## 1

#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a[2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

#### US–China war goes nuclear – crisis mis-management ensures conventional escalation - extinction

Kulacki 20 [Dr. Gregory Kulacki focuses on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China on nuclear and space arms control and is the China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020. Would China Use Nuclear Weapons First In A War With The United States?, Thediplomat.com, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-first-in-a-war-with-the-united-states/] srey

Admiral Charles A. Richard, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently told the Senate Armed Service Committee he “could drive a truck” through the holes in China’s no first use policy. But when Senator John Hawley (R-MO) asked him why he said that, Commander Richard backtracked, described China’s policy as “very opaque” and said his assessment was based on “very little” information. That’s surprising. **China** has been exceptionally **clear** **about** its **intentions** **on** the possible **first** **use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons**. On the day of its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared it “will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” That **unambiguous** **statement** **has** **been** a **cornerstone** **of** **Chinese** **nuclear** **weapons** policy for 56 years and has been repeated frequently in authoritative Chinese publications for domestic and international audiences, including a highly classified training manual for the operators of China’s nuclear forces. Richard should know about those publications, particularly the training manual. A U.S. Department of Defense translation has been circulating within the U.S. nuclear weapons policy community for more than a decade. The commander’s comments to the committee indicate a familiarity with the most controversial section of the manual, which, in the eyes of some U.S. analysts, indicates there may be some circumstances where **China** **would** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **first** **in** a **war** **with** **the** **U**nited **S**tates. This U.S. misperception is understandable, especially given the difficulties the Defense Department encountered translating the text into English. The language, carefully considered in the context of the entire book, articulates a strong reaffirmation of China’s no first use policy. But it also reveals **Chinese** military planners are **struggling** **with** **crisis** **management** **and** **considering** **steps** **that** could **create** **ambiguity** **with** **disastrous** **consequences**. Towards the end of the 405-page text on the operations of China’s strategic rocket forces, in a chapter entitled, “Second Artillery Deterrence Operations,” the authors explain what China’s nuclear forces train to do if **“**a strong military power possessing nuclear‐armed missiles and an absolute advantage in high‐tech conventional weapons is carrying out intense and continuous attacks against our major strategic targets and we have no good military strategy to resist the enemy.**”** The military power they’re talking about is the United States. The authors indicate China’s nuclear missile forces train to take specific steps, including increasing readiness and conducting launch exercises, to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks.” The manual refers to these steps as an “adjustment” to China’s nuclear policy and a “lowering” of China’s threshold for brandishing its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders would only take these steps in extreme circumstances. The text highlights several triggers such as U.S. conventional bombing of China’s nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, heavy conventional bombing of large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or other acts of **conventional** **warfare** **that** “**seriously** **threatened**” the “safety and **survival**” of the nation. U.S. Misunderstanding Richard seems to believe this planned adjustment in China’s nuclear posture means China is **preparing** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** first under these circumstances. He told Hawley that there are a “number of situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred that do not meet our definition of first use.” The head of the U.S. Strategic Command appears to assume, as do other U.S. analysts, that the **Chinese** would **interpret** **these** types of U.S. conventional **attacks** **as** **equivalent** **to** a **U.S. first use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons** against China. But that’s not what the text says. “Lowering the threshold” refers to China putting its nuclear weapons on alert — it does not indicate Chinese leaders might lower their threshold for deciding to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. Nor does the text indicate Chinese nuclear forces are training to launch nuclear weapons first in a war with the United States. China, unlike the United States, keeps its nuclear forces off-alert. Its warheads are not mated to its missiles. China’s nuclear-armed submarines are not continuously at sea on armed patrols. The manual describes how China’s nuclear warheads and the missiles that deliver them are controlled by two separate chains of command. Chinese missileers train to bring them together and launch them after China has been attacked with nuclear weapons. All of these behaviors are consistent with a no first use policy. The “adjustment” Chinese nuclear forces are preparing to make if the United States is bombing China with impunity is to place China’s nuclear forces in a state of readiness similar to the state the nuclear forces of the United States are in all the time. This step is intended not only to end the bombing, but also to convince U.S. decision-makers they cannot expect to destroy China’s nuclear retaliatory capability if the crisis escalates. Chinese Miscalculation Unfortunately, alerting Chinese nuclear forces at such a moment could have terrifying consequences. Given the relatively small size of China’s nuclear force, a U.S. president might be tempted to try to limit the possible damage from a Chinese nuclear attack by destroying as many of China’s nuclear weapons as possible before they’re launched, especially if the head of the U.S. Strategic Command told the president China was preparing to strike first. One study concluded that if the United States used nuclear weapons to attempt to knock out a small fraction of the Chinese ICBMs that could reach the United States it may kill tens of millions of Chinese civilians. The authors of the text assume alerting China’s nuclear forces would “create a great shock in the enemy’s psyche.” That’s a fair assumption. But they also assume this shock could “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” That’s highly questionable. There is a **substantial** **risk** **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would** **respond** **to** this implicit **Chinese** **threat** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **by** **escalating**, rather than halting, its **conventional** **attacks**. If China’s nuclear forces were targeted, it would put even greater strain on the operators of China’s nuclear forces. A **slippery** **slope** **to** **nuclear** **war** Chinese military planners are aware that attempting to coerce the United States into halting conventional bombardment by alerting their nuclear forces could fail. They also know it might trigger a nuclear war. But if it does, they are equally clear China won’t be the one to start it. Nuclear attack is often preceded by nuclear coercion. Because of this, in the midst of the process of a high, strong degree of nuclear coercion we should prepare well for a nuclear retaliatory attack. The more complete the preparation, the higher the credibility of nuclear coercion, the easier it is to accomplish the objective of nuclear coercion, and the lower the possibility that the nuclear missile forces will be used in actual fighting. They assume if China demonstrates it is well prepared to retaliate the United States would not risk a damage limitation strike using nuclear weapons. And even if the United States were to attack China’s nuclear forces with conventional weapons, China still would not strike first. In the opening section of the next chapter on “nuclear retaliatory attack operations” the manual instructs, as it does on numerous occasions throughout the entire text: According to our country’s principle, its stand of no first use of nuclear weapons, the Second Artillery will carry out a nuclear missile attack against the enemy’s important strategic targets, according to the combat orders of the Supreme Command, only after the enemy has carried out a nuclear attack against our country. Richard is wrong. There are no holes in China’s no first use policy. But the worse-case planning articulated in this highly classified military text is a significant and deeply troubling departure from China’s traditional thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong famously called nuclear weapons “a paper tiger.” Many assumed he was being cavalier about the consequences of nuclear war. But what he meant is that they would not be used to fight and win wars. U.S. nuclear threats during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the 1950s – threats not followed by an actual nuclear attack – validated Mao’s intuition that nuclear weapons were primarily psychological weapons. Chinese leaders decided to acquire nuclear weapons to free their minds from what Mao’s generation called “**nuclear** **blackmail**.” A former director of China’s nuclear weapons laboratories told me China developed them so its leaders could “sit up with a straight spine.” Countering nuclear blackmail – along with compelling other nuclear weapons states to negotiate their elimination – were the only two purposes Chinese nuclear weapons were meant to serve. Contemporary Chinese military planners appear to have added a new purpose: compelling the United States to halt a conventional attack. Even though it only applies in extreme circumstances, it **increases** the **risk** **that** a **war** between the United States and China **will** **end** **in** a nuclear exchange with unpredictable and **catastrophic** **consequences**. Adding this new purpose could also be the first step on a slippery slope to an incremental broadening the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese national security policy. Americans would be a lot safer if we could avoid that. The United States government should applaud China’s no first use policy instead of repeatedly calling it into question. And it would be wise to adopt the same policy for the United States. If both countries declared they would never use nuclear weapons first it may not guarantee they can avoid a nuclear exchange during a military crisis, but it would make one far less likely.

## 2

#### CP: The United States federal government should

#### Establish a national space debris removal program;

#### Engage the commercial sector in space debris removal;

#### Establish special funds at the expense of parties who generate debris;

#### Prioritize transparency in space debris removal.

#### US debris removal solves best — it generates international follow on BUT avoids the downfalls of international cooperation that make solvency impossible.

