## 1

#### CP: The appropriation of outer space through asteroid mining by private entities not based in the United States should be banned. The United States should submit an environmental impact assessment of the appropriation of outer space by private entities to the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs for public comment, modification, and approval. The United States federal government should implement the approved version of the submitted proposal.

**Counterplan competes and creates the least environmentally damaging version of the aff.**

William R. **Kramer**, PhD Polisci/Futures Studies @ U of H Manoa, Currently HDR Inc. Extraterrestrial Environmental Analyst, **’14**, “Extraterrestrial environmental impact assessments A foreseeable prerequisite for wise decisions regarding outer space exploration, research and development” Space Policy 30 (2014) 215-222

To be most effective, all spacefaring nations and enterprises would voluntarily participate in assessing their extraterrestrial environmental impacts prior to undertaking actions in space. A hypothetical chronology of such a process might include: (1) Impact assessments are prepared by the action proponent and submitted to an impartial international panel or board; (2) The panel determines the assessment's sufficiency; (3) The assessment is published in an electronic or other format accessible to the public followed by a comment period; (4) The action proponent addresses comments and submits responses to the panel; (5) The panel publishes its approval or concerns; (6) The action proceeds, is **modified or is abandoned**; and (7) should the action proceed, periodic reports of the action's progress and impacts are filed for future reference in a digital format to allow broad access. The process would support the spirit of both **NEPA** to “fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations” (42 USC x4331(b)(1)) and Article 4(1) of the Moon Agreement's directive that “due regard shall be paid to the interests of present and future generations.” Given the likelihood that all states would appreciate the need for maintaining extraterrestrial environments and landscapes for both future research and exploitation, pressure from peer states and space industries may be sufficient to **encourage a trend of compliance**.

Such a review and approval system (perhaps similar to NEPA's relationship with the Council on Environmental Quality and its oversight function) could be attempted within the structure of the UN, such as within the **UN Office of Outer Space Affairs**. The spirit of an extraterrestrial environmental assessment program would be likely to fit within the mandate of the organization. However, amending the Outer Space Treaty or otherwise developing an administrative UN capacity to achieve the goals proposed in this paper would require a level of international commitment and cooperation that may be both lengthy and difficult to achieve. Spacefaring nations and international organizations are already invited to submit annual reports on their space activities and research to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Space, **so a precedent for reporting exists.** **Presently, however, reports tend to document positive actions and research, not details of extraterrestrial environmental impacts**.

**Extinction. EIA is key to preserve space resources, stop resource wars, and extra-terrestrial environmental damage.**

William R. **Kramer**, Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies @ University of Hawaii, **'17**, In dreams begin responsibilities – environmental impact assessment and outer space development, ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICE, VOL. 19, NO. 3, 128–138

**Benefits of extraterrestrial environmental impact assessment** Most publications regarding outer space resources maintain that those resources are nearly limitless, and many business models for exploitation do not imagine that resources on Mars, for example, will ever be exhausted (Lewis, 1996; Zubrin, 1996; Renstrom, 2016). Ever is a long time. While the statement may be figuratively true for some mineral ores that may last through an individual company’s project timeline, it is not necessarily true for long-term planning. **There will likely be competition for the rarest (most valuable) minerals**. Without some form of planning and regulation, they may be extracted in an inefficient and environmentally damaging manner and be **quickly depleted** (as exemplified by hydraulic mining for gold on Earth, which wasted much of the resource and resulted in extensive environmental damage) (Merchant, 1998).

How might resources be put to their highest and best use unless regulated? Both the Moon and Mars have water ice which will be **crucial for human survival**, but water also has lucrative industrial uses; it is potentially the raw material for manufacturing both rocket fuel and oxygen. **Conflicts over resource allocation** may be better addressed during an **assessment process** that seeks to balance highest and best use with discovery and first use. Who gains access to specific areas for mining becomes more problematic in that the Outer Space Treaty does not allow “ownership” of extraterrestrial territory; there is no guarantee that companies such as those listed previously will gain access to the most productive sites. The China National Space Administration is planning to place a crew on the Moon by 2024, so **competition for the best sites will be intense** (Kramer, 2015b; China Digital Times, 2012).

Space industries generally are not considering that their proposed actions may preclude alternative uses such as scientific research and human settlement. There will be a stream of not yet imagined uses that could be adversely affected or foreclosed. Many of the same conflicts between land use and human habitation experienced on Earth may emerge on extraterrestrial sites. On the Moon, for example, there are preferable sites for collecting solar energy. These “peaks of eternal light” are areas nearly always or constantly exposed to sunlight at the poles. They are very limited in both distribution and size (Elvis, Milligan, and Krolikowski, 2016). If a mining operation were to determine such areas suitable for their operations, or if mining created a constant plume of dust that would diminish the effectiveness of solar panels, how might such a situation be resolved?

Should potentially dangerous industries such as fuel manufacturing or storage be located near living areas? Would hydraulic fluid pipelines be closely monitored for leaks that may affect subsurface ice deposits mined for drinking water? How might vibrations from detonations affect unrelated structures or scientific instrumentation, such as telescopes? And how might a search for life, whether extinct or still living, be affected by human presence and our trail of bacteria and organic wastes? Humans’ biological pollution of Mars, for example, may greatly affect the results of any search for extraterrestrial life there (Kramer, 2009; McKay, 2009). Peter Doran of the Planetary Protection Subcommittee of the NASA Advisory Council offered, “The big issue with all missions to Mars is we don’t want to create a situation where we are impacting future life-detection science. Picture humans … walking around shedding microbes everywhere we go. Space suits as we know them do not take care of this problem (Mack, 2016).”

## Case

### TL – Asteroids

Err neg – they haven’t read an internal link to companies or states even being. Capable of bringing asteroids into orbit – it requires a massive tech innovation that doesn’t exist now.

Look their ev is all terrible and CX was embarrassing – 0 priv key warrant, no internal link

#### No impact to asteroids – the solar system is safer than its ever been and there are no civilization ending asteroids that pose a risk for 2400 years – don’t vote aff on a vague assertion that an asteroid \*could\* hit earth

Siegel 16 (Ethan. 12/21. Ph.D. astrophysicist, author, and science communicator, who professes physics and astronomy at various colleges. “No, Earth is not overdue for a massive asteroid strike” <https://medium.com/starts-with-a-bang/no-earth-is-not-overdue-for-a-massive-asteroid-strike-59ce8edc0cf8>)

