## 1

**The 1AC is invested in a death drive to perfection that inevitably comes out of the gratuitous violence of Indigenous people. The state operates through a drive of eradicating the otherness of the other, which is constitutive of Native genocide.**

**Young 17** (Bryanne Huston, Doctoral Student at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill "Killing the Indian in the Child: Materialities of Death and Political Formations of Life in the Canadian Indian Residential School System," pp. 48-55) NIJ//recut anop

Whiteness, the Child, and the Logics of Futurity Against the politicized topographies and temporalities of indigeneity and race, I now move into a consideration of the contributions of psychoanalytic theory to the questions of politics and time presented thus far. ***The kinds of questions psychoanalysis is interested in asking, the registers upon which it performs analysis, and its unique emphasis on temporality, language, and difference provide an excellent conceptual apparatus through which we might begin to trouble/problematize stable, taken-for-granted oppositions between psychic and social, personal and political, self and other***. Freud’s interest in time is evident in his work on the uncanny, and in his inaugural work on what we might now call trauma studies and conditions we now call post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For Freud, this theory of hysteria introduces a provocative temporality in which traumatic events reoccur, flashing up in perfect replication of themselves, as though happening again and again. In his diagnosis of so-called shell-shocked soldiers returning from World War I, Freud was keenly aware that time did not always progress along an even plane. Though Freud’s analysis of trauma is captivating and critically rich, it is not within my purview here to take on the full extent of this scholarship. Instead, what is most salient to my analysis are the capacities of psychoanalytic theory to move critique outside and beyond prevailing notions of time and narratives of progress that only mean moving forward. This chapter writes from a stance that views it as imperative that scholarship reaches beyond, and thinks outside, the paradigms that invented it. ***Psychoanalytic theory***, with its idiosyncratic temporal logics—particularly in conjunction with Foucauldian theory—***offers a productive and robust way to critique the continuing primacy of normative disciplines whose chronologics have historically warranted a politics that kills in the name of life***. Such an approach allows us to hold in productive tension any definition of “the political” as stable and finite, with—as in the case of liberal political philosophy—the legally constructed “person” as its primary epistemological unit. ***This conceptual capacity of psychoanalysis, in turn, allows us to politicize a form of life and modality of corporeal personhood hitherto constructed as what,*** in Bataillean parlance, ***we might call colonialism’s accursed share—colonialism’s pure waste***. Additionally, psychoanalytic notions of the ***death drive***, whose proper movement is explicitly circular, ***allows us to begin to locate the child within logics of futurity, onto which is laminated a kind of indelible whiteness. For the purpose of my analysis I engage Lacanian psychoanalysis, limiting myself to a consideration of the structure of the drives and to a Lacanian conceptualization of language, and its role in the formation of self and the suturing of the psyche to sociality***. Freud, as Teresa De Lauretis (2008) emphasizes, elaborated the death drive between the First and Second World Wars, in a Europe living “under the shadow of death and the threat of biological and cultural genocide” (1). Situating her analysis of the death drive in the contemporary moment, De Lauretis points to this contextual, historical darkening, writing: “I wonder whether our epistemologies can sustain the impact of the real … If I return to Freud’s notion of an unconscious death drive, it is because it conveys the sense and the force of something in human reality that resists discursive articulation as well as political diplomacy, an otherness that haunts the dream of a common world” (9). Using psychoanalysis as reading practice, Freud’s suspicion that human life, both individual and social, is compromised from the beginning by something that undermines it, works against it, is (darkly?) generative. ***The death drive indicates a tension bordering psychic and libidinal relations, which marks Freud’s radical break with Cartesian rationality and points to a negativity that counteracts the optimistic affirmations of human perfectability. This dimension of radical negativity cannot be reduced to an expression of alienated social conditions, nor is it entirely something the body does on its own. Theorized as the destruction drive, the antagonism drive, or sometimes, simply “the drive,” it is impossible to escape. In psychoanalytic theory, therefore, particularly in the clinical setting, the objective is not to overcome the drive, but rather to come to terms with it, in what Slovenian Lacanian psychoanalytic theorist Slavoj Žižek (1989) calls “its terrifying dimension” (4). It is a fundamental axiom of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that attempts to abolish the drive antagonism are precisely the source of totalitarian temptation. Žižek writes: “The greatest mass murders and holocausts have always been perpetrated in the name of man as harmonious being, of a New Man without antagonistic tension” (5). So it is that one of Canada’s greatest atrocities— the genocide of its First Peoples—took place in the name of Canada itself, that sought progress and unification as a single body politic with claims on a shared futurity. The fulfillment of this destiny relied upon the negation of the other, the bad race, the dangerous race, the race that stood outside the purview of the norm and had no share in its time-zone, the ones called to live in the between space—as nobody. As the relatively more benign civilization policies failed to convert Aboriginal forms of life into separate but civilized, Christian communities on reserves, the federal government intensified its tactics. Policies became more aggressive. As these more aggressive policies (such as enfranchisement) also failed, the federal government intensified its tactics once again, escalating the stakes and the strategies towards the horizon of assimilation. This ‘doubling down’ in the face of failure is a primary trace effect of the death drive, and indeed, it is not unreasonable to argue that the federal government Indian policy has, since confederation, been death driven. Because the aim of fully eradicating the otherness of the other can only fail—in Freudian parlance, it cannot be mastered—the trajectory of the aiming turns in a circularity, orbiting around that which can never be had: perfection. Caught in death drive circularity, the aiming towards the objective (i.e. a unified body politic) authorizes, and indeed recruits, escalating violence in the interest of—finally—closing the open***. For Žižek, ***this compulsive ‘doubling-down’ in the face of failure to arrive at the impossible horizon of perfection tips towards totalitarian temptation, which, he tells us, is implicated in the drive to unify a singular body politic, a new man without antagonistic tension. The drive aims for the return to a moment of unity before the intrusion of language and the entrance of the subject into what Lacan calls the Symbolic—the universe of symbols in which all human subjects share.*** Because this economy of signifiers operates through a modality of difference by association, on the premise that language does not reflect or carry within it universal a priori meaning, spirit, or Truth, ***signifiers are always and already sliding along a chain of signification that is never truly fixed.*** Rather, for Lacan, meaning is constructed through quilting points, durable concepts that affix ideas to their signifiers and which, in their durability, structure entire fields of meaning. For Lacan, subjects are formed by their entrance into this system of sliding difference from a pre-linguistic state retroactively constructed through nostalgic affective associations with unity, perfection, and completion. ***The loss or lack occurs in the imaginary, the order of presence and absence, and is formalized in the symbolic.*** This is experienced by the subject as a loss of that to which she/he can never again return, but for which she/he perpetually yearns, and toward which she/he perpetually moves. The circularity of movement toward this impossible horizon is precisely the movement of the drive. ***It is my argument that the concept of “the Indian” is a quilting point through which the field of politics in Canada is sutured into signification, a durable concept that organizes the meaning of nation, citizen, sovereignty, and subjecthood.*** Further, the ***hypoxic vision of national unity and a harmonious white(ned) citizenry is a movement propelled by the drive, a circularity impelled by the belief that what is lacking in the present can be made good in the future—an imaginary that activates/harnesses a kind of libidinal energy that is, by its very nature, inexhaustible***. It matters, in the instance of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools and their mandate, that before child subjects enter into the structuration of language/the Symbolic, their bodies are already marked as disprized, abject, inscribed into the signification for, and, I argue, as, loss itself. As I have argued above, ***reading through psychoanalytic theory facilitates a conceptualization of subject-formation that includes the role of signification in the contouring of subject/ivities***. This analytic rubric is importantly brought to bear in my analysis of “the child” the Canadian Indian Residential School System announces into presence: a child fundamentally and constitutively tied to a death whose temporal structure is always deferred, always impartial, always unfolding, and yet always still to be. Indeed, even in circumstances in which her/his mode of being in the world is not a deliberate practice of making- spectral***, “the child” remains a notoriously ambivalent, slippery signifier. This plasticity—differently stated, this over-abundant availability of “the child” as concept—takes on an interesting significance within political thought, functioning not as that which is politicized, but as the signifier in whose name the political mobilizes itself. In this way, the child functions as the absolute outside to political thought and the logics of its temporality, functioning instead to condition its possibilities and organize, from beyond its borders, its spatial and temporal limits***. An example of this conceptualization of the child as signifier—and certainly one of the more provocative articulations of this phenomena in the contemporary neoliberal moment—is the polemic Lee develops in his monograph No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. For Edelman, the Child—in its conflation with the kind of futurity toward which the teleology of (neo)liberal discourse is mobilized—is not simply important to contemporary politics, but is that which “serves to regulate political discourse [itself]” (ii). Indeed, as Edelman points out, “the figural Child alone embodies the citizen as ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed. For the social exists to preserve for this universalized subject, this fantasmatic Child, a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). In Edelman’s polemic, it goes without saying that the figural child is a white child and that ***children of colour, children of mixed heritage, Indian children—within the Ideological State Apparatus of the Indian Residential Schools—far from carrying the over-abundant significance Edelman so adeptly parses, signify on only the most spectral of registers. This child***, I argue, as a kind of spectral(ized) partial subject, ***instantiates a subjectivity simultaneously over-exposed to the political and over-determined by the word of the law, while barely accorded even the status of bare life. This is a subject that is hailed into a circularity of misrecognition in a relationship with death that is virtually inescapable***. This relationship with death is the suture that connects this subject to the social. Edelman’s argument does not address racialized formations of self-hood, but is no less relevant to the argument I seek to develop here. Indeed, it is perhaps all the keener in what it omits—which is the child of color. ***This omission points to the level of signification and the way in which the whitened child is effortlessly lifted from the problematically raced body—the body whose racialized status is found problematic. This fantasy of purification through signification speaks, in ways that are eloquent and disturbing in equal measure, precisely the fantasy of the Canadian Indian Residential School System: that the body of the Indian could be left behind in a transcendent movement away from the vexatious quagmire posed by the Indian body toward the realm of what Kantian philosophy calls pure spirit, the realm of whiteness, purity, and hypoxic visions of what Edelman calls, “a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself”*** (ii). This fantasy of corporeal abandonment points to the latent desire of Western philosophical thought that seeks, through the disavowal of bodily finitude and a fetishization of the logos, access to purity of form, a fantasy that relegates, leaves trapped, the sometimes racialized, sometimes feminized other, mired in flesh and finitude from which it is allowed no escape. ***The Indigenous person***, we remember from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, is ***imagined as always already outside the teleology of history, already extinct. This way of understanding difference, through the rubric of historical progress, remains central to liberal and neoliberal political thought, economic practices, and policies in the current moment***. Prising the child away from the Indian, meanwhile, continues to have important implications in the way we imagine colonial forms, not only of life, but also of death.

