**1**

**Interpretation: the resolution should define the division of affirmative and negative ground. To clarify, the aff must defend a world where a just government recognizes an unconditional right to strike.**

**Resolved” means to enact by law.**

**Words & Phrases ’64**

(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved **by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”**.

**Just Government definition**

Dcauthers ND [“Types and Purpose of Government” https://dcauthers.tripod.com/politicalissues/id10.html]//aaditg

I. Characteristics of "Good" Government A. Justness: By justness, I mean three things. First, there is fairness. A just government is fair to all people that it governs. This includes not only the governed, but also the governors. Subjecting the governors to the same laws as the governed will help to ensure that no one group's interests are served at the expense of others. Contrast this to Plato and Aristotle who believed that legislators were above the law. B. Morality. The laws of a government should be moral, meaning that they do not violate our natural rights. According to John Locke, the natural rights are life, liberty, and the pursuit of property. I agree. Contrast this to Plato's form of government where censorship, community property and children, eugenics, and arranged marriages would all be common place. A just government must be truthful to its citizens. Contrast this to Plato's idea of medicinal lying. Plato contradicts himself by saying "a philosopher must love truthness, hate falsehood and not tolerate untruth in any form" But then he advocates medicinal lying by the rulers to the populace. Aristotle would have violated some of our liberties under his system, but he would have given us some liberties, such as private property. Many things are not moral, but to make laws banning them when they do not violate another person's liberty would be immoral. C. Honor. A just government gains honor by being fair, upholding the law strictly, and deriving its power from the consent of the governed. Contrast this to Plato's idea of elitism - government by a few select qualified or best people. Plato believed that philosophers must be kings. He denied that the common people had the ability to rule themselves. To Plato, these people were just tools to his end that was the perfect government. I would almost agree with Plato on his statement that philosophers must be kings by saying that philosophers should be kings. To rob the choice of the people whether or not they chose to be governed by a philosopher or not would be wrong. Aristotle rejected the idea of intellectual elitism, and instead chose to let the common people participate in some ways in government. This was a step towards democracy.

**Unconditional means absolute**

**Merriam Webster ND** [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unconditional] //aaditg

un·​con·​di·​tion·​al | \ ˌən-kən-ˈdish-nəl , -ˈdi-shə-nᵊl \

Definition of unconditional

1: not conditional or limited : ABSOLUTE, UNQUALIFIED

**Strike def**

Merriam Webster ND [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strike]//aaditg

: a work stoppage by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on an employer

b: a temporary stoppage of activities in protest against an act or condition

**Vote Neg:**

**[1] predictable limits – all negative strategy is premised off a stable reading of the resolution. The lack of a stable mechanism lets them radically re-contextualize their aff and erase neg ground via perms. Including their advocacy authorizes any methodology or orientation tangentially related to the topic, which renders research burdens untenable. That outweighs and precedes their offense – debate is a game that we’ve all chosen to participate in and requires effective negation. It makes no sense to skew a competitive activity in favor of one side. The frame for evaluating offense is that debate is a game and we’re all here to win – that means procedural questions come first.**

**[2] Movement Building –**

**a] Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis – that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims which eviscerates the decision-making potential of debate**

**Steinberg & Freeley, 13**

David Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA, officer, American Forensic Association and National Communication Association. Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League, Masters in Communication, and Austin, JD, Suffolk University, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, *Argumentation and Debate Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition

**Debate is a means of settling differences,** **so there must be a** difference of opinion or a **conflict of interest** before there can be a debate. **If everyone is in agreement** on a tact or value or policy, **there is no need for debate**: **the matter can be settled by unanimous consent**. Thus, for example, **it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"** because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (**Controversy is an essential prerequisite** of debate. **Where there is no clash of ideas**, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, **there is no debate**. In addition, **debate cannot produce effective decisions** **without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered**. For example, **general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration**. **How many** illegal immigrants **are in the United States?** What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? **Do they take job**s from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? **Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration** by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? **Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?** Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? **Should we build a wall on the Mexican border**, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? **Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question** **and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy**. To be discussed and resolved effectively, **controversies must be stated clearly**. **Vague understanding** **results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions**, frustration, and emotional distress, as **evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007**.**Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job!** They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." **Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations**, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, **but without a focus for their discussions**, **they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions.** **A gripe session would follow**. **But if a precise question is posed**—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—**then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up** **simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step**. **One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.** The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. **They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making** **by** directing and **placing limits on the decision** to be made, **the basis for argument should be clearly defined**. **If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument**. For example, **the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation**. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

**Although we now have a general subject**, we have not yet stated a problem. **It is still too broad**, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. **What sort of writing are we concerned with**—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? **What does "effectiveness" mean** in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" **The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition** such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. **This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation** of the controversy by advocates, **or** **that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.**

#### TVA –

#### [a] Read an aff about Asian workers being allowed to strike in the United States due to xenophobia and techoorientalism which is DESCRIBED in 1AC ev

#### [b] Read an aff about an Asian country like China. Proven by Elmer reading the aff about how the state of China hamrs workers and workers right which perpatues the factory robotic mchinlelke arguments in th 1AC

#### [c] Solvency deficits to the TVA are neg ground – it proves there’s a debate to be had

#### [d] SSD is good – it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it. This takes out 1AC framing 3 – you can critically engage w the rez as the aff, you j have to defend the topic – we havent’ forced you to defend it in a certain way which solves.

#### T first –

#### [1] T indicts your reading of the aff in the first place, so it’s an evaluative mechanism to adjudicating substance of the 1AC. It’s silly nonsensical to leverage the aff against T since it presupposes that the aff is being won.

#### [2] T is a question of jurisdiction- judges don’t have the jurisdiction to vote on a non-topical aff that hasn’t met the burden of proof of the resolution.

#### [3] Topic ed – we only have 2 months to talk about the topic, but we can learn about the K outside of debate

#### [4] Extra-topicality – even if the affirmative claims to advocate the resolution, they skirt discussion of its instrumental intent by arguing the benefits derived from their contextualized advocacy outweigh.

