# 1AC -- Space Settlers

#### Space appropriation is a *re-entrenchment* of settler colonialism built on the lens of *‘conservation’* representing yet another *‘unknown’* to be conquered

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‍“In reaffirming our heritage as a free nation, we must always remember that America has always been a frontier nation. Now we must embrace the next frontier. America’s Manifest Destiny in the stars…The American nation was carved out of the vast frontier by the toughest, strongest, fiercest and most determined men and women ever to walk on the face of the Earth… Our ancestors braved the unknown, tamed the wilderness, settled the Wild West…This is our glorious and magnificent inheritance. We are Americans. We are pioneers. We are the pathfinders. We settled the New World. We built the modern world.” -President Donald J. Trump, 2020 State of the Union address T o most scholars, and certainly to the virtual majority of Indigenous peoples on Turtle Island, it is no secret that the country we call the United States of America was built upon the brutal subjugation of Indigenous people and Indigenous lands. Fueled by the American settler myths of terra nullius (no man’s land) and Manifest Destiny, the American settler state proceeded upon a project of cultural and physical genocide, with lasting effects that endure to the present day. The ‘settler myth’ permeates American culture. Words such as ‘pioneer’, the ‘West’, ‘Manifest Destiny’ grab the imagination as connected to the growth of the country in its early history. America sprang forth from a vast open ‘wilderness’. Of course, for Indigenous people, we know differently—these lands had complex cultural frameworks and political entities long before colonization. Words like ‘pioneer’ and ‘Manifest Destiny’, have deep meanings for us too, as they are indicative of the very real damage dealt against our cultures and nations, damage that we have had to work very hard to undo. Trump’s address raises key insights into the continuing logics of settler colonialism, as well as questions of its future trajectories. Trump’s invocation of ideas such as the ‘frontier’ and ‘taming the wilderness’ draws attention to the brutal violence that accompanied the building of the American state. Scholars such as Greg Grandin (2019) make the case that the frontier is part of what America is—whether it is the ‘Wild West’, or the U.S.-Mexican border, America is always contending with a frontier that must be defined. Language surrounding ‘frontier’ is troubling because it perpetuates the rationale of why the American settler state even exists—it could make better use of the land than Native people would, after all, they lived in wilderness. This myth tells us that what we know as the modern world was built through the hard work of European settlers; Indigenous people had nothing to offer or contribute. For someone like Mr. Trump, whose misgivings and hostility towards Native people have been historically documented, this myth fits well with his narrative as President—he is building a ‘new’ America, one that will return to its place of power and influence. The fact that similar language is being used around the potential of American power being extended to space could reasonably be expected, given the economic and military potential that comes from such a move. Space represents yet another ‘unknown’ to be conquered and bent to America’s will. However, such interplanetary conquest does not exist solely in outer space. I wish to situate the very real colonial legacies and violence associated with the desire to explore space, tracing the ways that they are perpetuated and reified through their destructive engagements with Indigenous peoples. I argue that a scientific venture such as space exploration does not exist in a vacuum, but instead draws from settler colonialism and feeds back into it through the prioritization of ‘science’ over Indigenous epistemologies. I begin by exploring the ways that space exploration by the American settler state is situated within questions of hegemony, imperialism, and terra nullius, including a brief synopsis of the controversy surrounding the planned construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea. I conclude by exploring Indigenous engagement with ‘space’ in both its Earthbound and beyond-earth forms as it relates to outer space, and what implications this might have for the ways we think about our engagement with space as the American settler state begins to turn its gaze skyward once again. I position this essay alongside a growing body of academic work, as well as journalistic endeavors (Haskins, 2020; Koren, 2020) that demands that the American settler colonial state exercise self-reflexivity as to why it engages with outer space, and who is advantaged and disadvantaged here on Earth as a result of this engagement. Settler Colonialism and ‘Space’ A brief exploration of what settler colonialism is, and its engagement with ‘space’ here on Earth is necessary to start. Settler colonialism is commonly understood to be a form of colonialism that is based upon the permanent presence of colonists upon land. This is a distinction from forms of colonialism based upon resource extraction (Wolfe, 2006; Veracini, 2013). What this means is that the settler colony is intimately tied with the space within which it exists—it cannot exist or sustain itself without settler control over land and space. This permanent presence upon land by ‘settlers’ is usually at the expense of the Indigenous, or original people, in a given space or territory. To reiterate: control over space is paramount. As Wolfe states, “Land is life—or at least, land is necessary for life. Thus, contests for land can be—indeed, often are—contests for life” (2006: 387). Without land, the settler state ‘dies’; conversely, deprivation of land from the indigenous population means that in settler logic, indigeneity dies (Povinelli, 2002; Wolfe, 2006.) The ultimate aims of settler colonialism is therefore the occupation and remaking of space. As Wolfe (2006) describes, the settler state seeks to make use of land and resources in order to continue on; whether that is through homesteading/residence, farming and agriculture, mining, or any number of activities that settler colonial logic deems necessary to its own survival. These activities are tied to a racist and hubristic logic that only settler society itself possesses the ability to make proper use of land and space (Wolfe, 2006). This is mated with a viewpoint of landscapes prior to European arrival as terra nullius, or empty land that was owned by no one, via European/Western conceptions of land ownership and tenure (Wolfe, 1994). Because of this overarching goal of space, there is an inherent anxiety in settler colonies about space, and how it can be occupied and subsequently rewritten to remove Indigenous presence. In Anglo settler colonies, this often takes place within a lens of conservation. Scholars such as Banivanua Mar (2010), Lannoy (2012), Wright (2014) and Tristan Ahtone (2019) have written extensively on the ways that settler reinscription of space can be extremely damaging to Indigenous people from a lens of ‘conservation’. However, dispossession of Indigenous space in favor of settler uses can also be tied to some of the most destructive forces of our time. For example, Aboriginal land in the Australian Outback was viewed as ‘empty’ land that was turned into weapons ranges where the British military tested nuclear weapons in the 1950s, which directly led to negative health effects upon Aboriginal communities downwind from the testing sites (Vincent, 2010). Indigenous nations in the United States have struggled with environmental damage related to military-industrial exploitation as well. Saturn V rocket. (Image credit: NASA) But, what does this all look like in regard to outer space? In order to really understand the potential (settler) colonial logics of space exploration, we must go back and explore the ways in which space exploration became inextricably tied with questions of state hegemony and geopolitics during the Cold War. US and Soviet space programs were born partially out of military utility, and propaganda value—the ability to send a nuclear warhead across a great distance to strike the enemy via a ICBM and the accompanying geopolitical respect that came with such a capability was something that greatly appealed to the superpowers, and when the Soviets took an early lead in the ‘Space Race’ with Sputnik and their Luna probes, the United States poured money and resources into making up ground (Werth, 2004). The fear of not only falling behind the Soviets militarily as well as a perceived loss of prestige in the court of world opinion spurred the US onto a course of space exploration that led to the Apollo moon landings in the late 1960s and the early 70s (Werth, 2004; Cornish, 2019). I argue that this fits neatly into the American settler creation myth referenced by Trump—after ‘conquering’ a continent and bringing it under American dominion, why would the United States stop solely at ‘space’ on Earth? To return to Grandin (2019), space represented yet another frontier to be conquered and known by the settler colonial state; if not explicitly for the possibility of further settlement, then for the preservation of its existing spatial extent on Earth. However, scholars such as Alan Marshall (1995) have cautioned that newer logics of space exploration such as potential resource extraction tie in with existing military logics in a way that creates a new way of thinking about the ‘openness’ of outer space to the logics of empire, in what Marshall calls res nullius (1995: 51)[i]. Telescopes on Mauna Kea. (Photo credit: University of Hawaii-Hilo) But we cannot forget the concept of terra nullius and how our exploration of the stars has real effects on Indigenous landscapes here on Earth. We also cannot forget about forms of space exploration that may not be explicitly tied to military means. Doing so deprives us of another lens through which to view the tensions between settler and Indigenous views of space and to which end is useful. Indeed, even reinscribing of Indigenous space towards ‘peaceful’ settler space exploration have very real consequences for Indigenous sovereignty and Indigenous spaces. Perhaps the most prominent example of the fractures between settler space exploration and Indigenous peoples is the on-going controversy surrounding the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea, on the island of Hawaii. While an extremely detailed description of the processes of construction on the TMT and the opposition presented to it by Native Hawai’ians and their allies is beyond the scope of this essay, and in fact is already expertly done by a number of scholars[ii], the controversy surrounding TMT is a prime example of the logics presented towards ‘space’ in both Earth-bound and beyond-Earth contexts by the settler colonial state as well as the violence that these logics place upon Indigenous spaces, such as Mauna Kea, which in particular already plays host to a number of telescopes and observatories (Witze, 2020). In particular, astronomers such as Chanda Prescod-Weinstein, Lucianne Walkowicz, and others have taken decisive action to push back against the idea that settler scientific advancement via space exploration should take precedence over Indigenous sovereignty in Earth-space. Prescod-Weinstein and Walkowicz, alongside Sarah Tuttle, Brian Nord and Hilding Neilson (2020) make clear that settler scientific pursuits such as building the TMT are simply new footnotes in a long history of colonial disrespect of Indigenous people and Indigenous spaces in the name of science, and that astronomy is not innocent of this disrespect. In fact, Native Hawai’ian scholars such as Iokepa Casumbal-Salazar strike at the heart of the professed neutrality of sciences like astronomy: One scientist told me that astronomy is a “benign science” because it is based on observation, and that it is universally beneficial because it offers “basic human knowledge” that everyone should know “like human anatomy.” Such a statement underscores the cultural bias within conventional notions of what constitutes the “human” and “knowledge.” In the absence of a critical self-reflection on this inherent ethnocentrism, the tacit claim to universal truth reproduces the cultural supremacy of Western science as self-evident. Here, the needs of astronomers for tall peaks in remote locations supplant the needs of Indigenous communities on whose ancestral territories these observatories are built (2017: 8). As Casumbal-Salazar and other scholars who have written about the TMT and the violence that has been done to Native Hawai’ians (such as police actions designed to dislodge blockades that prevented construction) as well as the potential violence to come such as the construction of the telescope have skillfully said, when it comes to the infringement upon Indigenous space by settler scientific endeavors tied to space exploration, there is no neutrality to be had—dispossession and violence are dispossession and violence, no matter the potential ‘good for humanity’ that might come about through these things. Such contestations over outer space and ethical engagement with previously unknown spaces will continue to happen. Outer space is not the first ‘final frontier’ (apologies to Gene Roddenberry) that has been discussed in settler logics and academic spaces. In terms of settler colonialism, scholars have written about how Antarctica was initially thought of as the ‘perfect’ settler colony—land that could be had without the messy business of pushing Indigenous people off of it (see Howkins 2010). Of course, we know now that engagement with Antarctica should be constrained by ecological concern—who is to say that these concerns will be heeded in ‘unpopulated’ space? What can be done to push back against these settler logics?

