### 1

#### Interp: All debaters must disclose all broken positions on the NDCA LD wiki.  The disclosure must include tags, analytics, complete citations, including page numbers, and the full text from each piece of evidence. The disclosure must occur within 30 minutes of the start of the round.

Violation: screenshots in the doc – they went to UK a bid tournament but haven’t disclose affs

A screenshot of a computer

Description automatically generated

Standards

#### Table Description automatically generated

**Quality research: disclosure promotes quality research and in-depth engagement.**

**Nails 13.** Jacob Nails debated on the high school LD national circuit and now debates for Georgia State University, 10-10-2013, "A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third-Party Disclosure) by Jacob Nails," NSD Update, <http://nsdupdate.com/2013/10/10/a-defense-of-disclosure-including-third-party-disclosure-by-jacob-nails/> //RS

I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides. First, disclosure streamlines research. Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of. Students can look through the different studies on the topic and choose the best ones on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature. The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. Quality of evidence increases across the board. In theory, the increased quality of information could trade off with quantity. If debaters could just look to the wiki for evidence, it might remove the competitive incentive to do one’s own research. Empirically, however, the opposite has been true. In fact, a second advantage of disclosure is that it motivates research. Debaters cannot expect to make it a whole topic with the same stock AC – that is, unless they are continually updating and frontlining it. Likewise, debaters with access to their opponents’ cases can do more targeted and specific research. Students can go to a new level of depth, researching not just the pros and cons of the topic but the specific authors, arguments, and advocacies employed by other debaters. The incentive to cut author-specific indicts is low if there’s little guarantee that the author will ever be cited in a round but high if one knows that specific schools are using that author in rounds. In this way, disclosure increases incentive to research by altering a student’s cost-benefit analysis so that the time spent researching is more valuable, i.e. more likely to produce useful evidence because it is more directed. In any case, if publicly accessible evidence jeopardized research, backfiles and briefs would have done LD in a long time ago.

#### Clash – disclosing solves predictability and allows debaters to prep for arguments before tournaments. Means, 1NC and 1AR blocks will become better because debaters can more easily form a coherent strategy. Strategy outweighs because it allows for in-depth argumentation and coherent rebuttals. Even if it’s a new aff disclosure ensures a) you are actually reading a new aff b) helps use see what kind of debater you are. Key to education because it creates better argumentation.

#### Voter:

#### Education – only portable impact we can from debate and reason why schools fund

#### .

Drop the debater

1. Doesn’t make sense because you were abusive out of round.
2. Sets a precedent

Competing interps

1. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom because debaters keep being barely reasonable, magnifying abuse.

No RVIs

1. RVIs center the debate on theory instead of substance because it’s the only place the round can be decided.

### 2 (3:30 – 4:00)

#### Indigeneity connotates a state of non-ontology allowing for the construction of the human that legitimizes its self into a history of elimination, jettisoned from or assimilated into the national body to cohere settler temporality

Belcourt 16. Billy-Ray Belcourt is from the Driftpile Cree Nation. He is a 2016 Rhodes Scholar and is reading for an M.St. in Women’s Studies at the University of Oxford. He was named by CBC Books as one of six Indigenous writers to watch, and his poetry has been published or is forthcoming in Assaracus: A Journal of Gay Poetry, Red Rising Magazine, SAD Mag, mâmawi-âcimowak, PRISM International, and The Malahat Review. ("A POLTERGEIST MANIFESTO," 2016, *Feral Feminism*) vikas recut aaditg

