# 1NC

## 1

Interpretation: The affirmative must only deem the appropriation of outer space by private entities unjust.

Violation: they defend a broad rejection of the structures that support settler colonialism - cx

Vote Neg - :

A] Jurisdiction -- the aff is extra T since it doesn’t affirm the resolution. At worst they lose on substance since they don’t win the debate, if you are not debating the rez, you are not following the pre-set resolution burden meaning the judge cannot vote aff since there was literally not an aff.

B] Limits -- There are infinite planks you can add to your advocacy text and infinite permutations of them which explodes the topic – I have to prep against infinite affs individually which massively skews engagement as you have infinite prep time to frontline your one aff whereas I won’t be prepared for yours. Limits key to fairness and education by ensuring a manageable prep burden to engage the aff.

C] Ground -- Solvency deficit is core neg ground, your interp allows you to just steal solvency out of thin air – functionally utopian fiat. For example, if I want to say that aff can’t solve since complete elimination isn’t realistic you just fiat that away instead of debating me, controls the internal link to clash.

D] TVA – defend space appropriation being unjust because it’s a form of settler desire to conquer other lands.

E] Competing Interps:

1] T is a binary – you’re either topical or ur not

2] collapses – debate ab a specified briteline

## 2

**The 1AC’s project of recognition only brings the suffering of others into the round so that they can profit from the ballot. This the same logic that created their impacts in the first place and serve to completely erase the fact that all of us are complicit within mass systems of death.**

**Abbas 10** /Asma, Professor and Division Head in Social Studies, Political Science, Philosophy at the Liebowitz Center for International Studies at Bard College at Simon’s Rock, Liberalism and Human Suffering: Materialist Reflections on Politics, Ethics, and Aesthetics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. Pg. 2-5 2010

This book is haunted by this murder—murder that is not merely the end of life but the giving up of living suffering to dead suffering. In Bachmann’s novel, “Ich”—a self-proclaimed unknown woman— personifies the entwinement of the suffering of speech and the speech of suffering. This weave baffles those schemes of managing human suffering whose arbitrary claims about what suffering is and how it matters in society form the basis of our lives and the **relations that allow us to live**. These schemes determine, rank, and organize the meaning, status, and worth of our hurt—and, then, **grant us the consolations when they “empower” us to represent and express it**. The novel is a chronicle as much of a death foretold—to wit, the “murder” announced at the end—as of death as it is suffered, as it comes to be, dynamic, demanding, exacting, reliant on life and the living. All the woman perhaps seeks is love, one imagines, looking to the men who signify fatal injunctions she receives as stone inscriptions in a dream, “Live and be amazed,” “To write is to be amazed,” and “Kill the Beloved.” In love, she is thwarted by those she desires, unable to inhabit spaces that supposedly promise safety, and even less willing to abandon them, at a loss of affirmations of happiness that affirm only others—for what lies would that take in a world that burns both inside and outside of her? Her “unknownness” is not accidental—it is just a sign that pages upon pages of being with her and her pain will still ironically require the **declaration of murder** to **let the rest of us off the hook**. For the more adventurous of us, yes, there is the mystery: who and what has died? Is the dying over and done with now? But as if the declaration of murder was not closure enough, in yet another gesture of assurance, Bachmann herself dies in exactly the way she writes Ich’s death. Both entwined narratives must be **brought to a close**, or at least be done with, so a story can be told, once and for all. What is the loss signified in this need? What exhaustion of suffering does this clarity of death attest to? What passing of the capacity to suffer are these gratuitous closures mocking? “Ich” may be Vienna itself—who knows?—in search of love and longevity, waiting for life to resurge, **is left capable of very little, not unlike what happens to human beings when wars that annihilate them may be easier to bear than wars waged through them**—these wars that are supposed to **bring them consolation, secure them, and allow them to continue living** through and across death. When this happens, even the universe forgets to keep count of how it was supposed to recalibrate itself for the death of one being; at the same time as modern constitutions, laws, and “human” rights—all assurances, as such, of something—ultimately are permissions to us to let humanity be, not demand too much from it. In opposition to these artifacts of modern politics and the subterfuges they provide for a material engagement with suffering, the novel is composed of half-written letters, incomplete conversations, reverberating phone hang-ups, the rush and blush of desire and rejection, dizzying monologues, italicized prayers, stubborn to-do lists, fragments of poetry, and snapshots of our everyday trials. Also present are figments and ghosts of those with whom both Ich and Bachmann have learnt to live, speak, make sense of words, and give their senses to the world in acts of sacrifice. Such is the artistry of this novel that attempts to redeem and reclaim the human, without ever allowing the aesthetic confusion and assemblage to become merely an artistic device in the hands of a master artificer. The vulnerability is not fragile or self-important, and it is amazing how the story of this woman gets told without the paradoxical misstep of objectifying the character, for even in so much “objective” distance—there are no claims to familiarity, not even names—and in this ultimate act of dispossession, the willing reader will find herself most present, most intimate. Bachmann’s Malina, in its artifice and its tempting of fate, in its trauma and its committed representations, is a homage to life as lived by those who love and who suffer life, its glories, and its indignities.1 Here, the space of the personal and the private would only criminally be separated from all the brutalities and violations that happen in a world where the **culprit and the savior are the same**. This is the familiar world where we are counted on to “feel” the pain of ailing capital and to save it as it rehearses its tricky death routine only to come back alive and stronger. Shockingly, we are much less capable of **seeing ourselves in those who die** everyday as they give up parts of their bodies and beings—their vital living labor—to the deadness that is capital. Any wonder, then, that in the recent economic crisis, capital took the character of an injured victim at the hands of “big government,” “bad people,” “greed,” among other villains, and any resistance to immediately rescuing Wall Street was framed by many as a moral wrong comparable to the cruelty and godlessness of letting a bleeding man die. There are numerous deceits in this story but only one irony: as if capital was not already “dead” labor! Materialist Overtures Might the story of our suffering be similar? That is, it is **on the suffering of the needful subjects of liberalism, imperialism, and colonialism that edifices of society as we know it are built**—edifices that claim their vital health as they reek of dead suffering and extract the labor of our senses. And that, **in then seeking to save these constructions, we commit the gravest inhumanity when we cease to have any senses left for the living suffering**. In every pathos that we **offer up** to liberal society can be found a clue to our lost senses—senses that have lost their way, forgetting where to look, what to look for, how to smell, how the dead call on us, how being tickles, how freedom tastes, what love sounds like, what intimacy suffering allows and asks for, and where a memory enters us. The **limits of the political**, then, are not reliant on **epistemic assessment** **but are** experienced relationally and aesthetically as a question of the **nature of our very being**—the degree to which our senses contest the imposed modes of the **presence and absence of suffering is the degree to which we are political** This claim of mine is rooted in the particular contrivances of time and space with which liberalism and capitalism substantiate their various subjections, something I deal with in detail throughout the book. Perhaps a brief example of the historically specific nature of this picture of the political will suffice here. During and after World War I, a peculiar profession gained some popularity: at the same time as circles of paranormal investigation and séances took off, creative ways of making the dead appear became fruitful occupations. A photographer by the name of William Hope was “considered by believers and supporters to be a true master of the art of producing spirits on ordinary photographic plates.”2 He brought a few photographers together to do this in earnest, creating and trading in “spirit photographs” that depicted the dead cohabiting with the living, capturing on photographic plates what could perhaps be kept from being forgotten. These photos and their very possibility are us, in a way, **picturing the range of life** and living that we deal with everyday, in **no way** quite **comprehended by the instrumental and utilitarian relation to suffering** and death that suffuse a society that **produces death prolifically** (and also opens up the question of the terms on which our labors will relate to this production). This is a first clue to my book’s partiality to the aesthetic—as signifying artistic creation but also perception and sensing on which the artistry is premised—as the locus of a materialist response to various political philosophies that find their power (even in their declared departures from religion) in an unclaimed or declaimed crafting of the character of suffering that then becomes the nonnegotiable truth and currency. There has to be a way out of religion’s primordial claim on the domain of suffering and secular modernity’s mimicry of that move by objectifying and **playing god with it, trading in its lives and deaths**. This would involve a recovery of aesthetics as encompassing the activities of the suffering, hoping, transforming, and creating body. The aesthetic, as a pivot for my recuperated materialism, is a holistic domain of cognition, sensation, and perception—beyond Alexander Baumgarten’s insistence that however bountiful the senses when they dabble in the world, their retrieval remains inferior and supplementary to reason—and of the insertion, fragmentary or wholesome, of our bodies and minds (and permutations thereof) in the world. It follows that suffering can encompass being and becoming to embrace our experience of the extant world and possible other worlds that can be constructed (or not) out of this one.