#### Drop the Debater – deters future abuse

#### Competing Interpretations -

#### [1] Reasonability causes a race to the bottom because debaters keep being barely reasonable

#### [2] reasonability collapses bc we debate ab the specified briteline anyway

**2**

**Indigeneity connotates a state of non-ontology allowing for the construction of the human that legitimizes its self into a history of elimination, jettisoned from or assimilated into the national body to cohere settler temporality**

**Belcourt 16**. Billy-Ray Belcourt is from the Driftpile Cree Nation. He is a 2016 Rhodes Scholar and is reading for an M.St. in Women’s Studies at the University of Oxford. He was named by CBC Books as one of six Indigenous writers to watch, and his poetry has been published or is forthcoming in Assaracus: A Journal of Gay Poetry, Red Rising Magazine, SAD Mag, mâmawi-âcimowak, PRISM International, and The Malahat Review. ("A POLTERGEIST MANIFESTO," 2016, *Feral Feminism*) vikas recut aaditg

Admittedly, the feral is a precarious space from which to theorize, sullied with an injurability bound up in the work of liberal humanism as such, an enterprise that weaponizes a set of moral barometers to distribute ferality unevenly to differently citizened and raced bodies—ones that are too close for comfort and must be pushed outside arm’s reach. Perhaps ferality traverses a **semantic line of flight commensurate­ with** that of **savagery, barbarism, and lawlessness**, concreting into one **history of elimination**: that is, a history of eliminating recalcitrant indigeneities incompatible within a supposedly hygienic social. The word savage comes from the Latin salvaticus, an alteration of silvaticus, meaning “wild,” literally “of the woods.” Of persons, it means “reckless, ungovernable” (“Savage”). In the space-time of settler states, savagery temporarily stands in for those **subjectivities tethered to a supposedly waning form of indigeneity**, one that came from the woods and, because of this, had to be **jettisoned from or assimilated into the national body**. Here is Audra Simpson on the history of Indian “lawlessness”: Its genealogy extends back to the earliest moments of recorded encounter, when Indians appeared to have no law, to be without order, and thus, to be in the colonizer’s most generous articulation of differentiation, in need of the trappings of civilization. “Law” may be one instrument of civilization, as a regulating technique of power that develops through the work upon a political body and a territory. (2014, 144) According to Simpson, the recognition of Indigenous peoples as lawless rendered them governable, motivating the settler state (here, Canada) to curate and thus contain atrophied indigeneities—and, consequently, their sovereignties, lands, and politics—within the borders of federal law (2014, 144-45). Similarly, in The Transit of Empire Jodi Byrd traces the epistemological gimmicks through which the concept of “Indianness” came to align with “the savage other” (2011, 27). For her, this alignment provided the “rationale for imperial domination” and continues to stalk philosophy’s patterns of thinking (ibid.). Simpson, writing about the Mohawks of Kahnawake, argues that “a fear of lawlessness” continues to haunt the colonial imaginary, thereby diminishing “Indigenous rights to trade and to act as sovereigns in their own territories” (2014, 145). We might take the following lyrics from the popular Disney film Pocahontas as an example of the ways indigeneity circulates as a feral signifier in colonial economies of meaning-making: [Ratcliffe] What can you expect From filthy little heathens? Their whole disgusting race is like a curse Their skin’s a hellish red They’re only good when dead They’re vermin, as I said And worse [English settlers] They’re savages! Savages! Barely even human. (Gabriel and Goldberg 1995) **Savagery connotes a state of non-ontology**: Indigenous peoples are forced to cling to a barely extant humanity and coterminously collapse into a putatively wretched form of animality. Savagery is lethal, and its Indian becomes the prehistoric alibi through which the human is constituted as such. Indigenous peoples have therefore labored to explain away this savagery, reifying whitened rubrics for proper citizenship and crafting a genre of life tangible within the scenes of living through that are constitutive of settler colonialism as such. These scenes, however, are dead set on destroying the remnants of that savagery, converting their casualties into morally compatible subjects deserving of rights and life in a multicultural state that stokes the liberal fantasy of life after racial trauma at the expense of decolonial flourishing itself. This paper is therefore interested in the subjectivities and forms of sociality that savagery destroys when applied from without, and the political work of appropriating that savagery in the name of decolonization. Ours is a form of indigeneity that hints at a fundamental pollutability that both confirms and threatens forms of ontology tethered to a taxonomized humanity built in that foundational episode of subjection of which Simpson speaks. I am suggesting that savagery always-already references an otherworld of sorts: there are forms of life abandoned outside modernity’s episteme whose expressivities surge with affects anomalous within the topography of settler colonialism. This paper is not a historicist or nostalgic attachment to a pre-savage indigeneity resurrected from a past somehow unscathed by the violence that left us in the thick of things in the first place. Instead, I emphasize the potentiality of ferality as a politics in a world bent on our destruction—a world that eliminates indigeneities too radical to collapse into a collective sensorium, training us to a live in an ordinary that the settler state needs to persist as such, one that only some will survive. This world incentivizes our collusion with a multicultural state instantiated through a myth of belonging that actively disavows difference in the name of that very difference. We are repeatedly hurried into a kind of waning sociality, the content and form of which appear both too familiar and not familiar enough. In short, we are habitually left scavenging for ways to go on without knowing what it is we want. Let’s consider Jack Halberstam’s thoughts on “the wild”: It is a tricky word to use but it is a concept that we cannot live without if we are to combat the conventional modes of rule that have synced social norms to economic practices and have created a world order where every form of disturbance is quickly folded back into quiet, where every ripple is quickly smoothed over, where every instance of eruption has been tamped down and turned into new evidence of the rightness of the status quo. (2013, 126) Where Halberstam finds disturbance, I find indigeneity-cum-disturbance par excellence. Halberstam’s “wild” evokes a potentiality laboured in the here and now and “an alternative to how we want to think about being” in and outside an authoritarian state (2013, 126-27). Perhaps the wild risks the decolonial, a geography of life-building that dreams up tomorrows whose referents are the fractured indigeneities struggling to survive a historical present built on our suffering. Ferality is a stepping stone to a future grounded in Indigenous peoples’ legal and political orders. This paper does not traffic in teleologies of the anarchic or lawless as they emerge in Western thought; instead, it refuses settler sovereignty and calls for forms of collective Indigenous life that are attuned to queerness’s wretched histories and future-making potentialities. Indigeneity is an ante-ontology of sorts: it is