Ansdell ’10 (Megan; is a graduate student at the George Washington University Elliot School of International Affairs, focusing on space policy; *Active Space Debris Removal: Needs, Implications, and Recommendations for Today’s Geopolitical Environment*; <https://jpia.princeton.edu/sites/jpia/files/space-debris-removal.pdf>; accessed 8/29/19; Julia/MSCOTT)//ww pbj

VI. US Leadership by Example Need to Initiate Unilateral Action International cooperation in space has rarely resulted in cost-effective or expedient solutions, especially in politically-charged areas of uncertain technological feasibility. The International Space Station, because of both political and technical setbacks, has taken over two decades to deploy and cost many billions of dollars—far more time and money than was originally intended. Space debris mitigation has also encountered aversion in international forums. The topic was brought up in COPUOS as early as 1980, yet a policy failed to develop despite a steady flow of documents on the increasing danger of space debris (Perek 1991). In fact, COPUOS did not adopt debris mitigation guidelines until 2007 and, even then, they were legally non-binding. Space debris removal systems could take decades to develop and deploy through international partnerships due to the many interdisciplinary challenges they face. Given the need to start actively removing space debris sooner rather than later to ensure the continued benefits of satellite services, international cooperation may not be the most appropriate mechanism for instigating the first space debris removal system. Instead, one country should take a leadership role by establishing a national space debris removal program. This would accelerate technology development and demonstration, which would, in turn, build-up trust and hasten international participation in space debris removal. Possibilities of Leadership As previously discussed, a recent NASA study found that annually removing as little as five massive pieces of debris in critical orbits could significantly stabilize the long-term space debris environment (Liou and Johnson 2007). This suggests that it is feasible for one nation to unilaterally develop and deploy an effective debris removal system. As the United States is responsible for creating much of the debris in Earth’s orbit, it is a candidate for taking a leadership role in removing it, along with other heavy polluters of the space environment such as China and Russia. There are several reasons why the United States should take this leadership role, rather than China or Russia. First and foremost, the United States would be hardest hit by the loss of satellites services. It owns about half of the roughly 800 operating satellites in orbit and its military is significantly more dependent upon them than any other entity (Moore 2008). For example, GPS precision-guided munitions are a key component of the “new American way of war” (Dolman 2006, 163-165), which allows the United States to remain a globally dominant military power while also waging war in accordance with its political and ethical values by enabling faster, less costly war fighting with minimal collateral damage (Sheldon 2005). The U.S. Department of Defense recognized the need to protect U.S. satellite systems over ten years ago when it stated in its 1999 Space Policy that, “the ability to access and utilize space is a vital national interest because many of the activities conducted in the medium are critical to U.S. national security and economic well-being” (U.S. Department of Defense 1999, 6). Clearly, the United States has a vested interest in keeping the near-Earth space environment free from threats like space debris and thus assuring U.S. access to space. Moreover, current U.S. National Space Policy asserts that the United States will take a “leadership role” in space debris minimization. This could include the development, deployment, and demonstration of an effective space debris removal system to remove U.S. debris as well as that of other nations, upon their request. There could also be international political and economic advantages associated with being the first country to develop this revolutionary technology. However, there is always the danger of other nations simply benefiting from U.S. investment of its resources in this area. Thus, mechanisms should also be created to avoid a classic “free rider” situation. For example, techniques could be employed to ensure other countries either join in the effort later on or pay appropriate fees to the United States for removal services. Recommendations for Leadership in Space Debris Removal Going forward, the U.S. government should engage the commercial sector in space debris removal. Government contracts with several commercial firms would create a competitive environment, encouraging innovation and cost minimization. Having several companies working on the problem at the same time would also accelerate remediation as several critical orbits could be addressed at once. Furthermore, early investments in a domestic space debris removal industry would give the United States a head start in what may become a critical industry over the coming decades. The aforementioned 2009 International Conference on Orbital Debris Removal, co-hosted by DARPA and NASA, suggests that these two agencies could lead U.S. government efforts in space debris removal. However, it is important to recognize that DARPA and NASA are driven by very different motives: one is a civilian space agency, while the other is a defense research agency. Failure to appreciate these differences when establishing mission requirements could lead to a situation like that of the National Polar Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), where the attempt to combine civil and military requirements into a single satellite resulted in doubling project costs, a launch delay of five years, and ultimately splitting the project into two separate programs (Clark 2010). Furthermore, any system developed through a joint NASA-DARPA partnership would need to be transferred to an operational agency, as both NASA and DARPA are research and development entities. The U.S. Air Force, as it is the primary agency responsible for national security space operations, is a possible option. Funding the development of a national space debris removal system carries risks because, due to the nascent state of the field, detailed cost-benefit estimates have not yet been carried out. The Space Frontier Foundation, however, proposes that the government should establish special funds at the expense of parties who generate debris (Dunstan and Werb 2009). Suggested mechanisms for raising the funds include charging fees for U.S. launches based on the debris potential of the mission, with the size of the fee determined by relevant factors such as the mass of the anticipated debris resulting from the mission and the congestion of the orbit into which the space object is being launched. Satellite manufacturers, operators, and service providers could all share responsibility for payment into such funds. Once debris removal systems are in operation, additional funds could also come from service fees. For example, entities that created debris could pay a specified amount to removal providers in return for the service rendered. Any national space debris removal program must also be kept transparent with ongoing international dialogue in forums such as COPUOS so that other nations can build-up trust in the effectiveness and efficiency of the program. A proven debris removal program will result in more productive discussions in these international forums. VII. Conclusion If the United States and other powerful governments do not take steps now to avert the potentially devastating effects of space debris, the issue risks becoming stalemated in a manner similar to climate change. Given the past hesitation of international forums in addressing the space debris issue, unilateral action is the most appropriate means of instigating space debris removal within the needed timeframe. The United States is well poised for a leadership role in space debris removal. Going forward, the U.S. government should work closely with the commercial sector in this endeavor, focusing on removing pieces of U.S. debris with the greatest potential to contribute to future collisions. It should also keep its space debris removal system as open and transparent as possible to allow for future international cooperation in this field.

## Case

### Top Level

#### Vote negative on presumption – the moon treaty bans ownership of land by private properties but that’s distinct from harvesting resources – that means Asteroid Mining is legal post-plan.

Abigail D. Pershing, J.D. Candidate @ Yale, B.A. UChicago,’19, "Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty's Non-Appropriation Principle: Customary International Law from 1967 to Today," Yale Journal of International Law 44, no. 1

