## 1

Interpretation: The affirmative debater must defend the desirability of a policy action where the member nations of the World Trade Organization reduce intellectural property protections for medicinse.

#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

**Army Officer School 4** (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### [4] Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis – that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims which eviscerates the decision-making potential of debate

**Steinberg & Freeley, 13**

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**Debate is a means of settling differences,** **so there must be a** difference of opinion or a **conflict of interest** before there can be a debate. **If everyone is in agreement** on a tact or value or policy, **there is no need for debate**: **the matter can be settled by unanimous consent**. Thus, for example, **it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"** because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (**Controversy is an essential prerequisite** of debate. **Where there is no clash of ideas**, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, **there is no debate**. In addition, **debate cannot produce effective decisions** **without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered**. For example, **general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration**. **How many** illegal immigrants **are in the United States?** What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? **Do they take job**s from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? **Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration** by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? **Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?** Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? **Should we build a wall on the Mexican border**, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? **Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question** **and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy**. To be discussed and resolved effectively, **controversies must be stated clearly**. **Vague understanding** **results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions**, frustration, and emotional distress, as **evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007**.**Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job!** They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." **Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations**, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, **but without a focus for their discussions**, **they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions.** **A gripe session would follow**. **But if a precise question is posed**—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—**then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up** **simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step**. **One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.** The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. **They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making** **by** directing and **placing limits on the decision** to be made, **the basis for argument should be clearly defined**. **If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument**. For example, **the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation**. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

**Although we now have a general subject**, we have not yet stated a problem. **It is still too broad**, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. **What sort of writing are we concerned with**—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? **What does "effectiveness" mean** in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" **The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition** such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. **This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation** of the controversy by advocates, **or** **that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.**

#### [5] Any alternative interpretation is bad because it is un-limiting. The impact is predictable limits---specific topics are key to reasonable expectations for 2Ns – open subjects create incentives for avoidance – that overstretches the negative and turns participation. Debate has unique potential to change attitudes and grow critical thinking skills because it forces pre-round internal deliberation on a of a focused, common ground of debate

#### [6] Extra-topicality – even if the affirmative claims to advocate the resolution, they skirt discussion of its instrumental intent by arguing the benefits derived from their contextualized advocacy outweigh. This is a voting issue because we’re forced to win framework just to get back to equal footing – extra topicality also proves the resolution insufficient and explodes aff ground.

**[7] SSD is good – it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it.**

**[8] Small schools disad: under-resourced are most adversely effected by a massive, unpredictable caselist which worsens structural disparities. Inclusion is an independent voter – you can’t debate if you can’t participate which is a prerequisite to accessing their benefits and ensures everyone gains from the activity.**

#### [9] Outweighs:

A. Even if their method is good, it isn’t valuable if it’s not procedurally debatable – they don’t get access to any of their offense. Even if their method is good for education there’s no reason you vote on it, just as even if exercise is good for soccer players you don’t vote for the team that ran most.

B. The best solutions are formed with critical contestation from multiple sides – it’s more likely we make a good liberation strategy if both debaters can engage and test it – link turns their offense.

C. Debate is about process not content – we inevitably switch sides, even if it’s arguing against one method with another. The individual ideas we learn, like \_\_, aren’t as valuable as learning how to effectively apply those ideas outside of round by engaging in precise discussions instead of just asserting opinions.

#### [10] T is a procedural issue

A. T indicts your reading of the aff in the first place, so its an evaluative mechanism to adjudicating substance of the 1AC, thus it is nonsensical to leverage the aff against T since it presupposes that the aff is being won.

B. The AC is the starting point for the discussion and I win that that the AC is flawed, then it means that the starting point for evaluating substance is flawed. So, the T determines the value of the debate to begin with.

C. Fairness is the evaluative mechanism to determine the better debater regardless of the role of the ballot. Thus, the question is not should we use their role of the ballot, but rather whether or not the way that they presented their offense is good for debate. Absent fairness you don’t know who best met their burden under any role of the ballot.

D. T is a question of jurisdiction- judges don’t have the jurisdiction to vote on a non-topical aff that hasn’t met the burden of proof of the resolution.

E. That’s a voting issue – destroys advocacy skills – they don’t have to defend their proposal against well-researched objections. AND, tons of screwed up things in the world we can’t fix without advocating for solutions. Also kills fairness.

#### [11] TVA:

[A] [INSERT TVA]

[B] Solvency deficits and turns to the TVA are neg ground – it proves there’s a debate to be had about that aff

#### [12] Competing Interpretations

A. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom because debaters keep being barely reasonable

B. No briteline to reasonability

#### [11] No RVIs

A. Real world applicability- proving that you’re being fair isn’t a reason to vote you up.

B. CI: You get an RVI if I read 2 or more shells – solves skew

C. it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

## 2

#### They conflate “materialism” with “materiality” – violence is not some amalgamation of signs but is instead about flesh and bone – their project fuels capitalist pedagogy

McLaren 10 [Peter, UC-Los Angeles and Nathalia E. Jaramillo, Purdue University, “Not Neo-Marxist, Not Post-Marxist, Not Marxian, Not Autonomist Marxism: Reflections on a Revolutionary (Marxist) Critical Pedagogy” Cultural Studies <=> Critical Methodologies 2010 10: 251]