#### That manifests into tropes of space exploration that arise the return of colonial exploitative dynamics under the guise of ‘manifest destiny’.

Koren 20 [ Marina Koren Staff writer at Atlantic 9/17/2020“No One Should ‘Colonize’ Space” https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/09/manifest-destiny-trump-space-exploration/612439/]//aaditg

Even if Martians aren’t going to protest our arrival, space exploration presents plenty of other opportunities for the exploitative dynamics of the colonial era to reemerge. Colonial-era travel spread invasive species across the planet; space-era travel could seed earthlings all over the solar system. Last year, for instance, an Israeli spacecraft crash-landed on the surface of the moon and spilled several thousand dehydrated tardigrades, microscopic animals that can survive extreme conditions. The creatures had been snuck aboard by a space entrepreneur who was only supposed to contribute a DVD-size compilation of human knowledge. “Technically, I’m the first space pirate,” he said when news of the stowaways was revealed, much to the horror of space lawyers and planetary-protection researchers. Connecting colonial language to space travel also helps shore up expansionist behavior on Earth: For the past six years in Hawaii, astronomers and local protesters have been locked in a standoff over the construction of a new telescope near the site of Mauna Kea, on land that native Hawaiians consider sacred. Read: The Thirty Meter Telescope and a fight for Hawaii's future “It’s a real failure of imagination to just keep recycling really harmful language and saying that it doesn’t matter because space is somehow different,” says Lucianne Walkowicz, an astronomer at the Adler Planetarium, in Chicago, and the organizer of the 2018 Decolonizing Mars conference. “We are still human beings, even if we go to space.” If astronauts are the elite of space workers, in the future a less powerful class could form, and language associated with exploitation and domination could make those people that much more vulnerable. “The use of this language can give policy makers and decision makers excuses to do bad things because it’s in the name of these really lofty things,” Divya Persaud, a planetary scientist at University College London who has written about the meaning of language in space domains, told me. Asteroid miners, for instance, would be dependent on their faraway employers for health care, safe working conditions, and, quite literally, life support. Oversight can be dicey when your operations are millions of miles away from the only planet with regulatory agencies (that we know of). People are drawn to sweeping rhetoric, wrapped up in fate and higher purpose, because it offers romantic ways of thinking about places they’ve yet to visit. But bringing God into space exploration, as the concept of manifest destiny does, complicates the issue even further. “It does hurt. This idea of It’s provenance; it’s inspired by God—they are taking it out of a human aspect and saying, ‘Hey, we’re being led by something else, something that’s greater than we are,’” Herrington says. “Take ownership and responsibility for what you’re doing. Don’t say somebody else is making us do it.” The way past manifest destiny and other colonial-era language can be simple: Be specific. Just as crewed is a more accurate word than manned, other phrases could easily sub in for the more outdated ones. “Instead of trying to say ‘settlement on Mars’ or ‘colony on Mars,’ why don't we just say, ‘We sent 12 astronauts to Mars?’” Persaud said. Melvin, who is Black, suggested pitching space exploration as something to benefit all humankind, not just the United States. He’s seen Earth as it truly is, a borderless place set against the boundless darkness of space. “You’re watching the world below you while you’re breaking bread with French, German, Russian, Asian American, African American [astronauts]—people from all around the world working together as a team,” Melvin said. “And you know that if Yuri does something wrong, or I do something wrong, or Peggy does something wrong, we can all die.” American leaders have, at times, sold space exploration as an international effort, as a boon for all humankind, as a push for scientific discovery. But in the U.S.—and Russia and China and India and other spacefaring nations—space travel is still a nationalist project. This spring, when NASA launched astronauts from U.S. shores for the first time in nearly a decade, the agency’s leaders pointed out, over and over, that the job was done by “American astronauts on American rockets from American soil.” And the next people to go to the moon, NASA officials have emphasized, will be Americans, and so will the first visitors to Mars. Language matters. When presidents speak of the country’s spirit and its space program in the same breath, when they yoke America’s strength to its feats beyond Earth, they end up describing the nation both as it exists today and as they imagine it in the future. By borrowing from a time when the dominant philosophy staked out American land for white settlers at the expense of the people who already lived there, Trump shows his hand about whom he believes the future of this country is for, whether here on Earth or on worlds beyond.

#### The Settler Vision of space exploration dooms it – it fetishizes the extraction and isolation of outer space, extends its static view of temporality, and reinforces the subject-object relationship with the world

Sammler 21 (Sammler KG, Lynch CR. Apparatuses of observation and occupation: Settler colonialism and space science in Hawai’i. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. September 2, 2021;39(5):945-965. doi:10.1177/02637758211042374, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/02637758211042374)//ww> pbj

Island laboratories

Since Cook’s expeditions, the West has subjected the constellation of Pacific Islands to a multitude of science experiments (DeLoughrey, 2012; Farbotko, 2010). Salmond (2003: ix) explains how “[a]s the edges of the known world were pushed out, wild nature – including the ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’ at the margins of humanity - was brought under the calm, controlling gaze of Enlightenment science, long before colonial domination was attempted.” There is a long history of the liveliness of islands being abstracted by colonial powers and scientists alike, from seemingly innocuous use of the Galapagos as discrete microcosms for theorizing evolution (Matsuda, 2006); to the United States’ devastating testing of nuclear weapons on the Marshall Islands; to botany’s role in the colonization of Hawai’i and its extension into contemporary experiments with genetically-modified organisms replacing native plant species (Goldberg-Hiller and Silva, 2015). As with other landscapes, specific imaginaries of place play a unique role in colonial practices on islands. Continental views of islands align with Enlightenment scientific desire for blank slates, perfect laboratories (Greenhough, 2006; Matsuda, 2007). Mobilizing imaginaries of frontier and isolation, representations of islands within a continental and colonial gaze are, as Matsuda explains, “distant, isolated, uninhabited, and abstract spaces” (2007: 230). The purported distance of the island colony enacts a separation between colonizer and colonized landscape that allows for specific relations and forms of observation. Islands become simplified models of a complex world, acting as “quintessential sites for experimentation” (Baldacchino, 2007: 165) based on fetishized assumptions about island spatiality. Scientists use islands to isolate variables and substitute space for time to construct linear timestreams. Islandness functions as stand-in for a computational time-step within an experimental design. These purported blank slates endow the initial time-step essential to modelling. Islands and their peoples have been employed to examine theories of geological, biological, human, and socio-cultural evolution. DeLoughrey describes how island spatiality is considered bound by “the theme of isolation, a model that had been deployed in the 19th century to propose the theory of evolution, and which re-energized the longstanding colonial understanding of the island as a laboratory” (2012: 168). The expansion of U.S. empire specifically enrolled island colonies from Puerto Rico to the Philippines as sites for grisly experimentations, from weapons to biomedical research on non-white bodies who were seen as relics of earlier stages of evolution (Immerwahr, 2019). Just as islands and their peoples have been used to model past evolutions, they are also established as models for specific futures. Baldacchino describes islands as sites of novelty; they tend toward clairvoyance; they are disposed to act as advance indicators or extreme reproductions of what is present or future elsewhere ... with fallacious simplicity, [they] can be conceived as a convenient platform for any whim or fancy. (2007: 165) Islands have emplaced visions of future climate dystopias (Farbotko, 2010) and imagined libertarian capitalist utopias (Lynch, 2017). The continuation of these projects of empire and white supremacy are shaping plans for human colonization of Moon and Mars. Such projects re-articulate debates around questions of race, ability, eugenics, reproduction, and human psychology in journals like Futures – including a 2019 special issue on ethics in offworld colonization. Through these projects, islands and peoples are erased and overwritten by the totality of the model world they represent. As DeLoughrey explains, “Western colonizers had long configured tropical islands into the contained spaces of a laboratory, which is to say a suppression of island history and Indigenous presence” (2012: 172). An affective landscape of history, more-than-human relationality (Watts, 2013), and lived social place gets transformed into independent, sterile variables instrumentalized in the projection of specific futures. Such discourses intersect with space science imaginaries of exploration, exoticism, and otherworldliness

Settling time

As an empire of time rather than space ... many significant American national theorists sought to escape the political paradoxes of space by conquering time. (Allen, 2008: 13) Allen examines how U.S. empire depends upon three notions of time: a romanticized historical time recounting myths of the nation’s founding, the geological time of natural history, and the mechanized time of the clock and apparatuses of measurement. The organization and control over these three temporalities constitutes a colonial totality (Matson and Nunn, 2017) that works to settle time as much as space in the projection of settler futures. The projection of settler futures depends on the ordering of time, constituted by ideologies of progress, of a mythologized past and present oriented toward the future. Scientific “progress” is positioned as a universal value key to constructing the future, while questioning the actions of Western science is positioned as irrational or reactionary. Concerning the TMT controversy, Casumbal-Salazar writes: Relegated to the ‘dark ages’ of tradition, Native peoples appear as the agonistic menace of the modern scientific state. Delegitimized as irrational within the gendered hierarchies of Western science and philosophy ... Hawaiians become suspect and subject to institutional anti-Native racism yet fetishized as an archeological remnant within multicultural society. (2017: 2) In dominant discourses, Indigenous time is linked to the past, with the present constituted on assimilation and the future on complete erasure (Rifkin, 2017). The existence of contemporary Indigenous peoples poses a challenge to ongoing settler colonial hegemony. Goodyear-Ka‘opua explains how “settler state officials cast the kia ʻi [land protectors, caretakers] as impediments on the road to ‘progress’ (aka settler futurity) ... (mis)representing us as fixed in place, pinned in a remote time” (2017: 191–192). Enlightenment notions of universality erase difference and thus Indigenous claims to prior rights or sovereignty. While these conceptions of time have long been critiqued, they continue to shape the central logics of contemporary Western science, including space science. Linear conceptions of time are necessarily produced out of complex practices that organize and control relative and variable spatio-temporal formations. Rifkin posits a multiplicity of temporalities, writing: temporalities need to be understood as having material existence and efficacy in ways that are not reducible to a single, ostensibly neutral vision of time as universal succession. The concept of frames of reference provides a way of breaking up this presumed timeline by challenging the possibility of definitively determining simultaneity ... Within Einsteinian relativity, simultaneity depends on one’s perspective based on one’s frame of reference. (2017: 20) Einstein’s theory of relativity demonstrates how time is relative, variable, and dependent on acceleration, which is a function of location within a gravitational field. It is a relationship between space, masses, and matter. As Valentine explains: gravity is a consequence of the relational warping of spacetime by matter... That is, gravitational effects are literally universal but emerge locally through relativistic and constantly shifting specific relations among the mass of cosmic bodies and spacetime, producing variable observations from differently situated observers of one another (2017: 189–190). The practices of Western astronomy are dependent on variable and relative relations among space and time. Whether it is earth-bound astronomers punching the clock on Martian time (Mirmalek, 2020) or the stretching of temporal experience in a gravity well, the location of bodies matters as it produces ‘differently situated observers,’ who experience time differently based on their frames of reference. Yet, time is held as a stable frame of reference from which the colonial scientist constitutes the metric for a purportedly universal observer situated in a neutral position of observation. Even Western science’s own understanding of time refuses to conform to Enlightenment notions of universality, demonstrating a contradiction between this ontology and the broader political and social ideologies with which it is entangled. While notions of linear, progressive time are used to justify settler colonial projects, the relative and contingent relationships among space, time, and matter complicate claims to universality. Time, like space, is subject to practices of organization and control that produce subject–object relations key to the Western colonial project. For instance, geologic time, or what Allen refers to as “vertical time,” is the spatial-temporal imaginary of geologic strata. He describes that, while “history often depicted time advancing horizontally across space, the geological revolution made it possible to imagine time extending perpendicularly into the territory beneath the nation” (Allen, 2008: 165). The deep time of geology historicizes Western civilization as the top layer, the apex of natural history, and thus stands to justify colonialism and its civilizational projects. The exploration of cosmological time in the space sciences extends the colonial project further into the far expanses of the future and the totality of the universe.