**The future-to-come arises out of the bleeding body of the Native, forging the past-present-and-future – the wheels of history begin to turn the moment the first Native is slain**

**Young 17** (Bryanne Huston, Doctoral Student at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill “Killing the Indian in the Child: Materialities of Death and Political Formations of Life in the Canadian Indian Residential School System,” pp. 95-100) NIJ recut aaditg

Bodies Out of Time: The IRS as Time-Zone and the Production of Bare Life **The history of settler-colonialism and the biopolitical violence it instantiated is a history of loss**, and the history of residential schools in Canada is one of its many archives. **The interpellative call to die** with which the Canadian Indian Residential School System announces itself **recapitulates a subjectivity that has been trapped, already, by and within the field of signification, and the dense network of intersubjective relations it sutures/renders legible. It is the task of our moment to think beyond the understanding of Indigeneity as that which is outside teleology, as the absolute outside of history and politics, as that which has always been dead/extinct, which positions Indigenous subjects as calculable sums that can be erased to complete a fantasy of national wholeness and completeness.** To do so, I argue, **we must take seriously not only the materializing force of language as it is embodied in entities such as the law, but also the uneven effect of language in carving bodies and contouring subjectivities, the effect of language as structure itself. Such analysis** not only helps us place into question the grounds for political struggle, but **gives us the tools to critique the all too often uninterrogated differences**, which are so often constructed as the oppositions and exclusions upon which the very existence of the political as such can be thought. **These *differences*** (or, oppositions and exclusions) ***include oppositions of temporality from spatiality temporality*, apolitical “Indian time” from the political time of the body politic, as well as the body politic from its limits, what biopolitical thinker Giorgio Agamben calls zone(s) of exclusion. The zone of exclusion is central to the organization of biopolitics,** which has been taken up most famously by Agamben as spatial in its logics—**Agamben argues that the concentration camp is, “the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity”** (Homo Sacer 123). **The metaphors at the center of biopolitical theories, even in instances that are explicitly spatial, are (also) distinctly temporal.** Indeed, even for Agamben, **the concentration camp does not designate a concrete historical place of a defined spatial unity. Instead, it symbolizes and fixes the border between what Agamben calls “bare life,” and political existence.** Accordingly, for Agamben, **the spatial metaphor of the concentration camp does not refer only to the Nazi death camps or contemporary and historical sites of detention, but rather any space in which “bare life” is systematically produced. Yet, what is “bare life,” if not a state of suspended animation outside the designated boundaries of the political?** I argue that in **Agamben’s writings on sovereign power and “bare life,” the spatial metaphor that designates the camp as that which organizes the production of “bare life” is stretched to the point of becoming untenable by the way in which, in the modern era of politics, “bare life,” formerly on the margins of political life, shifts to its center. “Bare life” as a strictly spatial designation does not make sense in this configuration, but requires a chronological supplement.** For, although its position has shifted, **Agamben still means “bare life” to indicate a threshold, the limit that bars homo sacer from the political. This configuration is less**, I argue, **a spatial relationship than a temporal one, a chronopolitical one. The time of the homo sacer hangs suspended at the center of political time, thereby proving its limits.** In other words, **the time of the zone of exception is measured out in its difference to the time of the political—for example, the *temporality of slow death in distinction to* the *forward-moving temporality of the body politic*; the (a) *political time of the Indian, versus the political time of nation.*** I find it significant that even within Agamben’s explicitly spatial figuration of the political and its limits, **there is a register of time that undergirds both positions: the forward moving, cohesive, temporal structure of the political, and the apolitical, ahistorical circular time of the homo sacer, whose relationship to death is a continued exposure unto death, a hanging possibility that effectively freezes him in time.** Let us now circle back to New Year’s Day in 1937, to a kind of death I would argue is arrested between singular and plural (four deaths becoming one, and then a part standing in for a larger whole: all of the children who died in the Canadian Indian Residential Schools). One thing a story like this does— about the boys and their flight across the frozen lake, their death(s), the way their names look on the page next to their ages, and the fact of the missing boot and sock, the rough specificity of those twenty-five meters of distance—is introduce into contemporary political thought not a single theory of “the body,” or some programmatic questions about bodies, but the singularity of the absence of these and other similarly marked child bodies from a conversation on biopolitics and colonial violence and governmentality; an intrusion that insists that this kind of disappearance is more than an instantiation of an early Canadian liberalist game of fort-da. **What we see so clearly demarcated in the empty spaces within (colonial) memory and archives surrounding these deaths, within the politics and practices of cruelty, violence, and excessive neglect that conditioned their possibilities, is the spaces between** the boys from **one another, between** their **bodies and home**, from the absence of a sock and a boot, of appropriate winter clothing, of mittens or scarves. **What we come to know through the material and semiotic remains** of these boys **is that their bodies** (and perhaps the others whose deaths these deaths followed, the ones that followed after) **had already been disprized as loss itself.** Further, dying in the perpetual liminality between one home and the other, in their march across the frozen surface of Fraser Lake, the boys—Maurice Justa, Allen Willie, John Jack, and Andrew Paul—performed a traversing of the distance, in signification, that separated “Indian” and “child,” freezing to death in the impossible distance between. I have argued that **the temporal structure of “the child” and “the Indian,” the zone of exception within which they are partitioned away from participation, or even legibility, within the political, tells a compelling story about the rise of liberal political thought and its inflection onto—and reliance upon—settler-colonialism and the logics of empire. This conjuncture, rather than evincing a radical break between liberalism and contemporary neoliberal aggregates of sovereignty and citizenship, provides a narrative of exclusion present in the current moment and the way**, particularly in Canada, **we continue to think about multiculturalism at the expense of interrogating the cuts and exclusions that inform the ways in which we think (about) difference.** Indeed, **on the logics of multiculturalism, and the exclusions and violence it perpetuates on the bodies and cultural practices conscripted to be its other, Žižek writes, “*multiculturalism is a racism which empties its own position of all positive content* … but nonetheless *retains* this position as the *privileged empty point of universality* from which one is able *to appreciate*** **(and depreciate) properly *other* particular *cultures*”** (The Universal Exception 171). For Žižek, “**the multiculturalist respect for “the Other’s specificity”** (ibid.) **is the very form of asserting his/her own superiority. What is provocative about this passage is that the multiculturalist occupies a temporality of universal timelessness. Others are assigned temporalities and corresponding practices, which the multiculturalist, from his/her position of smooth space-time, appreciates—in so doing, bolstering his/her own claim to universal, modern time. This is perhaps an intensification of colonial chronopolitics, an increased efficiency due at least in part to technological advances that allow the multiculturalist privileged access to consumption, to ownership over the gaze, to the kind of increased mobility that make his/her experience of time and space seem smooth and non-specific** (i.e. one airport looks like all the others; one “exotic” cultural practice seems indistinguishable for another). In this way, ***indigeneity is a category that adheres, coming to stand in for diverse peoples and practices, so indelibly laminated to terms like “primitive” or “anachronistic” the postcolonial imagination can barely distinguish the difference.*** Indigeneity: performatively renewed in signification over and over, frozen in time, like a child who is never allowed to grow up. **The temporal structure of empire is a future that is never fully realized, but rather that unfolds as an ever-burgeoning newness mobilized toward the imagined horizon of a unified citizenry. This is a temporality that carries its history with it, dramatizing the story of its own genesis, and the conditions of its continuing possibility, on the corporeal and figurative stage of Aboriginal bodies. My claim is that these deaths are suggestive of the violence held at the center of contemporary** Canadian **liberalism, the (ongoing) racial violence through which the** Canadian **social-political imaginary of multiculturalism and post-racial politics is predicated. Foundational to these politics**, I further contend, i**s a dramatization of the social contract overcoming the state of nature as the enactment of the New World. This is a repetition that acts to conceal the pernicious and persisting kernel of originary injustice around which the liberal democracies of empire constitute themselves—a centrifugal motion so tropologically powerful and durable it is as if things could never be (imagined) any other way. As if the spaces between bodies on the snow were “just the way it is,” as if this kind of death was/is all there ever could be, a kind of death so recognizable it seems always to have been there.**

**Settler colonialism is integral to the formation of slavery and its afterlife—anti-black racism is an inadequate frame absent understanding the role of colonialism**

King 13

[2013, Tiffany Jeannette King, “IN THE CLEARING: BLACK FEMALE BODIES, SPACE AND SETTLER COLONIAL LANDSCAPES”, PhD Dissertation]

We must consider that Settler colonialism shapes and constitutes Black life, ***specifically slavery and its afterlife in America.*** While slavery and anti-Black racism should be active and robust analytic frames that guide Black Studies and help us understand Black subjectivity in the Western Hemisphere, settler colonialism also structures Black life. The genocide of Native peoples, the perpetual making of Settler space and Settler subjectivity—as unfettered self actualization—do not immediately stop existing as forms of power when they run into Black bodies. The way that settler colonial power looks and manifests itself ***just changes;*** ***it does not stop.*** Settler colonialism, as a subjectless discourse, is a form of productive power that touches all that live in the US and Settler colonial nations.30 Though it touches and shapes everyone’s life it does so in very different ways. For the purposes of my own research I am arguing that settler colonialism’s normalizing power enacts genocide against Native peoples (disappears Native people) but it also shapes and structures antiBlack racism. The ontological positions that were created by slavery, specifically the Slave are still alive and well however, ***settler colonial power intersects with, works through and structures the repressive and productive power that makes the Black captive fungible and socially dead***. Throughout, In the Clearing poses the question, in what ways does settler colonial power help structure slavery and anti-Black racism? This project ultimately argues that ***slavery and anti-Black racism are not adequate to fully understand the material and discursive processes that create Blackness in all of its embodied genres in North America***. Slavery and anti-Black racism are also not the only repressive powers that make the Black body abject, fungible and situated at the outer limits of being-ness. Both ***slavery and settler colonialism structure modernity and need to be fully conceptualized as forms of power that help constitute Blackness***. Conceptualizing the ways that settler colonialism and slavery co-constitute one another is an essential component of this dissertation.

