# 1AC – India

### 1AC – Plan

#### Plan: The Republic of India should ban the appropriation of outer space by private entities.

#### The plan is enforced both internationally with UNCOPUOS and domestically through enforcement and liability regimes – solves best

* UNCOPUS is given power over private entities – 3 separate branches formed
* Cost allocation is proportional to countries’ space impact
* Domestic policies are passed uniformly
* Enforced with a variety of sanctions
* States with more defined space policies can diplomatically pressure others for uniformity

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A. Empower UNCOPUOS or a New International Enforcement Body with Increased Authority over Private Actors The space industry will likely benefit from a centralized enforcement authority that has actual regulatory, adjudicative, and arbitral powers.196 In fact, Article XI of the Moon Agreement arguably calls for such an organization to create and enforce laws related to commercial activity.197 Additionally, several countries have already advocated for a permanent specialized United Nations agency to oversee outer space activities, which some have deemed the “World Space Organization” (“WSO”).198 However, UNCOPUOS has yet to seriously consider a new overseeing body.199 Nonetheless, UNCOPUOS and the international space law community should either (1) create a separate U.N. body that enforces international space law on public and private actors, or (2) enhance the authority of UNCOPUOS to do the same. One particular structure that the WSO can follow is that which is already established by other U.N. specialized agencies: it may hold an Assembly, a Council, and a Secretariat.200 The Assembly may create policy, adopt amendments to international agreements, and ratify regulations and standards for commercial space activities. The Council may serve as an executive body that promotes cooperation among member states and international organizations.201 Commercial space interests may be adequately represented on this Council by allowing representation for all space-faring state members.202 Also, representation from state members that are not the primary producers of commercial space activity, but serve as geographic hotspots for launching space activities, should be adequately represented on this board as well.203 Finally, the Secretariat may facilitate administrative support for WSO’s undertakings.204 Additionally, the WSO should incorporate a dispute resolution organ that can hold accountable the actions of private actors through their respective member states. It should have the maximum enforcement capacity, such as by requiring that all state members adhere to the tribunal’s rulings. It should grant itself jurisdiction over private actors and allow these actors to bring a claim before the judicial organ as well, so long as the member states recognize the competence of the tribunal to consider the matter. Allowing cases concerning individual and private actors has already been established by many international courts and tribunals, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration and various international human rights courts.205 As commercial space activity only continues to grow, the WSO should provide an adequate means for adjudicating claims resulting from these activities. Problems will undoubtedly arise from creating the WSO. Developing countries or states without a strong presence in outer space may contend that this framework will be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Outer Space Treaty, which declares that outer space is to be the “province of all mankind.”206 Therefore, assurances must be made that developing countries or non-space faring nations will benefit from this organization.207 For instance, the organization may help facilitate commercial space activities that would benefit these countries by providing greater technology and services. Technological advances in satellite imagery may help these countries mitigate environmental damage and warn them of impending natural disasters.208 Another issue to address is how to establish an equitable cost allocation plan for this new organization. One idea is to allocate contributions based on the amount of tonnage launched per year by U.N. Member States.209 Another idea is to emulate the cost allocation structure already established by the U.N. General Budget.210 Regardless of the cost allocation structure provided, it should equitably reflect the contributions that space-faring nations make and ensure that they front the bulk of the costs.211 As an alternative to going through the process of creating a new legal entity, UNCOPUOS could use its own established regulatory framework and expand its own powers to create a similar regulatory framework as described above. This seems like an intuitive step for a U.N. Committee that is already among the largest committees of the United Nations212 and is currently the “only intergovernmental platform for fostering global governance of outer space activities.”213 However, problems associated with expanding UNCOPUOS’s role would undoubtedly arise. In particular, there is actually no natural progression in transforming a U.N. General Assembly committee into an enforcement body since the General Assembly does not have enforcement authority under the U.N. Charter. The U.N. Charter may need to be amended to provide the General Assembly with such enforcement authority if expanding UNCOPUOS’s role were to actually be realized. Nonetheless, these barriers to greater enforcement are surmountable, assuming that the member states can defy the complex political tensions that exist within the U.N.214 Creating the WSO or increasing UNCOPUOS’s powers will provide a forum for member states and private actors alike to facilitate space programs and should be reconsidered by UNCOPUOS. B. Promote Firmer and More Uniform Standards Among Domestic Laws To some extent, all five international space treaties rely on states to implement their own domestic laws to fulfill the treaties’ obligations. The strength of enforcement lies strongly with the strength of domestic space law to enforce itself upon private actors. National space law should particularly focus on (1) creating firmer and more uniform standards for the national registration requirements of space objects and (2) broadening avenues of recourse when private space activity causes harm. However, individual states may lack the incentive to increase regulation, as it may reduce space activity launching from that particular state.215 Time will tell whether these space-faring nations will overcome this collective action problem by placing the need for the safe use of outer space before individual state interests. While the Outer Space Treaty and the Registration Convention imparted an obligation on States Parties to implement registration requirements for space objects within their domestic law, they failed to “identify the contours of any particular licensing regime.”216 This has caused an unevenness in registration requirements that have led to confusion and the failure to report space objects in outer space, as described infra. Additionally, this lack of conformity in national law has allowed private actors to travel to more lenient states to launch their objects into space, also as described infra. For states to authorize space activities and provide greater supervision over them, all space-faring nations should establish a uniform licensing and regulatory regime with adequate enforcement measures within them.217 To create uniformity among domestic registration requirements for space objects, the International Law Association (“ILA”) issued a model law for national space legislation.218 Notably, ILA’s model national law suggests that all national registrations should include certain information, such as the registration number of the space object, date and location of the launch, orbital parameters, and the function of the space object.219 ILA’s model national law also lists extensive requirements for authorizing the space activity, including that the space activity be compatible with public safety standards, foreign policy, national security, and other standards.220 This would prevent the situation created by Swarm, where it took advantage of India’s lenient safety standards to launch its hard-to-detect satellites.221 Creating uniform standards for registration, including safety standards, would mitigate the risk of private actors forum shopping for the most lenient states from which to launch their space objects. States should also implement stronger enforcement mechanisms to motivate compliance with their respective national space laws and to harmonize their laws with other states. States’ enforcement mechanism schemes vary from sanctions such as license suspension or revocation, to fines and imprisonment. As for license suspension and revocation, the reasons for license suspension or revocation vary significantly. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, South Korea, China, and many other major space-faring nations, a license may be revoked if the licensee conducts actions that endanger national security.222 Meanwhile, South Korea’s additional rule, that a license may be suspended if a launch has been delayed for greater than one year without cause, is not as widely adopted.223 South Korea also imposes heavy fines (up to ₩50 million , or approximately U.S. $44,387) and long sentences (up to five years in prison) for an individual who launches without a license. In contrast, France does not impose any sentence for launching a space object without authorization, but does impose a fine of up to €200,000 (or approximately U.S. $257,000).224 Some states (such as India and Switzerland)225 have failed to enact any legislation concerning compliance to any safety and registration standards. In these cases, perhaps states with comprehensive compliance schemes (such as the United States and Australia)226 may diplomatically pressure less regulated states to impose basic safety and registration regulations. At a minimum, all states should institute a regulatory agency that holds the jurisdiction to license space activities and enforce licensing and safety protocols.227 In addition to standardizing registration requirements and compliance mechanisms, more states should provide adequate liability mechanisms for private actors when the private actors’ space activity causes harm. Currently, the Liability Convention puts total fault on a State Party for all harm caused by objects launched from that state. To hold private actors accountable for their actions, and to mitigate the risks of a “tremendous public payout” for private actions in space,228 governments should implement comprehensive domestic regulations of “safety and financial responsibility for private activities in space.”229 Some states have already done so, but this liability framework is not universal.230 All states should place liability on the operator of the spacecraft, as is suggested by ILA’s model national law.231 In relation to imposing liability on the operator of the spacecraft, all states should require a certain level of insurance and indemnification to allow victims to be adequately compensated. While imposing insurance and indemnification standards may seem like a natural progression in imposing liability standards, this requirement is currently missing from many state’s domestic space law.232 In crafting insurance and indemnification laws on private space-faring actors, however, states should be careful not to create such a high liability risk to these actors that it would threaten the development of space innovation in this relatively nascent era of space commercialization.233 Thus, liability arising out of space activities should be limited.234 While domestic laws are not “the perfect solution” for fixing gaps in enforcement, “they are easier to enact and more enforceable than any comparable international space law.”235 Increasing the strength of national space law as well as the uniformity among different states’ national space legal regimes would undoubtedly result in greater enforcement upon private actors. Additionally, increased domestic regulation may in turn inspire the further development of customary and conventional international space law.236