Admittedly, the feral is a precarious space from which to theorize, sullied with an injurability bound up in the work of liberal humanism as such, an enterprise that weaponizes a set of moral barometers to distribute ferality unevenly to differently citizened and raced bodies—ones that are too close for comfort and must be pushed outside arm’s reach. Perhaps ferality traverses a semantic line of flight commensurate­ with that of savagery, barbarism, and lawlessness, concreting into one history of elimination: that is, a history of eliminating recalcitrant indigeneities incompatible within a supposedly hygienic social. The word savage comes from the Latin salvaticus, an alteration of silvaticus, meaning “wild,” literally “of the woods.” Of persons, it means “reckless, ungovernable” (“Savage”). In the space-time of settler states, savagery temporarily stands in for those subjectivities tethered to a supposedly waning form of indigeneity, one that came from the woods and, because of this, had to be jettisoned from or assimilated into the national body. Here is Audra Simpson on the history of Indian “lawlessness”: Its genealogy extends back to the earliest moments of recorded encounter, when Indians appeared to have no law, to be without order, and thus, to be in the colonizer’s most generous articulation of differentiation, in need of the trappings of civilization. “Law” may be one instrument of civilization, as a regulating technique of power that develops through the work upon a political body and a territory. (2014, 144) According to Simpson, the recognition of Indigenous peoples as lawless rendered them governable, motivating the settler state (here, Canada) to curate and thus contain atrophied indigeneities—and, consequently, their sovereignties, lands, and politics—within the borders of federal law (2014, 144-45). Similarly, in The Transit of Empire Jodi Byrd traces the epistemological gimmicks through which the concept of “Indianness” came to align with “the savage other” (2011, 27). For her, this alignment provided the “rationale for imperial domination” and continues to stalk philosophy’s patterns of thinking (ibid.). Simpson, writing about the Mohawks of Kahnawake, argues that “a fear of lawlessness” continues to haunt the colonial imaginary, thereby diminishing “Indigenous rights to trade and to act as sovereigns in their own territories” (2014, 145). We might take the following lyrics from the popular Disney film Pocahontas as an example of the ways indigeneity circulates as a feral signifier in colonial economies of meaning-making: [Ratcliffe] What can you expect From filthy little heathens? Their whole disgusting race is like a curse Their skin’s a hellish red They’re only good when dead They’re vermin, as I said And worse [English settlers] They’re savages! Savages! Barely even human. (Gabriel and Goldberg 1995) Savagery connotes a state of non-ontology: Indigenous peoples are forced to cling to a barely extant humanity and coterminously collapse into a putatively wretched form of animality. Savagery is lethal, and its Indian becomes the prehistoric alibi through which the human is constituted as such. Indigenous peoples have therefore labored to explain away this savagery, reifying whitened rubrics for proper citizenship and crafting a genre of life tangible within the scenes of living through that are constitutive of settler colonialism as such. These scenes, however, are dead set on destroying the remnants of that savagery, converting their casualties into morally compatible subjects deserving of rights and life in a multicultural state that stokes the liberal fantasy of life after racial trauma at the expense of decolonial flourishing itself. This paper is therefore interested in the subjectivities and forms of sociality that savagery destroys when applied from without, and the political work of appropriating that savagery in the name of decolonization. Ours is a form of indigeneity that hints at a fundamental pollutability that both confirms and threatens forms of ontology tethered to a taxonomized humanity built in that foundational episode of subjection of which Simpson speaks. I am suggesting that savagery always-already references an otherworld of sorts: there are forms of life abandoned outside modernity’s episteme whose expressivities surge with affects anomalous within the topography of settler colonialism. This paper is not a historicist or nostalgic attachment to a pre-savage indigeneity resurrected from a past somehow unscathed by the violence that left us in the thick of things in the first place. Instead, I emphasize the potentiality of ferality as a politics in a world bent on our destruction—a world that eliminates indigeneities too radical to collapse into a collective sensorium, training us to a live in an ordinary that the settler state needs to persist as such, one that only some will survive. This world incentivizes our collusion with a multicultural state instantiated through a myth of belonging that actively disavows difference in the name of that very difference. We are repeatedly hurried into a kind of waning sociality, the content and form of which appear both too familiar and not familiar enough. In short, we are habitually left scavenging for ways to go on without knowing what it is we want. Let’s consider Jack Halberstam’s thoughts on “the wild”: It is a tricky word to use but it is a concept that we cannot live without if we are to combat the conventional modes of rule that have synced social norms to economic practices and have created a world order where every form of disturbance is quickly folded back into quiet, where every ripple is quickly smoothed over, where every instance of eruption has been tamped down and turned into new evidence of the rightness of the status quo. (2013, 126) Where Halberstam finds disturbance, I find indigeneity-cum-disturbance par excellence. Halberstam’s “wild” evokes a potentiality laboured in the here and now and “an alternative to how we want to think about being” in and outside an authoritarian state (2013, 126-27). Perhaps the wild risks the decolonial, a geography of life-building that dreams up tomorrows whose referents are the fractured indigeneities struggling to survive a historical present built on our suffering. Ferality is a stepping stone to a future grounded in Indigenous peoples’ legal and political orders. This paper does not traffic in teleologies of the anarchic or lawless as they emerge in Western thought; instead, it refuses settler sovereignty and calls for forms of collective Indigenous life that are attuned to queerness’s wretched histories and future-making potentialities. Indigeneity is an ante-ontology of sorts: it is prior to and therefore disruptive of ontology. Indigeneity makes manifest residues or pockets of times, worlds, and subjectivities that warp both common sense and philosophy into falsities that fall short of completely explaining what is going on. Indigenous life is truncated in the biopolitical category of Savage in order to make our attachments to ourselves assimilable inside settler colonialism’s national sensorium. Settler colonialism purges excessive forms of indigeneity that trouble its rubrics for sensing out the human and the nonhuman. In other words, settler colonialism works up modes of being-in-the-world that narrate themselves as the only options we have. What would it mean, then, to persist in the space of savagery, exhausting the present and holding out for futures that are not obsessed with the proper boundary between human and nonhuman life? This paper now turns to the present, asking: what happens when indigeneity collides with queerness inside the reserve, and how might a feral theory make sense of that collision? Deadly Presents “I went through a really hard time… I was beaten; more than once. I was choked” (Klassen 2014). These were the words of Tyler-Alan Jacobs, a two-spirit man from the Squamish Nation, capturing at once the terror of queer life on the reserve and the hardening of time into a thing that slows down bodies and pushes them outside its securitized geographies. Jacobs had grown up with his attackers, attackers who were energized by the pronouncement of queerness—how it insisted on being noticed, how it insisted on being. When the dust settled, “his right eye [had] dislodged and the side of his faced [had] caved in” (ibid.). Settler colonialism is fundamentally affective: it takes hold of the body, makes it perspire, and wears it out. It converts flesh into pliable automations and people into grim reapers who must choose which lives are worth keeping in the world. It can turn a person into a murderer in a matter of seconds; it is an epistemic rupturing of our attachments to life, to each other, and to ourselves. It is as if settler colonialism were simultaneously a rescue and military operation, a holy war of sorts tasked with exorcising the spectre of queer indigeneity and its putative infectivity. I rehearse this case because it allows me to risk qualifying the reserve as a geography saturated with heteronormativity’s socialities. This is a strategic interdiction that destroys supposedly degenerative queer affect worlds, untangling some bodies and not others from the future. I don’t have the statistics to substantiate these claims, but there is an archive of heartbreak and loss that is easy to come by if you ask the right people. Indeed, what would such statistics tell us that we don’t already know? What would the biopolitical work of data collection do to a knowledge-making project that thinks outside the big worlds of Statistics and Demography and, instead, inside the smaller, more precarious worlds created in the wake of gossip? I worry about ethnographic projects that seek to account for things and theory in the material in order to map the coordinates of an aberration to anchor it and its voyeurs in the theatres of the academy. The desire to attach to a body is too easily energized by a biological reading of gender that repudiates the very subjects it seeks so desperately to know and to study. What about the body? I have been asked this question, again and again. A feral theory is something of a call to arms: abolish this sort of ethnography and turn to those emergent methodologies that might better make sense of the affects and life-forms that are just now coming into focus and have been destroyed or made invisible in the name of research itself. Queer indigeneity, to borrow Fred Moten’s description of blackness, might “come most clearly into relief, by way of its negation” (2014). Perhaps decolonization needs to be a sort of séance: an attempt to communicate with the dead, a collective rising-up from the reserve’s necropolis, a feral becoming-undead. Boyd and Thrush’s Phantom Past, Indigenous Presence thinks indigeneity and its shaky histories vis-à-vis the language of haunting, where haunting is an endurant facet of “the experience of colonialism” (Bodinger de Uriarte 2012, 303). But, for me, ghostliness is differentially distributed: some more than others will be