The apparatus

Gazing out into the night sky or deep down into the structure of matter, with telescope or microscope in hand, Man [sic] reconfirms his ability to negotiate immense differences in scale in the blink of an eye. Designed specifically for our visual apparatus, telescopes and microscopes are the stuff of mirrors, reflecting what is out there ...Man is an individual apart from all the rest. And it is this very distinction that bestows on him the inheritance of distance, a place from which to reflect-on the world, his fellow man, and himself. A distinct individual, the unit of all measure, finitude made flesh, his separateness is the key. (Barad, 2007: 134, emphasis added) In Barad’s deconstructive reading of Enlightenment science, linear time and evacuated space are both the product of active material processes through which a purportedly universal “Man” continually enacts a separation between himself and the universe. It is this supposed separation from the rest of existence that constitutes “Man” as the subject of a masculinist science and the remainder of the universe as the object of his will. Practices of scientific observation and colonial occupation work in tandem to re-enact and reinforce this fundamental subject–object relationship. Critical scholars of science have long argued against the purported passivity of observation, from critiques of the Archimedean point (Yaqoob, 2014) to feminist theories of the embodied and situated nature of knowledge production (Haraway, 1988). Yet, beyond simply noting the ontological impossibility of Man’s separation from the universe, Barad theorizes an emergent and contingent form of separability – what she calls agential separability – that is (re)produced through the material practices of apparatuses. Barad explains that “apparatuses enact agential cuts that produce determinate boundaries and properties of entities within phenomena” (2007: 148). Apparatuses determine what comes to matter and how, thus producing differences between subject and object, which are not stable positions but rather enacted and contingent forms of relationality. We employ the apparatus to explore how subject–object relations of Western colonial science are not universal and absolute, but rather enacted through material practices that selectively produce the privileged subject positions on which settler colonialism and space science both depend. Barad’s theory of spacetimemattering highlights the mutual constitution of space and time through the ongoing material re-configuring of the world. Apparatuses are neither neutral probes of the natural world nor social structures that deterministically impose some particular outcome ... the notion of an apparatus is not premised on inherent divisions between the social and the scientific ... [they] are the practices through which these divisions are constituted. (Barad, 2007: 169) Reconceiving subjectivity, objectivity, space, time, and matter in this way implies that questions of ethics are inseparable from apparatuses as practices that produce differences and iteratively construct the world. Apparatuses enact material changes through which some possibilities are realized while others are foreclosed. Ontologically, apparatuses produce spatial, temporal, and material relations that constitute projects of Western colonial science. This approach helps elaborate arguments like those of Matson and Nunn that “even the most futuristic space telescopes have embedded within them a lineage of Euro-western cultural supremacy” (2017: n.p.). This is not to simply claim that telescopes are in some way symbolic of settler colonial relations, but to recognize how space science apparatuses actively orient relations of observation and materialize settler colonial relations. Both TMT and HI-SEAS constitute apparatuses that extend spatially well beyond the infrastructural footprint on these mountains, to the island and surrounding ocean, into the atmosphere, to Moon, Mars, and cosmos. As part of these apparatuses, mountain environments of Hawaii become both a gateway to the cosmos and simulation of an alien landscape. Temporally, the apparatus stretches beyond contemporary scientific practices, drawing on longstanding histories of European imperialism, Western law, and settler colonial logics, and projecting these ideologies into offworld futures. Materially, these projects enroll technological, logistical, and physical systems, including roads, mirrors and lenses, sensors and surveillance devices, electromagnetic waves and domes, the geology of the Hawaiian landscape, and bodies of observer and observed.

#### Any process of space colonization will merely serve to *recreate* earth’s crises – it’s founded on absent a recognition of the *exploitative* nature of colonialism.

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These accomplishments and setbacks from SpaceX and the world’s richest man are the most recent in a long series of launches by the first private company to engage in spaceflight. SpaceX is pushing many new boundaries to popular acclaim, but they are also simply the most recent continuation of a decades-long effort to privatize space travel, albeit an effort that is accelerating in recent years. Yet, while SpaceX may be developing beneficial new technologies and finding ways to lower the costs of space travel, their free-market perspective on space exploration will not provide the benefits they claim. Such privatization will only reproduce the Earth’s current exploitative economy and environmental destruction in outer space. Our climate and economic crises today are not inevitable outcomes of human existence, or of human population growth as other space-obsessed technocrats like Jeff Bezos have argued. They are instead the result of a particular set of social and economic forces, mostly arising during the last five centuries, which constitute capitalism. Capitalism requires the exploitation of both nature and people, leads to outward expansion and colonization, and is really the root cause of climate change. Yet instead of working to develop new social and economic structures here on Earth, Elon Musk is planning the colonization of Mars explicitly as a backup plan for Earth. He is not alone, as Jeff Bezos’ own aerospace company, Blue Origin, operates with the long-term goal of outsourcing destructive manufacturing to space in order to save Earth by shifting the exploitation of nature and people into orbit. With plans such as these, SpaceX and related companies are advocating escapism instead of dealing with the reality of deteriorating conditions on our own planet. By failing to acknowledge that privatizing industry and taking advantage of workers and the environment are the true causes of these Earthly crises, SpaceX will inadvertently reproduce the same conditions that are destroying the Earth in space. We need not engage in speculation informed by science-fiction to know this, either. History is full of examples of privatized, for-profit exploration and colonization that have caused more harm than good. For some of the clearest lessons, we can look to the colonization of what is now the United States, just a few hundred years ago. \*\*\*\*\*\* This past autumn marked the four hundredth anniversary of the Mayflower landing on the shores of what is now Massachusetts. Stories of this ship and its Pilgrim passengers are familiar to many people who were educated in the American school system. As the common narrative goes, these Puritan settlers sought freedom from religious persecution in England, and thus set sail to the “New World.” The Mayflower arrived in North America, and finding the land beautiful and productive, the Pilgrims “fell upon their knees and blessed the God of Heaven” for delivering them to safety and freedom. Yet key details of this story were not emphasized in our elementary school educations, such as the motivations behind the actual owners of the Mayflower. The Pilgrims did not own the ship they sailed upon, nor could they have afforded the voyage on their own. They needed investors, and the financial backers of this journey were not religious separatists seeking freedom, but some of the modern world’s first international venture capitalists. They funded the Pilgrims in the hope that they could reap the rewards of a profitable colony in North America capable of yielding cheap goods for European markets: largely fish, timber, and furs. The Pilgrims who established a colony at Plymouth may have been seeking liberty, but the financiers who backed them hardly cared. They were just in it for the money, and there was a lot to be made. There was also a lot of damage to be done. Within fifteen years of the Mayflower making landfall, epidemic disease had decimated the Native American population of New England. Wars and genocide followed, with Native peoples being killed and enslaved across the continent, before largely being forced onto reservations which still experience shockingly poor conditions today. All the while, the land of New England was gradually being divided into privately owned parcels of land in a process known as enclosure. When European colonists arrived in New England, they entered into a variety of agreements with Native peoples pertaining to land rights. European settlers often paid Native tribes or leaders for the right to limited use of tribal land, but the colonists often interpreted these transactions as wholesale, permanent purchase of land. These lands which were often communally owned by the tribe and managed as a “commons” – land or resources collectively owned by a community – were slowly carved up into privately owned parcels over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries. This privatization of land ownership and the incorporation of colonial New England into a globalized market economy led to profound environmental destruction nearly immediately. Settlers cleared forests for timber and farmland, nearly deforesting much of New England by the early 20th century. Beaver and deer were all but exterminated in the region by the 19th century, hunted for their pelts which were sold for profit in European markets. As early as 1646, Portsmouth, Rhode Island established the first prohibitions on hunting deer out of season, recognizing that the species’ population was dwindling. All of this local extirpation and deforestation occurred within a few decades of European arrival in New England, while the Indigenous peoples of the region had hunted deer and beaver and managed their forests sustainably for millennia prior. Exploitation of labor arose alongside this exploitation of nature. European settlers in 17th century New England exploited Native American hunters to acquire beaver furs, obtaining these pelts at little cost to themselves through the exchange of cheap cloth, metal trinkets, and shell beads. Merchants then in turn exploited these European settlers, paying only a small fraction of what these furs would be worth, and manufacturers back in Europe exploited their workers, paying them less than their labor was worth to produce products like fashionable felt hats for sale to the high-society aristocrats of the time. This exploitation of nature and labor is not a bug, but a feature of privatized, for-profit capitalist ventures. It is inherent in a capitalist economic model, as history has shown time and again. If profit maximization for the benefit of investors and owners is the goal, as it was for the owners of the Mayflower and as it is for SpaceX, the necessary materials and labor must be cheaply obtained. If they are not cheap, earnings will suffer. Colonization is a short-sighted solution to this problem. Colonialist companies and nations incorporate peripheral locations into their global economic system, where resources and labor can be cheaply obtained. The mercantile capitalism of the 17th century Atlantic world reflected this economic structure, with abundant timber, furs, and fish being obtained at low costs in New England and returned to European markets where they had greater value. Whether in the form of colonialist extraction of raw materials or the contemporary outsourcing of jobs, this search for cheap labor and resources is necessary for the perpetuation of capitalism, and remains the structuring force behind the global economy to this day. This same outward expansion in search of cheap raw materials and labor is exactly what will end up driving the colonization of space. The Moon, Mars, and even asteroids may all become the peripheral, privatized, and exploited locations that permit corporations on Earth to profit. Similar to Indigenous understandings of certain land rights in precolonial New England, space is currently viewed as a global commons. This means that all people have rights to it and none should be able to claim exclusive rights over it. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prevents any nation from claiming territory in space, although the treaty is known to be vague concerning the power of corporations in space and will certainly be challenged legally in the coming years. The enclosure and privatization of space may therefore lead not only to the direct and immediate exploitation of the environment and of people, but may also lay the groundwork for long-term systems of exploitation and dispossession. \*\*\*\*\*\* Elon Musk intends to colonize Mars as soon as possible. Thankfully, there is no potential for genocide of indigenous Martians as there was for Native Americans and other Indigenous peoples around the world under European colonialism. Yet because the endeavor is privatized and operating under centuries-old colonialist mindsets, exploitation and destruction will assuredly manifest in other ways. Mining and resource extraction is one avenue for profit, although Musk acknowledges that it is unclear if the natural resources on Mars could be extracted for the profit of companies on Earth. Even if the costs of transporting raw materials back to Earth are too great, natural resources extracted in space could be manufactured in space and shipped to Earth. Colonization of Mars may therefore differ slightly from cases of colonization on Earth, but the fundamental exploitative relationship remains. Plus, there are other ways to profit besides the extraction of raw materials. Space tourism by wealthy thrill-seekers is poised to be a cash cow for companies, and a relatively autonomous SpaceX colony on Mars could also have a potentially great degree of freedom to profit from all sorts of business ventures, especially if they are legally independent of the United States government as has been hinted. Musk has also alluded to other “extraordinary entrepreneurial opportunity” on Mars, ranging from manufacturing to restaurants to tourism. However, it remains to be seen just how the financing, ownership, and taxation of these enterprises will be handled in what may be a semi-autonomous colony. In the case of English colonists arriving in North America, it was often the case that the company financing the colony claimed ownership over all property and all economic products of the settlers for a set number of years. Any colonists on a settled Mars will certainly be exploited as well, in one form or another, for the profit of shareholders and company executives. More than a colony of Earth, Mars may become a colony of SpaceX, and this is a troubling thought. Resisting exploitation is exceedingly difficult in a privately funded, owned, and operated colony because such a colony is, by its very nature, undemocratic. Private companies like SpaceX are not democracies. CEOs are not elected representatives of the employees and business decisions are not voted upon by all workers. Thus, with a corporation calling the shots, settlers on Mars may have disturbingly little input in decision-making processes concerning their businesses and lives. Fundamentally, the privatization of space exploration is not the beneficial solution that many think it is. It will simply result in a continuation of the colonial exploitation of nature and people as our capitalist global economy transcends our own atmosphere. Exploitation is an inherent part of such for-profit ventures in a capitalist system, and this will carry over into space. Privatized exploration of our solar system will be biased towards profitable ventures instead of those with public benefits and will certainly have numerous detrimental environmental impacts. As private corporations begin to stake claims and enclose the commons of space, the rest of us lose our rights to it. We must avoid this outcome at all costs. Studying the repercussions of historical and contemporary colonialism on Earth permits us to engage with questions of space exploration from a decolonial and democratic perspective. Space cannot be privatized or exploited for profit, but must remain a commons for the benefit of all humanity.