It’s only a matter of time before a massive asteroid strike occurs on our world. There’s no doubt about it, as the Solar System and beyond is filled with massive rocks that travel, under the influence of gravity, through the interplanetary and interstellar medium. Every year carries with it a rough probability of such an impact for bodies of all sizes, from the pebbles that will never make it to the ground (a virtual certainty) to a 5–10 kilometer behemoth like the one that wiped out the dinosaurs (less than 0.000001% odds). But there’s a myth going around — propagated by scientists\* at reputable agencies like Los Alamos National Laboratory, the American Geophysical Union and NASA’s Planetary Defense Coordination Office — that we’re overdue for one, and so one is likelier-than-normal in our future. The scientific truth indicates otherwise. A map of the known asteroids in the Solar System. Image credit: The United Kingdom Spaceguard Centre. The asteroid population in our Solar System is the number one source of potentially hazardous impacts for our world. Almost all of the Earth-orbit-crossing objects we know of originate from the asteroid belt; of the impacts we find on our world and the other terrestrial planets (Mercury, Venus, Mars and even the Moon), the vast majority indicate an ultimate origin from our asteroid belt as well. A map of the Solar System’s asteroid population by size. Image credit: Marco Colombo, DensityDesign Research Lab, under a c.c.a.-s.a.-4.0 license. Based on what we’ve found in our Solar System, there are approximately a few million potential “10”s on the Torino scale, over 50 million potential “9”s and nearly a billion estimated potential “8”s. With lower likelihoods, Earth is also at risk from impacts due to centaurs, Kuiper belt objects, the Oort cloud and passing objects from the interstellar medium. But when rare events occur, they seem to inspire the worst fears in us. A meteorite trail is seen above a residential apartment block in the Urals city of Chelyabinsk, following the meteor strike on February 15, 2013. Image credit: Oleg Kargopolov/AFP/Getty Images. 2013 was a banner year for collision terror. The year started off with the Chelyabinsk meteor, which caused millions of dollars of property damage and injured more than a thousand people. Then, a fast-moving Oort cloud comet — Comet C/2013 A1 (Siding Spring) — was discovered on a near-collision course with Mars. It was approximately half a kilometer across and wound up missing Mars by only 140,000 kilometers, or roughly 11 Earth diameters. If that object had struck Earth, it would have been a Torino-scale “9” disaster. A composite image of Comet Siding Spring/C2013 A1 near Mars at closest approach, as taken with the Hubble Space Telescope. Image credit: NASA, ESA, PSI, JHU/APL, STScI/AURA. But a near-miss is still a miss. In fact, the largest impact in all of human history — both recorded and archaeologically discovered after-the-fact — is Barringer (meteor) crater in Arizona, which itself only rated an “8” on the Torino scale: the same rating as the 1908 Tunguska event. These events occur every few hundred years at most, and we can often go thousands or perhaps even ten thousand years between them. The Chelyabinsk event’s damage came mostly from broken glass; no meteors of the past century have had enough energy to rate above a “0” on the Torino scale. Meteor (Barringer) crater, in the Arizona desert, is over 1.1 km (0.7 mi) in diameter, and represents only a 3–10 MegaTon release of energy. A 300–400 meter asteroid strike would release 10–100 times the energy. Image credit: USGS/D. Roddy. Moreover, the Solar System itself is more cleared of potential impactors than at any time in history. They still occur, of course, but with lower frequency than ever before. Getting hit by a giant, fast-moving massive space rock is still a real threat, but there are only two common classes of impact. The most common type of impacts — from asteroids — are the most easily trackable. If we do a dedicated ongoing sky survey of the asteroid belt and all near-Earth asteroids, we could give ourselves decades or even centuries of lead time when it comes to these potentially hazardous objects. Asteroids in the early Solar System were more numerous, and cratering was catastrophic. The rate has plummeted over the past 4.5 billion years. Image credit: NASA / GSFC, BENNU’S JOURNEY — Heavy Bombardment. The less common type — from long-period objects — are likely to give us less than two years of lead time, and potentially only months. If a fast-moving, massive body from beyond Jupiter, Neptune or even farther out plummets in towards the Sun, and happens to be on a collision course with Earth, our best option is to get to it as fast as possible with a nuclear impactor to try and divert it or break it up as much as possible. It’s the worst-case scenario, but thankfully, it’s a very unlikely one. While asteroids (grey) and Kuiper Belt objects beyond Neptune (blue and orange) are generally considered Earth’s greatest threats, the centaurs (green) number over 44,000. Image credit: WilyD at English Wikipedia. Trans-Neptunian objects are most likely to head towards Earth after a recent encounter with a nearby, passing star. But we haven’t had one in many hundreds of thousands of years, and there isn’t one slated for perhaps millions more. The odds of a city-killer asteroid striking Earth are below 0.1% every year, and most of the ones that will hit us will land in the ocean (70%) or over a relatively unpopulated area (25%). Only around 5% of the Earth’s surface has a sizable human population density inhabiting it, and the fallout from those events are minor even a small distance away from the direct impact. The extinction-level events are so low-risk that the most dangerous object known to humanity doesn’t pose any danger at all for more than the next 2400 years. The orbital path of Comet Swift-Tuttle, which passes perilously close to crossing Earth’s actual path around the Sun. Image credit: Howard of Teaching Stars, via http://www.teachingstars.com/2012/08/08/the-2012-perseid-meteor-shower/orbital-path-of-swift-tuttle-outer-solar-system\_crop-2/. The odds of a massive asteroid strike are lower than they’ve ever been at any point in Earth’s history. Small asteroids will still hit us and we should still invest in the study and exploration of our Solar System and beyond, but we shouldn’t be afraid. The “quietness” of the past few millennia doesn’t mean we’re overdue for a city-killer asteroid; if anything, it means we’re living in a period of relatively low risk. Don’t let the catastrophic consequences in the game of “what if” blind you to the realities that of all the natural and human-caused disasters facing Earth, asteroids aren’t the one that should be topping our priority lists.

#### 1 in 100 million chance of existential asteroids

David A. Koplow, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, ’19, "Exoatmospheric Plowshares: Using a Nuclear Explosive Device for Planetary Defense against an Incoming Asteroid," UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 23, no. 1 76-158

The first graphic indicates, for example, that events roughly comparable to the Chelyabinsk asteroid might occur once every 50 years, while the bigger Tunguska-like strike might be a once-in-250- or 500-year phenomenon. A regional event, which could endanger tens ofthousands of square miles, would be expected every 5,000 years. At the high end of the spectrum, an extinction class occurrence, such as Chicxulub, would be anticipated on average, every 100 million years.40

#### Not existential.

Bennett 10 [James, Eminent Scholar and William P. Snavely Professor of Political Economy and Public Policy at George Mason University, and Director of The John M. Olin Institute for Employment Practice and Policy, “The Chicken Littles of Big Science; or, Here Come the Killer Asteroids!” THE DOOMSDAY LOBBY 2010, 139-185, DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-6685-8\_6]

The smallest falling bodies, those with diameters under a few meters, are of “no practical concern,” says Chapman, and in fact they are to be desired, at least by those who keep their eyes on the skies watching for brilliant fireballs whose burning up in the atmosphere provides a show far more spectacular than the most lavish Fourth of July fireworks. Even bodies with diameters of 10–30 meters, of which Chapman estimates six may fall to earth in a century, cause little more than broken windows. They explode too high in the atmosphere to cause serious harm. The next largest potential strikers of Earth are those in the Tunguska range of 30 meters–100 meters. The shock waves from the atmospheric explosion would “topple trees, wooden structures and ignit[e] fires within 10 kilometers,” writes Chapman. Human deaths could result if the explosion took place over a populated area. Though Chapman estimates the likelihood of a Tunguska occurring in any given century at four in ten, it is worth noting that there is no evidence that such an explosion has killed a single human being in all of recorded history. Either we’re overdue or that 40 percent is high. Moreover, given that the location of such an explosion is utterly unpredictable, it would be far more likely to happen over an ocean or a desert than over, say, Tokyo or Manhattan. The after effects would be minimal, and Chapman says that “nothing practical can be done about this modest hazard other than to clean up after the event.” In fact, “It makes no sense to plan ahead for such a modest disaster… other than educating the public about the possibility.” The cost of a telescopic survey capable of picking up bodies of such diminutive size would be prohibitive. It would be the ultimate Astronomers Full Employment Act. A body of 100 meters–300 meters in diameter would either explode at low altitude or upon impact with the ground; it would be “regionally devastating,” but Chapman pegs the chances of such a catastrophe at 1 percent per century. A small nation could be destroyed by the impact of a body of 300 meters—1 km in diameter, or a “flying mountain” of sorts, which would explode with energy yield ten times more than “the largest thermonuclear bomb ever tested.” If striking land, it would carve out a crater deeper than the Grand Canyon. If it hit a populated area, the death toll could be in the hundreds of thousands. The likelihood of such a collision Chapman estimates at 0.2 percent per century. An asteroid or comet of 1–3 kilometers in diameter would cause “major regional destruction,” possibly verging on “civilization-destruction level.” Chapman puts the chances of this at 0.02 percent per century. The impact of a body more than 3 kilometers in diameter might plunge the Earth into a new Dark Age, killing most of its inhabitants, though the chances of this are “extremely remote” — less than one in 50,000 per century. Finally, mass extinction would likely occur should a body greater than 10 kilometers pay us a visit, though the chances of this are less than one in a million every century, or so infinitesimal that even the most worry-wracked hypochondriac will not lose sleep over the possibility. In fact, for any impact with a Chapman-calculated likelihood of less than one in a thousand per century, he concedes that there is “little justification for mounting asteroid-specific mitigation measures.” The chance of a civilization-ender is so remote that he counsels no “advance preparations” — or almost none. For Chapman recommends further study of NEOs, as well as investigation into methods of their diversion. 82 This is exactly what the NEO lobby wants.

