# 1nc

## 1

#### I value morality.

The standard is minimizing material violence

#### Actor Spec— States must use util. Any other standard dooms the moral theory

**Goodin 90.** Robert Goodin 90, [professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences], “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142 //RS

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.

#### Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

**Moen 16**, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value** and disvalue **is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” **are** here **understood inclusively**, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for**?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. **The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good**. 3 As Aristotle observes: “**We never ask** [a man] **what** his **end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself**.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that **if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad**. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue**, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

[3] Extinction First –

[a] Forecloses future improvement – we can never improve society because our impact is irreversible

[b] Turns suffering – mass death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

[c] Moral uncertainty – if we’re unsure about which interpretation of the world is true – we ought to preserve the world to keep debating about it

## 2

#### Space mining releases *significantly* less emissions than Earth-based mining

Emerging Technology 18, 10-19-2018, "Asteroid mining might actually be better for the environment," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/10/19/139664/asteroid-mining-might-actually-be-better-for-the-environment/>]//pranav

But profit margins are only part of the picture. A potentially more significant aspect of these missions is the impact they will have on Earth’s environment. But nobody has assessed this environmental impact in detail. Today, that changes thanks to the work of Andreas Hein and colleagues at the University of Paris-Saclay in France. These guys have calculated the greenhouse-gas emissions from asteroid-mining operations and compared them with the emissions from similar Earth-based activities. Their results provide some eyebrow-raising insights into the benefits that asteroid mining might provide. The calculations are relatively straightforward. Rocket launches release significant amounts of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. The fuel on board the first stage of a rocket burns in Earth’s atmosphere to form carbon dioxide. For kerosene-burning rockets, one kilogram of fuel creates three kilograms of CO2. (The second and third stages operate outside the Earth’s atmosphere and so can be ignored.) Reentries are just as damaging. That’s because a significant mass of a re-entering vehicle ablates in the upper atmosphere, producing NOx such as nitrous oxide (N2O), a greenhouse gas that is about 300 times more potent than CO2. By one estimate, the space shuttle released about 20% of its mass in the form of N2O every time it returned to Earth. Hein and co use these numbers to calculate that a kilogram of platinum mined from an asteroid would release some 150 kilograms of CO2 into Earth’s atmosphere. However, economies of scale from large asteroid-mining operations could lower this to about 60 kilograms of CO2 per kilogram of platinum. That needs to be compared with the emission from Earth-based mining. Here, platinum mining generates significant greenhouse gases, mostly from the energy it takes to remove this stuff from the ground. Indeed, the numbers are huge. The mining industry estimates that producing one kilogram of platinum on Earth releases around 40,000 kilograms of carbon dioxide. “The global warming effect of Earth-based mining is several orders of magnitude larger,” say Hein and co. The figures for water are also encouraging. In this case, the authors calculate the greenhouse-gas emissions from an asteroid-mining operation that returns water to anywhere within the moon’s orbit, a so-called cis-lunar orbit. They compare this to the emissions from sending the same volume of water from Earth into orbit. The big difference is that a water-carrying vehicle from Earth can haul only a small percentage of its mass as water. But an asteroid-mining spacecraft can transport a significant multiple of its mass as water to cis-lunar orbit. “Substantial savings in greenhouse gas emissions can be achieved,” say Hein and co. This interesting work should help to focus minds on the environmental impacts of mining, which are rapidly increasing in profile. But it is only a first step. There is significant uncertainty in the numbers here, so these will need to be better understood.

**Warming causes extinction & turns every impact – no adaptation & each degree is worse**

**Krosofsky ’21** [Andrew, Green Matters Journalist, “How Global Warming May Eventually Lead to Global Extinction”, Green Matters, 03-11-2021, https://www.greenmatters.com/p/will-global-warming-cause-extinction]//pranav

Eventually, yes. **Global warming will invariably result in the mass extinction of millions of different species,** humankind included. In fact, **the Center for Biological Diversity says that global warming is currently the greatest threat to life on this planet**. **Global warming causes a number of detrimental effects on the environment that many species won’t be able to handle long-term**. Extreme weather patterns are shifting climates across the globe, eliminating habitats and altering the landscape. **As a result, food and fresh water sources are being drastically reduced**. Then, of course, **there are the rising global temperatures themselves, which many species are physically unable to contend with**. Formerly frozen arctic and antarctic regions are melting, increasing sea levels and temperatures. Eventually, **these effects will create a perfect storm of extinction conditions**. The melting glaciers of the arctic and the searing, **unmanageable heat indexes being seen along the Equator are just the tip of the iceberg, so to speak.** **The species that live in these climate zones have already been affected by the changes caused by global warming.** Take polar bears for example, whose habitats and food sources have been so greatly diminished that they have been forced to range further and further south. **Increased carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere and oceans have already led to ocean acidification**. **This has caused many species of crustaceans to either adapt or perish and has led to the mass bleaching of more than 50 percent of Australia’s Great Barrier Reef**, according to National Geographic. According to the Center for Biological Diversity, the current trajectory of global warming predicts that more than 30 percent of Earth’s plant and animal species will face extinction by 2050. By the end of the century, that number could be as high as 70 percent. We won’t try and sugarcoat things, humanity’s own prospects aren’t looking that great either. According to The Conversation, **our species has just under a decade left to get our CO₂ emissions under control. If we don’t cut those emissions by half before 2030, temperatures will rise to potentially catastrophic levels. It may only seem like a degree or so, but the worldwide ramifications are immense.** The human species is resilient. We will survive for a while longer, even if these grim global warming predictions come to pass, **but it will mean less food, less water, and increased hardship across the world — especially in low-income areas and developing countries. This increase will also mean more pandemics, devastating storms, and uncontrollable wildfires**.

## 3

#### The 1AC’s engagement with human rights is a liberal ruse that secures biopolitical control of the very human those rights constitute – turns the case and makes violence inevitable

McNeilly 16 - Kathryn McNeilly's work has been presented widely including as a Visiting Scholar at the Centre for Feminist Legal Studies at the University of British Columbia, funded by the County Antrim Grand Jury Bursary, and in conversation with Professor Judith Butler at LSE School of Law in February 2015. In September 2016 McNeilly was a Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Feminist Legal Studies at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. McNeilly is a contributor to a number of collaborative research initatives. These include the Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments Project, a venture between academics and legal practitioners which sought to bring a feminist methodology to bear on key cases in Northern/Irish law. In this project Kathryn engaged in a feminist rewriting of the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal decision in Re Family Planning Association for Northern Ireland. McNeilly is also a co-founder of the Reproductive Health Law and Policy Advisory Group, a joint initiative between Queen's University Belfast, Ulster University and Manchester Metropolitan University. The Advisory Group was established to provide expertise and knowledge on policy and legal matters related to reproductive rights and health; to facilitate discussions and knowledge transfer between academics, policy and law makers, health professionals and stakeholder groups; and to provide advice on policy and legal reform. 11 July 2016 [“After the Critique of Rights: For a Radical Democratic Theory and Practice of Human Rights”, Springer Law Critique] rpg