prior to and therefore disruptive of ontology. Indigeneity makes manifest residues or pockets of times, worlds, and subjectivities that warp both common sense and philosophy into falsities that fall short of completely explaining what is going on. **Indigenous life is truncated in the** biopolitical **category of Savage** in order to make our attachments to ourselves assimilable inside settler colonialism’s national sensorium. Settler colonialism purges excessive forms of indigeneity that trouble its rubrics for sensing out the human and the nonhuman. In other words, settler colonialism works up modes of being-in-the-world that narrate themselves as the only options we have. What would it mean, then, to persist in the space of savagery, exhausting the present and holding out for futures that are not obsessed with the proper boundary between human and nonhuman life? This paper now turns to the present, asking: what happens when indigeneity collides with queerness inside the reserve, and how might a feral theory make sense of that collision? Deadly Presents “I went through a really hard time… I was beaten; more than once. I was choked” (Klassen 2014). These were the words of Tyler-Alan Jacobs, a two-spirit man from the Squamish Nation, capturing at once the terror of queer life on the reserve and the hardening of time into a thing that slows down bodies and pushes them outside its securitized geographies. Jacobs had grown up with his attackers, attackers who were energized by the pronouncement of queerness—how it insisted on being noticed, how it insisted on being. When the dust settled, “his right eye [had] dislodged and the side of his faced [had] caved in” (ibid.). Settler colonialism is fundamentally affective: it takes hold of the body, makes it perspire, and wears it out. It converts flesh into pliable automations and people into grim reapers who must choose which lives are worth keeping in the world. It can turn a person into a murderer in a matter of seconds; it is an epistemic rupturing of our attachments to life, to each other, and to ourselves. It is as if settler colonialism were simultaneously a rescue and military operation, a holy war of sorts tasked with **exorcising the spectre of queer indigeneity and its putative infectivity**. I rehearse this case because it allows me to risk qualifying the reserve as a geography saturated with heteronormativity’s socialities. This is a strategic interdiction that destroys supposedly degenerative queer affect worlds, untangling some bodies and not others from the future. I don’t have the statistics to substantiate these claims, but there is an archive of heartbreak and loss that is easy to come by if you ask the right people. Indeed, what would such statistics tell us that we don’t already know? What would the biopolitical work of data collection do to a knowledge-making project that thinks outside the big worlds of Statistics and Demography and, instead, inside the smaller, more precarious worlds created in the wake of gossip? I worry about ethnographic projects that seek to account for things and theory in the material in order to map the coordinates of an aberration to anchor it and its voyeurs in the theatres of the academy. The desire to attach to a body is too easily energized by a biological reading of gender that repudiates the very subjects it seeks so desperately to know and to study. What about the body? I have been asked this question, again and again. A feral theory is something of a call to arms: abolish this sort of ethnography and turn to those emergent methodologies that might better make sense of the affects and life-forms that are just now coming into focus and have been destroyed or made invisible in the name of research itself. Queer indigeneity, to borrow Fred Moten’s description of blackness, might “come most clearly into relief, by way of its negation” (2014). Perhaps decolonization needs to be a sort of séance: an attempt to communicate with the dead, a collective rising-up from the reserve’s necropolis, a feral becoming-undead. Boyd and Thrush’s Phantom Past, Indigenous Presence thinks indigeneity and its shaky histories vis-à-vis the language of haunting, where haunting is an endurant facet of “the experience of colonialism” (Bodinger de Uriarte 2012, 303). But, for me, ghostliness is differentially distributed: some more than others will be wrenched into the domain of the dead and forced to will their own ontologies into the now. Perhaps the universalist notion that haunting is a metonym for indigeneity repudiates the very life-forms that it claims to include: those who are differently queered and gendered, and, because of this, haunt waywardly and in ways that cannot be easily predicted (Ahmed 2015). This paper thus takes an imaginative turn and proceeds with something of an incantation to summon the figure of the queer Indigenous poltergeist—the feral monster in the horror story of decolonization. Queer Indigenous poltergeists do not linger inaudibly in the background; we are beside ourselves with anger, we make loud noises and throw objects around because we are demanding retribution for homicide, unloved love, and cold shoulders. We do not reconcile; we escape the reserve, pillage and mangle the settler-colonial episteme. Our arrival is both uneventful and apocalyptic, a point of departure and an entry point for an ontology that corresponds with a future that has yet to come. Sometimes all we have is the promise of the future. For the queer Indigenous poltergeist, resurrection is its own form of decolonial love. The poltergeist is an ontological anomaly: a fusion of human, object, and ghost, a “creature of social reality” and a “creature of fiction” (Haraway 1991, 149). From the German poltern meaning “[to] make noise, [to] rattle” and Geist or “ghost,” it literally means “noisy ghost,” speaking into existence an anti-subjectivity that emerges in the aftermath of death or murder (“Poltergeist”). It is the subject of Tobe Hooper’s 1982 film Poltergeist, which tells a story of “a haunting based on revenge” (Tuck and Ree 2013, 652). The film’s haunting is a wronging premised on an initial wrong: the eponymous poltergeist materializes when a mansion is constructed on a cemetery—a disturbing of spirits, if you will. José Esteban Muñoz argues that “The double ontology of ghosts and ghostliness, the manner in which ghosts exist inside and out and traverse categorical distinctions, seems especially useful for… queer criticism” (2009, 46). In this paper, the poltergeist names the form which indigeneity takes when it brings queer matter into its folds. In other words, this essay evokes haunting as a metaphor to hint at the ways in which queerness was murderously absorbed into the past and prematurely expected to stay there as an effect of colonialism’s drive to eliminate all traces of sexualities and genders that wandered astray. The poltergeist conceptualizes the work of queer indigeneity in the present insofar as it does not presuppose the mysterious intentions of the ghost—an otherworldly force that is bad, good, and undetectable all at once. Instead, the poltergeist is melancholic in its grief, but also pissed off. It refuses to remain in the spiritual, a space cheapened in relation to the staunch materiality of the real, and one that, though housing our conditions of possibility, cannot contain all of us. We protest forms of cruel nostalgia that tether ghosts to a discarded past within which queer Indigenous life once flourished because we know that we will never get it back and that most of us likely never experienced it in the first place. We long for that kind of love, but we know it is hard to come by. I turn to the poltergeist because I don’t have