**The 1AC’s analysis through a lens of racial identity reiterates the ongoing structure of displacement – instead of the traditional frame of race as cultural or bodily identity, we must theorize settler colonialism through the social structures by which possession of indigenous lands is made ordinary**

**Rifkin 14**, Mark [ Associate Professor of English and WGS @ UNC-Greensboro, 'Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance,' pp. 19-25]//anop

Over the past twenty years, scholars have given greater prominence to slavery and its legacies and the intertwined processes of (re)producing blackness and whiteness as ubiquitous features of U.S. history, politics, and culture, understanding these dynamics as pervading all aspects of national life. In Playing in the Dark (1992), Toni Morrison asks the landmark question of how the presence of black people and the practices and legacies of enslavement might be registered in texts that do not foreground either, providing “the very manner by which American literature distinguishes itself as a coherent entity” (6). She demonstrates how texts illustrate “the impact of racism on those who perpetuate it” (11), “even, and especially, when American texts are not ‘about’ Africanist presences or characters or narrative or idiom” (46).26 This conceptual and methodological turn helps propel the emergence of immensely rich and important developments within nineteenth-century Americanist scholarship, enabling a centering of slavery and its legacies, blackness as a mode of racialization and anti-black racism, and African American experience within the field as a whole by indicating their relevance across the entire spectrum of U.S. political economy, cultural production, and social life. **While Settler Common Sense owes an immeasurable debt to this set of conceptual and methodological innovations**, these salutary developments also have had the effect of reaffirming what has been characterized as the “black/white binary.”27 Even more than taking the spe - cifics of one vector of racialization and the modes of oppression that sustain it (and that it sustains) and potentially generalizing them to all forms of racialization in ways that may ill-fit other histories, **the black/white binary tends to foreground citizenship, rights, and belonging to the nation, miscasting Indigenous self-representations and political aims in ways that make them illegible**.28 From a perspective organized around bondage, emancipation, labor, polit - ical participation, and formal versus substantive freedom, Native articulations of peoplehood, **sovereignty**, and collective landedness can appear confusing at best and at worst are taken as indicative of **an investment in** a form of reactionary **ethnic nationalism**. As Byrd argues in The Transit of Empire, “The generally accepted theorizations of racialization in the United States have, in the pursuit of equal rights and enfranchisements, tended to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion. . . . When the remediation of the colonization of American Indians is framed through discourses of racialization that can be redressed by further inclusion into the nation-state, there is a significant failure to grapple with the fact that such discourses further **reinscribe the original colonial injury”** (xxiii). More than simply leaving out Indigenous political aims, the substitution of racialization for colonization “masks the territoriality of conquest by assigning colonization to the racialized body . . . [;] land rights disappear into U.S. territoriality as indigenous identity becomes a racial identity and citizens of colonized indigenous nations become internal ethnic minorities within the colonizing nation-state” (xxiv), a process “of making racial what is international” (125).29 **Such “conflation,” confusion, obfuscation results in a tendency in American studies to treat Native presence and violence against Native peoples as a kind of originary sin of white supremacy that can be quickly noted on the way to a discussion of other apparently more significant and enduring modes of racial domination**. Byrd observes that American studies often “sees it as enough to challenge the wilderness as anything but vacant” while then “relegat[ing] American Indians to the site of the already-doneness that begins to linger as unwelcome guests to the future” (20). She suggests that a critical and historical lens developed to examine modes of racialization—a form of study itself overdetermined by the black/white binary—not only cannot grasp the contours and stakes of indigeneity but translates it in ways that **redouble colonial incorporation**.30 Scholarship within nineteenth-century American literary studies that has sought to consider both settlement and slavery often displaces the former on the way to the latter in ways that leave aside the question of the selfdetermination of Indigenous peoples, as well as the process by which the occupation of Native lands comes to be lived and represented as the “ready made” of everyday nonnative possibility. In Captivity and Sentiment, Michelle Burnham suggests that the popularity of narratives of captivity from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries (including slave narratives) can be understood in terms of the ways they worked to manage the “resistant and unrecuperable surplus of cultural difference always left over by the process of cultural exchange” (9): “The experience of captivity across cultural boundaries transports them [captives, the texts produced by and about them, and the readers of such narratives] to interstitial zones of contact, where dominant values, standards, and modes of representation fail, alter, or are brought to crisis” (170). Characterizing “boundaries” as cultural makes “space” and “zone” almost entirely metaphorical, delinked from actual places, land claims, and modes of occupancy, abstracting from the particular kinds of sociopolitical mappings at play in different instances in order to place them in the same analytic frame. “Culture” comes to mark the difference of nonwhiteness per se rather than indexing the normalization of specific formations of residence, land tenure, and political belonging. Ezra Tawil’s The Making of Racial Sentiment similarly enfolds American Indians into a critical narrative that defers questions of Native sovereignty, reading representations of settler–Indigenous conflict as a coded way of addressing slavery. He explores “the attribution of certain qualities of character and emotion to race,” which he characterizes as “racial sentiment” (11): “In the most general terms, it stands to reason that the Indian and the slave could operate at times as analogous figures in Anglo-American political discourse. Both could be represented as members of alien populations that vexed the smooth operation of Anglo-American power on the continent” (59). He later indicates that “the thematics of Indian dispossession was one aspect of a contemporary discussion about property conflict in which the politics of slavery, no less than Indian land ownership, was at stake” (86), naming Native “dispossession” as a struggle around “property” in ways that allow the contested geopolitics of sovereignty to be cast as similar in kind (“analogous”) to “the slavery debate.” In Fugitive Empire, Andy Doolen observes that the book’s title “invokes the heretofore hidden imperialism . . . that shaped our culture and institutions in America’s formative years” while then indicating that he seeks to attend “to the histories of slaves and the institutions of slavery” (xiii). For Doolen, U.S. imperialism refers to a “logic of racial domination” that shapes “the American rhetoric of equality” (xvi), as opposed to indicating a territorial project of expansion/incorporation in which governmental and jurisdictional authority is exerted over nonmember polities who do not seek such belonging, and from this perspective, Native political projects (such as that of Mashpees in the 1830s, which I discuss in chapter 3) appear as the pursuit of “cultural autonomy” within the broader achievement of “civil rights” (162–68). If an existing analytics of race produces distortion, what is the alternative? Or, approached from a slightly different angle, in addressing the implicit operation and reproduction of settler legalities in quotidian geographies of lived nonnative experience, what happens to the notion of whiteness? Work within Indigenous studies coming out of Anglophone settler-states other than the United States has foregrounded the role of whiteness as a principal mode through which settlement is realized and naturalized.31 In “Whiteness, Epistemology, and Indigenous Representation,” Moreton-Robinson distinguishes “between a racialised subject position and the power and knowledge effects of racialised discourse,” positioning whiteness not simply as a particular embodied social location but as a means of naming the structure through which Indigenous territory comes to be understood as possessable by nonnatives and by which that logic of expropriation/ownership by the settler nation comes to be experienced as given (84). However, in the context of the United States, in which the de facto racial divide is not white/ Native but white/black, can whiteness provide the principal means of naming the operation of everyday formations and sensations of settlement? MoretonRobinson suggests as much in “Writing off Treaties,” which addresses how whiteness studies in the United States takes the black/white binary as given in ways that efface settler colonialism and Indigenous dislocation: “USA as a white nation state cannot exist without land and clearly defined borders, it is the legally defined and asserted territorial sovereignty that provides the context for national identifications of whiteness. In this way I argue Native American dispossession indelibly marks configurations of white national identity” (85). If racializing attributions of Indianness work as a way of displacing indigeneity, does that dynamic make settlement equivalent to whiteness or identification with it? Moreton-Robinson observes that “the sovereignty claims” of Indigenous peoples “are different from other minority rights at the center of the struggle for racial equality,” because “their sovereignty is not epistemologically and ontologically grounded in the citizenship of the white liberal subject of modernity” (87). Describing Native “dispossession” as marking “white national identity,” though, need not be the same as characterizing whiteness as the primary vehicle through which Indigenous “sovereignty claims” are disowned. In other words, whiteness in the United States conventionally has signified in terms of a racial hierarchy through which populations’ access to citizenship rights and social wealth are managed, but given that all positions in that hierarchy are predicated on the continued existence of the settlerstate, settlement may be conceptualized less as a function of whiteness than whiteness may be understood as expressing a particular privileged position within the allocation of Native lands and resources among nonnatives. As Scott Morgensen suggests, **“Racialization under white supremacy will grant non-Natives distinct, often mutually exclusive, abilities to represent or enact settler colonial power.** But all non-Natives still will differ in their experiences of settler colonialism from the experiences of Native peoples” (21).32 Put a little differently, if whiteness names the mechanisms by which settler land tenure and jurisdiction are legitimized, it may not be the same whiteness as that of the black/white binary, even if both are lived in the same body, such that people of color may enact and aspire to whiteness-as-settlement while still contesting whiteness-as-allocation-of-entitlements-within-citizenship.33 Moreover, settlement may itself not depend on a routing through whiteness. In Creole Indigeneity, Shona Jackson addresses the dynamics of belonging in Guyana, analyzing how black subjects make themselves “native” in the pro - cess of emancipation and producing a postcolonial national identity. Jackson suggests that engaging with the history of the Caribbean “requires the difficult assessing of Creoles as themselves settlers,” adding that “we must begin to address the ways in which, in the Caribbean and even within settler states like the United States. . . , those brought in as forced labor (racialized capital) now contribute to the disenfranchisement of Indigenous Peoples” (3). Specifically, casting labor as nationalizing and nativizing allows formerly enslaved people to be narrated as having an intimate connection to the place of the state, a belonging made possible by the ongoing settlement of Native lands. Jackson argues, “[L]abor by formerly enslaved and indentured people is precisely what they are able to make into and reify as the new prior time of their belonging[,] . . . with which they supplant the prior time of Indigenous peoples” (69). Doing so reaffirms the legitimacy and inevitability of the nation-state’s existence, which itself depends on the translation and effacement of Native governments and geographies. Yet, in Guyana and elsewhere in the Caribbean, articulations of national identity come from majority nonwhite populations, largely of African descent. For these reasons, it may analytically be more productive to refer to the process of settlement in other terms than as “whiteness,” especially in the U.S. context in which the latter de facto is understood as referring to a struggle within the nation-state rather than as one over the nation-state’s domestication of Indigenous peoples and territories.34 The operation of the United States as a settler-state cannot be understood in isolation from the naturalization of racial identities and racialized access to resources, particularly inasmuch as the privileging of whiteness shapes nonnatives’ experience of possession and personhood. However, for the reasons sketched above, I do not foreground race as the primary modality through which to conceptualize processes of settlement and the dynamics of settler phenomenology, even as I address the (racial) coding of Native people(s) as Indians as part of how nonnatives edit out indigeneity and settler occupation from their sensation of the ordinary.35 I seek to address the ways that the legalities of the settler-state shape everyday experiences of givenness for all nonnatives, such that antiracist projects (along with other articulations of opposition, as in the texts I address) can recycle those lived grids of intelligibility as a basis for their alternative imaginings. In addition, bracketing the methodological centrality of race, while still engaging with dynamics of racialization, works as a way of forestalling the gravitational pull of citizenship and analogy with African Americans as the means for approach ing settler colonialism, while also potentially opening up my analyses to a comparative frame that addresses settler-states in which whites are not predominant.

