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#### Indigeneity connotates a state of non-ontology allowing for the construction of the human that legitimizes its self into a history of elimination, jettisoned from or assimilated into the national body to cohere settler temporality

Belcourt 16. Billy-Ray Belcourt is from the Driftpile Cree Nation. He is a 2016 Rhodes Scholar and is reading for an M.St. in Women’s Studies at the University of Oxford. He was named by CBC Books as one of six Indigenous writers to watch, and his poetry has been published or is forthcoming in Assaracus: A Journal of Gay Poetry, Red Rising Magazine, SAD Mag, mâmawi-âcimowak, PRISM International, and The Malahat Review. ("A POLTERGEIST MANIFESTO," 2016, *Feral Feminism*) vikas recut aaditg

Admittedly, the feral is a precarious space from which to theorize, sullied with an injurability bound up in the work of liberal humanism as such, an enterprise that weaponizes a set of moral barometers to distribute ferality unevenly to differently citizened and raced bodies—ones that are too close for comfort and must be pushed outside arm’s reach. Perhaps ferality traverses a semantic line of flight commensurate­ with that of savagery, barbarism, and lawlessness, concreting into one history of elimination: that is, a history of eliminating recalcitrant indigeneities incompatible within a supposedly hygienic social. The word savage comes from the Latin salvaticus, an alteration of silvaticus, meaning “wild,” literally “of the woods.” Of persons, it means “reckless, ungovernable” (“Savage”). In the space-time of settler states, savagery temporarily stands in for those subjectivities tethered to a supposedly waning form of indigeneity, one that came from the woods and, because of this, had to be jettisoned from or assimilated into the national body. Here is Audra Simpson on the history of Indian “lawlessness”: Its genealogy extends back to the earliest moments of recorded encounter, when Indians appeared to have no law, to be without order, and thus, to be in the colonizer’s most generous articulation of differentiation, in need of the trappings of civilization. “Law” may be one instrument of civilization, as a regulating technique of power that develops through the work upon a political body and a territory. (2014, 144) According to Simpson, the recognition of Indigenous peoples as lawless rendered them governable, motivating the settler state (here, Canada) to curate and thus contain atrophied indigeneities—and, consequently, their sovereignties, lands, and politics—within the borders of federal law (2014, 144-45). Similarly, in The Transit of Empire Jodi Byrd traces the epistemological gimmicks through which the concept of “Indianness” came to align with “the savage other” (2011, 27). For her, this alignment provided the “rationale for imperial domination” and continues to stalk philosophy’s patterns of thinking (ibid.). Simpson, writing about the Mohawks of Kahnawake, argues that “a fear of lawlessness” continues to haunt the colonial imaginary, thereby diminishing “Indigenous rights to trade and to act as sovereigns in their own territories” (2014, 145). We might take the following lyrics from the popular Disney film Pocahontas as an example of the ways indigeneity circulates as a feral signifier in colonial economies of meaning-making: [Ratcliffe] What can you expect From filthy little heathens? Their whole disgusting race is like a curse Their skin’s a hellish red They’re only good when dead They’re vermin, as I said And worse [English settlers] They’re savages! Savages! Barely even human. (Gabriel and Goldberg 1995) Savagery connotes a state of non-ontology: Indigenous peoples are forced to cling to a barely extant humanity and coterminously collapse into a putatively wretched form of animality. Savagery is lethal, and its Indian becomes the prehistoric alibi through which the human is constituted as such. Indigenous peoples have therefore labored to explain away this savagery, reifying whitened rubrics for proper citizenship and crafting a genre of life tangible within the scenes of living through that are constitutive of settler colonialism as such. These scenes, however, are dead set on destroying the remnants of that savagery, converting their casualties into morally compatible subjects deserving of rights and life in a multicultural state that stokes the liberal fantasy of life after racial trauma at the expense of decolonial flourishing itself. This paper is therefore interested in the subjectivities and forms of sociality that savagery destroys when applied from without, and the political work of appropriating that savagery in the name of decolonization. Ours is a form of indigeneity that hints at a fundamental pollutability that both confirms and threatens forms of ontology tethered to a taxonomized humanity built in that foundational episode of subjection of which Simpson speaks. I am suggesting that savagery always-already references an otherworld of sorts: there are forms of life abandoned outside modernity’s episteme whose expressivities surge with affects anomalous within the topography of settler colonialism. This paper is not a historicist or nostalgic attachment to a pre-savage indigeneity resurrected from a past somehow unscathed by the violence that left us in the thick of things in the first place. Instead, I emphasize the potentiality of ferality as a politics in a world bent on our destruction—a world that eliminates indigeneities too radical to collapse into a collective sensorium, training us to a live in an ordinary that the settler state needs to persist as such, one that only some will survive. This world incentivizes our collusion with a multicultural state instantiated through a myth of belonging that actively disavows difference in the name of that very difference. We are repeatedly hurried into a kind of waning sociality, the content and form of which appear both too familiar and not familiar enough. In short, we are habitually left scavenging for ways to go on without knowing what it is we want. Let’s consider Jack Halberstam’s thoughts on “the wild”: It is a tricky word to use but it is a concept that we cannot live without if we are to combat the conventional modes of rule that have synced social norms to economic practices and have created a world order where every form of disturbance is quickly folded back into quiet, where every ripple is quickly smoothed over, where every instance of eruption has been tamped down and turned into new evidence of the rightness of the status quo. (2013, 126) Where Halberstam finds disturbance, I find indigeneity-cum-disturbance par excellence. Halberstam’s “wild” evokes a potentiality laboured in the here and now and “an alternative to how we want to think about being” in and outside an authoritarian state (2013, 126-27). Perhaps the wild risks the decolonial, a geography of life-building that dreams up tomorrows whose referents are the fractured indigeneities struggling to survive a historical present built on our suffering. Ferality is a stepping stone to a future grounded in Indigenous peoples’ legal and political orders. This paper does not traffic in teleologies of the anarchic or lawless as they emerge in Western thought; instead, it refuses settler sovereignty and calls for forms of collective Indigenous life that are attuned to queerness’s wretched histories and future-making potentialities. Indigeneity is an ante-ontology of sorts: it is prior to and therefore disruptive of ontology. Indigeneity makes manifest residues or pockets of times, worlds, and subjectivities that warp both common sense and philosophy into falsities that fall short of completely explaining what is going on. Indigenous life is truncated in the biopolitical category of Savage in order to make our attachments to ourselves assimilable inside settler colonialism’s national sensorium. Settler colonialism purges excessive forms of indigeneity that trouble its rubrics for sensing out the human and the nonhuman. In other words, settler colonialism works up modes of being-in-the-world that narrate themselves as the only options we have. What would it mean, then, to persist in the space of savagery, exhausting the present and holding out for futures that are not obsessed with the proper boundary between human and nonhuman life? This paper now turns to the present, asking: what happens when indigeneity collides with queerness inside the reserve, and how might a feral theory make sense of that collision? Deadly Presents “I went through a really hard time… I was beaten; more than once. I was choked” (Klassen 2014). These were the words of Tyler-Alan Jacobs, a two-spirit man from the Squamish Nation, capturing at once the terror of queer life on the reserve and the hardening of time into a thing that slows down bodies and pushes them outside its securitized geographies. Jacobs had grown up with his attackers, attackers who were energized by the pronouncement of queerness—how it insisted on being noticed, how it insisted on being. When the dust settled, “his right eye [had] dislodged and the side of his faced [had] caved in” (ibid.). Settler colonialism is fundamentally affective: it takes hold of the body, makes it perspire, and wears it out. It converts flesh into pliable automations and people into grim reapers who must choose which lives are worth keeping in the world. It can turn a person into a murderer in a matter of seconds; it is an epistemic rupturing of our attachments to life, to each other, and to ourselves. It is as if settler colonialism were simultaneously a rescue and military operation, a holy war of sorts tasked with exorcising the spectre of queer indigeneity and its putative infectivity. I rehearse this case because it allows me to risk qualifying the reserve as a geography saturated with heteronormativity’s socialities. This is a strategic interdiction that destroys supposedly degenerative queer affect worlds, untangling some bodies and not others from the future. I don’t have the statistics to substantiate these claims, but there is an archive of heartbreak and loss that is easy to come by if you ask the right people. Indeed, what would such statistics tell us that we don’t already know? What would the biopolitical work of data collection do to a knowledge-making project that thinks outside the big worlds of Statistics and Demography and, instead, inside the smaller, more precarious worlds created in the wake of gossip? I worry about ethnographic projects that seek to account for things and theory in the material in order to map the coordinates of an aberration to anchor it and its voyeurs in the theatres of the academy. The desire to attach to a body is too easily energized by a biological reading of gender that repudiates the very subjects it seeks so desperately to know and to study. What about the body? I have been asked this question, again and again. A feral theory is something of a call to arms: abolish this sort of ethnography and turn to those emergent methodologies that might better make sense of the affects and life-forms that are just now coming into focus and have been destroyed or made invisible in the name of research itself. Queer indigeneity, to borrow Fred Moten’s description of blackness, might “come most clearly into relief, by way of its negation” (2014). Perhaps decolonization needs to be a sort of séance: an attempt to communicate with the dead, a collective