#### The alternative is not a new mode of politics but a “NO” to the affirmative. This intervention forces subjects to re-evaluate their complicity with tropes of enjoyment. We can endorse the implementation of the 1AC but reject its rhetorical investments – working through specific fantasmic demands is necessary to create a more effective politics.

Lundberg 12 (Christian, Assoc. Prof. of Rhetoric @ UNC, Chapel Hill, “On Being Bound to Equivalential Chains”, *Cultural Studies* 26.2-3)

Laclau's On Populist Reason provides an elegant account of demand as the fundamental unit of the political, and by extension of politics as a field of antagonism. Laclau's basic goal is to define the specificity of populist reason, or, to give an account of populism as ‘special emphasis on a political logic which, is a necessary ingredient of politics tout court’, of ‘Populism, quite simply, as a way of constructing the political’ (Laclau 2005, p. 18). Here, a focus on demands replaces a now prevalent approach focused on various taxonomies of populism (which Laclau diagnoses as hopelessly unsystematic) with a more formal account of the political based on the logic of demands, which in turn provides a way of thinking about the political as the space of demand and politics as a practice of working through specific demands. Demands serve a number of functions that derive from the split between the universal and the particular that Laclau relies upon. Demands articulate a specific political claim at the level of the particular, and also imply a more generalized relationship to hegemony in the register of the universal. On this logic, demands represent the hegemonic order, creating an implicit picture of how it functions and might change. Simultaneously, demands create possible lines of equivalential affinity between others also making demands on the hegemonic order. Thus, the demand is more fundamental than the group, in that the operation of the split demand inaugurates all ‘the various forms of articulation between a logic of difference and a logic of equivalence’ that animate the social affinities that give groups their coherence (Laclau 2005, p. 20). The logic of the demand is in turn the logic of equivalence, and equivalence is as important for how it animates a group identity, as it is in positing claims on a hegemonic order. Although Laclau owes a significant debt to Freud and Lacan, it is not clear that his theory of demand is explicitly crafted from psychoanalytic categories. For example, how central is enjoyment to Laclau's relatively formal account of the demand? As Glynos and Stavrakakis have argued, there is a ‘complete and conspicuous absence in Laclau's work of Lacanian categories such as fantasy, and, perhaps more importantly, jouissance’ (Glynos and Stavrakakis 2006, p. 202). Glynos and Stavrakakis claim that there is ‘to [their] knowledge no reference in Laclau's work to the concept of jouissance’ (Glynos and Stavrakakis 2006, p. 209). On Populist Reason contains a brief discussion of the concept of jouissance as worked out by Copjec, which Laclau summarizes by saying: there is no achievable jouissance except through radical investment in an objet petit a. But the same discovery (not merely an analogous one) is made if we start from the angle of political theory. No social fullness except through hegemony; and hegemony is nothing more than the investment in a partial object, of a fullness which will always evade us. The logic of the objet petit a and the hegemonic logic are not just similar, they are simply identical. (Laclau 2005, p. 109) There is an elegance to Laclau's point about enjoyment, provided that enjoyment is reducible to a set of logical forms. This presupposition makes the lack of talk about jouissance in Laclau's work understandable. If jouissance and hegemony are identical, one does not need Lacan to say something that might be said more elegantly with Gramsci. Jouissance is simply hegemonic investment, an elevation of an object or identity to the level of a thing or a universal. Despite occasional caveats to the contrary, the greatest virtues of Laclau's version of the political stem from his relentlessly persistent application of a formal, almost structural account of the political. And, as is the case with many well executed structuralist accounts, Laclau's system can elegantly incorporate caveats, objections to and oversights in the original system by incorporating them into the functioning of the structure – jouissance can easily be read as nothing more than hegemony in this account without changing the original coordinates of the system too drastically. Yet, enjoyment provides one particularly difficult stumbling block for a dedicated formal account. To start with, enjoyment is never quite as ‘achievable’ as the preceding quotation might suggest. Far from being the consummation of a logic of structure and investment, enjoyment is a supplement to a failing in a structure: for example, Lacan frames jouissance as a useless enjoyment of one's own subjectivity that supplements the fundamental failings of a subject in either finding a grounding or consummating an authoritative account of its coherence. This ‘uselessness’ defines the operation of jouissance. Thus, for example, when Lacan suggests that ‘language is not the speaking subject’ in the Seminar on Feminine Sexuality, lodging a critique of structural linguistics as a law governing speech, jouissance is understood as something excessive that is born of the failure of structures of signification (Lacan 1977). Language is not the speaking subject precisely because what is passed through the grist mill of the speech is the result of a misfiring of structure as much as it is prefigured by logics of structure, meaning and utility. Therefore the interpretive difficulty for a structuralist account of enjoyment: the moment that the fact of enjoyment is recoded in the language of structure, the moment that it is made useful in a logic of subjectivization is precisely the moment where it stops being jouissance. Following Glynos and Stavrakakis's suggestion, one might press the question of the relationship between the demand and jouissance as a way of highlighting the differences that a purely Lacanian reading of demand might make for Laclau's understanding of politics. Framing enjoyment as equivalent with hegemony, Laclau identifies the fundamental ‘split’ in psychoanalytic theory between the universal and the particular demands of a group. Framing the split in this way, and as the privileged site of the political, Laclau occludes attention to another split: namely, the split within a subject, between the one who enters an equivalential relationship and the identitarian claim that sutures this subject into a set of linkages. This too is a site of enjoyment, where a subject identifies with an external image of itself for the sake of providing its practices of subjectivity with a kind of enjoyable retroactive coherence. The demand is relevant here, but not simply because it represents and anticipates a change in the social order or because it identifies a point of commonality. Here the demand is also a demand to be recognized as a subject among other subjects, and given the sanction and love of the symbolic order. The implication of this argument about the nature of enjoyment is that the perverse dialectic of misfirings, failure and surpluses in identity reveals something politically dangerous in not moving beyond demand. Put another way: not all equivalences are equally equivalent. Some equivalences become fetishes, becoming points of identification that eclipse the ostensible political goal of the demand. To extend the line of questioning to its logical conclusion, can we be bound to our equivalential chains? Freud, Lacan and the demand Demand plays a central role in Freud's tripartite scheme for the human psyche specifically in the formation of the ego. Although this scheme does not exercise the same hold over psychoanalytic thinking that it once did, the question of the ego still functions as an important point of departure for psychoanalytic thinking as a representative case of the production of the subject and identity. Even for critics of ‘ego psychology’, the idea of the ego as a representation of the ‘I’ of the human subject is still significant – the main question is what kind of analytical dispositions one takes towards the ego, the contingencies of its emergence and its continuing function. Despite the tendency of some commentators to naturalize Freud's tripartite schema of the human psyche, Freud's account of the ego does not characterize the ego as pre-existent or automatically given. Although present in virtually every human subject, the ego is not inevitably present: the ego is a compensatory formation that arises in the usual course of human development as a subject negotiates the articulation and refusal of its needs as filtered through demand. Hypothetically a ‘subject’ whose every need is fulfilled by another is never quite a subject: this entity would never find occasion to differentiate itself from the other who fulfils its every need. As a mode of individuation and subjectification, egos are economies of frustration and compensation. This economy relies on a split in the Freudian demand, which is both a demand to satiate a specific need and a demand for addressee to provide automatic fulfilment of need generally. The generative power of the demand relies on this split and on fact that some demands will be refused. This economy of need and frustration works because refusal of a specific need articulated as a demand on another is also a refusal of the idea that the addressee of the demand can fulfil all the subject's needs, requiring a set of individuation compensatory economic functions to negotiate the refusal of specific demands. ‘Ego’ is nothing more than the name for the contingent economy of compensatory subjectification driven by the repetition and refusal of demands – the nascent subject presents wants and needs in the form of the demand, but the role of the demand is not the simple fulfilment of these wants and needs. The demand and its refusal are the fulcrum on which the identity and insularity of the subject are produced: an unformed amalgam of needs and articulated demands is transformed into a subject that negotiates the vicissitudes of life with others. Put in the metaphor of developmental psychology, an infant lodges the instinctual demands of the id on others but these demands cannot be, and for the sake of development, must not be fulfilled. Thus the logic of the pop-psychology observation that the incessant demands of children for impermissible objects (‘may I have a fourth helping of dessert’) or meanings that culminate in ungroundable authoritative pronouncements (the game of asking a never-ending ‘whys’) are less about satisfaction of a request than the identity producing effects of the distanciating parental ‘no’. In ‘The Question of Lay Analysis’, Freud argues: If … demands meet with no satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise … At that point … the ego begins to function. If all the driving force that sets the vehicle in motion is derived from the id, the ego … undertakes the steering, without which no goal can be reached. The instincts in the id press for immediate satisfaction at all costs, and in that way they achieve nothing or even bring about appreciable damage. It is the task of the ego to guard against such mishaps, to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world. (Freud 1986, p. 22) Later works move this theory from the narrow bounds of the parent/child relationship to a broader social relationship which was continually constituting and shaping the function of the ego – this is a theme of works such as Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, as well as Civilization and its Discontents. The latter repeats the same general dynamics of ego formation as ‘The Question of Lay Analysis’, but moves the question beyond individual development towards the entirety of social relations. For Freud, the inevitability of conflicts between an individual and the social whole is simply one of the facts of life among other people. Life with others inevitably produces blockages in the individual's attempts to fulfil certain desires – some demands for the fulfilment of desires must be frustrated. This blockage produces feelings of guilt, which in turn are sublimated as a general social morality. Here frustration of demand is both productive in that it authorizes social moral codes, and civilization as mode of functioning, though it does so at the cost of imposing a constitutively contested relationship with social mores (Freud 1989). Though there are many places to begin thinking the Freudian demand in Lacan, one of the best places to start is an almost accidental Lacanian rumination on demands. Confronted by student calls to join the movement of 1968 Lacan famously quipped: ‘as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!’ Framing the meaning of his response requires a treatment of Lacan's theory of the demand and its relationship to hysteria as an enabling and constraining political subject position. Lacan's theory of the demand picks up at Freud's movement outward from the paradigmatic relationships between the parent/child and individual/civilization towards a more general account of the subjects, sociality and signification. The infrastructure supporting this theoretical movement transposes Freud's comparatively natural and genetic account of development to a set of metaphors for dealing with the subject's entry into signification. Lacan's goal is to rearticulate Freudian development processes as metaphors for a theory of the subject's production within signification. In Lacanian terms, what is at stake in this transposition is a less naturalized account of the subject by privileging supplementary practices of enjoyment that give a subject coherence as an agent, not in the sense of an ultimate ontological grounding, but rather as a mode of enjoying the repetition of retroactive totalities that name and produce subjects. This process is most famously worked out in Lacan's famous ‘Mirror Stage’ which details the trauma of the subject's insertion into the symbolic order, and the way that this constitutive dislocation generates the jouissance that sustains the production of subjectivity (Lacan 1982a). Looking in the mirror, Lacan's hypothetical infant does not yet have a concept of a unified self, puzzled by the fact that when it moves the image of the child in the mirror also moves. From the child in the mirror, Lacan infers the existence of two ‘I's underwriting processes of subjectivization: an ‘ideal I’, a statuesque projection of what it means to be an ‘I’ (in this case the image of the child) and a phenomenological experience of ‘I-ness’. Lacan treats the dialectic of misidentification in the mirror as a constant and constitutive performance of subjectivity as opposed to a specific developmental stage (Wilden 1982). In this interpretation, the child in the mirror stage is a metaphor for the constant production of the subject as a performance of the self in relation to a constitutive gap between the Symbolic and the subject, and the articulation of subjectivity as a category serves to repress the trauma produced in the margin between a nascent subject, its alienation from a projected external identity, and within the structure of signification. The paradoxical effect of this mode of subject formation is that not only does the child ‘discover’ that she is the child in the mirror, it also experiences a disorienting distance between itself and its image. Despite this fact, the child requires the an external image such as the one in the mirror to impose a kind of unity on its experience – the image of the other child provides an imaginary framing, a retroactive totality or a kind of narrative about what it means to be a self. The paradox of subjectivity lies in the simultaneity of identifying with an image of one's self that is given by a specific location within the symbolic order and the simultaneous alienation produced by the image's externality. Thus, the assumption of a frame for identity cannot ever completely effective, or, a subject is never completely comfortable inhabiting subjectivity – there is always an impossible gap between an experience of alienated subjectivity, a prefigured given image of one's subjectivity and the experience of being produced by the Symbolic. There is a famous Lacanian aphorism that holds that ‘the signifier represents a subject for another signifier’ (Lacan 1977, p. 142). This formulation of the subject's relation to language inverts the conventional wisdom that ontologically pre-given subjects use language as an instrument to communicate their subjective intentions. Signifiers are constituted by their difference, and subjects come into being in negotiating their entry into this realm of difference. Instead of articulating subjective states through language, subjects are articulated through language, within the differential space of signification. The paradoxical implication of this reversal is that the subject is simultaneously produced and disfigured by its unavoidable insertion into the space of the Symbolic. The mirror stage marks the excess of the demand as a mode of subject formation. Subjects assume the identity as subjects as a way of accommodating to the demand placed on them by the symbolic, and as a node for producing demands on the symbolic, or, of being recognized as a subject (Lacan 1982a, p. 4). Here jouissance is nothing more than the useless enjoyment of one's own subjectivity, surplus produced in negotiating a difficult gap between the phenomenological and ideal ‘I's, produced by a failure in relation between Lacan's phenomenological I and the Symbolic. Both the site of subject production and the site where this subject fills out an identity by investing in equivalential linkages and common demands are sites of enjoyment. In this sense, perhaps there is an excess of jouissance that remains even after the reduction of jouissance to hegemony. This remainder may even be logically prior to hegemony, in that it is a useless but ritually repeated retroactive act of naming the self that produces the conditions of possibility for investment, the defining point for Laclau's reduction of jouissance to hegemony. This specific site of excess, where the subject negotiates the terms on a non-relationship with the symbolic is the primary site splitting need, demand and desire. Need approximates the position of the Freudian id, in that it is a precursor to demand. Demand is the filtering of the need through signification, but as Sheridan notes ‘there is no adequation between need and demand’ (Sheridan 1982). The same type of split that inheres in the Freudian demand inheres in the Lacanian demand, though in this case the split does not derive from the empirical impossibility of fulfilling demands as much as it stems from the impossibility of ever fully articulating needs to or receiving a satisfactory response from the Other. Since there is no adequation, the specificity of the demand becomes less relevant than the structural fact that demand presupposes the ability of the addressee to fulfil the demand. This impossibility points to the paradoxical nature of demand: namely that the demand is less a way of addressing need than a call for love and recognition by this other. ‘In this way’, writes Lacan, ‘demand annuls (aufheht) the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced (sich erniedrigt) to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love’ (Lacan 1982b, p. 286). The difficulty is that the Other cannot, by definition, ever give this gift: the starting presupposition of the mirror stage is the constitutive impossibility of comfortably inhabiting the symbolic – the mirror stage marks the constitutive split between the subject and the Symbolic. This paradoxical split, namely the structural impossibility of fulfilling demands, resonates with the logic of the Freudian demand in that the frustration of demand produces the articulation of desire. Thus, Lacan argues that ‘desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second’ (Lacan 1982b, p. 287). How might this subtraction occur? The answer to this question requires an account of the Other as seemingly omnipotent, and as simultaneously unable to fulfil demands. This sentiment animates the crucial Lacanian claim for the impossibility of the other giving a gift which it does not have, namely the gift of love: It will seem odd, no doubt, that in opening up the immeasurable space that all demand implies, namely, that of being a request for love …. Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need: this margin being that which is opened up by demand, the appeal of which can be unconditional only in regards to the Other … having no universal satisfaction … It is this whim that introduces the phantom of omnipotence, not of the subject, but of the other in which his demand is installed. (Lacan 1982c, p. 311) Transposed to the realm of political demands, this framing of demand reverses the classically liberal presupposition regarding demand and agency. In the classical iteration and contemporary critical theories that inherit its spirit, there is a presupposition that a demand is a way of exerting agency, and that the more firmly that the demand is lodged, the greater the production of an agential effect. The Lacanian framing of the demand sees the relationship as exactly the opposite: the more firmly one lodges a demand the more desperately one clings to the legitimate ability of an institution to fulfil it. Thus, demands ought to reach a kind of breaking point where the inability of an institution or order to proffer a response should produce a re-evaluation of the economy of demand and desire. In analytic terms, this is the moment of subtraction, where the manifest content of the demand is stripped away and the desire that underwrites it is laid bare. The result of this ‘subtraction’ is that the subject is in a position to relate to its desire, not as a set of deferrals, avoidances or transposition, but rather as an owned political disposition. As Lacan frames it, this is a dialectical process, where at each moment the subject is either learning to reassert the centrality of its demands, or where it is coming to terms with the impotence of the other as a satisfier of demands: But it is in the dialectic of the demand for love and the test of desire that development is ordered …. Clinical experience has shown us that this test of the desire of the Other is decisive not in the sense that the subject learns by it whether or not he has a real phallus, but in the sense that he learns that the mother does not have it. (Lacan 1982b, p. 311) Thus, desire both has general status and a specific status for each subject. In other words, it is not just the mirror that produces the subject and its investments, but the desire and sets of proxy objects that cover over this original gap. As Easthope puts it: Lacan is sure that everyone's desire is somehow different and their own – lack is nevertheless my lack. How can this be if each of us is just lost in language … passing through demand into desire, something from the real, from the individual's being before language, is retained as a trace enough to determine that I desire here and there, not anywhere and everywhere. Lacan terms this objet petit a … petit a is different for everyone; and it can never be in substitutes for it in which I try to refind it. (Easthope 2000, pp. 94–95) The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might ‘recognize and name’ their own desire, and as a result to become a political subject in the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on the other as a support for or organizing principle for political identity. This naming is not about discovering a latently held but hidden interiority, rather it is about naming a practice of political subjectivization that is not solely oriented towards or determined by the locus of the demand, determined by the contingent sets of coping strategies that orient a subject towards others and a political order. As Lacan argues, this is the point where a subject becomes a kind of new presence, or in the register of this essay, a new political possibility: ‘That the subject should come to recognize and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn't a question of recognizing something which would be entirely given …. In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world’ (Lacan 1988, pp. 228–229). Alternatively, subjects can stay fixated on the demand, but in doing so they forfeit the possibility of desire, or as Fink argues: ‘later, however, Lacan comes to see that an analysis … that … does not go far enough in constituting the subject as desire leaves him or her stranded at the level of demand … unable to truly desire’ (Fink 1996, p. 90). What does this have to do with hysteria? A politics defined by and exhausted in demands is definitionally a hysterical politics. The hysteric is defined by incessant demands on the other at the expense of ever articulating a desire which is theirs. In the Seminar on the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, for example, Lacan argues that the hysteric's demand that the Other produce an object is the support of an aversion towards one's desire: ‘the behavior of the hysteric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centred on the object, in so far as this object, das Ding, is, as Freud wrote somewhere, the support of an aversion’ (Lacan 1997, p. 53). This economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their demands. On one hand, the hysteric asserts their agency, even authority over the Other. Yet, what appears as unfettered agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a surrender of desire by enjoying the act of figuring the other as the one with the exclusive capability to satisfy the demand. Thus the logic of ‘as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!’ At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students’ call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought, but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. Here the fundamental problem of democracy is not in articulating resistance over and against hegemony, but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire. The difficulty in thinking hysteria is that it is both a politically effective subject position in some ways, but that it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at least a politics of interruption: imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility, with no site for contest or reappropriation and everything simply the working out of a structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, hysteria is net politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Thus, though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affective affirmation of a hegemonic order, and therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization.