Ebert (2009; Ebert & Zavarzadeh, 2008) makes an important distinction between corporeality/materiality and matter/materialism. Materiality is related to objective idealism and refers to the acceptance of an idea in the mind as something real, something that escapes class interests. In this way, avant-garde scholars will deconstruct materialism as merely the effects of tropes and representations. It attempts to create a prefigurative origin for what is essentially an ontology. However, Ebert (2009) argues that this constitutes transforming materialism into materiality, into a contemplative corporeality of difference, purging materialism of its conceptuality and determinate meanings. Matter is turned into signs or the effect of signs or sign power. This has led to the recent interest in the politics of performativity—performing identities, performing pedagogy, performing class, and so on. However, Ebert argues that matter is not synonymous with physical objects; matter exists outside the consciousness of the subject, and it cannot be separated from its production and contradictions in history. Matter is objective reality in history. Ebert and Zavarzadeh (2008) characterize materialism as the objective (transformative) productive activities of humans involving them in social relations; these social relations occur under definite historical conditions that are independent of their will and are shaped by class struggle over the surplus produced by social labor. A materialism that excludes historical processes and operates as a medium of cultural practices is not materialism; it is materiality or what Ebert (2009) refers to as “matterism.” Avant-garde critics who would replace materialism with materiality (through the tropes of supplementarity, spectrality, undecidability, and difference) severely undercut the claim for the objectivity of class interests and ultimately replace class struggle with the struggle over the sign. Like Ebert, David McNally (2001) in his classic Marxist text, Bodies of Meaning, describes the deconstructive efforts of post-structuralists such as Jacques Derrida as a form of linguistic idealism. In his critique of anti-fetishistic thought (like that of Marx), that palpates the farthest reach of linguistic meaning, Derrida devalues dialectical critique as useless by disavowing embodied human activity, by ignoring laboring human bodies and rejecting them as metaphysical illusions. When Derrida deals with issues of the economy, he is interested only in capital that begets capital—that is, in credit or fictitious capital. Likewise, in his critique of Saussure, he critiques the notion of a transcendental signified, a universal equivalent or what McNally refers to as meaning’s gold standard (something positive that can exist outside of an endless reference of commodities to other commodities). There is nothing extralinguistic for Derrida, since language suspends all reference to something outside of it. Similarly, for Derrida, money lacks a referent. It is driven by credit and speculation and lacks any material foundations. Derrida deals with fictitious or dematerialized money, money that can be produced without labor, that is, money as an expression of hyperreality. Capital in this view is nothing more than a self-engendering dance on a solipsistic path of self-fecundation. The real is folded into the representation. Derrida (and Baudrillard and others) assimilate the economy (the same one that is throwing people out of their homes and into the streets at present) into their poststructuralist model of language. Contrary to Derrida, Ebert and McNally maintain that value is not a sign freed from its referent; rather, value expresses itself in material form. It must pass through laboring bodies and their history of struggle, through toiling subjects and practical human activity that takes place in an organic social universe of skin, hair, blood, and bone. And capitalism abstracts from these bodies, and commodifies them. The work of McNally and Ebert implodes the limitations of post-structuralist thought in dealing with capitalist exploitation. According to Ebert (2009), revolutionary agents of social transformation act ethically when they attempt to resolve the contradictions of their objective location in relations of exploitation. Capitalist violence often doubles as cultural discourses, and Ebert views popular culture, especially, as a narcosis of violence, predicated on distracting subjects from the central antagonism of capitalist society—the struggles over the surplus labor of the other––thereby producing subjects who cannot grasp the totality of the system. In Ebert’s view, the pedagogical practices developed by the poststructuralist avant-garde theorize experience in relation to trauma, desire, and affective relations in general as if these relations were antiseptically cleaved from relations of class, thereby replacing a conceptual analysis of the social totality with liberating pedagogical narratives grounded in local affective strategies—strategies that serve unwittingly as epistemological covers for economic conditions that help the subject cope with the objective material conditions of capitalist exploitation. This leads ultimately to a de-historicization of social life and draws attention away from the way in which all human beings who populate capitalist societies are implicated in some manner in international class struggles and the social division of labor (see also Zavarzadeh, 2003). Ebert and Zavarzadeh describe this process as a “pedagogy of affect.” They write that The pedagogy of affect piles up details and warns students against attempting to relate them structurally because any structural analysis will be a causal explanation, and all causal explanations, students are told, are reductive. Teaching thus becomes a pursuit of floating details—a version of games in popular culture. Students seem to know but have no knowledge. This is exactly the kind of education capital requires for its new workforce: workers who are educated but nonthinking; skilled at detailed jobs but unable to grasp the totality of the system—energetic localists, ignorant globalists. This pedagogy provides instruction not in knowledge but in savviness—a knowing that knows what it knows is an illusion but is undeluded about that illusion; it integrates the illusion, thereby making itself immune to critique. Savviness is enlightened false consciousness: a consciousness that knows it is false, but its “falseness is already reflexively buffered.” (2008, pp. 107-108)

#### The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only the Party can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct violent tendencies within organizing, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation.

Escalante 18. Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist. Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “Party Organizing in the 21st Century. September 2018. <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century.>

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these

consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

#### This is a reformulation of classic white Marxism -- socialist organizing must center anti-racist struggle, mandating that allies put their lives on the line for revolutionary anti-capitalism and adopting Black demands as the demands of the entire working class.

Ervin 16. Lorenzo Kom'boa Ervin is an American writer, activist, and black anarchist. “The Progressive Plantation: racism inside white radical social change groups.” 2016. URL: [http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2017/01/04/book-review-vulnerability-in-resistance-edited-by-judith-butler-zeynep-gambetti-and-leticia-sabsay. cut by vikas](http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2017/01/04/book-review-vulnerability-in-resistance-edited-by-judith-butler-zeynep-gambetti-and-leticia-sabsay.%20cut%20by%20vikas) bbyyy

