### 1

**Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a just government in which a right to strike ought to be recognized**

**“A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just government” in the res – means that you have to prove the resolution true in a VACCUM, not in a particular instance**

**CCC** (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation) LHSLA JC/SJ

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. **A beagle** makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) **refers to all members of that class**

**Violation: they spec Kenya**

**Standards:**

**[1] precision – counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff.**

**[2] limits – the UN says there are 195 national governments but even that’s not an agreed upon brightline – explodes limits since there are tons of independent affs plus functionally infinite combinations, all with different advantages in different political situations. Kills neg prep and debatability since there are no DAs that apply to every aff – i.e. factors that affect labor shortages or unions in the US are different than in Egypt – means the aff is always more prepared and wins just for speccing. There’s been China, Hungary, EU, Kazakhstan, US, India, Egypt and this is the first major tournament of the topic.**

**[3] tva – just read your aff as an advantage under a whole res advocacy, solves all ur offense- Potential abuse doesn’t permit 1AC abuse – allows you to be infinitely abusive in the 1AC-– if the neg doesn’t have specific prep, they’ll resort to cheaty word PICs or process CPs (like I had to) which are net worse.**

**Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation.**

**Drop the debater – deter future abuse**

**Competing interps –reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm**

**[1] Race to bottom – reasonability incentivizes people to be barely reasonable, magnifying abuse**

**[2] collapses – we debate about a specified briteline which is a counter interp**

**[3] Invites judge intervention – it begs the question of what’s reasonable, destroying norm setting and is arbitrary**

**[4] Critical thinking –competing interps promotes in depth argumentation on theory which increases quality of clash.**

**No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices**

### 2

**Indigeneity connotates a state of non-ontology allowing for the construction of the human that legitimizes its self into a history of elimination, jettisoned from or assimilated into the national body to cohere settler temporality**