## Case

### Framing

#### The Role of the ballot is to only evaluate the material consequences of the aff and neg world. Prefer:

#### A] fairness - Fairness—Arbitrary frameworks moot the 1NC and destroy our possibility of engaging with the affirmative on an equal playing field. Our scholarship is tied to the consequences of the plan, so it makes no sense to separate assumptions from implementation. Both debaters get the resolution at the same time.

#### B] Clash—Debate is not about the content of what we debate about but the process of iterative testing through specific points of contestation. There is no 1-1 correspondence between the arguments we read and our ideologies. This turns the Aff—no matter your political worldview, critical thinking skills through an unrestrained framework is necessary for any revolutionary strategy.

C] Their model is self-serving and doesn’t explain how to evaluate the debate when both debaters reject settler colonialism – only ours is evaluative

D] our ROB subsumes theirs – only our model allows discussions about the effects of structural violence and a comparison with other forms of violence.

**Extinction first**

#### 1 – Forecloses future improvement – we can never improve society because our impact is irreversible

#### 2 – Turns suffering – mass death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### 3 – Moral obligation – allowing people to die is unethical and should be prevented because it creates ethics towards other people

#### 4 – Objectivity – body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical

#### 5 – Moral uncertainty – if we’re unsure about which interpretation of the world is true – we ought to preserve the world to keep debating about it

### T/L

Only let them weigh the amount of settler. Colonialism and capitalism that they resolve – they do not get to weigh the sum total of these broad structures of violence.

Independently, their ‘root cause’ warrant is only in the context of income inequality – doesn’t explain other forms of violence.

### Warming

They don’t get an extinction impact – the Macmillian ev is 1) talking about the past and doesn’t establish an internal link to the squo 2) requires them to solve ALL settler colonialism which they can’t do

#### No extinction – it takes 12 degrees without adaptation

Farquhar et al 17 [Sebastian Farquhar (PhD Candidate in Philosophy at Oxford and Project Manager at Future of Humanity Institute), John Halstead (climate activist and one of the co-founders of 350 Indiana-Calumet), Owen Cotton-Barratt (PhD in pure mathematics at Oxford. Previously worked as an academic mathematician and as Director of Research at the Centre for Effective Altruism), Stefan Schubert (Researcher at Department of Experimental Psychology at University of Oxford), Haydn Belfield (Associate Fellow at the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence. He has a background in policy and politics, including as a Senior Parliamentary Researcher to a British Shadow Cabinet Minister, as a Policy Associate to the University of Oxford’s Global Priorities Project, and a degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from Oriel College, University of Oxford), Andrew Snyder-Beattie (Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, Holds degrees in biomathematics and economics and is currently pursuing a PhD in Zoology at Oxford), Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, Global Priorities Project (Bostrom’s Institute), 2017-01-23, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]

The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios. The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain. It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures.

### Space Col Good

#### Space colonization solves extinction

Filling Space 19, 4-19, "Deflecting Existential Risk with Space Colonization," Filling Space, https://filling-space.com/2019/04/19/deflecting-existential-risk-with-space-colonization/