#### Lasers solve now

**Kumar 13** (2013, Prashant, Administrator/writer for Vivid Times, 2/17 “Scientists Propose System to Vaporize Asteroids That Threaten Earth”)

It has been an eventful year for space enthusiasts, with it seeming like a new asteroid is announced every week, each one coming closer and closer to our blue marble. Then, just a few days ago, a large meteorite smashed into Russia, injuring over 1000 people. Now a researcher and a physicist have teamed up to propose a solution to the problem – a laser-beam generating solar-based asteroid destroyer that could destroy a space rock half the size of a football field in 30 minutes. UC Santa Barbara physicist and professor Philip M. Lubin, and Gary B. Hughes, a researcher and professor from California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, conceived DE-STAR, or Directed Energy Solar Targeting of Asteroids an exploRation, as a realistic means of mitigating potential threats posed to the Earth by asteroids and comets. “We have to come to grips with discussing these issues in a logical and rational way,” said Lubin, who began work on DE-STAR a year ago. “We need to be proactive rather than reactive in dealing with threats. Duck and cover is not an option. We can actually do something about it and it’s credible to do something. So let’s begin along this path. Let’s start small and work our way up. There is no need to break the bank to start.” The system will work by using solar panels to turn energy from the sun into a “phased array” of individual laser beams that are channeled into a single mega-laser beam that eradicates the asteroids, a la the Death Star. If the asteroid is too large, DE-STAR would work by deflecting it away from our fragile planet. The best part? The concept is based on technology that is widely available now. “This system is not some far-out idea from Star Trek,” Hughes said. “All the components of this system pretty much exist today. Maybe not quite at the scale that we’d need –– scaling up would be the challenge –– but the basic elements are all there and ready to go. We just need to put them into a larger system to be effective, and once the system is there, it can do so many things.” “These are not just back-of-the-envelope numbers,” Hughes concurred. “They are actually based on detailed analysis, through solid calculations, justifying what is possible. And it’s all available under current theory and current technology. “There are large asteroids and comets that cross the Earth’s orbit, and some very dangerous ones going to hit the Earth eventually,” he added. “Many have hit in the past and many will hit in the future. We should feel compelled to do something about the risk. Realistic solutions need to be considered, and this is definitely one of those.”

#### Mining solves Water Shortages

Kean 15 Sam Kean December 2015 "The End of Thirst" <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/12/the-end-of-thirst/413176/> (writer based in Washington DC for the Atlantic)//Elmer

Imagine turning on your tap and seeing no water come out. Or looking down into your village’s only well and finding it dust-dry. Much of the developing world could soon face such a scenario. According to the United Nations, 1.2 billion people already suffer from severe water shortages, and that number is expected to increase to 1.8 billion over the next decade, in part because of climate change. Developed countries probably won’t be immune. California and other states in the western U.S. are already experiencing extreme drought, and climate experts warn of even worse to come—multi-decade megadroughts. Mass migrations and wars over freshwater loom as real possibilities. Staving off disaster will require conservation, especially in agriculture, which consumes more than two-thirds of all the water humans use. Basic infrastructure maintenance would also go a long way: Some developing countries lose more than half their water through leaky pipes. But conservation and maintenance won’t solve all our water woes, especially as the planet warms and people continue to pack into cities. As a result, governments around the world are investing in new water-recycling and water-harvesting technologies. Here’s what the future of water might look like. 1. Drinking From the Sea … One obvious solution would be to drink ocean water. Converting seawater into freshwater by stripping out the salt—a process called desalination—offers several advantages. Roughly half the world’s population lives within 65 miles of an ocean, and saltwater accounts for about 97 percent of all water on Earth. Still, desalination presents obstacles. Older plants that boil seawater and collect the vapors, as many of those in the Middle East do, use ungodly amounts of energy. Newer plants that use reverse osmosis—whereby seawater is forced through membranes at high pressure—are more efficient, but still expensive and energy-intensive. The process also produces a briny waste that can harm marine life if not disposed of properly. We can nevertheless expect to see more desalination plants soon—thanks in part to Israel, which all but eliminated its chronic water shortages in the past decade by building four large reverse-osmosis plants, inspiring other countries to follow suit. A $1 billion plant operated by an Israeli company is about to open north of San Diego; it will be the largest in the Western Hemisphere, providing up to 50 million gallons of water a day to Californians. 2. … Or From the Toilet Instead of desalination, some experts favor recycling wastewater—cleaning the water from showers, washing machines, and, yes, toilets—for human consumption. Most water-recycling plants clean water in two basic ways. First, they force it through filters, some of which have holes hundreds of times narrower than a strand of human hair. These filters remove waste particles, organic chemicals, bacteria, viruses, and other dreck. Second, chemicals like hydrogen peroxide or ozone and pulses of ultraviolet light destroy any pathogens that have slipped through. Water recycling is a proven technology: California recycles hundreds of millions of gallons each day for irrigation and other uses. So what’s stopping recycled wastewater from going directly to our taps? Human psychology. The very idea of drinking it disgusts many people. They view such water as irredeemably dirty, little better than toilet water. In reality, recycled water is some of the cleanest drinking water around—as good as or better than the best bottled water. (Breweries in Oregon and California have plans to make beer with recycled water for this very reason—it’s so clean that it’s tasteless, a blank slate.) More to the point, recycled water is far purer than most tap water. By the time the water in the Mississippi reaches New Orleans, for instance, every drop has been used by cities along the river multiple times, and the treatment it gets before going through the taps is nowhere near as extensive as what a water-recycling plant provides. Singapore and Namibia have recycled water for years with no adverse health effects, and nasa began recycling water on the International Space Station in 2008. (The Russian cosmonauts there don’t recycle their pee, but they give the Americans bags of it to recycle and then drink.) In the United States, a few parched towns in Texas and New Mexico drink recycled wastewater already, and last year the city of San Diego—which gets most of its water from rivers that are running dry—approved a $3 billion recycling plant that would provide one-third of its tap water, 83 million gallons a day, by 2035. San Diego had rejected essentially the same plan in 1998, but this time the city decided it had no other choice. 3. Microbe Power Rather than filtering out organic waste, water-recycling plants might one day be able to break it down with microbes, a process that could bring an ancillary benefit: electric power. As they digest the gunk in wastewater, certain species of bacteria, called electricigens, can liberate electrons, the stuff of electricity. Producing electrons is actually common in nature—much of photosynthesis involves shuttling them around. Unlike plants, though, electricigens don’t store electrons internally. They use microscopic appendages that look like hairs to deposit the electrons onto external surfaces, usually minerals. In experimental fuel cells, scientists have replaced the minerals with wires and harvested electrons. Someday the bacteria might even generate enough power to run a water-recycling plant, making it self-sufficient. 4. Keeping It Simple Some up-and-coming water technologies are startlingly straightforward. People on arid plateaus, for instance, can string a fine plastic mesh between two posts and use it to capture water from fog that rolls through, collecting the drops in storage tanks. Existing systems in one small Guatemalan village can collect 6,300 liters a day, and more during the wet season. Scientists think that updating the mesh with new materials and tighter weaves could dramatically improve yields. People could even channel the water into hydroponic gardens to grow food. Imagine famously foggy San Francisco with a farm on every rooftop. Oil films present another low-tech opportunity. Reservoirs lose appalling amounts of water to evaporation: By some estimates, more water escapes into the air than is used by humans. But covering the surface with an extremely thin layer—even just one molecule thick—of nontoxic chemicals derived from coconut or palm oil can cut evaporative losses. Wind tends to break up layers of oil, re-exposing the water to the elements. But drones or blimps equipped with sensors could someday monitor reservoirs and signal where oil needed to be re-applied. In one recent test, spreading oil over a lake in Texas (via boats) appears to have cut evaporation by about 15 percent. 5. Making It Rain Of course, for every modest proposal to save water, there’s an audacious one floating around. Take weather modification. Advocates of the idea hope to significantly boost precipitation using a process called “cloud seeding”: spraying clouds with a chemical like silver iodide, which acts as a nucleus around which water droplets collect. The droplets then fall to Earth as rain or snow. That’s the theory, at least. The first large-scale experiments, in the 1940s, generated a lot of excitement. More recently, weather modification has been dogged by accusations of hype and questions about its reliability. A six-year program in Wyoming claimed to have squeezed 5 to 15 percent more precipitation out of the clouds it seeded. Unfortunately, conditions were suitable for seeding only 30 percent of the time, so the total increase in precipitation was closer to 3 percent. That’s not nothing, especially during droughts. But weather modification may be the flying car of water technology—a tantalizing idea that’s forever on the horizon. 6. The Moon Shot If Earth does run dry, we might be able to save ourselves by mining water from asteroids and comets. Scientists have landed probes on these space rocks to study them. Future landers could mine them in deep space or possibly even drag them back toward Earth. Though the idea sounds far-fetched, space-mining companies already exist, and one of them, Planetary Resources, expects to start harvesting resources from asteroids in about a decade. According to Planetary Resources, a single 1,600-foot-wide asteroid could yield more platinum than has ever been mined in human history. But water could prove to be the real prize for space-mining companies. Some astronomers believe that the asteroid Ceres, which sits between Jupiter and Mars, may contain more freshwater (as ice) than all of Earth does. In addition to quenching people’s thirst, this water could be turned into fuel for interplanetary spaceships. In that case, an ample supply of water would be the key to a happy future not just down here on the ground, but up among the stars as well.