rising-up from the reserve’s necropolis, a feral becoming-undead. Boyd and Thrush’s Phantom Past, Indigenous Presence thinks indigeneity and its shaky histories vis-à-vis the language of haunting, where haunting is an endurant facet of “the experience of colonialism” (Bodinger de Uriarte 2012, 303). But, for me, ghostliness is differentially distributed: some more than others will be wrenched into the domain of the dead and forced to will their own ontologies into the now. Perhaps the universalist notion that haunting is a metonym for indigeneity repudiates the very life-forms that it claims to include: those who are differently queered and gendered, and, because of this, haunt waywardly and in ways that cannot be easily predicted (Ahmed 2015). This paper thus takes an imaginative turn and proceeds with something of an incantation to summon the figure of the queer Indigenous poltergeist—the feral monster in the horror story of decolonization. Queer Indigenous poltergeists do not linger inaudibly in the background; we are beside ourselves with anger, we make loud noises and throw objects around because we are demanding retribution for homicide, unloved love, and cold shoulders. We do not reconcile; we escape the reserve, pillage and mangle the settler-colonial episteme. Our arrival is both uneventful and apocalyptic, a point of departure and an entry point for an ontology that corresponds with a future that has yet to come. Sometimes all we have is the promise of the future. For the queer Indigenous poltergeist, resurrection is its own form of decolonial love. The poltergeist is an ontological anomaly: a fusion of human, object, and ghost, a “creature of social reality” and a “creature of fiction” (Haraway 1991, 149). From the German poltern meaning “[to] make noise, [to] rattle” and Geist or “ghost,” it literally means “noisy ghost,” speaking into existence an anti-subjectivity that emerges in the aftermath of death or murder (“Poltergeist”). It is the subject of Tobe Hooper’s 1982 film Poltergeist, which tells a story of “a haunting based on revenge” (Tuck and Ree 2013, 652). The film’s haunting is a wronging premised on an initial wrong: the eponymous poltergeist materializes when a mansion is constructed on a cemetery—a disturbing of spirits, if you will. José Esteban Muñoz argues that “The double ontology of ghosts and ghostliness, the manner in which ghosts exist inside and out and traverse categorical distinctions, seems especially useful for… queer criticism” (2009, 46). In this paper, the poltergeist names the form which indigeneity takes when it brings queer matter into its folds. In other words, this essay evokes haunting as a metaphor to hint at the ways in which queerness was murderously absorbed into the past and prematurely expected to stay there as an effect of colonialism’s drive to eliminate all traces of sexualities and genders that wandered astray. The poltergeist conceptualizes the work of queer indigeneity in the present insofar as it does not presuppose the mysterious intentions of the ghost—an otherworldly force that is bad, good, and undetectable all at once. Instead, the poltergeist is melancholic in its grief, but also pissed off. It refuses to remain in the spiritual, a space cheapened in relation to the staunch materiality of the real, and one that, though housing our conditions of possibility, cannot contain all of us. We protest forms of cruel nostalgia that tether ghosts to a discarded past within which queer Indigenous life once flourished because we know that we will never get it back and that most of us likely never experienced it in the first place. We long for that kind of love, but we know it is hard to come by. I turn to the poltergeist because I don’t have anywhere else to go. Help me, I could say. But I won’t. Queer indigeneity, then, is neither here nor there, neither dead nor alive but, to use Judith Butler’s language, interminably spectral (2006, 33). We are ghosts that haunt the reserve in the event of resurrection. According to Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, a reserve is a “tract of land, the legal title to which is held by the Crown, set apart for the use and benefit of an Indian band” (“Terminology”). The “reserve system” is part of the dispossessory ethos through which the settler state reifies land as the sign of sovereignty itself, and thus effects the political death of indigeneity, decomposing it into nothingness, into contaminated dirt. Reserves are the products of imaginations gone wild; they are ruins that bear “the physical imprint of the supernatural” on arid land, on decaying trailers arranged like weathered tombstones (Tuck and Ree 2013, 653). They are borderlands that connote simultaneous possession and dispossession: they represent the collision between settler sovereignty (insofar as the Crown holds the legal title to the land) and indigeneity (pointing to a genre of life that is distinctly Indigenous). Reserves were—some might say they still are—zones of death that regulated and regulate the movements of Indigenous bodies, quarantining their putatively contaminated flesh outside modern life in order to preserve settler-colonial futurities. It is as if the reserve were a site of complete atrophy, where indigeneity is supposed to waste away or degenerate, where queerness has already bled out. Look at the blood on your hands! The queer Indigenous poltergeist, however, foregrounds what I call a “reserve consciousness” —an awareness of the deathliness of the reserve. A reserve consciousness might be a kind of critical phenomenology that, to use Lisa Guenther’s description of this sort of insurgent knowledge project, pulls up “traces of what is not quite or no longer there—that which has been rubbed out or consigned to invisibility” (2015): here, the so-called on-reserve Indian. It might be about becoming a frictive surface; by rubbing up against things and resisting motion between objects, we might become unstuck. Queer Indigenous poltergeists are what Sara Ahmed calls “blockage points”: where communication stops because we cannot get through (2011, 68). That is, queer indigeneity connotes an ethical impasse, a dead end that presents us with two options: exorcism or resurrection. If settler colonialism is topological, if it persists despite elastic deformations such as stretching and twisting, wear and tear, we might have to make friction to survive. I turn to the reserve because it is a geography of affect, one in which the heaviness of atmospheres crushes some bodies to death and in which some must bear the weight of settler colonialism more than others. The violence done to us has wrenched us outside the physical world and into the supernatural. Some of us are spirits—open wounds that refuse to heal because our blood might be the one thing that cannot be stolen. Does resistance always feel like resistance, or does it sometimes feel like bleeding out (Berlant 2011)? Feral Socialities I must leave the beaten path and go where we are not. Queerness, according to Muñoz, is not yet here; it is an ideality that “we may never touch,” that propels us onward (2009, 1). Likewise, Halberstam suggests that the presentness of queerness signals a kind of emerging ontology. He argues that failure “is something that queers do and have always done exceptionally well in contrast to the grim scenarios of success” that structure “a heteronormative, capitalist society” (2011, 2-3). For Muñoz, queer failure is about “doing something that is missing in straight time’s always already flawed temporal mapping practice” (2009, 174). We know, however, that this isn’t the entire story. Whereas Muñoz’s queer past morphs into the here and now of homonormativity’s carceral tempos, indigeneity’s queernesses are saturated with the trauma of colonialism’s becoming-structure. Queer death doubles as the settler state’s condition of possibility. Pre-contact queer indigeneities had been absorbed into colonialism’s death grip; however, this making-dead was also a making-undead in the enduring of ghosts (Derrida 1994, 310). If haunting, according to Tuck and Ree, “lies precisely in its refusal to stop,” then the queer Indigenous poltergeist fails to have died by way of time travel (2013, 642). Queer indigeneity might be a kind of “feral sociality”: we are in a wild state after escaping colonial captivity and domestication. When the state evicts you, you might have to become feral to endure. To be feral is to linger in the back alleys of the settler state. It is a refusal of settler statecraft, a strategic failing to approximate the metrics of colonial citizenship, a giving up on the ethical future that reconciliation supposedly promises. As an aside, I suspect that the settler state’s reconciliatory ethos is always-already a domesticating project: it contains Indigenous suffering within the spectacularized theatre of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, building a post-Residential School temporality in which Indigenous peoples have been repaired through monetary reparations and storytelling. In the melodrama of reconciliation, the settler state wins its centuries-long war against Indian lawlessness by healing Indigenous peoples of the trauma that blocked them from becoming properly emotive citizens. Queer indigeneity, however, escapes discursive and affective concealment and therefore the category of the human itself, disturbing the binary clash between the living and nonliving by way of its un-humanity, a kind of “dead living” whereby flesh is animated through death. Perhaps we must become feral to imagine other space-times, to imagine other kinds of queerness. If settler colonialism incentivizes our collusion with the humanist enterprise of multiculturalism (and it does), what would it mean to refuse humanity and actualize other subject formations? In other words, how do the un-living live? Here, I want to propose the concept of “Indian time” to theorize the temporality and liminality of queer indigeneity as it festers in the slippage between near-death and the refusal to die. Indian time colloquially describes the regularity with which Indigenous peoples arrive late or are behind schedule. I appropriate this idiom to argue that the presentness of queer indigeneity is prefigured by an escape from and bringing forward of the past as well as a taking residence in the future. To be queer and Indigenous might mean to live outside time, to fall out of that form of affective life. Indian time thus nullifies the normative temporality of settler colonialism in which death is the telos of the human and being-in-death is an ontological fallacy. It connotes the conversion of queer indigeneity into non-living matter, into ephemera lurking in the shadows of the present, waiting, watching, and conspiring. Where Jasbir Puar argues that all things under the rubric of queer are always-already calculated into the state’s biopolitical mathematic, queer indigeneity cannot be held captive because it cannot be seen—we are still emerging in the social while simultaneously altering its substance (2012). If decolonization is, according to Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s reading of Frantz Fanon, an “unclean break from a colonial condition,” perhaps the queer Indigenous poltergeist is feral enough to will a decolonial world into a future that hails rather than expels its ghosts (2012, 20). The queer Indigenous poltergeist might have nothing else to lose.