wrenched into the domain of the dead and forced to will their own ontologies into the now. Perhaps the universalist notion that haunting is a metonym for indigeneity repudiates the very life-forms that it claims to include: those who are differently queered and gendered, and, because of this, haunt waywardly and in ways that cannot be easily predicted (Ahmed 2015). This paper thus takes an imaginative turn and proceeds with something of an incantation to summon the figure of the queer Indigenous poltergeist—the feral monster in the horror story of decolonization. Queer Indigenous poltergeists do not linger inaudibly in the background; we are beside ourselves with anger, we make loud noises and throw objects around because we are demanding retribution for homicide, unloved love, and cold shoulders. We do not reconcile; we escape the reserve, pillage and mangle the settler-colonial episteme. Our arrival is both uneventful and apocalyptic, a point of departure and an entry point for an ontology that corresponds with a future that has yet to come. Sometimes all we have is the promise of the future. For the queer Indigenous poltergeist, resurrection is its own form of decolonial love. The poltergeist is an ontological anomaly: a fusion of human, object, and ghost, a “creature of social reality” and a “creature of fiction” (Haraway 1991, 149). From the German poltern meaning “[to] make noise, [to] rattle” and Geist or “ghost,” it literally means “noisy ghost,” speaking into existence an anti-subjectivity that emerges in the aftermath of death or murder (“Poltergeist”). It is the subject of Tobe Hooper’s 1982 film Poltergeist, which tells a story of “a haunting based on revenge” (Tuck and Ree 2013, 652). The film’s haunting is a wronging premised on an initial wrong: the eponymous poltergeist materializes when a mansion is constructed on a cemetery—a disturbing of spirits, if you will. José Esteban Muñoz argues that “The double ontology of ghosts and ghostliness, the manner in which ghosts exist inside and out and traverse categorical distinctions, seems especially useful for… queer criticism” (2009, 46). In this paper, the poltergeist names the form which indigeneity takes when it brings queer matter into its folds. In other words, this essay evokes haunting as a metaphor to hint at the ways in which queerness was murderously absorbed into the past and prematurely expected to stay there as an effect of colonialism’s drive to eliminate all traces of sexualities and genders that wandered astray. The poltergeist conceptualizes the work of queer indigeneity in the present insofar as it does not presuppose the mysterious intentions of the ghost—an otherworldly force that is bad, good, and undetectable all at once. Instead, the poltergeist is melancholic in its grief, but also pissed off. It refuses to remain in the spiritual, a space cheapened in relation to the staunch materiality of the real, and one that, though housing our conditions of possibility, cannot contain all of us. We protest forms of cruel nostalgia that tether ghosts to a discarded past within which queer Indigenous life once flourished because we know that we will never get it back and that most of us likely never experienced it in the first place. We long for that kind of love, but we know it is hard to come by. I turn to the poltergeist because I don’t have anywhere else to go. Help me, I could say. But I won’t. Queer indigeneity, then, is neither here nor there, neither dead nor alive but, to use Judith Butler’s language, interminably spectral (2006, 33). We are ghosts that haunt the reserve in the event of resurrection. According to Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, a reserve is a “tract of land, the legal title to which is held by the Crown, set apart for the use and benefit of an Indian band” (“Terminology”). The “reserve system” is part of the dispossessory ethos through which the settler state reifies land as the sign of sovereignty itself, and thus effects the political death of indigeneity, decomposing it into nothingness, into contaminated dirt. Reserves are the products of imaginations gone wild; they are ruins that bear “the physical imprint of the supernatural” on arid land, on decaying trailers arranged like weathered tombstones (Tuck and Ree 2013, 653). They are borderlands that connote simultaneous possession and dispossession: they represent the collision between settler sovereignty (insofar as the Crown holds the legal title to the land) and indigeneity (pointing to a genre of life that is distinctly Indigenous). Reserves were—some might say they still are—zones of death that regulated and regulate the movements of Indigenous bodies, quarantining their putatively contaminated flesh outside modern life in order to preserve settler-colonial futurities. It is as if the reserve were a site of complete atrophy, where indigeneity is supposed to waste away or degenerate, where queerness has already bled out. Look at the blood on your hands! The queer Indigenous poltergeist, however, foregrounds what I call a “reserve consciousness” —an awareness of the deathliness of the reserve. A reserve consciousness might be a kind of critical phenomenology that, to use Lisa Guenther’s description of this sort of insurgent knowledge project, pulls up “traces of what is not quite or no longer there—that which has been rubbed out or consigned to invisibility” (2015): here, the so-called on-reserve Indian. It might be about becoming a frictive surface; by rubbing up against things and resisting motion between objects, we might become unstuck. Queer Indigenous poltergeists are what Sara Ahmed calls “blockage points”: where communication stops because we cannot get through (2011, 68). That is, queer indigeneity connotes an ethical impasse, a dead end that presents us with two options: exorcism or resurrection. If settler colonialism is topological, if it persists despite elastic deformations such as stretching and twisting, wear and tear, we might have to make friction to survive. I turn to the reserve because it is a geography of affect, one in which the heaviness of atmospheres crushes some bodies to death and in which some must bear the weight of settler colonialism more than others. The violence done to us has wrenched us outside the physical world and into the supernatural. Some of us are spirits—open wounds that refuse to heal because our blood might be the one thing that cannot be stolen. Does resistance always feel like resistance, or does it sometimes feel like bleeding out (Berlant 2011)? Feral Socialities I must leave the beaten path and go where we are not. Queerness, according to Muñoz, is not yet here; it is an ideality that “we may never touch,” that propels us onward (2009, 1). Likewise, Halberstam suggests that the presentness of queerness signals a kind of emerging ontology. He argues that failure “is something that queers do and have always done exceptionally well in contrast to the grim scenarios of success” that structure “a heteronormative, capitalist society” (2011, 2-3). For Muñoz, queer failure is about “doing something that is missing in straight time’s always already flawed temporal mapping practice” (2009, 174). We know, however, that this isn’t the entire story. Whereas Muñoz’s queer past morphs into the here and now of homonormativity’s carceral tempos, indigeneity’s queernesses are saturated with the trauma of colonialism’s becoming-structure. Queer death doubles as the settler state’s condition of possibility. Pre-contact queer indigeneities had been absorbed into colonialism’s death grip; however, this making-dead was also a making-undead in the enduring of ghosts (Derrida 1994, 310). If haunting, according to Tuck and Ree, “lies precisely in its refusal to stop,” then the queer Indigenous poltergeist fails to have died by way of time travel (2013, 642). Queer indigeneity might be a kind of “feral sociality”: we are in a wild state after escaping colonial captivity and domestication. When the state evicts you, you might have to become feral to endure. To be feral is to linger in the back alleys of the settler state. It is a refusal of settler statecraft, a strategic failing to approximate the metrics of colonial citizenship, a giving up on the ethical future that reconciliation supposedly promises. As an aside, I suspect that the settler state’s reconciliatory ethos is always-already a domesticating project: it contains Indigenous suffering within the spectacularized theatre of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, building a post-Residential School temporality in which Indigenous peoples have been repaired through monetary reparations and storytelling. In the melodrama of reconciliation, the settler state wins its centuries-long war against Indian lawlessness by healing Indigenous peoples of the trauma that blocked them from becoming properly emotive citizens. Queer indigeneity, however, escapes discursive and affective concealment and therefore the category of the human itself, disturbing the binary clash between the living and nonliving by way of its un-humanity, a kind of “dead living” whereby flesh is animated through death. Perhaps we must become feral to imagine other space-times, to imagine other kinds of queerness. If settler colonialism incentivizes our collusion with the humanist enterprise of multiculturalism (and it does), what would it mean to refuse humanity and actualize other subject formations? In other words, how do the un-living live? Here, I want to propose the concept of “Indian time” to theorize the temporality and liminality of queer indigeneity as it festers in the slippage between near-death and the refusal to die. Indian time colloquially describes the regularity with which Indigenous peoples arrive late or are behind schedule. I appropriate this idiom to argue that the presentness of queer indigeneity is prefigured by an escape from and bringing forward of the past as well as a taking residence in the future. To be queer and Indigenous might mean to live outside time, to fall out of that form of affective life. Indian time thus nullifies the normative temporality of settler colonialism in which death is the telos of the human and being-in-death is an ontological fallacy. It connotes the conversion of queer indigeneity into non-living matter, into ephemera lurking in the shadows of the present, waiting, watching, and conspiring. Where Jasbir Puar argues that all things under the rubric of queer are always-already calculated into the state’s biopolitical mathematic, queer indigeneity cannot be held captive because it cannot be seen—we are still emerging in the social while simultaneously altering its substance (2012). If decolonization is, according to Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s reading of Frantz Fanon, an “unclean break from a colonial condition,” perhaps the queer Indigenous poltergeist is feral enough to will a decolonial world into a future that hails rather than expels its ghosts (2012, 20). The queer Indigenous poltergeist might have nothing else to lose.

