressive Democrats, the vote fulfills a promise from Biden and House leaders not to neglect policies that have energized the left wing of their party. Members of the Congressional Progressive Caucus set aside major demands throughout the negotiations, including more spending and plans for aggressive changes to the nation's health care system, in order to reach an agreement that satisfied the full caucus. Senate hurdles could drag on for weeks The House vote is just the latest step in a lengthy process that will almost certainly involve further changes to the bill. Centrist Sens. Kyrsten Sinema, D-Ariz., and Joe Manchin, D-W.Va., have each expressed concerns about the House version of the legislation. Manchin is particularly opposed to a provision that would provide four weeks of paid family and medical leave for most workers. Sinema's objections are less clear but Democrats need both lawmakers on board in order for the legislation to pass. It is unclear how long it would take for senators to work out their disagreements and finalize the legislation. Once that work is done, the Senate would have to start a lengthy process to vote on the bill using the budget reconciliation process that would allow the bill to be passed in the Senate with 50 votes, rather than the 60 votes needed for most legislation. Pelosi told reporters on Thursday that Senate staff have already completed a necessary step to ensure the legislation meets the basic requirements to avoid a Republican filibuster. But the process still has several steps, including a series of unlimited amendment votes known as a vote-a-rama.

#### Biden PC is key to getting democratic skeptics on board, but it’s tentative

Cochrane & Weisman 11/05 [Emily Cochrane - correspondent based in Washington. She has covered Congress since late 2018, focusing on the annual debate over government funding and economic legislation, ranging from emergency pandemic relief to infrastructure, Jonathan Weisman - congressional correspondent, veteran Washington journalist and author of the novel “No. 4 Imperial Lane” and the nonfiction book “(((Semitism))): Being Jewish in America in the Age of Trump.” His career in journalism stretches back 30 years, “Live Updates: House Democrats Push Toward Votes on Biden’s Agenda”, 11-05-2021, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/11/05/us/biden-spending-infrastructure-bill]//pranav

At the White House, Mr. Biden called on lawmakers to pass the legislation. “I’m asking every House member, member of the House of Representatives, to vote yes on both these bills right now,” the president said. Spooked by Tuesday’s electoral drubbing, Democrats labored to overcome concerns among moderates about the cost and details of a rapidly evolving, $1.85 trillion social safety net and climate plan and push it through over unified Republican opposition. They also hoped to clear a Senate-passed $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill — the largest investment in the nation’s aging public works in a decade — for Mr. Biden’s signature. Top Democratic officials said they were confident they could complete both measures by day’s end, but Speaker Nancy Pelosi of California and her team continued to haggle with holdouts. Several moderates were pushing for more information about the cost of the sprawling plan, including a nonpartisan analysis from the Congressional Budget Office, the official scorekeeper responsible for calculating the fiscal impact of the 2,135-page legislation. “I think everyone’s waiting for the C.B.O. to do their job,” said Representative Jared Golden, Democrat of Maine, speaking to reporters on Friday morning as he left Ms. Pelosi’s office, where White House officials were also meeting on next steps. But Representative Steny H. Hoyer of Maryland, the majority leader, said the cost estimate would not be ready by the end of the day, and a person familiar with the discussions said a score from the budget office was weeks away from completion. “We’re working on it,” Mr. Hoyer said. Ms. Pelosi spent much of the day on Thursday buttonholing lawmakers on the House floor to try to corral support for the social policy bill, which includes monthly payments to families with children, universal prekindergarten, a four-week paid family and medical leave program, health care subsidies and a broad array of climate change initiatives. Mr. Biden and members of his cabinet worked the phones to win over Democratic skeptics. With Republicans united in opposition, Democrats could afford to lose as few as three votes from their side. As Democrats labored to unite their members behind the bill, Republicans sought to wreak procedural havoc on the House floor, forcing a vote to adjourn the chamber that leaders held open for hours to buy time for their negotiations. While the Senate approved the $1 trillion infrastructure bill in August, the measure has stalled as progressives have repeatedly refused to supply their votes for it until there is agreement on the other bill.

#### Business lobbying backlash ensures Sinema flips – empirics prove she doesn’t like similar bills

Duda ’21 [Jeremy, Prior to joining the Arizona Mirror, he worked at the Arizona Capitol Times, where he spent eight years covering the Governor's Office and two years as editor of the Yellow Sheet Report, “Business groups urge Kelly, Sinema to oppose pro-union PRO Act”, 08-30-2021, https://www.azmirror.com/2021/08/30/business-groups-urge-kelly-sinema-to-oppose-pro-union-pro-act/]//pranav

Business groups publicly called on Democratic U.S. Sens. Mark Kelly and Kyrsten Sinema to oppose a sweeping piece of pro-organized labor legislation that would wipe out Arizona’s “right-to-work” law that prohibits mandatory union membership. At a press conference at the office of the Arizona chapter of the Associated General Contractors near the state Capitol on Monday, leaders of several business groups warned that the Protecting the Right to Organize Act — or PRO Act, as it’s more commonly known — would undermine Arizona’s recovery from the economic slump it faced last year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, undermine the “gig economy,” jeopardize secret ballots in union organization votes, give unions access to confidential employee information and strip Arizonans of their right not to join a union. The bill would allow unions to override right-to-work laws and collect union dues from non-members who still benefit from collective bargaining. It would also prohibit company-sponsored meetings to urge employees against unionizing, define most independent contractors as employees, protect employees who are attempting to unionize from being fired and allow unions to engage in secondary strikes in support of other striking workers, among other provisions. “We want to thank and tell Senator Sinema and Senator Kelly that we appreciate them for not signing on as co-sponsors to the PRO Act, because if they were to change their opinions, New York Sen. Chuck Schumer will put this up for a vote,” said Danny Seiden, president and CEO of the Arizona Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Kelly and Sinema are two of only three Senate Democrats, along with Virginia’s Mark Warner, who haven’t co-sponsored the bill or thrown their public support behind it. Kelly last month told the Huffington Post that he opposes the independent contractor provision, but that he supports the “overall goals” of the legislation. Sinema is widely known as a holdout on the Democratic side and hasn’t supported the PRO Act, but spokesman Pablo Sierra-Carmona indicated that she hasn’t made up her mind, and that she won’t do so unless and until it comes up for a vote in the Senate.

#### Labor reform saps PC – empirically prove with Obama, corporate opposition, and Democratic resistance

Leon 21 Luis Feliz Leon, 01-06-2021, “"If we want it, we’re going to have to fight like hell for it" - Labor faces an uphill battle to pass the PRO Act,” Strike Wave, https://www.thestrikewave.com/original-content/labor-faces-uphill-battle-to-pass-pro-act/SJKS