**Building an Anti-Racist Liberation Support Movement**

**For years it has been known there are some very simple components to an anti-racist tendency on the Left.** The type of **organization needed must be** a "mass" organization working to unite all workers and poor people in common class struggle, but that it must also be **able to** recognize the duty to support and adopt **the** special demands of the Black and other non-white peoples **as those of the entire working class. It must challenge white supremacy on a daily basis** in both white working class communities and radical social change organizations; **it must** refute racist philosophy and propaganda **and must counter racist mobilizations and attacks**, with armed self-defense and street fighting, when necessary. The objective of such a mass movement was to win elements of the white working class over to an anti-white supremacy, class-conscious position; to unite the -entire- working class; and to directly confront the right wing. **This program**, **must function** in conjunction with pre-existing struggles in communities of color, **not as a white Left vanguard dominating the** entire **movement.** So I have never called for a white-led or "white rights" organization like those I have criticized. **The cooperation of and solidarity of all workers and poor people is essential for full social revolution, not just its privileged white sector.** They must be willing to follow the lead of poor and oppressed workers and activists of color, as was done during the civil rights movement of the 1960s. **That is something that the white Left has not been able to do** and is why they set up their own all-white groups, which in no time at all lapse into liberalism and racial exclusion. As revolutionaries, **we must always understand our objective is to overthrow the capitalist state and its rulers**, and that we must live the politics we preach. Racism is intolerable. This movement must have the potential to deconstruct the racist capitalist state and construct an entirely new society on anti-authoritarian principles. It has to go beyond white Left campaigns of the past, or it's just empty rhetoric. So I am proposing something different: an anti-racist tendency as a political movement to change society itself. This would be a race and class based revolutionary movement, not content to sit around and read books, elect a few Black politicians or "friends of Labor" to Congress or the State Legislature, write protest letters, circulate petitions, or other such tame liberal reform tactics. It also would not be concerned with white middle class leftist issues like "Nazi youth music", the so-called "vanguard role" of white workers, animal rights, world trade reform and other white rights campaigns. For years, I have asked these white radicals: What about racial profiling, mass imprisonment of Blacks/Latinos and the poor, police murder and brutality, etc. and other hallmarks of a racist society? Why are you not uniting with Black and other non-white peoples? I have never got a satisfactory response to these questions. This proposed campaign I am speaking of is around issues that could also act as a pole of attraction for peoples of color to this movement, because they directly affect them. Further, raising issues of the crushing of the human rights of poor and working people of color, especially the millions of homeless and unemployed in the inner cities could push it further than the agenda of the old civil rights movement, which only tepidly raised issues of racial discrimination and exploitation of the poor to demand reforms of capitalism, but shied away from anything that sounded vaguely like "Socialism". **We must be willing to fight in the streets with** the **poor, racially oppressed and economically down-pressed peoples**, because that is who we are. It would take the examples of the early radical labor movements like the IWW, as well as the later Civil Rights/ Black Power movements of the 1960s and the Welfare Rights movement, to show that only direct action tactics of confrontation and militant protest will yield any results at all. We also have to study the examples of the 1992 Los Angeles and 2001 Cincinnati rebellions, which show once again that, while poor people will revolt, there need to be powerful allies extending material aid and resistance information. These allies can also start resistance and support campaigns in the white communities. We need to also show there is an existing mass movement to take it to the next step and spread the insurrection on a long-term basis. **For the most part**, **the** Anarchist and **Socialist movement still does not** even **deal with police murder or brutality, poverty, or** certain kinds of "uncomfortable" **racist issues like criminalization of youth of color, except in a peripheral way as political rhetoric. I have not seen** the various Anarchist Black Cross or Anti-Racist Action groups, or the white led Socialist parties deal with the disproportionate imprisonment **of Black people in the U.S.**, (10 times that of white people), **the** frequent police murders **of Black civilians, or** the racial profiling of the millions of Black people each year. So, **we must also challenge our allies** in the Anarchist, anti-globalization movements, and "Occupy Wall Street" movement **to** both **act as** true political allies **and** serve as a source of material support, while still respecting our autonomy. **This is why I am continually saying** that **it is necessary for white workers to defend** the **democratic rights and gains of non-white workers** in the general society, instead of just fighting for white rights on the job and/ or white issues of social advancement. Finally, **to be clear this anti-racist movement is a coalition of peoples of color with white allies**. **But it has to be recognized** as a cardinal principle by all, **that oppressed peoples have a right to self-determination**, **including the right to run** their own **organizations and liberation struggle**. Most importantly, inside the anti-racism movement itself the peoples of colour have to take the lead, even if they share it with others. The victims of racism know best how to fight back against it. The Anarchists, **Socialists** and other white radicals **must recognize this and help build a** millitant **anti-racist group**, **which would** be both a **support** group for **the** Black revolution **and a** mass-organizing center **to unite the class of poor peoples and oppressed.** It is very important to wrest the mass influence of the racial equality movement out of the hands of the left-liberal Democratic wing of the ruling class. The left liberals like Jessie Jackson or Al Sharpton may talk a good fight, but as long as they are not overthrowing Capitalism and smashing the state, they will betray and sabotage the entire struggle against racism. **The strategy of the left-liberals is to deflect class consciousness into strictly race consciousness and then call for mere enforcement of the civil rights laws by the federal government**. For the most part, **they refuse to appeal to class material interests of the U.S. white working and middle classes to support Black rights and as a result allow the right-wing to capitalize unopposed** on the latent racist feeling among whites, as well as on their economic insecurity. Jackson did this during his political campaigns, but only to win votes for the Democrats. They do not even try to organize the Black working class poor. **The kind of movement I am proposing will step in the breach and attack white supremacy and dismantle the very threads of what hold capitalism together.** **Without the mass white consensus** to the rule of the American state and the system of white skin privilege, capitalism could not continue to function without interruption. Anarchists and Socialists have to stop giving lip service to all this. The way they apply it, "race treason" is a farce, it is just the latest political fad since whites don't have to really be inconvenienced or challenged. However, true anti-racist politics challenge the notion of whites doing anything less than putting their own lives and future on the line **for a new society and** dismantling a capitalist system which while it brutally oppresses peoples of color, and exploits all of us as working people.

## Case

### Method

flow

### case

#### Debate good – a. advocacy skills creates real world change i.e. Nelson Mandela did debate and was able to impact the real world b. just because debate WAS historyically bad doesn’t mean it WILL be c. surrendering to anti-asianism in educational spaces surrenders to whiteness, we should actively seek to fight it rather than generalizing that debate is bad when it can be used as a heuristic to learn

#### Psychoanalysis is non-falsifiable

**McConachie 7** (Brian, Chair of Theatre Arts at the University of Pittsburgh, December 2007, “Falsifiable Theories for Theatre and Performance Studies”, Volume 59, Number 4 of Theatre Journal, AZG)