II. THE FIRST SHIFT IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW’S INTERPRETATION OF THE NON-APPROPRIATION PRINCIPLE Since the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty, several States have chosen to reinterpret the non-appropriation principle as narrower in scope than its drafters originally intended. This reinterpretation has gone largely unchallenged and has in fact been widely adopted by space-faring nations. In turn, this has had the effect of changing customary international law relating to the non-appropriation principle. Shifting away from its original blanket application in 1967, States have carved out an exception to the non-appropriation principle, allowing appropriation of extracted space resources.53 This Part examines this shift in the context of the two branches of the United Nation’s customary international law standard: State practice and opinio juris. A. State Practice The earliest hint of a change in customary international law relating to the interpretation of the non-appropriation clause came in 1969, when the United States first sent astronauts to the moon. As part of his historic journey, astronaut Neil Armstrong collected moonrocks that he brought back with him to Earth and promptly handed off to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as U.S. property.54 Later, the USSR similarly claimed lunar material as government property, some of which was eventually sold to private citizens. 55 These first instances of space resource appropriation did not draw much attention, but they presented a distinct shift marking the beginning of a new period in State practice. Having previously been limited by their technological capabilities, States could now establish new practices with respect to celestial bodies. This was the beginning of a pattern of appropriation that slowly unfolded over the next few decades and has since solidified into the general and consistent State practice necessary to establish the existence of customary international law. Currently, the U.S. government owns 842 pounds of lunar material.56 There is little question that NASA and the U.S. government consider this material, as well as other space materials collected by American astronauts, to be government property.57 In fact, NASA explicitly endorses U.S. property rights over these moon rocks, stating that “[l]unar material retrieved from the Moon during the Apollo Program is U.S. government property.”5 The U.S. delegation’s reaction to the language of the 1979 Moon Agreement further cemented this interpretation that appropriation of extracted resources is a permissible exception to the non-appropriation clause of Article II. Although the United States is not a party to the Moon Agreement, it did participate in the negotiations.59 The Moon Agreement states in relevant part: Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of any State, international intergovernmental or nongovernmental organization, national organization or nongovernmental entity or of any natural person.60 In response to this language, the U.S. delegation made a statement laying out the American view that the words “in place” imply that private property rights apply to extracted resources61—a comment that went completely unchallenged. That all States seemed to accept this point, even those bound by the Moon Agreement, is further evidence of a shift in customary international law.62 B. Opinio Juris: Domestic Legislation Domestic law, both in the United States and abroad, provides further evidence of the shift in customary international law surrounding the issue of nonappropriation as it relates to extracted space resources. Domestic U.S. space law is codified at Section 51 of the U.S. Code and has been regularly modified to expand private actors’ rights in space.63 Beginning in 1984, the Commercial Space Launch Act provided that “the United States should encourage private sector launches and associated services.”64 The goal of the 1984 Act was to support commercial space launches by private companies and individuals.65 It did not, however, specifically discuss commercial exploitation of space. The first such mention of commercial use of space appeared in 2004, with the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act.66 This Act specifically aimed at regulating space tourism but did not explicitly guarantee any private rights in space.67 The most significant change in U.S. space law came with the passage of the Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship (SPACE) Act in 2015. As incorporated into Section 51 of the Code, this Act provides: A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the international obligations of the United States.68 Whereas the idea that private corporations might go into space may have seemed far-fetched to the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty, the SPACE Act of 2015 was the first instance of a government recognizing such a trend and officially supporting private companies’ commercial rights to space resources under law. With the new 2015 amendment to Section 51 in place, U.S. companies can now rest assured that any profits they reap from space mining are firmly legal—at least within U.S. jurisdictions. Although the United States was the first country to officially reinterpret the non-appropriation principle, other countries are following suit. On July 20, 2017, Luxembourg passed a law entitled On the Exploration and Utilization of Space Resources with a vote of fifty-five to two.69 The law took effect on August 1, 2017.70 Article 1 of the new law states simply that “[s]pace resources can be appropriated,” and Article 3 expressly grants private companies permission to explore and use space resources for commercial purposes.71 Official commentary on the law establishes that its goal is to provide companies with legal certainty regarding ownership over space materials—a goal that the commentators regard as legal under the Outer Space Treaty despite the non-appropriation principle.72 The next country to enact similar legislation may be the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to the UAE Space Agency director general, Mohammed Al Ahbabi, the UAE is currently in the process of drafting a space law covering both human space exploration and commercial activities such as mining.73 To further this goal, in 2017 the UAE set up the Space Agency Working Group on Space Policy and Law to specify the procedures, mechanisms, and other standards of the space sector, including an appropriate legal framework.74 C. Opinio Juris: Legal Scholarship Other major space powers are also considering similar laws in the future, including Japan, China, and Australia. 75 Senior officials within China’s space program have explicitly stated that the country’s goal is to explore outer space and to take advantage of outer space resources.76 The general international trend clearly points in this direction in anticipation of a potential “space gold rush.” 7 Mirroring the shift in State practice and domestic laws, the legal community has also changed its approach to the interpretation of the nonappropriation principle. Whereas at the time of the ratification of the Outer Space Treaty the majority of legal scholars tended to apply the non-appropriation principle broadly, most legal scholars now view appropriation of extracted materials as permissible.78 Brandon Gruner underscores that this new view is historically distinct from prior legal interpretation, noting that modern interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty’s non-appropriation principle differ from those of the Treaty’s authors.79 In contrast to earlier legal theory that denied the possibility of appropriation of any space resources, scholars now widely accept that extracting space resources from celestial bodies is a “use” permitted by the Outer Space Treaty and that extracted materials become the property of the entity that performed the extraction.80 Stressing the fact that the Treaty does not explicitly prohibit appropriating resources from outer space, other authors conclude that the use of extracted space resources is permitted, meaning that the new SPACE Act is a plausible interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty.81 However, scholars have been careful to cabin the extent to which they accept the legality of appropriation. For instance, although Thomas Gangale and Marilyn Dudley-Rowley acknowledge the legality of private appropriation of extracted space resources, they nonetheless emphasize that “[o]wnership of and the right to use extraterrestrial resources is distinct from ownership of real property” and that any such claim to real property is illegal.82 Lawrence Cooper is also careful to point out this distinction: “[t]he [Outer Space] Treaties recognize sovereignty over property placed into space, property produced in space, and resources removed from their place in space, but ban sovereignty claims by states; international law extends this ban to individuals.”83 Although there remain some scholars who still insist on the illegality of the 2015 U.S. law and State appropriation of space resources generally,84 their dominance has waned since the 1960s. These scholars are now a minority in the face of general acceptance among the legal community that minerals and other space resources, once extracted, may be legally claimed as property. 85 Taken together, the elements described above—statements made in the international arena, de facto appropriation of space resources in the form of moon rocks, the adoption of new national policies permitting appropriation of extracted space resources, and the weight of the international legal community’s opinion— indicate a fundamental shift in customary international law. The Outer Space Treaty’s non-appropriation clause has been redefined via customary international law norms from its broad application to now include a carve-out allowing appropriation of space resources once such resources have been extracted.

#### Collision is unlikely – all countries receive collision warnings THREE days ahead AND their evidence doesn’t assume new technology.

**Mosher** **’19** [Dave; September 3rd; Journalist with more than a decade of experience reporting and writing stories about space, science, and technology; Business Insider, “Satellite collisions may trigger a space-junk disaster that could end human access to orbit. Here’s How,” <https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Space_and_Defense_2_3.pdf>; GR]//ww pbj

The Kessler syndrome plays center-stage in the movie "Gravity," in which an accidental space collision endangers a crew aboard a large space station. But Gossner said that type of a runaway space-junk catastrophe is unlikely. "Right now I don't think we're close to that," he said. "I'm not saying we couldn't get there, and I'm not saying we don't need to be smart and manage the problem. But I don't see it ever becoming, anytime soon, an unmanageable problem." There is no current system to remove old satellites or sweep up bits of debris in order to prevent a Kessler event. Instead, space debris is monitored from Earth, and new rules require satellites in low-Earth orbit be deorbited after 25 years so they don't wind up adding more space junk. "Our current plan is to manage the problem and not let it get that far," Gossner said. "I don't think that we're even close to needing to actively remove stuff. There's lots of research being done on that, and maybe some day that will happen, but I think that — at this point, and in my humble opinion — an unnecessary expense." A major part of the effort to prevent a Kessler event is the Space Surveillance Network (SSN). The project, led by the US military, uses 30 different systems around the world to identify, track, and share information about objects in space. Many objects are tracked day and night via a networkof radar observatories around the globe. Optical telescopes on the ground also keep an eye out, but they aren't always run by the government. "The commercial sector is actually putting up lots and lots of telescopes," Gossner said. The government pays for their debris-tracking services. Gossner said one major debris-tracking company is called Exoanalytic. It uses about 150 small telescopes set up around the globe to detect, track, and report space debris to the SSN. Telescopes in space track debris, too. Far less is known about them because they're likely top-secret military satellites. Objects detected by the government and companies get added to a catalog of space debris and checked against the orbits of other known bits of space junk. New orbits are calculated with supercomputers to see if there's a chance of any collisions. Diana McKissock, a flight lead with the US Air Force's 18th Space Control Squadron, helps track space debris for the SSN. She said the surveillance network issues warnings to NASA, satellite companies, and other groups with spacecraft, based on two levels of emergency: basic and advanced. The SSN issues a basic emergency report to the public three days ahead of a 1-in-10,000 chance of a collision. It then provides multiple updates per day until the risk of a collision passes. To qualify for such reporting, a rogue object must come within a certain distance of another object. In low-Earth orbit, that distance must be less than 1 kilometer (0.62 mile); farther out in deep space, where the precision of orbits is less reliable, the distance is less than 5 kilometers (3.1 miles). Advanced emergency reports help satellite providers see possible collisions much more than three days ahead. "In 2017, we provided data for 308,984 events, of which only 655 were emergency-reportable," McKissock told Business Insider in an email. Of those, 579 events were in low-Earth orbit (where it's relatively crowded with satellites).

#### No debris impact at every layer of space

Fange 17 (Daniel von Fange. Web Application Engineer. “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped,” *Braino*, 5/21/17, <http://braino.org/essays/kessler_syndrome_is_over_hyped/>) dwc 19)//ww pbj

Kessler Syndrome is overhyped. A chorus of online commenters great any news of upcoming low earth orbit satellites with worry that humanity will to lose access to space. I now think they are wrong. //// What is Kessler Syndrome? Here’s the popular view on Kessler Syndrome. Every once in a while, a piece of junk in space hits a satellite. This single impact destroys the satellite, and breaks off several thousand additional pieces. These new pieces now fly around space looking for other satellites to hit, and so exponentially multiply themselves over time, like a nuclear reaction, until a sphere of man-made debris surrounds the earth, and humanity no longer has access to space nor the benefits of satellites.//// It is a dark picture.//// Is Kessler Syndrome likely to happen? I had to stop everything and spend an afternoon doing back-of-the-napkin math to know how big the threat is. To estimate, we need to know where the stuff in space is, how much mass is there, and how long it would take to deorbit. //// The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. //// Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over.///// High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. /// Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here. //// GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here. //// How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be? Let’s imagine a worst case scenario. //// An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? //// I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000. ////// So even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space. // Now though you can travel through the debris, you couldn’t keep a satellite alive for long in this orbit of death. Kessler Syndrome at its worst just prevents us from putting satellites in certain orbits. //// In real life, there’s a lot of factors that make Kessler syndrome even less of a problem than our worst case though experiment.//// Debris would be spread over a volume of space, not a single orbital surface, making collisions orders of magnitudes less likely.//// Most impact debris will have a slower orbital velocity than either of its original pieces - this makes it deorbit much sooner.//// Any collision will create large and small objects. Small objects are much more affected by atmospheric drag and deorbit faster, even in a few months from high LEO. Larger objects can be tracked by earth based radar and avoided.//// The planned big new constellations are not in High LEO, but in Low LEO for faster communications with the earth. They aren’t an issue for Kessler.//// Most importantly, all new satellite launches since the 1990’s are required to include a plan to get rid of the satellite at the end of its useful life (usually by deorbiting)//// So the realistic worst case is that insurance premiums on satellites go up a bit. Given the current trend toward much smaller, cheaper micro satellites, this wouldn’t even have a huge effect.