The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), which died in the Senate during President Barack Obama’s first term, had similar potential to increase union membership, as it would have enabled workers to get union representation if a majority signed union cards (“card check”) rather than through an election. It died because Obama was unwilling to put political capital behind it to overcome opposition from Republicans and center-right Democrats. “EFCA was very close to becoming law. At the end of the day, in my view, the Obama administration did not put the necessary political capital into securing its passage,” said EPI's McNicholas. “The Obama administration decided to focus on ‘bipartisan’ and ‘reach across the aisle’ type solutions to the 2008 financial crisis, and thus didn't care about EFCA in the face of the anti-EFCA mobilization by strong ‘antis’ like the Chamber of Commerce,” says Susan Kang, a professor of political science at John Jay College who studies political economy, labor, and human rights. “Basically, labor was swept aside by the Obama administration … at the exact moment when he had the strongest mandate and political capital.” Another issue, said Patrick Burke, an organizer with United Auto Workers Local 2322 in Massachusetts, was that EFCA's card-check provisions, when framed as a replacement for elections, “became very easy to demonize and difficult to explain to people not already familiar with labor law.” “The short story is that the EFCA was doomed from a few moderate Dems not being willing to go through with card check once actually in power to enact it. The long story is that the labor movement's disappearance from the ‘adult table’ of Democratic politics has cyclical downward effects. They're less able to convince Dems to go out on the limb for them and to prioritize their legislative requests,” said Brandon Magner, a labor lawyer in Indiana. Despite a history of betrayal and rejection, labor and immigrant rights organizations, [coalesced](https://progressive.org/dispatches/power-behind-win-feliz-leon-201123/) around Biden, a self-professed “[union guy](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/16/biden-holds-joint-meeting-with-union-leaders-and-retail-auto-tech-ceos.html),” after the primaries and [helped deliver](https://progressive.org/dispatches/bargaining-rights-with-that-feliz-leon-201229/) him to the White House in the hope that doing so would lead to [executive action](https://indypendent.org/2020/12/immigrants-rights-advocates-descend-on-delaware/) on immigration and labor law reform. “We call on Congress to pass and Biden to sign the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act early in 2021 to make sure every worker who wants to form or join a union is able to do so freely and fairly,” AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka said in a [statement](https://aflcio.org/press/releases/afl-cio-looks-forward-working-president-elect-joe-biden-0) after the election. But union organizers, researchers, and labor lawyers see dim prospects for winning significant labor reform during the Biden administration. “The PRO Act is obviously dead in the Senate unless Mitch McConnell gets knocked into the minority, but I don't see it being passed without full-throated support for gutting the filibuster from Biden, Harris, Schumer, Durbin, and more,” said Magner, the labor lawyer, adding that “the history of failed labor law reform efforts indicates you need 60 votes to pass anything.” That is particularly true of Democrats in “right-to-work” states like [South Carolina](https://www.postandcourier.com/politics/scs-rep-joe-cunningham-to-vote-against-pro-union-bill-in-break-with-democrats/article_426b38e2-4862-11ea-a0d9-77a96531c47e.html) where U.S. Rep. Joe Cunningham was a reliable opponent in the House. But the greatest liability might be Biden himself. “The few times that Biden met McConnell at the negotiating table during the Obama years, McConnell [left with Biden’s wallet](https://theintercept.com/2019/06/24/joe-biden-tax-cuts-mitch-mconnell/),” dryly [observed](https://theintercept.com/2020/12/28/mcconnell-trump-election/) The Intercept’s Ryan Grim. “Even if the Democrats capture the Georgia Senate seats, their margin will be too small to overcome a Republican filibuster or, if they change the rules, more than one Democrat will break ranks, and no Republicans will support the act,” said Friedman. Even if Biden were to somehow outmaneuver McConnell’s chicanery, there would be fierce opposition to contend with on the corporate side from the likes of Americans for Tax Reform, which has [used](https://www.atr.org/ab5) Georgia runoff elections as an opportunity to fearmonger on the PRO Act, and, when backed against the wall, Biden may revert to his timeworn moderate instincts and not go to bat for labor reform unless forced to. “Prospects for major labor law reform under the Biden administration are directly tied to unions’ and union federations’ willingness to hold the administration’s feet to the fire. They are not going to do it on their own – if we want it, we’re going to have to fight like hell for it,” said Pitkin, the former UNITE HERE organizer. “The biggest question is whether there is enough street heat and organizing to prioritize legislation like this," said Burke, the UAW organizer. “Workers in motion spur labor-law reforms, not the other way around.”

#### They lash out against Reconciliation – it includes similar provisions

FURCHTGOTT-ROTH 10/09 [Diana, former acting assistant secretary for economic policy at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is adjunct professor of economics at George Washington University, “Democrats can't pass the PRO Act, so it's buried in the reconciliation bill”, 10-09-2021, https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/575992-dems-cant-pass-the-pro-act-so-its-buried-in-the-reconciliation-bill]//pranav

Union membership has been declining for decades as workers find better uses than union dues for their hard-earned dollars. But union bosses and their supporters are trying to change the law to force hard-working Americans into unions. How? Through the Protecting the Right to Organize Act (PRO Act), a bill that would expand the power of union leaders at the expense of workers. After sailing through the House, the PRO Act now appears stalled in the Senate and Democrats are trying to slip some PRO Act provisions into a massive reconciliation bill. American workers are wise to turn down union membership. Union pension plans are in trouble. In 2020, the Labor Department listed 121 union plans in critical status, defined as less than 65 percent funded, and 61 in endangered status, with less than 80 percent funded. Unions desperately need new workers to join, because they pay contributions for many years without withdrawing money. Most recently, Amazon workers in Alabama resoundingly rejected efforts by the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store International Union to organize their plant, with more than 70 percent of workers voting against the union. The union’s plan was in critical status between 2015 and 2019, and the Labor Department informed the plan’s administrators that it had to be reorganized by reducing benefits and increasing contributions. Union leaders and their allies on Capitol Hill believe the way to increase membership after decades of decline is to pass elements of the PRO Act through reconciliation. Unlike the PRO Act, which needs 60 votes in the Senate to enable it to move to President Biden’s desk for signature, the reconciliation bill, which deals with taxes and spending, needs only a simple majority. So via a massive reconciliation bill, congressional Democrats are trying to move some labor union provisions of the PRO Act by arguing they are actually revenue raisers.

#### Reconciliation is k2 stopping existential climate change – warming is incremental and every change in temperature is vital

Higgins 8/16 [Trevor, Senior Director, Domestic Climate and Energy, “Budget Reconciliation Is the Key to Stopping Climate Change”, 08-16-2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2021/08/16/502681/budget-reconciliation-key-stopping-climate-change/]//pranav

The United States is suffering acutely from the chaotic changes in climate that scientists now directly attribute to the burning of fossil fuels and other human activity. The drought, fires, extreme heat, and floods that have already killed hundreds this summer across the continent and around the world are a tragedy—and a warning of worsening instability yet to come. However, this week, the Senate initiated an extraordinary legislative response that would set the world on a different path. Enacting the full scope of President Joe Biden’s Build Back Better agenda would put the American economy to work leading a global transition to clean energy and stabilizing the climate. A look at what’s coming next through the budget reconciliation process reveals a ray of hope that is easy to miss amid the fitful negotiations of recent months: At long last, Congress is on the verge of major legislation that would build a more equitable, just, and inclusive clean energy economy. This is our shot to stop climate change. Building a clean energy future must start now Until the global economy stops polluting the air and instead starts to draw down the emissions of years past, the world will continue to heat up, blundering past perilous tipping points that threaten irreversible and catastrophic consequences. Stemming the extent of warming at 1.5 degrees Celsius rather 2 degrees or worse will reduce the risk of crossing such tipping points or otherwise exceeding the adaptive capacity of human society. Every degree matters. Stabilizing global warming at 1.5 degrees Celsius starts with cutting annual greenhouse gas emissions in the United States to half of peak levels by 2030. This isn’t about temporary offsets or incremental gains in efficiency—it’s about the rapid adoption of scalable solutions that will work throughout the world to eliminate global net emissions by 2050 and sustain net-negative emissions thereafter. Building this better future will tackle climate change, deliver on environmental justice, and create good jobs. It will give us a shot to stop the planet from continuously warming. It will alleviate the concentrated burdens of fossil fuel pollution, which are concentrated in systemically disadvantaged, often majority Black and brown communities. It will empower American workers to compete in the global clean energy economy of the 21st century. There is no time to lose in the work of building a clean energy future.

## Case

### Underview

1] presumption negates if 2nr goes for an alternative advocacy

2] you get 1ar theory but it’s dta – puts u ahead bc I lose a position and deters fture abuse. Reasonability on 1ar theory to check back against 2ar sandbagging and yes new 2nr paradigm issues bc we don’t know hwo they’ll be implicated in the 1ar until the 2nr. Also getting more efficient solves all their offense.

### Solvency

#### Aff gets circumvented.

Lanard 17 [Noah Lanard, editorial fellow. Donald Trump just took another swipe at the labor unions that helped elect him, Mother Jones, 7-19-2017, Accessible Online at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/07/trumps-labor-board-appointments-are-another-blow-for-unions/]

Trump’s NLRB nominees are expected to create further challenges for workers seeking to unionize. Emanuel is a shareholder and longtime lawyer at Littler, the world’s largest management-side employment law firm. Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) has called it is one of the nation’s “most ruthless” union-busters. Emanuel’s clients include Uber and other companies accused of violating workers’ rights, according to his ethics disclosure form.

Outside of his legal practice, Emanuel has decried California’s “terrible climate for job creation,” citing the state’s generous overtime and break requirements for employees.

Kaplan was previously an attorney for the House education and labor committee. In that role, he drafted a bill to reverse an NLRB rule, dubbed the “ambush election rule” by conservative critics, that allowed workers to vote on unionization as soon as 11 days after a petition was submitted. The bill, which did not pass, would have also reversed the board’s recognition of micro-unions.

At Emanuel and Kaplan’s nomination hearing last week, Sens. Al Franken (D-Minn.) and Warren were particularly concerned by Emanuel’s record of defending the mandatory arbitration agreements that Carlson and many others have signed. Pressed by Franken, Emanuel declined to criticize arbitration agreements that prevent women who are sexually harassed from suing their employers in court. In theory, the legality of the arbitration agreements is now in the Supreme Court’s hands. But Ronald Meisburg, a former NLRB board member, has said it’s possible the NLRB could revisit the decision before the court decides. Emanuel told Warren he does not expect to recuse himself if the issue comes up.

The committee’s approval of both nominees along party lines on Wednesday follows other moves under Trump that are less than friendly to labor. Trump’s nominee for deputy labor secretary, Patrick Pizzella, was criticized last week for working with disgraced lobbyist Jack Abramoff to advocate for what was compared to sweatshop labor in the Northern Mariana Islands, a US commonwealth, in the early 2000s. The goods, which were often made by Chinese and Filipino workers, had the advantage of being stamped “Made in the USA.”