### 1AC – Adv – India Rise

#### Private Sector is growing and *key* for space exploration growth – the ISRO is a *facilitator* not a creator

Gill 21[ Prabhjote writes about technology, science and economics. Before Business Insider, she's worked with Tech Radar where she covered the newest gadgets and the most recent trends of the tech world. Business Insider “ISRO will transform in 2021 as India pumps big money to draw in startups for the 'second space age'” 2/4/2021 <https://www.businessinsider.in/science/space/news/isro-will-transform-in-2021-as-india-pumps-big-money-to-draw-in-startups-for-the-second-space-age/articleshow/80683054.cms> ] //aaditg

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is turning into a facilitator as it looks for the private sector to play a bigger role in space technology in the ‘second space age’. Despite the COVID-19 cash crunch, the Budget 2021-22 has not deprioritised the space sector with a 3.48% increase in expenditure allocation. Money earmarked for New Space India Limited — the Indian Space Research Organisation’s commercial arm — saw its budget increase 138 times. According to space policy expert Chaitanya Giri, the government is looking to monetise ISRO's intellectual property and bring in fresh revenue. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is on the road to transforming itself from an end-to-service provider for India’s space programme into a facilitator. The latest budget allocation is a signal that the Indian government is serious about giving private players a serious role In the ‘second space age’. Despite the cash crunch caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, India did not cut back on the money for the space programme. In fact, the outlay increased by 3.5%. More importantly, bulk of the funds will be routed to a new entity, New Space India Limited (NSIL). ISRO will transform in 2021 as India pumps big money to draw in startups for the 'second space age' Budget 2021-22 allocation for the Department of SpaceBI India NSIL, the commercial arm ISRO saw a 138 times jump in allocation. The money that earlier went from the Department of Space (DoS) to ISRO, will now be routed to NSIL, which will then authorise the participation of private players. Year NSIL expenditure budget 2019-20 ₹10 crore 2021-22 ₹700 crore “That means that the government is super serious about commercialising whatever IP (intellectual property) it has under its kitty and just monetising that. It’s a departure from the mindset of yesteryears where ISRO was only there to cater to the government’s requirements,” Chaitanya Giri, space policy expert and fellow with think tank Gateway House, told Business Insider. Doubling down on space sector reforms The push for private sector participation in the space sector is a strategic necessity, according to Giri. “For our commercial sector to get started on this front, it will need governmental space agency ISRO to get things done at its end first,” he points out. India’s edge in the global market was its ability to keep things cheap. An advantage that has now been diluted by the emergence of companies like Elon Musk’s SpaceX who have made launching satellites more competitive. Its Crew Dragon capsule is another indication that the second space age will be run by the commercial sector. “They will be building the rockets, launch services, building space capsules and providing logistics,” explained Giri. NSIL is set up, but what comes next? Last year, in May, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced major reforms for the space sector as a part of the Atma Nirbhar package — including the setting up of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN–SPACe). “In-SPACe was supposed to be formed by the end of last year — by December 2020 — so it’s getting slightly extended. But, I’m pretty sure that it will be completely established within the next two months,” Pawan Kumar Chandana, co-founder of Skyroot Aerospace told Business Insider in a pre-budget interaction. According to Giri, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has always built its own rockets and satellites. But, that will no longer be the case. “They want to include all of these small startups that have emerged and start giving them contracts according to their niche,” said Giri. In-SPACe opens up ISRO’s treasure trove of satellite data to private players and will allow start ups to use the apex space agency’s testing facilities to develop their own technologies. The challenge lies in setting the price points for this use. “Like always, when it comes to finance, every rupee counts when it comes to the government… And, the government's mandate is to encourage the private sector, so they cannot charge it as high as they may want to,” Chandana explained. DataLabs by Inc42 shows that there are around 120 active startups working in the space sector right now. Most of them emerged in or after 2014.

**Indian Space growth *bolsters* US relations and engagement with Quad – private sector engagement *proves* its reverse casual**

**Mohan 10/13** (Raja Mohan, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the director of the National University of Singapore’s Institute of South Asian Studies, October 13, 2021, Foreign Policy, India’s Space Program Inches Closer to America and the Quad, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/13/india-modi-space-program/)//ww pbj + aaditg

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants to privatize one of his country’s most zealously guarded governmental monopolies: the space sector. In a major speech at the inauguration of the Indian Space Association, a new industry grouping this week, Modi called for a new approach, where, he said, the private sector is free to innovate and the government becomes an enabler. The announcement was a significant step in Modi’s efforts to pull private resources into India’s space sector, which has rapidly fallen behind global peers as space competition heats up in telecommunications, resource exploration, planetary expeditions, and defense. What’s more, **Modi’s reorientation of India’s space policy is yet another indication of the profound shift in New Delhi’s geostrategic orientation.** Modi’s government has been exploring common ground on space security issues bilaterally with the United States and also plans to work with India’s partners in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—Australia, Japan, and the United States—to leverage their collective space capabilities. For now, these would include areas like monitoring climate change, managing disasters, and mapping precious natural resources from space. For the first time, New Delhi is also ready to work with Washington and its allies on setting new global norms to manage space, including rules for commercial competition and the use of space for defense. Although India was among the first nations in the developing world to build an impressive space program, it has not kept up with changing global trends. One is the dramatic expansion of space commerce since the start of the 21st century. The other is the private sector’s growing role in space activities. On both fronts, New Delhi has been unprepared. India now accounts for barely 2 percent of global space commerce, estimated to be worth around $440 billion today. The sector has been expanding at an explosive pace and is expected to reach more than $1 trillion in annual revenues by 2030, according to some estimates. New Delhi has set its sights on garnering at least 10 percent of this business by the end of this decade. In the United States, SpaceX CEO Elon Musk’s company has broken the last of the government monopolies: the difficult business of launching manned rockets. Washington has been coddling SpaceX with lucrative contacts, hoping private companies’ growing role will help reinforce traditional U.S. primacy in space. The Chinese government, too, is finding ways to bring greater innovation to space projects by allowing more private activity and promoting competition between different space-sector entities. India seemed hesitant to go down the private sector route—at least, until now. India’s space program, like its nuclear energy program, began soon after the country’s independence and was driven by considerations of national prestige and economic and technological development imperatives. Since then, Indians have had to put up with much ridicule about their poor, under-resourced country shooting into space. But today, few can deny India’s space program’s considerable achievements, including in satellite construction and launching, telecommunications, and terrestrial observation from orbit for national development and defense. If anything, international skepticism has reinforced India’s new techno-nationalism. The flag wrapped around the space program became even tighter beginning in the mid-1970s, when India faced growing international sanctions, including limits on technology transfers, as it was developing nuclear weapons. All along, any modest step in the space program was a cause for popular celebration. Before sanctions hit, India enjoyed expansive cooperation in space technology with the West; subsequently, it partnered with the Soviet Union. India’s forced international isolation increased the domestic prestige of the space program and ensured a steady flow of state funding as well as considerable autonomy for its functionaries to set goals and define priorities. This combination of external pressure and uncritical domestic support meant there was little incentive for reform and regeneration. As a result, India found itself incapable of scaling up its activities amid the unfolding boom in space commerce. The external situation began to change with the historic civilian nuclear initiative pushed by then-U.S. President George W. Bush beginning in 2005, which facilitated India’s reconciliation with the global nonproliferation order, brought an end to sanctions, and opened the door for international cooperation with India’s civilian nuclear and space programs. Domestic change, however, has been much slower. India’s new space policy began to take shape in June 2020, when Modi announced the first steps to open up India’s space sector to private capital. The new policy mandated that space assets and technologies developed by the Indian Space Research Organisation and other government agencies be accessible to the private sector. New Delhi also announced the creation of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Center and appointed a former private sector executive to head it. A new government company called NewSpace India will help reorient the Indian space program to a demand-driven model. Until now, India’s space activity was constrained by what government agencies chose and were able to develop. New Delhi now wants commercial demand for space services to drive the expansion of capabilities. The government is now considering a variety of policy measures that will provide a new regulatory framework for space activity. The first two policy initiatives are expected to focus on space communication and remote sensing. New Delhi’s cooperation with Washington may soon be reinforced by strong U.S. company participation in growing India’s space capabilities and commerce. Although there is much enthusiasm within India’s space industry about Modi’s latest steps to liberalize the space sector, there are also deep concerns that his government will be too slow in translating political commitments into policy actions. Transitioning from a government monopoly to significant private sector participation will face many obstacles, including a cumbersome approval process, a lack of coordination among different government agencies, and continuing temptation to regulate rather than promote. That said, Modi has been bold in opening up the government’s science and technology programs, which had long been considered absolutely no-go areas for private companies. Modi began his first term in 2014 with a vision of radically reforming India’s state-heavy economy, brandishing the slogan that government “has no business to be in business” and promising “minimum government and maximum governance.” But he found it hard to overcome entrenched political resistance in a country with a long history of economic populism and obstruction by India’s bureaucrats. He is beginning to have some success in the second term. Last week’s re-privatization of Air India 68 years after it was nationalized is a major landmark and likely to quicken the pace of public sector divestment. India’s liberalized space sector at home has been coupled with greater engagement with India’s partners in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the Quad) on space security, abandoning India’s traditional go-it-alone approach. Bilateral U.S.-Indian conversations on space security cooperation that began under the Trump administration now appear to be close to some concrete steps. When Modi and U.S. President Joe Biden met in Washington last month, the two sides agreed to finalize an agreement on space situational awareness by the end of this year. The agreement is about monitoring and exchanging information on the rapidly growing cloud of objects in near-Earth space, including satellites, disused objects known as “space junk,” and natural bodies. The objective is to keep space navigable as the world’s commercial and military stakes rise.