#### Kessler’s Syndrome wrong and super long timeframe

Kurt 15 – JD-William & Mary Joseph Kurt, JD- William & Mary School of Law, BA-Marquette University, NOTE: TRIUMPH OF THE SPACE COMMONS: ADDRESSING THE IMPENDING SPACE DEBRIS CRISIS WITHOUT AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY, 40 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 305 (2015)//ww pbj

A. Practical Considerations: Feasible Solutions to the Space Debris Problem Are on Their Way One key question in assessing whether an international treaty is a requisite for solving the space debris problem is just how difficult it will be to fashion a remedy. The more complex and costly are feasible solutions, the more likely it is that a comprehensive regime is necessary to bind the various actors together. 93Link to the text of the note A good place to begin is to determine just how imminent is the onset of the cascade of exponentially more frequent debris-creating collisions, known as the Kessler Syndrome. 94Link to the text of the note To be certain, no one can be sure--this phenomenon being subject to highly complex probabilities. 95Link to the text of the note Indeed, experts' estimates of when such a cascade will become irreversible vary [\*316] widely. 96Link to the text of the note The National Research Council produced a report in 2011 that suggested that "space might be just 10 or 20 years away from severe problems." 97Link to the text of the note In fact, the cascading effect has already begun, albeit at a modest pace. 98Link to the text of the note However, Donald Kessler, who first described the eponymous effect in 1978, has significantly recalibrated his own outlook over the years. 99Link to the text of the note Originally, Kessler predicted that catastrophe would result by the year 2000. 100Link to the text of the note That date long passed, Kessler now speaks of a century-long process that "we have time to deal with." 101Link to the text of the note

#### Alt cause – debris ALREADY exists out there and its TOO LATE, their own Bushnell and Moses evidence

Dennis M. Bushnell and Robert W. Moses 19, Bushnell, NASA scientist and lecturer, chief scientist at NASA Langley Research Center, Moses, NASA Rocket Scientist, “Reliability, Safety, and Performance for Two Aerospace Revolutions - UAS/ODM and Commercial Deep Space,” <https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20190025268.pdf>

Westwood reads greeen

Since the late 1950s, we have launched around 6600 satellites, approximately 1130 of which are still operational. However, many of the non-operational satellites are still in space. There have been approximately 240 explosions in space and many collisions, two of which were major events. All of this has contributed to the current space debris issue. The amount of this space debris is daunting. Estimates indicate about 6000 tons, with some 5000 pieces greater than 1 meter in size, 22,000 greater than 10 cm, 700,000 greater than 1 cm, and 150,000,000 bits greater than 1 mm. Even the smaller pieces, given the closure speeds, can create worrisome effects upon impact. As an example, an impact speed of 12 km/sec has approximately 10 times the energy density of dynamite. A quote from a 2011 National Research Council report entitled Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft, summarizes that year’s outlook, which is becoming ever more serious: “When a handful of reasonable assumptions are used in NASA’s models, scenarios are uncovered that conclude that the current orbital debris environment has already reached a ‘tipping point,’ meaning the amount of debris currently in orbit–in terms of the population of large debris objects, as well as overall mass of debris in orbit–has reached a threshold where it will continually collide with itself, further increasing the population of orbital debris.” The increase in orbital debris will lead to corresponding increases in spacecraft failures, which will only result in more debris in orbit. The increase thus far has been most rapid in LEO, with GEO potentially suffering the same fate, although over a much longer time period. The exact timing and pace of this exponential growth are uncertain, but the serious implications of such a scenario require careful attention because of the strategic and commercial importance of U.S. space operations. In the literature, this cascading of collisions producing ever more debris until the space region is essentially unusable is termed the Kessler Effect. Given the increasing worldwide reliance upon space assets, our positional Earth utilities have made space debris an increasingly serious problem.

#### Private space corporations are key to increasing safety in space technology.

**Kennedy 18** [Brian, “Many in US have confidence in what private space companies will accomplish”, Pew Research Center. 22 June 2018. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/22/many-in-u-s-have-confidence-in-what-private-space-companies-will-accomplish/] //DebateDrills LC

Most **Americans express confidence that private space companies will make meaningful contributions in** developing **safe and reliable spacecraft or conducting research to expand knowledge of space**, according to [a recent Pew Research Center survey](https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/06/06/majority-of-americans-believe-it-is-essential-that-the-u-s-remain-a-global-leader-in-space/).

**Private companies** such as SpaceX, Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic **are becoming increasingly important players in space exploration.** The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (**NASA) has**[**paid private companies $6.8 billion**](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/06/15/feature/what-does-it-mean-to-be-a-nasa-astronaut-in-the-celebrity-space-age-of-elon-musk-and-richard-branson/?utm_term=.b1045d9e9863)**to develop launch systems that might send astronauts into space** as early as this year. These companies are also [setting their sights](https://www.popsci.com/who-wants-to-go-to-mars) on going to the moon or Mars in the future.

(81%) are confident that private space companies will make a profit from these ventures. Some 44% of **Americans have a great deal of confidence that private space companies will be profitable**, and an additional 36% have a fair amount of confidence.

But Americans are also cautiously optimistic that private companies will make contributions that benefit U.S. exploration efforts. **At least two-thirds of Americans have a great deal or a fair amount of confidence that private space companies will build safe and reliable rockets and spacecraft** (77%), **conduct** basic **research to increase knowledge and understanding** of space (70%) **or control costs for developing rockets and spacecraft** (65%).

### Scenario 1 and 2

#### [1] Satelite rebuild solves – we can just rebuild them if they get destroyed, no timeframe to when satellite takeout matters

#### [2] Other satelites solve – probability that they all get taken down is zero, that’s the top level evidence

#### [3] Alonso is about satelites for third-world countries but that doesn’t matter since other countries can just fill them in on their climate information – big policy action can still occur which o/w since that’s more likely to solve climate change

#### Asteroid mining solves water access – only NEAs are sufficiently proximate and hydrated

Tillman 19 (Nola Taylor, has been published in Astronomy, Sky & Telescope, Scientific American, New Scientist, Science News (AAS), Space.com, and Astrobiology magazine, BA in Astrophysics) “Tons of Water in Asteroids Could Fuel Satellites, Space Exploration,” Space, 9/29/2019) // JL // recut by VS