Neil Gorsuch, whom Trump appointed to the Supreme Court, has a long record of siding with employers in labor disputes. In the court’s upcoming term, Gorsuch will hear arguments in a case that will decide whether mandatory arbitration agreements violate the National Labor Relations Act.

All 1AC ev proves squo strikes are suff to solve their offense – no warrant for unconditinatliy key means squo solves.

### Terror

#### 1] Rhetoric of terrorists acquiring the nuke deploy racialized dynamics to sustain the War on Terror, aimed at annihilating the Other. That’s a reason to reject the team bc reps shape reality.

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But unlike strategic Orientalism and techno-Orientalism, Military Orientalism is described as an exercise undertaken to investigate the mental baggage of Western consciousness accumulated from an interest in ‘non-Western warfare’ (Porter, 2013, pp. 16–17). The endeavor of military Orientalism is to unpack the ‘range of assumptions and myths through which Westerners gaze on the military East and engage in a critical dialogue with our own preconceptions’ (Porter, 2013, pp. 16–17). It encourages Westerners to voice their own ‘fears about themselves, their survival, identity and values, through different visions of non-Western warfare’ (Porter, 2013, p. 21). Military Orientalism issues a warning against reducing military history to a morality play (Porter, 2013, p. 75). But it is open to the idea that our common experiences of suffering can help cultivate a ‘source of critical self-reflection to perhaps nurture some understanding of the ‘intimacy of the relationship’ (Naeem & David, 2004, p. 187; Nandy, 1983). In investigating the intimacy of a relationship it might be possible to glean and ‘retrieve recessive images and practices’ that have been historically constituted through a network of social relations and processes (Naeem & David, 2004, p. 191). These might present creative opportunities to move beyond ‘policing boundaries of self as an exclusive and homogenous space’ and instead ‘appreciate and claim the self that exists as part of the other beyond those boundaries’ (Naeem & David, 2004, p. 204). Porter insists on ‘the interactive and power-political nature of war, which has a culture of its own that can change all parties to a conflict’ (2013, p. 55). Porter claims that, ‘paradoxically, war can drive cultures closer together’ (2013, p. 33). This is because, ‘war…is not simply a clash of Others, made possible by an ignorant horror of difference. The warrior looks out at the enemy and sees men who are, in crucial respects, recognizably like himself’ (Porter, 2013, p. 34). He also argues that an engagement with, ‘the foreign “Other” can be treated as a superior model to inform self-examination’ (2013, p. 108). But this hopeful promise of Military Orientalism has not stemmed the tide of populist discourses deploying the dynamic of difference between ‘The West and the Rest’ in the aftermath of the Cold War to wage and perpetuate a global War on Terror. On the contrary it is possible to argue that there is deliberate and contingent deployment of a ‘decivilizing rhetoric that blends irrational, aggressive, rigid, paranoid and exceptionalist discourses to demonize Other-ness’ and give ‘unwarranted authority and autonomy’ to ‘militarist and imperialist discourses of national security’ (Taylor, 2007, p. 670). There is ‘sustained use of decivilizing imagery’ that ‘represents the United States as a virtuous nation reluctantly but legitimately fulfilling its divine mandate to use civilized reason and superior force’ vis-a vis ‘nuclear capable and aspiring nations in Asia, Africa and the Middle East’ depicted in a ‘racist, sexist language that reproduces colonial ideology. As such it rejects the authority and legitimacy of these nations as potential possessors of nuclear weaponsand solidifies continued dominance by the United States of the nuclear strategic environment’ (Taylor, 2007, p. 685). The strength of these populist discourses reinforcing a dynamic of difference and denial is exhibited with the contemporary ‘malpractice’ of the Trump administration to not respect the nuclear deal negotiated with Iran (Kimball, 2018). Nuclear weapons have long been regarded as ‘a new technological deity’ and ‘a divinely offered gift that endorsed American exceptionalism and imbued its creators with God-like power and the mission to restore order and justice in a fallen world.’ (Taylor, 2007, p. 677). Gabrielle Hecht (2012) defines nuclear exceptionalism as ‘insistence on an essential nuclear difference – manifested in political claims, technological systems, cultural forms, institutional infrastructures, and scientific knowledge’ and insists ‘nuclear exceptionalism could be made, unmade, and remade’ as ‘for all efforts at making nuclear things exceptional, there were opposing attempts to render them banal’ (Hecht, pp. 6– 8). It is important to bear this in mind as this pernicious dynamic of difference and exceptionalism becomes even more acute with current US President Donald Trump’s everyday populist declarations. He is on record for stating that the US will be at the ‘top of the pack’ ‘until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes’ (Holland, 2017). In his recent visit to Poland ‘to summon the courage and the will to defend our civilization’ Trump (2017) claims ‘there are dire threats to our security and our way of life’ and argues, ‘the fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will to survive.’ There is little doubt in his mind of the ‘triumph’ of the West (Holland, 2017). It is therefore helpful to pause in this tumultuous ‘history of the present’ and suggest that ‘every identity owes a debt to alterity’ (Naeem & David, 2004, p. 8). Thus it is interesting to observe how the existing literature on ‘dynamic of difference’ between Orientalism and Occidentalism has expanded its arsenal with a more complex conceptual apparatus of Strategic Orientalism, Techno Orientalism and Military Orientalism to helps us grasp the everyday practices of techno-racial dynamic of differences that cultivate and nurture techno-racial stereotypes. These stereotypes more often than not dictate modes of behavior that make the Other ‘a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed…an enemy who no longer must be compelled to retreat into his borders only’ (Schmitt, 2007). It is this ‘dynamic of difference’ with its persistent desire to annihilate the Other, makes one wonder, whether it is not a complementary sub-text for an increasingly alarming and growing superstructure of a ‘dynamic of denial’ in weapons control? A dynamic of denial so petulant that it casts its shadow in celebrating the recent success of a Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty (2017).

#### No nuke terror.

Christopher J. Fettweis 19. Associate professor of political science at Tulane University. “Pessimism and Nostalgia in the Second Nuclear Age.” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 13.1

Finally, despite the string of bleak and terrifying projections from a variety of experts, nuclear weapons have remained well beyond the capabilities of the modern apocalyptic terrorist. The great fear of the SNA literature, that scientific knowledge and technology would gradually become more accessible to nonstate actors, has remained only a dream. Nor does there appear to be a great reservoir of fissile material in the world’s various black markets waiting to be weaponized.58 Just because something has not yet occurred does not mean that it cannot or will not occur eventually. However, it is worth noting that the world has not experienced any close calls regarding nuclear terrorism. Forecasting future unique events is a necessarily dicey enterprise, but one way to improve accuracy is to examine events that have already or almost happened. Given the many complexities involved with nuclear weapons, especially for amateurs as any terrorists would almost certainly be, it is not unreasonable to expect a few failures, or near misses, to precede success. While it is possible that we might not know about all the plots disrupted by international law enforcement, keeping the lid on nuclear near misses would presumably be no small task. As of this writing, the public is aware of no serious attempts to construct, steal, or purchase nuclear weapons, much less smuggle and detonate one. “Leakage” does not seem to be a problem, yet.59 The uniformly pessimistic projections about the second nuclear era have not, at least thus far, been borne out by events. Post–Cold War trends have instead been generally moving in directions opposite to these expectations, with fewer nuclear weapons in the hands of the same number of countries and none pursuing more. Why, then, doesnuclear pessimism persist? What are the roots of the current fashionable unwillingness—or even inability—to detect positive patterns in nuclear security?

There’s also just no internal link to nuke terror which proves they’re threat construction.