#### Thus, I affirm the resolution: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### The Role of the Ballot is to vote for the debater that best engages in decolonial praxis.

Saraceno 12 [ Johanne Saraceno works at University of Victoria. 2012 International Journal of Child, Youth and Family Studies (2012) 2 & 3: 248–271 “MAPPING WHITENESS AND COLONIALITY IN THE HUMAN SERVICE FIELD: POSSIBILITIES FOR A PRAXIS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN CHILD AND YOUTH CARE” <https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/ijcyfs/article/view/10869> Brackets in Original ] //aaditg

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A multicultural discourse of “embracing difference” too often defaults to essentialized images that inevitably foreground those who represent the dominant traditions or practices of the group, while further marginalizing those who do not fit within the prescribed boundaries (Pereira, 2008). Furthermore, as noted by Fee and Russell (2007), because of our less violent and divisive race history when compared to the U.S., Canadians “typically represent themselves as tolerant and polite [creating a] mythology of racelessness” (p. 193). This presents a serious challenge to making transparent intersections of racialized and gendered violence and inequity. As Rodriguez (2000), quoting McLaren (1997, p. 262), notes: color-blind discourse is not a racial project of benignly looking past race to the person under the skin motif… it is a project set up to “protect” white privilege and power by permitting “white people to construct ideologies that help them to avoid the issue of racial inequality while simultaneously benefiting from it.” (p. 9) The concepts of “empowerment” and “liberation” have limitations for achieving what they set out to do as they are inevitably constituted by a colonial history and a modernist-derived neo-liberal construction of the “individual” as an actor capable of social change (Jackson, 2007). For example, Freire’s work is built on “assumptions about the individual capacity for change through critical reflection” which ignore that “our life chances may certainly be determined by racism or sexism” (Jackson, p. 208) and further contextualized by structural power and economic inequities. Mohanty (2003) explicitly interrogates the neo-liberal ideology embedded in this notion that increased consciousness can enable an individual to change the structures of oppression and inequity. This implicit pressure on individuals to ameliorate their life circumstances often results in feelings of powerlessness, inadequacy, and an acceptance that compromise is the best or only way to achieve change for individuals who try to tackle social issues (Jackson, 2007) in the face of deeply entrenched institutional structures. It is time to shift from focusing on problems at the margins to centring whiteness and taken-for-granted norms in order to interrogate how these perpetuate social problems. Rodriguez (2000) advocates the positioning of whiteness within multiculturalism discourses in order to shift the focus from the “other” and to centre “critical analyses of whiteness as an invisible norm” (p. 3). Harper (2000) emphasizes that it is important to consider “issues of power and powerlessness in relation to how racialized identities are produced and normalized” (p. 129). In centring whiteness and foregrounding issues of power, we can better map out the structures and practices that reify forms of discrimination that lead some groups to be overrepresented in our systems of care and justice. Critical feminists have struggled to conceptualize issues of social justice in the wake of the disruptions to identity categories through post-structural analysis. Lorraine (2007) states that “many feminists share [the] concern that poststructuralist feminist theory’s antifoundationalist wariness of overarching principles does not provide adequate grounding for the kind of social critique necessary for feminist change” (p. 268). Lather (2008) raises this tension as well: International Journal of Child, Youth and Family Studies (2012) 2 & 3: 248–271 260 “essentialism and identity politics might be bad objects from the vantage point of antifoundational theory, but they are often seen as the only, if not the best, strategy for advancing minority-based claims” (p. 223). Wood (1995, as cited in McLaren, 2000) cautions against the risk to social justice presented by post-structural ideas: We should not confuse respect for the plurality of human experience and social struggles with a complete dissolution of historical causality where there is nothing but diversity, difference, and contingency, no unifying structures, no logic of process, no capitalism and therefore no negation of it, no universal project of human emancipation. (p. 153) Lather (2008) identifies that a “tension around a realist position that mediates the essentialism of identity politics is a mark of postcolonialism in its use of histories of exploitation to foster strategies of resistance” (p. 222). Like Braidotti (2006), Lather underlines the value in mapping out what is, in order to see how to uncover, track, and resist privilege and structural power to begin to work for change. Ultimately, this tension is captured and summarized in Braidotti’s (2009) reflection: “how [do we] engage [in] affirmative politics, which entails the production of social horizons of hope, while at the same time doing critical theory, which means resisting the present?” (p. 42). The invitation here is to consider productive strategies for working toward social justice by confronting existing structural inequities, while simultaneously thinking with complexity to conceptualize social change at the level of cultural transformation that eventually takes us beyond rigid identity categories and into new ways of knowing, doing, and being. In order for significant social transformation to occur, it is perhaps time to consider an ontological orientation that moves beyond a focus on human emancipation and makes conscious connections between human, animal, and plant ecologies. All life forms are interconnected (Braidotti, 2006; Haraway, 2008) and it is the modernist project that has entrenched a hierarchy and disconnection between different categories of beings. A stance of co-implication (Mohanty, 2003) also resonates with many Indigenous world views, for example the Nuu-chah-nulth concept “heshook ish tsawalk” or “everything is one” (Atleo, 2004, p. 10). Decolonizing practice In contemporary settings, decolonization is the term frequently used to describe the reclaiming of a proud identity by Indigenous people who have suffered the ravages of colonialism. With a decolonizing stance and vigilant critical reflection, we can begin to poke at and peel away layers of convention – social and professional practices – to disrupt privilege and make explicit how neo-colonialism continues to operate in normative ways of knowing, doing, and being in professional helping and CYC. Decolonization “involves profound transformations of the self, community, and governance structures [and] can only be engaged through active withdrawal of consent and resistance to structures of psychic and social domination… a historical and collective process” (Mohanty, 2003, p. 7). The literature suggests that it is time to move away from the dominant conceptualization of “helping” as a benign phenomenon, to think critically and creatively in order to “step outside the frameworks of colonial youth work and engage a different set of ideas, beliefs, and practices” (Skott-Myhre, 2004, p. 92). The link between solidarity work and decolonization must be explicit and “can only be achieved through ‘self-reflexive collective praxis’” (Schutte, 2007, p. 172). As Laenui (2000) asserts: International Journal of Child, Youth and Family Studies (2012) 2 & 3: 248–271 261 true decolonization is more than simply placing Indigenous people into the positions held by colonizers. Decolonization includes the re-evaluation of the political, social, economic, and judicial structures themselves and the development, if appropriate, of new structures that can hold and house the values and aspirations of the colonized people. (p. 155) Decolonizing praxis is not about substituting a new set of rules or codes but rather mapping out new, engaged methods to uncover, track, and resist these hidden hegemonic normative values and practices. Adopting a decolonizing stance demands an openness and willingness to map out coloniality and to dialogue with Indigenous and other minoritized ways of knowing, doing, and being in a praxis of solidarity and social justice. This is crucial as “silencing Indigenous worldviews has been and continues to be one of the major tools of colonization” (Walker, 2004, p. 531). Nevertheless, how do we engage authentically with Indigenous wisdom and ways of knowing in ways that might benefit new approaches to relating and thus practice, without appropriating or recolonizing this knowledge? A question of justice In her discussion of social service work with marginalized and minoritized people, Reynolds (2010) claims “this inherently political work requires an Ethic of resistance that takes a position for justice” (p. 5). Similarly, Newbury (2010a) critiques “the dichotomy between care (as emotional and private) and justice (as rational and public) [as] false. Care is justice” (p. 21). This has powerful implications made clear in Reynolds’ (2010) assertion that neutrality is not possible; it is in itself an ethical stance not to work for justice. As Derrida (as cited in Caputo, 1997) advances, “the condition of possibility of deconstruction is a call for justice” (p. 16) and yet he also advanced the idea that one can never be just; “the only thing that can be called ‘just’ is a singular action in a singular situation” (as cited in Caputo, 1997, p. 138). This requires that one who seeks to be just must remain engaged, alert, and self-reflexive. What implications does this hold for CYC practitioners? How can we cultivate practices to track how we enact justice (or not) in our work with children, families, and communities? In her call for making social justice explicit in CYC, Newbury (2010a) discusses how the social service field conceptualizes its role as helping people to overcome “their” problems (care), which then renders invisible the fact that these are “our” problems. This latter stance, of acknowledged collective ownership of social problems, allows us to begin to think in terms of social justice and productive social change. Kivel (2007) differentiates: “social service work addresses the needs of individuals reeling from the personal and devastating impact of institutional systems of exploitation and violence… social change work addresses the root causes of exploitation and violence” (p. 129). It is critical to adopt a praxis of solidarity and social justice to promote concepts that go beyond “service work” or “helper” to open up possibilities for individual healing that are grounded in a broader context of social transformation. As McKnight (1995) states, “human service is only one response to a human condition. There are always many other possibilities that do not involve paid experts and therapeutic concepts” (p. 103). Furthermore, it is because of the influence of neo-colonial and modernist concepts of regulation and control of environments that services have evolved with medicalized, International Journal of Child, Youth and Family Studies (2012) 2 & 3: 248–271 262 formulaic, and standardized approaches to helping, in turn facilitating the development of experts, but which do very little to mitigate or change the circumstances of individuals struggling amidst the racialized, gendered, and economic inequities of Canadian society (Scott, 1998). Solidarity as strategy An orientation to a praxis of social justice requires that we make explicit the connections between the challenges faced by individuals and collective experiences, given the Western hegemony entrenched in Canadian social, political, and economic structures. This next section explores strategies and actions to propose some beginning possibilities for mobilizing a socially just praxis. As discussed above, Western ontology has strongly shaped existing models of human service which has led to professionalization and regulation which, through specialized technical interventions, have resulted in the growth of the non-profit and professional helping sectors but which have not succeeded in resolving issues of inequity and injustice such as inadequate and unequal access to health, housing, food, and education, or issues of interpersonal violence, mental health, and substance abuse. McKnight (1995) calls for a commitment “to reallocation of power to the people we serve so that we will no longer need to serve” (p. 100). Solidarity strategies for mobilizing across identity groups against global capitalist inequities offer some potential for moving beyond “the binaries that structure liberatory struggle [as] ‘us versus them’ and ‘liberation’ versus ‘oppression’ to a multi-centered discourse with differential access to power” (Lather, 1991, p. 25). As Mohanty (2003) advocates, we must “move away from the ‘add and stir’ and the relativist ‘separate but equal’ (or different) perspective to the co-implication/solidarity one. The solidarity perspective requires understanding historical and experiential specificities and differences” (p. 242). Mohanty promotes a feminist solidarity which foregrounds the intersection of gender with colonial repression and white dominance. May (2009) notes “the damage done by identity politics, and [that] it no longer holds the imagination of many… as early as the misnamed ‘anti-globalization’ movement, really an anti-neoliberalism movement, solidarity began to return to the scene in place of ghettoized identities” (p. 2). Rancière (1999, as cited in May, 2009) presents an alternate construction of equality to support a solidarity approach to social change: “For liberals, equality is what must be granted and/or preserved by state institutions with regard to citizens. For Rancière, equality is what is presupposed by those who act” (p. 9). This alternative provides a “bottom up” view of equality allowing “people [to] act collectively out of the presupposition of their equality, both to one another and to those in [power] that are said to be superior … Equality, then, cuts against individualism and toward solidarity” (May, p. 9). McLaren (2000) sees the anti-capitalist struggle as a site of common ground from which to organize “revolutionary praxis and social transformation productively [as in this way] agency is neither limited to nor does it exclude agential spaces of ethnic struggle” (p. 155). This is liberating as it opens up possible ways of being with increased accountability and engagement in everyday life to and with one another as a viable and vital alternative to the current dominant, individualistic culture of self-interest. International Journal of Child, Youth and Family Studies (2012) 2 & 3: 248–271 263 Socially just praxis Praxis is a concept that offers constructive possibilities for a solidarity-focused, decolonizing practice that is dynamic and responsive and mobilized through an ethic of social justice. White (2007) defines praxis as: the integration of knowledge and action (theory and practice … Specifically, theory and practice are integrated and one does not precede nor hold greater value than the other (Carr 1987). Praxis is creative, “other-seeking” and dialogic (Smith 1999). It is the place where words and actions, discourses and experience merge… Praxis is expressed in particular contexts and thus can never be proceduralized or specified in advance. (p. 226) Considering all the elements of this definition, praxis can be viewed as a potentially constructive model for anti-capitalist, solidarity work toward social justice. Transformative or liberatory models of praxis strive to engage community members in shifting from an individualized view of an issue or problem to one that is more collective and politicized (de Finney, 2007; Lang, 2005; Reyes Cruz & Sonn, 2011; Reynolds, 2010; Skott-Mhyre, 2005; Wade, 1995; White, 2007). A socially just model of CYC praxis will require an approach that integrates theorization and practice rooted in working and thinking collaboratively with diverse community members (de Finney, Dean et al., 2011). Conscious awareness and a commitment to socially just praxis offer a site of possibility for transforming practice and supporting change at broader levels by connecting those who are currently pathologized on an individual basis to collective endeavours, and supporting meaningful engagement in regard to issues of concern to them. For white practitioners, our everyday interpersonal interactions and habituated responses warrant critical attention. As Bordo (2008) writes, “white people, even those who theorize with sophistication about ‘cultural difference’ and the perils of ethnocentrism, are often clueless when it comes to the practical, concrete ways race matters” (p. 410). It is critical that “white settler societies transcend their bloody beginnings and contemporary inequalities by remembering and confronting the racial hierarchies that structure our lives” (Razack, 2002, p. 5). Here is a further invitation to interrogate instances of (white, male, class, or heterosexual) privilege in our own lives and practice. It can be a painful process requiring courage and compassion for oneself in order to begin the deep and honest examination of the ways in which privilege is reified through how we speak, move, take up space, and the assumptions that underpin our judgements. Derrida’s (as cited in Caputo, 1997) thinking could be useful with regard to this dynamic and dilemma. Like hospitality and justice, the importance and possibility of being conscious of and disrupting privilege, is “sustained by its impossibility” (p. 111). This edge or tension requires us to always be vigilant in our reflexivity and endeavours to map out inequities and our complicity, and to make a commitment to integrate an ethic of social justice in an engaged and vital model of praxis.

#### Indigeneity connotates a state of non-ontology allowing for the construction of the human that legitimizes itself into a history of elimination, jettisoned from or assimilated into the national body to cohere settler temporality