#### Systems of knowledge serve to institute and replicate settler colonialism — the human is a storytelling species and knowledge systems are always already being chartered through the replication of sociogenic codes

Wynter and McKittrick 15. Sylvia Wynter is a Professor Emerita at Stanford University. Katherine McKittrick is a professor in Gender Studies at Queen's University. She is an academic and writer whose work focuses on black studies, cultural geography, anti-colonial and diaspora studies, with an emphasis on the ways in which liberation emerges in black creative texts. (Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis, *Duke University Press*, 2015) vikas

To resolve the aporia of this cognitive dilemma, I turn again to Césaire’s proposed new and hybrid bios / mythoi science of the Word. Here because, as he proposed, and as earlier cited, the study of the Word / the mythoi will now determine the study of the bios / of the brain, and this will thereby enable us to gain an external (demonic ground) perspective on the always already storytellingly chartered / encoded discursive formations / aesthetic fields, as well as of, co- relatedly, our systems of knowledge. And, with this gain insight into how these systems of knowledge, each together with its genre- specific “truth of solidarity,” all institute and **stably** replicate our genres **of being hybridly human** with the also communitarian viability of each respective societal order. Yet **with all of the above—including, in macro terms, the instituting of our contemporary secular and “single model” liberal (now neoliberal) monohumanist Western / Westernized transnational world system—what again must be emphasized is** that the respective “truths” of their knowledge systems are always already prespecified by **our** storytellingly chartered sociogenic replicator code of symbolic life / death, its Word and / or Bateson- type “descriptive statement” as rigorously discursively elaborated by its “status quo system of learning” and its overall epistemological order. **This order circularly ensures that each such genre- specific regime / program of truth, will law- likely function to semantically- neurochemically induce the performative enactment of** our ensemble of **always already role- allocated individual and collective behaviors** within the reflexly and subjectively experienced terms of a cognitively closed, thereby genre- specific and fictively eusocializing, autonomously functioning, higher- level living autopoietic system. Cosmogonies of Our Planetary Life and Our Chartered Codes of Symbolic Life and Symbolic Death: Fictively Induced Modes of Inter- Altruistic Kin Recognition and Auto- Instituted Pseudospeciated Mode of Kind KM: Here Wynter elaborates on storytelling beginnings and cosmogonies. She returns to her extension of Frantz Fanon’s conception of our being hybridly human, both bios and mythoi, in order to address the unsolved phenomenon of human consciousness. She explores how our chartering / encoding genre- specific cosmogonies provide the narrative source of our fictively eusocializing subjectivities, thus enabling us to be reborn- through- initiation as always already sociogenically encoded inter- altruistically kin- recognizing members of each referent- we. At the same time, however, **the law- like reification of** each fictively induced and subjectively experienced order of consciousness **of each referent- we is, itself, absolutized by** what Wynter identifies as **the law of cognitive closure**. SW: Fanon put forward the idea of our skin / masks, thereby of the hybridity of our being human, in 1952. Crick and Watson cracked the genetic code in 1953. Now, I argue that Fanon’s masks enact a “second set of instructions”: that of the sociogenic code of symbolic life / death. Further, within the overall enactment of each such “second set of instructions,” the ism of gender is itself—while only one member class—a founding member class. Gender is a founding member because in order to auto- institute ourselves as subjects of a genre- specific referent- we, we must, first, co- relatedly and performatively enact each such code’s “second set of instructions” at the familial level, in terms of our gender roles. We know of this brilliant concept of the performative enactment of gender from Judith Butler.60 I am suggesting that the enactments of such gender roles are always a function of the enacting of a specific genre of being hybridly human. Butler’s illuminating redefinition of gender as a praxis rather than a noun, therefore, set off bells ringing everywhere! Why not, then, the performative enactment of all our roles, of all our role allocations as, in our contemporary Western / Westernized case, in terms of, inter alia, gender, race, class / underclass, and, across them all, sexual orientation? All as praxes, therefore, rather than nouns. So here you have the idea that with being human everything is praxis. For we are not purely biological beings! As far as the eusocial insects like bees are concerned, their roles are genetically preprescribed for them. Ours are not, even though the biocentric meritocratic iq bourgeois ideologues, such as the authors of The Bell Curve, try to tell us that they / we are.61 So the question is: **What are the mechanisms, what are the technologies, what are the strategies by which we prescribe our own roles?** What is common to all are cosmogonies and origin narratives. The representations of origin, which we ourselves invent, **are then retroactively projected onto an imagined past.** Why so? Because each such projection is the shared storytelling origin out of which we are initiatedly reborn. In this case we are no longer, as individual biological subjects, primarily born of the womb; rather, we are both initiated and reborn as fictively instituted inter- altruistic kinrecognizing members of each such symbolically re- encoded genre- specific referent- we. This is to say we are all initiatedly reborn—renatus in Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Christian term—to subjectively experience ourselves as subjects of the same encoded symbolic life kind. Why this imperative? Because **for all genre- specific subjects who are reborn from the same eusocializing origin myth and / or cosmogony, their genetically encoded individual biological life and its attendant imperative of naked self- preservation must at the same time be**, via initiation, **aversively experienced as symbolic death.** 62 This is the concomitant condition of inducing in all subjects the mimetic desire for the group- collective symbolic life of its genre- specific referent- we, its fictive mode of pseudospeciated kind. **The centrality of the ritually initiated and enacted storytelling codes, and thus their positive / negative, symbolic** life / death **semantically- neurochemically activated “second set of instructions,”** **emerges** here: these codes are specific to each kind. **The** positive verbal meanings **attributed to their respective modes of kind** are alchemically transformed into living flesh**,** as **its members all reflexly subjectively experience themselves, in the mimetically desirable, because** opiate-rewarded, placebo terms of **that mode of** symbolic **life prescribed by the storytelling** code. This at the same time as they subjectively experience their former “born of the womb” purely biological life as mimetically aversive, because they are doing so in now opiate- reward- blocked symbolic death, nocebo terms.63 For the preservation of which of these lives, then, do you think wars are fought? In the wake of the answer to the above, we see our chartering cosmogonies as being isomorphic with what we now define as our “cultures”— in both cases **we are talking about our hybrid sociogenic codes and their “second set of instructions.”** These are **codes that are even able to override where necessary**—this with respect to our auto- instituted, non– genetically restricted fictive modes of eusociality—**the first set of instructions of our own dna** (unlike as is the case with all other primates). The logical corollary is this: our modes of auto- institution, together with their initiatory rituals of rebirth—as iconized by the ritual of Christian baptism—are indispensable to the enacting of the human as the only living species on Earth who is the denizen of its third and hybrid bios / mythoi level of existence! Our mode of hybrid living being alone—this together with our also hitherto always genre- specific bios / mythoi enacted orders of supraindividual consciousness—is thereby to arrive on the scene all at once! With the Big Bang of the biomutational Third Event! So you see now why we still can’t solve the problem of consciousness? In spite of the most dedicated efforts of natural scientists, brain scientists, and philosophers? For what becomes clear here is that our human orders of consciousness / modes of mind cannot exist outside the terms of a specific cosmogony. Therefore, human orders of consciousness / modes of mind cannot preexist the terms of the always already mythically chartered, genre- specific code of symbolic life / death, its “second set of instructions” and thus its governing sociogenic principle— or, as Keith Ward puts it, its nonphysical principle of causality.64 To give an example: here we are, we are talking and thinking. We are, in fact, reflexly talking and thinking in terms of Darwin’s biocosmogonically chartered definitive version—in The Descent of Man (1871)—of the British bourgeoisie’s ruling class’s earlier reinvention of Man1’s civic humanist homo politicus as that of liberal monohumanist Man2 as homo oeconomicus, together with its now fully desupernaturalized sociogenically encoded order of consciousness. These are the very terms, therefore, in which we ourselves, in now historically postcolonial / postapartheid contexts, are. If in our case, only mimetically so! This at the same time as we are also struggling to think outside the limits of the purely biocentric order of consciousness that is genre- specific to the Western bourgeoisie’s homo oeconomicus. But it’s extremely difficult to do, right? You know why? Because Darwinism’s powerful, seductive force as a cosmogony, or origin narrative, is due to the fact that it is the first in our human history to be not only part myth but also part natural science. In fact, this mutation—the part myth / part natural science workings of Darwinism—draws attention to Darwin’s powerful neoMalthusian conceptual leap.65 A leap by means of which—over and against Cardinal Bellarmine—Darwin was to definitively replace the biblical Cre- ation account of the origin of all forms of biological life, including the major bios aspect of our being hybridly human, with a new evolutionary account. Why, then, say that this Darwinian account is only part science? Biologist Glyn Isaac, in his essay “Aspects of Human Evolution” (1983), provides the answer. Isaac makes us aware of the ecumenically human trap into which Darwin had also partly fallen: Understanding the literature on human evolution calls for the recognition of special problems that confront scientists who report on this topic. Regardless of how the scientists present them, accounts of human origins are read as replacement materials for genesis. They fulfill needs that are reflected in the fact that all societies have in their culture some form of origin beliefs, that is, some narrative or configurational notion of how the world and humanity began. Usually, these beliefs do more than cope with curiosity, they have allegorical content, and they convey values, ethics and attitudes. The Adam and Eve creation story of the Bible is simply one of a wide variety of such poetic formulations. . . . The scientific movement which culminated in Darwin’s compelling formulation of evolution as a mode of origin seemed to sweep away earlier beliefs and relegate them to the realm of myth and legend. Following on from this, it is often supposed that the myths have been replaced by something quite different, which we call “science.” However, this is only partly true; scientific theories and information about human origins have been slotted into the same old places in our minds and our cultures that used to be occupied by the myths. . . . Our new origin beliefs are in fact surrogate myths, that are themselves part science, part myths. 66 So the trap, you see, is that of the paradox that lies at the core of our metaDarwinian hybridity. For what I’m saying is that as humans, we cannot / do not preexist our cosmogonies, our representations of our origins—even though it is we ourselves who invent those cosmogonies and then retroactively project them onto a past. We invent them in formulaic storytelling terms, as “donor figures” or “entities,” who have extrahumanly (supernaturally, but now also naturally and / or bioevolutionarily, therefore secularly) mandated what the structuring societal order of our genre- specific, eusocial or cultural present would have to be.67 As the French cultural anthropologist Maurice Godelier also makes clear, with respect to the above: we, too, hitherto have also systematically kept the reality of our own agency—from our origins until today—opaque to ourselves. 68 Thus all our humanly invented chartering cosmogonies, including our contemporary macro (monohumanistic / monotheistic) cosmogonies, are law- likely configured as being extrahumanly mandated.69 All such sacred theological discourses ( Judaism, Islamism, Christianity, for example) continue to function in the already theo- cosmogonically mandated cognitively closed terms that are indispensable to the enacting of their respective behavior- inducing and behavior- regulatory fictively eusocializing imperative. This is especially apparent, too, in the secular substitute monohumanist religion of Darwin’s neo- Malthusian biocosmogony: here, in the biocosmogony of symbolic life / death—as that of selection / dysselection and eugenic / dysgenic codes—the incarnation of symbolic life, will law- likely be that of the ruling- class bourgeoisie as the naturally selected (eugenic) master of Malthusian natural scarcity. With this emerges, cumulatively, the virtuous breadwinner, together with his pre- 1960s virtuous housewife, and, corelatedly, the savvy investor, the capital accumulator, or at least the steady job holder.70 In effect, wealth, no longer in its traditional, inherited freehold landowning form, but in its now unceasingly capital- accumulating, global form, is itself the sole macro- signifier of ultimate symbolic life. Symbolic death, therefore, is that of having been naturally dysselected and mastered by Malthusian natural scarcity: as are the globally homogenized dysgenic non- breadwinning jobless poor / the pauper / homeless / the welfare queens. Poverty itself, therefore, is the “significant ill” signifier of ultimate symbolic death and, consequently, capital accumulation, and therefore symbolic life signifies and narrates a plan of salvation that will cure the dysselected significant ill! **The systemic reproduction of** the real- life **categories** of both signifiers **are** indispensable **to the** continued enactment of **the ruling - class** bourgeoisie’s governing code of symbolic life / death and the defining of liberal (now neoliberal) monohumanist Man2. This now purely secular coding of life / death is itself discursively—indeed rigorously—elaborated bioepistemologically, on the model of a natural organism, by the disciplines of our social sciences and humanities, together with their respective genre- specific and ethno- class truths of solidarity.71 Consequently, **within the laws of** hybrid auto- institution and / or pseudospeciation the (**humanities and social science**) **disciplinary truths of solidarity enact** their biocosmogonically chartered **sociogenic code** of symbolic life / death, also **imperatively calling to be discursively elaborated in cognitively** (cum psychoaffectively / aesthetically) **closed terms.**