#### No bioterror – two reasons:

#### Terrorists can’t do it.

Pinker 18 – Steven Arthur Pinker is a Canadian-American cognitive psychologist, Professor at Harvard University. [Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, Viking, Penguin Group]//BPS

Biological agents are particularly ill-suited to terrorists, whose goal, recall, is not damage but theater (chapter 13).58 The biologist Paul Ewald notes that natural selection among pathogens works against the terrorist’s goal of sudden and spectacular devastation. 59 Germs that depend on rapid person-to-person contagion, like the common-cold virus, are selected to keep their hosts alive and ambulatory so they can shake hands with and sneeze on as many people as possible. Germs get greedy and kill their hosts only if they have some other way of getting from body to body, like mosquitoes (for malaria), a contaminable water supply (for cholera), or trenches packed with injured soldiers (for the 1918 Spanish flu). Sexually transmitted pathogens, like HIV and syphilis, are somewhere in between, needing a long and symptomless incubation period during which hosts can infect their partners, after which the germs do their damage. Virulence and contagion thus trade off, and the evolution of germs will frustrate the terrorist’s aspiration to launch a headline-worthy epidemic that is both swift and lethal. Theoretically, a bioterrorist could try to bend the curve with a pathogen that is virulent, contagious, and durable enough to survive outside bodies. But breeding such a fine-tuned germ would require Nazi-like experiments on living humans that even terrorists (to say nothing of teenagers) are unlikely to carry off. It may be more than just luck that the world so far has seen just one successful bioterror attack (the 1984 tainting of salad with salmonella in an Oregon town by the Rajneeshee religious cult, which killed no one) and one spree killing (the 2001 anthrax mailings, which killed five).60 To be sure, advances in synthetic biology, such as the gene-editing technique CRISPR-Cas9, make it easier to tinker with organisms, including pathogens. But it’s difficult to re-engineer a complex evolved trait by inserting a gene or two, since the effects of any gene are intertwined with the rest of the organism’s genome. Ewald notes, “I don’t think that we are close to understanding how to insert combinations of genetic variants in any given pathogen that act in concert to generate high transmissibility and stably high virulence for humans.”61 The biotech expert Robert Carlson adds that “one of the problems with building any flu virus is that you need to keep your production system (cells or eggs) alive long enough to make a useful quantity of something that is trying to kill that production system. . . . Booting up the resulting virus is still very, very difficult. . . . I would not dismiss this threat completely, but frankly I am much more worried about what Mother Nature is throwing at us all the time.”62 And crucially, advances in biology work the other way as well: they also make it easier for the good guys [public protectors] (and there are many more of them) to identify pathogens, invent antibiotics that overcome antibiotic resistance, and rapidly develop vaccines.63 An example is the Ebola vaccine, developed in the waning days of the 2014–15 emergency, after public health efforts had capped the toll at twelve thousand deaths rather than the millions that the media had foreseen. Ebola thus joined a list of other falsely predicted pandemics such as Lassa fever, hantavirus, SARS, mad cow disease, bird flu, and swine flu.64 Some of them never had the potential to go pandemic in the first place because they are contracted from animals or food rather than in an exponential tree of person-to-person infections. Others were nipped by medical and public health interventions. Of course no one knows for sure whether an evil genius will someday overcome the world’s defenses and loose a plague upon the world for fun, vengeance, or a sacred cause. But journalistic habits and the Availability and Negativity biases inflate the odds, which is why I have taken Sir Martin up on his bet. By the time you read this you may know who has won.65

#### It endangers the attackers.

Gunasingham 20 (Amresh Gunasingham is an Associate Editor at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, a constituent unit at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University; “Has Covid-19 increased the risk of bioterrorism?”; Today Online; May 26, 2020; <https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/has-covid-19-increased-risk-bioterrorism>; ERB)

For example, the bacterium that causes the anthrax disease is relatively easy to acquire and can be inhaled through aerosols or ingested via contaminated water supplies. But an anthrax attack will have a limited impact, both in terms of the geographical area and casualties involved. The illness is not contagious and cannot be transmitted easily from person to person. While technologies have now become more accessible, and groups like Isis have developed some infrastructural and scientific capabilities, they likely still lack the necessary resources to self-engineer a bioweapon that can wreak widespread devastation. In a broader sense, movements across the ideological spectrum long interested in gaining chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons continue to be hampered in these efforts by a lack of access, unlike state actors, to adequate technical expertise, materials, funding and infrastructure. EVOLVING TACTICS Military doctrines also largely downplay the risk of Covid-19, or a similarly virulent strain, being used as a bioweapon by terrorists on a large scale. This is because, given its highly infectious characteristics, a virus would not only cripple the attackers, but also risk blowback on their own supporters and communities. But tactics have evolved, particularly since the turn of the century, from one of targeted attacks to the indiscriminate use of violence, including suicide bomb attacks, wherein collateral deaths among the aggressors are deemed more acceptable. Among far-right groups in the West, successful bioterror attacks involving transmittable pathogens or toxins have been rare. Notable incidents include the Rajneesh Cult salmonella poisoning incident, which saw 751 individuals in the American state of Oregon suffer food poisoning when their meals were deliberately contaminated. Others include the Aum Shinrikyo cult’s nerve gas attack in Tokyo and the Anthrax letter attacks of 2001, where five people in the United States died. For its part, Isis has used chemical attacks in Syria, and has also showed intent to gain bioterror capabilities. In 2014, it was revealed that a confiscated laptop belonging to a Tunisian Isis operative allegedly contained information on how to weaponise the Bubonic plague using infected animals. There was, however, little indication of Isis’ capability to unleash such a bioweapon on humans.

### Income Inequality

#### Increased strikes sabotage the economy – they cause major disruptions and lower income for workers.

Grabianowski 6 [Ed; Author and freelance writer. He’s worked as a contributing writer for io9, HowStuffWorks, and Sweethome. His fiction has appeared in Black Static, Fear Project, and other publications and anthologies, including Fear After Fear; “How Strikes Work,” HSW; 3/24/06; https://money.howstuffworks.com/strike.htm]//SJWen

Labor strikes can cause major disruptions to industry, commerce and the lives of many people who aren't even connected to the strike itself. The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Association strike in 1981 resulted in the firing of thousands of air traffic controllers, and the New York City transit strike in late 2005 affected millions of people. The history of strikes and labor unions is a key chapter in the story of the Industrial Revolution.

While the reasons behind strikes can be complex, they all boil down to two key elements: money and power. In this article, we'll find out how labor strikes have affected the balance of power between corporations and workers, what laws regulate strikes and learn about some important strikes in history.

It's difficult to say when the first real labor strike occurred. The word "strike" was first used in the 1700s, and probably comes from to notion of dealing a blow to the employer [ref]. In 1786, a group of printers in Philadelphia requested a raise and the company rejected it. They stopped working in protest and eventually received their raise. Other professionals followed suit in the next few decades. Everyone in a city who practiced the same profession agreed to set prices and wages at the same rate. Members would shun anyone who diverged from the agreement, refusing to work in the same shop and forcing employers to fire them. By the 1800s, formal trade societies and guilds began to emerge.

To have a strike today, you must have a union (though not necessarily an official union) -- an organization of workers that bargain collectively with an employer. Workers form unions because an individual worker is powerless compared to an employer, who can set low wages and long working hours as long as it adheres to labor laws. When workers combine to form a union, they collectively have enough power to negotiate with the employer. The main weapon the union has against the employer is the threat of a strike action.

At its most basic level, a strike occurs when all the workers in the union stop coming to work. With no workers, the business shuts down. The employer stops making money, though it is still spending money on taxes, rent, electricity and maintenance. The longer the strike lasts, the more money the employer loses. Of course, the workers aren't getting paid either, so they're losing money as well. Some unions build up "war chests" -- funds to pay striking workers. But it isn't usually very much, and it's often not enough for a prolonged strike.

#### Economic collapse leads to terrorism

Bremmer 2009(Ian, - President of the Eurasia Group, sr. fellow @ World Policy Institute, , 3/4/09, Foreign Policy, http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/04/the\_global\_recession\_heightens\_terrorist\_risks)

But there's another reason why the financial crisis heightens the risk of global terrorism. Militants thrive in places where no one is fully in charge. The global recession threatens to create more such places. No matter how cohesive and determined a terrorist organization, it needs a supportive environment in which to flourish. That means a location that provides a steady stream of funds and recruits and the support (or at least acceptance) of the local population. Much of the counter-terrorist success we've seen in Iraq's al Anbar province over the past two years is a direct result of an increased willingness of local Iraqis to help the Iraqi army and US troops oust the militants operating there. In part, that's because the area's tribal leaders have their own incentives (including payment in cash and weaponry) for cooperating with occupation forces. But it's also because foreign militants have alienated the locals. The security deterioration of the past year in Pakistan and Afghanistan reflects exactly the opposite phenomenon. In the region along both sides of their shared border, local tribal leaders have yet to express much interest in helping Pakistani and NATO soldiers target local or foreign militants. For those with the power to either protect or betray the senior al-Qaeda leaders believed to be hiding in the region, NATO and Pakistani authorities have yet to find either sweet enough carrots or sharp enough sticks to shift allegiances. The slowdown threatens to slow the progress of a number of developing countries. Most states don't provide ground as fertile for militancy as places like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. But as more people lose their jobs, their homes, and opportunities for prosperity -- in emerging market countries or even within minority communities inside developed states -- it becomes easier for local militants to find volunteers. This is why the growing risk of attack from suicide bombers and well-trained gunmen in Pakistan creates risks that extend beyond South Asia. This is a country that is home to lawless regions where local and international militants thrive, nuclear weapons and material, a history of nuclear smuggling, a cash-starved government, and a deteriorating economy. Pakistan is far from the only country in which terrorism threatens to spill across borders.

