### T – spoiler

#### Interp – the aff maybe not satirize a work of fiction that the negative hasn’t engaged with

#### Violation – I haven’t watched the entire MCU series

#### Standards –

#### Critical education – I can’t engage with the substance because I have no clue what the movies are discussing in the literal sense which means the satire doesn’t have the same effectiveness or educational impact that it needs for the satire aspect to work. Satire is intended to persuade people and you aren’t achieving you intended goal with the ballot

#### Topic Education – kills topic education because it distracts from the core lit of the topic, we only have TFA on this topic whereas we can talk about spiderman or the mcu at any other point of time

#### Voters –

#### Paradigm issues

#### Drop the debater because only a loss sends a meaningful message, since debaters want to win and avoid losing, so dropping the arg is insufficient.

#### Competing Interp - Reasonability creates a double bind. Either a) reasonability is arbitrary and we don’t know what is “reasonable,” inviting judge intervention or b) we debate about what is or is not reasonable which devolves into competing interpretations.

### 2

#### Auto negate –

#### 1] 2ar gets new responses

#### 2] 2ar gets last word – always pyschologocally more persuaive

#### 3] aff gets infinite prep

#### 4] permissibility flows neg – better do nothing than something

#### 5] giving aff rvis gives the aff another ballot route

### NC: Kant

#### 1] Ethics must start a priori

#### a) Induction fails – We understand induction works because it’s worked in the past which is circular.

#### b) Bindingness – Experience is subjective, e.g two people can have different favorite foods, only a priori ethics can unify and create a universal theory.

#### c) Corruption – Experience can be corrupted by social norms – a person in the 1800s is more likely to think slavery is ok than someone now – only a priori ethics cannot be corrupted.

#### The standard is consistency with a Kantian system of inner and outer freedom

#### 2] If ethics are a priori, then they need to be universally accessible.

#### A) The only trait universal to all agents is the ability to set and pursue your own ends – Means a priori ethics require Practical Reason. Reason outweighs on inescapability – all actions are determined by reason.

Wood ‘11

Wood, Allen W. Kantian Ethics. Cambridge University Press, 2011. Page 32-33 Lindale PP

It ought to be utterly uncontroversial that whatever we do, we should act for reasons, and therefore from reason. It is a virtual tautology to say that what we should do is the same as whatever there are the best (or at least good enough) reasons to do, and that we should do it for (or from) those reasons. When people profess to act apart from or against reason, and even recommend acting that way, the only sense to be made of this is that there really are good reasons for acting that way, but the agents do not know what they are, under that description, yet have practical access to them through something else – “emotions” or “faith” (Pascal’s “reasons of the heart”). What is said is then sometimes correct, at least in substance. For emotions, or other sources of action that people distinguish from “reason,” do sometimes provide access to what we have best reason to do. Whether or not the substance is right, however, the sources of action appealed to here can never be self-authenticating – this would have to be decided by rational reflection. And the state of mind that appeals to nonrational sources over reason, even when it is right in substance, is in form never far removed from self-deception.

#### B] The only limit on agency is the law of non-contradiction, things like a round triangle cannot logically exist. Preempts aggregation since an action cannot be more contradictory or less contradictory.

#### 3] That means agents can’t use other agents as means to an end – they must be ends in themselves

#### A] To value your own reason is to value all other agents because they possess the same rational capacity – To restrict another agents free will is a contradiction since it would justify the restriction of your own will. For to act in your reason presupposes reason is a valid motivational factor – It would be a contradiction to say your reason is valid but someone else’s isn’t.

#### B] This justifies an Act-Omission Distinction since to act requires Reason – not acting is a lack of Reason and thus not intentional. If I do not act that means I am not using my Practical Reason – I did not set an end and thus cannot be held accountable.

#### 4] Treating agents as ends in themselves justifies universal ends –

#### A] Equality Principle – If all agents are equal and do not interfere with each other’s ends, then the justification for one agents ends justify another’s ends e.g if person x is equal to person y then whatever person x does person y must be able to do as well.

#### B] Exploitation – Non-universalizability allows agents to contort specific situations to fit their wants which collapses to skep and freezes action since some would exploit it and some would not.

#### C] Logic – It is illogical to say an a priori statement like 2 + 2 = 4is only true for me but false for you – Logic comes first because it is a litmus test for all arguments.

#### D] Identity – We set ends based on identity i.e I wish to win this round because I am a debater and the judge wishes to submit the ballot because they are a judge, only Reason allows us to create these roles and only universal ends allow us to stick to them.