Human rights have a long pedigree within liberalism and liberal thinking, stemming in their development from the work of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century liberal and natural law theorists such as Hobbes and Locke (Shapiro 1989, pp. 80–150; Moyn 2012, pp. 21–24). By virtue of this pedigree human rights enshrine liberal protection of the individual from oppressive state interference, and foreground a particularly liberal approach to personhood. The subject of liberal human rights is a bounded individual who possesses their life, liberty and security as property which should be protected from external interference, in doing so reflecting the wider imperatives of a capitalist economy (MacPherson 1962, pp. 2–4). Critical engagements with human rights have highlighted the way in which such a perception of liberal subjectivity enshrined within human rights forecloses wider relations of intersubjectivity and embodiment which characterise our existence as subjects. For example, Anna Grear has demonstrated how the unitary subject of law foregrounded within liberalism serves to advance ‘an abstract, socially decontextualised, hyper-rational, wilful individual systemically stripped of particularities, complexities and materiality’ (2007, p. 522). Costas Douzinas has also critiqued the atomisation of liberal human rights discourse, stating that human rights, as a special type of recognition, come into existence and can be exercised only in common with others… Rights do not find their limits in others and community, as liberal theory claims. On the contrary, if the function of rights is to give rise to reciprocal recognitions, they presuppose the existence of others and of community. (2000, pp. 286–287) In this respect, human rights problematically further bounded, as opposed to intersubjective, ideas of the individual which are conceptually one-dimensional and cohere with liberal, capitalist regimes. This critique of the bounded and atomised individual underpinning liberal human rights has also been linked to critique of the concept of the ‘human’ which has come to drive the idea of rights in the modern period. Human rights in contemporary liberal discourse are presented as inalienable rights that all possess by virtue of their basic humanity. Not only is the human subject a bounded individual, in being presented as a largely taken-for-granted concept, the ‘human’ within liberal human rights forecloses how, as Wendy Brown has highlighted, rights do not just attach to a natural human subject ‘but rather produce and regulate the subjects to whom they are assigned’ (2004, p. 459). A related critique has been levelled by Sokhi-Bulley (2012) who characterises rights as tools of governmentality, where individuals govern themselves through rights. Human rights cannot be perceived as possessions of a pre-existing human subject, but are a fundamental part of creating such subjects and restrictive ideas of the ‘human’. Many critical engagements with human rights have highlight the gendered, Western and ableist parameters of the liberal idea of humanity which human rights have served to reinforce throughout most of the twentieth century, and have sought to rework such ideas (Bunch 1990; Mutua 1995; Lloyd 2007). The ‘human’ in liberal human rights discourse has been critiqued, therefore, in its foreclosing of relations of power governing which lives can be perceived as human and in encouraging subjects to encounter themselves and others through dominant discourses of ‘humanity’. Indeed, liberal human rights can be problematised more generally as operating to reify existing regimes of power, rendering human rights impotent in staging a more radical challenge for those on the margins. In the modern period human rights have become increasingly tied to state and have, it has been argued, been co-opted by state agendas and their maintenance of power relations beneficial to dominant elites. Zigon (2014), for example, has asserted that human rights are fundamentally limited ‘as a language for radically progressive politics’. Zigon (2014) elaborates that, ‘every repetition of rights language further solidifies this necessary link between rights and the state-systemic-matrix’. For Zigon, while strategic usage of rights by radical politics may have short term utility, in the long run the historically accumulated limitations this language carries with it significantly decreases possibilities for imagining, articulating, and ultimately acting in ways to address these issues, abuses, and injustices that go beyond the current configuration of the state-systemic-matrix. (2014) Following such critique, the intertwining of contemporary human rights discourse and the state has been perceived as restricting human rights to operate within the given order of institutional power. The language of human rights and key human rights concepts such as ‘equality’ and ‘liberty’, in this view, retain an interpretation which coheres with current relations of power and offer limited possibilities to be used in a way that facilitates more than a limited shift in such relations. A further problematic element of liberal human rights in the modern period has been the way in which the politics of human rights often closes off political debate and engagement through an excessive pursuit of consensus. In Douzinas’ terms, ‘rights belong to the consensual domain of politics’ (2007, p. 107). For example, the creation of treaties and key international human rights documents are frequently described in terms of consensus achieved through reasoned dialogue and discussion between states and their conflicting interests, values and cultural perspectives (Cerna 1994, pp. 740–742; Merry 2006, pp. 42–44; Morsink 1999). The legitimacy and authority of the international human rights framework is bolstered by the fact that its treaties, conventions and other declarations have been consensually produced (Donnelly 2013, pp. 57–60). At the local level human rights are also often viewed as facilitating consensual outcomes between competing parties through rational discussion or, indeed, through forced consensus where human rights serve to close down political debate (Ignatieff 2001, p. 300). This focus on consensus in liberal human rights has been critiqued as obscuring key elements such as the messiness and unpredictability of the politics of rights, the ineradicable nature and importance of political disagreement and the performativity of the practice of rights (Zivi 2012, pp. 24–42).

#### The alternative is not a new mode of politics but a “NO” to the affirmative. This intervention forces subjects to re-evaluate their complicity with tropes of enjoyment. We can endorse the implementation of the 1AC but reject its rhetorical investments – working through specific fantasmic demands is necessary to create a more effective politics.

Lundberg 12 (Christian, Assoc. Prof. of Rhetoric @ UNC, Chapel Hill, “On Being Bound to Equivalential Chains”, *Cultural Studies* 26.2-3)