#### Systems of knowledge serve to institute and replicate settler colonialism — the human is a storytelling species and knowledge systems are always already being chartered through the replication of sociogenic codes

Wynter and McKittrick 15. Sylvia Wynter is a Professor Emerita at Stanford University. Katherine McKittrick is a professor in Gender Studies at Queen's University. She is an academic and writer whose work focuses on black studies, cultural geography, anti-colonial and diaspora studies, with an emphasis on the ways in which liberation emerges in black creative texts. (Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis, *Duke University Press*, 2015) vikas

To resolve the aporia of this cognitive dilemma, I turn again to Césaire’s proposed new and hybrid bios / mythoi science of the Word. Here because, as he proposed, and as earlier cited, the study of the Word / the mythoi will now determine the study of the bios / of the brain, and this will thereby enable us to gain an external (demonic ground) perspective on the always already storytellingly chartered / encoded discursive formations / aesthetic fields, as well as of, co- relatedly, our systems of knowledge. And, with this gain insight into how these systems of knowledge, each together with its genre- specific “truth of solidarity,” all institute and **stably** replicate our genres **of being hybridly human** with the also communitarian viability of each respective societal order. Yet **with all of the above—including, in macro terms, the instituting of our contemporary secular and “single model” liberal (now neoliberal) monohumanist Western / Westernized transnational world system—what again must be emphasized is** that the respective “truths” of their knowledge systems are always already prespecified by **our** storytellingly chartered sociogenic replicator code of symbolic life / death, its Word and / or Bateson- type “descriptive statement” as rigorously discursively elaborated by its “status quo system of learning” and its overall epistemological order. **This order circularly ensures that each such genre- specific regime / program of truth, will law- likely function to semantically- neurochemically induce the performative enactment of** our ensemble of **always already role- allocated individual and collective behaviors** within the reflexly and subjectively experienced terms of a cognitively closed, thereby genre- specific and fictively eusocializing, autonomously functioning, higher- level living autopoietic system. Cosmogonies of Our Planetary Life and Our Chartered Codes of Symbolic Life and Symbolic Death: Fictively Induced Modes of Inter- Altruistic Kin Recognition and Auto- Instituted Pseudospeciated Mode of Kind KM: Here Wynter elaborates on storytelling beginnings and cosmogonies. She returns to her extension of Frantz Fanon’s conception of our being hybridly human, both bios and mythoi, in order to address the unsolved phenomenon of human consciousness. She explores how our chartering / encoding genre- specific cosmogonies provide the narrative source of our fictively eusocializing subjectivities, thus enabling us to be reborn- through- initiation as always already sociogenically encoded inter- altruistically kin- recognizing members of each referent- we. At the same time, however, **the law- like reification of** each fictively induced and subjectively experienced order of consciousness **of each referent- we is, itself, absolutized by** what Wynter identifies as **the law of cognitive closure**. SW: Fanon put forward the idea of our skin / masks, thereby of the hybridity of our being human, in 1952. Crick and Watson cracked the genetic code in 1953. Now, I argue that Fanon’s masks enact a “second set of instructions”: that of the sociogenic code of symbolic life / death. Further, within the overall enactment of each such “second set of instructions,” the ism of gender is itself—while only one member class—a founding member class. Gender is a founding member because in order to auto- institute ourselves as subjects of a genre- specific referent- we, we must, first, co- relatedly and performatively enact each such code’s “second set of instructions” at the familial level, in terms of our gender roles. We know of this brilliant concept of the performative enactment of gender from Judith Butler.60 I am suggesting that the enactments of such gender roles are always a function of the enacting of a specific genre of being hybridly human. Butler’s illuminating redefinition of gender as a praxis rather than a noun, therefore, set off bells ringing everywhere! Why not, then, the performative enactment of all our roles, of all our role allocations as, in our contemporary Western / Westernized case, in terms of, inter alia, gender, race, class / underclass, and, across them all, sexual orientation? All as praxes, therefore, rather than nouns. So here you have the idea that with being human everything is praxis. For we are not purely biological beings! As far as the eusocial insects like bees are concerned, their roles are genetically preprescribed for them. Ours are not, even though the biocentric meritocratic iq bourgeois ideologues, such as the authors of The Bell Curve, try to tell us that they / we are.61 So the question is: **What are the mechanisms, what are the technologies, what are the strategies by which we prescribe our own roles?** What is common to all are cosmogonies and origin narratives. The representations of origin, which we ourselves invent, **are then retroactively projected onto an imagined past.** Why so? Because each such projection is the shared storytelling origin out of which we are initiatedly reborn. In this case we are no longer, as individual biological subjects, primarily born of the womb; rather, we are both initiated and reborn as fictively instituted inter- altruistic kinrecognizing members of each such symbolically re- encoded genre- specific referent- we. This is to say we are all initiatedly reborn—renatus in Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Christian term—to subjectively experience ourselves as subjects of the same encoded symbolic life kind. Why this imperative? Because **for all genre- specific subjects who are reborn from the same eusocializing origin myth and / or cosmogony, their genetically encoded individual biological life and its attendant imperative of naked self- preservation must at the same time be**, via initiation, **aversively experienced as symbolic death.** 62 This is the concomitant condition of inducing in all subjects the mimetic desire for the group- collective symbolic life of its genre- specific referent- we, its fictive mode of pseudospeciated kind. **The centrality of the ritually initiated and enacted storytelling codes, and thus their positive / negative, symbolic** life / death **semantically- neurochemically activated “second set of instructions,”** **emerges** here: these codes are specific to each kind. **The** positive verbal meanings **attributed to their respective modes of kind** are alchemically transformed into living flesh**,** as **its members all reflexly subjectively experience themselves, in the mimetically desirable, because** opiate-rewarded, placebo terms of **that mode of** symbolic **life prescribed by the storytelling** code. This at the same time as they subjectively experience their former “born of the womb” purely biological life as mimetically aversive, because they are doing so in now opiate- reward- blocked symbolic death, nocebo terms.63 For the preservation of which of these lives, then, do you think wars are fought? In the wake of the answer to the above, we see our chartering cosmogonies as being isomorphic with what we now define as our “cultures”— in both cases **we are talking about our hybrid sociogenic codes and their “second set of instructions.”** These are **codes that are even able to override where necessary**—this with respect to our auto- instituted, non– genetically restricted fictive modes of eusociality—**the first set of instructions of our own dna** (unlike as is the case with all other primates). The logical corollary is this: our modes of auto- institution, together with their initiatory rituals of rebirth—as iconized by the ritual of Christian baptism—are indispensable to the enacting of the human as the only living species on Earth who is the denizen of its third and hybrid bios / mythoi level of existence! Our mode of hybrid living being alone—this together with our also hitherto always genre- specific bios / mythoi enacted orders of supraindividual consciousness—is thereby to arrive on the scene all at once! With the Big Bang of the biomutational Third Event! So you see now why we still can’t solve the problem of consciousness? In spite of the most dedicated efforts of natural scientists, brain scientists, and philosophers? For what becomes clear here is that our human orders of consciousness / modes of mind cannot exist outside the terms of a specific cosmogony. Therefore, human orders of consciousness / modes of mind cannot preexist the terms of the always already mythically chartered, genre- specific code of symbolic life / death, its “second set of instructions” and thus its governing sociogenic principle— or, as Keith Ward puts it, its nonphysical principle of causality.64 To give an example: here we are, we are talking and thinking. We are, in fact, reflexly talking and thinking in terms of Darwin’s biocosmogonically chartered definitive version—in The Descent of Man (1871)—of the British bourgeoisie’s ruling class’s earlier reinvention of Man1’s civic humanist homo politicus as that of liberal monohumanist Man2 as homo oeconomicus, together with its now fully desupernaturalized sociogenically encoded order of consciousness. These are the very terms, therefore, in which we ourselves, in now historically postcolonial / postapartheid contexts, are. If in our case, only mimetically so! This at the same time as we are also struggling to think outside the limits of the purely biocentric order of consciousness that is genre- specific to the Western bourgeoisie’s homo oeconomicus. But it’s extremely difficult to do, right? You know why? Because Darwinism’s powerful, seductive force as a cosmogony, or origin narrative, is due to the fact that it is the first in our human history to be not only part myth but also part natural science. In fact, this mutation—the part myth / part natural science workings of Darwinism—draws attention to Darwin’s powerful neoMalthusian conceptual leap.65 A leap by means of which—over and against Cardinal Bellarmine—Darwin was to definitively replace the biblical Cre- ation account of the origin of all forms of biological life, including the major bios aspect of our being hybridly human, with a new evolutionary account. Why, then, say that this Darwinian account is only part science? Biologist Glyn Isaac, in his essay “Aspects of Human Evolution” (1983), provides the answer. Isaac makes us aware of the ecumenically human trap into which Darwin had also partly fallen: Understanding the literature on human evolution calls for the recognition of special problems that confront scientists who report on this topic. Regardless of how the scientists present them, accounts of human origins are read as replacement materials for genesis. They fulfill needs that are reflected in the fact that all societies have in their culture some form of origin beliefs, that is, some narrative or configurational notion of how the world and humanity began. Usually, these beliefs do more than cope with curiosity, they have allegorical content, and they convey values, ethics and attitudes. The Adam and Eve creation story of the Bible is simply one of a wide variety of such poetic formulations. . . . The scientific movement which culminated in Darwin’s compelling formulation of evolution as a mode of origin seemed to sweep away earlier beliefs and relegate them to the realm of myth and legend. Following on from this, it is often supposed that the myths have been replaced by something quite different, which we call “science.” However, this is only partly true; scientific theories and information about human origins have been slotted into the same old places in our minds and our cultures that used to be occupied by the myths. . . . Our new origin beliefs are in fact surrogate myths, that are themselves part science, part myths. 66 So the trap, you see, is that of the paradox that lies at the core of our metaDarwinian hybridity. For what I’m saying is that as humans, we cannot / do not preexist our cosmogonies, our representations of our origins—even though it is we ourselves who invent those cosmogonies and then retroactively project them onto a past. We invent them in formulaic storytelling terms, as “donor figures” or “entities,” who have extrahumanly (supernaturally, but now also naturally and / or bioevolutionarily, therefore secularly) mandated what the structuring societal order of our genre- specific, eusocial or cultural present would have to be.67 As the French cultural anthropologist Maurice Godelier also makes clear, with respect to the above: we, too, hitherto have also systematically kept the reality of our own agency—from our origins until today—opaque to ourselves. 68 Thus all our humanly invented chartering cosmogonies, including our contemporary macro (monohumanistic / monotheistic) cosmogonies, are law- likely configured as being extrahumanly mandated.69 All such sacred theological discourses ( Judaism, Islamism, Christianity, for example) continue to function in the already theo- cosmogonically mandated cognitively closed terms that are indispensable to the enacting of their respective behavior- inducing and behavior- regulatory fictively eusocializing imperative. This is especially apparent, too, in the secular substitute monohumanist religion of Darwin’s neo- Malthusian biocosmogony: here, in the biocosmogony of symbolic life / death—as that of selection / dysselection and eugenic / dysgenic codes—the incarnation of symbolic life, will law- likely be that of the ruling- class bourgeoisie as the naturally selected (eugenic) master of Malthusian natural scarcity. With this emerges, cumulatively, the virtuous breadwinner, together with his pre- 1960s virtuous housewife, and, corelatedly, the savvy investor, the capital accumulator, or at least the steady job holder.70 In effect, wealth, no longer in its traditional, inherited freehold landowning form, but in its now unceasingly capital- accumulating, global form, is itself the sole macro- signifier of ultimate symbolic life. Symbolic death, therefore, is that of having been naturally dysselected and mastered by Malthusian natural scarcity: as are the globally homogenized dysgenic non- breadwinning jobless poor / the pauper / homeless / the welfare queens. Poverty itself, therefore, is the “significant ill” signifier of ultimate symbolic death and, consequently, capital accumulation, and therefore symbolic life signifies and narrates a plan of salvation that will cure the dysselected significant ill! **The systemic reproduction of** the real- life **categories** of both signifiers **are** indispensable **to the** continued enactment of **the ruling - class** bourgeoisie’s governing code of symbolic life / death and the defining of liberal (now neoliberal) monohumanist Man2. This now purely secular coding of life / death is itself discursively—indeed rigorously—elaborated bioepistemologically, on the model of a natural organism, by the disciplines of our social sciences and humanities, together with their respective genre- specific and ethno- class truths of solidarity.71 Consequently, **within the laws of** hybrid auto- institution and / or pseudospeciation the (**humanities and social science**) **disciplinary truths of solidarity enact** their biocosmogonically chartered **sociogenic code** of symbolic life / death, also **imperatively calling to be discursively elaborated in cognitively** (cum psychoaffectively / aesthetically) **closed terms.**

#### Western colonial frameworks render Nativeness as the raw material for settler vitality — refuse the re-scripting of Native life and death onto settler landscapes and colonial cartographies

Urbanski 16. Claire Urbanski is a doctoral candidate in Feminist Studies with a designated emphasis in Critical Race and Ethnic Studies. As a scholar and social justice activist invested in collective liberation, her work considers how settler colonial ideologies of Indigenous dispossession and gendered violence structure and inform relationships between place, identity, and land. Her doctoral research examines how knowledges of spiritual afterlife have shaped ongoing material structures of United States settler colonial empire ("Genocidal Intimacies: Settler Desire and Carceral Geographies," 2016, *American Studies Association*) vikas

**Connecting Kim TallBear and Philip Deloria’s work**, **we can understand how** Western colonial scientific frameworks render ‘Nativeness’ into a material resource, already belonging to settler society, which can be mined for value; its imaginary, raw, authentic qualities are desired to make settler identity meaningful **and to construct intimate belongings** with landscape. Thinking about **desires to consume and own flesh** (or bone), **and rendering** bone **into personal property**, Alexander Weheliye’s concept of ‘pornotroping’ gets at the ways that the captive body is a “source of an irresistible, destructive sensuality” **and at the same time is** “reduced to a thing, to being for the captor” (90). Orlando Patterson also discusses the imagined intimacy between enslavers and captive bodies, **as well as a fear of danger waiting in the spiritual realm for the enslaver because of his actions**; which is assuaged through **imagining a ‘benevolent enslavement,’ thus** assuring a salvation for the enslaver. I do not mean to collapse the very differing racializing projects of antiBlackness and Indigenous dispossession into being the same thing, while also recognizing their inseparable entanglements in the mutual constitution of settler colonialism, and also acknowledging that perhaps my easy comparison here is very problematic; I do want to think about the space of settler sexualized desire for captive bodies, and connect it to a sexualized and intimate desire for captured dead bodies. How do settlers form (imagined) belongings through imagined intimacies with Indigenous dead? How does anti-Black consumption facilitate white settler intimacies with landscapes? What kinds of sexualized and intimate fantasies are being enacted through the dissection and hoarding of corpses, or the extraction of energy from human bones? When does the researcher, or witch, imagine and perform a fabricated emotional intimacy with the dead, and when is the dead body simply an object from which to extract, or dismember? I’m **reflecting on Audra Simpson’s comments** on yesterday’s panel “Colonial Unknowing and Biopolitics,” which speaking on the ruse of consent **that** settler society depicts in its relations with Indigenous peoples, I **call attention to the coercive intimacy researchers**, and perhaps witches, enforce onto the dead. I do acknowledge and hesitate at my oversimplification of histories and meanings of witchcraft, and at the same time, I do take seriously the settler colonial fantasies that very much inform the increasing popularity of witchcraft particularly amongst white queer identified settlers. To conclude, **I have begun to consider the historical and ongoing extractive projects that seek to render Indigenous bones into material resources** - **to be excavated, consumed, dismembered, and** the particular **logics of containment projected onto the dead through settler imaginaries.** I ask how are the bones of the dead consumed in order to enact queer settler belongings imagined to be subversive to the state, yet ultimately naturalizing of, and thus reinforcing to, a settler colonial project? Thinking with the work of Sylvia Wynter and Jodi Byrd, **projects of settler colonial grave excavation** reveal an important process in how meanings of ‘symbolic life and death’ are mapped onto landscape **through their centrality in establishing the normative standards of ‘Western Man’ as ‘human’ and as foundational to the parameters of US legal personhood**, furthermore, genocidal intimacies draws attention to the sexualized productions of colonial carceral geographies. Settler **belonging is** accessed through genocidal intimacies, which are both **informed by and reproductive of the carceral grounds from which** militarized settler space and racializing technologies of social death can be erected and enacted.