Can the master theorists in our critical theory consensus make the same claim? All scientific assertions are potentially falsifiable through the use of the scientific method, but what experiments or logics would the master theorists accept as a basis for the falsifiability of their ideas? Looking at the theorists featured in Critical Theory and Performance, one might say that they represent a range of approaches that admit of greater or lesser degrees of falsifiability. At one end of the continuum, the theories of Bourdieu, Habermas, Gramsci, and Williams generally work within the falsifiability protocols of social science, which (though open to dispute) have been fairly well established for fifty years. When Raymond Williams's version of Gramsci's hegemony theory was gaining a curious audience among historians, its potential falsifiability was widely discussed.46 While social scientists, including historians, cannot apply falsifiability to their work with the same rigor as scientists who work with nonhuman subjects, their standards concerning evidence, economy, and consistency are high.47 Somewhere in the middle of the continuum of falsifiability, perhaps, are the **psychoanalytic theories** of Freud, their synthesis with semiotics in Lacan, and the many theorists who build their own ideas on some version of a psychoanalytic base. Their advocates often claim scientific validity for these theories. Most psychologists, however, have **rejected psychoanalysis** and its spin-offs **as unfalsifiable.** In her Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Science, for example, Wilma Bucci concludes that Freud's meta-psychology has not "been subject to the empirical evaluation and theory development that is necessary for a scientific field." Specifically, the type of systematic inference that is applied in cognitive science and in all modern science requires explicit definitions that limit the meaning of the concepts, correspondence rules mapping hypothetical constructs and intervening variables onto observable events, and means of assessing reliability of observation. Each of the indicators that analysts rely on to make inferences about the conscious and unconscious states of other persons (as [End Page 571] about one's own conscious states) must itself be independently validated as having the implications that are assumed.48 In defense, Freudians and Lacanians often claim that their theories are consonant with good science because their concepts have been scientifically validated in therapeutic sessions.49 But clinical success, however it is measured, is not the same as empirical verification. Just because "the talking cure" has been effective in some cases does not mean that Freud's or Lacan's explanation for why it worked is valid. Humans have had many explanations for fire over the centuries, but understanding why and how combustion really works must rely on recent physics and chemistry. At the other end of the continuum are theorists such as Baudrillard, Derrida, Féral, and other poststructuralists, whose radical skepticism challenges the ability of science or any other discourse to provide a valid standard of falsifiability. The relativism of poststructuralism, including its challenges to empirical verification, defies any protocols that might stabilize knowledge based on the slippery signifiers provided by language. Despite what they take to be the inherent contradictions of textual assertions, poststructuralists from Lyotard to Derrida rely chiefly on logic and argumentation rather than scientific or historical evidence. Within the assumptions of poststructuralism, Derrida's gnomic remark, "There is nothing beyond the text," is simply unfalsifiable. The critic who wishes to rely on what Derrida might have meant in that statement, however, will have to ignore a great deal of good science in linguistics and evolutionary psychology to be able to assess the probable truth of Derrida's assertion.50 Brian Vickers challenges the weak scientific credentials of several of the master theorists that many humanist academics have embraced. As he points out with acerbity: Freud's work is notoriously speculative, a vast theoretical edifice elaborated with a mere pretense of corroboration, citing "clinical observations" which turn out to be false, with contrary evidence suppressed, data manipulated, building up over a forty-year period a self-obscuring, self-protective mythology. The system of Derrida, although disavowing systematicity, is based on several unproven theses about the nature of language which are supported by a vast expanding web of idiosyncratic terminology. . . . **Lacan's system**, even more vastly elaborated . . . **is a series of devices** for **evading accountability**. . . . Foucault places himself above criticism.51 Whether all of Vickers's charges are valid may be less important than his general point: he presents suggestive evidence that these master theorists tried to place their ideas beyond the protocols of falsifiability. [End Page 572] Are theatre and performance scholars aware of the substantial range of differences in the falsifiability of the ideas of the master theorists when they deploy one or another of their approaches to investigate problems in our discipline? There is little evidence for such discrimination. Like the general population of the United States, most humanistic scholars are genially uninformed about good science and its procedures.52 Once aware, however, what will they (and we) do about it? With regard to theatre and performance studies, the critic and historian interested in discussing how audiences perceive and process performance has a choice to make—a choice among kinds of theories that is already pressing and will become increasingly common in the future. This scholar should know that the history of Western thought since Copernicus suggests how this conflict between kinds of theories will likely be resolved; in the long run, among people who rely on reason instead of superstition, the theories of good science have trumped unscientific philosophy every time—and, I would add, this is as it should be, not because good science is always right, but because conclusions based on its provisional theories narrow the likelihood of egregious error and prevent humanistic scholarship from being foolishly wrong. As we know from the scandal concerning the Sokel hoax in Social Text, the same cannot be said for advocates of the ideas of our present master theorists.53 This returns me to the question that began my essay: how can scholars in our field ensure that their legacy will provide a firm basis for future work in our discipline? Reinelt and Roach use the word "consolidated" twice in their page-and-a-half-long preface to suggest that ideas gained from applying present theoretical methods can continue to illuminate future investigations. This assumes, however, that all **knowledge** based on the ideas of master theorists **is cumulative**, even progressive. While we probably know more about theatre and performance than we did twenty years ago, we have no agreed-upon standards as to what counts as valid knowledge, partly because our poststructuralist habits of skepticism have led us to distrust language as a mode of truth-telling. What Eugene Goodheart has said about the criticism of literature in English departments could easily be assessed against critics in theatre and performance studies: "Quarrels among critics have rarely, if ever, been adjudicated. Interpretations and evaluations abound and are often different from or in conflict with one another. The reputations of writers, determined by criticism, fluctuate, sometimes as wildly as the stock market in crisis."54 In such circumstances, consolidating what we know and using it as a foundation for the construction of future knowledge is very difficult. [End Page 573] Performance analysis is a case in point. As Reinelt points out in her introduction to the performance analysis section of Critical Theory and Performance: "Perhaps what we do most in theatre and performance studies is analyze performances."55 Common sense tells us that some ideas about how performances affect audiences must be better than others, but typically the antagonists in battles about such matters draw on different theories to dress their arguments and, when conflict occurs, pack their separate theoretical bags for the trek to the next article or book. A few years ago, Philip Auslander and Peggy Phelan disagreed over the issue of human presence and mediatization in performance—a conflict about whether and how actual performing bodies mattered to spectators, as opposed to watching images of performers on film or television. Apart from which scholar may have marshaled the better arguments, Auslander (representing a mostly materialist point of view) and Phelan (who drew on psychoanalysis and phenomenology) agreed on no body of relevant evidence that could serve to adjudicate their conflict.56 This important dispute remains unresolved and, more significantly, cannot be resolved within the usual protocols of our discipline. Tellingly, Reinelt and Roach discuss the conflict over "liveness" between Auslander and Phelan, but add more wrinkles to the discussion rather than attempting to iron out their differences by including a poststructuralist take on the problem by Herbert Blau in their anthology. Important scholarly battles with little hope of a resolution are a recipe not for the consolidation of knowledge, but for its fragmentation into sects of believers in this or that corner of theory. Good science, on the other hand, encourages the resolution of such differences and may lead to the accumulation of knowledge. Paradigm shifts in science often reinterpret traditional evidence, but that does not mean that the old experiments have no value. Einstein's General Theory of Relativity led to modifications in Galileo's conclusions about gravity, but Einstein needed the ideas of Galileo, Newton, and others to enable him to construct his theory. On the basis of mounting evidence, irresolvable problems, and emerging theories, many cognitive scientists during the 1980s concluded that the computer was no longer an adequate metaphor to explain the operations of the brain. Computing still retains theoretical credibility as a description of some mental processes, but most cognitive scientists now understand the brain as a "connectionist" and/or "embodied" system. In the process of crafting a new paradigm, scientists continued to use much of the earlier experimental evidence. Apart from large paradigm shifts, scientific knowledge at the level of intermediate theories may change, but many of its **empirical findings will remain constant.