#### Indo-US space alliance antagonizes China – its perceived as a security threat and escalates tensions

Hicket 17 (Cameron Hickert (Class of 2017) is from the United States of America, and graduated from the University of Denver. Space Rivals: Power and Strategy in the China-India Space Race August 14, 2017, Schwarzman Scholars, <https://www.schwarzmanscholars.org/events-and-news/space-rivals-power-strategy-china-india-space-race/)//ww> pbj

Yet in light of regional power politics, deep technological cooperation – particularly regarding space tracking capabilities – would be imprudent for the United States. Due to the current political climate between the U.S. and China in regards to space cooperation, the partnership with India would appear negatively. This is also true against the backdrop of South China Sea involvement in which the U.S. is currently a factor, as well as ongoing border disputes between China and India. Because China sets such a strong emphasis on the power implications of the regional space order, as well as the reality of the military-civilian dual uses of space technology, stronger U.S.-India cooperation on this front would almost surely antagonize Beijing. This is in contrast to India’s approach, which finds a more solid grounding in the economic aspects of the regional space race. The implications of U.S.-India technological cooperation would be a heightened risk environment in the region, and potentially a more belligerent China on security issues; both of these would be negative outcomes for the U.S., and would cause India more risk. It would also escalate the security and military aspects of the regional space race to a new level, stirring tensions and undermining the possibility of enhanced regional cooperation in the near future.

Political ramifications outside the region are also possible, as China might seek to block India from the sort of partnerships it has been developing with Europe and Russia. Although this would not be a problem as of now – India does not seem intensely focused on space station access or capabilities – it would crystallize an environment unfriendly to burgeoning Indian capabilities in the coming decades. Avoiding technological transfer to both China and India would also enable the U.S. to avoid growing any perceived role in the India-Pakistan relationship, in which both nations would resent any technological support provided to the other. U.S. technological assistance to India would irk Pakistan, and the China-Pakistan relationship could produce anti-American sentiment in India if U.S. technological assistance to China were to seep into SUPARCO’s hands. Finally, because the space industry in India is still in its early stages and is tightly interwoven with commercial interests, the risks that U.S. technology shared in partnership with India then disseminate to actors and areas unfavorable to the United States is a stark possibility. Favoring people-to-people and political partnerships with China above technological cooperation with India may appear to undercut positive momentum built under the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, but that is not the case. Similar to its economy- focused approach to space-related developments, India continues to uphold economic success as its core goal. This not only means the civil nuclear deal the U.S. Congress ratified in 2008 may not have earned the U.S. as much pull as some had expected, but also that India is unlikely to sabotage economic ties with China on behalf of U.S. interests. The year after the framework for the nuclear deal was announced, China and India declared China-India Friendship Year. Even after India participated in some military exercises in the South China Sea upon signing a joint communiqué with the U.S. stating “the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea,” India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi made it extremely clear that his first, second, and third priorities were the advancement of India’s economy. The regional space race in Asia is alive and well, with China and India developing an increasingly fast-paced rivalry. Within this context, there exists clear differences in approaches between the two nations: China is open in its power-based rationale (including both hard and soft power) for the space program, which is targeted at both domestic and foreign audiences, while India is much more circumspect and technical in its official rhetoric and strategy. These dissimilarities make sense within the frameworks of the existing strengths and shortfalls of each nation’s space program, and also drive the future aims of both nations as they continue to develop a space program encompassing military, economic, and scientific characteristics. The U.S., as the global space superpower, is always a factor in this competitive dynamic, and as such must be deliberate in its approach.

#### Tensions are bad now, but have potential to improve – it’s try or die aff – independently takes out revisionism args in context of India – China wants cooperation

IANS 12/28 [Business Standard, “Will India-China relations take a different turn in the coming year?”, 12-28-2021, https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/will-india-china-relations-take-a-different-turn-in-the-coming-year-121122800367\_1.html]//pranav

New Delhi, December 28: Will the new year bring in new dimensions to India-China relations? The two neighbours have not had the best of relations since the Galwan clash in 2020. But despite that bilateral trade between the two have grown in the last one year. 'Boosting China's imports from India is the right way to go, and there is room for coordination between the two sides in this regard, and it should be a joint effort,' Global Times in its editorial. The Chinese state-owned news organization also said that the challenge for both sides 'is not who will replace whom but how to work together to strengthen their positions in the global supply chain.' 'Like it or not, India is already tightly connected to China and embedded in the international supply chain,' it said adding that deepening economic ties will go a long way in resolving the current impasse. Bilateral trade between the two Asian giants crossed $100 billion in the first 11 months of this year to clock a total of $114.26 billion. This is a whopping 46.4 per cent increase over the same period in the previous year. In 2001, trade between the two countries stood at $1.83 billion. While India's exports to China touched $26.358 billion -- an increase of 38.5 per cent year-on-year imports from Beijing stood at $87.905 billion, a rise of 49 per cent. Consider this. China which earlier did not import rice from India, has now started sourcing the grain from New Delhi. Its dependence on India for supply of rice has steadily increased in the last two years. According to S&P Global, 'Indian rice has come from representing less than 1 per cent of Chinese rice imports in 2020 to representing 23 per cent so far in 2021, making it the largest supplier of rice to China.'