anywhere else to go. Help me, I could say. But I won’t. Queer indigeneity, then, is neither here nor there, neither dead nor alive but, to use Judith Butler’s language, interminably spectral (2006, 33). We are ghosts that haunt the reserve in the event of resurrection. According to Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, a reserve is a “tract of land, the legal title to which is held by the Crown, set apart for the use and benefit of an Indian band” (“Terminology”). The “reserve system” is part of the dispossessory ethos through which the settler state reifies land as the sign of sovereignty itself, and thus effects the political death of indigeneity, decomposing it into nothingness, into contaminated dirt. Reserves are the products of imaginations gone wild; they are ruins that bear “the physical imprint of the supernatural” on arid land, on decaying trailers arranged like weathered tombstones (Tuck and Ree 2013, 653). They are borderlands that connote simultaneous possession and dispossession: they represent the collision between settler sovereignty (insofar as the Crown holds the legal title to the land) and indigeneity (pointing to a genre of life that is distinctly Indigenous). Reserves were—some might say they still are—zones of death that regulated and regulate the movements of Indigenous bodies, quarantining their putatively contaminated flesh outside modern life in order to preserve settler-colonial futurities. It is as if the reserve were a site of complete atrophy, where indigeneity is supposed to waste away or degenerate, where queerness has already bled out. Look at the blood on your hands! The queer Indigenous poltergeist, however, foregrounds what I call a “reserve consciousness” —an awareness of the deathliness of the reserve. A reserve consciousness might be a kind of critical phenomenology that, to use Lisa Guenther’s description of this sort of insurgent knowledge project, pulls up “traces of what is not quite or no longer there—that which has been rubbed out or consigned to invisibility” (2015): here, the so-called on-reserve Indian. It might be about becoming a frictive surface; by rubbing up against things and resisting motion between objects, we might become unstuck. Queer Indigenous poltergeists are what Sara Ahmed calls “blockage points”: where communication stops because we cannot get through (2011, 68). That is, queer indigeneity connotes an ethical impasse, a dead end that presents us with two options: exorcism or resurrection. If settler colonialism is topological, if it persists despite elastic deformations such as stretching and twisting, wear and tear, we might have to make friction to survive. I turn to the reserve because it is a geography of affect, one in which the heaviness of atmospheres crushes some bodies to death and in which some must bear the weight of settler colonialism more than others. The violence done to us has wrenched us outside the physical world and into the supernatural. Some of us are spirits—open wounds that refuse to heal because our blood might be the one thing that cannot be stolen. Does resistance always feel like resistance, or does it sometimes feel like bleeding out (Berlant 2011)? Feral Socialities I must leave the beaten path and go where we are not. Queerness, according to Muñoz, is not yet here; it is an ideality that “we may never touch,” that propels us onward (2009, 1). Likewise, Halberstam suggests that the presentness of queerness signals a kind of emerging ontology. He argues that failure “is something that queers do and have always done exceptionally well in contrast to the grim scenarios of success” that structure “a heteronormative, capitalist society” (2011, 2-3). For Muñoz, queer failure is about “doing something that is missing in straight time’s always already flawed temporal mapping practice” (2009, 174). We know, however, that this isn’t the entire story. Whereas Muñoz’s queer past morphs into the here and now of homonormativity’s carceral tempos, indigeneity’s queernesses are saturated with the trauma of colonialism’s becoming-structure. Queer death doubles as the settler state’s condition of possibility. Pre-contact queer indigeneities had been absorbed into colonialism’s death grip; however, this making-dead was also a making-undead in the enduring of ghosts (Derrida 1994, 310). If haunting, according to Tuck and Ree, “lies precisely in its refusal to stop,” then the queer Indigenous poltergeist fails to have died by way of time travel (2013, 642). Queer indigeneity might be a kind of “feral sociality”: we are in a wild state after escaping colonial captivity and domestication. When the state evicts you, you might have to become feral to endure. To be feral is to linger in the back alleys of the settler state. It is a refusal of settler statecraft, a strategic failing to approximate the metrics of colonial citizenship, a giving up on the ethical future that reconciliation supposedly promises. As an aside, I suspect that the settler state’s reconciliatory ethos is always-already a domesticating project: it contains Indigenous suffering within the spectacularized theatre of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, building a post-Residential School temporality in which Indigenous peoples have been repaired through monetary reparations and storytelling. In the melodrama of reconciliation, the settler state wins its centuries-long war against Indian lawlessness by healing Indigenous peoples of the trauma that blocked them from becoming properly emotive citizens. Queer indigeneity, however, escapes discursive and affective concealment and therefore the category of the human itself, disturbing the binary clash between the living and nonliving by way of its un-humanity, a kind of “dead living” whereby flesh is animated through death. Perhaps we must become feral to imagine other space-times, to imagine other kinds of queerness. If settler colonialism incentivizes our collusion with the humanist enterprise of multiculturalism (and it does), what would it mean to refuse humanity and actualize other subject formations? In other words, how do the un-living live? Here, I want to propose the concept of “Indian time” to theorize the **temporality and liminality of queer indigeneity as it festers in the slippage** between near-death and the refusal to die. Indian time colloquially describes the regularity with which Indigenous peoples arrive late or are behind schedule. I appropriate this idiom to argue that the presentness of queer indigeneity is prefigured by an escape from and bringing forward of the past as well as a taking residence in the future. To be queer and Indigenous might mean to live outside time, to fall out of that form of affective life. **Indian time thus nullifies the normative temporality of settler colonialism** in which death is the telos of the human and being-in-death is an ontological fallacy. It connotes the conversion of queer indigeneity into non-living matter, into ephemera lurking in the shadows of the present, waiting, watching, and conspiring. Where Jasbir Puar argues that all things under the rubric of queer are always-already calculated into the state’s biopolitical mathematic, queer indigeneity cannot be held captive because it cannot be seen—we are still emerging in the social while simultaneously altering its substance (2012). If decolonization is, according to Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s reading of Frantz Fanon, an “unclean break from a colonial condition,” perhaps the queer Indigenous poltergeist is feral enough to will a decolonial world into a future that hails rather than expels its ghosts (2012, 20). The queer Indigenous poltergeist might have nothing else to lose.