### Authoritarianism

1] no prolif impact or it should’ve already happened – it’s been 3 years, but no new actors are attempting to develop nukes

#### 2] Prolif is declining and has no impact

Dr. John **Mueller 18**, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, “Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter”, Foreign Affairs, November / December 2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter

THE ATOMIC OBSESSION

Over the decades, the **atomic obsession** has taken various forms, **focus**ing on an endless array of **worst-case scenarios**: bolts from the blue, **accidental wars**, lost **arms races**, **proliferation spirals**, nuclear terrorism. The common feature among all these disasters is that **none of them has ever materialized**. Either we are the luckiest people in history or the risks have been **overstated**.

The cartoonist and inventor Rube Goldberg received a Pulitzer Prize for a 1947 cartoon showing a huge atomic bomb teetering on a cliff between "world control" and "world destruction." In 1950, the historian John Lewis Gaddis has noted, no U.S. official could imagine "that there would be no World War" or that the superpowers, "soon to have tens of thousands of thermonuclear weapons pointed at one another, would agree tacitly never to use any of them." And in 1951, the great philosopher Bertrand Russell put the matter simply:

Before the end of the present century, unless something quite unforeseeable occurs, one of three possibilities will have been realized. These three are: —

1. The end of human life, perhaps of all life on our planet.

2. A reversion to barbarism after a catastrophic diminution of the population of the globe.

3. A unification of the world under a single government, possessing a monopoly of all the major weapons of war.

The novelist and scientist C. P. Snow proclaimed it a "certainty" in 1960 that several nuclear weapons would go off within ten years, and the strategist Herman Kahn declared it "most unlikely" that the world could live with an uncontrolled arms race for decades. In 1979, the dean of realism, Hans Morgenthau, proclaimed the world to be moving "ineluctably" toward a strategic nuclear war and assured us that nothing could be done to prevent it.

A 1982 essay by the author Jonathan Schell asserted that the stakes were nothing less than the fate of the earth and concluded that soon "we will make our choice." Schell continued: "Either we will sink into the final coma and end it all or, as I trust and believe, we will awaken to the truth of our peril . . . and rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons." In the spirit of the times, the following year, a chart-topping pop song traced the dangers of accidental nuclear war, and the year after, Brown University students passed a referendum demanding that the university health service stockpile suicide pills for immediate dispensation to survivors in the event of a nuclear attack.

Disasters were certainly possible, and a healthy appreciation of the dangers nuclear weapons posed eventually led to the development and spread of best practices in strategy and safety. But prudence in controlling tail-end risks sometimes evolved into **near hysteria**. Nuclear exchanges were assumed to be **easy to start**, hard to stop, and certain to end up destroying life on earth.

Nuclear proliferation has been a perennial source of fear. During the 1960 U.S. presidential campaign, John F. Kennedy predicted that there might be "ten, 15, or 20" countries with a nuclear capability by the next election, and similar declarations continue. And since 9/11, nuclear terrorism has been the nightmare of choice.

Ever since the dropping of the bomb, in short, Armageddon and apocalypse have been thought to be looming just over the horizon. Such fears and anxieties were understandable, especially at first. But they haven't been **borne out** by the **lived record** of the nuclear era.

WHAT ABOUT THAT LONG PEACE?

Fine, one might concede. In retrospect, perhaps the risks were exaggerated. But at least there is a retrospect — which there might not have been without nuclear weapons, since they staved off a third world war, right?

Actually, no. Nuclear strategy — a theoretical and nonexperimental enterprise — has been built on a grand counterfactual: the notion that without the prospect of nuclear devastation hanging over its head, the postwar world would have collapsed into a major conflict yet again. But this turns out to be just a story, and less history than fable.

The nuclear-deterrence-saved-the-world theory is predicated on the notion that policymakers after 1945 were so stupid, incompetent, or reckless that, but for visions of mushroom clouds, they would have plunged the great powers back into war. But the catastrophic destruction they experienced in their recent war (one they had tried to avoid) proved more than enough to teach that lesson on its own, and there is little reason to believe that nuclear weapons were needed as reinforcement.

Moreover, the Soviet Union never seriously considered any sort of direct military aggression against the United States or Western Europe. After examining the documentation extensively, the historian Vojtech Mastny concluded that the strategy of nuclear deterrence was "irrelevant to deterring a major war that the enemy did not wish to launch in the first place." He added: "All Warsaw Pact scenarios presumed a war started by NATO." In 1987, George Kennan, the architect of containment himself, had agreed, writing in these pages, "I have never believed that [Soviet leaders] have seen it as in their interests to overrun Western Europe militarily, or that they would have launched an attack on that region generally even if the so-called nuclear deterrent had not existed."

Moscow's global game plan stressed revolutionary upheaval and subversion from within, not Hitlerian conquest. Given Russia's calamitous experience with two world wars, a third was the last thing Soviet policymakers wanted, so nuclear deterrence was largely irrelevant to postwar stability. Nor has anyone ever come up with a compelling or even plausible rationale for using such weapons in conflicts short of total war — because there simply aren't many targets that can't be attacked as effectively with conventional weapons.

Nuclear weapons have also proved useless in conventional or guerrilla warfare, lousy at compellence (think Saddam Hussein refusing to leave Kuwait), and not very good at deterrence (think the Yom Kippur War or Argentina's seizure of the Falklands). There are circumstances in which such weapons would come in handy — say, in dealing with a super-aggressive, risk-acceptant fanatic leading a major country. But that has always been a remote possibility. The actual contribution of nuclear weapons to postwar stability, therefore, has been purely theoretical — extra insurance against an unlikely calamity.

HOW ABOUT PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM?

Great powers are one thing, some might say, but rogue states or terrorist groups are another. If they go nuclear, it's game over — which is why any further proliferation must be prevented by all possible measures, up to and including war.

That logic might seem plausible at first, but it **breaks down** on close examination. Not only has the world **already survived** the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some of the **craziest mass murderers** in history (**Stalin** and **Mao**), but **prolif**eration has **slowed down** rather than **sped up** over time. **Dozens** of technologically sophisticated countries have **considered** obtaining nuclear arsenals, but **very few have done so**. This is because **nuc**lear weapon**s** turn out to be **difficult** and **expensive** to acquire and **strategically provocative** to possess.

They have not even proved to enhance status much, as many expected they would. Pakistan and Russia may garner more attention today than they would without nukes, but would Japan's prestige be increased if it became nuclear? Did China's status improve when it went nuclear — or when its economy grew? And would anybody really care (or even notice) if the current British or French nuclear arsenal was doubled or halved?

Alarmists have **misjudged** not only the **pace** of proliferation but also its **effects**. Proliferation is incredibly dangerous and necessary to prevent, we are told, because going nuclear would supposedly empower rogue states and lead them to dominate their region. The details of how this domination would happen are rarely discussed, but the general idea seems to be that once a country has nuclear weapons, it can use them to threaten others and get its way, with nonnuclear countries deferring or paying ransom to the local bully out of fear.

Except, of course, that in three-quarters of a century, the United States has never been able to get anything close to that obedience from anybody, even when it had a nuclear monopoly. So why should it be true for, say, Iran or North Korea? It is far more likely that a nuclear rogue's threats would cause its rivals to **join together against** the provocateur — just as countries around the Persian Gulf responded to **Saddam**'s invasion of Kuwait by **closing ranks to oppose**, rather than **acquiescing** in, his effort at domination.