#### India China war escalates nuclear.

Mizokami ’21 [Kyle Mizokami, 1-16-2021, "A Chinese-Indian Nuclear War Would Ruin the Whole Planet," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/chinese-indian-nuclear-war-would-ruin-whole-planet-176573>] // akhileshp

Still, China does not necessarily need tactical aircraft to do great damage to India. China could supplement its aerial firepower with ballistic missiles from the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces. The PLARF overseas both nuclear, conventional and dual-use ballistic missiles, and could conceivably move up to two thousand short- and medium-range DF-11, DF-15 and DF-21 ballistic missiles into positions adjacent to India. These missiles could be used to blitz Indian strategic targets on the ground, at the cost of making them unavailable for contingencies in the South and East China Seas. Meanwhile, India’s air forces are in a better position to contest the skies than their Chinese counterparts. While the war would take place on China’s sparsely manned frontier, New Delhi is only 213 miles from the Tibetan frontier. India’s air fleet of 230 Su-30Mk1 Flankers, sixty-nine MiG-29s and even its Mirage 2000s are competitive with or even better than most of China’s aircraft in theater, at least until the J-20 fighter becomes operational. India likely has enough aircraft to deal with a two-front war, facing off with Pakistan’s Air Force at the same time. India is also fielding the [Akash medium-range air defense missile system](http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/revealed-indias-newest-air-defense-system/) to protect air bases and other high-value targets. While India could be reasonably confident of having an air force that deters war, at least in the near term, it has no way of stopping a Chinese ballistic-missile offensive. Chinese missile units, firing from Xinjiang and Tibet, could hit targets across the northern half of India with impunity. India has no ballistic-missile defenses and does not have the combined air- and space-based assets necessary to hunt down and destroy the missile launchers. India’s own ballistic missiles are dedicated to the nuclear mission and would be unavailable for conventional war. The war on the ground between the Indian and Chinese armies might at first glance seem like the most decisive phase of the war, but it’s actually quite the opposite. Both the western and eastern theaters are in rugged locations with little transportation infrastructure, making it difficult to send a mechanized army through. Massed attacks could be easily stopped with artillery as attacking forces are funneled through well-known valleys and mountain passes. Despite the enormous size of both armies (1.2 million for the Indian Army and 2.2 for the Chinese Army) fighting on the ground would likely be a stalemate with little lost or gained. The war at sea would be the decisive front in a conflict between the two countries. Sitting astride the Indian Ocean, India lies on China’s jugular vein. The Indian Navy, with its force of submarines, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and surface ships could easily curtail the the flow of trade between China and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. It would take the Chinese Navy weeks to assemble and sail a fleet capable of contesting the blockade. Even then, the blockade would be hard to break up, conducted over the thousands of square miles of the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, shipping to and from China would be forced to divert through the western Pacific Ocean, where such diversions would be vulnerable to Australian, Japanese, or American naval action. 87 percent of the country’s petroleum needs are imported from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Africa. [China’s strategic petroleum reserves](http://www.businessinsider.com/biggest-strategic-petroleum-reserves-countries-2017-3), once completed sometime in the 2020s, could stave off a nationwide fuel shortage for up to seventy-seven days—but after that Beijing would have to seek an end to the war however possible. The second-order effects of the war at sea would be India’s greatest weapon. War jitters, the shock to the global economy, and punitive economic action by India’s allies—including Japan and the United States—could see demands for exports fall, with the potential to throw millions of Chinese laborers out of work. Domestic unrest fueled by economic troubles could become a major problem for the Chinese Communist Party and its hold on the nation. China has no similar lever over India, except in the form of a rain of ballistic missiles with high-explosive warheads on New Delhi and other major cities. A war between India and China would be nasty, brutal and short, with far-reaching consequences for the global economy. The balance of power and geographic constraints means a war would almost certainly fail to prove decisive. Both sides have almost certainly concluded this, which is why there hasn’t been a war for more than fifty years. We can only hope it stays that way.

#### Externally, causes US-China and US-Pakistan war where they first strike– it undermines South Asian stability

Hutto ’20 [Dr. J. Wesley Hutto, “Space Entanglements: The India–Pakistan Rivalry and a US–China Security Dilemma”, 11-24-2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2425757/space-entanglements-the-indiapakistan-rivalry-and-a-uschina-security-dilemma/]//pranav

On 1 May 2023, protests in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (commemorating the 75th anniversary of the entrance of the Pakistan Army into the 1947 war), devolved into riots, and a subsequent militant action to cross the LAC into Indian union territory of Jammu and Kashmir.9 The night of protests seem to have served as cover for the covert action, thought to be carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), designated as a terrorist group by a number of countries and international organizations, including the United States and the United Nations.

Members of JeM reportedly crossed the LAC sometime around midnight in several different places and fired on Indian Army patrols and outposts near Uri, Punch, Rajauri, and Naushahra, killing hundreds of Indian personnel before retreating back across the border. Based on Indian reports, many of the militants are believed to be members of the regular Pakistan Army. JeM historically has been known to have close ties to Pakistan’s security establishment.

While Pakistan arrested dozens of JeM members in response, this was not satisfactory for New Delhi, which, in retaliation, ordered immediate air strikes on several known JeM encampments in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Much as it did in 2019, Pakistan responded with air strikes of its own, but more reminiscent to the events in 2001, both states as of 5 May 2023, have mobilized their armies not only along the Kashmiri borders but also elsewhere along the borders of Pakistan and India. The mutual mobilizations are creating the tensest situation between the two nuclear powers since the 2001 standoff and threaten to spill over into a full-blown regional war.

China, having come to blows with India as recently as 2020,10 grows increasingly concerned with the buildup and mobilization of Indian forces. Since the Indian government officially announced the establishment of the Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh as separate union territories in 2019, to more easily integrate the region politically into India, relations with China have deteriorated. The Chinese Communist Party, in addition to providing military aid to Pakistan, has placed troops on alert along its Himalayan border with India.

The United States is in a peculiar position regarding the crisis, as it values both of its partnerships with India and Pakistan in South Asia. As the world’s largest democracy, India has always served the interests of the United States and has proved to be a potential balancer against China’s rise in the East. Pakistan, for its part, remains a necessary, if sometimes unreliable, partner that is needed to assist bringing an end to the America’s 22-year misadventure in Afghanistan.11 Since the incident in Indo-Pakistan 2019, the United States has largely stayed above the fray, advising and (in some cases) aiding the construction of resiliency mechanisms to terrorist attacks across the Indian government, while turning a relatively blind eye to Pakistani belligerence.12 While many in the United States are calling for a condemnation of Pakistan’s involvement in the attacks, Washington has remained mute. When asked directly as to why this was, the US secretary of state responded that a regional war in South Asia would be “devastating.” Still, Chinese involvement in the conflict, especially the activation of its space assets on behalf of Pakistan, has increased US concern.

US and Indian cooperation in space goes back to the 1960s, when the United States assisted the inception of the Indian space program to train personnel, assemble and launch sounding rockets, and establish a launch center on Indian soil. Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the United States continued to share telecommunications and weather forecasting satellite data with India. The progressive development of the Indian space program has been accompanied by further cooperation with the United States and NASA. India was the first country in the world to enter the Martian orbit on its first attempt. Additionally, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) successfully directed satellites in the vicinities of the Moon and Mars between 2008 and 2014. As the number of Indian assets in space has grown, the need to protect those assets has grown as well.13 Additionally, the increasing militarization of space by countries such as the United States and China has pushed India further in the direction of military space programs that go beyond the current limits of military communications and surveillance. Asked about India’s reaction to the Chinese antisatellite missile test (ASAT) test of 2008, the former ISRO head responded, “Obviously we start worrying. We cannot overlook this aspect. India has spent a huge sum to develop its capabilities and place assets in space. Hence, it becomes necessary to protect them from adversaries. There is a need to look at means of securing these.”14 The Pakistani government has raised concerns about the growing Indo-US relationship in space,15 noting that too much US assistance will undermine strategic stability in South Asia.16

In combination with the new Indian warfighting strategy, “Cold Start,” designed to seize Pakistani territory quickly to prevent the tactical use of nuclear weapons over India, India’s quest for larger constellations of remote sensing satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO) risks to further destabilize the political situation in South Asia: “It is generally believed that India’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) system cannot work effectively without having a constellation of remote sensing satellites in LEO.”17 A more functional Indian BMD system provides the Indian arsenal a higher probability of survivability, almost guaranteeing an Indian second-strike option. The capability afforded by India’s dedicated geostationary satellite GSAT-7 plays an important role in supporting such a delivery of ballistic missiles and, more generally, in any future crises.18 Thus, it threatens to undermine the fragile balance of nuclear and conventional capabilities on the subcontinent. The successful Indian direct ascent antisatellite (DA-ASAT) missile test in 2019 compounds this danger, promising to remove adversary’s orbiting remote sensing satellites that might threaten India’s own missile capabilities. Any move by the United States to further this offset could result in a larger military action on the part of not only Pakistan but China as well.