**Techno-orientalism is reliant and constitutive of settler colonialism – turns case because the aff serves to reproduce itself**

**Arvin 18** [Maile Arvin Dr. Maile Arvin is an assistant professor of History and Gender Studies at the University of Utah. She is a Native Hawaiian feminist scholar who works on issues of race, gender, science and colonialism in Hawai‘i and the broader Pacific. At the University of Utah, she is part of the leadership of the Pacific Islands Studies Initiative, which was awarded a Mellon Foundation grant to support ongoing efforts to develop Pacific Islands Studies curriculum, programming and student recruitment and support. “Polynesia Is a Project, Not a Place : Polynesian Proximities to Whiteness in Cloud Atlas and Beyond” 2018 <https://laulima.hawaii.edu/access/content/user/kfrench/sociology/Family_Text/SOC%20214/Beyond%20Ethnicity%20Hawaii/Chapter_1_Polynesia%20is%20a%20Project%2C%20not%20a%20place.pdf> ] // aaditg

SETTLER COLONIALISM MEETS TECHNO-ORIENTALISM ON THE PACIFIC RIM In addition to those about Polynesians transcending race (in my analysis, being possessed by Whiteness), another troubling narrative in Cloud Atlas is the story of Sonmi, a female cyborg-slave played by Korean actress Doona Bae in a fastfood restaurant in Neo-Seoul. Her political awakening and escape, aided by an underground revolutionary network, leads her to become a prophetess and martyr for the cause of cyborg abolition. Although not set directly in the Pacific Islands, a key subplot links the stories: namely, Sonmi becomes a goddess that future Pacific Islanders worship. Thus, the Sonmi narrative’s inclusion in Cloud Atlas is suggestive of some of the ways that **Orientalism and settler colonialism are embedded in each other and mutually constitutive**. Considering the Asia Pacific pivot military strategy of the United States, the so-called Pacific Rim and the often-overlooked Pacific Islands are tightly enmeshed. At work in the Sonmi narrative is a familiar form of Orientalism often found in science fiction, what David Morley and Kevin Robins have termed technoOrientalism. 59 In their formulation, techno-Orientalism ties older forms of Orientalism, in which the East is an exotic and excluded Other from the West, to fears about Asia’s seeming technological, and increasingly economic, superiority. 60 Where Morley and Robins relate techno-Orientalism to the rise of Japan in the 1980s and the overwhelming postmodern and decentered metropolis of Tokyo in movies such as Blade Runner, other scholars, including Aimee Bahng, have shown how techno-Orientalism continues to move and reemerge in places like Singapore, which markets itself as a future hub of finance, biotechnology, and engineering. 61 Cloud Atlas locates the Sonmi story in a future South Korea but differs little from these other articulations of techno-Orientalism. In all articulations, the “future is technological,” and thus the future is Asian, “a future that seems to be transcending and displacing western modernity.” Morley and Robins note that “**The association of technology and Japaneseness now serves to reinforce the image of a culture that is cold, impersonal and machine-like, an authoritarian culture lacking emotional connection to the rest of the world.”** 62 In line with such techno-Orientalism, Cloud Atlas places Sonmi as a nearly indistinguishable cog in a cold, machine-filled, authoritarian Orient. Sonmi’s realization of her true humanity—that she has emotions and deserves to live outside the indignities and sexual exploitation of the restaurant she is trapped in—leads her to become the figurehead and martyr of the cyborg and allied human revolution. This narrative then operates as a cautionary tale about the consequences of allying with a rising, authoritarian Asia instead of the original capitalists, the West, who are equally rapacious but, this story seems to indicate, fundamentally more caring and more human. Neo-Seoul is presented as a doomed enterprise that will never eliminate the true human spirit, which audiences will recognize as a uniquely individualistic American spirit. Though Sonmi is represented as a Korean cyborg, her femininity and the love story interwoven with her escape and martyrdom make her an appropriate sexual object of Western audiences, and her belief in democracy and freedom bestows upon her a kind of honorary Whiteness. The reemergence of Sonmi in the Pacific Islander story of Zachry uses the **narrative of Western freedom as always triumphant over Oriental authoritarianism to further instruct audiences to view the Pacific as naturally aligned with the West rather than the East.** Revealing a towering statue of Sonmi at the summit of a volcano on Zachry’s island, the movie suggests that Pacific Islanders were tricked into superstitiously believing that Sonmi was a goddess when she was really just a cyborg. When Halle Barry’s character Meronym explains this to Zachry, one possible implication is that his Pacific Islander people are mistaken for believing in an Oriental future, rather than a Western one. Sonmi’s true spirit, after all, was a Western one, which modern people may admire but do not worship in such a Native or Oriental fashion. In any case, Meronym highlights that the admiration for Sonmi among Zachry’s people should be for her Western traits of a strong belief in freedom and democracy. Considering the juxtaposition of Neo-Seoul against the future Big Island of Zachry’s narrative, we can also see the Pacific Islands as operating directly as an antidote to the overwhelming, post-apocalyptical metropolis of Asian countries. The Big Island is visually portrayed as empty of any markers of modern life, inhabited primarily by goat herders who live in shacks and the roaming savages who prey on the goat herders. Here again, the two types of Polynesian noted by Louis Sullivan, as discussed earlier, **emerge to represent rustic but innocent Whiteness on the one hand, and barbaric savagery that must be eradicated in the name of that innocence on the other hand**. Where Neo-Seoul is overwhelmingly disorienting, the Big Island is still pristine, even in the distant future when the rest of the world is destroyed. **The Pacific is the place where the West survives the East; it is a safer, experimental Orient that reorients the hegemony of the West. In this story, settler colonialism is the salve of a failed imperial contest, as the successful settlement of the Pacific Islands will allow the West to rise again and last beyond the boom and busts of Asia**. Thus, we must recognize that **stories that are techno-Orientalist also often depend on naturalizing settler colonialism in the Pacific and present occupation of the welcoming feminine Pacific as a solution to threats from the technological advances of the Asian metropolis.