The first living organism on Earth emerged approximately three and a half billion years ago. Since then, life has evolved into countless forms and colonized the planet. But the story of life is not a rosy one. At least five mass extinctions have occurred, and nearly all species that have ever existed on our planet are now dead. One of the most well-understood mass extinctions occurred when the Alvarez asteroid impacted Earth and, likely combined with other factors, killed many dinosaurs and other species. Life then had no tools to detect the coming asteroid or to be able to plan proactively to ensure its survival. In order to avoid sharing the same fate as the dinosaurs, scholars argue that humans should become a multi-planetary species. We spoke with Professor Gonzalo Munevar, Emeritus Professor at Lawrence Technical University, to hear his thoughts on the existential risks we face and how colonization of the cosmos can help us address them. He has written extensively about the philosophy of space exploration and human consciousness. Why do you argue that “failure to move into the cosmos would condemn us to oblivion”? By having a significant presence in the solar system in the next few thousands of years and beyond, we will be in a better position to deflect asteroids and comets that might bring the end of humanity, and much other Earth life, in a horrible collision. And if perchance one such catastrophe proves inevitable (e.g. a rogue planet passing through the solar system), humanity would still survive by having colonized Mars and other bodies, as well as by having built artificial space colonies of the type advocated by Gerard O’Neill. Once the sun begins to turn into a red giant in a few billion years, we must have long moved into the outer solar system. In the very long run, we have to move into other solar systems. Relativistic-speed starships would be nice, but they are not necessary for the task of moving humanity to the stars. We can reach them, slowly but surely, by propelling some of our space colonies away from the sun, carrying perhaps millions of human beings. They would take advantage of the many resources to be found in the Oort Cloud, and then of equivalent clouds in other solar systems. Even interstellar space has resources to offer. Nuclear energy, probably fusion, would likely be required. It may take us tens of thousands of years, but in the cosmic time scale, that is but a blink in the eye. What are these catastrophic threats? Are there any records of catastrophic events happening before humans appeared on Earth? I have already mentioned collisions with asteroids and comets. Although the active geology of our planet tends to erase the record of many collisions, we can find a well-preserved record on the Moon and Venus, the two closest bodies to Earth. On the 600-million-years-old Venusian surface, the spacecraft Magellan discovered about one thousand impact craters at least twice the diameter of meteor craters on Earth. This impact record makes it reasonable to estimate a catastrophic impact on Earth every half a million years or so. Collisions with bodies of 5 km across would happen, on the average, every 20 million years. Apart from the Alvarez asteroid (crater near Yucatan) that led to the extinction of the dinosaurs and the majority of species on Earth 65 million years ago, there have been at least two more impacts by asteroids 10 km or larger in the last 300 million years. How could human colonization of outer space save other terrestrial life? On both O’Neill types of colonies as well as on colonies on other planets, and particularly on terraformed planets, we would need all sorts of organisms like bacteria and plants for food, medicine, and ornamentation, as well as many animals for food and other purposes. We cannot have a proper colony without an Earthly environment to surround and nourish us. So, we have to take much other terrestrial life with us in order to survive and flourish. And given the value of biodiversity we would make it a point to take a great variety of organisms that contribute to our biosphere. Of course, we should heed Mark Twain and be sure not to include mosquitoes in our future space arks. I myself would keep out tarantulas and some other obnoxious viruses, bacteria, plants, and animals.

#### Earth won’t be inhabitable forever – colonization is essential to preventing extinction

Newitz 13 [(Annalee, is the author, most recently, of the science fiction novel The Future of Another Timeline, a contributing opinion writer at the New York Times, and co-host of the podcast Our Opinions Are Correct.), “Escape Plans,” Slate, 5/15/13, https://slate.com/technology/2013/05/surviving-the-next-mass-extinction-humans-will-need-to-leave-earth-for-space-colonies.html] MN

When the Russian asteroid became a fireball in the air over Chelyabinsk, destroying buildings and injuring hundreds, we were lucky it wasn’t worse. What about when the next one hits? Just for fun, let’s say a 10-kilometer-diameter asteroid—much larger than the one over Chelyabinsk but close to the size of one that hit the planet 65 million years ago—smashed into central California. It wouldn’t just destroy Hollywood and Silicon Valley. It would punch a hole in the atmosphere. That’s what surprises people the most. Every disaster-from-space movie we’ve ever seen prepares us for fire and explosive destruction. Instead, blowback from the strike would be so powerful that it would hurl millions of tons of debris back into space. A thick, toxic cloud layer would settle over our upper atmosphere, wrapping itself around the world within hours after the impact, cutting off the sun. We’re not talking about an ordinary cloud, either. Packed with carbon, dust, and sulfur particles, it would reflect a lot more sunlight than a normal cloud would. Our satellites would record images of a once-blue planet gone brilliant white, like a pool ball. On Earth, it would be twilight for months. Temperatures would plummet. Crops would die, and then the forests. There would be fires the whole time, of course, especially around the impact site. Plus earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. But most of the 5 billion people who are likely to be killed by an asteroid strike like this would die of famine. In many parts of the world, permanent dusk would mean nothing to feed our animals, let alone our families. Food supplies would dwindle. And that’s when the riots would start. This is an all-too-plausible scenario for the near future if we suffered an asteroid strike comparable to the one that killed most of the dinosaurs 65 million years ago. It wasn’t a giant explosion that exterminated Tyrannosaurus rex, Triceratops, and their kin. In reality, most of those giants died out over thousands of years, their numbers winnowed down to nothing as their food-rich, tropical environments grew barren and cold. Today, we have solid evidence that confirms environmental changes like these can be blamed directly or indirectly for most mass extinctions that have scourged the Earth. And that’s why our space program isn’t just something educational we’re doing to learn more about the universe. It’s vital to our survival as a species, because the Earth isn’t going to be a safe place for us in the long term. I learned about the many pathways to mass death while researching my book published this week: Scatter, Adapt and Remember: How Humans Will Survive a Mass Extinction. There is a pattern to how mass extinctions happen. A calamity like an asteroid strike or an enormous volcanic eruption causes an initial disaster that kills a lot animals and plants at once. And this leads to climate changes that eventually kill more than 75 percent of all species on the planet, usually in less than a million years—the blink of an eye in geological time. There is a pattern to survival, too. Every mass extinction has its survivors. A group of furry, mouselike mammals took over the planet after the dinosaurs’ heyday and eventually evolved into us. What these survivors have in common are three abilities encapsulated by the title of my book: They are able to scatter to many places in the world, adapt to them, and remember how to avoid danger. Humans are exceptionally good at all three, but perhaps our greatest strength is an ability to reconstruct the deep history of our planet—and to plan for the future. Because we know Earth is inherently dangerous, any long-term plan for humanity has to involve building communities on other worlds, or maybe in vast, artificial environments in space. But the process of doing so will take a lot longer, and be a lot weirder, than what you see in most science fiction stories. It’s likely we won’t have bustling cities the size of San Francisco on Mars or Titan in the next hundred years, so in the meantime we need to come up with a plan to deal with threats to Earth from space. Already, the U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs and space agencies like NASA monitor the skies for potentially deadly asteroids in our neighborhood, called near-Earth objects (NEOs). These groups have already proposed simple solutions to the asteroid problem, all of which are within our technological grasp.

#### Colonization of outer space is essential to humanity – 5 warrants (good, diverse non just extinction impacts)

Orwig 15 [(Jessica, a senior editor at Insider. She has a Master of Science in science and technology journalism from Texas A&M University and a Bachelor of Science in astronomy and physics from The Ohio State University. Before NY she spent time as an intern at: American Physical Society in MD International Center for Theoretical Physics in Italy Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in IL American Geophysical Union in DC), “5 undeniable reasons humans need to colonize Mars — even though it's going to cost billions,” Slate, 4/21/2015, https://www.businessinsider.com/5-undeniable-reasons-why-humans-should-go-to-mars-2015-4] MN