When it comes to mining space for water, the best target may not be the moon: Entrepreneurs' richest options are likely to be asteroids that are larger and closer to Earth. A recent study suggested that roughly 1,000 water-rich, or hydrated, asteroids near our planet are easier to reach than the lunar surface is. While most of these space rocks are only a few feet in size, more than 25 of them should be large enough to each provide significant water. Altogether, the water locked in these asteroids should be enough to fill somewhere around 320,000 Olympics-size swimming pools — significantly more than the amount of water locked up at the lunar poles, the new research suggested. Because asteroids are small, they have less gravity than Earth or the moon do, which makes them easier destinations to land on and lift off from. If engineers can figure out how to mine water from these space rocks, they could produce a source of ready fuel in space that would allow spacecraft designers to build refuelable models for the next generation of satellites. Asteroid mining could also fuel human exploration, saving the expense of launching fuel from Earth. In both cases, would-be space-rock miners will need to figure out how to free the water trapped in hydrated minerals on these asteroids. "Most of the hydrated material in the near-Earth population is contained in the largest few hydrated objects," Andrew Rivkin, an asteroid researcher at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Research Laboratory in Maryland, told Space.com. Rivkin is the lead author on the paper, which estimated that near Earth asteroids could contain more easily accessible water than the lunar poles. According to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, more than 5,200 of the objects launched into space are still in orbit today. While some continue to function, the bulk of them buzz uselessly over our heads every day. They carry fuel on board, and when they run out, they are either lowered into destructive orbits or left to become space junk, useless debris with the potential to cause enormous problems for working satellites. Refueling satellites in space could change that model, replacing it with long-lived, productive orbiters. "It's easier to bring fuel from asteroids to geosynchronous orbit than from the surface of the Earth," Rivkin said. "If such a supply line could be established, it could make asteroid mining very profitable." Hunting for space water from the surface of the Earth is challenging because the planet's atmosphere blocks the wavelength of light where water can be observed. The asteroid warming as it draws closer to the sun can also complicate measurements. Instead, Rivkin and his colleagues turned to a class of space rocks called Ch asteroids. Although these asteroids don't directly exhibit a watery fingerprint, they carry the telltale signal of oxidized iron seen only on asteroids with signatures of water-rich minerals, which means the authors felt confident assuming that all Ch asteroids carry this rocky water. Based on meteorite falls, a previous study estimated that Ch asteroids could make up nearly 10% of the near-Earth objects (NEOs). With this information, the researchers determined that there are between 26 and 80 such objects that are hydrated and larger than 0.62 miles (1 km) across. Right now, only three NEOs have been classified as Ch asteroids, although others have been spotted in the asteroid belt. Most NEOs are discovered and observed at wavelengths too short to reveal the iron band that marks the class. Carbon-rich asteroids, which include Ch asteroids and other flavors, are also darker than the more common stony asteroids, making them more challenging to observe. Although Ch asteroids definitely contain water-rich minerals, that doesn’t necessarily mean that they will always be the best bet for space mining. It comes down to risk. Would an asteroid-mining company rather visit a smaller asteroid that definitely has a moderate amount of water, or a larger one that could yield a larger payday but could also come up dry? "Whether getting sure things with no false positives, like the Ch asteroids, is more important or if a greater range of possibilities is acceptable with the understanding that some asteroids will be duds is something the miners will have to decide," Rivkin said. In addition to estimating the number of large, water-rich asteroids might be available, the study also found that as many as 1,050 smaller objects, roughly 300 feet (100 meters) across, may also linger near Earth. Their small bulk will make them easier to mine (and) because their low gravity will require less fuel to escape from, but they will produce less water overall, and Rivkin expects that the handful of larger space rocks will be the first targets. "It seems likely that the plan for these companies will be to find the largest accessible asteroid with mineable material with the expectation that it will be more cost-effective than chasing down a large number of smaller objects," Rivkin said. "How 'accessible' and 'mineable material' and 'cost-effective' are defined by each company is to be seen."

#### Asteroid mining solves climate change through solar-powered satellites – provides infrastructure for existing tech

**Faure 11** (Jamie Faure, 7-15-2011, "Can space-based solar power save the climate? – Young Scientists Journal," No Publication, <https://ysjournal.com/can-space-based-solar-power-save-the-climate/>) // VS

Introduction How shall we tackle climate change? This is still an unresolved question. Here, I will put forward an idea and argue its case. Burning fuels creates carbon dioxide, which thickens the atmosphere. Consequently, an increasing amount of the Sun’s heat is trapped. So, to tackle climate change, we must stop burning fuels. However, fuel is needed for energy. Therefore, we (can use) need to find other sources of energy that do not adversely impact the environment. Space-based Solar Power What I think has the most potential in reducing global warming is Space-based Solar Power (SBSP) . This technology involves placing solar satellites in space, where their energy production is unaffected by seasons, weather, the day and night cycle, and the filtering effect of the Earth’s atmosphere, learn more at solar the gap. The Sun’s energy for us is virtually unlimited (around 5 billion years to go). In addition, the satellites are placed nearer to the Sun in space than to the Earth, so they receive more of the Sun’s energy. The satellite then transmits power to the Earth using a laser or microwave beam. Transmission by microwaves has already been tested by NASA, and proven possible. In space, solar irradiance is 144% higher than in the Earth, which means there is a lot more power available up there! Japan has already been working on this idea for 30 years and invested over 20 billion dollars, hoping to finish their project by 2030. The Americans and the Russians are also at the breach, working on a similar idea. The problem with this solution is that we would need to make sure the laser or microwave beam is perfectly orientated toward its receptor on Earth, and would not hit planes or other satellites. Further development is needed before this method is actually feasible.

#### M3 instruments show 600kg of water located in PSRs on the moon – solves increasing water shortages.

Mehta 8-16 [Jatan Mehta, 08-16-21, "How NASA and India discovered water on the Moon," No Publication, [https://blog.jatan.space/p/how-nasa-and-chandrayaan-discovered-water-on-the-moon]//](https://blog.jatan.space/p/how-nasa-and-chandrayaan-discovered-water-on-the-moon%5d//) akhileshp