Laclau's On Populist Reason provides an elegant account of demand as the fundamental unit of the political, and by extension of politics as a field of antagonism. Laclau's basic goal is to define the specificity of populist reason, or, to give an account of populism as ‘special emphasis on a political logic which, is a necessary ingredient of politics tout court’, of ‘Populism, quite simply, as a way of constructing the political’ (Laclau 2005, p. 18). Here, a focus on demands replaces a now prevalent approach focused on various taxonomies of populism (which Laclau diagnoses as hopelessly unsystematic) with a more formal account of the political based on the logic of demands, which in turn provides a way of thinking about the political as the space of demand and politics as a practice of working through specific demands. Demands serve a number of functions that derive from the split between the universal and the particular that Laclau relies upon. Demands articulate a specific political claim at the level of the particular, and also imply a more generalized relationship to hegemony in the register of the universal. On this logic, demands represent the hegemonic order, creating an implicit picture of how it functions and might change. Simultaneously, demands create possible lines of equivalential affinity between others also making demands on the hegemonic order. Thus, the demand is more fundamental than the group, in that the operation of the split demand inaugurates all ‘the various forms of articulation between a logic of difference and a logic of equivalence’ that animate the social affinities that give groups their coherence (Laclau 2005, p. 20). The logic of the demand is in turn the logic of equivalence, and equivalence is as important for how it animates a group identity, as it is in positing claims on a hegemonic order. Although Laclau owes a significant debt to Freud and Lacan, it is not clear that his theory of demand is explicitly crafted from psychoanalytic categories. For example, how central is enjoyment to Laclau's relatively formal account of the demand? As Glynos and Stavrakakis have argued, there is a ‘complete and conspicuous absence in Laclau's work of Lacanian categories such as fantasy, and, perhaps more importantly, jouissance’ (Glynos and Stavrakakis 2006, p. 202). Glynos and Stavrakakis claim that there is ‘to [their] knowledge no reference in Laclau's work to the concept of jouissance’ (Glynos and Stavrakakis 2006, p. 209). On Populist Reason contains a brief discussion of the concept of jouissance as worked out by Copjec, which Laclau summarizes by saying: there is no achievable jouissance except through radical investment in an objet petit a. But the same discovery (not merely an analogous one) is made if we start from the angle of political theory. No social fullness except through hegemony; and hegemony is nothing more than the investment in a partial object, of a fullness which will always evade us. The logic of the objet petit a and the hegemonic logic are not just similar, they are simply identical. (Laclau 2005, p. 109) There is an elegance to Laclau's point about enjoyment, provided that enjoyment is reducible to a set of logical forms. This presupposition makes the lack of talk about jouissance in Laclau's work understandable. If jouissance and hegemony are identical, one does not need Lacan to say something that might be said more elegantly with Gramsci. Jouissance is simply hegemonic investment, an elevation of an object or identity to the level of a thing or a universal. Despite occasional caveats to the contrary, the greatest virtues of Laclau's version of the political stem from his relentlessly persistent application of a formal, almost structural account of the political. And, as is the case with many well executed structuralist accounts, Laclau's system can elegantly incorporate caveats, objections to and oversights in the original system by incorporating them into the functioning of the structure – jouissance can easily be read as nothing more than hegemony in this account without changing the original coordinates of the system too drastically. Yet, enjoyment provides one particularly difficult stumbling block for a dedicated formal account. To start with, enjoyment is never quite as ‘achievable’ as the preceding quotation might suggest. Far from being the consummation of a logic of structure and investment, enjoyment is a supplement to a failing in a structure: for example, Lacan frames jouissance as a useless enjoyment of one's own subjectivity that supplements the fundamental failings of a subject in either finding a grounding or consummating an authoritative account of its coherence. This ‘uselessness’ defines the operation of jouissance. Thus, for example, when Lacan suggests that ‘language is not the speaking subject’ in the Seminar on Feminine Sexuality, lodging a critique of structural linguistics as a law governing speech, jouissance is understood as something excessive that is born of the failure of structures of signification (Lacan 1977). Language is not the speaking subject precisely because what is passed through the grist mill of the speech is the result of a misfiring of structure as much as it is prefigured by logics of structure, meaning and utility. Therefore the interpretive difficulty for a structuralist account of enjoyment: the moment that the fact of enjoyment is recoded in the language of structure, the moment that it is made useful in a logic of subjectivization is precisely the moment where it stops being jouissance. Following Glynos and Stavrakakis's suggestion, one might press the question of the relationship between the demand and jouissance as a way of highlighting the differences that a purely Lacanian reading of demand might make for Laclau's understanding of politics. Framing enjoyment as equivalent with hegemony, Laclau identifies the fundamental ‘split’ in psychoanalytic theory between the universal and the particular demands of a group. Framing the split in this way, and as the privileged site of the political, Laclau occludes attention to another split: namely, the split within a subject, between the one who enters an equivalential relationship and the identitarian claim that sutures this subject into a set of linkages. This too is a site of enjoyment, where a subject identifies with an external image of itself for the sake of providing its practices of subjectivity with a kind of enjoyable retroactive coherence. The demand is relevant here, but not simply because it represents and anticipates a change in the social order or because it identifies a point of commonality. Here the demand is also a demand to be recognized as a subject among other subjects, and given the sanction and love of the symbolic order. The implication of this argument about the nature of enjoyment is that the perverse dialectic of misfirings, failure and surpluses in identity reveals something politically dangerous in not moving beyond demand. Put another way: not all equivalences are equally equivalent. Some equivalences become fetishes, becoming points of identification that eclipse the ostensible political goal of the demand. To extend the line of questioning to its logical conclusion, can we be bound to our equivalential chains? Freud, Lacan and the demand Demand plays a central role in Freud's tripartite scheme for the human psyche specifically in the formation of the ego. Although this scheme does not exercise the same hold over psychoanalytic thinking that it once did, the question of the ego still functions as an important point of departure for psychoanalytic thinking as a representative case of the production of the subject and identity. Even for critics of ‘ego psychology’, the idea of the ego as a representation of the ‘I’ of the human subject is still significant – the main question is what kind of analytical dispositions one takes towards the ego, the contingencies of its emergence and its continuing function. Despite the tendency of some commentators to naturalize Freud's tripartite schema of the human psyche, Freud's account of the ego does not characterize the ego as pre-existent or automatically given. Although present in virtually every human subject, the ego is not inevitably present: the ego is a compensatory formation that arises in the usual course of human development as a subject negotiates the articulation and refusal of its needs as filtered through demand. Hypothetically a ‘subject’ whose every need is fulfilled by another is never quite a subject: this entity would never find occasion to differentiate itself from the other who fulfils its every need. As a mode of individuation and subjectification, egos are economies of frustration and compensation. This economy relies on a split in the Freudian demand, which is both a demand to satiate a specific need and a demand for addressee to provide automatic fulfilment of need generally. The generative power of the demand relies on this split and on fact that some demands will be refused. This economy of need and frustration works because refusal of a specific need articulated as a demand on another is also a refusal of the idea that the addressee of the demand can fulfil all the subject's needs, requiring a set of individuation compensatory economic functions to negotiate the refusal of specific demands. ‘Ego’ is nothing more than the name for the contingent economy of compensatory subjectification driven by the repetition and refusal of demands – the nascent subject presents wants and needs in the form of the demand, but the role of the demand is not the simple fulfilment of these wants and needs. The demand and its refusal are the fulcrum on which the identity and insularity of the subject are produced: an unformed amalgam of needs and articulated demands is transformed into a subject that negotiates the vicissitudes of life with others. Put in the metaphor of developmental psychology, an infant lodges the instinctual demands of the id on others but these demands cannot be, and for the sake of development, must not be fulfilled. Thus the logic of the pop-psychology observation that the incessant demands of children for impermissible objects (‘may I have a fourth helping of dessert’) or meanings that culminate in ungroundable authoritative pronouncements (the game of asking a never-ending ‘whys’) are less about satisfaction of a request than the identity producing effects of the distanciating parental ‘no’. In ‘The Question of Lay Analysis’, Freud argues: If … demands meet with no satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise … At that point … the ego begins to function. If all the driving force that sets the vehicle in motion is derived from the id, the ego … undertakes the steering, without which no goal can be reached. The