** Thus, George Lakoff can both assert many new ideas about language and categorization in Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things and reassure his (and Johnson's) readers in Philosophy in the Flesh that "much of what we have learned about the brain and the mind is now stable knowledge."57 Nor does the slippery slope of language drive scientists into the melancholy limbo of "undecidability" and postmodern relativism. Whether light is best described as a "particle" or a "wave" remains an ambiguity in modern physics that cannot be resolved through language alone. Experimentation and probability theory can get [End Page 574] scientists around the imprecision of language in describing light, however, by providing an acceptable, provisional answer to this apparent conundrum. In psychology and neuroscience today, the term "emotion" has several definitions, depending on whose science you read. Definitions of this term (of obvious concern to theatre and performance scholars interested in spectatorship) will likely be narrowed in a few years, however, as different notions of "emotion" compete empirically and theoretically for more robust explanatory value.58 In similar ways, scientific definitions of "atom" and "cell" achieved provisional validity in the past. Eventually scientists may be able to state reliable "facts" about our emotional lives, according to the definition of a scientific fact provided by Stephen Jay Gould: a statement "confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional consent."59 When confronted by confusing information, scientists are initially no better than performance critics at naming significant attributes of the natural world. Experimentation, theorizing, and falsification, however, encourage the **honing of** provisionally acceptable **terms and descriptions.** Some philosophers now hold that there are no fundamental differences between humanistic hermeneutics and hermeneutic reasoning in the sciences.60 Relying on similar procedures, both humanists and scientists can aim at plausible, provisional, and falsifiable statements of truth There are many such theories and facts in cognitive science for theatre and performance studies, if only we would remove the blinkers of unfalsifiable theories and decide to recognize them. Few scientists have chosen to address our concerns about spectatorship directly, but many of their insights are easily transferable to analyses about what happens to audiences in performance situations. As noted, Jacob and Jeannerod provide provisionally reliable insight into spectator vision and simulation. Gerald Edelman can tell us how audiences use their connectionist brains to remember what they hear from actors for later use in a performance and in responding to subsequent productions.61 In his Gesture and Thought, David McNeill can help us to explore how spectators understand the integration of gesturing and speaking by actors.62 Mark [End Page 575] Johnson and others who approach ethics from a naturalistic point of view can provide insight into how audiences probably process the ethical and political challenges they encounter in performances.63 There is a world of falsifiable theories in cognitive science relevant to all of the areas of our discipline. It is past time for us to check them out Not all good theories are falsifiable according to the protocols of natural or social science, however. As we saw, Saltz bases his infiction-outfiction theory on the philosophical speculations of Wittgenstein, and neither he nor Wittgenstein performed repeatable experiments and measured the outcomes to generate their insights. Because Saltz's infiction-outfiction theory arrived at much the same conclusion as a theory that has been provisionally falsified, it can be used to extend the ideas of conceptual blending. In my work with cognitive science and spectatorship, I have found other theories deriving primarily from phenomenology and materialism that are consistent with the science I am using.64 While I concluded that the subject-object dichotomy that semiotics and phenomenology rests upon is inconsistent with Lakoff and Johnson's embodied realism, this does not mean that all of the content of these two broad theories is necessarily at odds with good science. From a scientific point of view more in accord with the traditions of analytic philosophy, in fact, semiotics and phenomenology have some insights to offer.65 In short, falsifiability does not necessarily close the door on all of the master theorists in critical theory, but it does relegate many of them to secondary status. Unless their theories admit to protocols of falsifiability in the natural or social sciences or work with material that is beyond empirical verification, the theories of our present masters can best serve to amplify and extend what we can already know through scientifically valid approaches. Can falsifiable theories advance progressive politics? First, let us be clear about the implications of this question. Before worrying about the political possibilities of any theory, we need to ask if it can deliver statements of truth that will withstand the examination of scholars in many fields of investigation. To put right-thinking politics before an epistemology of provisional truth backs us into an ethical minefield that has more in common with the thinking of Stalin and Mao than Brecht and Boal. Second, the fear of social constructivists that "naturalizing" the human condition will only degrade our human potential to reinvent ourselves through social means seems to be misplaced. Few cognitive scientists support the idea that nature and nurture can be divided at all; genetic endowment and social learning must function together in the brains of all individuals in highly intertwined ways if they are to survive.66 Significantly, once genetics, culture, and cognition are examined as mutually reinforcing dynamics, proto-progressive questions about the roles of empathy, compassion, and cooperation in our past and present behavior begin to surface. Far from nature hardwiring us as [End Page 576] competitive social Darwinists, it may be that humans have a predisposition to act altruistically towards one another. In A Darwinian Left, Peter Singer imagines what a progressive movement based in Darwinian science (which includes all of the cognitive sciences) might propose and practice.67 There is nothing inherently contradictory that I can see about scholars in theatre and performance studies advocating for progressive change and consolidating and advancing our knowledge through falsifiable experiments and theories In the short term, **testing hypotheses** about spectators **and accumulating** provisional, **empirical truths** about them **can lead to** some consolidation of **knowledge**. In this regard, it ought to be possible to set up experiments that can provide empirical information about the similarities and differences between the experiences of spectators when they watch "live" and "mediatized" performances. Such experiments would necessarily rest on common definitions of key terms and rely on provisional neuroscientific, linguistic, and psychological theories about spectator attention, simulation, memory, emotion, conceptual blending, and meaning-making. Experimental procedures might range from postperformance interviews to brain scanning. I can imagine a hypothesis that might propose that more oscillation between blended and unblended actor/characters occurs in "live" than in "mediatized" performances. Conclusions based on these and similar results could resolve some of the ongoing disputes in our discipline and lead to significant consolidation. (Such conclusions might have political implications as well; Phelan's Unmarked, subtitled The Politics of Performance, which began the controversy, assumed that "live" performances could effect political change.) Even before we can conduct such experiments, however, it makes more sense to base our provisional ideas about spectatorship, when possible, on relevant theories that are **falsifiable**, rather than on unfalsifiable psychoanalytic and poststructuralist beliefs. In the long term, though, consolidation may be the wrong metaphor for falsifiable truths in theatre and performance studies. One obligation that a scientific orientation carries with it is to recognize that provisional conclusions will have to be scrapped if better science comes along and displaces the theories that have provided the initial basis of knowledge. Unlike scholars who draw on Lacan, Foucault, and most of our other master theorists, there are no foundational texts to which an investigator in performance and cognitive studies can return for first principles and primary definitions. Cognitive neuroscience, especially, has made rapid strides in recent years and continues to expand how and what we can know about the mind and brain. This pressure will make scholarly consistency and consolidation less important for the critic-historian in theatre and performance studies than a cutting-edge knowledge and a readiness to rethink recent approaches and conclusions.