For most of the 20th century, scientists thought the Moon’s surface was bone-dry. The 382 kilograms of rock and soil samples brought by the Apollo missions to Earth attested to this. When they did find traces of water in the samples, scientists dismissed them as terrestrial contamination. After all, any water on the Moon’s surface would quickly evaporate due to being directly exposed to the vacuum of space. And due to the Moon’s low gravity, the water vapor would quickly escape into space. However, there are certain regions on the Moon that haven’t received sunlight for over a billion years, and where scientists think the water can be. On the lunar poles, the Sun is very close to the local horizon throughout the day so even a small feature, like a rock, can cast very long shadows. Likewise, large craters with terraced edges can easily block sunlight from entering the crater from any direction. Scientists call such places [permanently shadowed regions](https://blog.jatan.space/p/permanently-shadowed-regions-on-the-moon), or PSRs, because they’re eternally dark. They’re also [really cold](https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/news/907/moons-south-pole-in-nasas-landing-sites/), making them apt to preserve water in the form of ice. But where would the water come from? Scientists know that comets and many types of asteroids contain water. For a large part of our solar system’s existence, these objects have been continually bombarding planets and their moons. This is why the Moon is covered in craters, and scientists think the asteroids and comets responsible for them could have deposited water on the Moon. While most of the water must have evaporated, some fraction of it could’ve found its way into PSRs on the lunar poles, where, like sitting inside a refrigerator, they can stay preserved for billions of years. In 1994, NASA launched the Clementine lunar orbiter. Its [Bistatic Radar Experiment](https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/experiment/display.action?id=1994-004A-09) beamed radio signals straight into the PSRs. The signals bounced off the PSRs and were received by ground stations on Earth. Scientists found the nature of the reflected signals to be consistent with water ice but the data wasn’t conclusive. NASA sent another orbiter in 1998, called the Lunar Prospector, to find out if the Moon was hiding water ice deposits. Its neutron spectrometer found that the nature of neutrons in the soil of many PSRs corresponded with the [presence of hydrogen atoms](https://www.nasa.gov/vision/universe/solarsystem/14apr_moonwater.html). Could these hydrogen atoms be part of water molecules? Armed with Clementine and Lunar Prospector data, scientists were almost certain that there must be water on the Moon but they needed to be absolutely sure. In 2008, [India forayed into planetary exploration](https://blog.jatan.space/p/interviewing-isro-chandrayaan-1-mission-director) with the launch of their Chandrayaan 1 lunar orbiter, for which ISRO [solicited instruments](https://www.lpi.usra.edu/meetings/lpsc2006/pdf/1704.pdf) from scientists around the world. NASA pitched and built two of these, named Mini-SAR and M3. The Miniature Synthetic Aperture Radar (Mini-SAR) [also found](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/Mini-RF/multimedia/feature_ice_like_deposits.html) that the PSRs reflected signals in patterns consistent with water ice, from more than 40 polar craters. But just like with Clementine, they couldn’t be 100% certain with the data at hand. The Moon Mineralogical Mapper (M3), an infrared spectrometer, would go on to clinch the prize. M3 detected not just water in the PSRs but [could also differentiate between ice, liquid water, and water vapor](https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/ice-confirmed-at-the-moons-poles) based on how the surface absorbed infrared light. M3 confirmed that the Moon hosted water once and for all. The Chandrayaan 1 orbiter also carried an impact probe—a craft that intentionally crashed near a PSR on the Moon’s south pole. As it descended, its mass spectrometer [purportedly detected water molecules](http://www.planetary.org/blogs/emily-lakdawalla/2010/2430.html) in the thin but present lunar atmosphere. However, ISRO didn’t publish the results until NASA announced that Mini-SAR and M3 had discovered lunar water. ISRO then [claimed](https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/MIP-detected-water-on-Moon-way-back-in-June-ISRO-Chairman/article16883362.ece) that their instrument had detected water on the Moon first. All this time, scientists had been developing ideas about how the Moon could host water in its other parts as well, not just near or on its poles. The Moon is constantly bombarded by the [stream of protons coming from the Sun](https://blog.jatan.space/p/the-sun-and-its-wind), some of which its surface absorbs. Scientists thought the oxygen in the lunar soil could interact with the absorbed protons to produce water, and that they should be able to detect such water molecules from orbit. Likewise, incessant bombardment by [micrometeorites](https://lunasights.jatan.space/2019/08/19/the-tiniest-of-impact-craters/) on the lunar surface could also deliver or produce water. NASA’s Cassini spacecraft flew by the Moon in 1999, en route to Saturn. Its infrared spectrometer [found water-bearing minerals](https://www.nasa.gov/topics/moonmars/features/clark1.html) at most latitudes on the Moon, with higher concentrations at the poles. The results were in stark contrast to the bone-dry Apollo samples. One reason could be that since most Apollo landing sites were near the equator, high daytime temperatures might have evaporated any water present. However, the team didn’t publish their findings until the Chandrayaan 1 discovery a decade later. The European Space Agency’s instrument onboard Chandrayaan 1, SARA, analyzed protons reflected by the lunar surface. Like Cassini, SARA [found water/hydroxyl groups](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/10/091015091605.htm) in the lunar soil. The discovery proved timely for ESA’s [BepiColombo mission](https://www.planetary.org/space-missions/bepicolombo) to study Mercury, which carries two similar instruments for detecting water. Chandrayaan 1’s M3 instrument detected water and hydroxyl molecules almost everywhere on the Moon too. All of these observations had one catch—it was impossible to tell if what the instruments detected was water (H2O) or just hydroxyl groups (OH) bound to minerals. NASA and the Germany space agency’s airborne SOFIA telescope could distinguish between the two. In 2020, it [confirmed the presence of water molecules](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-s-sofia-discovers-water-on-sunlit-surface-of-moon/), as in H2O, on the Moon’s surface in non-polar regions. Scientists now knew that the lunar soil does hold trace amounts of water even in non-polar regions. Note that it’s still less water than the driest deserts on Earth. However, the PSRs on the lunar poles host appreciably more water. In 2009, NASA launched the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO). It also [detected water ice on the Moon’s poles](https://lunar.gsfc.nasa.gov/images/lithos/LRO%20litho5-shadowedFinal.pdf) using the onboard radar, ultraviolet detector as well as the [neutron spectrometer](https://svs.gsfc.nasa.gov/4057). LRO has been orbiting the Moon for over a decade now, longer than any other orbiter. The LRO team has published an extensive [atlas of PSRs](http://lroc.sese.asu.edu/psr), laying the groundwork for [future exploration](https://moonmonday.jatan.space/) and settlement on the Moon. Like Chandrayaan 1’s impact probe, LRO carried an impactor too, called LCROSS. In 2009, its upper stage deliberately impacted one of the PSRs on the Moon’s south pole. The other half of LCROSS followed and studied the plume of moondust the crash kicked up. It was found to [contain 155 kilograms of water](https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2010Sci...330..463C/abstract). Using this result and other observations, scientists estimated all the PSRs together must host [at least 600 billion kg](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/Mini-RF/multimedia/feature_ice_like_deposits.html) of water ice, equivalent to 240,000 Olympic-sized swimming pools. India’s [Chandrayaan 2 orbiter](https://blog.jatan.space/p/chandrayaan-2-is-creating-the-highest-resolution-map-of-the-moon), orbiting the Moon since 2019, intends to extend [our knowledge of water on the Moon](https://blog.jatan.space/p/ultimate-guide-to-water-on-the-moon). Its enhanced infrared spectrometer will build a global, high-resolution map of water concentrations in the lunar soil, and also determine the specific water-bearing minerals present. With Chandrayaan 2’s long-term observations, scientists want to learn how the lunar soil’s water content changes in response to changes in the lunar environment. The orbiter’s upgraded radar will better map the water ice in the PSRs. With twice as much penetration depth and higher resolution, it will quantify the amount of accessible water trapped in these cold regions, something no one has adequately done yet. The story of finding water on the Moon spans at least two decades and multiple space agencies, culminating in renewed lunar exploration plans across the world. The lunar science and exploration communities agree that we can harness water ice on the Moon for future habitat needs. Using solar power generated by the habitats, we can also split the water ice into hydrogen and oxygen to use as rocket fuel. But before we plan habitats on the Moon, we need to know more about the exact nature of its water ice. Surface missions that explore PSRs up-close, like NASA’s upcoming [VIPER rover](https://blog.jatan.space/p/nasa-viper-mission), are the next logical step towards building sustainable habitats on the Moon. It will physically study and map [water ice deposits](https://blog.jatan.space/p/ultimate-guide-to-water-on-the-moon) to not only inform us how we can extract the water to sustainably live on the Moon but also provide insights into the history and origin of water in the inner solar system, including Earth. In the long run, as we develop technologies to harness water ice, we can [not just settle on the Moon but across the solar system](https://blog.jatan.space/p/the-moon-as-a-rocket-platform). We should be glad our nearest neighbor has plenty of water; we can’t keep dragging everything out of Earth’s gravitational pull for eternity.

#### Companies such as Moon Express plan to mine on the moon – legislation has already created an incentive and legalization of extraction of space resources.

Basulto ’15 [Dominic Basulto, 11-18-2015, "How property rights in outer space may lead to a scramble to exploit the moon’s resources," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2015/11/18/how-property-rights-in-outer-space-may-lead-to-a-scramble-to-exploit-the-moons-resources/?tid=usw_passupdatepg>] //akhileshp

This week the U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation known as the SPACE Act of 2015 ([The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2262/text)), which recognizes and promotes the rights of U.S. companies to engage in the exploration and extraction of space resources from asteroids and other celestial bodies. That’s a huge win for private space exploration companies, especially for companies with upcoming plans to tap into the economic potential of the moon. That’s because the legislation, in its definition of “space resources,” is sufficiently broad to include resources found on the lunar surface. In short, the moon could now be in play for some of America’s most innovative space exploration companies. One of those companies is [Moon Express](http://moonexpress.com/), a privately funded commercial space company with [an audacious plan to mine the surface of the moon](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2015/03/19/an-audacious-plan-to-mine-the-surface-of-the-moon/?itid=lk_inline_manual_5). As Bob Richards, co-founder and CEO of Moon Express, told me, minerals and water found on the moon would be technically classified as a “space resource” according to Title IV of the SPACE Act, which defines “space resource” simply as “an abiotic resource in situ in outer space.” “The key to unlocking the economic potential of the moon is the water on the moon,” Richards said. “Water is the ‘oil of the solar system,’ and can be used to create rocket fuel that changes the economics of space resources, not just on the moon, but throughout the solar system. So our initial goal is to locate and learn how to mine and stockpile the water on the moon. We’re effectively after our first gusher.” And it’s not just Moon Express interested in finding water on the moon. Mining the moon for water has attracted the attention of [Shackleton Energy Resources](http://www.shackletonenergy.com/overview/#goingbacktothemoon), which suggests that [there are billions of tons of water ice on the poles of the moon](http://www.shackletonenergy.com/overview/#goingbacktothemoon) that might be converted into rocket fuel. Moreover, NASA has [two different mission concepts for extracting water from the lunar surface](http://www.space.com/27388-nasa-moon-mining-missions-water.html). If there’s ever going to be human lunar colony, then finding water on the moon is going to be a priority. It’s just cheaper and easier to have a source of water on the moon than it is to bring water to the moon. [In introducing the SPACE Act legislation for a vote Monday night](http://www.majorityleader.gov/2015/11/16/the-future-of-space-exploration-is-now/), House Majority Leader (R-Calif.) Kevin McCarthy invoked the inspiring examples of both Kitty Hawk and Chuck Yeager breaking the sound barrier and cited the extraordinary innovation already happening around commercial space exploration: With this law, I have great hope for the future of space exploration. You know, whenever I visit the Mojave Air and Spaceport, where so many of our advancements are happening, I’m overwhelmed by the feeling that the future is now… Upon the firm foundation of the SPACE Act, I know they and others will lead us far and that our limits are only bounded by what we can imagine as we continue our journey to the stars. When it comes to outer space, however, there’s the matter of a pesky little document known as the [Outer Space Treaty of 1967](http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html), to which the United States is a signatory. The Outer Space Treaty indirectly suggests that commercial space companies don’t own the rights to any resources they find in outer space. The treaty states that no “celestial body” is subject to “national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” The SPACE Act of 2015 carefully skirts this issue by specifically making a disclaimer that the United States “does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.” Clever, right? If there’s no U.S. sovereign claim, then the Outer Space Treaty can’t be applicable to private U.S. companies that assert a similar type of claim. When asked about a hypothetical example in which a Chinese company or even the Chinese government might contest the rights of a U.S. company to space resources, Richards suggests that the SPACE Act would provide a sufficient legal basis. “It’s hard to imagine what challenge China or any other country could mount against this U.S. legislation, which is about rights to materials obtained, not territory, and is really just codifying principles and rights already in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty that have been demonstrated by multinational activities on the moon as applicable to the private sector.” Nearly 50 years ago, of course, we didn’t know anything about the economic potential of space and nobody was seriously talking about humans as an interplanetary species. Certainly, there were not any private companies angling for a piece of the action. Space exploration was solely the preserve of sovereign governments and [we referred to astronauts as the “envoys of mankind.”](http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html) The prevailing sentiment, [as expressed in the Outer Space Treaty](http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html), was that outer space should belong to all of humanity, not just the first nation to venture into space and plant a flag on the surface of a celestial body. What’s happening now, in essence, is [a sea change in how we think about outer space](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2015/02/12/one-small-step-for-man-one-giant-step-for-the-commercialization-of-the-moon/?itid=lk_inline_manual_23). To convince private commercial space exploration companies to invest millions of dollars, there have to be economic incentives involved. In short, financial backers of these companies have to be able to realize a profit from their investments if innovation is going to happen. That’s the reality. Richards cites the rights of fishing boats in international waters as an economic template for the SPACE Act, “The ships are owned by companies flying flags of nations under which laws they are bound: they have a right to peacefully fish in international waters that they don’t own; but they have a right of ownership of the fish once obtained.” The fishing analogy is a useful one. It suggests that we’re simply extending the same economic principles used on Earth to the moon and beyond, not creating new principles. Seafaring nations are now spacefaring nations. [Moon Express even refers to the moon as “the eighth continent,”](http://moonexpress.com/) suggesting that people should think about the moon the same way they think about the other seven continents on the planet. And Planetary Resources, an asteroid mining company, refers to the [“off-planet economy.”](http://www.planetaryresources.com/2015/11/planetary-resources-applauds-u-s-congress-in-recognizing-asteroid-resource-property-rights/) Throughout the annals of exploration, there have always been commercial incentives. Would the untapped economic potential of America have been possible without similar types of incentives? [One example cited by backers of the SPACE Act is the Homestead Act of 1862](http://www.planetaryresources.com/2015/11/planetary-resources-applauds-u-s-congress-in-recognizing-asteroid-resource-property-rights/), which paved the way for Americans to search for gold and timber. Governments they say, have an important role to play here by passing legislation that catalyzes, rather than stifles, growth and innovation. For supporters of the SPACE Act, the year 2017 looms large. That’s exactly 50 years since the passage of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. And it’s also the deadline for winning the [$30 million Google Lunar X-PRIZE](http://lunar.xprize.org/). If privately owned companies are going to be landing on the surface of the moon within the next 24 months, they are going to want assurances that their innovative efforts now are going to have an economic payoff later.