Korsgaard ‘06

[Christine M. (Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University). “Morality and The Logic of Caring: A Comment on Harry Frankfurt.” 2006, pgs. 7-8, <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.Frankfurt.pdf>.] Lindale PP

But what, if anything, compels us to view reasons as public and universal in this way?15 In my view, part of the answer lies in the role of universal principles in unifying and therefore constituting the will or the self, the role played in Frankfurt’s view by caring. And if the self is constituted by volition, it cannot be assumed to exist in advance of volition. When I will to go to the dentist on the day of my appointment, I cannot be willing a law that my future self should go to the dentist, for whether I have a future self depends on whether that law and others like it are obeyed. If that law and others like it are not obeyed, then my body is, in Frankfurt’s terms, not that of a person but that of a wanton without a self, and no person has disobeyed my law. So I must be willing that an agent characterized in some other way—perhaps as the future conscious subject of my body—should go to the dentist. Minimally, this shows that any maxim that I will must universalize over some group more inclusive than my present conscious self, and that the normative force of the reason I legislate should be public and shared between me (my present conscious self ) and the members of that group.16 Perhaps it is only all the future conscious subjects of my body, but we need some reason why that and only that should be the relevant group, and some of the possible answers to that question suggest that the group should be more inclusive still. For instance, one possible answer is that I must interact cooperatively with the future conscious subjects of my body if I am to carry any of my projects out. But of course it may also be argued that I must interact cooperatively with other rational agents as well, for unless others respect my reasons and I respect theirs, we are apt to get in each other’s way.17 So it begins to look as if I must will universally and publicly— that is, will reasons I can share, not only with the future conscious subjects of my body, but with all rational beings, or at least all with whom I must interact. In any case, I cannot coherently regard my reasons as applying merely to myself. And there may be the beginnings of a route to morality.

#### Offense

#### Advocacy is an inevitable product of the market attempting to differentiating it’s products – different people want different perspectives

Tella et. al ‘07

Tella, Rafael & Anand, Bharat & Galetovic, Alexander. (2007). Information or Opinion? Media Bias as Product Differentiation. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 16. 635-682. 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2007.00153.x. // Phoenix

Two aspects of media bias are important empirically. First, bias is persistent: it does not seem to disappear even when the media is under scrutiny. Second, bias is conflicting: different people often perceive bias in the same media outlet to be of opposite signs. We build a model in which both empirical characteristics of bias are observed in equilibrium. The key assumptions are that the information contained in the facts about a news event may not always be fully verifiable, and consumers have heterogeneous prior views (“ideologies”) about the news event. Based on these ingredients of the model, we build a location model with entry to characterize firms’ reports in equilibrium, and the nature of bias. When a news item comprises only fully verifiable facts, firms report these as such, so that there is no bias and the market looks like any market for information. When a news item comprises information that is mostly nonverifiable, however, then consumers may care both about opinion and editorials, and a firm’s report will contain both these aspects—in which case the market resembles any differentiated product market. Thus, the appearance of bias is a result of equilibrium product differentiation when some facts are nonverifiable. We use the model to address several questions, including the impact of competition on bias, the incentives to report unpopular news, and the impact of owner ideology on bias. In general, competition does not lead to a reduction in bias unless this is accompanied by an increase in verifiability or a smaller dispersion of prior beliefs.

#### Free markets are good and can be universalized

Jones ‘6

Jones,Harold B.,,Jr. (2006). The kantian ethic of capitalism. Journal of Private Enterprise, 22(1), 37-52. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.uh.edu/scholarly-journals/kantian-ethic-capitalism/docview/215108180/se-2?accountid=7107> // Phoenix

According to Kant (2002, 5), we can address the core issues of morality only by means of disciplined logic. The indispensable tool is the law of non-contradiction, and the lesson it teaches is what Kant (37) described as the Categorical Imperative: "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law."

Kant said that everything we do can be referred back to some "maxim," which was his word for a general principle of behavior. If the general principle underlying a particular action could be universally applied, that action is moral. If a universal application of the underlying principle would run into the kw of non-contradiction, the behavior is immoral. I may know, for example, that I can get myself out of a particular difficulty by making a promise I do not intend to keep. The underlying principle is that it is all right to make lying promises. If everyone made promises without any intention of keeping them, though, promises would never be believed. If promises were never believed, I could not get myself out of trouble by lying, because no one would believe me (Kant, 2002, 39). I know the action is immoral because I see that when it is carried to the ultimate extreme it contradicts itself.