**The specter of extinction is a product of antiqueer, settler anxieties that arise not only from settlerism’s guilt for destroying the planet’s ability to sustain itself, but also from the settler’s need to strengthen solidarity and defer confrontation with native genocide**

**Dalley 16**. Hamish Dalley is an Assistant professor of English at Daemen College and techer in the areas of ancient and modern world literature [“The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature,” *Settler Colonial Studies*, Issue Number, No. 8]//vikas

**Considering the problem of futurity offers a useful foil to traditional analyses of settler colonial narrative**, which typically examine settlers’ attitudes towards history in order to highlight a constitutive anxiety about the past – about origins. **Settler colonialism**, the argument goes, **has a problem with historical narration that arises from a contradiction in its founding mythology.** In Stephen Turner’s formulation, the settler subject is by definition one who comes from elsewhere but who strives to make this place home. **The settlement narrative must explain how this gap** – which is at once geographical, historical, and existential – **has been bridged, and the settler transformed from outsider into indigene.** Yet the transformation **must remain constitutively incomplete, because the desire to be at home necessarily invokes the spectre of the native, whose existence** (which cannot be disavowed completely because it is needed to define the settler’s difference, superiority, and hence claim to the land) **inscribes the settler’s foreignness**, thus **reinstating the gap between settler and colony that the narrative was meant to efface.** Settler-colonial narrative is thus **shaped around its need to erase and evoke the native, to make the indigene both invisible and present in a contradictory pattern that prevents settlers from** ever **moving on from the moment of colonization.**2 As evidence of this constitutive contradiction, critics have identified in settler-colonial discourse symptoms of psychic distress such as disavowal, inversion, and repression.3 Indeed, the frozen temporality of settler-colonial narrative, fixated on the moment of the frontier, recalls nothing so much as Freud’s description of the ‘repetition compulsion’ attending trauma.4 As Lorenzo Veracini puts it, because: ‘settler society’ can thus be seen as a fantasy where a perception of a constant struggle is juxtaposed against an ideal of ‘peace’ that can never be reached, settler projects embrace and reject violence at the same time. The settler colonial situation is thus a circumstance where the tension between contradictory impulses produces long-lasting psychic conflicts and a number of associated psychopathologies.5 Current scholarship has thus focused primarily on settler-colonial narrative’s view of the past, asking how such a contradictory and troubled relationship to history might affect present-day ideological formations. Critics have rarely considered what such narratological tensions might produce when the settler gaze is turned to the future. Few social formations are more stubbornly resistant to change than settlement, suggesting that a future beyond settler colonialism might be simply unthinkable. Veracini, indeed, suggests that settler-colonial narrative can never contemplate an ending: that settler decolonization is inconceivable because settlers lack the metaphorical tools to imagine their own demise.6 This article outlines why I partly disagree with that view. I argue that **the narratological paradox that defines settler-colonial narrative does make the future a problematic object of contemplation.** But **that does not make settler decolonization unthinkable per se**; as I will show, **settlers do often try to imagine their demise** – but they do so **in a way that reasserts the paradoxes of their founding ideology, with the result that** the radical potentiality of decolonization is undone even as it is invoked. I argue that, notwithstanding Veracini’s analysis, there is a metaphor via which the end of settler colonialism unspools – **the** quasi-biological **concept of extinction**, which, when **deployed as a narrative trope, offers settlers a chance to consider and disavow their demise**, just as they consider and then disavow the violence of their origins. This article traces the importance of the trope of extinction for contemporary settler-colonial literature, with a focus on South Africa, Canada, and Australia. It explores variations in how the death of settler colonialism is conceptualized, drawing a distinction between historio-civilizational narratives of the rise and fall of empires, and a species-oriented notion of extinction that draws force from public anxiety about climate change – an invocation that adds another level of ambivalence by drawing on ‘rational’ fears for the future (because climate change may well render the planet uninhabitable to humans) in order to narrativize a form of social death that, strictly speaking, belongs to a different order of knowledge altogether. As such, **my analysis is intended to draw the attention of settler colonial studies toward futurity and** the **ambivalence of settler paranoia**, while highlighting a potential point of cross-fertilization between settler-colonial and eco-critical approaches to contemporary literature. That ‘extinction’ should be a key word in the settler-colonial lexicon is no surprise. In Patrick Wolfe’s phrase,7 settler colonialism is predicated on a ‘logic of elimination’ that tends towards the extermination – by one means or another – of indigenous peoples.8 This logic is apparent in archetypal settler narratives like James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1826), a historical novel whose very title blends the melancholia and triumph that demarcate settlers’ affective responses to the supposed inevitability of indigenous extinction. Concepts like ‘stadial development’ – by which societies progress through stages, progressively eliminating earlier social forms – and ‘fatal impact’ – which names the biological inevitability of strong peoples supplanting weak – all contribute to the notion that settler colonialism is a kind of ‘ecological process’ 9 that necessitates the extinction of inferior races. What is surprising, though, is how often the trope of extinction also appears with reference to settlers themselves; it makes sense for settlers to narrate how their presence entails others’ destruction, but it is less clear why their attempts to imagine futures should presume extinction to be their own logical end as well. The idea appears repeatedly in English-language literary treatments of settler colonialism. Consider, for instance, the following rumination on the future of South African settler society, from Olive Schreiner’s 1883 Story of an African Farm: It was one of them, one of those wild old Bushmen, that painted those pictures there. He did not know why he painted but he wanted to make something, so he made these. […] Now the Boers have shot them all, so that we never see a yellow face peeping out among the stones. […] And the wild bucks have gone, and those days, and we are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the stones will lie on, looking at everything like they look now.10 In this example, the narrating settler character, Waldo, recognizes prior indigenous inhabitation but his knowledge comes freighted with an expected sense of biological superiority, made apparent by his description of the ‘Bushman’s’ ‘yellow face’, and lack of mental self-awareness. What is not clear is why Waldo’s contemplation of colonial genocide should turn immediately to the assumption that a similar fate awaits his people as well. A similar presumption of racial vulnerability permeates other late nineteenth century novels from the imperial metropole, such as Dracula and War of the Worlds, which are plotted around the prospect of invasions that would see the extinction of British imperialism, and, in the process, the human species. Such **anxieties draw energy from a pattern of settler defensiveness that can be observed across** numerous **settler-colonial contexts.** Marilyn Lake’s and Henry Reynold’s account of **the emergence of transnational ‘whiteness’ highlights the paradoxical fact that while white male settlers have been arguably the most privileged class in history,** they have **routinely perceived themselves to be ‘under siege’, threatened with destruction** to the extent **that their very identity of** ‘**whiteness was born in the apprehension of imminent loss**’. 11 The **fear of looming annihilation serves a powerful ideological function in settler communities, working to foster racial solidarity, suppress dissent, and legitimate violence against indigenous populations who**, by any objective measure, **are far more at risk of extermination than the settlers who fear them.** Ann Curthoys and Dirk Moses have traced this pattern in Australia and Israel-Palestine, respectively.12 This scholarship suggests that **narratives of settler extinction are acts of ideological mystification, obscuring the brutal inequalities of the frontier behind a mask of white vulnerability** – an argument with which I sympathize. However, this article shows how there is more to settler-colonial extinction narratives than bad faith. I argue that we need a more nuanced understanding of how they encode a specifically settler-colonial framework for imagining the future, one that has implications for how we understand contemporary literatures from settler societies, and which allows us to see extinction as a genuine, if flawed, attempt to envisage social change. In the remainder of this paper I consider extinction’s function as a metaphor of decolonization. I use this phrase to invoke, without completely endorsing, Tuck and Yang’s argument that to treat decolonization figuratively, as I argue **extinction narratives** do, is necessarily to **preclude radical change, creating opportunities for settler ‘moves to innocence’ that re-legitimate racial inequality.**13 The counterview to this pessimistic perspective is offered by Veracini, who suggests that progressive change to settler-colonial relationships will only happen if narratives can be found that make decolonization thinkable.14 This article enters the debate between these two perspectives by asking what it means for settler writers to imagine the future via the trope of extinction. Does extinction offer a meaningful way to think about ending settler colonialism, or does it re-activate settler-colonial patterns of thought that allow exclusionary social structures to persist? I explore this question with reference to examples of contemporary literary treatments of extinction from select English-speaking settler-colonial contexts: South Africa, Australia, and Canada.15 The next section of this article traces key elements of extinction narrative in a range of settler-colonial texts, while the section that follows offers a detailed reading of one of the best examples of a sustained literary exploration of human finitude, Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy (2003–2013). I advance four specific arguments. First, extinction narratives take at least two forms depending on whether the ‘end’ of settler society is framed primarily in historical-civilizational terms or in a stronger, biological sense; the key question is whether the ‘thing’ that is going extinct is a society or a species. Second, biologically oriented extinction narratives rely on a more or less conscious slippage between ‘the settler’ and ‘the human’. Third, this slippage is ideologically ambivalent: on the one hand, it contains a radical charge that invokes environmentalist discourse and climate-change anxiety to imagine social forms that re-write settler-colonial dynamics; on the other, it replicates a core aspect of imperialist ideology by normalizing whiteness as equivalent to humanity. Fourth, **these ideological effects are mediated by gender**, insofar as **extinction narratives invoke issues of biological reproduction, community protection, and violence that function to differentiate and reify masculine and feminine roles** in the putative de-colonial future. Overall, my central claim is that extinction is a core trope through which settler futurity emerges, one **with crucial narrative and ideological effects that shape** much of the contemporary **literature emerging from white colonial settings.**

#### Settler Colonialism constitutes the processes of unequal health care and medicine for indigenous bodies – their use of the state to “solve global health inequality” ignores the disparities natives face in health care and legitimatizes the states power over health care

Burnett et al 20 [Kristin Burnett is part of the Department of Indigenous Studies, Lakehead University, 955 Oliver Road, Thunder Bay, Ontario, P7B 5E1, Canada, Chris Sanders is part of the Department of Sociology, Lakehead University, 955 Oliver Road, Thunder Bay, Ontario, P7B 5E1, Canada, Donna Halperin Is part of the Elizabeth & Thomas Rankin School of Nursing, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Canada Scott Halperin is part of the Division of Infectious Diseases, IWK Health Centre PO Box 9700 5850-5980 University Ave, Halifax, NS B3K 6R8, Canada. “Indigenous Peoples, settler colonialism, and access to health care in rural and northern Ontario” November 2020 [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1353829220300952#](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1353829220300952)! //aaditg