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Admittedly, the feral is a precarious space from which to theorize, sullied with an injurability bound up in the work of liberal humanism as such, an enterprise that weaponizes a set of moral barometers to distribute ferality unevenly to differently citizened and raced bodies—ones that are too close for comfort and must be pushed outside arm’s reach. Perhaps ferality traverses a semantic line of flight commensurate­ with that of savagery, barbarism, and lawlessness, concreting into one history of elimination: that is, a history of eliminating recalcitrant indigeneities incompatible within a supposedly hygienic social. The word savage comes from the Latin salvaticus, an alteration of silvaticus, meaning “wild,” literally “of the woods.” Of persons, it means “reckless, ungovernable” (“Savage”). In the space-time of settler states, savagery temporarily stands in for those subjectivities tethered to a supposedly waning form of indigeneity, one that came from the woods and, because of this, had to be jettisoned from or assimilated into the national body. Here is Audra Simpson on the history of Indian “lawlessness”: Its genealogy extends back to the earliest moments of recorded encounter, when Indians appeared to have no law, to be without order, and thus, to be in the colonizer’s most generous articulation of differentiation, in need of the trappings of civilization. “Law” may be one instrument of civilization, as a regulating technique of power that develops through the work upon a political body and a territory. (2014, 144) According to Simpson, the recognition of Indigenous peoples as lawless rendered them governable, motivating the settler state (here, Canada) to curate and thus contain atrophied indigeneities—and, consequently, their sovereignties, lands, and politics—within the borders of federal law (2014, 144-45). Similarly, in The Transit of Empire Jodi Byrd traces the epistemological gimmicks through which the concept of “Indianness” came to align with “the savage other” (2011, 27). For her, this alignment provided the “rationale for imperial domination” and continues to stalk philosophy’s patterns of thinking (ibid.). Simpson, writing about the Mohawks of Kahnawake, argues that “a fear of lawlessness” continues to haunt the colonial imaginary, thereby diminishing “Indigenous rights to trade and to act as sovereigns in their own territories” (2014, 145). We might take the following lyrics from the popular Disney film Pocahontas as an example of the ways indigeneity circulates as a feral signifier in colonial economies of meaning-making: [Ratcliffe] What can you expect From filthy little heathens? Their whole disgusting race is like a curse Their skin’s a hellish red They’re only good when dead They’re vermin, as I said And worse [English settlers] They’re savages! Savages! Barely even human. (Gabriel and Goldberg 1995) Savagery connotes a state of non-ontology: Indigenous peoples are forced to cling to a barely extant humanity and coterminously collapse into a putatively wretched form of animality. Savagery is lethal, and its Indian becomes the prehistoric alibi through which the human is constituted as such. Indigenous peoples have therefore labored to explain away this savagery, reifying whitened rubrics for proper citizenship and crafting a genre of life tangible within the scenes of living through that are constitutive of settler colonialism as such. These scenes, however, are dead set on destroying the remnants of that savagery, converting their casualties into morally compatible subjects deserving of rights and life in a multicultural state that stokes the liberal fantasy of life after racial trauma at the expense of decolonial flourishing itself. This paper is therefore interested in the subjectivities and forms of sociality that savagery destroys when applied from without, and the political work of appropriating that savagery in the name of decolonization. Ours is a form of indigeneity that hints at a fundamental pollutability that both confirms and threatens forms of ontology tethered to a taxonomized humanity built in that foundational episode of subjection of which Simpson speaks. I am suggesting that savagery always-already references an otherworld of sorts: there are forms of life abandoned outside modernity’s episteme whose expressivities surge with affects anomalous within the topography of settler colonialism. This paper is not a historicist or nostalgic attachment to a pre-savage indigeneity resurrected from a past somehow unscathed by the violence that left us in the thick of things in the first place. Instead, I emphasize the potentiality of ferality as a politics in a world bent on our destruction—a world that eliminates indigeneities too radical to collapse into a collective sensorium, training us to a live in an ordinary that the settler state needs to persist as such, one that only some will survive. This world incentivizes our collusion with a multicultural state instantiated through a myth of belonging that actively disavows difference in the name of that very difference. We are repeatedly hurried into a kind of waning sociality, the content and form of which appear both too familiar and not familiar enough. In short, we are habitually left scavenging for ways to go on without knowing what it is we want. Let’s consider Jack Halberstam’s thoughts on “the wild”: It is a tricky word to use but it is a concept that we cannot live without if we are to combat the conventional modes of rule that have synced social norms to economic practices and have created a world order where every form of disturbance is quickly folded back into quiet, where every ripple is quickly smoothed over, where every instance of eruption has been tamped down and turned into new evidence of the rightness of the status quo. (2013, 126) Where Halberstam finds disturbance, I find indigeneity-cum-disturbance par excellence. Halberstam’s “wild” evokes a potentiality laboured in the here and now and “an alternative to how we want to think about being” in and outside an authoritarian state (2013, 126-27). Perhaps the wild risks the decolonial, a geography of life-building that dreams up tomorrows whose referents are the fractured indigeneities struggling to survive a historical present built on our suffering. Ferality is a stepping stone to a future grounded in Indigenous peoples’ legal and political orders. This paper does not traffic in teleologies of the anarchic or lawless as they emerge in Western thought; instead, it refuses settler sovereignty and calls for forms of collective Indigenous life that are attuned to queerness’s wretched histories and future-making potentialities. Indigeneity is an ante-ontology of sorts: it is prior to and therefore disruptive of ontology. Indigeneity makes manifest residues or pockets of times, worlds, and subjectivities that warp both common sense and philosophy into falsities that fall short of completely explaining what is going on. Indigenous life is truncated in the biopolitical category of Savage in order to make our attachments to ourselves assimilable inside settler colonialism’s national sensorium. Settler colonialism purges excessive forms of indigeneity that trouble its rubrics for sensing out the human and the nonhuman. In other words, settler colonialism works up modes of being-in-the-world that narrate themselves as the only options we have. What would it mean, then, to persist in the space of savagery, exhausting the present and holding out for futures that are not obsessed with the proper boundary between human and nonhuman life? This paper now turns to the present, asking: what happens when indigeneity collides with queerness inside the reserve, and how might a feral theory make sense of that collision? Deadly Presents “I went through a really hard time… I was beaten; more than once. I was choked” (Klassen 2014). These were the words of Tyler-Alan Jacobs, a two-spirit man from the Squamish Nation, capturing at once the terror of queer life on the reserve and the hardening of time into a thing that slows down bodies and pushes them outside its securitized geographies. Jacobs had grown up with his attackers, attackers who were energized by the pronouncement of queerness—how it insisted on being noticed, how it insisted on being. When the dust settled, “his right eye [had] dislodged and the side of his faced [had] caved in” (ibid.). Settler colonialism is fundamentally affective: it takes hold of the body, makes it perspire, and wears it out. It converts flesh into pliable automations and people into grim reapers who must choose which lives are worth keeping in the world. It can turn a person into a murderer in a matter of seconds; it is an epistemic rupturing of our attachments to life, to each other, and to ourselves. It is as if settler colonialism were simultaneously a rescue and military operation, a holy war of sorts tasked with exorcising the spectre of queer indigeneity and its putative infectivity. I rehearse this case because it allows me to risk qualifying the reserve as a geography saturated with heteronormativity’s socialities. This is a strategic interdiction that destroys supposedly degenerative queer affect worlds, untangling some bodies and not others from the future. I don’t have the statistics to substantiate these claims, but there is an archive of heartbreak and loss that is easy to come by if you ask the right people. Indeed, what would such statistics tell us that we don’t already know? What would the biopolitical work of data collection do to a knowledge-making project that thinks outside the big worlds of Statistics and Demography and, instead, inside the smaller, more precarious worlds created in the wake of gossip? I worry about ethnographic projects that seek to account for things and theory in the material in order to map the coordinates of an aberration to anchor it and its voyeurs in the theatres of the academy. The desire to attach to a body is too easily energized by a biological reading of gender that repudiates the very subjects it seeks so desperately to know and to study. What about the body? I have been asked this question, again and again. A feral theory is something of a call to arms: abolish this sort of ethnography and turn to those emergent methodologies that might better make sense of the affects and life-forms that are just now coming into focus and have been destroyed or made invisible in the name of research itself. Queer indigeneity, to borrow Fred Moten’s description of blackness, might “come most clearly into relief, by way of its negation” (2014). Perhaps decolonization needs to be a sort of séance: an attempt to communicate with the dead, a collective rising-up from the reserve’s necropolis, a feral becoming-undead. Boyd and Thrush’s Phantom Past, Indigenous Presence thinks indigeneity and its shaky histories vis-à-vis the language of haunting, where haunting is an endurant facet of “the experience of colonialism” (Bodinger de Uriarte 2012, 303). But, for me, ghostliness is differentially distributed: some