instincts in the id press for immediate satisfaction at all costs, and in that way they achieve nothing or even bring about appreciable damage. It is the task of the ego to guard against such mishaps, to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world. (Freud 1986, p. 22) Later works move this theory from the narrow bounds of the parent/child relationship to a broader social relationship which was continually constituting and shaping the function of the ego – this is a theme of works such as Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, as well as Civilization and its Discontents. The latter repeats the same general dynamics of ego formation as ‘The Question of Lay Analysis’, but moves the question beyond individual development towards the entirety of social relations. For Freud, the inevitability of conflicts between an individual and the social whole is simply one of the facts of life among other people. Life with others inevitably produces blockages in the individual's attempts to fulfil certain desires – some demands for the fulfilment of desires must be frustrated. This blockage produces feelings of guilt, which in turn are sublimated as a general social morality. Here frustration of demand is both productive in that it authorizes social moral codes, and civilization as mode of functioning, though it does so at the cost of imposing a constitutively contested relationship with social mores (Freud 1989). Though there are many places to begin thinking the Freudian demand in Lacan, one of the best places to start is an almost accidental Lacanian rumination on demands. Confronted by student calls to join the movement of 1968 Lacan famously quipped: ‘as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!’ Framing the meaning of his response requires a treatment of Lacan's theory of the demand and its relationship to hysteria as an enabling and constraining political subject position. Lacan's theory of the demand picks up at Freud's movement outward from the paradigmatic relationships between the parent/child and individual/civilization towards a more general account of the subjects, sociality and signification. The infrastructure supporting this theoretical movement transposes Freud's comparatively natural and genetic account of development to a set of metaphors for dealing with the subject's entry into signification. Lacan's goal is to rearticulate Freudian development processes as metaphors for a theory of the subject's production within signification. In Lacanian terms, what is at stake in this transposition is a less naturalized account of the subject by privileging supplementary practices of enjoyment that give a subject coherence as an agent, not in the sense of an ultimate ontological grounding, but rather as a mode of enjoying the repetition of retroactive totalities that name and produce subjects. This process is most famously worked out in Lacan's famous ‘Mirror Stage’ which details the trauma of the subject's insertion into the symbolic order, and the way that this constitutive dislocation generates the jouissance that sustains the production of subjectivity (Lacan 1982a). Looking in the mirror, Lacan's hypothetical infant does not yet have a concept of a unified self, puzzled by the fact that when it moves the image of the child in the mirror also moves. From the child in the mirror, Lacan infers the existence of two ‘I's underwriting processes of subjectivization: an ‘ideal I’, a statuesque projection of what it means to be an ‘I’ (in this case the image of the child) and a phenomenological experience of ‘I-ness’. Lacan treats the dialectic of misidentification in the mirror as a constant and constitutive performance of subjectivity as opposed to a specific developmental stage (Wilden 1982). In this interpretation, the child in the mirror stage is a metaphor for the constant production of the subject as a performance of the self in relation to a constitutive gap between the Symbolic and the subject, and the articulation of subjectivity as a category serves to repress the trauma produced in the margin between a nascent subject, its alienation from a projected external identity, and within the structure of signification. The paradoxical effect of this mode of subject formation is that not only does the child ‘discover’ that she is the child in the mirror, it also experiences a disorienting distance between itself and its image. Despite this fact, the child requires the an external image such as the one in the mirror to impose a kind of unity on its experience – the image of the other child provides an imaginary framing, a retroactive totality or a kind of narrative about what it means to be a self. The paradox of subjectivity lies in the simultaneity of identifying with an image of one's self that is given by a specific location within the symbolic order and the simultaneous alienation produced by the image's externality. Thus, the assumption of a frame for identity cannot ever completely effective, or, a subject is never completely comfortable inhabiting subjectivity – there is always an impossible gap between an experience of alienated subjectivity, a prefigured given image of one's subjectivity and the experience of being produced by the Symbolic. There is a famous Lacanian aphorism that holds that ‘the signifier represents a subject for another signifier’ (Lacan 1977, p. 142). This formulation of the subject's relation to language inverts the conventional wisdom that ontologically pre-given subjects use language as an instrument to communicate their subjective intentions. Signifiers are constituted by their difference, and subjects come into being in negotiating their entry into this realm of difference. Instead of articulating subjective states through language, subjects are articulated through language, within the differential space of signification. The paradoxical implication of this reversal is that the subject is simultaneously produced and disfigured by its unavoidable insertion into the space of the Symbolic. The mirror stage marks the excess of the demand as a mode of subject formation. Subjects assume the identity as subjects as a way of accommodating to the demand placed on them by the symbolic, and as a node for producing demands on the symbolic, or, of being recognized as a subject (Lacan 1982a, p. 4). Here jouissance is nothing more than the useless enjoyment of one's own subjectivity, surplus produced in negotiating a difficult gap between the phenomenological and ideal ‘I's, produced by a failure in relation between Lacan's phenomenological I and the Symbolic. Both the site of subject production and the site where this subject fills out an identity by investing in equivalential linkages and common demands are sites of enjoyment. In this sense, perhaps there is an excess of jouissance that remains even after the reduction of jouissance to hegemony. This remainder may even be logically prior to hegemony, in that it is a useless but ritually repeated retroactive act of naming the self that produces the conditions of possibility for investment, the defining point for Laclau's reduction of jouissance to hegemony. This specific site of excess, where the subject negotiates the terms on a non-relationship with the symbolic is the primary site splitting need, demand and desire. Need approximates the position of the Freudian id, in that it is a precursor to demand. Demand is the filtering of the need through signification, but as Sheridan notes ‘there is no adequation between need and demand’ (Sheridan 1982). The same type of split that inheres in the Freudian demand inheres in the Lacanian demand, though in this case the split does not derive from the empirical impossibility of fulfilling demands as much as it stems from the impossibility of ever fully articulating needs to or receiving a satisfactory response from the Other. Since there is no adequation, the specificity of the demand becomes less relevant than the structural fact that demand presupposes the ability of the addressee to fulfil the demand. This impossibility points to the paradoxical nature of demand: namely that the demand is less a way of addressing need than a call for love and recognition by this other. ‘In this way’, writes Lacan, ‘demand annuls (aufheht) the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced (sich erniedrigt) to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love’ (Lacan 1982b, p. 286). The difficulty is that the Other cannot, by definition, ever give this gift: the starting presupposition of the mirror stage is the constitutive impossibility of comfortably inhabiting the symbolic – the mirror stage marks the constitutive split between the subject and the Symbolic. This paradoxical split, namely the structural impossibility of fulfilling demands, resonates with the logic of the Freudian demand in that the frustration of demand produces the articulation of desire. Thus, Lacan argues that ‘desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second’ (Lacan 1982b, p. 287). How might this subtraction occur? The answer to this question requires an account of the Other as seemingly omnipotent, and as simultaneously unable to fulfil demands. This sentiment animates the crucial Lacanian claim for the impossibility of the other giving a gift which it does not have, namely the gift of love: It will seem odd, no doubt, that in opening up the immeasurable space that all demand implies, namely, that of being a request for love …. Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need: this margin being that which is opened up by demand, the appeal of which can be unconditional only in regards to the Other … having no universal satisfaction … It is this whim that introduces the phantom of omnipotence, not of the subject, but of the other in which his demand is installed. (Lacan 1982c, p. 311) Transposed to the realm of political demands, this framing of demand reverses the classically liberal presupposition regarding demand and agency. In the classical iteration and contemporary critical theories that inherit its spirit, there is a presupposition that a demand is a way of exerting agency, and that the more firmly that the demand is lodged, the greater the production of an agential effect. The Lacanian framing of the demand sees the relationship as exactly the opposite: the more firmly one lodges a demand the more desperately one clings to the legitimate ability of an institution to fulfil it. Thus, demands ought to reach a kind of breaking point where the inability of an institution or order to proffer a response should produce a re-evaluation of the economy of demand and desire. In analytic terms, this is the moment of subtraction, where the manifest content of the demand is stripped away and the desire that underwrites it is laid bare.