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Admittedly, the feral is a precarious space from which to theorize, sullied with an injurability bound up in the work of liberal humanism as such, an enterprise that weaponizes a set of moral barometers to distribute ferality unevenly to differently citizened and raced bodies—ones that are too close for comfort and must be pushed outside arm’s reach. Perhaps ferality traverses a **semantic line of flight commensurate­ with** that of **savagery, barbarism, and lawlessness**, concreting into one **history of elimination**: that is, a history of eliminating recalcitrant indigeneities incompatible within a supposedly hygienic social. The word savage comes from the Latin salvaticus, an alteration of silvaticus, meaning “wild,” literally “of the woods.” Of persons, it means “reckless, ungovernable” (“Savage”). In the space-time of settler states, savagery temporarily stands in for those **subjectivities tethered to a supposedly waning form of indigeneity**, one that came from the woods and, because of this, had to be **jettisoned from or assimilated into the national body**. Here is Audra Simpson on the history of Indian “lawlessness”: Its genealogy extends back to the earliest moments of recorded encounter, when Indians appeared to have no law, to be without order, and thus, to be in the colonizer’s most generous articulation of differentiation, in need of the trappings of civilization. “Law” may be one instrument of civilization, as a regulating technique of power that develops through the work upon a political body and a territory. (2014, 144) According to Simpson, the recognition of Indigenous peoples as lawless rendered them governable, motivating the settler state (here, Canada) to curate and thus contain atrophied indigeneities—and, consequently, their sovereignties, lands, and politics—within the borders of federal law (2014, 144-45). Similarly, in The Transit of Empire Jodi Byrd traces the epistemological gimmicks through which the concept of “Indianness” came to align with “the savage other” (2011, 27). For her, this alignment provided the “rationale for imperial domination” and continues to stalk philosophy’s patterns of thinking (ibid.). Simpson, writing about the Mohawks of Kahnawake, argues that “a fear of lawlessness” continues to haunt the colonial imaginary, thereby diminishing “Indigenous rights to trade and to act as sovereigns in their own territories” (2014, 145). We might take the following lyrics from the popular Disney film Pocahontas as an example of the ways indigeneity circulates as a feral signifier in colonial economies of meaning-making: [Ratcliffe] What can you expect From filthy little heathens? Their whole disgusting race is like a curse Their skin’s a hellish red They’re only good when dead They’re vermin, as I said And worse [English settlers] They’re savages! Savages! Barely even human. (Gabriel and Goldberg 1995) **Savagery connotes a state of non-ontology**: Indigenous peoples are forced to cling to a barely extant humanity and coterminously collapse into a putatively wretched form of animality. Savagery is lethal, and its Indian becomes the prehistoric alibi through which the human is constituted as such. Indigenous peoples have therefore labored to explain away this savagery, reifying whitened rubrics for proper citizenship and crafting a genre of life tangible within the scenes of living through that are constitutive of settler colonialism as such. These scenes, however, are dead set on destroying the remnants of that savagery, converting their casualties into morally compatible subjects deserving of rights and life in a multicultural state that stokes the liberal fantasy of life after racial trauma at the expense of decolonial flourishing itself. This paper is therefore interested in the subjectivities and forms of sociality that savagery destroys when applied from without, and the political work of appropriating that savagery in the name of decolonization. Ours is a form of indigeneity that hints at a fundamental pollutability that both confirms and threatens forms of ontology tethered to a taxonomized humanity built in that foundational episode of subjection of which Simpson speaks. I am suggesting that savagery always-already references an otherworld of sorts: there are forms of life abandoned outside modernity’s episteme whose expressivities surge with affects anomalous within the topography of settler colonialism. This paper is not a historicist or nostalgic attachment to a pre-savage indigeneity resurrected from a past somehow unscathed by the violence that left us in the thick of things in the first place. Instead, I emphasize the potentiality of ferality as a politics in a world bent on our destruction—a world that eliminates indigeneities too radical to collapse into a collective sensorium, training us to a live in an ordinary that the settler state needs to persist as such, one that only some will survive. This world incentivizes our collusion with a multicultural state instantiated through a myth of belonging that actively disavows difference in the name of that very difference. We are repeatedly hurried into a kind of waning sociality, the content and form of which appear both too familiar and not familiar enough. In short, we are habitually left scavenging for ways to go on without knowing what it is we want. Let’s consider Jack Halberstam’s thoughts on “the wild”: It is a tricky word to use but it is a concept that we cannot live without if we are to combat the conventional modes of rule that have synced social norms to economic practices and have created a world order where every form of disturbance is quickly folded back into quiet, where every ripple is quickly smoothed over, where every instance of eruption has been tamped down and turned into new evidence of the rightness of the status quo. (2013, 126) Where Halberstam finds disturbance, I find indigeneity-cum-disturbance par excellence. Halberstam’s “wild” evokes a potentiality laboured in the here and now and “an alternative to how we want to think about being” in and outside an authoritarian state (2013, 126-27). Perhaps the wild risks the decolonial, a geography of life-building that dreams up tomorrows whose referents are the fractured indigeneities struggling to survive a historical present built on our suffering. Ferality is a stepping stone to a future grounded in Indigenous peoples’ legal and political orders. This paper does not traffic in teleologies of the anarchic or lawless as they emerge in Western thought; instead, it refuses settler sovereignty and calls for forms of collective Indigenous life that are attuned to queerness’s wretched histories and future-making potentialities. Indigeneity is an ante-ontology of sorts: it is prior to and therefore disruptive of ontology. Indigeneity makes manifest residues or pockets of times, worlds, and subjectivities that warp both common sense and philosophy into falsities that fall short of completely explaining what is going on. **Indigenous life is truncated in the** biopolitical **category of Savage** in order to make our attachments to ourselves assimilable inside settler colonialism’s national sensorium. Settler colonialism purges excessive forms of indigeneity that trouble its rubrics for sensing out the human and the nonhuman. In other words, settler colonialism works up modes of being-in-the-world that narrate themselves as the only options we have. What would it mean, then, to persist in the space of savagery, exhausting the present and holding out for futures that are not obsessed with the proper boundary between human and nonhuman life? This paper now turns to the present, asking: what happens when indigeneity collides with queerness inside the reserve, and how might a feral theory make sense of that collision? Deadly Presents “I went through a really hard time… I was beaten; more than once. I was choked” (Klassen 2014). These were the words of Tyler-Alan Jacobs, a two-spirit man from the Squamish Nation, capturing at once the terror of queer life on the reserve and the hardening of time into a thing that slows down bodies and pushes them outside its securitized geographies. Jacobs had grown up with his attackers, attackers who were energized by the pronouncement of queerness—how it insisted on being noticed, how it insisted on being. When the dust settled, “his right eye [had] dislodged and the side of his faced [had] caved in” (ibid.). Settler colonialism is fundamentally affective: it takes hold of the body, makes it perspire, and wears it out. It converts flesh into pliable automations and people into grim reapers who must choose which lives are worth keeping in the world. It can turn a person into a murderer in a matter of seconds; it is an epistemic rupturing of our attachments to life, to each other, and to ourselves. It is as if settler colonialism were simultaneously a rescue and military operation, a holy war of sorts tasked with **exorcising the spectre of queer indigeneity and its putative infectivity**. I rehearse this case because it allows me to risk qualifying the reserve as a geography saturated with heteronormativity’s socialities. This is a strategic interdiction that destroys supposedly degenerative queer affect worlds, untangling some bodies and not others from the future. I don’t have the statistics to substantiate these claims, but there is an archive of heartbreak and loss that is easy to come by if you ask the right people. Indeed, what would such statistics tell us that we don’t already know? What would the biopolitical work of data collection do to a knowledge-making project that thinks outside the big worlds of Statistics and Demography and, instead, inside the smaller, more precarious worlds created in the wake of gossip? I worry about ethnographic projects that seek to account for things and theory in the material in order to map the coordinates of an aberration to anchor it and its voyeurs in the theatres of the academy. The desire to attach to a body is too easily energized by a biological reading of gender that repudiates the very subjects it seeks so desperately to know and to study. What about the body? I have been asked this question, again and again. A feral theory is something of a call to arms: abolish this sort of ethnography and turn to those emergent methodologies that might better make sense of the affects and life-forms that are just now coming into focus and have been destroyed or made invisible in the name of research itself. Queer indigeneity, to borrow Fred Moten’s description of blackness, might “come most clearly into relief, by way of its negation” (2014). Perhaps decolonization needs to be a sort of séance: an attempt to communicate with the dead, a collective rising-up from the reserve’s necropolis, a feral becoming-undead. Boyd and Thrush’s Phantom Past, Indigenous Presence thinks indigeneity and its shaky histories vis-à-vis the language of haunting, where haunting is an endurant facet of “the experience of colonialism” (Bodinger de Uriarte 2012, 303). But, for me, ghostliness is differentially distributed: some more than others will be wrenched into the domain of the dead and forced to will their own ontologies into the now. Perhaps the universalist notion that haunting is a metonym for indigeneity repudiates the very life-forms that it claims to include: those who are differently queered and gendered, and, because of this, haunt waywardly and in ways that cannot be easily predicted (Ahmed 2015). This paper thus takes an imaginative turn and proceeds with something of an incantation to summon the figure of the queer Indigenous poltergeist—the feral monster in the horror story of decolonization. Queer Indigenous poltergeists do not linger inaudibly in the background; we are beside ourselves with anger, we make loud noises and throw objects around because we are demanding retribution for homicide, unloved love, and cold shoulders. We do not reconcile; we escape the reserve, pillage and mangle the settler-colonial episteme. Our arrival is both uneventful and apocalyptic, a point of departure and an entry point for an ontology that corresponds with a future that has yet to come. Sometimes all we have is the promise of the future. For the queer Indigenous poltergeist, resurrection is its own form of decolonial love. The poltergeist is an ontological anomaly: a fusion of human, object, and ghost, a “creature of social reality” and a “creature of fiction” (Haraway 1991, 149). From the German poltern meaning “[to] make noise, [to] rattle” and Geist or “ghost,” it literally means “noisy ghost,” speaking into existence an anti-subjectivity that emerges in the aftermath of death or murder (“Poltergeist”). It is the subject of Tobe Hooper’s 1982 film Poltergeist, which tells a story of “a haunting based on revenge” (Tuck and Ree 2013, 652). The film’s haunting is a wronging premised on an initial wrong: the eponymous poltergeist materializes when a mansion is constructed on a cemetery—a disturbing of spirits, if you will. José Esteban Muñoz argues that “The double ontology of ghosts and ghostliness, the manner in which ghosts exist inside and out and traverse categorical distinctions, seems especially useful for… queer criticism” (2009, 46). In this paper, the poltergeist names the form which indigeneity takes when it brings queer matter into its folds. In other words, this essay evokes haunting as a metaphor to hint at the ways in which queerness was murderously absorbed into the past and prematurely expected to stay there as an effect of colonialism’s drive to eliminate all traces of sexualities and genders that wandered astray. The poltergeist conceptualizes the work of queer indigeneity in the present insofar as it does not presuppose the mysterious intentions of the ghost—an otherworldly force that is bad, good, and undetectable all at once. Instead, the poltergeist is melancholic in its grief, but also pissed off. It refuses to remain in the spiritual, a space cheapened in relation to the staunch materiality of the real, and one that, though housing our conditions of possibility, cannot contain all of us. We protest forms of cruel nostalgia that tether ghosts to a discarded past within which queer Indigenous life once flourished because we know that we will never get it back and that most of us likely never experienced it in the first place. We long for that kind of love, but we know it is hard to come by. I turn to the poltergeist because I don’t have anywhere else to go. Help me, I could say. But I won’t. Queer indigeneity, then, is neither here nor there, neither dead nor alive but, to use Judith Butler’s language, interminably spectral (2006, 33). We are ghosts that haunt the reserve in the event of resurrection. According to Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, a reserve is a “tract of land, the legal title to which is held by the Crown, set apart for the use and benefit of an Indian band” (“Terminology”). The “reserve system” is part of the dispossessory ethos through which the settler state reifies land as the sign of sovereignty itself, and thus effects the political death of indigeneity, decomposing it into nothingness, into contaminated dirt. Reserves are the products of imaginations gone wild; they are ruins that bear “the physical imprint of the supernatural” on arid land, on decaying trailers arranged like weathered tombstones (Tuck and Ree 2013, 653). They are borderlands that connote simultaneous possession and dispossession: they represent the collision between settler sovereignty (insofar as the Crown holds the legal title to the land) and indigeneity (pointing to a genre of life that is distinctly Indigenous). Reserves were—some might say they still are—zones of death that regulated and regulate the movements of Indigenous bodies, quarantining their putatively contaminated flesh outside modern life in order to preserve settler-colonial futurities. It is as if the reserve were a site of complete atrophy, where indigeneity is supposed to waste away or degenerate, where queerness has already bled out. Look at the blood on your hands! The queer Indigenous poltergeist, however, foregrounds what I call a “reserve consciousness” —an awareness of the deathliness of the reserve. A reserve consciousness might be a kind of critical phenomenology that, to use Lisa Guenther’s description of this sort of insurgent knowledge project, pulls up “traces of what is not quite or no longer there—that which has been rubbed out or consigned to invisibility” (2015): here, the so-called on-reserve Indian. It might be about becoming a frictive surface; by rubbing up against things and resisting motion between objects, we might become unstuck. Queer Indigenous poltergeists are what Sara Ahmed calls “blockage points”: where communication stops because we cannot get through (2011, 68). That is, queer indigeneity connotes an ethical impasse, a dead end that presents us with two options: exorcism or resurrection. If settler colonialism is topological, if it persists despite elastic deformations such as stretching and twisting, wear and tear, we might have to make friction to survive. I turn to the reserve because it is a geography of affect, one in which the heaviness of atmospheres crushes some bodies to death and in which some must bear the weight of settler colonialism more than others. The violence done to us has wrenched us outside the physical world and into the supernatural. Some of us are spirits—open wounds that refuse to heal because our blood might be the one thing that cannot be stolen. Does resistance always feel like resistance, or does it sometimes feel like bleeding out (Berlant 2011)? Feral Socialities I must leave the beaten path and go where we are not. Queerness, according to Muñoz, is not yet here; it is an ideality that “we may never touch,” that propels us onward (2009, 1). Likewise, Halberstam suggests that the presentness of queerness signals a kind of emerging ontology. He argues that failure “is something that queers do and have always done exceptionally well in contrast to the grim scenarios of success” that structure “a heteronormative, capitalist society” (2011, 2-3). For Muñoz, queer failure is about “doing something that is missing in straight time’s always already flawed temporal mapping practice” (2009, 174). We know, however, that this isn’t the entire story. Whereas Muñoz’s queer past morphs into the here and now of homonormativity’s carceral tempos, indigeneity’s queernesses are saturated with the trauma of colonialism’s becoming-structure. Queer death doubles as the settler state’s condition of possibility. Pre-contact queer indigeneities had been absorbed into colonialism’s death grip; however, this making-dead was also a making-undead in the enduring of ghosts (Derrida 1994, 310). If haunting, according to Tuck and Ree, “lies precisely in its refusal to stop,” then the queer Indigenous poltergeist fails to have died by way of time travel (2013, 642). Queer indigeneity might be a kind of “feral sociality”: we are in a wild state after escaping colonial captivity and domestication. When the state evicts you, you might have to become feral to endure. To be feral is to linger in the back alleys of the settler state. It is a refusal of settler statecraft, a strategic failing to approximate the metrics of colonial citizenship, a giving up on the ethical future that reconciliation supposedly promises. As an aside, I suspect that the settler state’s reconciliatory ethos is always-already a domesticating project: it contains Indigenous suffering within the spectacularized theatre of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, building a post-Residential School temporality in which Indigenous peoples have been repaired through monetary reparations and storytelling. In the melodrama of reconciliation, the settler state wins its centuries-long war against Indian lawlessness by healing Indigenous peoples of the trauma that blocked them from becoming properly emotive citizens. Queer indigeneity, however, escapes discursive and affective concealment and therefore the category of the human itself, disturbing the binary clash between the living and nonliving by way of its un-humanity, a kind of “dead living” whereby flesh is animated through death. Perhaps we must become feral to imagine other space-times, to imagine other kinds of queerness. If settler colonialism incentivizes our collusion with the humanist enterprise of multiculturalism (and it does), what would it mean to refuse humanity and actualize other subject formations? In other words, how do the un-living live? Here, I want to propose the concept of “Indian time” to theorize the **temporality and liminality of queer indigeneity as it festers in the slippage** between near-death and the refusal to die. Indian time colloquially describes the regularity with which Indigenous peoples arrive late or are behind schedule. I appropriate this idiom to argue that the presentness of queer indigeneity is prefigured by an escape from and bringing forward of the past as well as a taking residence in the future. To be queer and Indigenous might mean to live outside time, to fall out of that form of affective life. **Indian time thus nullifies the normative temporality of settler colonialism** in which death is the telos of the human and being-in-death is an ontological fallacy. It connotes the conversion of queer indigeneity into non-living matter, into ephemera lurking in the shadows of the present, waiting, watching, and conspiring. Where Jasbir Puar argues that all things under the rubric of queer are always-already calculated into the state’s biopolitical mathematic, queer indigeneity cannot be held captive because it cannot be seen—we are still emerging in the social while simultaneously altering its substance (2012). If decolonization is, according to Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s reading of Frantz Fanon, an “unclean break from a colonial condition,” perhaps the queer Indigenous poltergeist is feral enough to will a decolonial world into a future that hails rather than expels its ghosts (2012, 20). The queer Indigenous poltergeist might have nothing else to lose.