1. Introduction Rural and northern communities often face challenges disproportionate to their urban counterparts in accessing health care services (Ontario, 2011, p. 9). This situation is further complicated by social identities related to Indigeneity, race, gender, settler colonialism, age, ability, and sexual identity. Northwestern Ontario is located within the Robinson Superior Treaty and Treaties 3, 5, and 9. There are more than 49 First Nations in this region, 32 of which are only accessible by plane or briefly during the winter by seasonal ice roads, depending upon the duration and temperature of the winter months (Burnett et al., 2015). Looking at northwestern Ontario, we explore how space and place shape the health access and outcomes of Indigenous Peoples as both a function of historical and ongoing relations with the settler state and geography. Northwestern Ontario is a geographic region comprised of multiple rural spaces with important similarities and differences. In this paper, we consider the complicated ways in which notions of rural space operate alongside jurisdictional service boundaries that are rooted in settler colonialism. While elsewhere we have looked at the importance of trust and rapport in vaccination attitudes, in this paper our findings suggest that rural space is a more nuanced concept that requires further exploration.(See Map 1) Map 1 Download : Download high-res image (2MB)Download : Download full-size image Map 1. First Nations in Northern Ontario. The size of northern Ontario, particularly the provincial far north, presents unique challenges in regards to service delivery and complicates the notion of the urban/rural divide (Northern Policy Institute, 2017; Speer and Jivani, 2017). In northern Ontario, for example, Indigenous Peoples transverse multiple spaces and boundaries when accessing health care services. Many Indigenous Peoples residing in northern Ontario live on-reserve and off-reserve and often somewhere in-between. In other words, they may live in the city and regularly travel to their home community to visit family, participate in cultural activities, or to pursue land and water based food procurement activities. Some reserves/First Nations1 are located adjacent to or nearby cities or small municipalities that are scattered throughout northern Ontario. Other reserves are located further from urban spaces but are still connected by all-season roads. For some community members, these distances pose insurmountable barriers because they do not have regular and reliable access to transportation. This is increasingly true, for instance, with the cessation of Greyhound Lines bus services to rural and northern areas in Canada (Lambert and Graveland, 2018). Understanding the complicated intersection of structural barriers, space, and settler colonialism is essential to identifying the ways in which systems of oppression operate, specifically through health care provision. This paper explores three notions of rural space (urban-rural spaces, fly-in/remote spaces, and mid-range spaces) and argue that living in a mid-range First Nation that lies in relative close proximity (within 20–30 min' drive) to a northern urban area and its health services complicates notions of “rurality” and has implications regarding access to health care generally, and relationships with health care practitioners and continuity of care specifically. Drawing on research into Indigenous People's beliefs regarding vaccination, we explore understandings of rurality to illuminate the ways in which space and settler colonialism both shape and limit choices around health care access and attitudes toward vaccines and immunization. Significantly, given the ways in which anti-Indigenous racism and settler colonialism operate in northern urban spaces, First Nations (reserves) communities situated in a uniquely rural space (mid-range) with proximity to urban space have the potential to provide security, safety, and continuity of care that is frequently unavailable in either urban-rural spaces or remote/fly-in locales. As white settler2 scholars, we feel it is imperative that we actively engage in the ‘unsettling’ and uncomfortable work of decolonization by identifying those structures and systems of power that privilege non-Indigenous peoples by making visible the “invisibilized dynamics of settler colonialism” (Tuck and Yang, 2012) that maintain the current status quo. In order to undertake this work, we need to know and understand local contexts and histories so that we can recognize the unique ways in which space and colonialism operate in northern Ontario. 1.1. Defining rural and the Northern Ontario Context There is no one accepted definition of what constitutes “rural” and it shifts from region to region and dramatically within countries as well. For instance, the United States' government currently employs more than 15 different definitions across various federal programs due to state and federal jurisdictional policies (Coburn et al., 2007). While there is no definitive definition of rural especially within the health literature, most definitions locate notions of rural within two interrelated categories: proximity to an urban area of a certain population size and the distance required to travel to access necessary services and resources like health care (e.g., Bourke et al., 2013; Burns et al., 2007; Gessert et al., 2015; Kulig and Williams, 2012). Statistics Canada employs an extremely broad definition of rural noting that it includes “all territory [ies] lying outside population centers” (Statistics Canada, 2017), with populations centers varying enormously in size with the smallest no less than 1000 people. A definition of rural and community more specific to northern Ontario and relevant to the ways in which health care services are organized and understood was generated by Ontario's Ministry of Health and Long-term Care in 2011 describing rural communities as those “with a population of less than 30,000 that are greater than 30 min away in travel time from a community with a population of more than 30,000 (Ontario, 2011, p. 8). In other words, understandings of rurality rely on a relational definition that constitutes place in connection to urban space (broadly defined) and what kinds of services are available. It should be noted that these definitions, while demonstrably affecting the lives and well-being of Indigenous Peoples, do not consider Anishinaabe understandings of and relationships to land, place, and community. More conventional definitions of urban include high population densities, multiple lane highways, and tall buildings (Jacquin and Gay, 2008). The urban north would not meet these expectations. For instance, Thunder Bay (pop. 110,000), the largest city in northern Ontario, does not fall within those understandings, and the regular presence of wildlife like bears and moose in the middle of the city is unfathomable for many individuals living in more southern and urban regions of the country. Nevertheless, Thunder Bay operates as a service centre for more than 49 First Nations in northwestern Ontario where people regularly travel to access health care, education, and goods and services unavailable elsewhere in the region. Further complicating these understandings of space is the history of the region and relations, both formal and informal, between Indigenous Peoples and the state. For example, the ways in which, and spaces that Indigenous Peoples, especially status Indians, can access health care is determined by jurisdictional boundaries rooted in the British North American Act (BNA) of 1867. According to Sections 91 and 92 of the 1867 BNA Act, “Indians and all lands reserved for Indians” lie under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government while health care, infrastructure (roads, bridges, drinking water, sewage facilities, schools, airports), education, and child welfare all fall under provincial jurisdiction. Thus, provinces are responsible for the day-to-day provision of health services and infrastructure except in regards to Indigenous People, and more specifically “status Indians” (as per the legal definition). According to the federal government of Canada (Government of Canada, 2017), “Indian status is the legal status of a person who is registered as an Indian under the Indian Act.” Indian status is defined under section 6 of the Indian Act. Therefore, according to the BNA Act, ‘Indians’ are the responsibility of the federal government and thus not entitled to health care services from provincial governments. While the 1960s witnessed the federal government negotiate access for Indigenous Peoples to provincial health care and social services through a series of inter-governmental funding agreements, this process remains flawed. In spite of human rights challenges, court rulings, the passage of Jordan's Principle obligating the state to provide the same level of health care available to non-Indigenous children in Canada, and Article 24 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states “Indigenous individuals have the right to access without any discrimination, to all social and health services” (UNDRIP), health care on reserve remains a patchwork of systems pieced together by the First Nation and Health Canada in combination with provincial health services. Co-existing alongside the provincial hospital systems in regards to the delivery of health care are federally funded on-reserve nursing stations/health centers, nurses, community health representatives, and itinerant doctors. Increasingly, especially for northern fly-in communities, frequent evacuations for extended periods of time to provincially run hospitals in more southern and urban locales have become the norm for a growing list of health services. The health disparities that exist in Canada between Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations are well documented (see, for example, Allan and Smylie, 2015; Mitrou et al., 2014; Palmater, 2011; Patrick, 2011). More recently these disparities were highlighted in a report issued by the Auditor General of Canada in Spring (2015) which noted Indigenous People living in remote communities in northern Ontario did not have “comparable access to clinical and client care services as other provincial residents living in similar geographic locations” (Auditor General, 2015, 27). Those First Nations that face the greatest challenges accessing services are reserves located in the far provincial north that do not have all-season road access. In short, the notion of rural space is complicated by federal/provincial jurisdictions regarding the governance of health care and of “Indian status.” As a result of all these factors, contemporary on-reserve health care lacks uniformity and consistency in provision and quality. The geographic spaces that these communities occupy, compounded by jurisdictional responsibilities for health care, demonstrably affects the access of Indigenous Peoples to services. In the findings below, we further explore the nuanced meanings of rurality in northern Ontario with respect to urban-rural, fly-in/remote, and mid-ranges spaces and in turn the ways in which those spaces shape access to health care, relationships with health care practitioners, and continuity of care. 2. Methods The data used for this paper are part of a larger project exploring attitudes and beliefs about vaccination in general and Haemophilus influenzae type a (Hia) infection and vaccine in particular. Over the last decade, invasive Haemophilus influenzae type a (Hia) infection has emerged as a leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Indigenous communities in northern Canada. Hia is a particularly pernicious disease with most cases occurring in young children, with manifestations including meningitis, septicemia, septic arthritis, and bacteremic pneumonia (Boisvert and Moore, 2015; Jin et al., 2007). The data set reported on here come from individual interviews with healthcare service providers (N = 14), ten focus group interviews with community members (N = 72), and field notes taken by the lead researchers (KB, CS) following all individual interviews and focus groups. Data were collected between February 2017 and July 2019 in Thunder Bay, Sioux Lookout, 4 road-access communities within a 6-h drive of both cities, and 5 fly-in communities that use Sioux Lookout as a service hub. 2.1. Community engagement and recruitment We began this project by engaging with Indigenous health organizations and service providers, as well as community leaders and members in the region so that the questions we asked gathered information that was useful to Indigenous Peoples, and did not continue to perpetuate colonial relationships devoid of reciprocity and respect (Smith, 2012). These conversations quickly revealed that despite being an important health issue in the region, there was little to no knowledge about Hia except among select health care provider participants. Significantly, attitudes towards vaccines and immunization practices were more complicated than acceptance or refusal, and needed to be considered within a complex web of historical and ongoing structural violence and settler colonialism. As a result, questions that initially focused on knowledge about and attitudes towards vaccines and vaccine schedules, shifted to include broader conversations about trust and respect. Conversations with community members centered on the importance of strong relationships of accountability in both the research process and in health care systems, more broadly (Wilson, 2008). As settler scholars, and to ensure we approached this work from an ethical research space, it was most appropriate for us to draw on a two-eyed seeing framework to avoid appropriating or claiming to speak from an Ingenious perspective. Using a two-eyed seeing framework allowed us to explore how multiple and diverse perspectives could work together to “answer [the most] pressing questions about the health of Indigenous peoples and communities,” (Martin, 2012, 22). Our objective was to privilege the knowledge and perspectives of Indigenous Peoples and avoid an extractive research process that removed Indigenous experiences from their immediate contexts (Gaudry, 2011). We held sharing circles (similar to focus groups) and open one-on-one conversations with community members. Community members guided the conversations so that they determined what was most relevant and important to them. Listening to and centering the stories that were shared with us, inverted the extractive processes of research. This approach is consistent with the Two-eyed seeing methodological framework (Kovach, 2009; Smith, 2012). Two community research assistants with previous experience assisted with recruitment, data collection, and analysis worked with us. Multiple recruitment strategies were used in order to access a range of perspectives on vaccines and immunization. First, the researchers used a snowball sampling approach to recruit healthcare service providers in the region with relevant expertise but who were not limited to our professional network (Patton, 2015). We began by reaching out to our professional network to seek participants for individual interviews and then asked those who participated in individual interviews to notify other healthcare providers with relevant expertise in northwestern Ontario to contact us if they were interested in participating in an interview. Second, community research assistants used a variety of strategies to recruit Indigenous community members living in northwestern Ontario for focus group interviews. These strategies included advertising on social media, approaching Chief and Council, and reaching out to friendship networks and service users. Additionally, a purposive sampling strategy was used to recruit parents with young children and people who had lived on reserve at some point in their lives. We sought to recruit these individuals in particular for their perspectives on and experiences accessing healthcare services on and off reserve and because people with young children were likely to have recently been approached about vaccines and immunizations from a variety of sources (Patton, 2015). 