#### 3] Collapse of democracy’s inevitable – transition to Chinese autocracy solves.

Schiavenza ’17 (Matt; 1/19/17; Senior Content Manager at Asia Society; Asia Society; “Could China's System Replace Democracy?”; <http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/could-chinas-system-replace-democracy>; DOA: 12/6/17)

Two decades later, this notion seems increasingly unfeasible. **Democracy is** **struggling**. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies has **fallen since** reaching a peak in **2006**. The world’s non-democracies, meanwhile, have become **more authoritarian**. Russia, once a tentative democracy, is now under the control of Vladimir Putin, a **nationalist leader** whose regime has centralized power, targeted opposition journalists, and seized sovereign territory of other countries. Then there’s China. For years, conventional wisdom stated that as the People’s Republic grew more prosperous, the country would naturally transition to a liberal democracy. But this prediction — dubbed the “China Fantasy” by the author James Mann — has not happened. If anything, China’s economic success has only **further solidified the C**hinese **C**ommunist **P**arty: The current ruler, Xi Jinping, is widely considered to be the country’s **most powerful** since Deng Xiaoping. Democracy’s ill health has also **infected the U**nited **S**tates **and Europe**. The president of Hungary, a formerly Communist state whose accession to the European Union in 2004 was a triumph for the West, has sought to “**end liberal democracy**” in his country by clamping down on press freedom and judicial independence. These trends are also evident in neighboring Poland. Far-right parties — like the United Kingdom Independence Party, the orchestrator of Brexit — have **gained popularity** across the continent. During his successful campaign for president of the United States, Donald Trump expressed, at best, an indifference toward democratic norms and ideals. Trump called for his opponent, Hillary Clinton, to be imprisoned, raised false accusations of voter fraud, threatened legal action against the media, and refused to commit to honoring the results of the election. Trump has repeatedly professed his **admiration for Putin**, Russia’s dictatorial leader, for being “**a strong leader**”; as president-elect, he **praised the Kazakh dictator** Nursultan Nazarbayev for “achieving a miracle” in his country. Where Did Democracy Go Wrong? According to Brian Klaas, author of the new book The Despot’s Accomplice: How the West Is Aiding and Abetting the Decline of Democracy, there are **three main reasons**. One is **American hypocrisy**, or, as Klaas puts it, the “Saudi effect.” President George W. Bush made democracy promotion an explicit centerpiece of American foreign policy during his second inaugural speech in 2005, yet the following year when Hamas won democratic elections to govern the Gaza Strip, the U.S. refused to honor the results. And as Washington invested billions of dollars and thousands of American lives to **impose democracy by force** in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government forged a military deal with Uzbekistan’s tyrannical regime and maintained a close relationship with Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s most repressive countries. A second reason for democracy’s decline is the **resurgence of China and Russia**. As China’s economic rise continued without interruption in the quarter-century after Tiananmen Square, observers began wondering whether the Chinese miracle was **because of**, rather than in spite of, **its autocratic government**. (The slower growth of India, a messy democracy, only seemed to strengthen this argument.) And while Russia’s economic fortunes in the Putin era have lived and died with the price of oil, there’s little question that the country is **wealthier and more stable** than it had been under Boris Yeltsin. The success of both countries, sustainable or not, seemed to indicate that democracy and growth were not necessarily co-dependent. Klaas’ third reason is the **weaknesses embedded in** modern **American democracy** itself. Last year’s presidential election was a multi-billion dollar, 18-month saga that resulted in the election of a candidate who had **never served in government** or the military and one, incidentally, who earned **three million fewer votes** than his main opponent. “Not many people looked at our election and thought that they were missing out,” Klaas told Asia Society. “I even heard a Thai general say that if ‘democracy means Donald Trump, we don’t want it.’” What About China's System? There’s **no doubt** that liberal democracy is in crisis. But the next question — whether plausible alternatives exist — is less certain. Consider China. The country’s ability to push through major infrastructure projects, such as a nationwide high-speed rail network, without political obstruction has dazzled Westerners frustrated at the gridlock endemic to American politics. In a 2010 episode of Meet the Press, the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman famously admitted to fantasizing that the U.S. “could be China for a day” simply as a means to get things done. Daniel Bell, a professor of political science at Shandong University in eastern China, has written extensively about the meritocratic advantages of China’s political system. Chinese leaders must pass a series of examinations and negotiate a complex bureaucracy before achieving national power. Xi Jinping may have benefited from nepotism: His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a key Mao-era official. But the Chinese president also accumulated experience as the governor of two major Chinese provinces and a stint as vice president. This, Bell argues, has given Xi legitimacy in spite of never having to face voters. “I disagree with the view that there’s only one morally legitimate way of selecting leaders: one person, one vote,” Bell said in an appearance at Asia Society in 2015. State-run media in China spun the chaotic outcome of the Arab Spring uprisings as an example of democracy’s inherent flaws. The election of Donald Trump only served to further reinforce this notion. “I remember talking to the Chinese ambassador, and he made a crack about how in the U.S. you can be a nobody one day and the next day rise to power,” said Isaac Stone Fish, a senior fellow at Asia Society, “and you can’t do that in China because you have to go through all these different levels and rise through the system.” Bell acknowledges that the Chinese system has serious drawbacks. The prohibition of free speech, ban on political opposition, and absence of an independent judiciary mean that there are no checks against official abuse of power, something that has emerged as a major crisis in the past decade in the country. The high-profile anti-corruption campaign launched by President Xi has reduced visible signs of excess, such as lavish banquets and fast cars. But critics believe that the campaign also serves as cover for Xi’s sidelining of rivals within the Communist Party. Defenders of China’s Communist Party point to the country’s near-four-decade run of economic growth as proof that the system works. But in structural terms, the modern Party is little different from the one that, under Chairman Mao, presided over widespread political persecution, a deadly famine, and a disastrous period of social upheaval known as the Cultural Revolution. Even after Deng Xiaoping reversed Mao’s policies and adopted a pragmatic economic approach, the Party has still implemented policies whose consequences threaten stability and prosperity. The One Child Policy, adopted in 1980 without public debate, created a demographic imbalance that, three decades later, has prematurely reduced China’s working-age population. Even the much-vaunted record of economic growth is built on a shaky foundation of debt-fueled investment. "There have been 30 instances in the postwar period when a country's debt increased by 40 percent over a 5-year horizon," Ruchir Sharma, an economics expert at Morgan Stanley, said of China in an appearance at Asia Society in December. “And in 100 percent of these instances, the country got into a deep economic trouble within the next five years." China has taken steps to systematize its government by introducing a mandatory retirement age for senior officials and establishing term limits for its leaders. The Communist Party’s Standing Committee of the Politburo, a seven-man body that stands atop China’s government pyramid, is designed to divide the responsibilities of government and ensure no one individual assumes too much power. The behavior of Xi Jinping over the past three years, though, has raised questions whether these norms are durable. Xi has assumed positions within the Chinese government once shared by fellow leaders and has weakened Li Keqiang, his prime minister, by denying him the office’s traditional stewardship of economic policy. Xi has abetted and re-established a cult of personality, something explicitly discouraged in China after the Maoist era, by encouraging the singing of songs in his name. And, as the Wall Street Journal recently reported, there are questions that Xi may not name a successor at this fall’s 19th Party Congress in order to continue as president beyond the customary 10-year term. The Consequences of Democracy's Decline China, for what it’s worth, has never claimed that its system of government was universally applicable. In contrast to the United States or the Soviet Union, Beijing has never tried to install its system in a foreign country by force. Even still, democracy’s decline may prove advantageous to China in other ways. For one, it would weaken the democratic movement in Hong Kong, which has vied with pro-Beijing elements for political control of the Chinese territory, and deter would-be Chinese dissidents from challenging Communist Party rule on the mainland. In addition, Klaas argues, the American absence of support for democracy leaves a vacuum in emerging states that Washington’s geopolitical rivals in Moscow and Beijing might fill. “The ‘America First’ mentality, or the mentality that it’s not our business, makes the mistake that thinking that the withdrawal of Western influence means there’s self-determination,” says Klaas. “ [But what it means is] that China and Russia control things. It’s not something where if the West leaves, then, say, Malawi will be free to choose. It’s a global foreign policy battle, and the West’s losses are China's and Russia’s gains.” Before the U.S. can promote democracy overseas, though the country may need to firm up support for it at home. A Harvard study conducted in November found that just 19 percent of American millennials believe that a military takeover is not legitimate in democracy compared to 45 percent of those older. 26 percent of millennials likewise feel that choosing leaders through free elections is “unimportant,” a sentiment shared by just 14 percent of Baby Boomers. “A lot of people growing up now don’t understand what it’s like not to live in a free society in the West,” says Klaas. “That, combined with the "end of history," assumed that democracy is the natural way of things. “In fact, democracy is the least organic and least natural way we’ve had."

#### 4] Pursuit of democracy causes nuclear war with China, Russia, and Iran. Even if democratic peace is true, corrupt American models alter international calculus.