#### Western colonial frameworks render Nativeness as the raw material for settler vitality — refuse the re-scripting of Native life and death onto settler landscapes and colonial cartographies

Urbanski 16. Claire Urbanski is a doctoral candidate in Feminist Studies with a designated emphasis in Critical Race and Ethnic Studies. As a scholar and social justice activist invested in collective liberation, her work considers how settler colonial ideologies of Indigenous dispossession and gendered violence structure and inform relationships between place, identity, and land. Her doctoral research examines how knowledges of spiritual afterlife have shaped ongoing material structures of United States settler colonial empire ("Genocidal Intimacies: Settler Desire and Carceral Geographies," 2016, *American Studies Association*) vikas

**Connecting Kim TallBear and Philip Deloria’s work**, **we can understand how** Western colonial scientific frameworks render ‘Nativeness’ into a material resource, already belonging to settler society, which can be mined for value; its imaginary, raw, authentic qualities are desired to make settler identity meaningful **and to construct intimate belongings** with landscape. Thinking about **desires to consume and own flesh** (or bone), **and rendering** bone **into personal property**, Alexander Weheliye’s concept of ‘pornotroping’ gets at the ways that the captive body is a “source of an irresistible, destructive sensuality” **and at the same time is** “reduced to a thing, to being for the captor” (90). Orlando Patterson also discusses the imagined intimacy between enslavers and captive bodies, **as well as a fear of danger waiting in the spiritual realm for the enslaver because of his actions**; which is assuaged through **imagining a ‘benevolent enslavement,’ thus** assuring a salvation for the enslaver. I do not mean to collapse the very differing racializing projects of antiBlackness and Indigenous dispossession into being the same thing, while also recognizing their inseparable entanglements in the mutual constitution of settler colonialism, and also acknowledging that perhaps my easy comparison here is very problematic; I do want to think about the space of settler sexualized desire for captive bodies, and connect it to a sexualized and intimate desire for captured dead bodies. How do settlers form (imagined) belongings through imagined intimacies with Indigenous dead? How does anti-Black consumption facilitate white settler intimacies with landscapes? What kinds of sexualized and intimate fantasies are being enacted through the dissection and hoarding of corpses, or the extraction of energy from human bones? When does the researcher, or witch, imagine and perform a fabricated emotional intimacy with the dead, and when is the dead body simply an object from which to extract, or dismember? I’m **reflecting on Audra Simpson’s comments** on yesterday’s panel “Colonial Unknowing and Biopolitics,” which speaking on the ruse of consent **that** settler society depicts in its relations with Indigenous peoples, I **call attention to the coercive intimacy researchers**, and perhaps witches, enforce onto the dead. I do acknowledge and hesitate at my oversimplification of histories and meanings of witchcraft, and at the same time, I do take seriously the settler colonial fantasies that very much inform the increasing popularity of witchcraft particularly amongst white queer identified settlers. To conclude, **I have begun to consider the historical and ongoing extractive projects that seek to render Indigenous bones into material resources** - **to be excavated, consumed, dismembered, and** the particular **logics of containment projected onto the dead through settler imaginaries.** I ask how are the bones of the dead consumed in order to enact queer settler belongings imagined to be subversive to the state, yet ultimately naturalizing of, and thus reinforcing to, a settler colonial project? Thinking with the work of Sylvia Wynter and Jodi Byrd, **projects of settler colonial grave excavation** reveal an important process in how meanings of ‘symbolic life and death’ are mapped onto landscape **through their centrality in establishing the normative standards of ‘Western Man’ as ‘human’ and as foundational to the parameters of US legal personhood**, furthermore, genocidal intimacies draws attention to the sexualized productions of colonial carceral geographies. Settler **belonging is** accessed through genocidal intimacies, which are both **informed by and reproductive of the carceral grounds from which** militarized settler space and racializing technologies of social death can be erected and enacted.