Establishing a permanent colony of humans on Mars is not an option. It's a necessity. At least, that's what some of the most innovative, intelligent minds of our age — Buzz Aldrin, Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, Bill Nye, and Neil deGrasse Tyson — are saying. Of course, it's extremely difficult to foresee how manned missions to Mars that would cost hundreds of billions of dollars each, could benefit mankind. It's easier to imagine how that kind of money could immediately help in the fight against cancer or world hunger. That's because humans tend to be short-sighted. We're focused on what's happening tomorrow instead of 100 years from now. "If the human race is to continue for another million years, we will have to boldly go where no one has gone before," Hawking said in 2008 at a lecture series for NASA's 50th anniversary. That brings us to the first reason humans must colonize Mars: 1. Ensuring the survival of our species The only home humans have ever known is Earth. But history shows that surviving as a species on this tiny blue dot in the vacuum of space is tough and by no means guaranteed. The dinosaurs are a classic example: They roamed the planet for 165 million years, but the only trace of them today are their fossilized remains. A colossal asteroid wiped them out. Putting humans on more than one planet would better ensure our existence thousands if not millions of years from now. "Humans need to be a multiplanet species," Musk recently told astronomer and Slate science blogger Phil Plait. Musk founded the space transport company SpaceX to help make this happen. Mars is an ideal target because it has a day about the same length as Earth's and water ice on its surface. Moreover, it's the best available option: Venus and Mercury are too hot, and the Moon has no atmosphere to protect residents from destructive meteor impacts. 2. Discovering life on Mars Nye, the CEO of The Planetary Society, said during an episode of StarTalk Radio in March that humanity should focus on sending humans instead of robots to Mars because humans could make discoveries 10,000 times as fast as the best spacecraft explorers we have today. Though he was hesitant to say humans should live on Mars, he agreed there were many more discoveries to be made there. One monumental discovery scientists could make is determining whether life currently exists on Mars. If we're going to do that, we'll most likely have to dig much deeper than NASA's rovers can. The theory there is that life was spawned not from the swamps on adolescent Earth, but from watery chasms on Mars. The Mars life theory suggests that rocks rich with microorganisms could have been ejected off the planet's surface from a powerful impact, eventually making their way through space to Earth. It's not a stretch to imagine, because Martian rocks can be found on Earth. None of those, however, have shown signs of life. "You cannot rule out the fact that a Mars rock with life in it landing on the Earth kicked off terrestrial life, and you can only really test that by finding life on Mars," Christopher Impey, a British astronomer and author of over a dozen books in astronomy and popular science, told Business Insider. 3. Improving the quality of life on Earth "Only by pushing mankind to its limits, to the bottoms of the ocean and into space, will we make discoveries in science and technology that can be adapted to improve life on Earth." British doctor Alexander Kumar wrote that in a 2012 article for BBC News where he explored the pros and cons of sending humans to Mars. At the time, Kumar was living in the most Mars-like place on Earth, Antarctica, to test how he adapted to the extreme conditions both physiologically and psychologically. To better understand his poignant remark, let's look at an example: During its first three years in space, NASA's prized Hubble Space Telescope snapped blurry pictures because of a flaw in its engineering. The problem was fixed in 1993, but to try to make use of the blurry images during those initial years, astronomers developed a computer algorithm to better extract information from the images. It turns out the algorithm was eventually shared with a medical doctor who applied it to the X-ray images he was taking to detect breast cancer. The algorithm did a better job at detecting early stages of breast cancer than the conventional method, which at the time was the naked eye. "You can't script that. That happens all the time — this cross pollination of fields, innovation in one, stimulating revolutionary changes in another," Tyson, the StarTalk radio host, explained during an interview with Fareed Zakaria in 2012. It's impossible to predict how cutting-edge technologies used to develop manned missions to Mars and habitats on Mars will benefit other fields like medicine or agriculture. But we'll figure that out only by "pushing humankind to its limits" and boldy going where we've never been before. 4. Growing as a species Another reason we should go to Mars, according to Tyson, is to inspire the next generation of space explorers. When asked in 2013 whether we should go to Mars, he answered: "Yes, if it galvanizes an entire generation of students in the educational pipeline to want to become scientists, engineers, technologists, and mathematicians," he said. "The next generation of astronauts to land on Mars are in middle school now." Humanity's aspirations to explore space are what drive us toward more advanced technological innovations that will undoubtedly benefit mankind in one way or another. "Space is like a proxy for a lot of what else goes on in society, including your urge to innovate," Tyson said during his interview with Zakaria. He added: "There's nothing that drives ambitions the way NASA does." 5. Demonstrating political and economic leadership At a February 24 hearing, Aldrin told the US Senate's Subcommittee on Space, Science and Competitiveness that getting to Mars was a necessity not only for science, but also for policy. "In my opinion, there is no more convincing way to demonstrate American leadership for the remainder of this century than to commit to a permanent presence on Mars," he said. If Americans do not go to Mars, someone else will. And that spells political and economic benefit for whoever succeeds. "If you lose your space edge," Tyson said during his interview with Zakaria, "my deep concern is that you lose everything else about society that enables you to compete economically."

#### Space colonization is good and possible – new developing tech and adaptation solves civil war, extinction, civilization collapse, and exploration defense doesn’t apply.

Kennedy ’19 [Fred, “To Colonize Space Or Not To Colonize: That Is The Question (For All Of Us)”, 12-18-2019, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/fredkennedy/2019/12/18/to-colonize-or-not-to-colonize--that-is-the-question-for-all-of-us/?sh=65a8d2702367]//pranav

It’s important to distinguish between colonize and explore. Exploration already enjoys broad approval here in America. In June, 77% of U.S. respondents told Gallup pollsters that NASA’s budget should either be maintained or increased – undeniable evidence of support for the American space program (as it’s currently constituted). By any measure, we’ve done an admirable job of surveying the solar system over the past 60 years – an essential first step in any comprehensive program of exploration. Unmanned probes developed and launched by the United States and the Soviet Union conducted flybys of the Moon and the terrestrial planets not long after we reached Earth orbit, and since then, we’ve flown by the outer planets. Multiple nations have placed increasingly sophisticated robotic emissaries on the surfaces of the Moon, Mars, Venus and Saturn’s largest moon, Titan. Most stunningly, in a tour de force of technology and Cold War chutzpah, the U.S. dispatched humans to set foot on another world, just 50 years and a few months ago. But after only six such visits, we never returned. Moon habitats in lava tubes, crops under glass domes, ice mining at the south pole? No. NASA’s Artemis program may place a man and a woman on the Moon again in 2024. But that’s hardly colonization. For perspective, let’s look closer to home. Sailors from an American vessel may have landed on Antarctica as early as 1821 – the claim is unverified – but no scientific expeditions “wintered” there for another 75 years. The first two of these, one Belgian and one British, endured extreme cold and privation – one inadvertently, the other by design. And yet, 200 years after the first explorer set foot on the continent, there are no permanent settlements (partially as a result of a political consensus reached in the late 1950s, but in no small part due to the difficulty of extracting resources such as ore or fossil fuels through kilometers of ice). Less than 5,000 international researchers and support staff comprise the “summer population” at the bottom of the world. That number dwindles to just 1,100 during the harsh Antarctic winter, requiring millions of tons of supplies and fuel to be delivered every year – none of which can be produced locally. To suggest that Antarctica is colonized would be far overstating the sustainability of human presence there. If Antarctica is hard, the Moon, Mars, asteroids, and interplanetary space will be punishingly difficult. Writing in Gizmodo this past July, George Dvorsky describes the challenges to a human colony posed by low gravity, radiation, lack of air and water, and the psychological effects of long-term confinement and isolation inside artificial structures, in space or on planetary surfaces. Add to this the economic uncertainties of such a venture – where the modern analog of a Dutch or British East India Company would face enormous skepticism from investors regarding the profitability of shipping any good or finished product between colonial ports of call – and it becomes clear why nation states and mega-corporations alike have so far resisted the temptation to set up camp beyond geosynchronous orbit. Perhaps, many argue, we should focus our limited resources on unresolved problems here at home? Yet a wave of interest in pursuing solar system colonization is building, whether its initial focus is the Moon, Mars, or O’Neill-style space habitats. Jeff Bezos has argued eloquently for moving heavy industry off the home planet, preserving Earth as a nature reserve, and building the space-based infrastructure that will lower barriers and create opportunities for vast economic and cultural growth (similar to how the Internet and a revolution in microelectronics has allowed Amazon and numerous other companies to achieve spectacular wealth). Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking both suggested the need for a “hedge” population of humans on Mars to allow human civilization to reboot itself in the event of a catastrophe on Earth – an eggs-in-several-baskets approach which actually complements the arguments made by Bezos. And while both are valid reasons for pursuing colonization, there’s a stronger, overarching rationale that clinches it. I’ll assert that a fundamental truth – repeatedly borne out by history – is that expanding, outwardly-focused civilizations are far less likely to turn on themselves, and far more likely to expend their fecundity on growing habitations, conducting important research and creating wealth for their citizens. A civilization that turns away from discovery and growth stagnates – a point made by NASA’s Chief Historian Steven Dick as well as Mars exploration advocate Robert Zubrin. As a species, we have yet to resolve problems of extreme political polarization (both internal to nation states as well as among them), inequalities in wealth distribution, deficiencies in civil liberties, environmental depredations and war. Forgoing opportunities to expand our presence into the cosmos to achieve better outcomes here at home hasn’t eliminated these scourges. What’s more, the “cabin fever” often decried by opponents of colonization (when applied to small, isolated outposts far from Earth) turns out to be a potential problem for our own planet. Without a relief valve for ideological pilgrims or staunch individualists who might just prefer to be on their own despite the inevitable hardships, we may well run the risk of exacerbating the polarization and internecine strife we strive so hard to quell. Focusing humanity’s attention and imagination on a grand project may well give us the running room we need to address these problems. But the decision cannot be made by one country, or one company, or one segment of the human population. If we do this, it will of necessity be a truly international endeavor, a cross-sector endeavor (with all commercial, civil, and defense interests engaged and cooperating). The good news: Critical technologies such as propulsion and power generation systems will improve over time. Transit durations between celestial destinations will shorten (in the same way sailing vessels gave way to steam ships and then to airliners and perhaps, one day, to point-to-point ballistic reusable rockets). Methods for obtaining critical resources on other planets will be refined and enhanced. Genetic engineering may be used to better adapt humans, their crops and other biota to life in space or on other planetary surfaces – to withstand the effects of low or micro-gravity, radiation, and the psychological effects of long-duration spaceflight.