#### Vote negative on presumption -- affirming whatever politics in the abstract should NOT be a sufficient solvency mechanism for the 1AC, especially if that politics already exists. They MUST explain that whatever politics resolves their totalizing claims about state power and how it materializes at the level of implementation and procedure.

------------------- NOT READ

#### The affirmative’s intellectual project doesn’t simply become commodified, it takes up the academy as a model for desire.

Clarke 15 (Paul Clarke is a Lecturer in Performance Studies @ The University of Bristol “The Impact Market: The complicity of practitioner-researchers in ‘the spread of the university beyond the university’” *Performance Research* 20, no. 4, pp. 115-120)//NotJacob

The university territorializes new knowledges, which can be taught and exploited as cultural or economic capital; to use Harney and Moten’s analogy, it ‘encircle[es them with] war wagons’ (2013:34) in order to capitalize on them. Looked at from this perspective, my 2003 paper played a role in the discursive enclosure of ‘expert practices’ (Melrose 2007) in the institution’s unfolding encyclopaedia of knowledge and power. Practical action and doing performance work, which once belonged to the sphere of praxis, have become part of the realm of knowledge and belong to the university as intellectual property. Practices that were felt to be ‘just intuitive’ (Melrose 2005) have been named properly, as ‘expert-performancepractitioner-centred modes of knowledge and models of intelligibility’ (Melrose 2007), embodied thinking or somatic knowing. With performance becoming valued as a subject, and with the legitimation of practice-as-research, comes the ability to regulate its unruly ways and imprecise languages – to bring those who make this object of study within the university, its disciplines and governance. In the 1980s and early 1990s it might have been possible to work in the academy and borrow its resources to create professional practice outside. But, since the admission of practical research outcomes in HEFCE’s 1996 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and the embedding of practice-as-research in UK research culture, the field of performance has been territorialized and work presented professionally counts as university product. There are few socio-cultural spaces beyond the scope of the REF and its new impact agenda, and in order to be a practitioner in the university you must demonstrate the excellence of work produced outside, plus evidence of external recognition. While the intellectual ‘worthiness’ (Melrose 2002) of practice-as-research and the counting of impact has strengthened the position of practitioners in universities and their potential for progression or promotion, this inclusion has undoubtedly influenced their creative activities. The debt that the performancemaker ‘owes to the academy’ for their entry is to ‘incorporate[, in their work,] a scholarly apparatus that enables [their peers] to assess [its] value and significance … as the results of … research’ (Cooper 2005, np). The ‘obligation’ is to make art with a research imperative and to produce excellence within the frame of the REF, which values practice if ‘enhancements’ are produced ‘in knowledge and understanding in the discipline’ (ibid.). This transforms the aims and aspirations of university practitioners, their ways of practising performance and the form of artwork produced, the quality of which is assessed according to criteria for research and impact rather than aesthetic judgements. In spite of the above, in the hierarchy of knowledge, monographs and peer-reviewed articles, like this one, still rule. Performance can only pass as research when accompanied by framing discursive documents – 300 word statements and questions, which are admittedly often written retrospectively, after the practical research has concluded and its outcomes are known. As Conquergood (2002) wrote thirteen years ago in his article ‘Performance studies: Interventions and radical research’, ‘knowing how’ (146) remains a ‘subjugated knowledge’ (Foucault 1980:81), struggling for its place. As he said then, ‘promotion committees dominated by the more institutionally powerful scholars [… still] do not know how to appraise a record of artistic accomplishment commensurate with traditional criteria of scholarly research and publication’ (Conquergood 2002:153). Despite doing the necessary labour of teaching performance practice and producing impact, as a practitioner-researcher my position continues to feel weak and at risk, like an uninvited guest or imposter in the academy. In addition there is an ongoing fight to maintain the hours allocated for workshops, to justify the low staffstudent ratios necessary and the inefficiency of practice-based teaching, which fails to produce more student satisfaction in the National Student Survey (NSS) for less contact hours. Having internalized the precarity that even those of us on permanent contracts feel, I place an obligation on myself to fulfil all aspects of my role professionally and responsibly, perform self-assurance, compete effectively with other researchers (especially in UOA 35, Music, Drama, Dance and Performing Arts) and continue my professional development. I acknowledge the way that my subjectivity has been fabricated by the university and shaped by our precarious positions in it. Hence I cannot resist the desire to do well in the next REF, feeling driven to attempt to produce research excellence and be impactful. My subjectivity is one of the outputs of the institutional apparatus and I reproduce the university, HEFCE and Arts Council England’s values and ways of thinking as my own aspirations, putting myself into my work and wanting it to ‘influenc[e] civil society and quality of life’, to believe in this vision and the need to capture such contributions. For all this writing of subversion I may not have the autonomous agency or self-determination to resist, or be ‘disobedient’ in Virno’s terms (Virno 2004; see also Lazzarato 2010). As well as the good citizenship discussed above, the format of Bristol’s academic CV has a category for ‘Entrepreneurship’, a further academic responsibility to determine routes to market for research outputs and develop their competitiveness. Each institution’s environment statement for REF 2014 and impact case studies also accounted for academic enterprise, contribution ‘to economic prosperity’ (REF 2012) and scholars’ relationships with cultural and creative industries.6 I am an artistic director of Uninvited Guests and this company limited by guarantee was listed on the Environment Template along with its income. Here the professional world, ‘the industries of creativity’ 6 The REF 2014 Environment Template provides an account of the university department, or unit of assessment’s research strategy, people and staff development, income, statistical data, infrastructure and facilities, collaboration with other institutions or industries and contribution to the discipline or research base (see REF 2012). (Raunig 2013) and culture exterior to the university are encircled or brought inside its expanded walls. Uninvited Guests, its producers and those employed by it, become university workers by proxy, as they transfer practiceframed-as-research to wider audiences, whose number and diversity are measured. We may ask whether Uninvited Guests therefore reproduces the university and performs its social work in the private-public spheres beyond, whether its performers are unwitting agents or representatives of the university, marketing and distributing its knowledge, know-how and vision. The Department of Drama’s Environment Template measured the quality of Uninvited Guests’ performances by financial income, transformed audiences and reception into figures and capital, and quantified dissemination. It is worth noting that there is a double counting of Uninvited Guests’ output of impact and that Arts Council England (ACE), who fund the work, also use the neoliberal language of instrumentalization, social change and transformation. The company has received project funding from Grants for the arts and ACE for a number of research and development (R&D), production processes and national tours. The Arts Council’s website ‘talk[s] about the value of arts and culture to society’, how – in addition to art’s ‘intrinsic value’ – they ‘cherish’ the ways it ‘can illuminate our inner lives and enrich our emotional world’, along with producing ‘more measurable impact on our economy, health and wellbeing, society and culture’ (2014). ACE encourages the professionalization