## Case

### Underview

1] u get 1ar theory but it’s dta and neg reasonability – no infinite abuse bc 7 min 1nc and getting more efficient and faster solves skew

2] Text: The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best proves the desirability of the resolution by comparing the world of the affirmative to the world of the negative. To clarify, it’s comparative worlds.

Prefer:

[1] Ground – Truth testing forecloses core neg ground like counterplans and K alts bc they don’t prove the resolution false but say something else is better which kills fairness and puts affs permanently ahead.

[2] Hijack – Truth testing collapses – we can only determine the truth or falsity of something by comparing the world in which it’s true to a world in which it’s false

[3] Advocacy Skills – Comparative worlds forces advocating for real world advocacies which increases policy education. Tons of messed up things we can’t fix without advocating for something - comes first – only terminal impact in debate.

[4] Weighability – Can’t compare between multiple NIBs and aprioris – means only comparative worlds allows ways for the judge to make a decision.

AT: Jurisdiction

[1] Definitions –

[a] affirm - to ratify and accept a voidable transaction ie the resolution– outweighs your definitions – it’s a legal definition which o/w on scope – the resolution poses a question about legislative action that States should take

https://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm

[b] negate - Negate means to make ineffective or invalid; to deny the truth or existence of something. For example, by failing to meet the required funding, the plans for construction were negated. – Proves that negate in context means to deny the existence of an action – ie to defend a world without that action which proves comparative worlds.

https://definitions.uslegal.com/n/negate/

group a& C

[1] Proves the hijack – we have to compare different ROBs to determine which one is best or ‘most true’

[2] infinitely regressive – takes out resolvability – we can’t determine what is most true bc by saying something is a good moral obligation proves that it’s true which means there can be conflicting ‘good’ moral obligations which freezes action

Presumption negates unless 2nr goes for alt advocacy also no risk bc always risk of offense

### Framing

1] ideal theory fails – can’t account for material realities bc it presumes an ideal world which makes tackling oppression impossible – o/w bc it controls the internal link to the validity of the framework

2] Weiss justifies extinction first bc we have an obligation to care for future generations and proves warming o/w an aff impact

3] space colonization would be good bc it expands access to global commons for all people

4] requires consequences – only way to know you’re in accordance with Lockean proviso is on the consequences of ur actions

5] Recognizing contracts freezes action – infinite contracts to recognize, so u cant verify if someone is always adhering

6] util hijacks – only reason it matters is because it is pleasureful to us to abide by the proviso

7] appropriation is good bc the resources belong to everyone means that everyone can have access to it

### Contention

Locke Negates –

#### Acquisition of property can never be unjust – to create rights violations, there must already be an owner of the property being violated, but that presupposes its appropriation by another entity.

Feser 1, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition. This is, to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I contradict not only Nozick’s critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible for there to be injustices in acquisition, whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive taxation for the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side. Rather than attempt —unsatisfactorily, in the view of his critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no such challenge to be met in the first place. Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intu- itions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acqui- sition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previ- ous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our under- standing of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification. II. The Basic Argument The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisi- tion of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

#### To own yourself and use your own freedom is to be able to interact with external objects. Anything else makes you unable to exercise your own freedom on other things and creates a contradiction.