** More specifically, the presence of Sonmi as a Pacific Islander goddess also naturalizes the presence of Asians in the Pacific, rather than situating that presence as historical and political. **Asian settler colonialism**, a field of scholarship that has grown in recent years**, attempts to reframe such naturalized Asian and Asian American relationships to land in Hawai‘i.** Although Asian settler colonialism has existed as a concept since at least the 1990s, stemming from Haunani-Kay Trask’s insistence that Asian Americans in Hawai‘i are settlers rather than immigrants, the project has more recently coalesced with the 2008 publication of the volume Asian Settler Colonialism, 63 The contributors to the volume identify themselves as Asian settler scholars who are committed to respectfully confronting the ways that Asian Americans living in Hawai‘i have long erased Native Hawaiian claims to land and sovereignty. In contrast to histories that laud the first generations of Japanese and Chinese plantation workers as the foundation for the contemporary Asian American middle class in Hawai‘i, these scholars seek to reposition themselves and their communities outside U.S. national frames and within a squarely settler colonial one. 64 Although criticism of the term “Asian settler” has denounced the potential for lumping Asians and Asian Americans along with White settlers into a category starkly opposed to Native Hawaiians, the Asian settler scholars of the volume repeatedly position their critiques as ones that do not seek to reproach Asian Americans in Hawai‘i for their presence there but rather to challenge Asian affiliations with the American nation-state. In other words, Asian settler colonialism reminds everyone (to recall Edouard Glissant and Dean Saranillio’s words) that America is a project, not a place, not only in Hawai‘i but also in Alaska, the continent, and other outposts of American empire. What does recognizing America “as a project, not a place” mean for intervening into settler colonialism and possessive forms of Whiteness in the Pacific? For Asian settler colonialism, it means asking for Asian settlers to disavow the project, not the place, and for the place to be recognized as Hawai‘i nei, not America, and not a U.S. state. Here, I understand the discourse of Asian settler colonialism as one that dovetails with Victor Bascara’s theorizing of model minority imperialism. Bascara reminds us that critiques of the Asian American model minority stereotype are also critiques of U.S. imperialism. **Rather than an effort to name and divide populations into settlers and indigenes, Asian settler colonialism is a critique of, as Bascara says, the use of “the success stories of Asian Americans” to erase both the conditions of empire that involved Asians in the racial-capitalist project of America and to mask the “new terms of empire” under the more recent names of multiculturalism and globalization.** 65 To be sure, Asian settler scholars are not interested in dishonoring “the struggles of their grandparents and greatgrandparents, the early Asian settler laborers who demonstrated tremendous courage and resourcefulness,” only in reclaiming their stories within narratives Fojas, C., Guevarra, R. P., & Sharma, N. T. (Eds.). (2018). Beyond ethnicity : New politics of race in hawai'i. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from wcc-ebooks on 2019-10-08 20:28:20. Copyright © 2018. University of Hawaii Press. All rights reserved. that do not valorize the settler colonial project of America. 66 In a similar vein, Asian American writer Dennis Kawaharada writes about the need for all residents of Hawai‘i to educate themselves about Hawaiian language and culture, rather than assume that the plantation experience and pidgin language that developed on the plantations reflects everyone’s experience. He points to the work of Native Hawaiian poet Dana Naone Hall to remind his readers that, for many Native Hawaiians, “identity is rooted not in the plantation experience, but in the mythic world of nature and ancestral gods,” where “K nehekili / flashes in the sky / and Moanonuikalehua changes / from a beautiful woman / into a lehua tree / at the sound of the pahu.” Kawaharada further points out that resistance on the part of Asian American residents of Hawai‘i to learning more about Hawaiian culture and history often stems from “the hurt and rejection they feel when they discover they cannot become Hawaiian by moving here or living here, which they believe is their right as Americans, based on the cultural myth that a person is free to be anything he or she wants to be.” 67 Kawaharada’s work points out though both Asians and Native Hawaiians were crucially part of the material to be “melted” in the American melting pot image of Hawai‘i, both would assimilate and effectively disappear into Whiteness. Rather than transferring the privileges and property of Whiteness to Asians and Native Hawaiians, this logic simply strengthened the structure of Whiteness and White supremacy, allowing White American settlers to be understood as the natural leaders and owners of Hawai‘i. Asian American proximity to Whiteness thus notably works similarly to Native Hawaiian proximity to Whiteness. The model minority myth, Bascara writes, trotted Asian Americans out as, in the language of Aiiieeee!, “miracle synthetic white people.” 68 Not being able to assume that synthetic Whiteness in any secure, consistent way, however, puts Asian Americans in a similar if incommensurable position to Native Hawaiians in respect to Whiteness: each is engaged in the project of America by being possessed through Whiteness, but is not extended the possession of Whiteness.