#### Settler colonialism expropriates native bodies through a process of proletarianization and racialization grounds Traditional Western Labor movements necessitating an analysis of coloniality

Englert 20 [Sai Englert is a lecturer in the Institute for Area Studies. I work on political economy and development in the Middle East. July 20, 2020 “Settlers, Workers, and the Logic of Accumulation by Dispossession” <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659> ] //aaditg

An Alternative Reading: Settler Colonies and the Exploitation of the Native By focusing on an ideal form of settler colonialism, SCS directs much of its analytical focus to the Anglo-Saxon settler colonial world, in particular, to North America and Australia. There are important exceptions, including for example, the excellent collection edited by Elkins and Pedersen (2005), Saranillio’s (2013) focus on Asian settler colonisation, or the 2018 special issue of Settler Colonial Studies on Algeria (Barclay et al. 2018), but these remain outliers. The near absence of studies of South American or African settler colonies is striking, as has been remarked on by a host of different scholars including Kelley (2017), Vimalassery et al. (2016) and Speed (2017). These authors also make the connection between these silences and the identification of elimination as the specific characteristic of settler colonial regimes. Kelley (2017:269) points out that the African encounter with settler colonialism was primarily marked by exploitative processes. He demonstrates this not only through the case of enslaved African population, discussed above, but also through the centrality of exploitation in the case of settler colonialism in South Africa. He shows convincingly how, in the construction of white settler social relations in the country, “the expropriation of the native from the land was a fundamental objective, but so was proletarianization. They wanted the land and the labour, but not the people—that is to say, they sought to eliminate stable communities and their cultures of resistance”. The attempted elimination of collective peoplehood, Kelley shows, is here a political goal pursued through exploitation, unsettling the sharp division theorised by Wolfe and Veracini. Following a similar critique with a focus on South American settler regimes, Speed (2017:784) argues they have remained largely outside of the framework of SCS precisely because Spanish settlers did not either exploit or eliminate but did both, in different ways, depending on time and place. The issue of labour alongside that of land defines much of these experiences, as does indigenous labour resistance: “In places like Mexico and Central America, such labour regimes … were often the very mechanisms that dispossessed indigenous peoples of their lands, forcing them to labour in extractive undertakings on the very land that had been taken from them”. As these cases show, here are settler colonies that were deeply dependent on the labour of the indigenous population and although displacement and expropriation were definitely a central part of their modus vivendi, as was the undermining of collective indigenous claims over the land, so was the exploitation of their labour. Furthermore, as O’Brien (2017) points out, even within SCS’ favoured settings, such as North America, the overemphasis on elimination as foundational can have complicated consequences. She points out—alongside others discussed above—that an important distinction should be made between “logics” of political elimination and actual elimination. Failing to do so can overstate the power of settler regimes and fail to capture the ongoing importance of indigenous resistance. O’Brien (2017:254) instead argues that “Indigenous resistance to colonial power … continues to override the logic of elimination”. This critique is not only important in terms of understanding different forms of settler colonial regimes, but also in reflecting on processes of de-colonisation. It is striking, for example, that settler colonies based primarily on the exploitation of the indigenous population more often achieved their independence from both the settler state and the metropolis. Acknowledging this, Mamdani (2015:596) notes that “[f]or students of settler colonialism in the modern era, Africa and America represent two polar opposites. Africa is the continent where settler colonialism has been defeated; America is where settler colonialism triumphed”. While taking seriously the unfinished nature of this triumph, pointed out above, and the ongoing nature of indigenous resistance, the difference in outcomes so far can be accounted for through the different treatment by the settler colonial regimes of the indigenous populations. It was the very dependence of settler colonial regimes in Africa on native labour, which laid the foundation for their destruction. It was the ability of indigenous resistance movements in Algeria and Southern Africa to shut down the settler economy as well as challenge the colonial states militarily that made decolonisation possible.2 This is also a reality that settlers themselves understood. As Lockman (2012) argues, it was, in part, the example of resistance by indigenous labour in other settler colonial settings, in particular in South Africa, that convinced Labour Zionists in Palestine to reject a model based on the exploitation of the indigenous population and opt for its exclusion instead (see below). In fact, some scholars, such as Fieldhouse (1982) in hisThe Colonial Empires, made the existing variety of labour regimes central to the study of settler colonialism. He took the presence of settlers, and the establishment of European societies within the colonial territories, as the determining characteristics of “colonies of settlements” as opposed to “colonies of occupation”. Fieldhouse then divided settler colonies in three categories: “pure”, “mixed”, and “plantation” settlements, which denote, respectively, settler societies based on imported settler labour, those constructed around a significant but minoritarian settler population where indigenous labour continued to play a central role, and those where imported enslaved populations worked on plantations for small settler minorities. Importantly, Fieldhouse’s approach (and that of others after him, such as Shafir 1996) demonstrates the danger of supposing a hermetic separation between different models. Instead, settler colonies have a variety of different strategies at their disposal, which can include exploitation, elimination, or both. One strategy can morph into another through such processes as the development of new strategic necessities for the colonial powers, interactions with indigenous resistance, or changing economic relations with the metropolis. Fieldhouse (1982:181) shows how the French colonisation of Algeria started as a colony of occupation in the North of the country. It was only in response to the 1834 Algerian revolt that France annexed more of the country and established French settlements in an attempt to pacify the indigenous peoples. In South Africa, Fieldhouse (1982:188–189) argues that the interaction between Boer and British colonisation, indigenous resistance, and the discovery of precious metal and diamonds in the second half of the 19th century, changed the nature of the settler colonial enterprise from pure to mixed. The question of labour (and therefore exploitation) is then a crucial aspect in the organisation of settler colonialism. This is true both in terms of the relationship between the settler colonial power and the native populations, but also in terms of social relations within the settler colonial polity. In fact, the labour movement within settler colonies has often been at the forefront of the imposition of racial segregation through colour bars, limits on racialised migration, and “whites-only” policies. The reasons behind this tendency will be discussed in greater detail below, but for now it will suffice to point out that from the late-19th century onwards, white working class movements across the settler colonial world organised over the question of limiting, excluding, or containing the use of indigenous and/or racialised workers. They furthermore rebelled against the settler states, or united with indigenous workers for collective improvement to their labour rights. In the United States, white workers organised against the competition of African American workers in the aftermath of emancipation, as well as the barring of Chinese migration to California, which successfully passed into law in the late 19th century (see Day 2016; Karuka 2019). Similar campaigns where waged in both South Africa and Australia against the immigration of Asian workers in the early 20th century. In fact, the formation of the Australian Labour Party took place on the basis of taking the “white Australia” campaign into parliament (Hyslop 1999; Shafir 1996). Perhaps the most emblematic example of these labour campaigns for the exclusion of racialised workers is that for the colour bar in South Africa (and later for the imposition of Apartheid) by the white workers' movement. In a strange mixture of internationalist rhetoric and settler colonial racism the white miners in 1922 raised the slogan: “Workers of the World, Unite and Fight for a White South Africa” (Reddy 2016:101). In the case of the Zionist colonisation of Palestine, the labour movement even became the social actor behind which the entire settler polity united. As Shafir (1996) has shown, Zionist colonial strategy in Palestine transformed, under the leadership of the Labour Zionist movement in the early decades of the 20th century, from a settler colonial project based primarily on exploited Palestinian labour to one which emphasised their exclusion and reliance on “Hebrew labour” instead. The change was brought about by the campaigns led by the settler labour movement, colonial responses to Palestinian resistance, and the material problems faced by the Zionist movement in attempting to attract new settlers to Palestine. More will be said about this in the fifth section of this paper. For now it will suffice to point out that the Labour Zionist movement fought for this form of settler organisation against Palestinian workers as well as against settler bosses and their project for a settler economy based on the exploitation—not the elimination—of the natives. The guiding principle of this movement was that to make settlement effective Jewish workers needed to be granted higher wages and living standards, while indigenous workers needed to be excluded from the labour market all together. It is this logic of full separation, that Sayegh (2012:214), described as lying at the root of the Zionist project in Palestine: “[R]acial self-segregation, racial exclusiveness and racial supremacy”. A series of important points emerge from this alternative view of settler colonialism. Firstly, the exclusive Wolfe-an focus on elimination of the native as opposed to exploitation, although of central importance within some periods and locales of settler colonialism, does not allow one to develop an effective general axiomatic analysis of the settler colonial form and its social relations. Secondly, the racial organisation of labour—whether settler, enslaved, or indigenous—and the struggle over its organisation between settlers and indigenous populations, as well as between settlers themselves, are a crucial aspect of settler colonialism, both in its eliminatory and/or exploitative forms (on which more below). Thirdly, the participation of settler labour movements in the colonial project, particularly in the process of control and/or expulsion of racialised, enslaved, and/or indigenous population appears as a key characteristic across the settler colonial world.