Miller ’17 (Benjamin; 4/27/17; Professor of International Relations at the School of Political Sciences, The University of Haifa; The International Security Studies Forum; “Policy Series: Will Trumpism increase the Danger of War in the International System?: IR Theory and the Illiberal Turn in World Politics”; <https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5ag-war>; DOA: 12/6/17)

Some realists might, however, not see these recent developments as necessarily leading to more conflict, although they may not see them as leading to stable peace either.[22] In the eyes of these realists, the seemingly unconditional U.S. security umbrella for America’s allies has **allowed them to ‘free-ride’** on the U.S. commitment and to **avoid allocating** the **necessary resources** for their own national defense.[23] Moreover, some of the allies have been **provocative toward** their **opponents**, while relying on the U.S. security umbrella. This could **cause** **unnecessary conflict**. Especially provocative toward Russia, for example, was the enlargement of NATO to the east and the EU economic agreement with Ukraine in 2014. Such anti-Russian expansionist Western moves, in the realist view, compelled Moscow to **behave** more **assertively** and to **annex Crimea** and to **intervene in** Eastern **Ukraine**.[24] Somewhat similarly, it seems **less costly** for American allies in East Asia to engage in maritime conflicts with China so long they are under the U.S. protective shield. Realists believe that moving away from such ever-growing commitments will **stabilize the international system**, or at the very least **reduce** the likelihood of a **great-power conflict**. The realists are especially concerned about the American policies to shape the domestic character of other states, particularly by advancing democracy-promotion, “nation-building,” and the universal protection of human rights.[25] In this context they highlight what they see as **disastrous** American **military interventions**, notably, in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011 and also the continuously costly intervention in Afghanistan since 2001. In their eyes such military interventions are not necessary for the protection of American national interests. Moreover, such military engagements are **unlikely to succeed** and in many cases are **de-stabilizing** and are causing unnecessary conflicts. Such interventions simply **increase the perceived threat** posed by the U.S. to some other countries. Thus, lessening—if not **completely abandoning**—the U.S. commitment to advance these liberal values is likely, in realist eyes, to **stabilize the international system** and to **serve well** the American national security interests. Even though liberals see trade as a major pacifying mechanism, realists view trade—and economic interdependence more broadly—as potential sources for conflict.[26] They highlight the earlier U.S. trade conflicts with Japan and currently with Mexico and China. Thus, moving away from free trade might diffuse conflicts rather than accelerate them. Moreover, there is a growing populist opposition in the West to globalization. In this sense, it cannot work as a useful recipe for the promotion of peace. Similarly, despite the high levels of economic interdependence between Japan and China, for example, such interdependence does not prevent conflict between them and definitely does not result in stable peace even if it might have helped to prevent a shooting war between them, at least thus far. Realists are also skeptical about the ability of international institutions to advance stable peace.[27] Such institutions are not independent actors, which can influence the behavior of the member-states in important ways. International institutions just reflect the balance of power among states. States follow their national interests, and even more so in this age of rising nationalism. Thus we **cannot** expect much from the ability of international institutions to **pacify intense conflicts**, especially among the great powers. Even the most remarkable of international intuitions—the EU—has recently **failed in advancing cooperation** among its members with regard to the key issues of immigration, terrorism and the Euro financial crisis. Realists might be a bit skeptical about a potential reconciliation between the U.S. and Russia based on factors such as the personal friendship between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin or the supposedly common traditional/illiberal values of key figures in their respective administrations. Yet, the presence of a common enemy might be a good source of friendship. In this sense the Islamic State and perhaps even China create a potential basis for cooperation and avoidance of conflict between Moscow and Washington. But on the whole this will not advance a high-level ‘warm’ peace in Europe or elsewhere; rather it may, at most, lead to some kind of an unstable spheres-of-influence arrangement, which is unlikely to endure for an extended period. In sum, while liberals offer a menu of mechanisms for promoting peace, these mechanisms seem now **under assault** or in some process of weakening under Trumpism and the illiberal turn in quite a few other countries. Realists, for their part, do not believe in the far-reaching peace-producing effects of such liberal mechanisms. They tend to see some level of great-power competition as the natural order under international anarchy. Realists at most expect that there will be some stabilizing effects of deterrence, especially **nuclear deterrence**, and of the balance of power among the great powers. These kind of factors might — also under Trumpism—**maintain world stability** and **prevent war** even if some level of great-power conflict is expected to endure at any rate. The **most effective instrument** for cooperation—applicable even under the illiberal turn– is based on common threats faced by the great powers such as large-scale terrorism or risky behavior by a small nuclear power such as North Korea and potentially Iran. Evaluation of the Realist and the Liberal Views At this stage, less than three months into the Trump administration, it is quite difficult to determine which approach is right. Still, on the whole, we might be able to distinguish between short-term versus long-term effects and among different types of peace. In the short-term, **realists** may **have a point**: the avoidance of American interventions for democracy-promotion and humanitarian interventions might **stabilize the international system**. The key American adversaries—Russia, China, and Iran— will be **less troubled** by regime–change strategies or ‘color revolutions’ advanced by the U.S. that are **perceived to be posing major threats** to their regimes. The eastward expansion of NATO and the EU, which realists argue has provoked Russia, **will** also **stop**. Such reassurances are likely to **increase stability** in international politics and to produce at least a ‘cold peace’ in the international system and in key regions.

#### 5] Democracy unsustainable and causes war – 2500 years of history prove

Brooks 17 (Rosa, law professor at Georgetown University, “REVIEW --- Books: Democracy Is Dependent on War” <https://www.wsj.com/articles/democracy-is-dependent-on-war-1483741787> )

Some books should come stamped with a surgeon general's warning: "Likely to cause discomfort," perhaps, or "Not suitable for romantics." The political scientists John Ferejohn and Frances McCall Rosenbluth have written such a book: "Forged Through Fire: War, Peace and the Democratic Bargain" is not for the faint of heart.¶ It begins with a paradox. "Humans have inflicted untold horrors on each other through wars," Mr. Ferejohn and Ms. Rosenbluth write, but these wars have also been responsible for fostering one of our "most cherished human values": modern democracy, with its unique combination of universal suffrage and property rights.¶ This isn't the story we're taught in high-school civics. But it's a compelling one, powerfully told by two scholars with mastery of their subject. The authors walk the reader through **2,500 bloody years of Western history**, from the Peloponnesian wars to the war in Vietnam, **highlight**ing, again and again, **a brutal trade-off: The emergence and consolidation of democracy depends on warfare**, and a particular kind of warfare, at that.¶ Here's the logic: The rich and powerful prefer to remain that way, and are, as a general rule, disinclined to share either wealth or political power with the poor. Only when elites are faced with external military threats do the poor become valuable to the rich. This is so because **armies** have traditionally **require**d **bodies** -- and plenty of them.¶ This, the authors argue, is the awful "alchemy of iron and blood" that produces democracy. Manpower-intensive forms of warfare require the large-scale mobilization of the population, **which forces elites** facing external threats **to grant political concessions** to the common man. Mr. Ferejohn and Ms. Rosenbluth are not the first to chart the linkages between warfare and the evolution of the modern democratic state, but their magisterial volume makes the case in persuasive and explicit detail.¶ We begin in Athens, where the shift from aristocracy to democracy was driven by the need to defend the city against foreign invasion. In 508 B.C., Cleisthenes "promised to turn political power over to the Athenian public in exchange for their help in repelling Spartan intervention," and the great age of Athenian democracy was born.¶ It might soon have died, too, but for the existence of near-continuous external threats during the Peloponnesian and Persian wars, and the fact that Athenian naval supremacy soon came to require the active participation of tens of thousands of ordinary men. "Whether they liked it or not," note the authors, "Athens' wealthy and conservative citizens seem to have understood that the city's survival rested in the hands of thousands of commoners who rowed the triremes."¶ Similar dynamics led Rome's elites to grant freedom, land, citizenship and the franchise to an expanding body of commoners and ultimately to residents of far-flung colonial outposts. As in Athens, "Roman military accomplishments rested on wide manpower mobilization rewarded by . . . political voice."¶ But not all wars produce democracy. In medieval Europe, feudal lords were able to rely mainly on small forces of heavy cavalry to sustain their power, not on large-scale mobilization of the poor, and this mostly eliminated the need to offer political concessions to the masses in exchange for military service.¶ Later, in early modern Europe, "the effective use of gunpowder decisively tipped the balance away from the cavalry-dominated militaries of the previous 500 years and in favor of mass armies . . . shifting political power upward to leaders who could finance and maintain such large armies." Even so, for a time most European governments were able to finance armies with plunder from the New World, "or, where necessary, through exchanges of favors with merchants that were less destabilizing than the bargains [monarchs] would otherwise have had to strike with the poor." As a result, pressures to democratize remained minimal and episodic. "As long as monarchies could buy armies with money, blood did not buy voting rights, as it had in Athens and Rome," the authors write.¶ It was only in the 19th and 20th centuries, Mr. Ferejohn and Ms. Rosenbluth observe, that conditions once again became favorable for the widespread expansion of democracy. The French Republic's levee en masse set the stage: **Mass mobilizations require**d both **an effective administrative state and** eventually a **more egalitarian approach to politics.** By the end of the 19th century, both France and Germany had "enormous standing armies" and "both had adopted representative government," with universal suffrage placating the masses, counterbalanced by protections for property rights to assuage the concerns of the wealthy.¶ In much of Europe, however, the interests of the wealthy and the working class remained at odds. It "took the white-hot wars of the twentieth century, which required both money and manpower, to hinge them into a single coalition in favor of representative democracy," the authors write.¶ When it happened, it happened quickly. Norway and Sweden initiated universal military conscription at the beginning of the 20th century; within a decade, both had also granted universal male suffrage. In Britain, conscription did not begin until 1916; by 1918, universal male suffrage had also been granted. By the end of World War II, 60 million people were dead, but democracy had become the norm throughout the West.¶ "Forged Through Fire" is full of grim lessons. One lesson: warfare, as the authors of this book soberly remind us, has been a near-constant throughout human history. Those inclined to take solace in the post World War II decline of interstate wars might pause to consider that 70 years is, in the grand scheme of things, not a very long time. Another lesson: Those with power have rarely been inclined to relinquish it voluntarily. Only fear and threat have driven the rich and powerful to share -- grudgingly -- with history's have-nots.¶ A third lesson -- perhaps the hardest to swallow -- is that our most cherished modern liberal political values would likely never have triumphed without war and its multiple horrors, and even the democratic gains produced by centuries of war were "neither easy nor inevitable." Democracy depended upon a unique combination of circumstances: technologies favoring manpower-intensive forms of warfare; the lack of external sources of wealth that might have enabled governing elites to purchase military power, rather than coax it from their citizens; and so on. Even with all these conditions present, coercion and propaganda were sometimes sufficient to thwart the development of democracy. Russia and China, for instance, have managed, so far, to buck the trend.¶ All this leads to an uncomfortable question. **Wealthy modern states can** once again increasingly **outsource their security to private contractors, and** in any case, **the emergence of new military tech**nologies **is** again **reducing the need for mass armies.** Drones, surveillance technologies and cyber-warfare make it possible for states to achieve war's traditional ends without much need to mobilize their citizens, shifting the balance of power away from ordinary citizens and back towards governing elites.¶ **"When armies no longer need flesh and blood,"** wonder Mr. Ferejohn and Ms. Rosenbluth, **"what can take their place to stabilize democracy?"** In other words: forged through war, can democracy survive peace?