#### The aff’s analysis of health overlooks structures of white supremacy and settler colonialism dictating healtb conditions for indigenous people which turns the case.

Kashyap 20 [Monika Batra Kashyap is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Seattle University School of Law, Ronald A. Peterson Law Clinic. J.D., University of California Berkeley School of Law. November 2020 California Law Review “U.S. Settler Colonialism, White Supremacy, and the Racially Disparate Impacts of COVID-19” <https://www.californialawreview.org/settler-colonialism-white-supremacy-covid-19/>] //aaditg

A settler colonialism framework recognizes that the United States is a present-day settler colonial society whose laws, institutions, and systems of governance continue to enact an ongoing “structure of invasion” that persists to this day.[5][5] ... Scholars across multiple disciplines have turned towards using a settler colonialism framework in their analyses to broaden understandings of how systems of subordination are structured in the United States.[6][6] ... A framework of settler colonialism understands that the three foundational processes upon which the United States was built—Indigenous elimination, anti-Black racism, and immigrant exploitation—are ongoing processes that continue to shape present-day systemic inequities.[7][7] In other words, a settler colonialism framework acknowledges the endurance of three ongoing “strategies of colonization” that continue to maintain settler colonialism’s structure of invasion: 1) strategies of elimination targeting Indigenous peoples; 2) strategies of subjugation targeting Black people (anti-Black racism); and 3) strategies of exploitation and exclusion targeting immigrants of color.[8][8] ... Moreover, a settler colonialism framework acknowledges that the ongoing strategies of colonization continue to be fueled, enabled and bolstered by an elaborate set of racial logics that Andrea Smith describes as the “logics of White supremacy.”[9][9] ... Smith argues that White supremacy in the U.S. context is enacted through three primary interrelated logics: 1) the view of Indigenous people as necessarily disappearing;[10][10] ... 2) the view of Black people as enslavable;[11][11] ... and 3) the view of immigrants of color as inferior and permanent “threats to the empire” who must either be exploited or excluded.[12][12] ... While the manifestations of these White supremacist logics may change over time, “they remain as persistently present today as they were five hundred years ago.”[13][13] This Essay will connect the persistent strategies, logics, and identities created by settler colonialism to the disparate health impacts of COVID-19 in Indigenous, Black, and immigrant of color communities in the United States. By offering a framework that uncovers the root causes of ongoing patterns of systemic oppression, this Essay hopes to inspire reform efforts that seek to alter such patterns by advancing reform efforts that are grounded in truth, justice, and reconciliation. I. Strategies of Indigenous Elimination: The Impacts of COVID-19 on Indigenous Communities Settler colonialism has eliminated Indigenous peoples in the United States through a host of strategies meant to obtain and maintain territorial control of the settler state.[14][14] As historian Patrick Wolfe explains, settler colonialism “requires the elimination of the owners of that territory, but not in any particular way.”[15][15] Elimination strategies employed by settler colonialism include genocidal violence, biological warfare through the introduction of infectious diseases, forced removal and relocation, confinement to reservations, child abduction, religious conversion, forced resocialization in residential boarding schools, and intricate biological and cultural assimilation programs that strip Indigenous people of their culture and replace it with settler culture.[16][16] White supremacist logics support the idea that Indigenous people are “nonhuman wild savages unsuited for civilization” who must therefore be eliminated, rendered expendable, or made invisible in order to justify dispossessing them of their lands.[17][17] ... These logics continue to underpin the removal of Indigenous people from settler spaces in both literal and conceptual ways.[18][18] ... For example, despite the fact that Indigenous peoples are killed in police encounters at a higher rate than any other racial or ethnic group, these deaths rarely gain the national spotlight, and are instead rendered invisible.[19][19] ... Moreover, contemporary popular narratives that designate European settlers as the “founding fathers” and refer to the United States as a “nation of immigrants” erase the existence of Indigenous peoples and render them invisible.[20][20] ... Another significant way in which settler colonialism’s ongoing strategy of Indigenous elimination manifests today is through devastating health disparities in Indigenous communities, which result in higher death rates for Indigenous peoples.[21][21] ... Important medical research implicates settler colonialism in contributing to poor health outcomes and high mortality rates in Indigenous communities in the United States.[22][22] ... This research highlights the devastating health impacts resulting from the brutal dispossession of traditional lands, the forced relocation to unproductive and polluted lands contaminated by heavy metals and industrial waste, the introduction of infectious settler diseases, and the introduction of harmful substances such as tobacco and alcohol.[23][23] ... This research also affirms a report previously published by the World Health Organization finding that Indigenous health is significantly affected by factors related to loss of language and connection to the land, environmental deprivation, and spiritual, emotional, and mental disconnectedness resulting from the loss of Indigenous traditions, culture, and identity.[24][24] ... The research concludes that these “oppressive factors” caused by colonialism perpetuate “severe inequalities in Indigenous health status, unsatisfactory disease and vital statistics, impaired emotional and social wellbeing, and poor prospects for future generations.”[25][25] Indigenous Health Part 1, supra note 22, at 66. The devastating health impacts resulting from settler colonialism’s strategy of Indigenous elimination have led to disproportionately high rates of pre-existing health conditions such as asthma, diabetes, hypertension and heart disease[26][26] ... that put Indigenous peoples at a higher risk of death by COVID-19.[27][27] ... And historical and structural inequities in federal funding—such as lack of support for municipal plumbing systems—have further exacerbated the health disparities that put Indigenous peoples at higher-risk in the COVID-19 crisis.[28][28] ... For example, 40 percent of Navajo households do not have access to running water, making it difficult to comply with handwashing recommendations.[29][29] ... As a result, Indigenous communities who were previously decimated by the imposition of settler diseases such as measles, whooping cough, small-pox, influenza, and tuberculosis continue to be eliminated by health disparities that make them disproportionately vulnerable to a new disease: COVID-19.[30][30] ... Today, Indigenous peoples in the United States are dying 3.2 times the rate of White people as a result of COVID-19.[31][31]

#### The alternative is refusal – a political depression that recognizes reconciliation will never be enough and creates harmful optimism to the political. Instead, embrace an affective pessimism that grounds alternative futures. The question is not whether Native people want the world, but if the world wants Native people

Belcourt 2016 (Billy-ray Belcourt is from the Driftpile Cree Nation. He is a 2016 Rhodes Scholar and is reading for an M.St. in Women's Studies at the University of Oxford. He was named by CBC Books as one of six Indigenous writers to watch,Political Depression in a Time of Reconciliation, Jan 15, 2016, <http://activehistory.ca/2016/01/political-depression-in-a-time-of-reconciliation/)//NotJacob//recut> anop