**The alternative is to refuse the affirmative’s endorsement of settler political selfhood. This isn’t “reject the aff”—it’s a micro-political process that destabilizes the settler psyche by breaking down the coherence of settler colonialism built through repetition. Debate is an ethical affirmation of a certain ideology. Voting neg forces a confrontation of the genocidal settlement, destabilizing the settler subject—that comes prior to evaluating the settler truth claims of the aff.**

**Henderson 15** Henderson, Phil. (2015). Imagoed communities: the psychosocial space of settler colonialism. Settler Colonial Studies, 7(1), 40–56. doi:10.1080/2201473x.2015.1092194 // JPark//recut anop

At a distance, the duplicity here is quite strange. Lines are drowned, forests are cut, nets are stolen, because **settlers know reflexively that they have a right – duty even – to shape the vacant land according to their collective and individual needs.** Yet, the very things which they seek to remove should prove the falsity of terra nullius, as they evidence indigenous presence. **The settler subject is able to gloss the violence of his actions so easily, however, because he is ultimately the product of, and dependent upon, a series of power relations that actively disappear indigenous peoples as active sovereign bodies. Within the psychosocial order of settler sovereignty, supported by the settler imago, these acts are understood as progressive or represent an adherence to the law, and become *unreadable to the settler for what they are*: the latest in a series of dispossessive acts.** Destabilizing a dispossessive subject Not only does the concept of the spatial imago allow us to interrogate the formation of the settler as a subject, it also provides a powerful analytical tool to explain the extreme vitriolic reactions that indigenous peoples constantly face from settlers. Many point to racism as 10 P. HENDERSON Downloaded by [New York University] at 15:35 26 February 2016 the source of such reactions, and this is not without cause, as settlers have long imbibed a sense of racial and cultural superiority – particularly toward indigenous peoples. Despite these prejudices, however, Wolfe notes that the ‘primary motive’ of settler colonialism’s domination ‘is not race’ but ‘access to territory’. 63 **Thus, inasmuch as the settler colonial imago validates access to territory by occluding indigenous sovereignty, the ongoing presences on and claims to the land by indigenous peoples trouble the settler imago and induce panic in settler subjects. Facing assertive indigenous presences within settler colonial spaces, settlers must answer the legitimate charge that their daily life – in all its banality – is predicated upon the privileges produced by ongoing genocide. The jarring nature of such charges offers an irreconcilable challenge to settlers qua settlers.**64 **Should these charges become impossible to ignore, they threaten to explode the imago of settler colonialism, *which had hitherto operated within the settler psyche in a relatively smooth and benign manner*. This explosion is potentiated by the revelation of even a portion of the violence that is required to make settler life possible. If, for example, settlers are forced to see ‘their’ beach as a site of murder and ongoing colonization, it becomes more difficult to sustain it within the imaginary as a site of frivolity**.65 As Brown writes, in the ‘loss of horizons, order, and identity’ **the subject experiences a sense of enormous vulnerability**.66 Threatened with this ‘loss of containment’, the settler subject embarks down the road to psychosis.67 Thus, to parlay Brown’s thesis to the settler colonial context, the uncontrollable rage that indigenous presences induce within the settler is not evidence of the strength of settlers, but rather of a subject lashing out on the brink of its own dissolution. This panic – this rabid and insatiable anger – is always already at the core of the settler as a subject. As Lorenzo Veracini observes, the settler necessarily remains in a disposition of aggression ‘even after indigenous alterities have ceased to be threatening’. 68 **This disposition results from the precarity inherent in the maintenance of settler colonialism’s imago, wherein any and all indigenous presences threaten subjective dissolution of the settler as such**. Trapped in a Gordian Knot, the very thing that provides a balm to the settler subject – further development and entrenchment of the settler colonial imago – is also what panics the subject when it is inevitably contravened.69 **We might think of this as a process of hardening that leaves the imago brittle and more susceptible to breakage. Their desire to produce a firm imago means that settlers are also always already in a psychically defensive position – that is, the settler’s offensive position on occupied land is sustained through a defensive posture. For while settlers desire the total erasure of indigenous populations, the attendant desire to disappear their own identity as settlers necessitates the suppression of both desires, if the subject’s reliance on settler colonial power structure is to be psychically naturalized**. Settlers’ reactions to indigenous peoples fit, almost universally, with the two ego defense responses that Sigmund Freud observed. The first of these defenses is to attempt a complete conversion of the suppressed desire into a new idea. In settler colonial contexts, this requires averting attention from the violence of dispossession; as such, **settlers** often suggest that they **aim to create a ‘city on the hill’.** 70 Freud noted that the conversion defense mechanism does **suppress the anxiety-inducing desire**, but it also leads to ‘periodic hysterical outbursts’. Such is the case when settlers’ utopic visions are forced to confront the reality that the gentile community they imagine is founded in and perpetuates irredeemable suffering. A second type of defense is to channel the original desire’s energy into an obsession or a phobia. The effects of this defense are seen in the preoccupation that settler colonialism has with purity of blood or of community.71 As we have already seen, this obsession at once solidifies the power of the settler state, thereby naturalizing the settler and simultaneously perpetuating the processes of erasing indigenous peoples. **Psychic defenses are intended to secure the subject from pain, and whether that pain originates inside or outside the psyche is inconsequential.** Because of the threat that indigeneity presents to the phantasmatic wholeness of settler colonialism, settlers must always remain suspended in a state of arrested development between these defensive positions. **Despite any pretensions to the contrary, the settler is necessarily a parochial subject who continuously coils, reacts, disavows, and lashes out, when confronted with his dependency on indigenous peoples and their territory.** This psychic precarity exists at the core of the settler subject because of the unending fear of its own dissolution, should indigenous sovereignty be recognized.72 Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that **decolonization must include an analysis of the dominant ‘self-disciplining colonial subject’**. 73 However, as this discussion of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies must also examine and cultivate the ways in which settler subjects fail to be totally disciplined. Evidence of this incompletion is apparent in the subject’s arrested state of development. Discovering the instability at the core of the settler subject, indeed of all subjects, is the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from Rifkin’s. His phenomenology falls into the trap that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that of assuming a successful internalization of norms. From the psychoanalytical perspective, the ‘unconscious constantly reveals the “failure”’ of internalization.74 As we have seen, **within settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status**. Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. Thus, the process of subject formation is always in slippage and never totalized as others might suggest.75 Because of this precarity, **the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject in slippage also provides an avenue by which the process of settler colonialism can be subverted – creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider. Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to pursue what Paulette Regan calls a ‘restorying’ of settler colonial history and culture, to decanter settler mythologies built upon and within the dispossession of indigenous peoples.76 The cultivation of these cracks is a necessary part of decolonizing work, as it continues to panic and thus to destabilize settler subjects. Resistance to settler colonialism** does not occur only in highly visible moments like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake,77 it also **occurs in reiterative and disruptive practices, presences, and speech acts. Goeman correctly observes that the ‘repetitive practices of everyday life’ are what give settler spaces their meaning, as they provide a degree of naturalness to the settler imago and its psychic investments.**78 As such, **to disrupt the ease of these repetitions is at once to striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism and also to disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject.** Goeman calls these subversive acts the ‘**micro-politics of resistance’**, which historically 12 P. HENDERSON Downloaded by [New York University] at 15:35 26 February 2016 took the form of ‘moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties’ amongst other process.79 **These acts panic the subject that is disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This reveals to the settler, if only fleetingly, the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. While such practices may not overthrow the settler colonial system, they do subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples who refuse erasure. Today, we can draw similar inspiration from the variety of tactics used in movements like Idle No More. From flash mobs in major malls, to round dances that block city streets, and even projects to rename Toronto locations, Idle No More is engaged in a series of micro-political projects across Turtle Island**.80 The micro-politics of the movement strengthen indigenous subjects and their spatialities, while leaving an indelible imprint in the settler psyche. Predictably, rage and resentment were provoked in some settlers;81 however, **Idle No More also drew thousands of settler-allies into the streets and renewed conversations about the necessity of nation-to-nation relationships**. With settler colonial spaces disrupted and a relationship of domination made impossible to ignore, in the tradition of centuries of indigenous resistance, **Idle No More put the settler subject into serious flux once more.**