2.2. Individual and focus group interview procedures Similar interview guides were created for individual interviews and focus group interviews; both guides were semi-structured. For individual interviews with healthcare service providers, questions were organized around knowledge, beliefs, and values as well as provider expertise and practices regarding Hia, vaccines in general, and experiences providing immunizations with northern and rural communities. For focus groups, we developed an initial interview guide in consultation with our community researchers who aided us in the phrasing and to ensure the questions were culturally sensitive (Krueger and Casey, 2014). The research assistants attended focus groups and the individual interviews were conducted in pairs. Following focus groups and interviews, we met with the research assistants to share insights and observations so that we learned from each other. Questions initially focused on knowledge and beliefs about and attitudes toward vaccines, vaccine schedules, and experiences with healthcare institutions and providers. Participants were encouraged to speak from experience and share illustrative examples. Some questions developed organically in response to the concerns, knowledge, and interests of the participants. Accordingly, our interview guides underwent an early revision. For example, we had to readjust our focus regarding Hia to speak to vaccines more generally because participants had no knowledge, including some health practitioners, of this disease. Furthermore, after the first focus group it became clear that participants also wanted to talk about trust and respect, and we included questions to reflect this community interest. Individual interviews with healthcare service providers were carried out by two researchers (KB, CS). Providers included physicians, nurses working at community health centers and public health units, and community health educators. Individual interviews took place in community settings and workplace offices; some practitioners in remote communities were interviewed by phone. Focus group interviews were conducted by two researchers (KB, CS) with the assistance of community research assistants, who facilitated discussions and encouraged participation. Focus groups ranged in size from 3 to 11 participants were held in community settings (e.g., coffee shops, health centers including hospitals and nursing stations, schools, community centers, and band offices). Focus group participants completed an anonymous demographic questionnaire that asked general questions including age, gender, and whether participants identified as Indigenous and, if so, did they have Indian status. A similar informed consent process was performed for both individual interviews and focus group interviews (e.g., purpose of study, review of risks and benefits, volunteerism, answering questions). Individual interviews with healthcare service providers lasted between 45 to 60 min while focus group interviews with community members lasted between 90 to 120 min. All individual interviews and focus group interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. 2.3. Data analysis Transcripts were not returned to focus group participants due to confidentiality concerns; none of the individual interview participants were interested in reviewing their transcripts, instead preferring to receive the final results. We used thematic qualitative analysis to identify key codes or points of interest, interpret them as broader themes, review the themes and organize the analysis, and then report on the findings (Braun and Clarke, 2008; Nowell et al., 2017). We also used MAXQDA qualitative software analysis to code and assist with analyzing transcripts. The software allowed us to organize and manage the data thematically as we had a large number of participants (over 70). The software also enabled us to compare and ensure that the excerpts we highlighted were consistent with what participants were sharing with us across focus groups. We further confirmed these findings through conversations with our with community researchers and partners. This was consistent with the two-eyed seeing framework that we used. 2.4. Ethics The direction of the project was guided by conversations with community members and Elders to ensure that our research and research questions responded to concerns identified by Indigenous Peoples and that our relationship was ethical and non-exploitive (Smith, 2012). During the course of our project, it became clear that community members were much more concerned with identifying structural issues that affected access to health services, and we shifted the focus of data collection to reflect this. It was clear vaccines are important, but understandings about their value and role are nested within a host of other structural concerns that are rooted in historical and ongoing settler colonialism. Thus, data that identified systemic problems and produced data in forms that made sense to individual communities members as well as Indigenous Peoples more broadly was our goal (OCAP, 2014). However, we also needed to maintain the anonymity of individual participants who often shared information that may be perceived as critical of community leadership and/or local service providers. As a result, data returned/shared was anonymized and aggregated. Translation service was offered to participants. Participants gave informed consent prior to taking part in the study; the consulting process included information about the researchers and the purpose and the rationale of the study. This study received ethics approval from the Lakehead University's REB #1465416. 3. Findings Focus group participants ranged in age from 24 to 69 years, 49 (68%) were female, 21 (29%) were parents with children who were minors, and 15 (21%) were elders (aged 55+). One focus group withdrew from the study because their community was revising their research protocols and, until completed, halted all research. Conversations with community members revealed that rural space/location, access to health care, and relationships with health care providers and the state more generally (contemporary and historical) were the most significant factors that informed people's decisions regarding vaccinations. Indeed, relationships between people/community and their health care provider figured most significantly in these conversations and the context within which decisions about health care were made. We explore the ways in which these themes are operationalized in three notions of rural space, mid-range, urban-rural and fly-in/remote spaces, identified by the researchers as relevant. Notably, many communities talked about their experiences with health care providers as negative and frequently affected by racism (Browne, 2005, 2007; Levin and Herbert, 2004). As a result, we identified two important themes about these spaces in regards to state and health practitioners: 1) suspicion and distrust of the state and, by extension, its health care providers, and 2) a lack of choice in healthcare and negative relationships with providers more specifically. 3.1. Urban-rural spaces “Urban-rural” spaces, like typical urban spaces, present a contradictory space for Indigenous People. Thunder Bay, for example, operates as a service center for Indigenous People living across northwestern Ontario. People regularly visit and relocate to the city to obtain services or to access educational or employment opportunities unavailable elsewhere in the region. Although Thunder Bay is not a large city by southern Ontario standards, at 110K people it is the largest city in northern Ontario and the de facto urban center for the region (the closest Canadian cities of comparable size are Winnipeg, MB to the west and Sudbury, ON to the east). Although the potential to access a more diverse range of health care services and providers exists in an urban-rural space, the majority of Indigenous People we interviewed in Thunder Bay did not have a long-term health provider and most often used walk-in clinics or visited the Emergency Room for their care. The people we spoke with reported access to fewer services (e.g., family physician, relied on public health and emergency rooms) and had poorer relationships with providers. Compounded by racism and colonialism, many participants indicated that they had not developed long-term and trusting relationships with health care providers. Without continuity of care or the time necessary to develop a relationship with health providers, people, expressed a lack of trust or comfortability: I moved to this community [Thunder Bay] about eight years ago, and I don't have a regular family doctor. I usually just go to a walk-in clinic. I've had to use the emergency department for my healthcare. Not ideal, obviously, but, yeah. I come from a smaller community, and I had a health practitioner there that I was comfortable with, who I knew in the community, and felt that trust factor, and I feel like, moving to a larger city, I never quite got there. (FG 3). Participants also identified lack of personal identification as another barrier to health access. One participant, who was both a health care practitioner and community member, noted that in the course of her work she frequently encounters Indigenous clients who are without either a birth certificate or Indian status card: I find a lot of people that come in to see a doctor don't have the proper identification. They don't have their birth certificates or Status Card. ‘Oh, man, you're 40-something, you don't have your Status Card? Like, how have you been getting through life?’ (Practitioner 4). Lack of a regular provider or appropriate personal identification was also compounded by perceptions of health care providers who were aggressive with children when giving vaccinations and were “cold” or appeared distant with parents by failing to establish a rapport: Some are really rough and then others are just, I don't know they don't even show anything, they are just boom, boom, done and go. It's very unpleasant. (FG 1). The importance of trust and relationship-building were echoed in the comments of an Indigenous health care provider working at an Indigenous organization: I try to prepare them in a nice way to get their babies vaccinated. See, if they feel someone was rough at the two-month visit, and they feel that someone was kind of being rough, they will avoid coming back for the four-month visit. (Practitioner 7). Further compounding perceptions of rough treatment were the enforcement of inflexible clinic rules that ignored people's circumstances. One mother shared with us that, after a multi-hour bus ride in the rain with her three young children, she was refused service at the clinic for her infant: I was 10 min late, and I was still there but they made me reschedule. Yes, and that was at the [public] health unit! (FG 1). For Indigenous People, developing trust relationships was particularly important because of historical and ongoing relationships with the state. Fear of the state and school authorities using vaccines as means to prove neglect were prominent in many of these conversations: So sometimes schools are problematic to our people. There's a lot of judgment toward us that goes on there. It's supposed to be a place of learning but often you feel like it's a place of punishment when you don't do as you're told. Seeing a school nurse and her telling you what to do is part of that. Vaccines are one more way, it feels like, that we are monitored by the government. So a lot of times you won't see people taking the shots, or taking their vaccines, or whatever … you have to trust your providers, and a lot of times our – like, what she's saying [referring to another focus group participant] about, like, our parents, they all come from Residential School, so they don't have no trust, you know? And that kind of puts a barrier on things that are coming down to the community. I just think it's mostly trust, after what's been done. Lack of trust. (Focus Group 4). Indeed, schools have become sites of conflict in the effort to vaccinate children. Largely the perception among participants was that in order to attend school their children had to be up to date on their vaccinations. One participant described a negative experience, which happened after moving from the reserve to Thunder Bay as a child that has always remained with her: I was seven years old. I didn't have no vaccinations. I remember going to the place on Victoria Ave, there's an old arts building there. Me and my brother were just constantly poked – and we had no idea why. My mom had to sign, or her kids can't go to school. They'd called the truant officer or somebody on us instead of talking to her (FG 4). The importance of building trust and taking the time to listen and answer questions was also highlighted: You go in feeling forced. You don't really understand what's going on. And then if you don't comply – because, you know, you might be scared, you might have issues with authority, or wanting to talk to somebody because you've had bad experiences – then Children's Aid gets called on you. So it's like, I think that there's a lot more that needs to be done around education pieces. (FG 4). Thus, the role played by settler colonialism in urban spaces and the histories and ongoing experiences of violence and racism cannot be overlooked in this context.