more than others will be wrenched into the domain of the dead and forced to will their own ontologies into the now. Perhaps the universalist notion that haunting is a metonym for indigeneity repudiates the very life-forms that it claims to include: those who are differently queered and gendered, and, because of this, haunt waywardly and in ways that cannot be easily predicted (Ahmed 2015). This paper thus takes an imaginative turn and proceeds with something of an incantation to summon the figure of the queer Indigenous poltergeist—the feral monster in the horror story of decolonization. Queer Indigenous poltergeists do not linger inaudibly in the background; we are beside ourselves with anger, we make loud noises and throw objects around because we are demanding retribution for homicide, unloved love, and cold shoulders. We do not reconcile; we escape the reserve, pillage and mangle the settler-colonial episteme. Our arrival is both uneventful and apocalyptic, a point of departure and an entry point for an ontology that corresponds with a future that has yet to come. Sometimes all we have is the promise of the future. For the queer Indigenous poltergeist, resurrection is its own form of decolonial love. The poltergeist is an ontological anomaly: a fusion of human, object, and ghost, a “creature of social reality” and a “creature of fiction” (Haraway 1991, 149). From the German poltern meaning “[to] make noise, [to] rattle” and Geist or “ghost,” it literally means “noisy ghost,” speaking into existence an anti-subjectivity that emerges in the aftermath of death or murder (“Poltergeist”). It is the subject of Tobe Hooper’s 1982 film Poltergeist, which tells a story of “a haunting based on revenge” (Tuck and Ree 2013, 652). The film’s haunting is a wronging premised on an initial wrong: the eponymous poltergeist materializes when a mansion is constructed on a cemetery—a disturbing of spirits, if you will. José Esteban Muñoz argues that “The double ontology of ghosts and ghostliness, the manner in which ghosts exist inside and out and traverse categorical distinctions, seems especially useful for… queer criticism” (2009, 46). In this paper, the poltergeist names the form which indigeneity takes when it brings queer matter into its folds. In other words, this essay evokes haunting as a metaphor to hint at the ways in which queerness was murderously absorbed into the past and prematurely expected to stay there as an effect of colonialism’s drive to eliminate all traces of sexualities and genders that wandered astray. The poltergeist conceptualizes the work of queer indigeneity in the present insofar as it does not presuppose the mysterious intentions of the ghost—an otherworldly force that is bad, good, and undetectable all at once. Instead, the poltergeist is melancholic in its grief, but also pissed off. It refuses to remain in the spiritual, a space cheapened in relation to the staunch materiality of the real, and one that, though housing our conditions of possibility, cannot contain all of us. We protest forms of cruel nostalgia that tether ghosts to a discarded past within which queer Indigenous life once flourished because we know that we will never get it back and that most of us likely never experienced it in the first place. We long for that kind of love, but we know it is hard to come by. I turn to the poltergeist because I don’t have anywhere else to go. Help me, I could say. But I won’t. Queer indigeneity, then, is neither here nor there, neither dead nor alive but, to use Judith Butler’s language, interminably spectral (2006, 33). We are ghosts that haunt the reserve in the event of resurrection. According to Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, a reserve is a “tract of land, the legal title to which is held by the Crown, set apart for the use and benefit of an Indian band” (“Terminology”). The “reserve system” is part of the dispossessory ethos through which the settler state reifies land as the sign of sovereignty itself, and thus effects the political death of indigeneity, decomposing it into nothingness, into contaminated dirt. Reserves are the products of imaginations gone wild; they are ruins that bear “the physical imprint of the supernatural” on arid land, on decaying trailers arranged like weathered tombstones (Tuck and Ree 2013, 653). They are borderlands that connote simultaneous possession and dispossession: they represent the collision between settler sovereignty (insofar as the Crown holds the legal title to the land) and indigeneity (pointing to a genre of life that is distinctly Indigenous). Reserves were—some might say they still are—zones of death that regulated and regulate the movements of Indigenous bodies, quarantining their putatively contaminated flesh outside modern life in order to preserve settler-colonial futurities. It is as if the reserve were a site of complete atrophy, where indigeneity is supposed to waste away or degenerate, where queerness has already bled out. Look at the blood on your hands! The queer Indigenous poltergeist, however, foregrounds what I call a “reserve consciousness” —an awareness of the deathliness of the reserve. A reserve consciousness might be a kind of critical phenomenology that, to use Lisa Guenther’s description of this sort of insurgent knowledge project, pulls up “traces of what is not quite or no longer there—that which has been rubbed out or consigned to invisibility” (2015): here, the so-called on-reserve Indian. It might be about becoming a frictive surface; by rubbing up against things and resisting motion between objects, we might become unstuck. Queer Indigenous poltergeists are what Sara Ahmed calls “blockage points”: where communication stops because we cannot get through (2011, 68). That is, queer indigeneity connotes an ethical impasse, a dead end that presents us with two options: exorcism or resurrection. If settler colonialism is topological, if it persists despite elastic deformations such as stretching and twisting, wear and tear, we might have to make friction to survive. I turn to the reserve because it is a geography of affect, one in which the heaviness of atmospheres crushes some bodies to death and in which some must bear the weight of settler colonialism more than others. The violence done to us has wrenched us outside the physical world and into the supernatural. Some of us are spirits—open wounds that refuse to heal because our blood might be the one thing that cannot be stolen. Does resistance always feel like resistance, or does it sometimes feel like bleeding out (Berlant 2011)? Feral Socialities I must leave the beaten path and go where we are not. Queerness, according to Muñoz, is not yet here; it is an ideality that “we may never touch,” that propels us onward (2009, 1). Likewise, Halberstam suggests that the presentness of queerness signals a kind of emerging ontology. He argues that failure “is something that queers do and have always done exceptionally well in contrast to the grim scenarios of success” that structure “a heteronormative, capitalist society” (2011, 2-3). For Muñoz, queer failure is about “doing something that is missing in straight time’s always already flawed temporal mapping practice” (2009, 174). We know, however, that this isn’t the entire story. Whereas Muñoz’s queer past morphs into the here and now of homonormativity’s carceral tempos, indigeneity’s queernesses are saturated with the trauma of colonialism’s becoming-structure. Queer death doubles as the settler state’s condition of possibility. Pre-contact queer indigeneities had been absorbed into colonialism’s death grip; however, this making-dead was also a making-undead in the enduring of ghosts (Derrida 1994, 310). If haunting, according to Tuck and Ree, “lies precisely in its refusal to stop,” then the queer Indigenous poltergeist fails to have died by way of time travel (2013, 642). Queer indigeneity might be a kind of “feral sociality”: we are in a wild state after escaping colonial captivity and domestication. When the state evicts you, you might have to become feral to endure. To be feral is to linger in the back alleys of the settler state. It is a refusal of settler statecraft, a strategic failing to approximate the metrics of colonial citizenship, a giving up on the ethical future that reconciliation supposedly promises. As an aside, I suspect that the settler state’s reconciliatory ethos is always-already a domesticating project: it contains Indigenous suffering within the spectacularized theatre of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, building a post-Residential School temporality in which Indigenous peoples have been repaired through monetary reparations and storytelling. In the melodrama of reconciliation, the settler state wins its centuries-long war against Indian lawlessness by healing Indigenous peoples of the trauma that blocked them from becoming properly emotive citizens. Queer indigeneity, however, escapes discursive and affective concealment and therefore the category of the human itself, disturbing the binary clash between the living and nonliving by way of its un-humanity, a kind of “dead living” whereby flesh is animated through death. Perhaps we must become feral to imagine other space-times, to imagine other kinds of queerness. If settler colonialism incentivizes our collusion with the humanist enterprise of multiculturalism (and it does), what would it mean to refuse humanity and actualize other subject formations? In other words, how do the un-living live? Here, I want to propose the concept of “Indian time” to theorize the temporality and liminality of queer indigeneity as it festers in the slippage between near-death and the refusal to die. Indian time colloquially describes the regularity with which Indigenous peoples arrive late or are behind schedule. I appropriate this idiom to argue that the presentness of queer indigeneity is prefigured by an escape from and bringing forward of the past as well as a taking residence in the future. To be queer and Indigenous might mean to live outside time, to fall out of that form of affective life. Indian time thus nullifies the normative temporality of settler colonialism in which death is the telos of the human and being-in-death is an ontological fallacy. It connotes the conversion of queer indigeneity into non-living matter, into ephemera lurking in the shadows of the present, waiting, watching, and conspiring. Where Jasbir Puar argues that all things under the rubric of queer are always-already calculated into the state’s biopolitical mathematic, queer indigeneity cannot be held captive because it cannot be seen—we are still emerging in the social while simultaneously altering its substance (2012). If decolonization is, according to Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s reading of Frantz Fanon, an “unclean break from a colonial condition,” perhaps the queer Indigenous poltergeist is feral enough to will a decolonial world into a future that hails rather than expels its ghosts (2012, 20). The queer Indigenous poltergeist might have nothing else to lose.