### 3

**Interpretation: Debaters must post links to all previous constructive speech docs read at the tournament at least 30 minutes prior to the round. To clarify, this means you must include all analytics, full text, underlining, and highlighting of all cards as read in round.**

**Violation – they don’t disclose highlgithing**

Graphical user interface, text, application, Word

Description automatically generated

**Standards –**

**1] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal framework justifications or cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs.**

**Antonucci 5** [Michael (Debate coach for Georgetown; former coach for Lexington High School); “[eDebate] open source? resp to Morris”; December 8; http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2005-December/064806.html //nick]

a. Open source systems are preferable to the various punishment proposals in circulation. It's better to share the wealth than limit production or participation. Various flavors of argument communism appeal to different people, but banning interesting or useful research(ers) seems like the most destructive solution possible. Indeed, open systems may be the only structural, rule-based answer to resource inequities. Every other proposal I've seen obviously fails at the level of enforcement. Revenue sharing (illegal), salary caps (unenforceable and possibly illegal) and personnel restrictions (circumvented faster than you can say 'information is fungible') don't work. This would - for better or worse. b. With the help of a middling competent archivist, an open source system would reduce entry barriers. This is especially true on the novice or JV level. Young teams could plausibly subsist entirely on a diet of scavenged arguments. A novice team might not wish to do so, but the option can't hurt. c. An open source system would fundamentally change the evidence economy **without targetting anyone** or putting anyone out of a job. It seems much smarter (and less bilious) to change the value of a professional card-cutter's work than send the KGB after specific counter-revolutionary teams.

**2] leads to higher quality engagement b/c I know exactly what the neg says which internal link turns the aff b/c it leads to net better discussion. This is especially true given that you did not disclose the offense of the NC—no way I can engage with it or contest it.**

**3] Evidence ethics – open sour4ce is the only way to verify before round that cards aren’t miscut – full text doesn’t solve since you could have highlighted unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t miscut ev.**

## Case

### disease

**They have no timeframe or anything for covid sparking war**

**2] No extinction from pandemics**

* Death rates as high as 50% didn’t collapse civilization
* Fossil fuel record caps risk at .1% per century
* health, sanitation, medicine, science, public health bodies, solve
* viruses can’t survive in all locations
* refugee populations like tribes, remote researchers, submarine crews, solve

**Ord 20** Ord, Toby. Toby David Godfrey Ord (born 18 July 1979) is an Australian philosopher. He founded Giving What We Can, an international society whose members pledge to donate at least 10% of their income to effective charities and is a key figure in the effective altruism movement, which promotes using reason and evidence to help the lives of others as much as possible.[3] He is a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, where his work is focused on existential risk. BA in Phil and Comp Sci from Melbourne, BPhil in Phil from Oxford, PhD in Phil from Oxford. The precipice: existential risk and the future of humanity. Hachette Books, 2020.

Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?10 The Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11 When Europeans reached the Americas in 1492, the two populations exposed each other to completely novel diseases. Over thousands of years each population had built up resistance to their own set of diseases, but were extremely susceptible to the others. The American peoples got by far the worse end of exchange, through diseases such as measles, influenza and especially smallpox. During the next hundred years a combination of invasion and disease took an immense toll—one whose scale may never be known, due to great uncertainty about the size of the pre-existing population. We can’t rule out the loss of more than 90 percent of the population of the Americas during that century, though the number could also be much lower.12 And it is very difficult to tease out how much of this should be attributed to war and occupation, rather than disease. As a rough upper bound, the Columbian exchange may have killed as many as 10 percent of the world’s people.13 Centuries later, the world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible. Near the end of the First World War, a devastating strain of influenza (known as the 1918 flu or Spanish Flu) spread to six continents, and even remote Pacific islands. At least a third of the world’s population were infected and 3 to 6 percent were killed.14 This death toll outstripped that of the First World War, and possibly both World Wars combined. Yet even events like these **fall short of being a threat to humanity’s** longterm potential.15 In the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover. The regional 25 to **50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization**. It changed the relative fortunes of empires, and may have altered the course of history substantially, but if anything, it gives us reason to believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death rates, even if they were global in scale. The 1918 flu pandemic was remarkable in having very little apparent effect on the world’s development despite its global reach. It looks like it was lost in the wake of the First World War, which despite a smaller death toll, seems to have had a much larger effect on the course of history.16 It is less clear what lesson to draw from the Columbian exchange due to our lack of good records and its mix of causes. Pandemics were clearly a part of what led to a regional collapse of civilization, but we don’t know whether this would have occurred had it not been for the accompanying violence and imperial rule. The strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the fossil record argument from Chapter 3. Extinction **risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with the evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted**. But this argument only works where the risk to humanity now is similar or lower than the longterm levels. For most risks this is clearly true, but not for pandemics. We have done many things to exacerbate the risk: some that could make pandemics more likely to occur, and some that could increase their damage. Thus even “natural” pandemics should be seen as a partly anthropogenic risk. Our population now is a thousand times greater than over most of human history, so there are vastly more opportunities for new human diseases to originate.17 And our farming practices have created vast numbers of animals living in unhealthy conditions within close proximity to humans. This increases the risk, as many major diseases originate in animals before crossing over to humans. Examples include HIV (chimpanzees), Ebola (bats), SARS (probably bats) and influenza (usually pigs or birds).18 Evidence suggests that diseases are crossing over into human populations from animals at an increasing rate.19 Modern civilization may also make it much easier for a pandemic to spread. The higher density of people living together in cities increases the number of people each of us may infect. Rapid long-distance transport greatly increases the distance pathogens can spread, reducing the degrees of separation between any two people. Moreover, we are no longer divided into isolated populations as we were for most of the last 10,000 years.20 Together these effects suggest that we might expect more new pandemics, for them to spread more quickly, and to reach a higher percentage of the world’s people. But we have also changed the world in ways that offer protection. We have a healthier population; improved sanitation and hygiene; preventative and curative medicine; and a scientific understanding of disease. Perhaps most importantly, we have **public health bodies** to

facilitate global communication and coordination in the face of new outbreaks. We have seen the benefits of this protection through the dramatic decline of endemic infectious disease over the last century (though we can’t be sure pandemics will obey the same trend). Finally, we have spread to a range of locations and environments **unprecedented** for any mammalian species. This offers special protection from extinction events, because it requires the pathogen to be able to flourish **in a vast range** of environments and to reach exceptionally **isolated populations** such as uncontacted tribes, Antarctic researchers and nuclear submarine crews. 21 It is hard to know whether these combined effects have increased or decreased the existential risk from pandemics. This uncertainty is ultimately bad news: we were previously sitting on a powerful argument that the risk was tiny; now we are not. But note that we are not merely interested in the direction of the change, but also in the size of the change. If we take the fossil record as evidence that the risk was less than one in 2,000 per century, then to reach 1 percent per century the pandemic risk would need to be at least 20 times larger. **This seems unlikely.** In my view, the fossil record still provides a strong case against there being a high extinction risk from “natural” pandemics. So most of the remaining existential risk would come from the threat of permanent collapse: a pandemic severe enough to collapse civilization globally, combined with civilization turning out to be hard to re-establish or bad luck in our attempts to do so.

### Growth

**Collapse inevitable**

**MacKenzie 8**. MacKenzie Debora is a scientific reporter citing Jared Diamond (prof of Geography at UC Los Angeles and Physiology PhD), Joseph Tainter (archaeologist at University of Utah and Anthropology PhD), Yaneer Bar-Yam (head of the New England Complex Systems Institute in Cambridge and Physics PhD), and Luis Bettencourt (Pritzker Director of the Mansueto Institute for Urban Innovation at the University of Chicago and statistical and high-energy physics models PhD) [“Are We Doomed, New Scientist,” 2008, EBSCO, Vol. 197, Issue 2650, p. 32-35]