#### The 1AC’s appeal to innovation and western imperial science under the justification of inequality is grounded in the “jungle” functioning through a logic of biocolonialism

Barker 19 [Clare Barker is a an Associate Professor in English Literature (Medical Humanities) Their Areas of expertise : postcolonial literature; indigenous literature; disability studies; medical humanities. “Biocolonial Fictions: Medical Ethics and New Extinction

Discourse in Contemporary Biopiracy Narratives”https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7116577/pdf/EMS109293.pdf] //aaditg

The age of big pharma, population genetics, and global health initiatives that transcend national borders has ushered in new forms of extractivism that consist of mining the bodies of Indigenous people, their medicinal plants, and their traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) for their pharmacological potential. These new forms of scientific endeavour echo and reconfigure the colonialist appropriations of the past. As scholar and activist, Vandana Shiva, writes, ‘[t]he colonies have now been extended to the interior spaces, the “genetic codes” of life-forms from microbes and plants to animals, including humans’.1 Shiva terms the expropriation of Indigenous biological resources ‘biopiracy’, while other activists and critics apply the broader term ‘biocolonialism’ to the range of practices that extend colonialist logic to the acquisition of human and plant organic materials, genetic ‘data’, and medicinal knowledge. This term in particular highlights the marked continuities between European colonialist practices of land and resource appropriation and the research practices within what Laurelyn Whitt calls the ‘new imperial science’, which, ‘marked by the confluence of science with capitalism’ and acting ‘in the service of western pharmaceutical … industries’ (among others), ‘enabl[es] the appropriation of indigenous knowledge and resources at a prodigious and escalating rate’.2 The logic of biocolonial extractivism operates through a reorientation of the temporal formations of settler colonialism, which equate settler practices with development and consign Indigenous peoples to the past. The land dispossessions of the colonial era were facilitated by powerful narratives of inevitable Indigenous extinction: ‘vanishing Indians’, Maori and Aboriginal ‘dying races’. As critics have shown, contemporary biocolonialist initiatives operate on similar assumptions, under which indigenous biospecimens must be preserved and biological data acquired before they vanish forever. Joanna Radin demonstrates that, since the mid-twentieth century, the ability to freeze and store blood and other organic samples has ‘emerged as a potentially powerful strategy for preserving fragments of a world that appeared to be increasingly in flux’. It enables ‘biological material to be studied in the present and especially in the future’, when (whether due to genetic admixture, European diseases, or environmental damage produced by the industrialized global North) ‘the individuals from whom it had been extracted were expected to have disappeared or changed beyond recognition’.3 In this article, I explore the intertwined relationship between medical research ethics and the logic and ideology of biocolonialism as it is represented in two contemporary American novels, Ann Patchett’s State of Wonder (2011) and Hanya Yanagihara’s The People in the Trees (2013). These novels depict ‘medical adventurer[s]’4 undertaking biocolonialist excursions into the remote jungles of, respectively, the Amazon and the Pacific, and are centrally concerned with the methods and infrastructure of biomedical and pharmaceutical research. In both cases, the fictional scientists’ ethically problematic research practices implicate them in what Pauline Wakeford calls ‘two entangled narratives of death and disappearance: the grand récits of wildlife extinction and the vanishing Indian’.5 I focus in particular on how these texts, by presenting us with fictional bioethical quandaries related to human longevity and reproduction, engage with the new formulations of extinction discourse produced by the life sciences. Patrick Brantlinger asserts that colonial ‘extinction discourse was performative in the sense that it acted on the world as well as described it’.6 State of Wonder and The People in the Trees both imagine biological discoveries with the potential to extend human lifecycles, but these research endeavours are steeped in extinctionist ideology and themselves set in motion the decimation of previously thriving Indigenous communities. Aspirational narratives of ‘eternal life’ (in Yanagihara) and ‘world health’ (in Patchett) are underpinned by the knowledge that these communities, reframed as research subjects, are likely to vanish in the wake of what Warwick Anderson calls ‘scientific colonialism’, along with their unique ecosystems.7 The different narrative temporalities of these texts – Patchett’s anticipating a significant breakthrough in global health, Yanagihara’s narrated retrospectively from a position of irreversible loss – produce divergent valuations of human and nonhuman lives and different perspectives on the ethics of biopiracy, as I shall discuss. But in reading them together, I demonstrate how fictional engagements with biocolonial science illuminate the continuities between colonial-era extractivism and contemporary research practices. In their temporal reorientations and their ability to imagine actual and potential acts of extinction, these texts resituate extinction discourse squarely within the context of twentieth- and twenty-first-century bioscientific experimentation. State of Wonder follows Marina Singh, a pharmacologist for a multinational pharmaceutical corporation, Vogel, on her expedition into the Amazon to investigate the death in the field of her colleague, Anders Eckman, and to assess the progress of a senior scientist, Annick Swenson, who is developing a fertility drug for Vogel while living with a remote tribe, the Lakashi. Swenson has discovered that the Lakashi women’s practice of chewing bark from a particular local tree (the Martin tree) not only alters their reproductive chemistry, allowing them to conceive and give birth into their seventies and eighties, but also inoculates them against malaria. Alongside their work on the fertility drug, Swenson and her team are surreptitiously developing a malaria vaccine at Vogel’s expense, which will have little appeal logic tied up with numerous contemporary research initiatives, particularly the Human Genome Diversity Project. See, for example, to company shareholders even though it ‘will have enormous benefits to world health’, since ‘[t]he people who need a malarial vaccine will never have the means to pay for it’.8 As the narrative unfolds, the protection of the Lakashi, their lifeways, and their environment is pitted against this urgent global health imperative to save the lives of the ‘[e]ight hundred thousand children’ who, as Swenson tells Marina, ‘die every year of malaria’ in the so-called ‘Third World’.9 The People in the Trees is framed as the memoirs of Norton Perina, a ‘renowned immunologist’ who, as a young doctor in 1950, joins an anthropological expedition to U’ivu, a fictional Micronesian state.10 Along with his anthropologist colleagues, he ‘discovers’ a ‘lost tribe’ living on the island of Ivu’ivu whose ritual ingestion of a sacred turtle endemic to the island, the opa’ivu’eke, causes extended longevity, with some tribe members apparently living for several hundred years. Perina’s research on this phenomenon earns him a Nobel Prize for Medicine, but also kickstarts a rapid process of biocolonial incursion on this island that has ‘never [before] been colonized’, beginning with pharmaceutical companies, seeking to develop ‘age-retarding drugs, … anti-aging skin creams, [and] elixirs to restore male potency’, ‘swarming throughout Ivu’ivu on the hunt for the opa’ivu’eke’.11 It results in the extinction of the turtle, the razing of the island, and the decimation of the Ivu’ivuan community through an accelerated experience of the impacts of colonization, including forced displacement, alcoholism, and disease. Both texts emphasize the overdetermination of their respective jungle environments by longstanding colonialist tropes of exotic difference that are inflected by bioscientific discourse. The Pacific island, as Elizabeth DeLoughrey has demonstrated, has long been figured as a remote, ‘hermetically sealed laboratory’, ‘deemed ahistorical and isolated’ from modernity and therefore ideal for experimentation in anthropology, ecology, and nuclear science.12 The Amazon, meanwhile, is imagined as what Veronica Davidov terms a ‘pharmacopia’ that holds within its rich ecosystems ‘fantastic cures for illnesses that defy the capacities of the Western pharmaceutical industry’, or, as Dr Swenson puts it in State of Wonder, ‘some sort of magical medicine chest’.13 Under the globalized conditions of the biomedical and pharmaceutical industries, the jungle spaces outside the West are vulnerable to exploitation due to their construction as ‘global commons’ or ‘global resource frontier[s]’ available to be harvested for their medical riches.14 As Swenson asserts in an unapologetic utilization of extractivist rhetoric: ‘there is much to be taken from the jungle’.15 Through their focus on the activities of life scientists in the interconnected fields of big pharma and global health, both novels appear to offer a critique of the impacts of biocolonialism on Indigenous people and the ecosystems in which they exist. But, as I will show, Perina’s retrospective narration in The People in the Trees brings into critical focus the extinctionist logic of biocolonial science, while State of Wonder’s anticipatory positioning is ultimately bound up with the future-oriented rhetoric used to justify much exploitative and damaging scientific research.

#### The alternative is refusal – a political depression that recognizes reconciliation will never be enough and creates harmful optimism to the political. Instead, embrace an affective pessimism that grounds alternative futures. The question is not whether Native people want the world, but if the world wants Native people

Belcourt 2016 (Billy-ray Belcourt is from the Driftpile Cree Nation. He is a 2016 Rhodes Scholar and is reading for an M.St. in Women's Studies at the University of Oxford. He was named by CBC Books as one of six Indigenous writers to watch,Political Depression in a Time of Reconciliation, Jan 15, 2016, <http://activehistory.ca/2016/01/political-depression-in-a-time-of-reconciliation/)//NotJacob//recut> anop

It’s tough: knowing that you might not get the world you want and the world that wants you back, that your bones might never stop feeling achy and fragile from the wear and tear of mere existence, from the hard labour of getting through the day. Ours are bodies that have been depleted by time, that have been wrenched into a world they can’t properly bend or squirm into because our flesh is paradoxically both too much and not enough for it. In the wake of both eventful and slowed kinds of premature death, what does it mean that the state wants so eagerly to move Indigenous bodies, to touch them, so to speak? Reconciliation is an affective mess: it throws together and condenses histories of trauma and their shaky bodies and feelings into a neatly bordered desire; a desire to let go, to move on, to turn to the future with open arms, as it were. Reconciliation is stubbornly ambivalent in its potentiality, an object of desire that we’re not entirely certain how to acquire or substantiate, but one that the state – reified through the bodies of politicians, Indigenous or otherwise – is telling us we need. In fact, Justice Murray Sinclair noted that the launch of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report on December 15, 2015, puts us at the “threshold of a new era in this country.”[1] I am interested in how life might be lived willfully and badly in the face of governmental forms of redress when many of us are stretched thin, how reconciliation, though instantiating a noticeable shift in the national affective atmosphere,[2] doesn’t actually remake the substance of the social or the political such that we’re still tethered to scenes of living that can’t sustain us. What I am trying to get at is: reconciliation works insofar as it is a way of looking forward to being in this world, at the expense of more radical projects like decolonization that want to experiment with different strategies for survival.[3] This way of doing things isn’t working and, because of that, optimism is hard to come by. According to cultural theorist Ann Cvetkovich, political depression emerges from the realization “that customary forms of political response, including direct action and critical analysis, are no longer working either to change the world or to make us feel better.”[4] It is the pestering sense that whatever you do, it won’t be enough; that things will continue uninterrupted, teasing you because something different is all you’ve wanted from the start. To be politically depressed is to worry about the temporal reach of neoliberal projects like reconciliation, to question their orientation toward the future because the present requires all of your energy in order to feel like anything but dying. Political depression is of a piece with a dispossessory enterprise that remakes the topography of the ordinary such that the labour of maintaining one’s life becomes too hard to keep up. We have to wait for the then and there in the here and now; how do we preserve ourselves until then? As Leanne Simpson points out, reconciliation has been reparative for some survivors, encouraging them to tell their stories, to keep going, so to speak.[5] But, what of the gendered and racialized technologies of violence that created our scenes of living, scenes we’ve been forced to think are of our own choosing? Optimism for the work of reconciliation disappeared in the face of multiple crises: of Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, of HIV infection rates, of mass incarceration, of diabetes, of suicide. Reconciliation, at once a heuristic and a form of statecraft, fakes a political that doesn’t actually exist as such, one that not only presupposes that we – Indigenous peoples, that is – are willing to stay attached to it, but that we are already folded into it, that we’ve already consented to it. What does it mean, for example, to consent to a nation-to-nation relationship if there are no other options to choose from? Reconciliation wants so badly to be a keyword of sorts, to contain so much inside its semantic confines, to be “wide-reaching in its explanatory power.”[6] I’m not surprised things have started to leak all over the place. Decolonization might need something of an affective turn: I think there are ways of being attuned to our bodies such that we can gauge if our visceral responses are trained or not, parasitic or not. In short: what do our tears signal, what do his – Justin Trudeau’s – signal? We cry because pain holds our world together. I don’t want pain to hold our world together anymore. Perhaps admitting we are politically depressed is one of the most important things we could do in this day and age. When survival becomes radical and death becomes part and parcel of the ordinary itself, political depression might be our only point of departure. But, political depression is also about dreaming up alternatives that can sustain your attachments to life. Cvetkovich reminds us that we need “other affective tools for transformation” because hope and blind allegiance have failed too many of us too often.[7] I am interested in the generative work of pessimism, how being fed up propels us onward, and keeps us grounded in the now, such that we can make it to the future, even if that’s just tomorrow. As Kim TallBear put it, we’ve been living in a post-apocalyptic world (in its ecological ruins and in the face of its crisis-making politics) for quite some time,[8] one that exhausts our bodies to the point of depression and death and one that slowly removes us from the non-normative or the astray.[9] We are stuck in the thick of things, left clinging to an impasse without an exit strategy. We might need reconciliation today, but Indigenous peoples need a more capacious world-building project for tomorrow, one that can bear all of us and the sovereignties built into our breathing. We should not be asked: do you want the world today? Instead, we should be asking: does the world want us?

#### The counterinterpretation is that you should evaluate the 1AC as an object of study

#### [a] Sociogeny – debate may not spill over to political change but it has the potential to reproduce affirmations and negations that trigger neurohcmeical responses via reward and punishment mechanisms privilege certain research methods as valuable in the way debaters view the world.

#### [b] Objectivity – consequence based plan focus shifts the focus of debate from our investments in settler colonialism to a plan text, which is incoherent because debate is a communicative activity and their inter sidesteps discussions of genocide.

#### [c] Temporality – the affs models teaches violence can be wished away through administrative tinkering propogating desires within debate to play as activits without reimagnign the social structures that cause violence in the first place. Viewing the ballot as an mechanism to restore ethicality fails – they still dogmatically adhere to these protocols even though they know debate doesn’t caus emateiral change. That creates an process where nativeness is confined to death as their promise of a fiated political horizon relies on a politics of futurity.