#### Systems of knowledge serve to institute and replicate settler colonialism — the human is a storytelling species and knowledge systems are always already being chartered through the replication of sociogenic codes

Wynter and McKittrick 15. Sylvia Wynter is a Professor Emerita at Stanford University. Katherine McKittrick is a professor in Gender Studies at Queen's University. She is an academic and writer whose work focuses on black studies, cultural geography, anti-colonial and diaspora studies, with an emphasis on the ways in which liberation emerges in black creative texts. (Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis, *Duke University Press*, 2015) vikas

To resolve the aporia of this cognitive dilemma, I turn again to Césaire’s proposed new and hybrid bios / mythoi science of the Word. Here because, as he proposed, and as earlier cited, the study of the Word / the mythoi will now determine the study of the bios / of the brain, and this will thereby enable us to gain an external (demonic ground) perspective on the always already storytellingly chartered / encoded discursive formations / aesthetic fields, as well as of, co- relatedly, our systems of knowledge. And, with this gain insight into how these systems of knowledge, each together with its genre- specific “truth of solidarity,” all institute and **stably** replicate our genres **of being hybridly human** with the also communitarian viability of each respective societal order. Yet **with all of the above—including, in macro terms, the instituting of our contemporary secular and “single model” liberal (now neoliberal) monohumanist Western / Westernized transnational world system—what again must be emphasized is** that the respective “truths” of their knowledge systems are always already prespecified by **our** storytellingly chartered sociogenic replicator code of symbolic life / death, its Word and / or Bateson- type “descriptive statement” as rigorously discursively elaborated by its “status quo system of learning” and its overall epistemological order. **This order circularly ensures that each such genre- specific regime / program of truth, will law- likely function to semantically- neurochemically induce the performative enactment of** our ensemble of **always already role- allocated individual and collective behaviors** within the reflexly and subjectively experienced terms of a cognitively closed, thereby genre- specific and fictively eusocializing, autonomously functioning, higher- level living autopoietic system. Cosmogonies of Our Planetary Life and Our Chartered Codes of Symbolic Life and Symbolic Death: Fictively Induced Modes of Inter- Altruistic Kin Recognition and Auto- Instituted Pseudospeciated Mode of Kind KM: Here Wynter elaborates on storytelling beginnings and cosmogonies. She returns to her extension of Frantz Fanon’s conception of our being hybridly human, both bios and mythoi, in order to address the unsolved phenomenon of human consciousness. She explores how our chartering / encoding genre- specific cosmogonies provide the narrative source of our fictively eusocializing subjectivities, thus enabling us to be reborn- through- initiation as always already sociogenically encoded inter- altruistically kin- recognizing members of each referent- we. At the same time, however, **the law- like reification of** each fictively induced and subjectively experienced order of consciousness **of each referent- we is, itself, absolutized by** what Wynter identifies as **the law of cognitive closure**. SW: Fanon put forward the idea of our skin / masks, thereby of the hybridity of our being human, in 1952. Crick and Watson cracked the genetic code in 1953. Now, I argue that Fanon’s masks enact a “second set of instructions”: that of the sociogenic code of symbolic life / death. Further, within the overall enactment of each such “second set of instructions,” the ism of gender is itself—while only one member class—a founding member class. Gender is a founding member because in order to auto- institute ourselves as subjects of a genre- specific referent- we, we must, first, co- relatedly and performatively enact each such code’s “second set of instructions” at the familial level, in terms of our gender roles. We know of this brilliant concept of the performative enactment of gender from Judith Butler.60 I am suggesting that the enactments of such gender roles are always a function of the enacting of a specific genre of being hybridly human. Butler’s illuminating redefinition of gender as a praxis rather than a noun, therefore, set off bells ringing everywhere! Why not, then, the performative enactment of all our roles, of all our role allocations as, in our contemporary Western / Westernized case, in terms of, inter alia, gender, race, class / underclass, and, across them all, sexual orientation? All as praxes, therefore, rather than nouns. So here you have the idea that with being human everything is praxis. For we are not purely biological beings! As far as the eusocial insects like bees are concerned, their roles are genetically preprescribed for them. Ours are not, even though the biocentric meritocratic iq bourgeois ideologues, such as the authors of The Bell Curve, try to tell us that they / we are.61 So the question is: **What are the mechanisms, what are the technologies, what are the strategies by which we prescribe our own roles?** What is common to all are cosmogonies and origin narratives. The representations of origin, which we ourselves invent, **are then retroactively projected onto an imagined past.** Why so? Because each such projection is the shared storytelling origin out of which we are initiatedly reborn. In this case we are no longer, as individual biological subjects, primarily born of the womb; rather, we are both initiated and reborn as fictively instituted inter- altruistic kinrecognizing members of each such symbolically re- encoded genre- specific referent- we. This is to say we are all initiatedly reborn—renatus in Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Christian term—to subjectively experience ourselves as subjects of the same encoded symbolic life kind. Why this imperative? Because **for all genre- specific subjects who are reborn from the same eusocializing origin myth and / or cosmogony, their genetically encoded individual biological life and its attendant imperative of naked self- preservation must at the same time be**, via initiation, **aversively experienced as symbolic death.** 62 This is the concomitant condition of inducing in all subjects the mimetic desire for the group- collective symbolic life of its genre- specific referent- we, its fictive mode of pseudospeciated kind. **The centrality of the ritually initiated and enacted storytelling codes, and thus their positive / negative, symbolic** life / death **semantically- neurochemically activated “second set of instructions,”** **emerges** here: these codes are specific to each kind. **The** positive verbal meanings **attributed to their respective modes of kind** are alchemically transformed into living flesh**,** as **its members all reflexly subjectively experience themselves, in the mimetically desirable, because** opiate-rewarded, placebo terms of **that mode of** symbolic **life prescribed by the storytelling** code. This at the same time as they subjectively experience their former “born of the womb” purely biological life as mimetically aversive, because they are doing so in now opiate- reward- blocked symbolic death, nocebo terms.63 For the preservation of which of these lives, then, do you think wars are fought? In the wake of the answer to the above, we see our chartering cosmogonies as being isomorphic with what we now define as our “cultures”— in both cases **we are talking about our hybrid sociogenic codes and their “second set of instructions.”** These are **codes that are even able to override where necessary**—this with respect to our auto- instituted, non– genetically restricted fictive modes of eusociality—**the first set of instructions of our own dna** (unlike as is the case with all other primates). The logical corollary is this: our modes of auto- institution, together with their initiatory rituals of rebirth—as iconized by the ritual of Christian baptism—are indispensable to the enacting of the human as the only living species on Earth who is the denizen of its third and hybrid bios / mythoi level of existence! Our mode of hybrid living being alone—this together with our also hitherto always genre- specific bios / mythoi enacted orders of supraindividual consciousness—is thereby to arrive on the scene all at once! With the Big Bang of the biomutational Third Event! So you see now why we still can’t solve the problem of consciousness? In spite of the most dedicated efforts of natural scientists, brain scientists, and philosophers? For what becomes clear here is that our human orders of consciousness / modes of mind cannot exist outside the terms of a specific cosmogony. Therefore, human orders of consciousness / modes of mind cannot preexist the terms of the always already mythically chartered, genre- specific code of symbolic life / death, its “second set of instructions” and thus its governing sociogenic principle— or, as Keith Ward puts it, its nonphysical principle of causality.64 To give an example: here we are, we are talking and thinking. We are, in fact, reflexly talking and thinking in terms of Darwin’s biocosmogonically chartered definitive version—in The Descent of Man (1871)—of the British bourgeoisie’s ruling class’s earlier reinvention of Man1’s civic humanist homo politicus as that of liberal monohumanist Man2 as homo oeconomicus, together with its now fully desupernaturalized sociogenically encoded order of consciousness. These are the very terms, therefore, in which we ourselves, in now historically postcolonial / postapartheid contexts, are. If in our case, only mimetically so! This at the same time as we are also struggling to think outside the limits of the purely biocentric order of consciousness that is genre- specific to the Western bourgeoisie’s homo oeconomicus. But it’s extremely difficult to do, right? You know why? Because Darwinism’s powerful, seductive force as a cosmogony, or origin narrative, is due to the fact that it is the first in our human history to be not only part myth but also part natural science. In fact, this mutation—the part myth / part natural science workings of Darwinism—draws attention to Darwin’s powerful neoMalthusian conceptual leap.65 A leap by means of which—over and against Cardinal Bellarmine—Darwin was to definitively replace the biblical Cre- ation account of the origin of all forms of biological life, including the major bios aspect of our being hybridly human, with a new evolutionary account. Why, then, say that this Darwinian account is only part science? Biologist Glyn Isaac, in his essay “Aspects of Human Evolution” (1983), provides the answer. Isaac makes us aware of the ecumenically human trap into which Darwin had also partly fallen: Understanding the literature on human evolution calls for the recognition of special problems that confront scientists who report on this topic. Regardless of how the scientists present them, accounts of human origins are read as replacement materials for genesis. They fulfill needs that are reflected in the fact that all societies have in their culture some form of origin beliefs, that is, some narrative or configurational notion of how the world and humanity began. Usually, these beliefs do more than cope with curiosity, they have allegorical content, and they convey values, ethics and attitudes. The Adam and Eve creation story of the Bible is simply one of a wide variety of such poetic formulations. . . . The scientific movement which culminated in Darwin’s compelling formulation of evolution as a mode of origin seemed to sweep away earlier beliefs and relegate them to the realm of myth and legend. Following on from this, it is often supposed that the myths have been replaced by something quite different, which we call “science.” However, this is only partly true; scientific theories and information about human origins have been slotted into the same old places in our minds and our cultures that used to be occupied by the myths. . . . Our new origin beliefs are in fact surrogate myths, that are themselves part science, part myths. 66 So the trap, you see, is that of the paradox that lies at the core of our metaDarwinian hybridity. For what I’m saying is that as humans, we cannot / do not preexist our cosmogonies, our representations of our origins—even though it is we ourselves who invent those cosmogonies and then retroactively project them onto a past. We invent them in formulaic storytelling terms, as “donor figures” or “entities,” who have extrahumanly (supernaturally, but now also naturally and / or bioevolutionarily, therefore secularly) mandated what the structuring societal order of our genre- specific, eusocial or cultural present would have to be.67 As the French cultural anthropologist Maurice Godelier also makes clear, with respect to the above: we, too, hitherto have also systematically kept the reality of our own agency—from our origins until today—opaque to ourselves. 68 Thus all our humanly invented chartering cosmogonies, including our contemporary macro (monohumanistic / monotheistic) cosmogonies, are law- likely configured as being extrahumanly mandated.69 All such sacred theological discourses ( Judaism, Islamism, Christianity, for example) continue to function in the already theo- cosmogonically mandated cognitively closed terms that are indispensable to the enacting of their respective behavior- inducing and behavior- regulatory fictively eusocializing imperative. This is especially apparent, too, in the secular substitute monohumanist religion of Darwin’s neo- Malthusian biocosmogony: here, in the biocosmogony of symbolic life / death—as that of selection / dysselection and eugenic / dysgenic codes—the incarnation of symbolic life, will law- likely be that of the ruling- class bourgeoisie as the naturally selected (eugenic) master of Malthusian natural scarcity. With this emerges, cumulatively, the virtuous breadwinner, together with his pre- 1960s virtuous housewife, and, corelatedly, the savvy investor, the capital accumulator, or at least the steady job holder.70 In effect, wealth, no longer in its traditional, inherited freehold landowning form, but in its now unceasingly capital- accumulating, global form, is itself the sole macro- signifier of ultimate symbolic life. Symbolic death, therefore, is that of having been naturally dysselected and mastered by Malthusian natural scarcity: as are the globally homogenized dysgenic non- breadwinning jobless poor / the pauper / homeless / the welfare queens. Poverty itself, therefore, is the “significant ill” signifier of ultimate symbolic death and, consequently, capital accumulation, and therefore symbolic life signifies and narrates a plan of salvation that will cure the dysselected significant ill! **The systemic reproduction of** the real- life **categories** of both signifiers **are** indispensable **to the** continued enactment of **the ruling - class** bourgeoisie’s governing code of symbolic life / death and the defining of liberal (now neoliberal) monohumanist Man2. This now purely secular coding of life / death is itself discursively—indeed rigorously—elaborated bioepistemologically, on the model of a natural organism, by the disciplines of our social sciences and humanities, together with their respective genre- specific and ethno- class truths of solidarity.71 Consequently, **within the laws of** hybrid auto- institution and / or pseudospeciation the (**humanities and social science**) **disciplinary truths of solidarity enact** their biocosmogonically chartered **sociogenic code** of symbolic life / death, also **imperatively calling to be discursively elaborated in cognitively** (cum psychoaffectively / aesthetically) **closed terms.**