of artists as entrepreneurs, uses the terminology of the transformation economy (see Pine and Gilmore 2001), and makes demands on publicly funded cultural labourers similar to those asked of academic researchers – that is, to account for and evidence how their work is applied as an instrument of personal and social change, its extrinsic use-value: excellence in impact translates into investment as much as intrinsic aesthetic quality, and the latter may only accrue cultural capital. It could also be argued that, as well as art experiences, the Arts Council and state’s ethos, ideology and policies are disseminated or reproduced through touring to new neighbourhoods and diversifying audiences. With Arts Council England and funded venues operating within the same neoliberal conditions and policies as the university, being required to evidence their efficiency and efficacy, they subject arts producers to related impact agendas and evaluative metrics – apparatuses for accounting for interactions and engagement. While ‘defection’ from the university to the professional or public context is an option, it does not ‘modify the conditions within which the struggle takes place’, constitute an ‘exit’ or afford further autonomy, as the professional practitioner remains in service to the production of impact, in order to justify investment, and also to art market forces (Virno 2004:70). Closely related dispositifs – management instruments, financialized languages and evaluative frameworks – determine artists' drive to innovate and the association of practices with capital, both within and beyond the university. The business or profession of performance- making was once resistant to the production of commodities or exchangeable objects. Rather than producing material or durable goods, the outputs of this cooperative labour were cultural products that became themselves through disappearance. For Marx (1990 [1976]), in the case of teaching and performing, the product was inseparable from the act of producing and the producer; they were activities-without-end- product, like personal services. Performance, as Virno (2004) writes, ‘is an activity which finds its own … purpose … in itself, without objectifying itself into … a “finished product,” or into an object which would survive the performance’ (52). For him, theatre or performance ‘requires the presence of others’ (52) and interactions, and is hence closely aligned to praxis, the vita activa and political action. As I have noted, work has appropriated the activities of praxis, the political and social interactions that took place in the territory of politics and leisure, turning these to the public good of the private company – or in this case the university – and its ethos. Our economic model has shifted from ‘general intellect’ (Marx 1993 [1972]: 706), in which the common mode of labour is cognitive, to ‘general performance’ (Lütticken 2012), in which the majority of workers across diverse fields and forms are expected to perform themselves publicly, improve their performance and produce immaterial goods, such as relationships with customers and colleagues, positive feelings and affects. As Hardt and Negri (2004) write, contemporary labour ‘from sales work to financial services, is fundamentally a performance: the product is the act itself’ (200). In our post-Fordist times, cultural industry, and specifically performance, has become the ‘industry of the means of production’ (Virno 2004: 61). ‘Performance has been put to work’ (Hardt and Negri 2004: 200) and it is ‘the special capabilities of [the] performing artist’ (Virno 2004: 52), their virtuosities, which are the contemporary tools, techniques and procedures of the means of production. If workers are generally expected to perform their labour, then performance abilities appreciate as embodied assets in people as ‘enterprises’ (Lazzarato 2012: 56). How does studying performance through practice resist the production of human capital and producing graduates as virtuosic ‘entrepreneurs of themselves’ (Foucault 2008: 226)? The language of theatre and performance is prevalent in business schools and management studies, with Pine and Gilmore (2001) writing of companies staging unique events – shopping and dining experiences – in which the work ‘perishes upon its performance’ but ‘the value of the experience lingers in the memories of individuals engaged by the event’ (80). This chimes with performance studies’ thinking around the way that performance both disappears and remains (see Phelan 1993 and Schneider 2011). What does this context of an economy of experience, affects and transformation mean for the politics or ethics of teaching practical performance – producing students well-trained in the means of production, for experiential approaches to research and for the radical potential of companies like Uninvited Guests, which stage experiences or market unique, participatory performance events? In conclusion I will return to Conquergood, whose 2002 article, subtitled ‘Interventions and radical research’, was a foundational text for the inclusion of practice and applied performance research in the academy. In it he proposed ‘braiding together disparate and stratified ways of knowing’ (152), crisscrossing between ‘activity and analysis, … thinking and doing, interpreting and making (153), in order to challenge the academy’s ‘deeply entrenched division of labor’, hierarchy of value and organization of knowledge. What I would ask now is whether his mission to triangulate ‘practical knowledge, … propositional knowledge and politic[al]’ action remains resistant, if these spheres are already hybridized as scholarly work and part of the university’s terrain. It is precisely these hybrid modes that the academic institution currently seeks to develop and capitalize upon, through enterprise and networking with creative industries, and through engaging with diverse publics in order to generate measurable impact. Conquergood writes optimistically of research projects that reach outside the academy, of performance studies’ workers engaging with ‘activism, outreach’ (152), making meaningful connections and social commitments to communities – of political praxis. In the context of the contemporary university we need to consider the territorializing as well as radical possibilities of such articulations. How can creative practice fulfil its transgressive promise when it is institutionalized, transformed into the university’s impact, enterprise and product mix? If these activities are in the university and part of the work that a professional academic is contracted for, they can be acquired, commodified, managed and marketed by the university. The academy has embraced different ways of knowing, but to what end and are these modes of knowledge any less subjugated? Under these late capitalist conditions, can performance practice still generate fugitivity escape capture as knowledge or unsettle the ‘encyclopedic circle of the university’ (Harney and Moten 2013: 34)? As Isabell Lorey (2010) proposes, can socio-political affects, impacts and exchanges with others retain a ‘capacity for refusal’, resisting being entirely measured or ‘economicized’ (5)? Are there ‘surpluses’ that cannot be capitalized on, ‘absorbed’ or ‘wholly determined’ by the institution, which produce ‘potentialities of resistance’? Can subversive intellectuals save some autonomous time for inconvenient academic freedom, inefficient and unprofessional activities, including study in Harney and Moten’s terms, without ‘knowledge production’ (12), output, credit or end? Can the ‘refugee colony’ of practitioner researchers, of which I am one, retain the subversive potential ‘to be in but not of the university’ (26), to steal into the academy and poach its resources, to intervene, as Conquergood claimed? Or do we borrow from the university solely for the university’s benefit? As a virtue of being incorporated in the neoliberal institution, are our subjectivities produced and shaped, such that, whether we are practising inside or outside, we are of the university, embodying ways of thinking, desires and aspirations that mimic institutional drives, values and vision? Or, in Lazzarato’s terms, can immaterial and cognitive wage-labourers access non- exploitative temporalities, in which antagonistic subjectivities may form themselves or be created, politically, intellectually and imaginatively independent of the interests of university and state productivity: can our practices be dissociated from capital and returned to common sense or collective knowledge, as public goods? (See Lazzarato 2010 and Chukrov 2010.)