### Scenario 3

#### Alternative measures solve misclac from satellite takeout

Lambakis 01 (Steven Lambakis is a senior defense analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy and the author of On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power (University Press of Kentucky, 2001). “Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics” <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6612>, Donnie)//ww pbj

In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite, for example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces are redundant. Urgent communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves. Other means are also available to perform special reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our ability to know what transpires in space is growing — so we are not always in the dark.

### Asteroid Mining Good

**Private appropriation for asteroid mining solves rare earth metal shortages**

**Manufacturing 20** [ Manafacturing,net “Asteroid Mining Could Solve Rare Metal Shortage” 1/31/2020 https://www.manufacturing.net/technology/blog/21113380/asteroid-mining-could-solve-rare-metal-shortage ] //aaditg

The infancy of a space industry This may sound like science fiction, but since at least the 1970s, **organizations like NASA have been considering the possible advantages of asteroid mining for resources**. While space travel is still extremely risky and expensive, there are certain advantages that make asteroid mining an appealing possibility. In the midst of a new privatized space race, companies are revisiting the possibility of sourcing materials from outer space, and that is because: Earth faces a global rare metal shortage A single asteroid could contain trillions of dollars worth of precious metals Sourcing materials from asteroids could enable large-scale construction in space Global material shortages **The world demand for rare and precious metals is growing, and a mix of political turmoil and natural scarcity are contributing to fears that the global supply will be unable to keep up. As supplies dwindle, demand grows, and prices rise, the new private company-based space race might offer a solution to the shortage.** The asteroid mining would require major investments in new technologies, but **there has been enough interest that companies have been formed to prospect for asteroids to harvest.** asteroid mining - mining ores Global demand for technologically critical metals is still growing. On the image: aerial view of enormous copper mine at Palabora, South Africa. **Asteroids can be grouped broadly into those that are primarily carbonaceous, silicates, or metallic. Metallic asteroids are primarily iron and nickel but can contain rare metals like platinum, gold, iridium, palladium, osmium, ruthenium and rhodium (see the links to find properties of these materials) at concentration several times higher than what is found on Earth.** A single asteroid could be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, billions, or more if humans could overcome the formidable challenge of harvesting it. Mine in space to build in space Bringing rare metals to Earth is not the only possible use for asteroid-derived materials. Building equipment on Earth then lifting it into space is, in fact, expensive. Every kilogram of material costs money to lift into orbit, and individual space launches cost upwards of $100 million USD. So even the more common materials in asteroids, like iron and nickel, take on new value because they are already in outer space.

#### That beats China and protects against Chinese REM gatekeeping

Stavridis 21 [(James, retired US Navy admiral, chief international diplomacy and national security analyst for NBC News, senior fellow at JHU Applied Physics Library, PhD in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts) “U.S. Needs a Strong Defense Against China’s Rare-Earth Weapon,” Bloomberg Opinion, March 4, 2021, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-04/u-s-needs-a-strong-defense-against-china-s-rare-earth-weapon>] TDI

You could be forgiven if you are confused about what’s going on with rare-earth elements. On the one hand, news reports indicate that China may increase production quotas of the minerals this quarter as a [goodwill gesture](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3122501/china-raises-rare-earth-quotas-goodwill-trade-signal-us) to the Joe Biden administration. But other sources say that China may ultimately ban the export of the rare earths altogether on “[security concerns](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-19/china-may-ban-rare-earth-technology-exports-on-security-concerns?sref=QYxyklwO).” What’s really going on here?

There are 17 elements considered [rare earths](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-16/why-rare-earths-are-achilles-heal-for-europe-u-s-quicktake) — lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium — and while many aren’t actually rare in terms of global deposits, extracting them is difficult and expensive. They are used across high-tech manufacturing, including smartphones, fighter aircraft and components in virtually all advanced electronics. Of particular note, they are essential to many of the clean-energy technologies expected to come online in this decade.

I began to focus on rare-earth elements when I commanded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence in Afghanistan, known as the International Security Assistance Force. While Afghans live in an extremely poor country, [studies](https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/afghanistans-mineral-resources-are-a-lost-opportunity-and-a-threat/) have assessed that they sit atop $1 trillion to $3 trillion in a wide variety of minerals, including rare earths. Some [estimates](https://www.fraserinstitute.org/article/afghanistans-rare-earth-element-bonanza) put the rare-earth levels alone at 1.4 million metric tons.

But every time I tried to visit a mining facility, the answer I got from my security team was, “It’s too dangerous right now, admiral.” Unfortunately, despite a great deal of effort by the U.S. and NATO, those security challenges remain, deterring the large foreign-capital investments necessary to harvest the lodes. Which brings us back to Beijing.

China controls roughly 80% of the rare-earths market, between what it mines itself and processes in raw material from elsewhere. If it decided to wield the weapon of restricting the supply — something it has repeatedly [threatened](https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-trade-fight-raises-specter-of-rare-earth-shortage-11559304000) to do — it would create a significant challenge for manufacturers and a geopolitical predicament for the industrialized world.

It could happen. In 2010, Beijing threatened to cut off exports to Japan over the disputed Senkaku Islands. Two years ago, Beijing was reportedly considering restrictions on exports to the U.S. generally, as well as against specific companies (such as defense giant Lockheed Martin Corp.) that it deemed in violation of its policies against selling advanced weapons to Taiwan.

President Donald Trump’s administration issued an executive order to spur the production of rare earths domestically, and created an [Energy Resource Governance Initiative](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Energy-Resource-Governance-Initiative-ERGI-Fact-Sheet.pdf) to promote international mining. The European Union and Japan, among others, are also aggressively seeking newer sources of rare earths.

Given this tension, it was superficially surprising that China announced it would boost its mining quotas in the first quarter of 2021 by nearly 30%, reflecting a continuation in strong (and rising) demand. But the increase occurs under a shadow of uncertainty, as the Chinese Communist Party is undertaking a “review” of its policies concerning future sales of rare earths. In all probability, the tactics of the increase are temporary, and fit within a larger strategy.