#### Water Wars cause Sino-India Conflict – goes Nuclear

Klare 20 — Five College professor emeritus of peace and world security studies, and director of the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies (PAWSS), holds a B.A. and M.A. from Columbia University and a Ph.D. from the Graduate School of the Union Institute. (Michael; Published: 2020; "Climate Change, Water Scarcity, and the Potential for Interstate Conflict in South Asia"; Journal of Strategic Security 13, No. 4, Pages 109-122; https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1826 Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss4/8)//CYang

China, India, and the Brahmaputra River

The potential for interstate conflict—even nuclear conflict—over shared water supplies arises in the case of another major river at risk from climate change: The Brahmaputra, which originates in China and traverses much of northeastern India before merging with the Ganges in Bangladesh and emptying into the Bay of Bengal. The fifth-largest river in the world by volume of water flow, the Brahmaputra starts on the northern slopes of the Himalayas and flows easterly across the southern Tibetan plateau (where it is known as the Yarlung Tsangpo) before making a nearly 180-degree turn and crossing into the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh; from there, it flows in a southwesterly direction towards its confluence with the Ganges and thence its exit into the Bay of Bengal. For the Chinese, the Brahmaputra is an important engine of hydroelectric power; they have already installed one dam on the river, at Zangmu, and have announced plans for at least three more. For the Indians, it is a valuable source of irrigation water, especially in agriculture-dependent regions of the northeast. Leaders of both countries are fully aware of their counterparts’ interests and concerns over the river but have made little effort to reach a mutual understanding—let alone any formal agreements—regarding its future development.31

Several factors make the future status of the Brahmaputra a matter of deep concern to security analysts. To begin with, the river enters India through the state of Arunachal Pradesh, an area of northeastern India abutting Tibet that is claimed by both countries. Beijing insists that this region was once part of the kingdom of Tibet, and so belongs to China; New Delhi claims it is a legitimate part of India under a 1914 treaty between Tibet and Great Britain. The two sides fought a war here in 1962, with India suffering significant battlefield setbacks but China agreeing to restore the status quo ante. The countries have not been able to resolve the ownership dispute in subsequent years, despite intermittent negotiations, and both continue to maintain substantial military forces in the region. To this day, discord over Arunachal Pradesh remains a continuing source of friction in Sino-Indian relations and a potential spark for violent conflict.32

Another potential source of friction between China and India arises from Chinese plans (or rumors of such plans) to divert water from the upper Brahmaputra and funnel it via a series of tunnels and canals to northeastern China, where existing supplies are hugely inadequate.33 While dismissed by many Chinese experts as overly ambitious and costly, the notion of diverting water from the Brahmaputra has generated considerable anxiety in India, where experts fear that the resulting decline in water flow into the Indian section of the river would threaten agricultural productivity. Given the centrality of farming in the Indian economy and political system, any Chinese move to proceed with such a diversion project could lead to increased tension between the two countries. 34

Few analysts believe that a Sino-Indian conflict over the Brahmaputra is likely in the years immediately ahead. Both countries have strong motives for maintaining friendly—if not necessarily, warm—relations between them, and water issues have not yet dominated the bilateral agenda. This, however, is where global warming enters the picture. The Brahmaputra, like the Indus, draws much of its flow during dry seasons from the melting of Himalayan glaciers—and these, as has already been noted, are melting as a result of climate change, and could eventually disappear. For both China and India, the melting of the Himalayan glaciers will have momentous consequences. Given the Brahmaputra’s critical importance to agriculture and economic activity in both countries, any significant long-term decline in its flow would be highly disruptive, causing widespread hardship and social unrest.35

Under these more stressful conditions, the Chinese leadership, desperate to provide additional supply to China’s water-starved northeast, might be more inclined to proceed with water diversion projects on the Brahmaputra and other shared river systems.36 Coming at a time of equivalent water scarcity in India, such an effort is almost certain to trigger a harsh Indian response. “The most salient climate-related point of conflict [between China and India] could be China’s move to divert the upstream waters of rivers originating in the Himalayan watershed,” the NIC warned in a special report on climate change and India. “If China was determined to move forward with such a scheme, it could become a major element in pushing China and India towards an adversarial rather than simply a competitive relationship. Border clashes related to control of the rivers are not out of the question.”37

Any conflict between China and India over the waters of the Brahmaputra, should one occur, is most likely to remain a localized affair, without provoking a full-scale mobilization of forces on both sides. During the 1962 war over Arunachal Pradesh, Chinese army troops engaged their Indian counterparts in disputed areas along the border, but neither side escalated to large-scale combat. However, once fighting breaks out, it is impossible to predict the succeeding chain of events, and any outcome is conceivable. A minor skirmish along the Indo-Chinese border might not be a cause for alarm in the United States, but a larger war between those two countries undoubtedly would be. Both are armed with nuclear weapons, and Washington views India as a strategic counterweight to China.38 A crushing defeat of India would be viewed as a potential threat to American national interests and might conceivably precipitate U.S. military intervention. Where that might lead is anyone’s guess, but the mere possibility of such combat has made this scenario a matter of deep concern for security analysts in Washington.39

**No ‘space war’ – Insurmountable barriers and everyone has an interest in keeping space peaceful**

**Dobos 19** [(Bohumil Doboš, scholar at the Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic, and a coordinator of the Geopolitical Studies Research Centre) “Geopolitics of the Outer Space, Chapter 3: Outer Space as a Military-Diplomatic Field,” Pgs. 48-49] TDI

Despite the theorized potential for the achievement of the terrestrial dominance throughout the utilization of the ultimate high ground and the ease of destruction of space-based assets by the potential space weaponry, the utilization of space weapons is with current technology and no effective means to protect them far from fulfilling this potential (Steinberg 2012, p. 255). In current global international political and technological setting, the utility of space weapons is very limited, even if we accept that the ultimate high ground presents the potential to get a decisive tangible military advantage (which is unclear). This stands among the reasons for the lack of their utilization so far. Last but not the least, it must be pointed out that the states also develop passive defense systems designed to protect the satellites on orbit or critical capabilities they provide. These further decrease the utility of space weapons. These systems include larger maneuvering capacities, launching of decoys, preparation of spare satellites that are ready for launch in case of ASAT attack on its twin on orbit, or attempts to decrease the visibility of satellites using paint or materials less visible from radars (Moltz 2014, p. 31). Finally, we must look at the main obstacles of connection of the outer space and warfare. The first set of barriers is comprised of physical obstructions. As has been presented in the previous chapter, the outer space is very challenging domain to operate in. Environmental factors still present the largest threat to any space military capabilities if compared to any man-made threats (Rendleman 2013, p. 79). A following issue that hinders military operations in the outer space is the predictability of orbital movement. If the reconnaissance satellite's orbit is known, the terrestrial actor might attempt to hide some critical capabilities-an option that is countered by new surveillance techniques (spectrometers, etc.) (Norris 2010, p. 196)-but the hide-and-seek game is on. This same principle is, however, in place for any other space asset-any nation with basic tracking capabilities may quickly detect whether the military asset or weapon is located above its territory or on the other side of the planet and thus mitigate the possible strategic impact of space weapons not aiming at mass destruction. Another possibility is to attempt to destroy the weapon in orbit. Given the level of development for the ASAT technology, it seems that they will prevail over any possible weapon system for the time to come. Next issue, directly connected to the first one, is the utilization of weak physical protection of space objects that need to be as light as possible to reach the orbit and to be able to withstand harsh conditions of the domain. This means that their protection against ASAT weapons is very limited, and, whereas some avoidance techniques are being discussed, they are of limited use in case of ASAT attack. We can thus add to the issue of predictability also the issue of easy destructibility of space weapons and other military hardware (Dolman 2005, p. 40; Anantatmula 2013, p. 137; Steinberg 2012, p. 255). Even if the high ground was effectively achieved and other nations could not attack the space assets directly, there is still a need for communication with those assets from Earth. There are also ground facilities that support and control such weapons located on the surface. Electromagnetic communication with satellites might be jammed or hacked and the ground facilities infiltrated or destroyed thus rendering the possible space weapons useless (Klein 2006, p. 105; Rendleman 2013, p. 81). This issue might be overcome by the establishment of a base controlling these assets outside the Earth-on Moon or lunar orbit, at lunar L-points, etc.-but this perspective remains, for now, unrealistic. Furthermore, no contemporary actor will risk full space weaponization in the face of possible competition and the possibility of rendering the outer space useless. No actor is dominant enough to prevent others to challenge any possible attempts to dominate the domain by military means. To quote 2016 Stratfor analysis, "(a) war in space would be devastating to all, and preventing it, rather than finding ways to fight it, will likely remain the goal" (Larnrani 20 16). This stands true unless some space actor finds a utility in disrupting the arena for others.