**As two settlers debating in front of non-Native judges** **we should adopt an ethic that is willing to risk absolute failure to formulate ethical subjectivities -- this *radical break* from ‘business as usual’ *turns their impact calculus* and is a prerequisite for value itself. The role of the ballot is to center Indigenous scholarship and resistance.**

**Pinkard 13** [2013, Lynice Pinkard, “Revolutionary Suicide: Risking Everything to Transform Society and Live Fully”, Tikkun 2013 Volume 28, Number 4: 31-41, http://tikkun.dukejournals.org/content/28/4/31.full]

I’d like to present an alternative to conventional identity politics, one that requires that we understand the way that capitalism itself has grown out of a very particular kind of identity politics — white supremacy — aimed at securing “special benefits” for one group of people. It is not sufficient to speak only of identities of race, class, and gender. I believe we must also speak of identities in relation to domination. To what extent does any one of us identify with the forces of domination and participate in relations that reinforce that domination and the exploitation that goes with it? In what ways and to what extent are we wedded to our own upward mobility, financial security, good reputation, and ability to “win friends and influence people” in positions of power? Or conversely, do we identify (not wish to identify or pretend to identify but actually identify by putting our lives on the line) **with efforts to reverse patterns of domination, empower people on the margins (even when we are not on the margins ourselves),** and seek healthy, sustainable relations? When we consider our identities in relation to domination, **we realize the manifold ways in which we have structured our lives and desires in support of the very economic and social system that is dominating us**. To shake free of this cycle, **we need to embrace a radical break from business as usual.** We need to commit revolutionary suicide. By this I mean not the killing of our bodies but the destruction of our attachments to security, status, wealth, and power. These attachments **prevent us from becoming spiritually and politically** **alive. They prevent us from changing the violent structure of the society in which we live.** Revolutionary suicide means living out our commitments, **even when that means risking death**. When Huey Percy Newton, the cofounder of the Black Panther Party, called us to “revolutionary suicide,” it appears that he was making the same appeal as Jesus of Nazareth, who admonished, “Those who seek to save their lives will lose them, and those who lose their lives for the sake of [the planet] will save them.” Essentially, both movement founders are saying the same thing. **Salvation is not an individual matter. It entails saving, delivering, rescuing an entire** **civilization**. This cannot be just another day at the bargain counter. The salvation of an entire planet **requires a total risk of everything** — of you, of me, of unyielding people everywhere, for all time. This is what revolutionary suicide is. The cost of revolutionary change is **people’s willingness to pay with their own lives**. This is what Rachel Corrie knew when she, determined to prevent a Palestinian home in Rafah from being demolished**, refused to move and was killed by an Israeli army bulldozer in the Gaza Strip**. This is what Daniel **Ellsberg knew when he made public the Pentagon Papers.** It’s what Oscar Schindler knew when he rescued over 1,100 Jews from Nazi concentration camps, what subversive Hutus knew when they risked their lives to rescue Tutsis in the Rwandan genocide. This call may sound extreme at first, but **an unflinching look at the structure of our society reveals why nothing less is enough**. Before returning to the question of revolutionary suicide and what it might mean in each of our lives, let’s look at what we’re up against.