#### Mourning is disempowering and delegitimizes a legacy of political progress

NancyLuxon 15, Prof of Political Science @ U of Minnesota–Twin Citites, “Beyond Mourning and Melancholia: Nostalgia, Anger, and the Challenges of Political Action,” Contemporary Political Theory 1-21

If this article began by **sidestepping the antinomies of mourning/activism** and iteration/interruption **as** leaving politics bottled up between **false choices**, I close by suggesting how to work within and past these disjunctures. **Following the deaths of Eric Garner, Michael Brown, Tamir Rice and other African-Americans killed by the police, the relationship between mourning, politics and collective action in the United States has never been more critical**. These deaths have spurred protests and die-ins across the country, federal civil rights inquiries and a pervading sense that something in the United States is wrong even as the exact nature of that ‘something’ remains elusive. **American responses to these charged moments of racialized state violence have oscillated between grief and anger**. Likewise, the **literature on mourning and politics rests on an uneasy hinge between personal scenes of grief** as ‘the trace of primary passions and losses’ **that condition personhood, and the political scene of a ‘normative and normalizing violence that determines** the terms of **subjectivity** [and] survival’ (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, p. 2). Claims to mourning often work in both registers, but **when this hinge is covered over, the need for sustained collective action recedes**. Winnicott’s description of how people come to draw on attachments – rather than taking them for granted, or as unchanging – helps us to understand the kinds of **disengagements or undoings** that **are something other than political apathy. These** same **practices, and the therapeutic changes they provoke**, prepare individuals first to ‘talk back’ to objects that are not who or what they think, and eventually to **construe a narrative about** their experience of **change. Is the personal so simply political?**¶ **After all, these narratives are a far cry from the ‘explanatory social narratives’ that might organize a new political understanding of events. Indeed**, composing those narratives and **challenging the political order** they evoke **may well be a different task and one that needs the very anger that psychoanalysis tends to sublimate. Political theorists should not expect that by moving practices of mourning into public, we can achieve the same effects. Politics is hardly a space in which** leaders forestall retaliation or anger in the face of unruly subjects, and few would want their **leaders** to **think of themselves as psychoanalysts**. But nor should **Americans use these therapeutic preoccupations as an excuse to postpone political action and account- abilities**. **Instead, Americans need to** tend differently to those mediating practices that bridge personal and public lives, and especially those that **make political organization tactile rather than imagined, and galvanize** anger mixed with **hope into political action. Otherwise, there is a risk of reiterating Freud’s own tendency to map the psychic onto the political.**

#### Mourning is easily reappropriated into Westernized political subjects. We are rewarded for how well we grieve, assimilating an experience that we can never understand.

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There are politics to grief in our contemporary moment of officially unending war and nearly unfettered primitive accumulation. And it is tempting in these instances to demand an equal distribution of the "grievable." Indeed, for one such instance of the demand for an equitable distribution of the so-called "grievable," we might note that those on the queer left, who were already interpellated by the call to grieve but refused to shed tears over Clementi's death, demonstrated their affective "repression" of grief against the marginalization, once again, of all those working-poor queers and trans of color whose deaths daily go unnoticed, unmentioned, ungrieved, and buried. Tempting as this is, I think we miss something important in such demands - something to which scholars, such as Lowe, theorizing the global formation of race alert us. n23 Our political culture has so saturated our practices, subjectivities, and their meanings that **even grief**, in the late modern west, **has become a source for the reproduction of western and westernized political subjects**, their self-sanctioned histories, and the continued absenting of those "non-western," "non-modern," and non-normative cultural subjects, practices and histories who are the "pre-maturely buried," and un-grievable racialized groups, accounted, if ever, [\*279] generally as ciphers of western death. To universalize the grievable across what Randall Williams calls the "international division of humanity" **has the danger of occluding** just how much the modern experience of grief and tears has been crucially a part of the creation and reproduction of the shadow zones of un-grievable loss and premature burials through which, and by which, the material conditions of "our" contemporary modernity are determined. n24 That is, we miss the more grievous situation of which the recent production of media tears and political burial for "gay teens" lost to suicide is a part. Their **deaths are so quickly assimilated by our humanizing tears,** we absent from recognition precisely the social disposability and terror political society has wrought upon non-normative differences and subaltern communities. If suicide is an act of violence, it is so only within a context in which non-violent acts seem no longer possible. We cannot know with absolute certainty why these teens took their lives, and this is part of the violence that suicide creates in its wake. In my own experience, suicide is the mode of acting when one cannot say "no" to the humanizing norms in which one's life is at stake. It is at once an assertion of agonistic social being against those norms and an agreement with the norms that constitute the un-grievability of that very being. Rather than universalize modern grief to all, **these losses demand a radically different acknowledgment: "we" do not know how to have feelings for the un-grievable**, those subjects and relations that undo our affective and psychic economies and make our interpretive paradigm falter and stutter, and so they remain un-remembered, loudly grieved by modern politics, and prematurely buried by a noble corporate media. To engage with un-grievable life, we will need to suspend what we think we know and learn to cultivate alternative practices, histories, memories and modes of knowing and feeling. At stake are lives at once intimate and far.

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