### 1NC – Turn – US-Russia

The story of this advantage is that China & Russia cooperate bc of US mining which results in a coalition that collapses American unipolarity – American primacy is bad--

#### Russia isn’t even close to threating US dominance

Doug Bandow 17, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, a Senior Fellow in International Religious Persecution with the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, "What Russian Threat? Americans Shouldn't Be Running Scared Of Moscow", Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2017/03/06/what-russian-threat-americans-shouldnt-be-running-scared-of-moscow/

Listen to folks in Washington talk about the supposed Russian threat and you’d think America was a small, third-rate country—friendless, stuck in Moscow’s shadow, possessing a tiny, obsolete military. The paranoia seems strongest from Neoconservatives who otherwise demand that the U.S. dominate the globe, bombing, invading, and occupying other nations at will. In 2012, Mitt Romney charged Russia with being America’s number one “geopolitical foe,” causing some to later hold him up as a prophet. Earlier this year, Secretary of Defense James Mattis testified before the Senate that Moscow is the “principal threat” to the U.S., which should be “ready to confront Russia.” Yet the fear-mongering is nonsense. Russia’s presumed attempt to influence America’s election was more smoke than fire. Moscow is accused of a private hack which released emails detailing the sleaze afflicting one of the presidential candidates. Although illegal like other cyber-attacks, that’s pretty mild, especially compared to Washington’s routine interference in other nations’ political affairs, including their elections. Although American officials proclaim their commitment to democracy, their activities almost always promote parties, leaders, and movements friendly to the U.S. More serious are claims that Moscow poses a security threat. Military capabilities are more than formal military budgets, but the spending disparity between the U.S. and Russia is vast: Washington’s outlays are almost ten times as much as Moscow’s. President Donald Trump just proposed an annual jump in outlays, $54 billion, which is nearly as much as Russia will spend all year. Russia lacks the global reach to challenge America. As Putin noted in an interview with an Italian journalist: “Publish a world map and mark all the U.S. military bases on it. You will see the difference between Russia and the U.S.” Moscow also lacks the economic foundation to match the U.S. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “One effect of the country’s deteriorating economic situation has been the delay in concluding the next State Armament Program; originally intended to have been started in 2016, this has now been pushed back to 2018.” Russia possesses the world’s second most powerful nuclear arsenal, capable of destroying America many times over. But even Moscow’s sharpest critics don’t believe Vladimir Putin plans to commit suicide. That nuclear threat acts more as Russia’s guarantee against U.S. coercion. Neither side can allow the stakes of any conflict to race out of control. Beyond inaugurating nuclear Armageddon, how does Moscow threaten America? An invasion seems unlikely, since the two countries don’t share a land boundary. An attack across the Bering Strait to retake Alaska is more than a little unlikely. Which means there is no direct threat to the U.S. How about isolating America by controlling sea and air and interdicting commerce? That’s almost as implausible. The vaunted Red Navy is gone. Moscow deploys one decrepit aircraft carrier, no match for Washington’s multiple carrier groups. And the U.S. is allied with European nations which also possess capable if smaller fleets. Russia is upgrading its forces, but it lacks the resources to equal America. Moscow is no more likely to dominate the air above or around the U.S. Russia’s air force is capable and has gained valuable combat experience over Syria, but remains no match for America’s globe-spanning force. More dangerous may be Russian air defenses, which would ensure that hostile U.S. air operations were not the cakewalk like in Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Nor is there any obvious reason why Moscow would inaugurate war with the U.S. Russia’s critics notwithstanding, the Cold War is over. There is only one aggressive ideological power, and that is America. Putinism is a simpler, practical authoritarian nationalism. That’s obviously not a congenial home for anyone who believes in America’s classical liberal heritage. The vision of a limited government dedicated to protecting individual rights has few takers in the Russian Federation. The real problem posed by Vladimir Putin is not that he’s an unpleasant thug, but that he seems to represent a substantial number—a strong majority if polls are to be believed—of Russians. Still, Moscow’s policy reflects much more a defensive than aggressive stance. Its role in the world looks a lot like that of pre-1914 imperial Russia. The Putin government wants its interests to be respected and its borders to be secure. It especially doesn’t like seeing its friends, such as Serbia, dismembered without so much as a nod in Moscow’s direction. Russia also opposes a potentially hostile alliance pushing ever eastward, absorbing lands such as Ukraine that once were integral to the Russian Empire as well as the Soviet Union. The U.S. (and Moscow’s neighbors) might wish that Russia would accept America’s not always so benevolent hegemony. However, Boris Yeltsen’s rule proved to be but a brief interregnum until age-old Russian nationalism reasserted itself. That Moscow now stands up for what it considers to be its interests is no cause for alarm in Washington unless the latter has aggressive designs on Russia itself. The belief that such a nation and people would voluntarily, even enthusiastically, submit to American “leadership” always was a fantasy. Of course, Moscow’s policies sometimes run contrary to Washington’s desires, but that doesn’t mean Russia poses a threat. Moscow generally has been helpful in Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea, all significant concerns of the U.S. Russia has moved closer to China, despite major differences between the two, but largely in response to Washington’s hostile policies toward both great powers. In this way the Obama administration inadvertently reversed Richard Nixon’s geopolitical masterstroke of 45 years ago.

#### Hegemony incentivizes rapid escalation - competitive decline creates incentives to wait and de-escalate

Hal Brands 18, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins-SAIS, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10/24/18, “Danger: Falling Powers,” <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/10/24/danger-falling-powers/>

There is, then, no disputing that rising powers can have profoundly disruptive effects. Yet such powers might not actually be the most aggressive or risk-prone type of revisionist state. After all, if a country’s position is steadily improving over time, why risk messing it all up through reckless policies that precipitate a premature showdown? Why not lay low until the geopolitical balance has become still more favorable? Why not wait until one has surpassed the reigning hegemon altogether and other countries defer to one’s wishes without a shot being fired? So while a rising revisionist power may be tempted to assert itself, it should also have good reason to avoid going for broke.

Now imagine an alternative scenario. A revisionist power—perhaps an authoritarian power—has been gaining influence and ratcheting its ambitions upward. Its leaders have cultivated intense nationalism as a pillar of their domestic legitimacy; they have promised the populace that past insults will be avenged and sacrifices will be rewarded with geopolitical greatness and global prestige. Yet then the country’s potential peaks, either because it has reached its natural limit or because of some unforeseen development, and the balance of power starts to shift in unfavorable ways. It becomes clear to the country’s leadership that it may not be able to accomplish the goals it has set and fulfill the promises it has made, and that the situation will only further worsen with time. A roll of the iron dice now seems more attractive: It may be the only chance the nation has to claim geopolitical spoils before it is too late.

In this scenario, it is not rising power that makes the revisionist state so dangerous, but the temptation to act before decline sets in. In this sense, the dynamic bears a resemblance to the famous Davies J-Curve theory of revolution, wherein a populace is held to be more inclined to revolt not when it is maximally oppressed but rather when raised expectations are shown to be in vain.