### Util

#### Moean

#### Empirical claimw out warrant

#### Q of what type of pleasure

#### YPAR

#### I hv !t political resistant stregies which means its not transformative

#### There is no spill over to activism – fiat doesn’t mean the plan happens irl cx proves they cant exlpain

#### The aff is not an isntnae of activism or resistance nor is it YPAR which means they don’t get offense don’t let the 1ar make this clarification should have been in the 1AC

#### Deostn matter if I have !t the stasis point fo research the 1AC begins at

Not responsive to the criticism

### Covid

#### waiver doesn’t solve- it doesn’t obligate countries to do anything, just makes it legal.

Mercurio 21 [Bryan; Professor of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; "The IP Waiver for COVID-19: Bad Policy, Bad Precedent," 2021; 1-6. International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law.] Justin

It is not only the length of time which is an issue but also the ultimate impact of the waiver. A waiver simply means that a WTO Member would not be in violation of its WTO obligations if it does not protect and enforce the COVID-19-related IPRs for the duration of the waiver. The waiver would thus allow Members to deviate from their international obligations but not obligate Members to suspend protection and enforcement of the IPRs. Members like the US who support the waiver may not implement the necessary domestic legislation to waive IPRs within the jurisdiction. It is questionable whether the US could even legally implement the waiver given that IPRs are a matter of constitutional law.17

#### The squo is goldilocks--COVAX and licensing agreements ensure vaccine access now, but patent waiver causes unsafe vaccines and decks innovation.

Crosby et al. 21 (Daniel Crosby [Lawyer specializing in international trade/law], Evan Diamond [Lawyer specializing in pharmaceutical and biotechnology patent litigation], Isabel Fernandez de la Cuesta [Lawyer specializing in international treaty arbitration], Jamieson Greer [Lawyer specializing in international trade], Jeffrey Telep [Lawyer specializing in international trade litigation], Brian White [Lawyer specializing in international arbitration], Group of Nearly 60 WTO Members Seek Unprecedented Waiver from WTO Intellectual Property Protection for COVID-related Medical Products, JD Supra, 3/5/2021, <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/group-of-nearly-60-wto-members-seek-2523821/>) hwof

Efforts to develop, produce, and equitably distribute medical products. WTO Members recognize that unprecedented demand for medical products used in the fight against COVID-19 has far outstripped supply of required supplies. Several WTO Members have pointed out that intellectual property protections have not limited production of vaccines and other medical products. Rather, these Members have argued that intellectual property protection has incentivized the research, development and production of the necessary vaccines, treatments and products. Moreover, the international community is coordinating and funding equitable COVID-19 vaccine distribution globally through COVAX, which is organized by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, the World Health Organization and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations. Despite these facts, less developed countries continue to push for a waiver of all intellectual property protection for medical products related to the pandemic. Waiver risks uncontrolled use of patented technologies, without improving vaccine access. Pharmaceutical companies can provide, and have provided, licenses to distribute or scale-up production of COVID-19 vaccines and therapies at reduced cost. Such license agreements allow for expanded access in low- and middle-income countries, while also setting reasonable parameters so that patents and other IP rights are used to address the specific medical needs of the COVID-19

pandemic at hand, and not for other purposes. License agreements also allow for orderly technology transfer, including of unpatented “trade secret” information and other critical “know-how,” that may be essential to efficiently producing and scaling-up safe and effective versions of technologically complex vaccines and biologic drug products. Under the present TRIPS waiver proposal, however, member countries could try to exploit an extraordinarily broad scope of IP and copy patented technologies so long as they are “in relation to prevention, containment or treatment of COVID-19.” For example, under an expansive reading of the proposed waiver language, a member country could try to produce patented pharmaceutical compounds that have other indicated uses predating COVID-19, if such compounds had later been studied or experimentally used for potential symptomatic relief or antiviral activity in COVID-19 patients. The same risks may be faced by manufacturers of patented materials or devices that have multiple uses predating COVID-19, but also may be used as “personal protective equipment” or components thereof, or in other measures arguably relating to COVID-19 “prevention” or “containment.” At the same time, it is unclear how the proposed TRIPS waiver could provide the technology transfer and know-how critical for making the complex molecules and formulations constituting the various COVID-19 vaccines. Vaccine manufacture undertaken by an unauthorized party without the proper processes and controls could result in a different product that is potentially ineffective or results in unwanted health consequences. And even if an unauthorized manufacturer could overcome those substantial hurdles to reverse-engineer and scale up a safe and effective vaccine copy, it would likely take substantial time and a series of failures to do so. Notably, several of the original COVID-19 vaccine developers have recently faced low product yield and other manufacturing challenges during pre-commercial scale-up efforts and the initial months of commercial production.

#### No I/L to great power war lol – their ev is abt global ehatlh crisses not just spec covid which means 1.5 years of covid check

**IPR hasn’t harmed access – manufacturing capacity alt cause**

**Mercurio 2/12** (Bryan Mercurio, [Simon F.S. Li Professor of Law at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), having served as Associate Dean (Research) from 2010-14 and again from 2017-19. Professor Mercurio specialises in international economic law (IEL), with particular expertise in the intersection between trade law and intellectual property rights, free trade agreements, trade in services, dispute settlement and increasingly international investment law.], 2-12-2021, “WTO Waiver from Intellectual Property Protection for COVID-19 Vaccines and Treatments: A Critical Review“, No Publication, accessed: 8-8-2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3789820) ajs

2. Intellectual property rights have not hampered access to COVID-19 vaccines

A WTO waiver is an extreme measure which should only be used when existing WTO obligations prove inadequate. This was the case in relation to the compulsory licencing provisions under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, which essentially precluded Members with no or inadequate manufacturing capabilities from making use of the flexibility granted in the TRIPS Agreement. 25 This was also the case with the Kimberley Process, which attempts to eliminate trade in “conflict diamonds”. 26

Although the IP waiver proposal states that “there are several reports about intellectual property rights hindering or potentially hindering timely provisioning of affordable medical products to the patients”, 27 the sponsors did not provide further elaboration or evidence to support their declaration that “many countries especially developing countries may face institutional and legal difficulties when using flexibilities available [under the TRIPS Agreement]”. 28 Instead, many of the examples used by India and South Africa point to problems not with the TRIPS Agreement but rather to failures at the domestic level. As mentioned above, the WTO allowed for the importation of medicines under a compulsory licence in 2003, and yet many developing countries have yet to put in place any framework to allow their country to make use of the flexibility. 29 This is not an institutional problem of the international system but rather a problem at the country level.

Two additional factors which make the proposed waiver unnecessary and potentially harmful. First, pharmaceutical companies are selling the vaccine at extremely reasonable rates and several announced plans for extensive not-for-profit sales.30 Although agreements between the pharmaceutical companies and governments are not publicly disclosed, the Belgian Secretary of State Eva De Bleeker temporarily made publicly available in a tweet the prices the EU is being charged by each manufacturer. The De Bleeker tweet indicated the European Commission negotiated price arrangements with six companies, with the range of spending between €1.78 and €18 per coronavirus vaccine dosage. Specific price per dose listed for each of the six vaccines was as follows: Oxford/AstraZeneca: (€1.78), Johnson & Johnson (€8.50), Sanofi/GSK (€7.56), CureVac (€10), BioNTech/Pfizer (€12) and Moderna (€18).31

While much as been made of the fact that South Africa agreed to purchase 1.5 million doses of the Oxford/AstraZeneca from the Serum Institute of India (SII) at a cost of €4.321 per dose,32 these criticisms are directed at the lack of transparency in pharmaceutical licenses and production contracts – an issue which would be wholly unaddressed by a waiver of IPRs.

Moreover, while the disparity in pricing is concerning the overall per dosage rate South Africa is paying nevertheless represents value for money given the expected health and economic returns on investment. Despite the disparity in pricing between nations, the larger point remains that the industry has not only rapidly produced vaccines for the novel coronavirus but is making them available at unquestionably reasonable prices.

Second, the proposed waiver will do nothing to address the problem of lack of capacity or the transfer of technology and goodwill. Pharmaceutical companies have not applied for patents in the majority of developing countries – in such countries, any manufacturer is free to produce and market the vaccine inside the territory of that country or to export the vaccine to other countries where patents have not been filed.33 Patents cannot be the problem in the countries where no patent applications have been filed, but the lack of production in such countries points to the real problem – these countries lack manufacturing capacity and capability.

While advanced pharmaceutical companies will have the technology, know-how and readiness to manufacture, store and transport complex vaccine formulations, such factories and logistics exist in only a handful of countries.34 Regardless of whether an IP waiver is granted, the remaining countries will be left without enhanced vaccine access and still reliant on imported supplies. With prices for the vaccine already very low, it is doubtful that generic suppliers will be able to provide the vaccine at significantly lower prices. Under such a scenario, the benefit of the waiver would go not to the countries in need but to the generic supplier who would not need to pay the licence fee or royalty to the innovator. Thus, the waiver would simply serve to benefit advanced generic manufacturers, most of which are located in a handful of countries, including China and Brazil as well as (unsurprisingly) India and South Africa. Countries would perhaps be better off obtaining the vaccine from suppliers that have negotiated a voluntary licence from the patent holder, as such licences include provisions for the transfer of technology, know-how and ongoing quality assurance support.

#### Interdependence doesn’t solve war – prefer studies at the multilateral not just dyadic level – competitive dynamics outweigh conflict dampening incentives.

Chatagnier and Kavakli 17 – (2017, J. Tyson, PhD in Political Science, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Houston, and Kerim Can, PhD in Political Science, assistant professor at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Sabanci University in Turkey, “From Economic Competition to Military Combat: Export Similarity and International Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 61, Issue 7, 2017)

International trade has long been thought to facilitate peace among nations (Kant [1795] 1970). A voluntary exchange of goods that leaves both parties better off inherently raises the value of each side to the other, increasing the cost of conflict. The belief that economic interaction can ignite a positive dynamic of cooperation and reduce conflictual behavior is so intuitive and widespread that some political pundits have even heralded free trade as the path to world peace (see, e.g., Griswold 1998; Boudreaux 2006).The conventional wisdom within the international relations literature (e.g., Oneal and Russett 1997; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2003; Polachek and Xiang 2010) reinforces these claims, having found consistent empirical (and theoretical) links between trade and peace. At the same time, however, there is certainly evidence that trade can exacerbate rivalry and conflict between states. Throughout history, states have fought their competitors for advantage (i.e., access to inputs and markets) in the global marketplace. For instance, in his authoritative account of the Anglo-German rivalry before World War I, Kennedy (1980, 464) concludes that “the most profound cause [of the conflict], surely, was economic”. More specifically, the cause was “the detectable increase in Anglo-German trade rivalry since Bismarck’s time as the latter country steadily became more competitive.” Moreover, while modern empirical international relations research has largely come down on the side of the neoliberals, it has not been monolithic. Indeed, numerous studies by Barbieri (1996, 2002) have demonstrated that increased trade actually has the potential to aggravate tensions between states. These inconsistencies in both the historical and analytical records raise questions about the simplicity of the link between trade and conflict. Additionally, the vast majority of previous work considers only the bilateral effects of trade, neglecting the way in which trade between two actors can affect a third. We remedy this oversight by analyzing the effects of trade competition, arguing that the tension produced by export competition can be an important source of international conflict. More specifically, we highlight that economic actors who face foreign competition have an incentive to use military power to gain an advantage in international markets. These domestic actors can use their economic power to influence their nation’s political elites and increase the likelihood that economic conflict erupts into war. We support this theoretical argument with several well-established historical cases including the seventeenth-century Dutch-English commercial rivalry, the pre-World War I Anglo-German rivalry, and the 1990 invasion of Kuwait

by Iraq. Our argument suggests that, although trade can have a pacifying direct effect at the dyadic level, it also has strong indirect effects, which can be conflict aggravating. We test this argument using commodity-level trade data from 1962 to 2000. We measure each country pair’s portfolio similarity along nearly 1,300 commodity categories and test the effect of this variable on several indicators of international conflict. Our results strongly support our claim that countries that produce and export similar goods are significantly more likely to fight, even taking into account their bilateral trade. These findings are robust to several checks on model specification as well as alternative explanations. We also show that our findings are not driven by oil or other strategic resources and that they hold for both raw and manufactured goods. In light of these results, we are confident that we have identified a significant and practically important cause of war.