#### The alternative is refusal – a political depression that recognizes reconciliation will never be enough and creates harmful optimism to the political. Instead, embrace an affective pessimism that grounds alternative futures.

Belcourt 2016 (Billy-ray Belcourt is from the Driftpile Cree Nation. He is a 2016 Rhodes Scholar and is reading for an M.St. in Women's Studies at the University of Oxford. He was named by CBC Books as one of six Indigenous writers to watch,Political Depression in a Time of Reconciliation, Jan 15, 2016, <http://activehistory.ca/2016/01/political-depression-in-a-time-of-reconciliation/)//NotJacob//recut> anop

It’s tough: knowing that you might not get the world you want and the world that wants you back, that your bones might never stop feeling achy and fragile from the wear and tear of mere existence, from the hard labour of getting through the day. Ours are bodies that have been depleted by time, that have been wrenched into a world they can’t properly bend or squirm into because our flesh is paradoxically both too much and not enough for it. In the wake of both eventful and slowed kinds of premature death, what does it mean that the state wants so eagerly to move Indigenous bodies, to touch them, so to speak? Reconciliation is an affective mess: it throws together and condenses histories of trauma and their shaky bodies and feelings into a neatly bordered desire; a desire to let go, to move on, to turn to the future with open arms, as it were. Reconciliation is stubbornly ambivalent in its potentiality, an object of desire that we’re not entirely certain how to acquire or substantiate, but one that the state – reified through the bodies of politicians, Indigenous or otherwise – is telling us we need. In fact, Justice Murray Sinclair noted that the launch of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report on December 15, 2015, puts us at the “threshold of a new era in this country.”[1] I am interested in how life might be lived willfully and badly in the face of governmental forms of redress when many of us are stretched thin, how reconciliation, though instantiating a noticeable shift in the national affective atmosphere,[2] doesn’t actually remake the substance of the social or the political such that we’re still tethered to scenes of living that can’t sustain us. What I am trying to get at is: reconciliation works insofar as it is a way of looking forward to being in this world, at the expense of more radical projects like decolonization that want to experiment with different strategies for survival.[3] This way of doing things isn’t working and, because of that, optimism is hard to come by. According to cultural theorist Ann Cvetkovich, political depression emerges from the realization “that customary forms of political response, including direct action and critical analysis, are no longer working either to change the world or to make us feel better.”[4] It is the pestering sense that whatever you do, it won’t be enough; that things will continue uninterrupted, teasing you because something different is all you’ve wanted from the start. To be politically depressed is to worry about the temporal reach of neoliberal projects like reconciliation, to question their orientation toward the future because the present requires all of your energy in order to feel like anything but dying. Political depression is of a piece with a dispossessory enterprise that remakes the topography of the ordinary such that the labour of maintaining one’s life becomes too hard to keep up. We have to wait for the then and there in the here and now; how do we preserve ourselves until then? As Leanne Simpson points out, reconciliation has been reparative for some survivors, encouraging them to tell their stories, to keep going, so to speak.[5] But, what of the gendered and racialized technologies of violence that created our scenes of living, scenes we’ve been forced to think are of our own choosing? Optimism for the work of reconciliation disappeared in the face of multiple crises: of Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, of HIV infection rates, of mass incarceration, of diabetes, of suicide. Reconciliation, at once a heuristic and a form of statecraft, fakes a political that doesn’t actually exist as such, one that not only presupposes that we – Indigenous peoples, that is – are willing to stay attached to it, but that we are already folded into it, that we’ve already consented to it. What does it mean, for example, to consent to a nation-to-nation relationship if there are no other options to choose from? Reconciliation wants so badly to be a keyword of sorts, to contain so much inside its semantic confines, to be “wide-reaching in its explanatory power.”[6] I’m not surprised things have started to leak all over the place. Decolonization might need something of an affective turn: I think there are ways of being attuned to our bodies such that we can gauge if our visceral responses are trained or not, parasitic or not. In short: what do our tears signal, what do his – Justin Trudeau’s – signal? We cry because pain holds our world together. I don’t want pain to hold our world together anymore. Perhaps admitting we are politically depressed is one of the most important things we could do in this day and age. When survival becomes radical and death becomes part and parcel of the ordinary itself, political depression might be our only point of departure. But, political depression is also about dreaming up alternatives that can sustain your attachments to life. Cvetkovich reminds us that we need “other affective tools for transformation” because hope and blind allegiance have failed too many of us too often.[7] I am interested in the generative work of pessimism, how being fed up propels us onward, and keeps us grounded in the now, such that we can make it to the future, even if that’s just tomorrow. As Kim TallBear put it, we’ve been living in a post-apocalyptic world (in its ecological ruins and in the face of its crisis-making politics) for quite some time,[8] one that exhausts our bodies to the point of depression and death and one that slowly removes us from the non-normative or the astray.[9] We are stuck in the thick of things, left clinging to an impasse without an exit strategy. We might need reconciliation today, but Indigenous peoples need a more capacious world-building project for tomorrow, one that can bear all of us and the sovereignties built into our breathing. We should not be asked: do you want the world today? Instead, we should be asking: does the world want us?

## Case

#### Presumption –

#### [a] the impossible demand does nothing – the state has ALWAYS been given impossible demands and nothing has changed, how comfortable with failure should we get before the state eradicates the indigenous? How many indigenous have to die before we’re comfortable? Listen for an answer from the 1AR regarding the brightline of how much more native genocide must be forefronted *before* instituting genocide? There isn’t one which proves the Aff’s method isn’t just vague but that their lack of a serious blueprint for sabotage means their impacts are unachievable

#### [b] using the state to defeat the state is a form of cruel optimism – its infinitely regressive and justifies future state action which will ALWAYS be anti-indigenous THIS IS AN IMPACT TURN TO THE 1AC’S METHOD – can’t deconstruct master’s house with master’s tools, even if you by that radical praxis is necessary to confront the state or the object of the topic, their method needs to breathe theory into practise: their sole advocate, Wilderson, *is not advocating for incorporation to the libidinal economy or expanationist liberal project* - they are double turning themselves and bastardising this lit base to justify violent but creative mechanisms of desire that (un)intentionally replicate whiteness,– ask yourself, “What does the Aff functionally do? When does the investment into state based solutions come to a tipping point where folks can magically turn on the Frankenstein they’ve made?”