#### It's more unstable – our evidence is comparative.

Christopher Preble 16, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. PhD in History from Temple University. With William Ruger. 2016. “The Problem With Primacy.” In “Our Foreign Policy Choices, Rethinking America’s Global Role” https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=741072022102024090075118113101083026016056000029024069069123111076082080009064093108016120111006027011049007074022115108007102123042042011081092085100005025006088070001052041101115092080116097001012108114029011071004086091092118120095090091004096029029&EXT=pdf

Another key problem is that primacy inadvertently increases the risk of conflict. Allies are more willing to confront powerful rivals, because they are confident that the United States will rescue them if the confrontation turns ugly, a classic case of moral hazard, or what Barry Posen calls "reckless driving." Restraining our impulse to intervene militarily or diplomatically when Our vital national interests are not threatened would reduce the likelihood that Our friends and allies will engage in such reckless behavior in the first place. Libya and Georgia are only two cases of this problem. Plus, a more restrained U.S. foreign policy would provide a powerful incentive for allies to share the burden of defense. Primacy has not stopped rivals from challenging U.S. power. Russia and China, for example, have resisted the U.S. government's efforts to expand its influence in Europe and Asia. Indeed, by provoking security fears, primacy exacerbates the very sorts of problems that it claims to prevent, including nuclear proliferation. U.S. efforts at regime change and talk of an "axis of evil" that needed to be eliminated certainly provided additional incentives for States to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. actions (e.g„ North Korea). Meanwhile, efforts intended to smother security competition or hostile ideologies have destabilized vast regions, undermined Our counter- terrorism efforts, and even harmed those we were ostensibly trying to help. After U S. forces deposed the tyrant Saddam Hussein in 211)3, Iraq descended into chaos and has never recovered. The situation in Libya is not much better; the United States helped Overthrow Muammar el-Qaddafi in 2011, but violence still rages. The Islamic State, which Originated in Iraq, has now established a presence in Libya as well. It is clear that those interventions were counterproductive and have failed to make America safer and more secure.

#### Pursuit of hegemony leads to Sino-Russia alliance and is unsustainable – internal link turns their impact

Porter, DPhil, 19

(Patrick, ModernHistory@Oxford, ProfInternationalSecurityAndStrategy@Birmingham, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more. Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place. Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### B. A strong Sino-Russian alliance combined with expanded US military presence ensures joint retaliation — that escalates to the use of nuclear force

Klare 18 – Professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College. (Michael T., “The Pentagon Is Planning a Three-Front ‘Long War’ Against China and Russia,” April 4, 2018, https://fpif.org/the-pentagon-is-planning-a-three-front-long-war-against-china-and-russia/)//sy

In relatively swift fashion, American military leaders have followed up their claim that the U.S. is in a new long war by sketching the outlines of a containment line that would stretch from the Korean Peninsula around Asia across the Middle East into parts of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and finally to the Scandinavian countries. Under their plan, American military forces — reinforced by the armies of trusted allies — should garrison every segment of this line, a grandiose scheme to block hypothetical advances of Chinese and Russian influence that, in its global reach, should stagger the imagination. Much of future history could be shaped by such an outsized effort. Questions for the future include whether this is either a sound strategic policy or truly sustainable. Attempting to contain China and Russia in such a manner will undoubtedly provoke countermoves, some undoubtedly difficult to resist, including cyber attacks and various kinds of economic warfare. And if you imagined that a war on terror across huge swaths of the planet represented a significant global overreach for a single power, just wait. Maintaining large and heavily-equipped forces on three extended fronts will also prove exceedingly costly and will certainly conflict with domestic spending priorities and possibly provoke a divisive debate over the reinstatement of the draft. However, the real question — unasked in Washington at the moment — is: Why pursue such a policy in the first place? Are there not other ways to manage the rise of China and Russia’s provocative behavior? What appears particularly worrisome about this three-front strategy is its immense capacity for confrontation, miscalculation, escalation, and finally actual war rather than simply grandiose war planning. At multiple points along this globe-spanning line — the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Syria, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, to name just a few — forces from the U.S. and China or Russia are already in significant contact, often jostling for position in a potentially hostile manner. At any moment, one of these encounters could provoke a firefight leading to unintended escalation and, in the end, possibly all-out combat. From there, almost anything could happen, even the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, officials in Washington should be thinking hard before committing Americans to a strategy that will make this increasingly likely and could turn what is still long-war planning into an actual long war with deadly consequences.

#### 2] Terrorism

#### A. Hegemony fails and propagates terrorism – it justifies intervention and empirically causes blowback.

Bandow 19 (Doug, senior fellow @ Cato Institute and JD Stanford, 6-2-2019, "Understanding the Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Albright Doctrine," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/understanding-failure-us-foreign-policy-albright-doctrine-60477)> AG

Since 9/11, Washington has been extraordinarily active militarily—invading two nations, bombing and droning several others, deploying special operations forces in yet more countries, and applying sanctions against many. Tragically, **the threat of Islamist violence and terrorism only have metastasized**. Although Al Qaeda lost its effectiveness in directly plotting attacks, it continues to inspire national offshoots. Moreover, while losing its physical “caliphate” the Islamic State added further terrorism to its portfolio.

Three successive administrations have ever more deeply ensnared the United States in the Middle East. War with Iran appears to be frighteningly possible. Ever-wealthier allies are ever-more dependent on America. Russia is actively hostile to the United States and Europe. Washington and Beijing appear to be a collision course on far more than trade. Yet the current administration appears convinced that doing more of the same will achieve different results, the best definition of insanity.

Despite his sometimes abusive and incendiary rhetoric, the president has departed little from his predecessors’ policies. For instance, American forces remain deployed in Afghanistan and Syria. Moreover, the Trump administration has increased its military and materiel deployments to Europe. Also, Washington has intensified economic sanctions on Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, and even penalized additional countries, namely Venezuela.

U.S. foreign policy suffers from systematic flaws in the thinking of the informal policy collective which former Obama aide Ben Rhodes dismissed as “The Blob.” Perhaps no official better articulated The Blob’s defective precepts than Madeleine Albright, United Nations ambassador and Secretary of State.

First is overweening hubris. In 1998 Secretary of State Albright declared that “If we have to use force, it is because we are America: **we are the indispensable nation**. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.”

Even then her claim was implausible. America blundered into the Korean War and barely achieved a passable outcome. The Johnson administration infused Vietnam with dramatically outsize importance. For decades, Washington foolishly refused to engage the People’s Republic of China. Washington-backed dictators in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and elsewhere fell ingloriously. An economic embargo against Cuba that continues today helped turn Fidel Castro into a global folk hero. Washington veered dangerously close to nuclear war with Moscow during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and again two decades later during military exercises in Europe.

U.S. officials rarely were prepared for events that occurred in the next week or month, let alone years later. Americans did no better than the French in Vietnam. Americans managed events in Africa no better than the British, French, and Portuguese colonial overlords. Washington made more than its share of bad, even awful decisions in dealing with other nations around the globe.

Perhaps the worst failing of U.S. foreign policy was ignoring the inevitable impact of **foreign intervention**. Americans would never passively accept another nation bombing, invading, and occupying their nation, or interfering in their political system. Even if outgunned, they would resist. Yet Washington has undertaken all of these practices, with little consideration of the impact on those most affected—hence **the rise of terrorism** against the United States. Terrorism, horrid and awful though it is, became the weapon of choice of weaker peoples against intervention by the world’s industrialized national states.

The U.S. record since September 11 has been uniquely counterproductive. Rather than minimize hostility toward America, Washington adopted a policy—highlighted by launching new wars, killing more civilians, and ravaging additional societies—guaranteed to create enemies, exacerbate radicalism, and spread terrorism. **Blowback is everywhere**. Among the worst examples: Iraqi insurgents **mutated into ISIS**, which wreaked military havoc throughout the Middle East and turned to terrorism.

#### B. Unipolarity is specifically responsible for the globalization of extremism – that makes heg unsustainable.

Ibrahimi 18 (2/19/18; S. Yaqub Ibrahimi, [researcher and instructor of political science. PhD @ Carleton University] “Unipolar politics and global peace: a structural explanation of the globalizing jihad”; taylor and francis <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17467586.2018.1428763?needAccess=true)>

* JSG = Jihadi-Salafi Groups

Three conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the peacefulness of the contemporary unipolar system could be discussed beyond the interstate conflict and the likelihood of great powers competition debate. The new forms of asymmetric warfare, particularly the emergence of JSGs and their violent activities at different levels of the global order, could be assessed as another variable in debates on the peacefulness of the system. These actors DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 59 emerged and operate under the unipolarity conditions. Unipolarity, in this sense, has generated conflict-producing mechanisms and nonstate actors that drove sovereign states in lengthy wars against JSGs. This argument makes a significant contribution to the unipolarity-peace puzzle, which is conventionally addressed from the interstate conflict perspective. Second, unipolarity transformed Islamist-oriented terrorism from domestic to global. In addition to other conflict-generating conditions produced under unipolarity, the United States’ unipolar policies in Muslim regions transformed the traditional near-enemy-centric narrative of jihad into a far-enemy-centric ideology. As a result of the transformation of this doctrine, new forms of JSGs emerged that posed a threat to peace and security at all levels. Finally, because of the unipolarity of the system, global peace depends largely on the sole great power’s foreign and military policies. The US interventionism, due to the absence of a challenging great power, might not generate interstate conflict. However, it would engage the US in asymmetric warfare with nonstate actors that would emerge independently or on behalf of states to disrupt the US hegemony through insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of violence at different levels. These all might not challenge the durability of unipolarity, drastically, but they would disrupt peace and security at all domestic, regional, and global levels.