It’s tough: knowing that you might not get the world you want and the world that wants you back, that your bones might never stop feeling achy and fragile from the wear and tear of mere existence, from the hard labour of getting through the day. Ours are bodies that have been depleted by time, that have been wrenched into a world they can’t properly bend or squirm into because our flesh is paradoxically both too much and not enough for it. In the wake of both eventful and slowed kinds of premature death, what does it mean that the state wants so eagerly to move Indigenous bodies, to touch them, so to speak? Reconciliation is an affective mess: it throws together and condenses histories of trauma and their shaky bodies and feelings into a neatly bordered desire; a desire to let go, to move on, to turn to the future with open arms, as it were. Reconciliation is stubbornly ambivalent in its potentiality, an object of desire that we’re not entirely certain how to acquire or substantiate, but one that the state – reified through the bodies of politicians, Indigenous or otherwise – is telling us we need. In fact, Justice Murray Sinclair noted that the launch of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report on December 15, 2015, puts us at the “threshold of a new era in this country.”[1] I am interested in how life might be lived willfully and badly in the face of governmental forms of redress when many of us are stretched thin, how reconciliation, though instantiating a noticeable shift in the national affective atmosphere,[2] doesn’t actually remake the substance of the social or the political such that we’re still tethered to scenes of living that can’t sustain us. What I am trying to get at is: reconciliation works insofar as it is a way of looking forward to being in this world, at the expense of more radical projects like decolonization that want to experiment with different strategies for survival.[3] This way of doing things isn’t working and, because of that, optimism is hard to come by. According to cultural theorist Ann Cvetkovich, political depression emerges from the realization “that customary forms of political response, including direct action and critical analysis, are no longer working either to change the world or to make us feel better.”[4] It is the pestering sense that whatever you do, it won’t be enough; that things will continue uninterrupted, teasing you because something different is all you’ve wanted from the start. To be politically depressed is to worry about the temporal reach of neoliberal projects like reconciliation, to question their orientation toward the future because the present requires all of your energy in order to feel like anything but dying. Political depression is of a piece with a dispossessory enterprise that remakes the topography of the ordinary such that the labour of maintaining one’s life becomes too hard to keep up. We have to wait for the then and there in the here and now; how do we preserve ourselves until then? As Leanne Simpson points out, reconciliation has been reparative for some survivors, encouraging them to tell their stories, to keep going, so to speak.[5] But, what of the gendered and racialized technologies of violence that created our scenes of living, scenes we’ve been forced to think are of our own choosing? Optimism for the work of reconciliation disappeared in the face of multiple crises: of Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, of HIV infection rates, of mass incarceration, of diabetes, of suicide. Reconciliation, at once a heuristic and a form of statecraft, fakes a political that doesn’t actually exist as such, one that not only presupposes that we – Indigenous peoples, that is – are willing to stay attached to it, but that we are already folded into it, that we’ve already consented to it. What does it mean, for example, to consent to a nation-to-nation relationship if there are no other options to choose from? Reconciliation wants so badly to be a keyword of sorts, to contain so much inside its semantic confines, to be “wide-reaching in its explanatory power.”[6] I’m not surprised things have started to leak all over the place. Decolonization might need something of an affective turn: I think there are ways of being attuned to our bodies such that we can gauge if our visceral responses are trained or not, parasitic or not. In short: what do our tears signal, what do his – Justin Trudeau’s – signal? We cry because pain holds our world together. I don’t want pain to hold our world together anymore. Perhaps admitting we are politically depressed is one of the most important things we could do in this day and age. When survival becomes radical and death becomes part and parcel of the ordinary itself, political depression might be our only point of departure. But, political depression is also about dreaming up alternatives that can sustain your attachments to life. Cvetkovich reminds us that we need “other affective tools for transformation” because hope and blind allegiance have failed too many of us too often.[7] I am interested in the generative work of pessimism, how being fed up propels us onward, and keeps us grounded in the now, such that we can make it to the future, even if that’s just tomorrow. As Kim TallBear put it, we’ve been living in a post-apocalyptic world (in its ecological ruins and in the face of its crisis-making politics) for quite some time,[8] one that exhausts our bodies to the point of depression and death and one that slowly removes us from the non-normative or the astray.[9] We are stuck in the thick of things, left clinging to an impasse without an exit strategy. We might need reconciliation today, but Indigenous peoples need a more capacious world-building project for tomorrow, one that can bear all of us and the sovereignties built into our breathing. We should not be asked: do you want the world today? Instead, we should be asking: does the world want us?

#### The counterinterpretation is that you should evaluate the 1AC as an object of study

#### [a] Sociogeny – debate may not spill over to political change but it has the potential to reproduce affirmations and negations that trigger neurohcmeical responses via reward and punishment mechanisms privilege certain research methods as valuable in the way debaters view the world.

#### [b] Objectivity – consequence based plan focus shifts the focus of debate from our investments in settler colonialism to a plan text, which is incoherent because debate is a communicative activity and their inter sidesteps discussions of genocide.

#### [c] Temporality – the affs models teaches violence can be wished away through administrative tinkering propogating desires within debate to play as activits without reimagnign the social structures that cause violence in the first place. Viewing the ballot as an mechanism to restore ethicality fails – they still dogmatically adhere to these protocols even though they know debate doesn’t caus emateiral change. That creates an process where nativeness is confined to death as their promise of a fiated political horizon relies on a politics of futurity.

## Case

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#### IP developed COVID vaccines rapidly and produced collaboration – turns case

Stevens and Schultz 21 [Philip Stevens and Mark Schultz, “WHY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS MATTER FOR COVID-19”. Geneva Network, January, 2021. https://geneva-network.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Why-IP-matters-for-Covid-19.pdf]