#### [c] revolutionary politics DO NOT DO ANYTHING – if the politics of the 1AC manifest in state action it’ll always be coopted and will fail which creates more cruel optimism – only a refusal solves which means the alt solves case, if anything we should give up on the state as hope and find other forms of survival which means the 1ac is wasting our time and hope

#### Their theorization of indigenous suffering not being able to be analogous to the suffering of blackness – the structure of settler colonialism creates a racial hierarchy of whiteness

**Glenn**, Professor of Asian American and Asian Diaspora Studies at UC Berkeley, **15**

[Evelyn Nakano, 2015, Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, “Settler Colonialism as Structure: A Framework for Comparative Studies of U.S. Race and Gender Formation”, Volume 1, No. 52, 60-61, EAW] //recut aaditg

I next turn to settler colonial mobilization of race and gender to manage “exogenous others” beyond the indigenes and enslaved blacks. In contrast to virtuous or potentially virtuous exogenous others (typically European immigrants) who may be selected for gradual inclusion, undesirable exogenous others (typically racialized immigrants) were considered morally degraded, sometimes irredeemably so. Settler colonialism’s response to undesirable exogenous others has often swung (and still does) between the poles of “elimination” and coercive “exploitation.”

In making connections between settler colonial treatment of undesirable exogenous others and the treatment of Native Americans and African Americans, I am not assuming a commensurability between anti-black racism or anti-Indian racism and other racisms. The so-called Afro-pessimist school of thought argues for the singularity of antiblack racism, which is rooted in the unique conditions of chattel slavery (Patterson 1985; Sexton 2010, 2011; Wilderson 2010). In his exegesis of Afro-pessimism, Jared Sexton (2010) contends that despite the fact that some non-black groups have at times labored under conditions similar to blacks, they have not been subject to the rule of slave law. He goes on to argue “the ‘social death’ in which one is denied kinship entirely by the force of law, is reserved for the ‘natal alienation’ and ‘genealogical isolation’ characterizing slavery” (Sexton 2010:41). Thus, the analogizing of people of color suffering to black suffering “bear(s) a common refusal to admit to significant differences of structural position born of discrepant histories between Blacks and their political allies, actual or potential” (Sexton 2010:47–48).

I agree that racisms targeting different groups are not identical and that different racisms cannot be made equivalent by drawing analogies between differing forms of subordination, for example between chattel slavery and labor exploitation. However, I do argue that the structure of U.S. settler colonialism rests on social, economic, and political underpinnings that link racisms. In making the argument, I eschew constructing or adjudicating a hierarchy of suffering but work at uncovering some of the underpinnings.

Among the groups that can be considered under the rubric of “undesirable exogenous others” are Mexicans and Chinese. They are each single nationality groups that are often subsumed under broader designations, Hispanics/Latinos and Asian Americans, respectively. For purposes of this analysis, I hone in on the specific groups—Mexicans and Chinese—rather than the broader heterogeneous groupings because of their long history in the United States and their prominent representation in popular culture and political-legal discourse. Also relevant is that the period of these groups’ initial incorporation into the United States coincided with the westward expansion of U.S. settler colonialism and its project of final elimination of indigenes during the second half of the nineteenth century. While the category of exogenous other seems to fit the Chinese, who were viewed and treated as inalterably alien, it may seem incongruent to characterize Mexicans in that way. But, as Mae Ngai (2004:131– 32) points out, “When Anglos confronted Mexicans, they perceived Mexicans as foreigners even though the majority of the Anglos themselves had also migrated to the Southwest at the same time.

**Indigeneity cannot be theorized through the lens of racial identity – geopolitics, not biopolitics, grounds the authority of the settler state to determine what counts as a political issue and what is self-evidently natural – settler colonialism transcends racial violence through the question of authority and geopolitical control**

**Rifkin 9** (Mark, “Indigenizing Agamben: Rethinking Sovereignty in Light of the ‘Peculiar’ Status of Native Peoples,” Cultural Critique, Number 73, pp. 88-124)//recut anop

In using Agamben’s work to address U.S. Indian policy, though, it needs to be reworked. In particular, his emphasis on biopolitics tends to come at the expense of a discussion of geopolitics, the production of race supplanting the production of space as a way of envisioning the work of the sovereignty he critiques, and while his concept of the exception has been immensely influential in contemporary scholar- ship and cultural criticism, such accounts largely have left aside discussion of Indigenous peoples. Attending to Native peoples’ position within settler-state sovereignties requires investigating and **adjusting** three aspects of Agamben’s **thinking**: the persistent inside/outside tropology he uses to address the exception, specifically the ways it serves as a metaphor divorced from territoriality; the notion of “bare life” as the basis of the exception, especially the individualizing ways that he uses that concept; and the implicit depiction of sovereignty as a self-confident exercise of authority free from anxiety over the legitimacy of state actions.5 Such revision allows for a reconsideration of the “zone of indistinction” produced by and within sovereignty, opening up analysis of the ways settler-states regulate not only proper kinds of embodiment (“bare life”) but also legitimate modes of collectivity and **occupancy**—what I will call **bare habitance**.¶ If the “overriding sovereignty” of the United States is predicated on the creation of a state of exception, then the struggle for sovereignty by Native peoples can be envisioned **as less about control of** particular policy **domains** than of **metapolitical authority**—**the ability to define the content and scope of “law” and “politic**s.” Such a shift draws attention away from critiques of the particular rhetorics used to justify the state’s plenary power and toward a macrological effort to contest the “overriding” assertion of a **right to exert control over Native polities**. My argument, then, **explores the limits** of forms of analysis organized around the critique of the settler-state’s employment of racialized discourses of savagery and the emphasis on cultural distinctions between Euramerican and Indigenous modes of governance. Both of these strategies within Indigenous political theory treat sovereignty as a particular kind of political content that can be juxtaposed with a substantively different—more Native-friendly or Indigenous-centered—content, but by contrast, I suggest that discourses of racial difference and equality as well as **of cultural recognition** are deployed by the state in ways that reaffirm its geopolitical self-evidence and its **authority to determine** what issues, processes, and statuses will count as meaningful within the political system. **While arguments about Euramerican racism** and the disjunctions be- tween Native traditions and imposed structures of governance can be quite powerful in **challengi**ng **aspects of settler-state policy, they cannot account for the structuring violence performed by the figure of sovereignty**. Drawing on Agamben, I will argue that “sovereignty” functions as a placeholder that has no determinate content.6 **The state** has been described as an entity that exercises a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of violence, and what I am suggesting is that the state of exception produced through Indian policy creates a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of legitimacy, an exclusive uncontestable right to define what will count as a viable legal or political form(ul)ation. That fundamentally circular and self-validating, as well as anxious and fraught, performance grounds the legitimacy of state rule on nothing more than the axiomatic negation of Native peoples’ authority to determine or adjudicate for themselves the normative principles by which they will be governed. Through Agamben’s theory of the exception, then, I will explore how the supposedly underlying sovereignty of the U.S. settler-state is a retrospective projection generated by, and dependent on, the “peculiar”-ization of Native peoples.