**The alternative is to refuse the affirmative’s endorsement of settler political selfhood. This isn’t “reject the aff”—it’s a micro-political process that destabilizes the settler psyche by breaking down the coherence of settler colonialism built through repetition. Debate is an ethical affirmation of a certain ideology. Voting neg forces a confrontation of the genocidal settlement, destabilizing the settler subject—that comes prior to evaluating the settler truth claims of the aff.**

**Henderson 15** Henderson, Phil. (2015). Imagoed communities: the psychosocial space of settler colonialism. Settler Colonial Studies, 7(1), 40–56. doi:10.1080/2201473x.2015.1092194 // JPark//recut anop

At a distance, the duplicity here is quite strange. Lines are drowned, forests are cut, nets are stolen, because **settlers know reflexively that they have a right – duty even – to shape the vacant land according to their collective and individual needs.** Yet, the very things which they seek to remove should prove the falsity of terra nullius, as they evidence indigenous presence. **The settler subject is able to gloss the violence of his actions so easily, however, because he is ultimately the product of, and dependent upon, a series of power relations that actively disappear indigenous peoples as active sovereign bodies. Within the psychosocial order of settler sovereignty, supported by the settler imago, these acts are understood as progressive or represent an adherence to the law, and become *unreadable to the settler for what they are*: the latest in a series of dispossessive acts.** Destabilizing a dispossessive subject Not only does the concept of the spatial imago allow us to interrogate the formation of the settler as a subject, it also provides a powerful analytical tool to explain the extreme vitriolic reactions that indigenous peoples constantly face from settlers. Many point to racism as 10 P. HENDERSON Downloaded by [New York University] at 15:35 26 February 2016 the source of such reactions, and this is not without cause, as settlers have long imbibed a sense of racial and cultural superiority – particularly toward indigenous peoples. Despite these prejudices, however, Wolfe notes that the ‘primary motive’ of settler colonialism’s domination ‘is not race’ but ‘access to territory’. 63 **Thus, inasmuch as the settler colonial imago validates access to territory by occluding indigenous sovereignty, the ongoing presences on and claims to the land by indigenous peoples trouble the settler imago and induce panic in settler subjects. Facing assertive indigenous presences within settler colonial spaces, settlers must answer the legitimate charge that their daily life – in all its banality – is predicated upon the privileges produced by ongoing genocide. The jarring nature of such charges offers an irreconcilable challenge to settlers qua settlers.**64 **Should these charges become impossible to ignore, they threaten to explode the imago of settler colonialism, *which had hitherto operated within the settler psyche in a relatively smooth and benign manner*. This explosion is potentiated by the revelation of even a portion of the violence that is required to make settler life possible. If, for example, settlers are forced to see ‘their’ beach as a site of murder and ongoing colonization, it becomes more difficult to sustain it within the imaginary as a site of frivolity**.65 As Brown writes, in the ‘loss of horizons, order, and identity’ **the subject experiences a sense of enormous vulnerability**.66 Threatened with this ‘loss of containment’, the settler subject embarks down the road to psychosis.67 Thus, to parlay Brown’s thesis to the settler colonial context, the uncontrollable rage that indigenous presences induce within the settler is not evidence of the strength of settlers, but rather of a subject lashing out on the brink of its own dissolution. This panic – this rabid and insatiable anger – is always already at the core of the settler as a subject. As Lorenzo Veracini observes, the settler necessarily remains in a disposition of aggression ‘even after indigenous alterities have ceased to be threatening’. 68 **This disposition results from the precarity inherent in the maintenance of settler colonialism’s imago, wherein any and all indigenous presences threaten subjective dissolution of the settler as such**. Trapped in a Gordian Knot, the very thing that provides a balm to the settler subject – further development and entrenchment of the settler colonial imago – is also what panics the subject when it is inevitably contravened.69 **We might think of this as a process of hardening that leaves the imago brittle and more susceptible to breakage. Their desire to produce a firm imago means that settlers are also always already in a psychically defensive position – that is, the settler’s offensive position on occupied land is sustained through a defensive posture. For while settlers desire the total erasure of indigenous populations, the attendant desire to disappear their own identity as settlers necessitates the suppression of both desires, if the subject’s reliance on settler colonial power structure is to be psychically naturalized**. Settlers’ reactions to indigenous peoples fit, almost universally, with the two ego defense responses that Sigmund Freud observed. The first of these defenses is to attempt a complete conversion of the suppressed desire into a new idea. In settler colonial contexts, this requires averting attention from the violence of dispossession; as such, **settlers** often suggest that they **aim to create a ‘city on the hill’.** 70 Freud noted that the conversion defense mechanism does **suppress the anxiety-inducing desire**, but it also leads to ‘periodic hysterical outbursts’. Such is the case when settlers’ utopic visions are forced to confront the reality that the gentile community they imagine is founded in and perpetuates irredeemable suffering. A second type of defense is to channel the original desire’s energy into an obsession or a phobia. The effects of this defense are seen in the preoccupation that settler colonialism has with purity of blood or of community.71 As we have already seen, this obsession at once solidifies the power of the settler state, thereby naturalizing the settler and simultaneously perpetuating the processes of erasing indigenous peoples. **Psychic defenses are intended to secure the subject from pain, and whether that pain originates inside or outside the psyche is inconsequential.** Because of the threat that indigeneity presents to the phantasmatic wholeness of settler colonialism, settlers must always remain suspended in a state of arrested development between these defensive positions. **Despite any pretensions to the contrary, the settler is necessarily a parochial subject who continuously coils, reacts, disavows, and lashes out, when confronted with his dependency on indigenous peoples and their territory.** This psychic precarity exists at the core of the settler subject because of the unending fear of its own dissolution, should indigenous sovereignty be recognized.72 Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that **decolonization must include an analysis of the dominant ‘self-disciplining colonial subject’**. 73 However, as this discussion of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies must also examine and cultivate the ways in which settler subjects fail to be totally disciplined. Evidence of this incompletion is apparent in the subject’s arrested state of development. Discovering the instability at the core of the settler subject, indeed of all subjects, is the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from Rifkin’s. His phenomenology falls into the trap that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that of assuming a successful internalization of norms. From the psychoanalytical perspective, the ‘unconscious constantly reveals the “failure”’ of internalization.74 As we have seen, **within settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status**. Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. Thus, the process of subject formation is always in slippage and never totalized as others might suggest.75 Because of this precarity, **the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject in slippage also provides an avenue by which the process of settler colonialism can be subverted – creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider. Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to pursue what Paulette Regan calls a ‘restorying’ of settler colonial history and culture, to decanter settler mythologies built upon and within the dispossession of indigenous peoples.76 The cultivation of these cracks is a necessary part of decolonizing work, as it continues to panic and thus to destabilize settler subjects. Resistance to settler colonialism** does not occur only in highly visible moments like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake,77 it also **occurs in reiterative and disruptive practices, presences, and speech acts. Goeman correctly observes that the ‘repetitive practices of everyday life’ are what give settler spaces their meaning, as they provide a degree of naturalness to the settler imago and its psychic investments.**78 As such, **to disrupt the ease of these repetitions is at once to striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism and also to disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject.** Goeman calls these subversive acts the ‘**micro-politics of resistance’**, which historically 12 P. HENDERSON Downloaded by [New York University] at 15:35 26 February 2016 took the form of ‘moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties’ amongst other process.79 **These acts panic the subject that is disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This reveals to the settler, if only fleetingly, the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. While such practices may not overthrow the settler colonial system, they do subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples who refuse erasure. Today, we can draw similar inspiration from the variety of tactics used in movements like Idle No More. From flash mobs in major malls, to round dances that block city streets, and even projects to rename Toronto locations, Idle No More is engaged in a series of micro-political projects across Turtle Island**.80 The micro-politics of the movement strengthen indigenous subjects and their spatialities, while leaving an indelible imprint in the settler psyche. Predictably, rage and resentment were provoked in some settlers;81 however, **Idle No More also drew thousands of settler-allies into the streets and renewed conversations about the necessity of nation-to-nation relationships**. With settler colonial spaces disrupted and a relationship of domination made impossible to ignore, in the tradition of centuries of indigenous resistance, **Idle No More put the settler subject into serious flux once more.**