#### C. Terrorism causes global nuclear war—collapses internal AND external stability

Arguello and Buis, 18 – \*Irma, Founder and Chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation (Non-proliferation for Global Security), degree in Phyisics Science from the University of Buenos Aires, Master degree in Business Administration from IDEA/Wharton School, Defense and Security studies (Master level) at the Escuela de Defensa Nacional, Argentina; \*\*Emiliano, lawyer and associate professor of public international law, international humanitarian law, international law of disarmament, and the origins of international law in antiquity (Irma Arguello & Emiliano J. Buis, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1436812)

But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

#### AT Brands and Edel No liberal order or SOI impact---states won’t risk war, err towards isolation, AND mediate ties economically.

Mueller ’21 [John; February 17; Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies; The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, “The Rise of China, the Assertiveness of Russia, and the Antics of Iran,” Ch. 6]

Complacency, Appeasement, Self-destruction, and the New Cold War It could be argued that the policies proposed here to deal with the international problems, whether real or imagined, presented by China, Russia, and Iran constitute exercises not only in complacency, but also in appeasement. That argument would be correct. As discussed in the Prologue to this book, appeasement can work to avoid military conflict as can be seen in the case of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. As also discussed there, appeasement has been given a bad name by the experience with Hitler in 1938. Hitlers are very rare, but there are some resonances today in Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping. Both are shrewd, determined, authoritarian, and seem to be quite intelligent, and both are fully in charge, are surrounded by sychophants, and appear to have essentially unlimited tenure in office. Moreover, both, like Hitler in the 1930s, are appreciated domestically for maintaining a stable political and economic environment. However, unlike Hitler, both run trading states and need a stable and essentially congenial international environment to flourish.128 Most importantly, except for China’s claim to Taiwan, neither seems to harbor Hitler-like dreams of extensive expansion by military means. Both are leading their countries in an illiberal direction which will hamper economic growth while maintaining a kleptocratic system. But this may be acceptable to populations enjoying historically high living standards and fearful of less stable alternatives. Both do seem to want to overcome what they view as past humiliations – ones going back to the opium war of 1839 in the case of China and to the collapse of the Soviet empire and then of the Soviet Union in 1989–91 in the case of Russia. Primarily, both seem to want to be treated with respect and deference. Unlike Hitler’s Germany, however, both seem to be entirely appeasable. That scarcely seems to present or represent a threat. The United States, after all, continually declares itself to be the indispensable nation. If the United States is allowed to wallow in such self-important, childish, essentially meaningless, and decidedly fatuous proclamations, why should other nations be denied the opportunity to emit similar inconsequential rattlings? If that constitutes appeasement, so be it. If the two countries want to be able to say they now preside over a “sphere of influence,” it scarcely seems worth risking world war to somehow keep them from doing so – and if the United States were substantially disarmed, it would not have the capacity to even try. If China and Russia get off on self-absorbed pretensions about being big players, that should be of little concern – and their success rate is unlikely to be any better than that of the United States. Charap and Colton observe that “The Kremlin’s idee fixe that Russia needs to be the leader of a pack of post-Soviet states in order to be taken seriously as a global power broker is more of a feel-good mantra than a fact-based strategy, and it irks even the closest of allies.” And they further suggest that The towel should also be thrown in on the geo-ideational shadow-boxing over the Russian assertion of a sphere of influence in post-Soviet Eurasia and the Western opposition to it. Would either side be able to specify what precisely they mean by a regional sphere of influence? How would it differ from, say, US relations with the western-hemisphere states or from Germany’s with its EU neighbors?129 Applying the Gingrich gospel, then, it certainly seems that, although China, Russia, and Iran may present some “challenges” to US policy, there is little or nothing to suggest a need to maintain a large US military force-in-being to keep these countries in line. Indeed, all three monsters seem to be in some stage of self-destruction or descent into stagnation – not, perhaps, unlike the Communist “threat” during the Cold War. Complacency thus seems to be a viable policy. However, it may be useful to look specifically at a couple of worst-case scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China (after it builds up its navy more) and an invasion of the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia by Russia. It is wildly unlikely that China or Russia would carry out such economically self-destructive acts: the economic lessons from Putin’s comparatively minor Ukraine gambit are clear, and these are unlikely to be lost on the Chinese. Moreover, the analyses of Michael Beckley certainly suggest that Taiwan has the conventional military capacity to concentrate the mind of, if not necessarily fully to deter, any Chinese attackers. It has “spent decades preparing for this exact contingency,” has an advanced early warning system, can call into action massed forces to defend “fortified positions on home soil with precision-guided munitions,” and has supply dumps, booby traps, an wide array of mobile missile launchers, artillery, and minelayers. In addition, there are only 14 locations that can support amphibious landing and these are, not surprisingly, well-fortified by the defenders.130 The United States may not necessarily be able to deter or stop military attacks on Taiwan or on the Baltics under its current force levels.131 And if it cannot credibly do so with military forces currently in being, it would not be able to do so, obviously, if its forces were much reduced. However, the most likely response in either eventuality would be for the United States to wage a campaign of economic and military (including naval) harassment and to support local – or partisan – resistance as it did in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion there in 1979. 132 Such a response does not require the United States to have, and perpetually to maintain, huge forces in place and at the ready to deal with such improbable eventualities. The current wariness about, and hostility toward, Russia and China is sometimes said to constitute “a new Cold War.”133 There are, of course, considerable differences. In particular, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union – indeed the whole international Communist movement – was under the sway of a Marxist theory that explicitly and determinedly advocated the destruction of capitalism and probably of democracy, and by violence to the degree required. Neither Russia nor China today sports such cosmic goals or is enamored of such destructive methods. However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the United States was strongly inclined during the Cold War massively to inflate the threat that it imagined the Communist adversary to present. The current “new Cold War” is thus in an important respect quite a bit like the old one: it is an expensive, substantially militarized, and often hysterical campaign to deal with threats that do not exist or are likely to selfdestruct.134 It may also be useful to evaluate terms that are often bandied about in considerations within foreign policy circles about the rise of China, the assertiveness of Russia, and the antics of Iran. High among these is “hegemony.” Sorting through various definitions, Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow array several that seem to capture the essence of the concept: domination, controlling leadership, or the ability to shape international rules according to the hegemon’s own interests. Hegemony, then, is an extreme word suggesting supremacy, mastery, preponderant influence, and full control. Hegemons force others to bend to their will whether they like it or not. Reich and Lebow also include a mellower designation applied by John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan in which a hegemon is defined as an entity that has the ability to establish a set of norms that others willingly embrace.135 But this really seems to constitute an extreme watering-down of the word and suggests opinion leadership or entrepreneurship and success at persuasion, not hegemony. Moreover, insofar as they carry meaning, the militarized application of American primacy and hegemony to order the world has often been a fiasco.136 Indeed, it is impressive that the hegemon, endowed by definition by what Reich and Lebow aptly call a grossly disproportionate military capacity, has had such a miserable record of military achievement since 1945 – an issue discussed frequently in this book.137 Reich and Lebow argue that it is incumbent on IR scholars to cut themselves loose from the concept of hegemony.138 It seems even more important for the foreign policy establishment to do so. There is also absurdity in getting up tight over something as vacuous as the venerable “sphere of influence” concept (or conceit). The notion that world affairs are a process in which countries scamper around the world seeking to establish spheres of influence is at best decidedly unhelpful and at worst utterly misguided. But the concept continues to be embraced in some quarters as if it had some palpable meaning. For example, in early 2017, the august National Intelligence Council opined that “Geopolitical competition is on the rise as China and Russia seek to exert more sway over their neighboring regions and promote an order in which US influence does not dominate.”139 Setting aside the issue of the degree to which American “influence” could be said to “dominate” anywhere (we still wait, for example, for dominated Mexico supinely to pay for a wall to seal off its self-infatuated neighbor’s southern border), it doesn’t bloody well matter whether China or Russia has, or seems to have, a “sphere of influence” someplace or other. More importantly, the whole notion is vapid and essentially meaningless. Except perhaps in Gilbert and Sullivan’s Iolanthe. When members of the House of Lords fail to pay sufficient respect to a group of women they take to be members of a ladies’ seminary who are actually fairies, their queen, outraged at the Lords’ collected effrontery, steps forward, proclaims that she happens to be an “influential fairy,” and then, with a few passes of her wand, brushes past the Lords’ pleas (“no!” “mercy!” “spare us!” and “horror!”), and summarily issues several edicts: a young man of her acquaintance shall be inducted into their House, every bill that gratifies his pleasure shall be passed, members shall be required to sit through the grouse and salmon season, and high office shall be obtainable by competitive examination. Now, that’s influence. In contrast, on December 21, 2017, when the United States sought to alter the status of Jerusalem, the United Nations General Assembly voted to repudiate the US stand in a nearly unanimous vote that included many US allies. Now, that’s not influence. In fact, to push this point perhaps to an extreme, if we are entering an era in which economic motivations became paramount and in which military force is not deemed a sensible method for pursuing wealth, the idea of “influence” would become obsolete because, in principle, pure economic actors do not care much about influence. They care about getting rich. (As Japan and Germany have found, however, influence, status, and prestige tend to accompany the accumulation of wealth, but this is just an ancillary effect.) Suppose the president of a company could choose between two stories to tell the stockholders. One message would be, “We enjoy great influence in the industry. When we talk everybody listens. Our profits are nil.” The other would be, “No one in the industry pays the slightest attention to us or ever asks our advice. We are, in fact, the butt of jokes in the trade. We are making money hand over fist.” There is no doubt about which story would most thoroughly warm the stockholders’ hearts.