#### Chinese space industrial base is set to surpass the US

Patel 21 [(Neel, space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and I also write The Airlock newsletter, your number one source for everything happening off this planet. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where I grew and led the website’s space coverage.) “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US” MIT Technology Review, 1/21/2021. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/] BC

How did China get here—and why?

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called Document 60 that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a 2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses. More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it released the first images taken by the satellite, Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

### Cap Good

#### Cap is sustainable

**Seabra 12** (Leo, has a background in Communication and Broadcasting and a broad experience which includes activities in Marketing, Advertising, Sales and Public Relations, 2/27, “Capitalism can drive Sustainability and also innovation,” http://seabraaffairs.wordpress.com/2012/02/27/capitalism-can-drive-sustainability-and-also-innovation/)

There are those who say that if the world does not change their habits, even the end of economic growth, and assuming alternative ways of living, will be a catastrophe. “Our lifestyles are unsustainable. Our expectations of consumption are predatory.Either we change this, or will be chaos”. Others say that the pursuit of unbridled economic growth and the inclusion of more people in consumption is killing the Earth. We have to create alternative because economic growth is pointing to the global collapse. “What will happen when billions of Chinese decide to adopt the lifestyle of Americans?” I’ll disagree if you don’t mind… **They might be** wrong. **Completely wrong** .. Even very intelligent people wrongly interpret the implications of what they observe when they lose the perspective of time. In the vast scale of time (today, decades, not centuries) it is the opposite of what expected, because they start from a false assumption: the future is the extrapolation of this. But not necessarily be. How do I know? Looking at history. What story? The history of innovation, this thing generates increases in productivity, wealth, quality of life in an unimaginable level. It is innovation that will defeat pessimism as it always did. It was innovation that made life today is incomparably better than at any other time in human history. And will further improve. Einstein, who was not a stupid person, believed that capitalism would generate crisis, instability, and growing impoverishment. He said: “The economic anarchy of capitalist society as it exists today is, in my opinion, the true source of evil.” The only way to eliminate this evil, he thought, was to establish socialism, with the means of production are owned by the company. A centrally controlled economy would adjust the production of goods and services the needs of people, and would distribute the work that needed to be done among those in a position to do so. This would guarantee a livelihood to every man, women and children. Each according to his possibilities. To each according to their needs. And guess what? What happened was the opposite of what Einstein predicted. Who tried the model he suggested, impoverished, screwed up. Peter Drucker says that almost of all thinking people of the late nineteenth century thought that Marx was right: there would be increased exploitation of workers by employers. They would become poorer, until one day, the thing would explode. Capitalist society was considered inherently unsustainable. It is more or less the same chat today. **Bullshit. Capitalism, with all appropriate regulations, self-**corrects. It is **an adaptive system that learns and changes by design. The design is just for the system to learn and change.** There was the opposite of what Einstein predicted, and held the opposite of what many predict, but the logic that “unlike” only becomes evident over time. It wasn’t obvious that the workers are those whom would profit from the productivity gains that the management science has begun to generate by organizing innovations like the railroad, the telegraph, the telephone .. to increase the scale of production and cheapen things. The living conditions of workers today are infinitely better than they were in 1900. They got richer, not poorer .. You do not need to work harder to produce more (as everyone thought), you can work less and produce more through a mechanism that is only now becoming apparent, and that brilliant people like Caetano Veloso still ignores. The output is pursuing growth through innovation, growth is not giving up. More of the same will become unsustainable to the planet, but most of it is not what will happen, will happen more different, than we do not know what is right. More innovative. Experts, such as Lester Brown, insist on statements like this: if the Chinese also want to have three cars for every four inhabitants, as in the U.S. today, there will be 1.1 billion cars there in 2030, and there is no way to build roads unless ends with the whole area used for agriculture. You will need 98 million barrels of oil per day, but the world only produces about 90 million today, and probably never produce much more. The mistake is to extrapolate today’s solutions for the future. We can continue living here for 20 years by exploiting the same resources that we explore today? Of course not. But the other question is: how can we encourage the stream of innovations that will enable the Chinese, Indians, Brazilians, Africans .. to live so as prosperous as Americans live today? Hey, wake up … what can not stop the engine of innovation is that the free market engenders. This system is self correcting, that is its beauty. We do

This impact turns the privatization stuff –

#### 1 - space exploration

**Blundell ‘4** [John, director general of the Institute of Economic Affairs, “Mission to Mars must go private to succeed”, Feb 2, http://news.scotsman.com/marsexploration/Mission-to-Mars-must-go.2499794.jp]

Bush is not finding the billions himself. Rather the tab will be picked up by US taxpayers in perhaps 20 years’ time. **What arrests me is the** unchallenged **assumption that space exploration must be a nationalised industry**. The Soviet effort may be stalled but the Chinese seem committed to joining the race. The European Space Agency is a strange combination of nationalised bodies. NASA is a pure old-fashioned nationalised entity. I argue **we should relinquish the expectationthat space has to be limited to vast quangos.** The mindset we all share is an echo of the rivalry between the evaporated USSR and the still dynamic US. The first bleeps of the Sputnik galvanised the US into accelerating its space effort.   **What we need is capitalists in space. Capitalism needs property rights, enforcement of contracts and the rule of law.** The ideological tussle does not cease once we are beyond the ionosphere.   With the exception of Arthur C Clarke, **none of us imagined the entertainment potential from satellites**. Geostationary lumps of electronic gadgetry beam us our BSkyB television pictures. I remain in awe that Rupert Murdoch can place a device in the skies above Brazil that sends a signal to every home in each hemisphere. Who could have foreseen that mobile phones could keep us chattering without any wiring, or that global position techniques could plot where we all are to within a metre? **These are business applications. Business is already in space.**   Markets detect and apply opportunities that are not envisaged by even the most accomplished technicians. I’m not saying Murdoch has special competences. I imagine he is as baffled by digital miracles as I am. The point is that **companies define and refine what public bodies cannot achieve**. Lift the veil of course and all those **satellite firms are an intricate web of experts supplying ideas and services. We have an infant space market.**   What use will the Moon be? Is there value on Mars other than the TV rights? The answer is nobody can know. We can only make some guesses. The Spanish ships that set off for the US thought they would get to India. The Portuguese knew they’d reach China. The English followed them westwards seeking gold. In fact, they got tobacco. Events always confound expectations.   The arguments for putting men on Mars are expressly vague from President Bush. Perhaps he was really bidding for votes.   From my reading the **best results may be medical. Zero, or low, gravity techniques may allow therapies of which we are ignorant.** It seems facetious to suggest tourism may be a big part of space opportunity but as both the North and South poles are over-populated and there is a queue at the top of Mount Everest, a trip to the Sea of Tranquility may prove a magnet for the wealthy. **Instead of NASA’s grotesque bureaucracy it may be Thomas Cook will be a greater force for exploration.**   NASA could be a procurement body. It need not design and run all space ventures. It could sub-contract far more extensively. Without specialised engineering expertise it is not easy to criticise projects such as the shuttle. It seems to be excessively costly and far too fragile.   **There are private space entrepreneurs already.** They are tiddlers up against the mighty NASA. Yet Dan **Goldin, the NASA leader, says he favours the privatisation of space: "We can’t afford to do solar system exploration until we turn these activities over to the cutting edge private sector...**   "Some may say that commercialising portions of NASA’s functions is heresy. Others may think we are taking a path that will ruin the wonders of space. I believe that **when NASA can creatively partner, all of humankind will reap the benefits of access to open space".   Is it possible the Moon has a more noble future than merely a branch office of NASA? Is it tolerable that Mars could be a subsidiary of the USA? Could it be nominally a further state of the union? These are not silly questions. In time space will be defined by lawyers and accountants as property rights will need to be deliberated**.   One possibility may be that both environments are so hostile that Mars and the Moon will never be more than token pockets for humanity. On the evidence so far it is the orbiting satellites that have made us see the Earth through new eyes. **We can survey and explore the planet better from 200 miles up than stomping on the surface. The emerging commercial body of space law is derived from telecommunications law**.   It is perplexing and contrary to our immediate senses. How can you own or exchange something as intangible as digital messages bouncing off satellites? Yet we all pay our mobile phone bills.   **Many of the business results of space exploration are unintended consequences of NASA’s early adventures. Computer development would probably have been slower but for the need for instrumentation for Apollo**.   Are there prospects for Scottish firms in space? The prizes will not go to only the mega corporations. Perhaps Dobbies, the Edinburgh garden centre group, can create new roses by placing pots beyond gravity. Edinburgh University laboratories, or rather their **commercial spin offs, could patent new medicines**. Is it possible the genetic magicians at the Bush could hitch a ride into space and extend their discoveries?   NASA is a monopolist. All monopolies are bad for business. They only stunt opportunities. They blunt alternatives.   **By opening space to entrepreneurship we will be starting on what FA Hayek memorably describes as "a discovery procedure". Science is an open system. So is capitalism.**