DOOMSDAY. The end of civilisation. Literature and film abound with tales of plague, famine and wars which ravage the planet, leaving a few survivors scratching out a primitive existence amid the ruins. Every civilisation in history has collapsed, after all. Why should ours be any different? Doomsday scenarios typically feature a knockout blow: a massive asteroid, all-out nuclear war or a catastrophic pandemic. Yet there is another chilling possibility: what if the very nature of civilisation means that ours, like all the others, is destined to collapse sooner or later? A few researchers have been making such claims for years. Disturbingly, recent insights from fields such as complexity theory suggest that they are right. It appears that once a society develops beyond a certain level of complexity it becomes increasingly fragile. Eventually, it reaches a point at which even a relatively minor disturbance can bring everything crashing down. Some say we have already reached this point, and that it is time to start thinking about how we might manage collapse. Others insist it is not yet too late, and that we can - we must - act now to keep disaster at bay. History is not on our side. Think of Sumeria, of ancient Egypt and of the Maya. In his 2005 best-seller, **Jared Diamond of the University of California**, Los Angeles, blamed environmental mismanagement for the fall of the Mayan civilisation and others, and warned that we might be heading the same way unless we choose to stop destroying our environmental support systems. **Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute in Washington DC agrees**. He has that governments must pay more attention to vital environmental resources. "It's not about saving the planet. It's about saving civilisation," he says. Others think our problems run deeper. From the moment our ancestors started to settle down and build cities, we have had to find solutions to the problems that success brings. "For the past 10,000 years, **problem solving has produced increasing complexity** in human societies," **says Joseph Tainter**, **an archaeologist at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City**, and author of the 1988 book The Collapse of Complex Societies. If crops fail because rain is patchy, build irrigation canals. When they silt up, organise dredging crews. When the bigger crop yields lead to a bigger population, build more canals. When there are too many for ad hoc repairs, install a management bureaucracy, and tax people to pay for it. When they complain, invent tax inspectors and a system to record the sums paid. That much the Sumerians knew. Diminishing returns There is, however, a price to be paid. Every extra layer of organisation imposes a cost in terms of energy, the common currency of all human efforts, from building canals to educating scribes. And increasing complexity, Tainter realised, produces diminishing returns. The extra food produced by each extra hour of labour - or joule of **energy** invested per farmed hectare - **diminishes** as that investment mounts. We see the same thing today in a declining number of patents per dollar invested in research as that research investment mounts. This law of diminishing returns appears everywhere, Tainter says. To keep growing, societies must keep solving problems as they arise. Yet each problem solved means more complexity. Success generates a larger population, more kinds of specialists, more resources to manage, more information to juggle – and, ultimately, less bang for your buck. Eventually, says Tainter, the point is reached when all the energy and resources available to a society are required just to maintain its existing level of complexity. Then when the climate changes or barbarians invade, overstretched institutions break down and civil order collapses. What emerges is a less complex society, which is organised on a smaller scale or has been taken over by another group. Tainter sees diminishing returns as the underlying reason for the collapse of all ancient civilisations, from the early Chinese dynasties to the Greek city state of Mycenae. These civilisations relied on the solar energy that could be harvested from food, fodder and wood, and from wind. When this had been stretched to its limit, things fell apart. Western industrial civilisation has become bigger and more complex than any before it by exploiting new sources of energy, notably coal and oil, but these are limited. There are increasing signs of diminishing returns: the energy required to get is mounting and although global is still increasing, constant innovation is needed to cope with environmental degradation and evolving - the yield boosts per unit of investment in **innovation are shrinking**. "Since problems are inevitable," Tainter warns, "this process is in part ineluctable." Is Tainter right? **An analysis of complex systems has led Yaneer Bar-Yam**, **head of the New England Complex Systems Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts**, **to the same conclusion that Tainter reached from studying history**. Social organisations become steadily more complex as they are required to deal both with environmental problems and with challenges from neighbouring societies that are also becoming more complex, Bar-Yam says. This eventually leads to a fundamental shift in the way the society is organised. "To run a hierarchy, managers cannot be less complex than the system they are managing," Bar-Yam says. As complexity increases, societies add ever more layers of management but, ultimately in a hierarchy, one individual has to try and get their head around the whole thing, and this starts to become impossible. At that point, hierarchies give way to networks in which decision-making is distributed. We are at this point. This shift to decentralised networks has led to a widespread belief that modern society is more resilient than the old hierarchical systems. "I don't foresee a collapse in society because of increased complexity," says futurologist and industry consultant Ray Hammond. "Our strength is in our highly distributed decision making." This, he says, makes modern western societies more resilient than those like the old Soviet Union, in which decision making was centralised. Things are not that simple, says Thomas Homer-Dixon, a political scientist at the University of Toronto, Canada, and author of the 2006 book The Upside of Down. "Initially, increasing connectedness and diversity helps: if one village has a crop failure, it can get food from another village that didn't." As connections increase, though, networked systems become increasingly tightly coupled. This means the impacts of failures can propagate: the more closely those two villages come to depend on each other, the more both will suffer if either has a problem. **"Complexity leads to higher vulnerability** in some ways," says Bar-Yam. "This is not widely understood." The reason is that as networks become ever tighter, they start to transmit shocks rather than absorb them. "The intricate networks that tightly connect us together - and move people, materials, information, money and energy - amplify and transmit any shock," says Homer-Dixon. "A financial crisis, a terrorist attack or a disease outbreak has almost instant destabilising effects, from one side of the world to the other." For instance, in 2003 large areas of North America and Europe suffered when apparently insignificant nodes of their respective electricity grids failed. And this year China suffered a similar blackout after heavy snow hit power lines. Tightly coupled networks like these create the potential for propagating failure across many critical industries, says Charles Perrow of Yale University, a leading authority on industrial accidents and disasters. Credit crunch Perrow says interconnectedness in the global production system has now reached the point where "a breakdown anywhere increasingly means a breakdown everywhere". This is especially true of the world's financial systems, where the coupling is very tight. "Now we have a debt crisis with the biggest player, the US. The consequences could be enormous." "A networked society behaves like a multicellular organism," says Bar-Yam, "random damage is like lopping a chunk off a sheep." Whether or not the sheep survives depends on which chunk is lost. And while we are pretty sure which chunks a sheep needs, it isn't clear - it may not even be predictable - which chunks of our densely networked civilisation are critical, until it's too late. "When we do the analysis, almost any part is critical if you lose enough of it," says Bar-Yam. "Now that we can ask questions of such systems in more sophisticated ways, we are discovering that they can be very vulnerable. That means civilisation is very vulnerable." So what can we do? "The key issue is really whether we respond successfully in the face of the new vulnerabilities we have," Bar-Yam says. That means making sure our "global sheep" does not get injured in the first place - something that may be hard to guarantee as the climate shifts and the world's fuel and mineral resources dwindle. Scientists in other fields are also warning that complex systems are prone to collapse. Similar ideas have emerged from the study of natural cycles in ecosystems, based on the work of ecologist Buzz Holling, now at the University of Florida, Gainesville. Some ecosystems become steadily more complex over time: as a patch of new forest grows and matures, specialist species may replace more generalist species, biomass builds up and the trees, beetles and bacteria form an increasingly rigid and ever more tightly coupled system. "It becomes an extremely efficient system for remaining constant in the face of the normal range of conditions," says Homer-Dixon. But unusual conditions - an insect outbreak, fire or drought - can trigger dramatic changes as the impact cascades through the system. The end result may be the collapse of the old ecosystem and its replacement by a newer, simpler one. Globalisation is resulting in the same tight coupling and fine-tuning of our systems to a narrow range of conditions, he says. Redundancy is being systematically eliminated as companies maximise profits. Some products are produced by only one factory worldwide. Financially, it makes sense, as mass production maximises efficiency. Unfortunately, it also minimises resilience. "We need to be more selective about increasing the connectivity and speed of our critical systems," says Homer-Dixon. "Sometimes the costs outweigh the benefits." Is there an alternative? Could we heed these warnings and start carefully climbing back down the complexity ladder? Tainter knows of only one civilisation that managed to decline but not fall. "After the Byzantine empire lost most of its territory to the Arabs, they simplified their entire society. Cities mostly disappeared, literacy and numeracy declined, their economy became less monetised, and they switched from professional army to peasant militia." Pulling off the same trick will be harder for our more advanced society. Nevertheless, Homer-Dixon thinks we should be taking action now. "First, we need to encourage distributed and decentralised production of vital goods like energy and food," he says. "Second, we need to remember that slack isn't always waste. A manufacturing company with a large inventory may lose some money on warehousing, but it can keep running even if its suppliers are temporarily out of action." The electricity industry in the US has already started identifying hubs in the grid with no redundancy available and is putting some back in, Homer-Dixon points out. Governments could encourage other sectors to follow suit. The trouble is that in a world of fierce competition, private companies will always increase efficiency unless governments subsidise inefficiency in the public interest. Homer-Dixon doubts we can stave off collapse completely. He points to what he calls **"tectonic" stresses** that will shove our rigid, tightly coupled system outside the range of conditions it is becoming ever more finely tuned to. These include population growth, the growing divide between the world's rich and poor, financial instability, weapons proliferation, disappearing forests and fisheries, and climate change. In imposing new complex solutions we will run into the problem of diminishing returns - just as we are running out of cheap and plentiful energy. "This is the fundamental challenge humankind faces. We need to allow for the healthy breakdown in natural function in our societies in a way that doesn't produce catastrophic collapse, but instead leads to healthy renewal," Homer-Dixon says. This is what happens in forests, which are a patchy mix of old growth and newer areas created by disease or fire. If the ecosystem in one patch collapses, it is recolonised and renewed by younger forest elsewhere. We must allow partial breakdown here and there, followed by renewal, he says, rather than trying so hard to avert breakdown by increasing complexity that any resulting crisis is actually worse. Lester Brown thinks we are fast running out of time. "The world can no longer afford to waste a day. We need a Great Mobilisation, as we had in wartime," he says. "There has been tremendous progress in just the past few years. For the first time, I am starting to see how an alternative economy might emerge. But it's now a race between tipping points - which will come first, a switch to sustainable technology, or collapse?" Tainter is not convinced that even new technology will save civilisation in the long run. "I sometimes think of this as a 'faith-based' approach to the future," he says. Even a society reinvigorated by cheap new energy sources will eventually face the problem of diminishing returns once more. **Innovation** itself **might be subject to diminishing returns, or** perhaps absolute **limits**. **Studies of** the way **by Luis Bettencourt of the Los Alamos National Laboratory**, **New Mexico**, **support this idea**. His team's work suggests that an ever-faster rate of innovation is required to keep cities growing and prevent stagnation or collapse, and in the long run this cannot be sustainable.