Feser 2, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is. An alternative, soft-line approach could acknowledge that the initial acquirer who abuses a monopoly over a water hole (or any similar crucial resource) does commit an injustice against those who are disad- vantaged, but such an approach could still hold that the acquirer never- theless has not committed an injustice in acquisition —his acquisition was, as I have said, neither just nor unjust. Nor does he fail to own what he has acquired; he still cannot be said to have stolen the water from anyone. Rather, his injustice is an unjust use of what he owns, on a par with the unjust use I make of my self-owned fist when I wield it, unprovoked, to bop you on your self-owned nose. In what sense does the water-hole owner use his water unjustly, though? He doesn’t try to drown anyone in it, after all— indeed, the whole problem is that he won’t let anybody near it! Eric Mack gives us the answer we need in what he has put forward as the “self-ownership proviso” (SOP).28 This is a proviso not (as the Lock- ean proviso is) on the initial acquisition of property, but rather on how one can use his property in a way that respects others’ self-ownership rights. It is motivated by consideration of the fact that the talents, abilities, capac- ities, energies, etc., that a person rightfully possesses as a self-owner are inherently “world-interactive”; that is, it is of their very essence that they are directed toward the extra-personal environment.29 Your capacity to use your hand, for instance, is just a capacity to grasp and manipulate external objects; thus, what you own in owning your hand is something essentially grasping and manipulating.30 Now if someone were to cut off your hand or invasively keep you from using it (by tying your arm against your body or holding it behind your back), he would obviously be violating your self-ownership rights. But there are, Mack suggests, other, noninvasive ways in which those rights might be violated. If, to use an example of Mack’s, I effectively nullify your ability to use your hand by creating a device that causes anything you reach for to be propelled beyond your grasp, making it impossible for you ever to grasp or manip- ulate anything, I have violated your right to your hand as much as if I had cut it off or tied it down. I have, in any case, prevented your right to your hand from being anything more than a formal right, one that is practically useless. In the interests of guaranteeing respect for substantive, robust rights of self-ownership, then, “[t]he SOP requires that persons not deploy their legitimate holdings, i.e., their extra-personal property, in ways that severely, albeit noninvasively, disable any person’s world-interactive powers.” 31 The SOP follows, in Mack’s view, from the thesis of self-ownership itself; or, at any rate, the considerations that would lead anyone to accept that thesis should also, in his view, lead one to accept the proviso.32 A brief summary of a few of Mack’s thought experiments should suffice to give a sense of why this is so.33 In what Mack calls the Adam’s Island example, Adam acquires a previously uninhabited island and later refuses a shipwrecked Zelda permission to come ashore, as a result of which she remains struggling at sea (and presumably drowns). In the Paternalist Caging example, instead of drowning, Zelda becomes caught offshore in a cage Adam has constructed for catching large sea mammals, and, rather than releasing her, Adam keeps her in the cage and feeds her regularly. In the Knuckle-Scraper Barrier example, Zelda falls asleep on some unowned ground, whereupon a gang of oafish louts encircles her and, using their bodies and arms as barriers, refuses to let her out of the circle (accusing her of assault if she touches them in order to climb over or break through). In the Disabling Property Barrier example, instead of a human barrier, Adam constructs a plastic shield over and around the unowned plot of ground upon which Zelda sleeps, accusing her of trespassing upon his property when she awakens and tries to escape by breaking through the plastic. And in the (similarly named) Disabling Property Barriers example, seem to suggest an Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of natural function, and though this by no means troubles me, it might not be what Mack himself has in mind (nor, of course, is it something every philosopher is going to sympathize with). Mack’s view nevertheless seems to require something like this conception. And something like it —enough like it to do the job Mack needs to be done, anyway—is arguably to be found in Larry Wright’s well- known reconstruction, in modern Darwinian terms, of the traditional notion of natural function. See Larry Wright, “Functions,” Philosophical Review 82, no. 2 (1973): 139–68. Adam, instead of enclosing Zelda in a plastic barrier, encloses in plastic barriers every external object that Zelda would otherwise be able to use — thus, in effect, enclosing her in a larger, all-encompassing plastic barrier of a more eccentric shape. In all of these cases, Mack says, although Zelda’s formal rights of self-ownership have not been violated—no one has invaded the area enclosed by the surface of her skin —her rights over her self-owned powers, and in particular her ability to exercise those powers, have nevertheless been nullified. But a plausible self-ownership- based theory surely cannot allow for this. It cannot, for instance, allow the innocent Zelda justly to be imprisoned in any of the ways described! If Mack is right, then it seems we have, in the SOP, grounds for holding that a water-hole monopolist would indeed be committing an injustice against anyone he refuses water to, or to whom he charges exorbitant prices for access. The injustice would be a straightforward violation of a person’s rights to self-ownership, a case of nullifying a person’s self- owned powers in a way analogous to Adam’s or the knuckle-scrapers’ nullification of Zelda’s self-owned powers. It would not be an injustice in initial acquisition, however. The water-hole monopolist still owns the water hole as much as he ever did; he just cannot use it in a way that violates other individuals’ self-ownership rights (either by drowning them in it or by nullifying their self-owned powers by denying them access to it when there is no alternative way for them to gain access to the water necessary for the use of their self-owned powers). Is Mack right? The hard-liner might dig in his heels and insist that none of Mack’s examples amount to self-ownership-violating injustices; instead, they are merely subtle but straightforward property rights violations or cases of moral failings of various other sorts (cruelty, selfishness, etc.). The Adam’s Island case, for starters, is roughly analogous to the example of the water-hole monopolist, so that it arguably cannot give any non-question- begging support to the SOP, if the SOP is then supposed to show that the water-hole example involves an injustice. The Disabling Property Barriers case might also be viewed as unable to provide any non-question-begging support, since Adam’s encasing everything in plastic might plausibly be interpreted as his acquiring everything, in which case we are back to a water-hole-type monopoly example. The Knuckle-Scraper Barrier and Dis- abling Property Barrier examples might be explained by saying that in falling asleep on the unowned plot of land, Zelda in effect has come (at least temporarily) to acquire it, and (by virtue of walking) to acquire also the path she took to get to it, so that the knuckle-scrapers and Adam violate her property rights (not her self-ownership rights) in not allowing her to escape. The Paternalist Caging example can perhaps be explained by arguing that in building the cage, Adam has acquired the water route leading to it, so that in swimming this route (and thus getting caught in the cage) Zelda has violated his property rights and, therefore, can justly be caged. Accordingly, the hard-liner might insist, we can explain all of these examples in a hard-line way and thus avoid commitment to the SOP. Such a hard-line response would be ingenious (well, maybe), but still, I think, ultimately doomed to failure. Can the Paternalist Caging example, to start with, plausibly be explained away in the manner that I have suggested? Does Adam commit no injustice against Zelda even if he never lets her out? It will not do to write this off merely as a case of excessive punishment (explaining the injustice of which would presumably not require commitment to the SOP). For suppose Adam says, after a mere five minutes of confinement, “I’m no longer punishing you; you’ve paid your debt and are free to go, as far as I’m concerned. But I’m not going to bother exerting the effort to let you out. I never forced you to get in the cage, after all —you did it on your own —and you have no right to the use of my self-owned cage-opening powers to fix your mistake! So teleport out, if you can. Or get someone else —if you can find someone —to let you out.” Adam would be neither violating Zelda’s rights to external property nor excessively punishing her in this case; nor would he be invasively vio- lating her self-ownership rights. But wouldn’t he still be committing an injustice, however noninvasively? Don’t we need something like the SOP to explain why this is so? The barrier examples, for their part, do not require Zelda’s walking and falling asleep on virgin territory, which thus (arguably) becomes her prop- erty. We can, to appeal to the sort of science-fiction scenario beloved of philosophers, imagine instead a bizarre chance disruption of the structure of space-time that teleports Zelda into Adam’s plastic shell or into the midst of the knuckle-scrapers. There is no question now of their violating her property rights; yet don’t they still commit an injustice by nullifying her self-owned powers in refusing to allow her to exit? Consider a parallel example concerning property ownership itself. If your prized $50,000 copy of Captain America Comics number 1, due to another rupture in space-time or just to a particularly strong wind that blows it out of your hands and through my window, suddenly appears on the floor of my living room, do I have the right to refuse to bring it back out to you or to allow you to come in and get it? Suppose I attempt to justify my refusal by saying, “I won’t touch it, and you’re free to have it back if you can arrange another space-time rupture or gust of wind. But I refuse to exert my self-owned powers to bring it out to you, or to allow you on my property to get it. I never asked for it to appear in my living room, after all!” Would anyone accept this justification? Doesn’t your property right in the comic book require me to give it back to you? The hard-liner might suggest that this example transports the SOP advocate out of the frying pan and into the fire. For if the SOP is true, wouldn’t we also have to commit ourselves to a “property-ownership proviso” (POP) that requires us not to nullify anyone’s ability to use his external private property in a way consistent with its “world-interactive powers”? If I build a miniature submarine in my garage, and you have the only swimming pool within one thousand miles, must you allow me the use of your pool lest you nullify my ability to use the sub? If (to take an example of Cohen’s cited by Mack) I own a corkscrew, must I be provided with wine bottles to open lest the corkscrew sadly fail to fulfill its full potential?34 Mack’s response to this line of thought seems basically to amount to a bit of backpedaling on the claim that his proviso really follows from the notion of self-ownership per se —so as to avoid the conclusion that a (rather unlibertarian and presumably redistributionist) POP would also, in par- allel fashion, follow from the concept of property ownership. His response seems, instead, to emphasize the idea that the considerations favoring self-ownership also favor, via an independent line of reasoning, the SOP.35 In my view, however, a better response would be one that took note of some relevant disanalogies between property in oneself and property in external things. Note first that the self-owned world-interactive powers, the possible use of which the SOP is intended to guarantee, are possessed by a living being who is undergoing development, which involves passing through various stages; therefore, these powers are ones that flourish with use and atrophy or even disappear with disuse.36 To nullify these powers even for a limited time, then, is (very often at least) not merely temporarily to inconvenience their owner, but, rather, to bring about a permanent reduc- tion or even disablement of these powers. By contrast, a submarine (or a corkscrew) retains its powers even when left indefinitely in a garage (or a drawer). This difference in the effect that nullification has on self-owned powers versus extra-personal property plausibly justifies a difference in our judgments concerning the acceptability, from the point of view of justice, of such nullification in the two cases; that is, it justifies adoption of the SOP but not of the POP.37 Second, there is an element of choice (and in particular, of voluntary acquisition) where extra-personal property is concerned that is morally relevant here. One’s self-owned powers, along with the SOP-guaranteed right to the non-nullification of those powers, are not something one chooses or acquires; one just has them —indeed, to a great degree one just is the constellation of those powers, abilities, etc.—and owns them fully. By contrast, extra-personal property is something one chooses to acquire or not to acquire, and as we have seen, one always acquires property rights in various degrees, from partial to full ownership—and this would include the rights guaranteed by a POP. If one chooses to acquire a corkscrew under conditions where wine bottles are unavailable, or are even likely at some point to become unavailable, one can hardly blame others if one finds oneself bottle-less. To fail to acquire POP-like rights regarding the corkscrew (by, say, contracting with someone else to provide one with wine bottles in perpetuity) is not the same thing as to have those rights and then have them violated. Someone who buys a corkscrew and then finds that he cannot use it is like the person who acquires only partial property rights in a water hole that others have already acquired partial use rights over. He cannot complain that his co-owners have violated his rights; he never acquired those other rights in the first place. Similarly, the corkscrew owner cannot complain that he has no bottles to open; he never acquired the right to those bottles, only to the corkscrew. If full ownership of a corkscrew requires POP-like rights over it, then all that follows is that corkscrew owners who lack bottles are not full owners of their corkscrews.