#### Extinction

**Pelton ‘3** [Joseph N. Pelton is director of the Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute at George Washington University and executive director of the Arthur C. Clarke Foundation “COMMENTARY: Why Space? The Top 10 Reasons”, Sept 12, http://www.space.com/news/commentary\_top10\_030912.html]

Actually **the lack of a space program could get us all killed**. I dont mean you or me or my wife or children. I mean that **Homo sapiens as a species are** actually **endangered**. Surprising to some, **a well conceived space program may well be our only hope for long-term survival**. The right or wrong decisions about space research and exploration may be key to the futures of our grandchildren or great-grandchildren or those that follow.  Arthur C. Clarke, the author and screenplay writer for 2001: A Space Odyssey, put the issue rather starkly some years back when he said: The dinosaurs are not around today because they did not have a space program. He was, of course, referring to the fact that we now know **a quite largish meteor crashed into the earth, released poisonous** Iridium **chemicals into our atmosphere and created a killer cloud above the Earth that blocked out the sun for a prolonged period of time.  This could have been foreseen and averted with a sufficiently advanced space program**. But this is only one example of how space programs, such as NASAs Spaceguard program, help protect our fragile planet. **Without a space program we would not know about the large ozone hole in our atmosphere, the hazards of solar radiation, the path of killer hurricanes or many other environmental dangers**. But this is only a fraction of the ways that space programs are crucial to our future. Protection against catastrophic planetary accidents: It is easy to assume that an erratic meteor or comet will not bring destruction to the Earth because the probabilities are low. **The truth is we are bombarded from space daily. The dangers are greatest not from a cataclysmic collision, but from not knowing enough about solar storms, cosmic radiation and the ozone layer. An enhanced** Spaceguard **Program** **is** actually **a prudent course that could save our species in time.**

#### 2 - disease mutation

Jackson 16. Kerry, Pacific Research Institute; 12/19/16; Free Market Policies Needed To Incentivize Creation Of New Life-Saving Treatments; https://www.pacificresearch.org/article/free-market-policies-needed-to-incentivize-creation-of-new-life-saving-treatments/

“Our strongest antibiotics don’t work and patients are left with potentially untreatable infections,” Director Dr. Tom Frieden said when the CDC issued its warning. He asked doctors, hospitals and public health officials to “work together” to “stop these infections from spreading.” The 2014 Report to the President expressed a similar concern: “The evolution of antibiotic resistance is now occurring at an alarming rate and is outpacing the development of new countermeasures capable of thwarting infections in humans. This situation threatens patient care, economic growth, public health, agriculture, economic security and national security.” For those thinking this sort of thing shouldn’t be happening when medical science is more advanced than can almost be conceived, be assured that it is. And unless there are public policy interventions, it’s likely to get worse. “More and more microorganisms will continue to gain resistance to the current drug therapies because (antimicrobial resistance, or AMR) is basic evolution,” Wayne Winegarden writes in the Pacific Research Institute’s newly-released report “Incenting the Development of Antimicrobial Medicines to Address the Problem of Drug-Resistant Infections.” The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers says the problem is caused by “a dearth of new antibiotic medicines.” At the same time that there’s been an increase in AMR, there has been “a sharp decline in the development of new antibiotic medicines.” The group reports that only two new classes of antibiotics have been discovered in the last three decades compared to 11 in the previous 50 years. The answers to many medical problems are still not within reach of researchers. But the hazards of AMR can be diminished. Winegarden suggests we begin with public health campaigns that encourage handwashing, which he calls a highly effective and low-cost way to reduce the spread of infection. He further recommends policy that would address the problem of antibiotic overuse and greater use of vaccines to cut the incidents of infection. But Winegarden’s primary concern is establishing the correct incentives for developing new antimicrobial medicines that would be effective against AMR microorganisms. He’s specifically referring to policies “based on a thorough understanding of the disincentives that are currently inhibiting their development.” “These disincentives are well-recognized,” he writes. “Despite the medical need, and despite the generally strong return on investment for many other drug classes, the return on investment for developing new antimicrobial medicines (particularly antibiotics) is too low.” Producing a new drug is a grinding and expensive endeavor. It can take 10 to 15 years to develop a single prescription drug that is introduced to the market, and a company can spend as much as $5.5 billion on research and development for each medication that is eventually approved and prescribed. Less than 2 percent of all projects launched to create new drugs succeed. This is not an environment in which pharmaceutical companies can get too amped up about pursuing new treatments. Yet new drug approvals increased over the last decade. Don’t look for a surge of antimicrobial drugs in that pipeline, though. Winegarden says that particular drug class is among several that “face unique impediments” that serve as disincentives for innovation. To overcome the steep hill that impedes the development of new AMR drugs, lawmakers must implement policies that unleash the incentives of the free market. Policymakers also should look at the 1983 federal Orphan Drug Act and its market-oriented reforms that increased the number of drugs developed to treat rare diseases. More than 400 have been introduced to the market since the law was enacted, compared to fewer than 10 in the 1970s. Put another way, government needs to remove its anchors from the process and let the market do what it does so well. In this case, that’s restoring patients’ health, enriching innovative companies that create jobs, and inspiring biotech start-ups such as the group of Stanford undergraduates that has been capitalized to develop new antibiotics. If the proper incentives are in place, the needed treatments will follow.

#### Pandemics end civilization – no burnout

Kerscher 14. Karl-Heinz, professor and management consultant “Space Education”, Wissenschaftliche Studie, 2014

The death toll for a pandemic is equal to the virulence, the deadliness of the pathogen or pathogens, multiplied by the number of people eventually infected. It has been hypothesized that there is an upper limit to the virulence of naturally evolved pathogens. This is because a pathogen that quickly kills its hosts might not have enough time to spread to new ones, while one that kills its hosts more slowly or not at all will allow carriers more time to spread the infection, and thus likely out-compete a more lethal species or strain. This simple model predicts that if virulence and transmission are not linked in any way, pathogens will evolve towards low virulence and rapid transmission. However, this assumption is not always valid and in more complex models, where the level of virulence and the rate of transmission are related, high levels of virulence can evolve. The level of virulence that is possible is instead limited by the existence of complex populations of hosts, with different susceptibilities to infection, or by some hosts being geographically isolated. The size of the host population and competition between different strains of pathogens can also alter virulence. There are numerous historical examples of pandemics that have had a devastating effect on a large number of people, which makes the possibility of global pandemic a realistic threat to human civilization.