#### That goes nuclear – threat’s underrated, and the US uses bad war planning so don’t assume the perfect strategy during first strike

Talmadge 18 [Caitlin Talmadge is Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. This essay is adapted from “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War With the United States,” International Security, Spring 2017. Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control. 2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option]

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power.

### 1AC – Adv-- Space Militarization

**India space privatizing now – government development has been too slow; but that causes militarization– the government believes it needs to defend its private assets**

**Nanda 10/13** (Prakash Nanda has been commenting on politics, foreign policy on strategic affairs for nearly three decades. A former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship, he is also a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. October 13, 2021, As India Opens Up Space, How ISRO Could Help Indian Air Force Become An Aerospace Superpower, Eurasian Times, Prime Minister Narendra Modi on October 11 launched the Indian Space Association (ISpA) – the premier industry association of space and satellite companies. <https://eurasiantimes.com/as-india-opens-up-space-how-isro-could-help-indian-air-force-become-an-aerospace-superpower/)//ww> pbj

He said: “Today is the day the Indian space sector receives new wings. **For 75 years since independence, Indian space has been dominated by a single umbrella of Indian government and government institutions**. Scientists of India have made huge achievements in these decades, but the need of the hour is that there should be **no restrictions on Indian talent, whether it is in the public sector or in the private sector**. “In a way, the country has given a new gift to the **talent of India’s entrepreneurs by opening up India’s space sector in its 75th year of independence**. Let this collective power of India’s population take the space sector forward in an organized manner. The Indian Space Association (ISpA) will play a huge role in this.” ISpA aims at contributing to the government’s vision of making India “Atmanirbhar” (self-reliant) and a global leader in the space arena, which is fast emerging as the next growth frontier for mankind. **The association is supposed to engage with stakeholders across the ecosystem for the formulation of an enabling policy framework that will also work towards building global linkages for the Indian space industry to bring in critical technology and investments.** Its founding members include Bharti Airtel, Larson & Toubro, Nelco (Tata Group), OneWeb, Mapmyindia, Walchandnagar Industries, and Alpha Design Technologies. Other core members include Godrej, Hughes India, Ananth Technology Limited, Azista-BST Aerospace Private Limited, BEL, Centum Electronics, and Maxar India. India Lagging Behind According to ISRO, the current size of the global space economy stands at about $360 billion. **However, India accounts for only about 2% of the space economy with a potential to capture 9% of the global market share by 2030.** This needs to change. Despite Rafale Boost, Why Indian Air Force Remains ‘Ill-Equipped’ To Battle Chinese PLAAF Over The LAC? And here comes the **role of the IAF in safeguarding the space economy**, among other reasons. With the **increasing private sector activities in space, such as the launching of commercial satellites, the introduction of ‘space tourism’, asteroid mining of minerals, and a range of other fascinating stuff, these space assets of the country need protection from the enemy forces. This explains why many countries have been creating their respective “space forces”.** The US created one in 2019, with the space force becoming a new military branch to protect the nation’s satellites and other space assets, which are vital to everything from national security to day-to-day communications. The United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Japan are said to be following suit. Last month, Germany announced the development of a military space command. China’s “Strategic Support Force”, established in 2015, takes care of its space assets. And Russia since 2015 has had dedicated “Russian Aerospace Forces”. India’s Defence Space Agency It is against this background that Prime Minister Modi had in 2018 **announced the government’s intention to create the Defence Space Agency (DSA)** by integrating space assets from the army, navy, and air force. It was formally set up in 2019 with a staff of some 200 officers drawn from the three services, commanded by an air force officer. It took over the Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre and the Defence Satellite Control Centre. Pioneer In Indian Aviation – Can Tatas Again ‘Rule The Roost’ After Acquiring National Carrier – Air India? In fact, the DSA conducted its first integrated space warfare exercise in July 2019, bringing together personnel from across the services. It “focused on using communications and reconnaissance satellites to integrate intelligence and fires across the range of Indian military assets, indicating a firm understanding of the necessity of access to space.” However, the **DSA is still a work in progress. It is yet to become fully operational**. It is to be located in Delhi and supposed to work closely with the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) and ISRO to **integrate military assets, surveillance platforms such as the AWACS and AEW&C, and commercial and military satellites for intelligence sharing across all three services.** It may be noted that satellites are vitally important to modern warfare as they are a key communication link for ground, sea, and airborne assets, which require sufficient data for voice and data communication. The **DSA, therefore, is also expected to play a greater role in enunciating the planned policies for space-based assets, allowing Indian agencies and companies to work towards meeting these requirements**. A 2016 report on ‘Exploiting Indian Military Capacity in Outer Space’ by the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), states that while indigenous satellites provide an adequate capability, “but despite these, India does not get uninterrupted observation of the interested area which is possible only if India launches constellation of satellites for observation which is an emerging trend.” However, it did not mean that India never had dedicated satellites for military purposes before. India had created an “Integrated Space Cell” in June 2008 under the command of the Integrated Defence Services Headquarters with the responsibility to coordinate activities of ISRO and the Indian Armed forces. Integrating Space Assets By 2017, India had reportedly some 14 satellites that were being used for surveillance purposes. This number must have gone up by now, with the country developing ASAT (Anti-satellite) capability, though it is said to be in a nascent stage. Besides, India’s National Technical Research Organization (NTRO), which is controlled by the Research and Analysis Wing, India’s premier intelligence agency, makes extensive use of IRS (Indian Remote Satellites), RISAT (Radar Imaging Satellites), and CARTOSAT (optical earth observation satellites) data to aid in building a comprehensive intelligence picture. All this makes it clear why the Indian government has now realized the need for integrating space assets and capabilities. But, the IAF had realized this very well by publishing in 2012 “Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force, 2012”. In it, the IAF repeatedly mentioned “air and space power”. The doctrine was not talking of “air power” in isolation of “space power”; it talked of “aerospace power”. However, the problem has been that while the IAF has been very clear that it has an aerospace role and in this task, it needs the help of the ISRO, the latter has not been that enthusiastic to join hands, at least publicly. As India is a signatory to the international treaty that outlaws military activities (Outer Space Treaty) in space, a common property of mankind, the ISRO seems to have taken a too legalistic view of abhorring the IAF. But then the fact is that the Outer Space Treaty has been the subject of diplomatic wrangles over the precise definition of space weapons, other than nuclear weapons. Besides, there has been no transparency on the part of major world powers in keeping the outer space free from military activities, with the result that one hears concepts like “Star Wars” (Strategic Defence Initiative) by the US and anti satellites (ASAT) by Russia. In any case, it is a fact that the US and its allies have used space resources extensively in fighting recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. All told, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the **aerospace power of the IAF will protect the space tools like satellites that are used by the ISRO to augment the country’s economic and scientific power. And this will be possible when there is the capacity to destroy the adversary’s space weapons, based in space, air, land, and water.** Secondly, developing aerospace power does not necessarily mean that there will be war. In most cases, augmented power or strength will ensure that the enemy will not dare to attack you. Instead of being a frontier now, **space complements airpower in numerous missions as an enabler.** That is why analysts say that air and space should be complementary components of defense so that they compensate for each other’s inadequacies in maintaining surveillance of the vertical dimension and in **countering threats from systems like ballistic missiles that transit and maneuver through both air and space. They must be integrated so that the diverse and yet potent elements of air and space are networked adequately. Now that the space sector is being opened up by the Modi government, it is hoped that such a network will be a reality, sooner rather than later.**

#### Indian Space Militarization incentivizes Chinese space race destabilizing the space order, increases tensions with Pakistan, and shreds NFU. Reject internal link defense – it doesn’t take into account Modi’s lash out strategies for political gain