China will go to great lengths to maintain overall control of the global rare-earths supply. This fits neatly within the geo-economic approach of the [One Belt, One Road](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-30/china-is-determined-to-reshape-the-globe) initiative, which seeks to use a variety of carrots and sticks — economic, trade, diplomatic and security — to create zones of influence globally. In terms of rare earths, the strategy seems to be allowing carefully calibrated access to the elements at a level that makes it economically less attractive for competitors to undertake costly exploration and mining operations. This is similar to the oil-market strategy used by Russia and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries for decades.

Some free-market advocates believe that China will not take aggressive action choking off supply because that could [precipitate retaliation](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-02-22/china-weaponizing-rare-earths-technology-will-probably-backfire) or accelerate the search for alternate sources in global markets. What seems more likely is a series of targeted shutdowns directed against specific entities such as U.S. defense companies, Japanese consumer electronics makers, or European industrial concerns that have offended Beijing.

The path to rare-earth independence for the U.S. must include: Ensuring supply chains of rare earths necessary for national security; promoting the exploitation of the elements domestically (and removing barriers to responsibly doing so); mandating that defense contractors and other critical-infrastructure entities wean themselves off Chinese rare earths; sponsoring research and development to find alternative materials, especially for clean energy technology; and creating a substantial stockpile of the elements in case of a Chinese boycott.

This is a bipartisan agenda. The Trump administration’s [strategic assessment](https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/06/department-commerce-releases-report-critical-minerals) of what needs to be done (which goes beyond just 17 rare earths to include a total of 35 critical minerals) is thoughtful, and should serve as a basis for the Biden administration and Congress.

#### REM access key to military primacy and tech advancement – alternatives fail

Trigaux 12 (David, University Honors Program University of South Florida St. Petersburg) “The US, China and Rare Earth Metals: The Future Of Green Technology, Military Tech, and a Potential Achilles‟ Heel to American Hegemony,” USF St. Petersberg, May 2, 2012, <https://digital.stpetersburg.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1132&context=honorstheses>] TDI

The implications of a rare earth shortage aren’t strictly related to the environment, and energy dependence, but have distinct military implications as well that could threaten the position of the United States world’s strongest military. The United States place in the world was assured by powerful and decisive deployments in World War One and World War Two. Our military expansion was built upon a large, powerful industrial base that created more, better weapons of war for our soldiers. During the World Wars, a well-organized draft that sent millions of men into battle in a short amount of time proved decisive, but as the war ended, and soldiers drafted into service returned to civilian life, the U.S. technological superiority over its opponents provided it with sustained dominance over its enemies, even as the numerical size of the army declined. New technologies, such as the use of the airplane in combat, rocket launched missiles, radar systems, and later, GPS, precision guided missiles, missile defense systems, high tech tanks, lasers, and other technologies now make the difference between victory and defeat.

The United States military now serves many important functions, deterring threats across the world. The United States projects its power internationally, through a network of bases and allied nations. Thus, the United States is a powerful player in all regions of the world, and often serves as a buffer against conflict in these regions. US military presence serves as a buffer against Chinese military modernization in Eastern Asia, against an increasingly nationalist Russia in Europe, and smaller regional actors, such as Venezuela in South America and Iran in the Middle East. The U.S. Navy is deployed all over the world, as the guarantor of international maritime trade routes. The US Navy leads action against challenges to its maritime sovereignty on the other side of the globe, such as current action against Somali piracy. Presence in regions across the world prevents escalation of potential crisis. These could result in either a larger power fighting a smaller nation or nations (Russia and Georgia, Taiwan and China), religious opponents (Israel and Iran), or traditional foes (Ethiopia and Eretria, Venezuela and Colombia, India and Pakistan). US projection is also key deterring emerging threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation. While not direct challenges to US primacy, both terrorism and nuclear proliferation can kill thousands.

The US Air Force has a commanding lead over the rest of the world, in terms of both numbers and capabilities. American ground forces have few peers, and are unmatched in their ability to deploy to anywhere in the world at an equally unmatched pace.

The only perceived challenge to the United States militarily comes from the People’s Republic of China.76 While the United States outspends all other nations in the world put together in terms of military spending, China follows as a close second, and has begun an extensive modernization program to boot.77 The Chinese military however, is several decades behind the United States in air power and nuclear capabilities.78 To compensate, China has begun the construction of access-denial technology, preventing the US from exercising its dominance in China’s sphere of influence.79 Chinese modernization efforts have a serious long-term advantage over the United States; access to rare earth metals, and a large concentration of rare earth chemists doing research.80 This advantage, coupled with the U.S. losing access to rare earth metals, will even the odds much quicker than policymakers had previously anticipated. 81

The largest example is US airpower. With every successive generation of military aircraft, the U.S. Air Force becomes more and more dependent on Rare Earth Metals.82 As planes get faster and faster, they have to get lighter and lighter, while adding weight from extra computers and other features on board.83 To lighten the weight of the plane, scandium is used to produce lightweight aluminum alloys for the body of the plane. Rare Earth metals are also useful in fighter jet engines, and fuel cells.84 For example, rare earths are required to producing miniaturized fins, and samarium is required to build the motors for the F-35 fighter jet.85 F-35 jets are the next generation fighter jet that works together to form the dual plane combination that cements U.S. dominance in air power over the Russian PAK FA.86

Rare earth shortages don’t just affect air power, also compromising the navigation system of Abrams Tanks, which need samarium cobalt magnets. The Abrams Tank is the primary offensive mechanized vehicle in the U.S. arsenal. The Aegis Spy 1 Radar also uses samarium.87 Many naval ships require neodymium. Hell Fire missiles, satellites, night vision goggles, avionics, and precision guided munitions all require rare earth metals. 88

American military superiority is based on technological advancement that outstrips the rest of the world. Command and control technology allows the U.S. to fight multiple wars at once and maintain readiness for other issues, as well as have overwhelming force against rising challengers. This technology helps the U.S. know who, where, and what is going to attack them, and respond effectively, regardless of the source of the threat.

Rare Earth Elements make this technological superiority possible.

To make matters worse, the defense industrial base is often a single market industry, dependent on government contracts for its business. If China tightens the export quotas further, major US defense contractors will be in trouble.89 Every sector of the defense industrial base is dependent on rare earth metals. Without rare earths, these contractors can’t build anything, which collapses the industry.90

Rare Earth shortages are actually already affecting our military, with shortages of lanthanum, cerium, europium and gadolinium happening in the status quo. This prevents us not only from building the next generation of high tech weaponry, but also from constructing more of the weapons and munitions that are needed in the status quo. As current weapon systems age and they can’t be replaced, the US primacy will be undermined. Of special concern is that U.S. domestic mining doesn’t produce “heavy” rare earth metals that are needed for many advanced components of military technologies. Given the nature of many military applications, substitutions aren’t possible. 91

#### Primacy and allied commitments solve arms races and great power war – unipolarity is sustainable, and prevents power vacuums and global escalation

Brands 18 [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6

From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep.

This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance.

Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate.

American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap.

Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled.

THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors.

First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment.

#### Turns their first scenario – REMs key to renewable shift

Arrobas et al 17 [(Daniele La Porta Arrobas is a senior mining specialist with the World Bank based in Washington DC and has degrees in Geoscience and Environmental Management, Kirsten Hund is a senior mining specialist with the Energy and Extractives Global Practice of the World Bank and holds a Master’s in IR from the University of Groningen in the Netherlands, Michael Stephen McCormick, Jagabanta Ningthoujam has an MA in international economics and international development from JHU and a BS in MechE from Natl University of Singapore, John Drexhage also works at the Intl Institute for Sustainable Development) “The Growing Role of Minerals and Metals for a Low Carbon Future,” World Bank, June 30, 2017, <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/207371500386458722/the-growing-role-of-minerals-and-metals-for-a-low-carbon-future>] TDI

* Full report - https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/207371500386458722/pdf/117581-WP-P159838-PUBLIC-ClimateSmartMiningJuly.pdf

Climate and greenhouse gas (GHG) scenarios have typically paid scant attention to the metal implications necessary to realize a low/zero carbon future. The 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change indicates a global resolve to embark on development patterns that would significantly be less GHG intensive. One might assume that nonrenewable resource development and use will also need to decline in a carbon-constrained future. This report tests that assumption, identifies those commodities implicated in such a scenario and explores ramifications for relevant resource-rich developing countries. Using wind, solar, and energy storage batteries as proxies, the study examines which metals will likely rise in demand

to be able to deliver on a carbon-constrained future. Metals which could see a growing market include aluminum (including its key constituent, bauxite), cobalt, copper, iron ore, lead, lithium, nickel, manganese, the platinum group of metals, rare earth metals including cadmium, molybdenum, neodymium, and indium—silver, steel, titanium and zinc. The report then maps production and reserve levels of relevant metals globally, focusing on implications for resource-rich developing countries. It concludes by identifying critical research gaps and suggestions for future work.