**Cooption DA – The aff is Occupy and Standing Rock 2.0 – themes of a minoritized, but collective ‘we’ that will reclaim freedom necessitates the erasure of indigeneity**

**Barker 12** (Adam J., Department of Geography, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK “Already Occupied: Indigenous Peoples, Settler Colonialism and the Occupy Movements in North America” Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest No.1 pp.3-5)

Pervasive Settler Colonialism. The relationships within and between the various communities converging around Occupy are complicated and shifting. Settler colonialism does not explain the friction between Occupy and Indigenous peoples in totality; however, it does provide a powerful lens through which to examine Settler–Indigenous dynamics around Occupy. Settler colonialism is persistent and pervasive, and is one of the most powerful forces to shape the North American social, political and economic landscapes. It cannot be ignored if for no other reason than that it implicates almost every Settler person in its functioning. ***The settler colonization of the Americas created* a vast amount of *wealth for colonizers***, while **forcing Indigenous peoples to the extreme margins**. **It is impossible not to feel for the American homeowners whose lives have been devastated by predatory banks and lax regulations**, **or the** increasing mass of the **poor caught on one side of the widening wealth gap**. **But** at the same time, it cannot be ignored that ***American wealth*** (especially that of the esteemed home-owning middle class) **was and is *generated from the exploitation of stolen land.*** The **dispossession of Indigenous peoples through a vast array of ‘transfers’** (Veracini, 2010, pp. 35–50) **enables invasive settler *collectives* to co-opt** the power of place: **physical resources of minerals, timber, fertile land and conceptual power relationships with the land** enacted through private property and the nation state. **The diffuse nature** of settler colonialism **enables the perception that**, while **everyone may be somehow connected to colonization, *no one is responsible for it.*** Veracini explains: ...a recurrent need to disavow produces a circumstance where the actual operation of settler colonial practices is concealed behind other occurrences.... **The settler hides**... **behind the activity of settlers elsewhere**, **behind the persecuted**, **the migrant**, even **the refugee**.... ***The settler hides behind his labour and hardship***.... Most importantly, the peaceful settler hides behind the ethnic cleanser.... Settler colonialism obscures the conditions of its own production. (Veracini, 2010, p. 14) This denial—not of the existence of colonization, but of personal complicity (Regan, 2010, p. 45)—makes settler colonialism very difﬁcult to confront effectively. **That these elements manifest inside the Occupy movements is** not surprising, but rather **inevitable**. However, **it is not only the persistence of settler colonialism within Occupy** that is at issue; **it is also what settler colonialism reveals about the direction and intent of the Settler majority** that makes up Occupy. Beyond the colonial accumulation of wealth and power, **Settler people remain preoccupied with naturalization.** Veracini argues that all settler colonial societies desire to supersede themselves, that is, to create a ‘post settler’ polity. He describes **settler colonial societies as ‘palindromes’** (Veracini, 2010, pp. 100–101) **that must come full circle to naturalize themselves** in place, or be forever reminded of their status as foreigners and, more accurately, invaders and exploiters. ***This necessitates the erasure of indigeneity*** from place (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005, p. 598). Not just the physical erasure of indigenous populations, either; **the very memory of Indigenous ways of knowing and being must be erased or subsumed into a multicultural Settler polity.** In this way, the Indigenous–Settler divide disappears, and Settler people become naturalized as simply ‘American’, ‘Canadian’ or whichever other identity labels apply. Kilibarda (2012) points out that ***themes of nationalism persist in the Occupy movements***. The ***narrative of reclaiming ones country from a corrupt few*** is a powerful story. Selbin’s (2010) analysis of social movements reminds us that ***people respond to ‘stories that they know’ and build the narratives of social change as ‘bricoleurs’***, ***using*** the pieces of ***social memory and history* that are available** to them. In many ways, **the Occupy movements return to powerful settler colonial stories**: **the exceptional nation, individual equality, a market that generates** fundamental **freedoms** if only properly tended and regulated. Despite the roots of capital accumulation in Indigenous dispossession, Occupy has largely chosen to focus on the abuse of power and position by individuals and corporations. This problem is to be addressed by mass collections of individuals: ‘the 99%’. **Rather than addressing the roots of inequality in settler colonialism, the 99% seeks to level the playing ﬁeld within the imposed system** of state and capital, completing the settler colonial palindrome: **Settler and Indigenous disappear**, along with the history of colonization, **leaving only homogenized (liberal and progressive) rights-bearing individuals.** Settler colonial theory reveals this overlap between stories of national liberation and histories of colonial dispossession in settler states. This overlap is evident to some extent in the way that Occupy movements conceptualize themselves. **The ‘99%’ moniker is both a powerful rallying cry and also a homogenizing declaration** (Kilibarda, 2012, pp. 30–32). In fact, ***Indigenous peoples are not part of ‘the 99%’* in the way that most Settler people are** (Yee, 2011). In order to enter the social space of the 99%, ***Indigenous peoples must ignore generations of* difference making and *marginalization by*** governments and ***Settler communities***, ***and assume the role of a politicized ‘minority’ in solidarity* with other minority groups** making equivalent claims. Participation is contingent on abandoning fundamental aspects of indigeneity. Perhaps **it was inevitable that a movement** for economic justice—even framed **in social terms**—**would not resonate with Indigenous activists.** Indigenous peoples have contended with colonial power since before the creation of the northern bloc settler states. The severe deprivation and economic marginalization that is a feature of much of Indian Country inspired similar Indigenous-led protests decades ago. ***In 1972, before anyone thought to Occupy Wall Street, Indigenous activists were already occupying the*** Bureau of Indian Affairs (***BIA***) ofﬁces. It is important to remember that despite ‘centuries of genocidal policies targeting indigenous lands, belief systems and bodies, indigenous communities have nevertheless repeatedly managed to check the same capitalist system that #occupy is now confronting’ (Kilibarda, 2012, p. 27). I would argue here that Indigenous communities have more properly been checking the growth of settler colonial power, manifested as capitalist exploitation and state oppression. These power dynamics have been identiﬁed and engaged by Occupy movements as well; yet, there seems to be little understanding of how Indigenous peoples’ experiences in resistance have informed evolving goals, strategies and tactics, including that of occupation. There is a certain frustration that undoubtedly arises for Indigenous peoples observing Occupy movements trying to deﬁne themselves. In the early days of Occupy Wall Street, discussions about economics and policy were quickly subsumed into discourses about **the practice of *experimental and direct democracy***. For Indigenous peoples, these discourses must ***seem*** at turns ***ironic and absurd***: ***privileged Settler people play-acting at freedom while Indigenous peoples’*** own fully functioning, traditional and tested forms of ***governance have been derided and attacked for centuries***. And while the protesters would likely suggest that they are not the problem—instead citing government, military or corporate structures—in the context of settler colonialism, this position is untenable. ***It is* too *easy to point ﬁngers at*** these **large *institutions of power and privilege.*** Indigenous activists are aware of this. **There are many signs of shifts in Indigenous praxis away from contending with governments and institutions of power**, and towards asserting differential relationships to place in spite of (rather than against) colonial power structures (Alfred, 2005; Alfred & Corntassel, 2005). Although, as noted, Indigenous struggles in the northern bloc have long been characterized by tactical occupations, the motivations, goals and methods of occupying have changed over time. Occupations of Alcatraz and the BIA Ofﬁce in the 1960s and 1970s were intended to defy government dictates—asserting autonomy—and to raise public awareness. Later occupations, such as those in Tla-o-qui-aht (Clayoquot Sound) or Burnt Church, brought more speciﬁc demands to bear, asserting control of particular resources desirable to Settler society.