**Growth causes extinction**

**Smith 14**. Richard Smith is an economic historian with a UCLA history PhD and systems science PhD. He has written on China, capitalism and the global environment and on related issues for New Left Review, Monthly Review, The Ecologist, the International Journal of Ecological Economics and Statistics, and Real-World Economics Review [“Green Capitalism: The God That Failed,” January 9th, <http://truth-out.org/news/item/21060-green-capitalism-the-god-that-failed>]

The results are in: **No amount of "green capitalism" will** be able to ensure the profound changes we must urgently make to **prevent** the **collapse** of civilization from the catastrophic impacts of global warming. The following is an updated version of an article that originally was published in the Real-World Economics Review. We consider Richard Smith's article foundational to understanding the world we live in. Given its length, several sittings or a printout may be required to complete reading. As soaring greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions drove global CO2 concentrations past 400 parts per million in May 2013, shell-shocked climate scientists warned that unless we urgently adopt "radical" measures to suppress GHG emissions (50 percent cuts in emissions by 2020, 90 percent by 2050) **we're headed for a**n average temperature **rise of** 3 degrees or **4 degrees** Celsius before the end of the century. Four degrees might not seem like much, but make no mistake: Such an increase will be catastrophic for our species and most others. Humans have never experienced a rise of 4 degrees in average temperatures. But our ancestors experienced a four-degree cooler world. That was during the last ice age, the Wisconsin Stage (26,000 to 13,300 years ago). At that time, there were two miles of ice on top of where I'm sitting right now in New York City. In a four-degree warmer world "Heat waves of undreamt-of-ferocity will scorch the Earth's surface as the climate becomes hotter than anything humans have ever experienced. ... There will be "no ice at either pole." "Global warming of this magnitude would leave the whole planet without ice for the first time in nearly 40 million years." Sea levels will rise 25 meters - submerging Florida, Bangladesh, New York, Washington DC, London, Shanghai, the coastlines and cities where nearly half the world's people presently live. Freshwater aquifiers will dry up; snow caps and glaciers will evaporate - and with them, the rivers that feed the billions of Asia, South America and California. The "wholesale **destruction of ecosystems"** will bring on the **collapse** of **agriculture** around much of the world. "Russia's harsh cold will be a distant memory" as "temperatures in Europe will resemble the Middle East. ... The Sahara will have crossed the Strait of Gibraltar and be working its way north into the heart of Spain and Portugal. ... With food supplies crashing, humanity's grip on its future will become ever more tentative." Yet long before the temperature increase hits four degrees, the melting will have begun thawingthepermafrost of the Arctic, releasingvast quantities ofmethane buried under the Arctic seas and the Siberian and North American tundra, accelerating GHG concentrations beyond any human power to stop runaway warming and sealing our fate as a species.(1) Yet paradoxically, most climate scientists and even most climate activists have yet to grapple with the implications of their science: namely that GHG **suppression** on the order of 90 percent in less than 40 years would **require** a radical across-the-board **economic contraction** in the developed industrialized countries, and economic contraction is incompatible with a stable capitalism. On this point, the Chamber of Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers would appear to be right and pro-growth, pro-market environmentalists wrong: Under capitalism, growth and jobs are more often than not at odds with environmental protection. There may be some win-wins here and there. But for the most part, given capitalism, imposing big cuts in greenhouse gas emissions means imposing big job cuts across industrialized economies around the world. That's why, regardless of protests, no capitalist government on the planet will accept mandatory cuts in GHG emissions. Since the Reagan Revolution of the 1980s, when environmentalists began to turn to the market, "green growth" theorists and proponents have argued au contraire that "jobs and environment are not opposed," that economic growth is compatible with emissions reduction, that carbon taxes and/or cap-and-trade schemes could suppress GHG emissions while "green jobs" in new tech, especially renewable energy, would offset lost jobs in fossil fuel industries. Their strategy has failed completely, yet this remains the dominant view of leading climate scientists, including James Hansen, and of most environmental organizations. All such market-based efforts are doomed to fail, and a sustainable economy is inconceivable without sweeping systemic economic change. The project of sustainable capitalism based on carbon taxes, green marketing, "dematerialization" and so forth was misconceived and doomed from the start because **maximizing profit and saving the planet are inherently in conflict** and cannot be systematically aligned even if, here and there, they might coincide for a moment. That's because under capitalism, **CEOs and corporate boards are not responsible** to society; they're **responsible to private shareholders**. CEOs can embrace environmentalism so long as this increases profits. But saving the world requires that the pursuit of profits be systematically subordinated to ecological concerns: For example, the science tells us that to save the humans, we have to drastically suppress fossil fuel consumption, even close down industries like coal. But no corporate board can sacrifice earnings, let alone put themselves out of business, just to save humanity, and no government can suppress fossil fuel industries because to do so would precipitate economic collapse. I claim that profit-maximization is an iron rule of capitalism, a rule that trumps all else, and this sets the limits to ecological reform - not the other way around, as green capitalism theorists had supposed. And contrary to green capitalism proponents, across the spectrum from resource extraction to manufacturing, the practical possibilities for "greening" and "dematerializing" production are severely limited. This means the only way to prevent overshoot and collapse is to enforce a massive economic contraction in the industrialized economies, retrenching production across a broad range of unnecessary, resource-hogging, wasteful and polluting industries, even virtually shutting down the worst. Yet this option is foreclosed under capitalism because this is not socialism: No one is promising new jobs to unemployed coal miners, oil drillers, automakers, airline pilots, chemists, plastic junk makers and others whose jobs would be lost because their industries would have to be retrenched - and unemployed workers don't pay taxes. So CEOs, workers and governments find that they all "need" to maximize growth, overconsumption, even pollution, to destroy their children's tomorrows to hang onto their jobs today. If they don't, the system falls into crisis, or worse. So we're all on board the TGV of ravenous and ever-growing plunder and pollution. As our locomotive races toward the cliff of ecological collapse, the only thoughts on the minds of our CEOs, capitalist economists, politicians and most labor leaders is how to stoke the locomotive to get us there faster. Corporations aren't necessarily evil. They just can't help themselves. They're doing what they're supposed to do for the benefit of their owners. But this means that, so long as the global economy is based on capitalism and private property and corporate property and competitive production for market, we're doomed to a collective social suicide - and no amount of tinkering with the market can brake the drive to global ecological collapse. **We can't shop** our way **to sustainability**, because the problems we face cannot be solved by individual choices in the marketplace. They require collective democratic control over the economy to prioritize the needs of society and the environment. And they require local, reigional, national and international economic planning to reorganize the economy and redeploy labor and resources to these ends. I conclude, therefore, that if humanity is to save itself, we have no choice but to overthrow capitalism and replace it with a democratically planned eco-socialist economy. I. SAVING THE EARTH FOR FUN AND PROFIT In rejecting the antigrowth "limits" approach of the first wave of environmentalism in the 1970s, the pro-market theoretical founders of pro-growth "green capitalism" in the 1980s and '90s, Paul Hawken, Lester Brown and Francis Cairncross, argued that green technology, green taxes, green labeling, eco-conscious shopping and the like could "align" profit-seeking with environmental goals, even "invert many fundamentals" of business practice such that "restoring the environment and making money become one and the same process."(2) This turn to the market was an expression of broader trends from the 1980s in which activists retreated from collective action to change society in favor of individualist approaches to trying to save the world by embracing market forces - "shopping our way to sustainability."(3) In the market mania of the Reagan-Clinton era, Herman Daly's plea for imposing "limits to growth" came to seem dated - like Birkenstocks and Bucky Fuller's geodesic dome houses. Many American environmentalists bought into the "doing well by doing good" message of green capitalism because there had never been much of a left or socialist presence in the American environmental movement beyond a small anarchist fringe, unlike Europe, where many if not most greens were also reds. So it was easy for American environmentalists to go with the market - and there were jobs. Protesting didn't pay the rent. Some became eco-entrepreneurs or signed on with one or another of the hundreds of new green businesses from organic foods to eco-travel to certifying lumber or fair trade coffee that sprang up in the '80s and '90s. Others connected with mainstream environmental NGOs like the Sierra Club to focus on petitioning and lobbying efforts. In these and other ways, through the '80s and '90s, protesting gradually gave way to lobbying and promoting green capitalism. "There is No Polite Way to Say That Business is Destroying the World" Of all the eco-futurist writers of the 1980s and ;90s, entrepreneur and "Natural Capitalism" guru Paul Hawken has probably been the most influential voice for eco-capitalism. Hailed by Inc. magazine as "the poet laureate of American capitalism," Hawken says he was inspired to pen his best seller, Ecology of Commerce (1993), when his company Smith & Hawken won the prestigious Environmental Stewardship Award from the Council on Economic Priorities in 1991. When George Plimpton presented the award to Smith & Hawken at New York's Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, Hawken says he "looked out over the sea of pearls and black ties, suddenly realizing two things: first, that my company did not deserve the award and, second, that no one else did either. What we had done was scratch the surface of the problem. ... But in the end, the impact on the environment was only marginally different than if we had done nothing at all. The recycled toner cartridges, the sustainably harvested woods, the replanted trees, the soy-based inks and the monetary gifts to nonprofits were all well and good, but basically we were in the junk mail business, selling products by catalog. All the recycling in the world would not change the fact that [this] is an energy-intensive endeavor that gulps down resources." For the reality, Hawken said, was that: Despite all this good work, we still must face a sobering fact. If every company on the planet were to adopt the best environmental practices of the "leading" companies - say, the Body Shop, Patagonia or 3M - the world would still be moving toward sure degradation and collapse. ... Quite simply, our business practices are destroying life on earth. Given current corporate practices, not one wildlife preserve, wilderness or indigenous culture will survive the global market economy. We know that **every natural system on the planet is disintegrating. The land, water, air and sea have** been functionally **transformed from life-supporting systems into repositories for waste**. There is no polite way to say that business is destroying the world. (4)