Gettleman and Kumar 19 [Jeffrey Gettleman, a winner of the Pulitzer Prize in 2012 for international reporting, is The Times’s South Asia bureau chief; and Hari Kumar, reporter in the New Delhi bureau of The New York Times. 3-27-2019. India Shot Down a Satellite, Modi Says, Shifting Balance of Power in Asia. No Publication. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/world/asia/india-weather-satellite-missle.html?auth=login-email&login=email>.] //aaditg

NEW DELHI — Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced on Wednesday that India had test-fired a rocket that shot down one of its own satellites, escalating the country’s rivalry with China and Pakistan, and demonstrating a strategic capability in space that few countries possess. This technological leap, which was confirmed by the Pentagon, puts India in an exclusive club of nations, along with the United States, Russia and China, that have proved their ability to destroy targets in space. But it has potentially ominous repercussions, accelerating the space race with China and destabilizing the uneasy balance of power between India and Pakistan, which are both armed with nuclear weapons. It could allow India essentially to blind an enemy by taking out its space-based communication and surveillance satellites. Shooting down a satellite is no easy feat. In this case, scientists estimate that the satellite that India blasted apart was moving around the Earth at 17,000 miles per hour. Mr. Modi made the announcement to a rapt nation just weeks before the country heads into a hotly contested election. “India stands tall as a space power!” Mr. Modi tweeted after his announcement. He added that the entire effort had been “indigenous,” accomplished entirely by Indians. When China first successfully tested such an antisatellite missile in 2007, it set off global concern over the growing weaponization of space. Many analysts now worry that the regional rivalry between India and China, the two most populated countries in the world, has moved into space. India’s test was a “demonstration against China,’’ said Kazuto Suzuki, an international relations professor at Hokkaido University in Japan and an expert on space security. “The proliferation of this technology and capability would make the space order very unstable,’’ he said. In Washington, Air Force Lt. Gen. David D. Thompson told a Senate hearing on Wednesday that India’s test did occur, and that the Pentagon was aware beforehand because India had announced flight bans. General Thompson, the vice commander of the Air Force Space Command, said the launch occurred at 1:39 a.m. Eastern Time, and that the explosion was detected at Buckley Air Force Base in Colorado. He said the test “struck the target vehicle” and created 270 pieces of debris that will likely increase as the debris field expands. He added that, “At this point in time, the International Space Station is not at risk.” Mr. Modi broke the news in a rare televised address to the nation, and many Indians immediately suspected that his primary objective was more political than technological. Editors’ Picks An Overlooked Cure for Loneliness Boba Fett, Intergalactic Man of Mystery He Paid $30 for a Drawing. It Could Be a Renaissance Work Worth Millions. Image The launching of a ballistic missile on Wednesday in Odisha, India. The launching of a ballistic missile on Wednesday in Odisha, India.Credit...Indian Space Research Organization In a little more than two weeks, India will begin holding an election — the biggest in history, with nearly 900 million registered voters — and Mr. Modi is up for re-election. Leaders in his political party have recently been heckled in public and attendance has been poor at rallies for some of his party’s candidates. Though Mr. Modi enjoyed a burst of popular support after India conducted airstrikes last month in Balakot, Pakistan, in retaliation for a deadly suicide bombing by militants against Indian forces, that news has mostly subsided. The announcement “shows a poll-eve desperation we hadn’t yet detected/suspected,” tweeted Shekhar Gupta, one of India’s best known political commentators. “It’s just a frantic new national security headline as Balakot has faded in a month.” On Wednesday morning, Mr. Modi posted a message on Twitter, which he uses frequently, telling Indians to tune in because he was about to make a major announcement. Many people believed the speech would be related to Pakistan; tensions had risen fast and high last month after Indian warplanes dropped several bombs on the site in Balakot where Indian authorities said anti-India militants were hiding. It is not clear what, if anything, the Indian Air Force hit. But the next day Pakistan shot down an Indian fighter jet and captured the pilot, pushing the two nuclear-equipped nations dangerously close to a major conflict. Pakistan quickly defused the situation by releasing the pilot. The whole episode brought Mr. Modi a crest of support. The old, thorny issues that had been dogging him — such as rising unemployment, poor drinking water and widespread distress among farmers — disappeared for a moment. Flags came out across the country. Even Indians who disagreed with the Hindu nationalist flavor of Mr. Modi’s party still cheered him. But in the past few days, the electoral mood seems to have changed once again. Complaints about jobs, health care and farm subsidies have been rising. The Indian National Congress, the leading opposition party, scored some points after its leader, Rahul Gandhi, the scion of a longstanding political dynasty, promised that Congress would give the equivalent of $1,000 to India’s poorest families. Around noon, when Mr. Modi was set to address the nation, the streets of New Delhi, the capital, grew uncharacteristically quiet. Many people ducked inside shops to watch TV. Saurav Jha, the editor in chief of “Delhi Defence Review,” an online defense related magazine, said that successfully shooting down a satellite was a major achievement. “It’s as significant as India’s first nuclear blast,” he said. India has been steadily advancing its space program since its first satellite launch in 1975. It joined a manned space mission with Russia in 1984 and launched a Mars orbiter in 2013. This December, India sent its heaviest communication satellite so far, weighing nearly 5,000 pounds, into space. A big motivation clearly is China. As China has stepped up its satellite launches and space probes, India has been trying to catch up. The test, Mr. Jha said, was “very much the part of the India-China rivalry.” Another factor may have been archrival Pakistan. Last year, China helped Pakistan launch a remote sensing satellite. India’s test showed it could blast apart the Pakistani eye in the sky, turning it into space garbage. This could make the bitter regional contest between India and Pakistan even more dangerous. Before this test, the two militaries were widely viewed as comparable. Each side has been reluctant to start a major conflict, fearing that the other could stage a devastating counterattack. But some analysts said that India might now be able to stage a pre-emptive attack on Pakistan’s satellites. That could unsettle the longstanding doctrine of mutually assured destruction that both countries have followed, and put Pakistan even more on edge. It also could presage a change in Indian nuclear strategy. The country has always promised it would make no first use of nuclear weapons — a limitation that means it might lose one or more major cities in a nuclear exchange before striking back. But if it can leverage its new antisatellite technology to move ahead with basic antimissile defenses, which require hitting an incoming warhead in space, it could change the strategic balance. “The militarization of space is underway, whether anybody likes it or not,” Mr. Jha added. Part of the reason, he said, was that satellite technology had become “the backbone of global communication.”

#### Indian ASATS are uniquely destabilizing and produce debris which independently causes miscalc. Independently, flips uniqueness aff bc Indian ASAT capabilities haven’t stopped Chinese encroachment and Pakistan has 0 goals, but it’s try or die for destabilizing prolif.

Davenport ’19 [Kelsey, Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, where she focuses on the nuclear and missile programs in Iran, North Korea, India, and Pakistan and on international efforts to prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorism. She also reports on developments in these areas for Arms Control Today and runs the Arms Control Association’s project assessing the effectiveness of multilateral voluntary initiatives that contribute to nonproliferation efforts, “Indian ASAT Test Raises Space Risks”, May 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-05/news/indian-asat-test-raises-space-risks]/pranav

India’s successful March 27 test of a weapon designed to destroy satellites has raised concerns that the resulting debris field may threaten orbiting space objects and that other states will develop similar weapons.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that New Delhi had successfully used a ballistic missile interceptor to destroy an orbiting satellite, becoming just the fourth country after China, Russia, and the United States to test such anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

India launched the target satellite into low orbit in January, and the interceptor, developed as part of India’s ballistic missile defense system by the Defense Research and Development Organization, was launched from the Abdul Kalam Island launch center. India may have attempted an earlier test on Feb. 12, but that effort appears to have been unsuccessful.

Modi called the test a “historic feat” and said that the country is now “an established space power.” Modi said that India continues to maintain that “space should not be an area for warfare and that remains unchanged” despite the successful test. He described the test as defensive and said it was not targeted at any particular country.

Despite Modi’s insistence that the test was defensive, India’s development of ASAT capabilities could be perceived as offensive and destabilizing. ASAT weapons allow a state to target another country’s satellites, which could cripple intelligence and communications in the event of a conflict.