This is a point on which Kant disagrees with modern positivism. Milton Friedman (2002, 167), for example, says merely that society is held together by "a basic core of value judgments that are unthinkingly accepted by the great bulk of its members." Kant would argue that the Categorical Imperative points to a moral absolute: a value or practice that violates morality, even if "unthinkingly accepted," is socially destructive. He gave the example of fighting duels, which was a common custom in the world of his day. (Two students at the University of Jena fought a duel over their different interpretations of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason [Kuehn, 2001, 319]). The maxim or underlying principle of dueling is that you may kill anyone who offends you. If universalized, this maxim would lead quickly to the elimination of every potential offender. Dueling would disappear because society would collapse (Kant, 1996, 32).

The fact that the forcible redistribution of income has been "unthinkingly accepted" by most of the American population is not enough to make the practice moral. The maxim "To each according to his need" divorces consumption from production. Without production, however, there can be no consumption. Not even the fruits of nature can be consumed if no one harvests them. Any maxim that endorses consumption without reference to production runs very quickly into the law of non-contradiction and, therefore, is immoral quite without regard to how many people have come to think of it as acceptable.

Kant was not entirely blind to the fact that social norms often prevented an accepted custom from being carried to its logical conclusion. Dueling, for example, was surrounded by practices that made it less damaging than it might otherwise have been. A duel to which both parties had not agreed would be a murder and therefore punishable under the law. Kant himself was once challenged to a duel over his opinions on free trade. He ignored the challenge, went on with his comments, and turned a potential adversary into his best friend (Stuckenberg, 1990, 198). His own experience taught him that the custom of dueling was less dangerous in practice than it was in theory.

Nevertheless, the dangerous tendency was there, and Kant was more interested in the tendency than in observable results. Social consequences, remember, are "complex phenomena" (Mises, 1996, 31): it is impossible to predict everything that might intervene to prevent or exacerbate a particular effect. The Kantian method strips away all the empirical data to examine the decision itself in the light of pure reason.

Such a line of reasoning never raises the administrative questions of how to identify the "needy" and of how to set up an apparatus to provide for them. It does not address the problems of perverse incentives and bureaucracy. It bypasses the economist's concern with efficiency. It does not deny that the welfare state is impractical, but it insists that this impracticality is the result of something deeper. The redistribution of wealth is immoral, it says, and nothing immoral is likely to work well in practice.

Unlike the principle underlying the welfare state, the maxim of capitalism meets the tests both of economic efficiency and Kantian morality. "To each according to what he and the instruments he owns produces" (Fnedman, 2002, 161-62): The principle is moral because it can be universalized without running into the law of non-contradiction. Obedience to this principle cannot prevent economic difficulties, for the empirical fact of scarcity remains. Morality, however, is the key to the effective use of whatever resources a society may actually have at it disposal.

### Aff -

### AT – Aff RVIs

#### Carded offense doesn’t matter – you’re reading a spiderman case we’re not getting any real education.

#### We’re not reading T – there’s no warrant to reciprocity.

### AT – One Layer means I win

#### Just win the RVI, you get theory offense too. You’re uplayering by reading theory spikes in the underview so this spike has no offense.

#### Theory’s key to check abuse so we have to have equal access to the ballot on that layer.

#### Disproportional impact – you can’t get an auto win from winning one layer there’s a hierarchy in debate layer for a reason.

#### AT-clash: clash sucks when its on the theory flow because it’s not educational in any real sense of the word. Counter interp solves better for idea engagement since only talking about material I’ve engaged with makes for better breadth of education.

### AT – accept all aff interps

#### Abuse as a response is abusive – rewards the aff for doing nothing

#### Neg theory goes both way if you win the RVI so you have an out

#### Fairness isn’t a voter – no reason to give you the ballot just to be fair – that moots most their 1ac tricks impacts.

#### Trained judges check back against psychologically skewed – no impact since the rules say that we have to weight debates equally and the judge has experience doing so.

### Err Aff –

No speech times we both get 13 min

New 2nr – you get last word psychologically better

Uplayering – you started uplayering in the 1ac before I even spoke – made outs other than the aff

### AT – affirmation means you vote aff

#### Affirmation means you affirm a piece of substance – you’re not doing that.

#### Affirm, means you have to support something other than affirming bc there’d be no neg ballot otherwise.