**Crisis is a catalyst for transition**

**Alperovitz et al 16**. Lionel R. Bauman Alperovitz is a Professor of Political Economy (PhD) at the University of Maryland, College Park Department of Government and Politics, former fellow of King's College, Cambridge, founding Fellow of the Harvard Institute of Politics, former Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, former Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution, served as a Legislative Director in the US House of Representatives and the US Senate and as a Special Assistant in the US Department of State Gar, with James Gustave Speth, Senior Fellow at The Democracy Collaborative, and is Co-Chair of The Next System Project, Ted Howard, President and Co-Founder of The Democracy Collaborative, and Joe Guinan, Executive Director of The Next System Project, Senior Fellow at The Democracy Collaborative [“Systemic Crisis and Systemic Change in the United States in the 21st Century,” 2016, *The Next System*, URL: <http://thenextsystem.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/NSPOberlin-final.pdf>, Accessed on 4/17/2018]//vikas

The good news is that **the inability of traditional politics and policies to address fundamental challenges has fueled an extraordinary amount of experimentation in communities** across the United States and around the world. It has also generated increasing numbers of sophisticated and thoughtful proposals that build from the bottom and begin to suggest new systemic possibilities beyond the failed systems of the past and present. **It is becoming possible to bring together and extend elements of innovative thinking and real world practice in key areas** to define the underlying structural building blocks of a range of alternatives capable **of rebuilding the basis for** democracy, liberty, equality, **sustainability**, and community in the United States in the twenty-first century. Unbeknownst to many, literally **thousands of on the ground efforts have been developing**. These include cooperatives, worker-owned companies, neighborhood corporations, and many little known municipal, state, and regional efforts. These **emerging economic alternatives suggest different ways in which capital can be held** in common **by small and large publics.** They include **nonprofit community corporations and land trusts that develop low income housing**, as well **as community development financial institutions** (CDFIs) that have over $108 billion in assets under their management.56 Employee ownership is also on the rise, involving three million more workers than are members of private sector unions. 57 A third of Americans belong to cooperatives, including credit unions that serve 107 million people and manage $1.3 trillion in assets, almost as much as is managed by Citi. 58 In the public sector, local government economic development programs invest in local businesses, while municipal enterprises build infrastructure and provide services, raising revenue and creating employment, diversifying the base of locally controlled capital. Public utilities, together with co-ops, make up nearly 90 percent of all electricity providers and generate over 20 percent of America’s electricity.59 From California to Alabama, public pension assets are being channeled into job creation and community development.60 Cities and states are looking to the creation of public banking systems like that of North Dakota. Trusts that allow for public ownership and management of natural resources provide revenue streams from capital, recalling the unjustly neglected ideas of James Meade.61 From parks and blood banks to libraries and the internet, commons management systems can provide an expanding zone of decommodification to buffer against the market. Public trusts can be extended into additional domains, from dry land to the electromagnetic spectrum, underwriting public services or issuing a citizen dividend. Community land trusts can ensure affordable housing and prevent disruptive gentrification and speculative real estate bubbles. New public strategies encompass both democratic public ownership and new planning capacities and functions. Even experts working on such matters rarely appreciate the sheer range of activity. Practical and policy foundations have been established that offer a solid basis for future expansion. A body of hard won expertise is now available in each area, along with support organizations, and technical and other experts who have accumulated a great deal of direct problem-solving knowledge. **The idea that we need a “new economy”**—that the entire economic system must be radically restructured if critical social and environmental goals are to be met—**runs directly counter to the American creed that capitalism as we know it is the best, and only possible, option.** Most of the new **projects, ideas, and research efforts have thus gained traction slowly and with little** national **attention. But in the wake of the financial crisis, they have proliferated and earned a surprising amount of support**—and not only among advocates on the left. New terms have begun to gain currency in diverse areas with activist groups and constituencies, an indication that the domination of traditional thinking may be starting to weaken. Thus we encounter the sharing economy, the caring economy, the provisioning economy, the restorative economy, the regenerative economy, the sustaining economy, the collaborative economy, the solidarity economy, the gift economy, the resilient economy, the steady state economy, the new economy, and many, many more. **There are calls for a Great Transition**, or for a reclamation of the Commons. **Creative thinking by researchers and engaged scholars is also contributing to the ferment, and policies at the state and local level can help move projects to much more powerful scale and community-wide impact**. Larger scale strategic options that build on what is being learned locally are beginning to be sketched as the basis for longer-term national strategies. The press covers very little of this, but the various institutional efforts have begun to develop new strategies that suggest broader possibilities for change. One promising model builds on work in Cleveland, Ohio, where a linked group of worker owned companies has developed, supported in part by the massive purchasing power of local hospitals and universities. These cooperative firms include a solar installation and weatherization company, an industrial scale ecologically advanced laundry, and a greenhouse capable of producing over three million heads of lettuce and 300,000 pounds of herbs a year.62 This effort, modeled in part on the 74,000-person Mondragón cooperative network in the Basque region of Spain, will create new businesses, as time goes on.63 However, its goal is not simply worker ownership, but the democratization of wealth and sustainable community building in general in an extremely poor neighborhood of what was once a thriving industrial city. Linked by a community-serving non-profit corporation and a revolving fund, the companies cannot be sold outside the network; they also return ten percent of their profits to help develop additional worker-owned firms and grow the network. Cities across the United States—and overseas as well—are looking to the Cleveland Model as an inspiration for their own community wealth building efforts. A critical element of the overall sustainability strategy points to what is essentially a quasi-public community stabilizing planning model. Hospitals and universities in the area currently spend $3 billion a year on goods and services—none, until recently, purchased from the immediately surrounding neighborhood. The Cleveland Model is supported in part by decisions of these substantially publicly financed institutions to allocate part of their procurement to the worker-coops in support of a larger community-building agenda. The taxpayer funds that support institutions of this kind thereby do double duty by helping to support the broader community through the new localized purchasing arrangements. The same is true for a range of municipal, state, and other federal policies available to local businesses, including employee-owned firms. Note carefully that such stabilization also undercuts the growth imperative—and suggests principles that can also be applied at higher levels. Such approaches cannot claim to provide all the answers. But a number of exploratory efforts emphasize fundamental changes in underlying political-economic institutions. **Developing detailed and sophisticated alternatives that can be refined over time is a prerequisite if we are to stimulate a serious and wide-ranging debate around a broader menu of institutional possibilities** for future development than the narrow range of choices commonly discussed. The need for a major change of direction is increasingly obvious. **Efforts to cobble together “solutions” to today’s challenges commonly draw upon the very same institutional arrangements and practices that gave rise to the problems in the first place. What is required is a self-conscious effort to face the fact that the system itself has to be changed and a different kind of political economy created.** Although precisely what “changing the system” means is obviously a matter of debate, certain key points are clear. The **new movements seek a cooperative, caring and community-nurturing economy that is ecologically sustainable, equitable, and socially responsible**—one that is based on rethinking and democratizing the nature of ownership at every level and, along with this, **challenging the growth paradigm that is the underlying assumption of all conventional policies.** In short, these **movements seek an economy that gives true priority to people, place, and planet.** Such an economy, so different from our own, requires a new vocabulary, beyond the narrow choice between “capitalism” and “socialism.” It’s easy to overestimate the possibilities. Emerging ideas and institutional explorations are limited compared with the power of Wall Street banks and the other corporate giants of the American economy. On the other hand, precisely because the existing structures of power have created enormous economic problems and fueled public anger, the opportunity for a more profound shift exists. **Unexpectedly rapid change is not out of the question.** We have already seen how, in moments of crisis, the nationalization of auto giants like General Motors and Chrysler can suddenly become a reality. Such crises are likely to be repeated in the future, possibly with more far reaching outcomes over time. **When the next financial breakdown occurs, huge injections of public money may well lead to the breakup or de facto takeover of major financial institutions.** At the same time, various forms of larger **institutional experimentation**—and pressure for further experimentation—**are also clearly in the cards.**