India has been seeking to match and deter Chinese military capabilities, and New Delhi’s pursuit of an ASAT weapon may have been designed to send a signal to Beijing, which conducted its own ASAT weapons test in 2007. ASAT capabilities are less useful against India’s other regional adversary, Pakistan, because Islamabad relies less on satellites for military and security purposes.

The U.S. State Department press release following the March 27 test took note of India’s announcement, but did not condemn the test. The muted U.S. response could be interpreted by India and other states as a green light for future testing, contributing to concerns about igniting a space race.

In addition to enhancing risks of an ASAT weapons competition, the Indian test introduced orbital debris that could threaten other objects circling the globe, including the International Space Station.

NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine said it was a “terrible, terrible thing to create an event that sends debris” above the station. He said it is “not acceptable” to put astronauts at risk.

#### India Pakistan tensions are high – any attempt at reform is one step forward, three steps back

PTI 12/24 [ The Press Trust of India Ltd., commonly known as PTI, is the largest news agency in India. It is headquartered in New Delhi and is a nonprofit cooperative among more than 500 Indian newspapers 12-24-2021 East Mojo “India-Pakistan ties: Too near yet far apart” <https://www.eastmojo.com/national/2021/12/24/india-pakistan-ties-too-near-yet-far-apart/> ] //aaditg

Islamabad: When Pakistan and India agreed to restore peace along the highly volatile Line of Control (LoC) in February 2021, it appeared that they were again ready to take a turn on the bumpy road of animosity and mistrust. The ensuing months, however, showed that it was yet another mirage. The story of Pakistan-India relations is a tale of the proverbial ‘one step forward, two steps backward’. So far, almost every positive development in terms of the bilateral ties has been overtaken by innate hostility that is often driven by popular sentiments. In a surprise announcement on February 25, India and Pakistan said that they have agreed to strictly observe all agreements on ceasefire along the LoC. India and Pakistan signed a ceasefire agreement in 2003, but it has hardly been followed in letter and spirit over the past several years with more violations than observance of the pact. ADVERTISEMENT CONTINUE READING BELOW The restoration of the ceasefire agreement of 2003 on the LoC was not an exception. Soon it was followed by reports, insinuating that the two sides were engaged in a secret diplomacy in some shady haunt of the Arabian deserts (the so-called talks reportedly being held in the UAE). No official statement was issued about the status of talks but ties remain frozen. Weeks later in March, Army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa said that it was time for India and Pakistan to bury the past and move forward . In his address to first-ever Islamabad Security Dialogue, participated by Who’s Who’ of Pakistan’s security establishment, Gen Bajwa said that stable Indo-Pak relation is a key to unlock the untapped potential of South and Central Asia by ensuring connectivity between East and West Asia but also mentioned that Kashmir was the main stumbling block in normalisation of bilateral ties. Previously Pakistan had conditioned the start of talks with India if it reversed the August, 2019 steps in Kashmir, but Gen Bajwa lowered the bar by saying that India should create a conducive environment. The powerful army, which has ruled Pakistan for more than half of its 70 plus years of existence, has hitherto wielded considerable power in the matters of security and foreign policy. ADVERTISEMENT CONTINUE READING BELOW Prime Minister Imran Khan, who had taken a hardline stance since India abolished the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, also reduced his rhetoric by saying that good relations with neighbours were paramount for national security. “We will not be able to take full advantage of our geo-strategic location until we have regional peace, until our relations with our neighbours and our trade ties do not improve,” he said in the address to the same event. On March 31, Pakistan almost surprised India when its Economic Coordination Committee (ECC), a top decision-making body, lifted a ban on the import of sugar and cotton from India. Finance Minister Hammad Azhar had announced the big decision. Apparently, the permission for import was given without taking all stakeholders on board, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sources in the ministry said that foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi was unhappy with the decision. Consequently, it was withdrawn as quickly as it was announced. Months later in November, Pakistan silently allowed India to use its airspace for direct flights between Kashmir and the UAE, but its fate was not different from the previous positive steps. The move was scuttled after a week when Islamabad withdrew the permission. No reason was given why the flights were allowed, and why they were discontinued. ADVERTISEMENT CONTINUE READING BELOW The event in Afghanistan served as a major diversion as the Taliban took over Kabul in August, giving a big boost to Pakistan vis-a-vis India’s stakes in Afghanistan. In the wake of the change in regime in Afghanistan, Islamabad’s entire attention has been riveted on Kabul and it has been pulling all strings to give time to the Taliban to adjust to the new situation to earn global recognition of its interim government, which includes at least 14 Cabinet members blacklisted by the UN. The Afghan situation stirred a positive development in the context of Pak-India ties. In December, Pakistan allowed India to send a humanitarian shipment of 50,000 tonnes of wheat and life-saving drugs to Afghanistan through the Wagah border crossing. Unlike the short-lived optimism after the permission for direct flights between Srinagar and Sharjah and allowing import of sugar and cotton from India, the decision to let India send wheat on its condition of using only the Afghan trucks for transit has not been reversed. But it is difficult to interpret it as a breakthrough in bilateral relations. In November, India reopened the Kartarpur Corridor that links Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Pakistan, the final resting place of Guru Nanak Dev, to Dera Baba Nanak shrine in Punjab’s Gurdaspur district. ADVERTISEMENT CONTINUE READING BELOW Punjab Chief Minister Charanjit Singh Channi, along with about 30 persons, including his Cabinet ministers, visited the revered Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Pakistan using the visa-free Kartarpur corridor on the second day of the reopening of the route which was suspended for some 20 months following the COVID-19 outbreak. Towards the end of the year, Prime Minister Khan, while addressing a seminar on December 9 in Islamabad, said peace with India is not possible until the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. But he also added another hurdle this time: the RSS ideology. For ties between India and Pakistan, things are back to square one as another year nears its end. The two sides also failed to agree how Indian prisoner Kulbhushan Jadhav on death row in Pakistan should be represented in his review appeal in Islamabad High Court against his conviction by a Pakistani military court.

#### NFU *uniquely* likely to shred since Pakistan has *no* space militarization goals

Bano 20 [ Sher Bano is working as a Research Affiliate at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), a non-partisan think-tank based out of Islamabad, Pakistan. “Modern Diplomacy Indian Militarization of Outer Space: Security Implications For Pakistan” Aug 29, 2020 <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/08/29/indian-militarization-of-outer-space-security-implications-for-pakistan/> ] //aaditg

In March 2019, India had successfully tested an anti-satellite weapon by destroying one of its own satellites in outer space. By doing so, India has become the fourth country in the world after the US, Russia, and China that possess the ASAT capability. Similarly, with this capability, the likelihood of India’s space weaponization is more evident as India would be in a strong position to kinetically destroy any incoming satellite. This would be a significant military advantage, especially in a crisis, as India would be in a position to use its ASAT capability to disturb the satellite communications and intelligence gathering of its opponent states. Along with this, India would be able to destroy the targets of its adversary’s missiles. India has also enhanced the observation, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities of its GSAT series with 0.35m resolution, and RISAT/Cartosat series with1-meter resolution. Moreover, India aspires to integrate its BMD systems (Ballistic Missile Defenses) with its satellites. This expected integration would further strengthen India’s BMD as satellite networks in space would provide early information regarding the incoming missiles. In the same vein, India’s overall BMD capabilities would also enhance with the incorporation of space-based detection along with the S-400 missile system. India’s enhanced space capabilities have further enhanced the security concerns of Pakistan. Since Pakistan does not aspire to militarize the space, there exists a visible qualitative gap between Pakistan’s and India’s space programs. To penetrate the space-based precision targeting capability of India, at the least Pakistan can use the high energy lasers. These lasers are ground-based ASAT weapons that can damage and disturb the other satellites with its sensors. Furthermore, the MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle) capability of Pakistan can easily infiltrate India’s enhanced Missile Defence shield integrated with satellites. Pakistan’s premier space agency SUPARCO needs to further counter the emerging Indian space threat by developing indigenous observation and surveillance capability that could detect Indian space assets.