#### Thus, self-ownership justifies the appropriation of property – our freedom necessitates being able to set and pursue external things as our ends, including exercising our rights on property. Restricting this arbitrarily limits our freedom which is unjust.

Feser 3, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

V. Some Implications If what I have argued so far is correct, then the way is opened to the following revised case for strongly libertarian Lockean-Nozickian prop-erty rights: We are self-owners, having full property rights to our body parts, powers, talents, energies, etc. As self-owners, we also have a right, given the SOP, not to have our self-owned powers nullified —we have the right, that is, to act within the extra-personal world and thus to acquire rights to extra-personal objects that the use of our self-owned powers requires.39 This might involve the buying or leasing of certain rights or bundles of rights and, correspondingly, the acquiring of lesser or greater degrees of ownership of parts of the external world, but as long as one is able to exercise one’s powers to some degree and is not rendered incapable of acting within that world, the SOP is satisfied. In any case, such rights can only be traded after they are first established by initial acquisition. In initially acquiring a resource, an agent does no one an injustice (it was unowned, after all). Furthermore, [they] has mixed [their] labor with the resource, significantly altering it and/or bringing it under his control, and is himself solely responsible for whatever value or utility the resource has come to have. Thus, [they] has a presumptive right to it, and, if his control and/or alteration (and thus acquisition) of it is (more or less) complete, his own- ership is accordingly (more or less) full. The system of strong private property rights that follows from the acts of initial acquisition performed by countless such agents results, as a matter of empirical fact, in a market economy that inevitably and dramatically increases the number of resources available for use by individuals, and these benefited individuals include those who come along long after initial acquisition has taken place. (Indeed, it especially includes these latecomers, given that they were able to avoid the hard work of being the first to “tame the land” and draw out the value of raw materials.)40 The SOP is thus, in fact, rarely, if ever, violated. The upshot is that a system of Lockean-Nozickian private property rights is morally justified, with a strong presumption against tampering with exist- ing property titles in general. In any case, there is a strong presumption against any general egalitarian redistribution of wealth, and no case what- soever to be made for such redistribution from the general theory of prop- erty just sketched, purged as it is of the Lockean proviso, with all the egalitarian mischief-making the proviso has made possible.

#### Space colonization is good and possible – new developing tech and adaptation solves civil war, extinction, civilization collapse, and exploration defense doesn’t apply. Independently proves that space expansion means that we can reach it eventually even if not now bc tehc is developing.

Kennedy ’19 [Fred, “To Colonize Space Or Not To Colonize: That Is The Question (For All Of Us)”, 12-18-2019, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/fredkennedy/2019/12/18/to-colonize-or-not-to-colonize--that-is-the-question-for-all-of-us/?sh=65a8d2702367]//pranav