**3**

**Interpretation: Debaters must post links to all previous constructive speech docs read at the tournament at least 30 minutes prior to the round. To clarify, this means you must include all analytics, full text, underlining, and highlighting of all cards as read in round.**

**Violation –**

A screenshot of a computer

Description automatically generated

**Standards –**

**1] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal framework justifications or cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs.**

**Antonucci 5** [Michael (Debate coach for Georgetown; former coach for Lexington High School); “[eDebate] open source? resp to Morris”; December 8; http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2005-December/064806.html //nick]

a. Open source systems are preferable to the various punishment proposals in circulation. It's better to share the wealth than limit production or participation. Various flavors of argument communism appeal to different people, but banning interesting or useful research(ers) seems like the most destructive solution possible. Indeed, open systems may be the only structural, rule-based answer to resource inequities. Every other proposal I've seen obviously fails at the level of enforcement. Revenue sharing (illegal), salary caps (unenforceable and possibly illegal) and personnel restrictions (circumvented faster than you can say 'information is fungible') don't work. This would - for better or worse. b. With the help of a middling competent archivist, an open source system would reduce entry barriers. This is especially true on the novice or JV level. Young teams could plausibly subsist entirely on a diet of scavenged arguments. A novice team might not wish to do so, but the option can't hurt. c. An open source system would fundamentally change the evidence economy **without targetting anyone** or putting anyone out of a job. It seems much smarter (and less bilious) to change the value of a professional card-cutter's work than send the KGB after specific counter-revolutionary teams.

**2] leads to higher quality engagement b/c I know exactly what the neg says which internal link turns the aff b/c it leads to net better discussion. This is especially true given that you did not disclose the offense of the NC—no way I can engage with it or contest it.**

**3] Evidence ethics – open sour4ce is the only way to verify before round that cards aren’t miscut – full text doesn’t solve since you could have highlighted unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t miscut ev.**

Two conceded justificaions for

Rvi for ebing fair

Winning theiss takes it out

T is a q of engamgent and diduccsisosn better way to discuss our aff

Not a reason why we should lose the dbea which take sout your arguments

**Case**

**Framing**

The CROB is to vote for the better debater – anything else is infinitely regressive, arbitrary, unpredictable, and self-serving.

O/W your ROB

[1] Rigorous testing – their rotb crowds our criticisms of THEIR OWN method which a) means its self-serving b) forecloses any potentiality of testing the validity of their arguments – they can’t impact turn this arg – they read the aff for its value to be discussed OR nothing past the reading of the aff is important so vote neg on presumption

[2] no comparison – how do u compare between two methods that subvert techno-orientalism?

[3] k turns bc it overdertmines your rotb

[4] You don’t meet 1AC framing 2 – you haven’t affirmed the resolution – that was cx

[5] 1AC framing 3 – yes debate isn’t perfect, but it’s a place that is getting more inclusive through effective engagement which your model precludes

**Legalism**

**Biden law prosecutes hate crimes against Asian-Americans – proves contingent instances of progress for Asians – anything is ahistorical nonsense**

**Megerian ’21** [Chris, Staff Writer for LA Times, “Biden signs law targeting hate crimes against Asian Americans”, 05-20-2021, https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-05-20/biden-signs-law-targeting-hate-crimes-against-asian-americans]//pranav

WASHINGTON — **Responding to the surge of attacks on Asian Americans during the coronavirus crisis, President Biden on Thursday signed legislation intended to bolster federal and local investigations into hate crimes based on victims’ race or ethnicity.** The new law, **which the House and Senate passed with bipartisan support**, gained momentum in March after a shooting rampage at Atlanta-area spas killed six women of Asian descent. That crime drew attention to other violent assaults on Asian Americans around the country and to widespread reports of racial slurs and discrimination, problems that worsened during the COVID pandemic, in which the coronavirus was first reported in China. Under the new law, **the Justice Department is to increase its focus on hate crimes by designating a point person to review incidents for potential prosecution**. The federal government will also help develop a database to make it easier for people to report discrimination and attacks, and it will work with local officials to conduct public education campaigns about preventing and reporting hate crimes.

**Debate Good**

**Debate good –**

**[1] advocacy skills create real world change i.e. Nelson Mandela did debate and was able to impact the real world**

**[2] is/ought fallacy - just because debate WAS historically bad doesn’t mean it WILL be**

**[3] surrendering to anti-asianism in educational spaces surrenders to whiteness, we should actively seek to fight it rather than generalizing that debate is bad when it can be used as a heuristic to learn**

**LBL**

Huang & Lee –

[1] no warrant for why it applies to debate – you’ve read this aff multiple times this tournament and won the bid round on it – proves debate is willing to listen to things u have to say

Chow res not intrsinc to white labor proven by plan affs w Egypt

Begs the q of us

Just gov doens tmake sense – abt conforming to