#### Extinction outweighs should be rejected as an impact framing – explicit in their utilitarian calculus is the death of billions of indigenous and black communities to preserve a white future – it’s not the best of both worlds, it’s the protection of white futures in the name of human progress.

Mitchell & Chaudhury, ’20 (Audra, Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and Aadita, PhD candidate at the Department of Science and Technology Studies at York University, “Worlding beyond ‘the’ ‘end’ of ‘the world’: white apocalyptic visions and BIPOC futurisms,” International Relations, Research Article, pp. 7-9, ZW)

In addition, many authors working in this genre worry about the interruption of the perceived stadial progression of ‘humanity’, a narrative that celebrates the emergence of whiteness through the elimination of ‘inferior’ races or cultures.51 For example, Canadian settler scholar Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (italics ours) warns that the extinction of ‘humanity’, which she associates with ‘rational life’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘civilization’ (terms all deeply linked to Euro-centric and colonial subjectivities) would be ethically wrong ‘if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing’.52 In this vein, Bostrom idealizes a future in which the continued evolution of ‘(post)humanity’ culminates in a form of ‘technological maturity’ that adheres to mainstream norms of white maleness: deeply disembodied, unattached to place, and dominant over, or independent from, ‘nature’.53 Closely-linked to worries about the loss of potential ‘human progression’ is the fear of de-volution or back-sliding. In some cases, fears of demographic decline in ‘white-majority’ regions (see above) extend to worries about the biological ‘extinction’ of white people. For instance, a recent report asserts that there has been 59.3% decline in total sperm count in men from North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, but no comparable or significant decline in South America, Asia, and Africa, despite a paucity of studies in the latter regions (Ghosh 2017). While warning of a biological decline of whiteness, the articulation of these fears and the funding of research to address them undergirds a resurgence of whiteness formed in the perceived face of its destruction.54 Indeed, many contributors to ‘end of the world’ discourses offer strategies for the reconstruction and ‘improvement’ of existing power structures after a global catastrophe. For example, American settler economist Robin Hanson calculates that if 100 humans survived a global catastrophic disaster that killed all others, they could eventually move back through the ‘stages’ of ‘human’ development, returning to the ‘hunter-gatherer stage’ within 20,000 years and then ‘progressing’ from there to a condition equivalent to contemporary society (defined in Euro-centric terms).55 Other authors focus on social, political, and economic forms of regeneration through simplification, which Homer-Dixon56 calls ‘catagenesis’. ‘Western civilization is not a lost cause’, he insists, ‘using reason and science to guide decisions, paired with extraordinary leadership and exceptional goodwill, human society can progress to higher and higher levels of well-being and development. . . But that requires resisting the very natural urge. . .to become less cooperative, less generous and less open to reason’ (italics ours).57 In this vision, Western civilization – which, is elided here with ‘human society’ – can salvage the future using some of its trademark claims: the possession of reason, science, and cooperativeness. However, this requires assimilating all human communities into a Western liberal-cosmopolitan mode of civility and suppressing forms of resistance that threaten to knock this goal off course. If ‘humanity’ is able to achieve this goal and develop a ‘prospective mind’ capable of seeing opportunity in destruction, Homer-Dixon argues it will be able to ‘turn breakdown to our advantage’58 (italics ours). Recalling that the ‘us’ in this discourse actively interpellates whiteness, this discourse frames global catastrophe as an opportunity to consolidate white structures of domination, assimilate resistors, and ultimately increase their power. Other authors who foresee post-apocalyptic movement toward a dazzling future (for whiteness) are clear about its costs. In his seminal book on human extinction, Canadian settler philosopher John Leslie states that ‘misery and death for billions [caused by an ecological crisis] would be immensely tragic, but might be followed by slow recovery and then a glittering future for a human race which had learned its lesson’.59 Similarly**,** Bostrom argues even the fractional reduction of threats to the possibility of posthuman, techno-infused subjectivities, by any means, would be worth ‘at least a hundred times the value of a million [contemporary] human lives’.60 Although rarely explicitly stated, it is not difficult to discern whose lives these authors believe might be sacrificed for the ‘greater good’

of ‘learning lessons’ and rescuing ‘humanity’ as they see it. This can be gleaned from these authors’ assessments of the ‘winners and losers’ of previous global upheavals. For example, in assessing the tumult of the twentieth century, Homer-Dixon states that Western capitalist societies were amongst the ‘most adaptive’ – and therefore closest to his ideal of the ‘prospective mind’ – while ‘at the other end of the spectrum, we find societies, including many in sub-Saharan Africa and some in Asia and Latin America, that have much lower ability to manage or adapt. . . a few, like Haiti and Somalia, have completely succumbed.’61 While this statement refers historical patterns, it is presented as part of an analysis that explicitly analyzes historical trends as indicators of future scenarios. As such, it inscribes ongoing racial inequalities and stereotypes far into the future.