#### Heg is ineffective

Fettweis 17 – Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University (Christopher, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” *Security Studies*, 26:3, 423-451, 5-8-2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394)//Elmer

Conflict and Hegemony by Region Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear. Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse. In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace. In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

#### Their studies of revisionism are irredeemably flawed.

Turner and Nymalm, 19

[Dr. Oliver, IR @ UEdinburgh, UK; and Nicola, Research Fellow @ Swedish Institute for Int’l Affairs and Assistant Prof. of War Studies @ Swedish Defence University: “Morality and progress: IR narratives on international revisionism and the status quo,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32:4 (2019), 407-428, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2019.1623173]//AD

\*PTT=Power Transition Theory aka “Transition Wars”

A third wave of revisionist/status quo literature came with post-Cold-War debates over the US-led world order and emergence of ‘rising powers’. Authors in this wave utilize the logic of the PTT to interrogate the contemporary ‘rise’ of China in particular (see for example Lim 2015; Goldstein 2007). As Lemke (1997, 32) explains, threats to the post-war ‘Long Peace’ have now seemingly emerged, notably from ‘Chinese growth unaccompanied by a change in attitude toward the status quo’. To assuage these threats, ‘the United States and other leading satisfied Great Powers should continue patient cooperation with [China, and others such as Russia] … to encourage democratization and liberalization’. For Gerald Segal (1996, 108), ‘China is a powerful, unstable non-status quo power.’ China is also now argued to be demonstrating ‘significant revisionist objectives’ in the South China Sea (Lim et al. 2017) as well as by creating the AIIB (Wilson 2017, 150). Graham Allison writes that ‘war between the U.S. and China is more likely than recognized at the moment’, as his interpretation of the historical record stipulates that, in the majority of cases ‘in which a rising power has confronted a ruling power, the result has been bloodshed’ (Allison 2015).5 Beyond the PTT, a significant subliterature explores whether rising powers in general, and especially a rapidly rising China, represent revisionist or status quo powers (see for example Ding 2010; Feng 2009; Kastner and Saunders 2012). We return to the role of these narratives in the policy realm in the next sub-section on public narratives. Third-wave IR debates around rising powers, then, quietly sustain the logics of the ordering narratives of morality and civilizational progress central to the first and second waves, perpetuating largely unquestioned understandings that international revisionism must inevitably emanate from beyond the Western core of international order. To begin with, the term ‘rising power’ is not neutral, bringing powerful connotations of instability

and danger absent in such alternatives as ‘modernizing’ or ‘developing’. Crucially, the term ‘rising’, like ‘revisionist’, powers has most typically been used to refer only to non-Western states (see Turner 2014, 152–154). As noted earlier, the EU is rarely labelled ‘revisionist’ despite revisionism forming part of its self-identity. Explorations of the US as revisionist are also relatively absent, though counternarratives exist, as examined shortly. The selective formations and constraining boundaries of mainstream conceptual IR narratives prevent the inclusion of the US and EU because the term does not logically fit the known character or plotline. The assumption here is not of an unproblematic separation between the ‘West’ and ‘non-West’, or of timeless challenges the latter poses to the former. Fears over a ‘rising’ India, for instance, rarely enter US security discourse as do those of a ‘rising’ China, despite numerous material similarities and both typically being identified as residing beyond the West. Moreover, and as already shown, earlier waves of IR revisionism–status-quo debate interrogated the vulnerabilities of the Anglo-American/Western order to Imperial and Nazi Germany. That Germany is now routinely located within the West, alongside members of the ‘Anglo-American world’, demonstrates the fluidity of such imagined geographies. Indeed, India’s broad absence from US threat discourses is explained partly by its (re)construction as a pseudo-member of the Western world (Turner 2016). Similarly, while post-1945 Japan quickly became seen as part of the Western Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) world, by the 1970s and 1980s it was ‘orientalized’ because its economic growth generated concerns of a challenge to US economic hegemony (Nymalm 2017). Today, it is those actors commonly labelled ‘nonWestern’, in particular China, that have in many ways been seamlessly manoeuvred into spaces of IR debate once occupied by Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany. Members of ‘the West’ escape such interrogation, while China, like others before it, is now ideationally tied to well-rehearsed discourses of the enemy because its imagined Otherness makes it seemingly logical to do so (see Rousseau 2006). Mainstream scholarly/conceptual narratives of a ‘rising’ China are thus in important ways autobiographical narratives of Western authorship, with their meanings contingent on the worldview of a particular, prevailing (Western) disciplinary tradition.6 The ‘cognitive map’ of this tradition locates uncertainty and disorder, and an unravelling of gains made by the so-called liberal world order, as coming not from the central characters within it but from the global peripheries. China has become locked within narrativized understandings of what constitutes international order, on the one hand, and disorder (or chaos/ backwardness/barbarism), on the other, and not only within academic circles. For centuries within wider US politics and society, China has been represented as lacking the essential standards of civilization and as a corresponding threat to US security and its enlightened, progressive values (Turner 2013). Chengxin Pan points to self-reflecting Western narrations of the ‘China threat’ when he argues that the ‘threat’ derives at least partly from the American self. ‘Thus, to fully understand the U.S. “China threat” argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature’ (Pan 2004, 313). This equally applies to expectations of China developing according to the Western model of liberal democratic capitalism. This kind of convergence thinking has been a recurrent theme in US China policy (Nymalm 2013). As highlighted earlier, among those who directly interrogate the question of whether ‘rising’ China exists as a revisionist or a status quo actor, most agree that it more closely resembles the latter. Despite this, it is China and other ‘rising powers’ that are routinely interrogated as potential sources of instability. This apparent contradiction is enabled by the power of narratives to steer and select our knowledges of the world and its constituent actors. First- and second-wave IR debates around international revisionism and the status quo cemented the disciplinary (conceptual) narrative of an imperial/ unsatisfied non-Western threat to a stable Anglo-American/Western world order. Third-wave debates over China’s ‘rise’ align with, and reinforce, this story by retaining its authors as the central protagonists, most notably the US, before introducing China as the latest outsider to a functioning system, which it necessarily threatens to destabilize. The findings of the recent sub-literature within these debates on the explicit question of China as a revisionist or a status quo actor have not disrupted the more ingrained, overarching ‘truth’ that China should remain the principal object of study.