It’s important to distinguish between colonize and explore. Exploration already enjoys broad approval here in America. In June, 77% of U.S. respondents told Gallup pollsters that NASA’s budget should either be maintained or increased – undeniable evidence of support for the American space program (as it’s currently constituted). By any measure, we’ve done an admirable job of surveying the solar system over the past 60 years – an essential first step in any comprehensive program of exploration. Unmanned probes developed and launched by the United States and the Soviet Union conducted flybys of the Moon and the terrestrial planets not long after we reached Earth orbit, and since then, we’ve flown by the outer planets. Multiple nations have placed increasingly sophisticated robotic emissaries on the surfaces of the Moon, Mars, Venus and Saturn’s largest moon, Titan. Most stunningly, in a tour de force of technology and Cold War chutzpah, the U.S. dispatched humans to set foot on another world, just 50 years and a few months ago. But after only six such visits, we never returned. Moon habitats in lava tubes, crops under glass domes, ice mining at the south pole? No. NASA’s Artemis program may place a man and a woman on the Moon again in 2024. But that’s hardly colonization. For perspective, let’s look closer to home. Sailors from an American vessel may have landed on Antarctica as early as 1821 – the claim is unverified – but no scientific expeditions “wintered” there for another 75 years. The first two of these, one Belgian and one British, endured extreme cold and privation – one inadvertently, the other by design. And yet, 200 years after the first explorer set foot on the continent, there are no permanent settlements (partially as a result of a political consensus reached in the late 1950s, but in no small part due to the difficulty of extracting resources such as ore or fossil fuels through kilometers of ice). Less than 5,000 international researchers and support staff comprise the “summer population” at the bottom of the world. That number dwindles to just 1,100 during the harsh Antarctic winter, requiring millions of tons of supplies and fuel to be delivered every year – none of which can be produced locally. To suggest that Antarctica is colonized would be far overstating the sustainability of human presence there. If Antarctica is hard, the Moon, Mars, asteroids, and interplanetary space will be punishingly difficult. Writing in Gizmodo this past July, George Dvorsky describes the challenges to a human colony posed by low gravity, radiation, lack of air and water, and the psychological effects of long-term confinement and isolation inside artificial structures, in space or on planetary surfaces. Add to this the economic uncertainties of such a venture – where the modern analog of a Dutch or British East India Company would face enormous skepticism from investors regarding the profitability of shipping any good or finished product between colonial ports of call – and it becomes clear why nation states and mega-corporations alike have so far resisted the temptation to set up camp beyond geosynchronous orbit. Perhaps, many argue, we should focus our limited resources on unresolved problems here at home? Yet a wave of interest in pursuing solar system colonization is building, whether its initial focus is the Moon, Mars, or O’Neill-style space habitats. Jeff Bezos has argued eloquently for moving heavy industry off the home planet, preserving Earth as a nature reserve, and building the space-based infrastructure that will lower barriers and create opportunities for vast economic and cultural growth (similar to how the Internet and a revolution in microelectronics has allowed Amazon and numerous other companies to achieve spectacular wealth). Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking both suggested the need for a “hedge” population of humans on Mars to allow human civilization to reboot itself in the event of a catastrophe on Earth – an eggs-in-several-baskets approach which actually complements the arguments made by Bezos. And while both are valid reasons for pursuing colonization, there’s a stronger, overarching rationale that clinches it. I’ll assert that a fundamental truth – repeatedly borne out by history – is that expanding, outwardly-focused civilizations are far less likely to turn on themselves, and far more likely to expend their fecundity on growing habitations, conducting important research and creating wealth for their citizens. A civilization that turns away from discovery and growth stagnates – a point made by NASA’s Chief Historian Steven Dick as well as Mars exploration advocate Robert Zubrin. As a species, we have yet to resolve problems of extreme political polarization (both internal to nation states as well as among them), inequalities in wealth distribution, deficiencies in civil liberties, environmental depredations and war. Forgoing opportunities to expand our presence into the cosmos to achieve better outcomes here at home hasn’t eliminated these scourges. What’s more, the “cabin fever” often decried by opponents of colonization (when applied to small, isolated outposts far from Earth) turns out to be a potential problem for our own planet. Without a relief valve for ideological pilgrims or staunch individualists who might just prefer to be on their own despite the inevitable hardships, we may well run the risk of exacerbating the polarization and internecine strife we strive so hard to quell. Focusing humanity’s attention and imagination on a grand project may well give us the running room we need to address these problems. But the decision cannot be made by one country, or one company, or one segment of the human population. If we do this, it will of necessity be a truly international endeavor, a cross-sector endeavor (with all commercial, civil, and defense interests engaged and cooperating). The good news: Critical technologies such as propulsion and power generation systems will improve over time. Transit durations between celestial destinations will shorten (in the same way sailing vessels gave way to steam ships and then to airliners and perhaps, one day, to point-to-point ballistic reusable rockets). Methods for obtaining critical resources on other planets will be refined and enhanced. Genetic engineering may be used to better adapt humans, their crops and other biota to life in space or on other planetary surfaces – to withstand the effects of low or micro-gravity, radiation, and the psychological effects of long-duration spaceflight.

#### Deliberate asteroid attack is impossible and nukes are more likely, but settlement solves their impact.

Globus ’20 [Al, co-founded the NASA Ames Space Settlement Contest for 6-12th grade students. 6-12th grade students. He also co-founded the NASA Ames Nanotechnology Group, which, at first, worked on materials for space elevators and diamondoid machine phase matter to build $50,000 personal spacecraft. He has designed three orbital space settlements (Lewis One, Kalpana One, and Kalpana Two) and published over 45 papers in technical conferences and journals, won a Feynman Prize in Nanotechnology, a NASA Software of the Year award, and a NASA Public Service Medal. He has discussed space colonization and nanotechnology on the History Channel, Danish radio, a French magazine, on a European Commission video, and elsewhere. He is co-author of the book The High Frontier: An Easier Way, “Not so dark skies”, 07-13-2020, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3985/1]//pranav

Deliberate asteroid attack (Natural Threat Amplification)

Argument: a sufficiently large asteroid impacting Earth can exterminate homo sapiens; indeed many species have been destroyed this way. It is possible to build a surveillance system to track dangerous asteroids and develop means to deflect them. However, this very system could be used to deliberately target Earth and this may be a more extensive threat than untampered asteroids.

Counter-arguments and counter-counter arguments:

Without intervention, multiple major Earth strikes by large asteroids are certain, although the timing is unknown. Space settlement or no, we must find and monitor existing asteroids and develop deflection technology sufficient to make asteroids miss Earth.

Targeting Earth is much more difficult than making an asteroid miss Earth. Hitting Earth requires a much greater ability to manipulate and predict trajectories accurately. Missing Earth given an on-target asteroid only requires the asteroid to be delayed or advanced by a few minutes. Hitting Earth requires accurate prediction of thrust added to the asteroid, which is dependent on composition, and understanding the non-Newtonian effects (e.g., light pressure) for the time between thrust and collision.

However, given time and a vigorous asteroid mining industry that deliberately deflects asteroids routinely, targeting asteroids will someday be practical.

It is likely that the mining will be done by a factory that goes to the asteroid, and only refined products sent to Earth or elsewhere. Thus, the ability to accurately retarget asteroids will likely not get a boost from mining.

Any reasonable program to protect Earth from asteroids will track and predict the future motion of all the large asteroids, and many of the smaller ones, coming near Earth’s orbit. Thus, tampering with the natural trajectory of a dangerous asteroid will likely be detected long before it is an imminent threat, providing time for deflection.

A trusted but rogue element (i.e., a spy) inside the tracking organization may be able to cover up the new trajectory and true location of the asteroid until it is too late.

A potential solution is multiple redundant tracking operations such that penetration of all of them by rogue elements is extremely unlikely.

Asteroids are inferior weapons.

Aiming at the desired target at any particular time is often impossible. Asteroids travel in predictable orbits and are only a threat to settlements near that trajectory. There may not be an opportunity to hit a particular target with a large asteroid for hundreds of years or more.

Time constraints make a coordinated attack by multiple asteroids all but impossible to design much less execute.

Aiming to hit something as small as Earth is difficult, much harder than trying to miss Earth. Small perturbations can cause an asteroid to miss Earth entirely, whereas small perturbations do not matter much when trying to miss Earth.

Changing the trajectory of large asteroids is difficult. The velocities and masses are huge. Trajectory change must often be done years or even decades in advance to hit the target.

When attacking orbital settlements the target can, at least in principle, maneuver, making the difficult task of hitting the target much harder.

Nuclear weapons are smaller, easier to precisely maneuver, and much easier to hide than asteroids. Consider that, unlike asteroids, nuclear weapon locations won’t be in a solar-system-wide database. Nuclear weapons are far easier to use for surgical attacks that are not intended to exterminate humanity. They are also suitable for whole-planet destruction by designing the attack to create a nuclear winter. Given the superiority of nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that a deliberate asteroid attack will be attempted much less be successful.

Comparison with no space settlement: Space settlement or not, we would be fools indeed not to find, track, and deflect asteroids headed towards Earth. However, without settlement it will be more difficult to accomplish this. Without space settlement, our in-space industrial capabilities will be less advanced

, and removing the threat entirely by dismantling the appropriately asteroids and selling the materials will not be an option. The asteroid threat will continue more or less forever and vigilance will be easier to maintain if settlements dot the solar system. Finally, once a large number of space settlements are independent of Earth, a successful asteroid attack on Earth would not exterminate humanity.