#### Even limited war causes extinction – best studies

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The concept of nuclear winter was first developed in the early 1980s by scientists including Paul Crutzen, who later won a Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his work on the ozone hole, and legendary astronomer Carl Sagan.3 Sagan went to great lengths to raise awareness about nuclear winter in the 1980s and early 1990s.4 This episode apparently had some influence on policy, with Mikhail Gorbachev citing it as a factor in his desire to cool that era's nuclear tensions and reverse the arms race.5 After fading from the spotlight, nuclear winter began a bit of a comeback in 2007 with the publication of new research examining nuclear winter with the latest scientific models.6 Several follow-up studies and commentaries have been published since, and research is ongoing.7 In technical terms, ‘nuclear winter’ refers specifically to a cooling of Earth's surface such that winter-like temperatures occur during summer, as caused by a sufficiently large nuclear war. Cooling to warmer-than-winter temperatures can be called ‘nuclear autumn’. As per this definition, nuclear winter/autumn is part of a broader suite of environmental consequences of nuclear war. However, all of the environmental consequences can have profound consequences for the planet and for human civilization, and likewise are important for policy. No separate term has been coined for the full suite of environmental consequences of nuclear war, so this paper will use ‘nuclear winter’ as shorthand for the full suite. This use of ‘nuclear winter’ may be interpreted metaphorically: a time of cold, darkness, and death. Nuclear winter is caused by the burning of cities, industrial facilities, trees, and other flammable materials, sending smoke into the atmosphere. The main effects of the smoke derive from the fact that the smoke rises high up into the atmosphere, past the clouds, into the stratosphere where it will not quickly fall back out in rain. At this altitude, the smoke spreads across the planet and gradually falls back out over the next 10–20 years. While it is aloft, the smoke absorbs incoming sunlight and blocks it from reaching the surface. As the smoke absorbs sunlight, the stratosphere warms, causing ozone depletion at a potentially massive scale.8 The ozone depletion causes more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Increased UV radiation can harm living organisms, including humans. Harmful effects include skin cancer and eye damage to animals and the inhibition of photosynthesis in plants.9 Meanwhile, the smoke blocking sunlight from reaching the surface causes colder surface temperatures and less precipitation. Precipitation declines because there is less heat to power the hydrological cycle. The main harmful effect that has been identified is a decline in plant growth, including agricultural production. Secondary effects could include disease outbreaks and additional conflicts.10 The effects occur worldwide, regardless of where the detonations occur, though detonation location can affect the spatial distribution of impacts. For both UV radiation and cooling, the magnitude of the disruption is proportionate to the amount of smoke put into the atmosphere, which in turn depends on the number of nuclear detonations, the bombs’ yields, the detonation locations, and other factors. Regarding detonation location, a key variable is whether the detonation occurs in a city, and if it does, the population density of the city. Other locations such as industrial zones can also produce significant quantities of smoke. This is why nuclear weapons testing has not caused nuclear winter: the tests were conducted in remote locations or at high altitude, and thus did not have much to burn. The location of a city on the globe can also make a difference, given Earth's topography and atmospheric circulation patterns, but this effect is smaller. The most heavily studied nuclear winter scenario involves war between India and Pakistan in which each country uses 50 nuclear weapons, each with a 15 kiloton yield, comparable to the Little Boy weapon dropped on Hiroshima. The studies assume that the weapons are dropped on each country's major cities, and not on, for example, remote military targets, producing 5 teragrams of smoke.11 In this scenario, ozone loss would range from 20 per cent to 70 per cent from low to high latitudes.12 Temperatures would fall about 1.25°C within the first year. Even ten years after, temperatures would still be about 0.5°C below normal.13 Crop yields in China and the Midwestern United States are projected to decline by around 10–30 per cent.14 One analysis estimates that at least two billion people would be at risk of starvation.15 A core point is that even a ‘limited’ regional nuclear war could have catastrophic global consequences. It should be emphasized that what drives nuclear winter is the quantity of smoke entering the stratosphere, not where the nuclear war occurs. Thus, a comparably large nuclear war between other countries would have similar global climatic and humanitarian effects. The India–Pakistan scenario offers an illustrative and relatively probable case, but any nuclear weapon state except North Korea could produce similar effects. A larger nuclear exchange involving American and Russian arsenals would cause further disruption. An exchange of about 1,200 weapons could produce about 50 teragrams of smoke, causing temperatures to fall by about 4°C. For 4,000 weapons – around what New START prescribes – there could be 150 teragrams of smoke, with a temperature fall of about 8°C. Agriculture failure would be so severe and widespread that it becomes easier to count the survivors than the fatalities.16 Climate scientist Alan Robock, who has led many of the recent nuclear winter studies, expects some survivors ‘especially in Australia and New Zealand’.17 While this is hardly a cheerful evaluation, even this may be too optimistic. Hopefully some people somewhere would find some way to survive. But the conditions would be harsh enough that survival is no guarantee.18 Finally, it should be acknowledged that, over the years, there has been some scepticism of whether nuclear winter would actually occur, or would occur with enough severity to be worth factoring into security policy.19 To an extent, one cannot be sure what would happen, because a large exchange of nuclear weapons has fortunately never occurred. However, there are at least two reasons to believe that the current round of nuclear winter science is yielding results that are at least in the general vicinity of what would actually happen. One reason is that the science uses modern climate models developed for the study of global warming. Global warming has its own sceptics and controversies, which has led to the climate models being heavily scrutinized.20 Climate science may well be the most carefully vetted of all the sciences. The nuclear winter researchers are themselves distinguished climate scientists and are using state-of-the-art climate models. And two distinct nuclear winter research groups from two different countries using two different sets of models both report approximately the same results.21 While some uncertainties in the science of nuclear winter remain and additional research could provide additional confidence, it should be expected that the current research results are basically sound. The second reason for believing that nuclear winter would occur is that it has a historical precedent in volcano eruptions. Volcano eruptions, like nuclear weapon detonations, cause large amounts of smoke to rise into the atmosphere. An insightful example is the 1815 Mount Tambora eruption. The Tambora eruption caused temperatures to fall by about 0.5°C, resulting in major food shortages and other disruptions, such that 1816 is now known as the ‘Year Without Summer’.22 While humanity ultimately survived Tambora, nuclear war could put even more smoke into the atmosphere and cause more severe disruption. It, thus, is important to factor into nuclear security policy

### 1AC – Framing – Util

**The standard is minimizing material violence.**

**Prefer:**

#### [4] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

**Moen 16**, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value** and disvalue **is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” **are** here **understood inclusively**, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for**?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. **The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good**. 3 As Aristotle observes: “**We never ask** [a man] **what** his **end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself**.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that **if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad**. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue**, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

**[2] Actor Spec— States must use util. Any other standard dooms the moral theory**

**Goodin 90.** Robert Goodin 90, [professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences], “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142 //RS

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.

#### [3] Extinction First –

#### [a] Forecloses future improvement – we can never improve society because our impact is irreversible

#### [b] Turns suffering – mass death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### [c] Moral uncertainty – if we’re unsure about which interpretation of the world is true – we ought to preserve the world to keep debating about it

#### Science proves non util ethics are impossible.

Greene 10 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University

(The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)

**What turn-of-the-millennium science** **is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise**, that our **moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural**. **Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions**. Moreover, **anyone who claims to have such a theory**, or even part of one, **almost certainly doesn't**. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that **rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here**. Instead, I suspect, **they** **will insist that I have simply misunderstood what** Kant and like-minded **deontologists are all about**. **Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition**. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. **Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously**. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). **This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view**, as I've suggested, **may be misleading**. **The problem**, more specifically, **is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological**, though they may appear to be from the inside. **Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love**, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." **This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things**. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of **the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics**. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that **consequentialists**, as much as anyone else, **have respect for persons**, **are against treating people as mere objects,** **wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc**. **A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process**. **Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial**. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. **If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get** characteristically deontological **answers**. Some **will be tautological**: **"Because it's murder!"** **Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means**." "You have to respect people's rights." **But**, as we know, **these answers don't really explain anything**, because **if you give the same people** (on different occasions) **the trolley case** or the loop case (See above), **they'll make the opposite judgment**, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. **Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism**. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, **there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions**. **But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question**.