#### 6] Democracy causes drone warfare.

Kaag et al, 14 - \*John Kaag, Ph.D. Chair of Philosophy, Professor @ Umass \*\*Scott Pratt, Executive Vice Provost for Academic Affairs, Professor of Philosophy @ U of Oregon \*\*\*Sujata K. Bhatia, Former Associate, Science, Technology, and Globalization; “Democracy and the Necessity of Drones,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/democracy-and-necessity-drones-0>

But a worry lingers in the back of our minds: perhaps, far from causing a disconnect, instead there might be a necessary connection between modern democracies and drone warfare. Most Americans hold that modern liberal democracies are worth defending. They are worth defending because these democracies, more than any other form of government, provide space for their individual citizens to pursue their own interests. Every citizen has the right to his or her own property, own form of worship, and own freedom of speech. And we recognize the intrinsic value of every individual in our democratic community. Such is the perk of being an American citizen—liberty and justice for all, each in our own particular way. In this ideal democracy, the interests of the individual are continuous with the interests of the nation as a whole. Every citizen also has the right to vote for leaders who are elected to protect the liberal democratic institutions that Americans, for good reason, hold so dear. And protection is, unfortunately, often required. There are, after all, countries and nonstate actors who have little respect for the joys of Western liberalism and who aim to undermine it at every turn. Protecting democracy has always been a tricky proposition. Leaders such as President Obama find themselves in a double bind. On the one hand, they must take defensive measures to guard the nation and its citizens' rights and interests from external threats. But on the other hand, leaders must develop and then adopt defensive military strategies that minimize, hopefully even eliminate, the costs that their citizens must face; it is impermissible to send [people] men and women off to die in wars that could be won without these citizens' direct and dangerous involvement. Every citizen, even soldiers, has intrinsic value. And so Obama and his predecessors ushered in the era drone warfare and a slew of other automated technologies that would both protect citizens and shield citizen-soldiers. Drone warfare—and its collateral damage—is a necessary consequent of a certain type of modern liberal democracy. If we are good liberal democrats, the development of drone warfare should neither surprise nor disturb us. Drones are democratic weapons. There are no other options. But drones do disturb us. The gruesome scenes of drone strikes—at funerals and birthdays and reunions half a world away—disturb us. When we have the rare misfortune of seeing these scenes, they keep us up at night. So why? Our intuition about the shortcomings and moral failings of drone strikes is not just a discomfort with robot warfare or carnage, but ought to be a sign that we are uncomfortable with a particular form of liberal democracy that necessitates drone warfare.

#### Drone strikes CREATE terror and recreate the harms they try to resolve creating a negative doom loop – community massacres and imperfect data. Reject their responses, it’s from the perspective of the military industrial complex.

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This paper considers another issue with the U.S. government's use of drones: they create and propagate widespread terror among foreign populations. This terror results from two factors. First, the targets of drone strikes are rarely isolated. Instead, they are typically embedded in communities that include innocent civilians. This means that even where drone strikes are successful in annihilating a target identified by the intervening government, they will simultaneously produce negative externalities, or "neighborhood effects," which impose significant costs on the surrounding populace. These negative effects can be physical (bodily injury or death) or psychological (anxiety and terror) and can contribute to economic and social degradation. The remote and covert nature of drones is what makes them effective at killing targets. These same features, however, also make drones extremely effective and efficient at creating and promulgating a sense of terror among the broader populace within which targets are embedded. Second, the intelligence associated with drone strikes is highly imperfect. Decision makers often rely on patterns of behavior that have been predetermined to be general "signatures" of terrorists. Subsequent "signature strikes" occur when a drone is used to target a person or group of people based not on their known identity but instead on their general behaviors observed from afar. In many instances, these pattern-of-behavior analyses are inaccurate, with the result that innocent people are injured or killed by signature strikes. An associated issue is determining what constitutes an "accurate target." In many instances, the category "target" is so overly broad and abstract that it can include significant portions of a population. For example, absent clear evidence that demonstrates that a person killed in a strike was either not a military-age male or a military-age male but not an unlawful combatant, this person is automatically counted as an "enemy combatant" by the U.S. government (Scahill 2016,157). This methodology obfuscates the true costs imposed by drones because it classifies ordinary, innocent civilians as enemies by default based on a small number of general characteristics. Together, these factors contribute to a fundamental paradox regarding the use of drones to combat terrorism. The U.S. government justifies its use of drones as an efficient method for weakening and ultimately ending the threat of international terrorism while protecting members of the American military. The use of however, creates and perpetuates terror among foreign populations. These terror creating aspects of drones are often neglected, which understates their net effect on global terror. A central reason for this neglect is that treatments of drones typically evaluate their use and effectiveness from the perspective of the drone and those who control it. This framing advances and legitimizes categories such as "valid targets" and "collateral damage" while downplaying, if not altogether ignoring, the perspective of those experiencing the presence of drones in their everyday lives. From the perspective of the target population, the damage done by drones is not "collateral" but rather blunt, brutal, and devastating harm caused by an external state violently intervening in their lives. Understanding this perspective is crucial because what is perceived as "combatting terrorism" by the intervening government is simultaneously viewed as an act of state terrorism by the target population.

#### **7] Democracy destroys the environment – extinction – try or die for authoritarianism**

Daniel, Poli Sci @ University of Leeds, 12

(Charles, To what extent is democracy detrimental to the current and future aims of environmental policy and technologies?, POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012)

This is exactly what Mark Beeson suggests in his argument for the coming of environmental authoritarianism. He acknowledges the fact that individual liberty has led to ‘environmentally destructive behaviour’ (Beeson 2010: 276). Whilst democracy has allowed for a more open discussion on environmental issues as well as raising awareness, there has been too much trust put on ecological enlightenment through education. For Beeson, this ‘relies too much on an optimistic, naïve view of human nature’ (Beeson 2010: 282), the idea that an attitude of respect, through the emergence of a shared cosmopolitan rhetoric will produce environmental improvement is wide of the mark. As Beeson rightly points out, the ‘sobering reality’ is that as the human population continues to grow, consuming resources on an unprecedented scale, ‘policy-makers will have less and less capacity to intervene to keep damage to the environment from producing serious social disruption’ (Beeson 2010: 283). Liberal democracy, through the necessities dictated by a capitalist economy has built its survival on the continued exploitation of environmental resources to a point where an attempt to gain control of this practice has become almost impossible. The article, whilst not wholly advocating the Asian political model (indeed Beeson highlights the fact that China is a ruthless exploiter of its own natural environment and sets a poor example for the rest of the continent), is appropriately pessimistic towards the success of liberal democracy. It therefore seems rational to put forward soft authoritarianism as a viable alternative: for it avoids trust in the individual, taking a negative view of human nature and advocates the need for state control, particularly surrounding urgent policy issues like the environment. Whilst it is difficult to accept, it may be the case that ‘good forms of authoritarianism, in which environmentally unsustainable forms of behaviour are simply forbidden, may become not only justifiable, but essential for the survival of humanity’ (Beeson 2010: 289).