Some asserted that intellectual property would inevitably hold up urgent research. They theorised that the “winner-takes-all” nature of intellectual property rights, especially patents, would prevent scientists from rapidly disclosing research results, and discourage the sharing of unpatentable insights that may potentially lead to patentable treatments with further work. Members of Congress warned that IP would “put public health at risk”, while NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) called for “no patents or profiteering” on yet to be developed health technologies. A coalition of over 500 NGOs claimed that IP rights were a “hindrance” to efforts to tackle the pandemic, calling for all COVID-19-related IP to be rescinded. As events demonstrated, critics of IP were wrong by a wide margin. In January 2020 very little was known about COVID-19. By January 2021, three safe and highly efficacious vaccines had been authorised for use by stringent regulatory authorities, with several others poised to follow. As of 21st December 2o20, there were 1052 COVID-19-19 vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostic tools under development or approved globally, of which 219 are vaccines. This major achievement is a testament to how well the IP system has worked during the pandemic. Calls to override intellectual property rights in the early stages of the pandemic were seductive and were backed by respected global humanitarian NGOs and prominent political figures. But it is to the credit of the majority of governments that they held their nerve and ignored such calls, despite the growing urgency of the situation over 2020. V BUILDING ON EXISTING IP IP is the bedrock upon which today’s COVID-19 vaccines have been built. The technologies they are based on did not come out of thin air at the beginning of the pandemic, but had been under development for decades, with substantial research in academic labs followed by years of risky investment by commercial start-ups. Consider the messenger RNA (mRNA) technology that is the basis for two of the first vaccines approved in Western countries. Scientists discovered in 1961 that mRNA could be used to “reprogram” cells to battle disease. It took decades of lab research and private sector-funded development by startups BioNTech and Moderna to overcome major difficulties and turn the technology into an effective vaccine that can be safely given to patients. Both companies and their investors have spent billions of dollars on mRNA research prior to the pandemic. While academic research is fundamental, the end result would not have been possible without the private sector, which depends on intellectual property rights. Shortly before the pandemic started, we spoke to Dr. Derrick Rossi, the academic founder of Moderna. When asked whether the treatments could be brought from the academic lab to patients without the help of the private sector, Dr. Rossi’s reply was categorical: “Not a chance. Academics are good at academia and fundamental science. They are not good at developing drugs for patients.” Dr. Rossi explains that bringing a drug to market takes many professionals, sharing their labour and diverse expertise. “This industry of professionals is out there... The more people that are involved in the chain, post-academic discovery, the more you have pros involved — all the way from IP filings to VCs to due diligence to assembling a team,” the more likely you are to develop a viable treatment. Developing a practical application for a great academic insight takes vast sums, and investors need some prospect of a return on that investment. As Dr. Rossi explains, “you can be working on the coolest thing, but investors need to know that there is some protection for their investment, plain and simple.” V IP HELPS NOT HINDERS R&D COLLABORATION The other claim frequently heard at the beginning of the pandemic was that IP poses a barrier to collaboration and knowledge sharing, so in a time of emergency any related IP should be open licensed or pooled. In reality, the IP system encouraged the rapid establishment of dozens of partnerships around COVID-19-19, with even commercial rivals prepared to cooperate and share capital and proprietary intellectual resources such as compound libraries. Examples of consortia between the private sector and research centres include the COVID-19-19 Therapeutics Accelerator to evaluate new and repurposed drugs and biologics, the EU-backed Swift COronavirus therapeutics REsponse, Corona Accelerated R&D in Europe (CARE) as well as dozens of bilateral agreements between companies. Indeed, the Pfizer vaccine is the result of its collaboration with BioNtech, where partners shared and combined knowhow and proprietary knowledge to create the first vaccine authorized in the U.S. Far from being a barrier to such collaborations, IP is fundamental. Because patent rights require public disclosure, they enable drug developers to identify partners with the right intellectual assets such as knowhow, platforms, compounds and technical expertise. Without patents most of this valuable proprietary knowledge would be kept hidden as trade secrets, making it impossible for researchers to know what is out there. Second, the existence of laws protecting intellectual property helps rights-holders make the decision to collaborate in the first place. By allaying concerns about confidentiality, IP enables companies to open up their compound libraries, and to share platform technology and know-how without worrying they are going to sacrifice their wider business objectives or lose control of their valuable assets. For instance, rights holders might contribute IP that is useful for entirely different diseases to COVID-19 collaborations. IP rights and licensing ensure those rights can only be used for the agreed reason, preventing competitors freeriding to gain an unfair advantage in other areas. As the former Director General of WIPO noted in June 2020, the main challenge at the time was “not access to vaccines, treatments or cures for COVID-19-19, but the absence of any approved vaccines, treatments or cures to have access to. The policy focus of governments at this stage should therefore be on supporting science and innovation”. During this initial phase of the pandemic, the majority of governments followed this advice, especially by not threatening to remove IP of products yet to be invented. No government from a country with a significant life-science R&D industry, for instance, backed the WHO’s “Solidarity Call to Action” in which companies were asked to unilaterally cede IP and data related to COVID-19 to its new technology and IP pool, C-TAP. The WHO embarked on this initiative with no evidence that IP would stand in the way of R&D and access efforts, distracting efforts away from more practical initiatives that stood greater chance of success. V WHAT ABOUT THE PRICE OF PATENTED VACCINES AND THERAPEUTICS? Nevertheless, the emergence of several competing vaccines has shifted the debate. There are increasingly loud calls to suspend IP rights in order to promote affordable prices for low and middle-income countries, and to mandate forced transfer of know-how and technology in order to scale up global manufacturing . These calls have culminated in proposals at the WTO to implement a temporary suspension of certain provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), including obligations regarding patent rights and the protection of undisclosed information on all COVID-19-related technologies Such extreme proposals are based on muddled thinking. Specifically, the political campaigns that underpin them mischaracterise IP rights as “monopolies” that allow companies to charge unaffordable prices. One eminent scholar of patents, Prof. Edmund Kitch described the application of the term “monopoly” to patents as one of the “elementary and persistent errors in the economic analysis of Intellectual Property”. In reality, IP rights drive the emergence of competing products in the same category, putting a lid on the ability of manufacturers to charge premium prices. Owning IP rarely gives control over a market and IP markets are often intensely competitive. In medicines, for instance, there are usually many substitutes and alternatives. For example, a patient needing a cholesterol drug has a host of statins from which to choose, both patented and generic. Similarly, patients with osteoporosis and their doctors can choose from Fosamax®, Actonel®, or Boniva®. Recent years have seen the emergence of competing shingle vaccines, increased competition in the lung cancer therapeutic space, and a slew of promising clinical trials and new drug launches in the under-served area of lung disease. Each of the owners of patents in these products has a temporary exclusive right to their product; none of them has a monopoly over the market for this type of treatment. The most spectacular demonstration of this point is the recent emergence of multiple competing hepatitis C cures, which have opened up a wide range of treatment options and placed downward pressure on prices. As Geoffrey Dusheiko and Charles Gore wrote in The Lancet, “The market has done its work for HCV treatments: after competing antiviral regimens entered the market, competition and innovative price negotiations have driven costs down from the initially high list prices in developed countries.” Every step of the development of this new market in hepatitis C cures was accompanied by calls to override their IP by civil society and certain intergovernmental organizations. Had those calls been heeded, it is doubtful such a competitive market would exist today. A similar story is unfolding in the COVID-19 vaccine space. Pharmaceutical market analysts predict competition will hold COVID-19 vaccine prices down even in the unlikely scenario of rights holders declining to license their IP to other manufacturers. “In two years’ time, there could be 20 vaccines on the market,” Emily Field, head of European pharmaceutical research at Barclays told the BBC. “It’s going to be difficult to charge a premium price.” V THE REAL CHALLENGES IP has underpinned the research and development that has led to the arrival of several game-changing vaccines. But the challenge does not end there. Perhaps the biggest hurdle is manufacturing billions of doses or new antibody treatments while maintaining the highest quality standards. There’s more to it than starting a global manufacturing free for all by overriding or ignoring patents. A spokesperson for Regeneron, a manufacturer of a novel COVID-19 antibody treatment explained to The Lancet: “Manufacturing antibody medicines is incredibly complex and transferring the technology takes many months, as well as significant resources and skill. Unfortunately, it is not as simple as putting a recipe on the internet and committing to not sue other companies during the pandemic” John-Arne Røttingen, chair of the WHO COVID-19 Solidarity trial, explains that technology transfer will be crucial to scaling up production, but voluntary mechanisms are better: “If you want to establish a biological production line, you need a lot of additional information, expertise, processes, and biological samples, cell lines, or bacteria” to be able to document to regulatory agencies that you have an identical product, he explains. The TRIPS waiver, he says, is the “wrong approach” because COVID-19 therapeutics and vaccines are complex biological products in which the main barriers are production facilities, infrastructure, and know-how. “IP is the least of the barriers”, he says. Then there is the problem of distributing the vaccines to billions of people in every country. Even with plentiful supplies, a range of issues need to be considered such as regulatory bottlenecks; supply chain, transport and storage; maintenance of the cold chain; adequately trained staff; data tracking; and vaccine hesitancy amongst the population. The costs of the vaccine itself is only a small component of the total cost of delivering doses to millions of people. The UK, for example, has spent around £2.9bn on procuring vaccines, far less than the official estimate of £8.8bn to be spent on distributing and delivering them. Comparable costs will exist for all other countries, even if they are subsidised by Overseas Development Assistance. Even then, the combined costs of vaccination are dwarved by the other economic costs of the pandemic. V IP IS PART OF THE SOLUTION Far from being a problem, IP has repeatedly proven itself to be part of the solution in fighting disease. It allows innovators to manage production scale-up by selecting and licensing technology to partners who have the skills and capacity to reliably manufacture large quantities of high-quality products, which they distribute at scale in low and middle-income countries. It would make no sense for IP owners to use it to withhold access, when they can profit from supplying all demand. IP licensing is the way this is done. This is the model unfolding for COVID-19, with new manufacturing licensing deals such as those between AstraZeneca and the Serum Institute in India (1bn doses), China’s BioKangtai (200m doses), Brazil’s FioCruz, Russia’s R-Pharm and South Korea’s SK Bioscience. Collectively, such deals will see the manufacture of 2 billion doses by the end of 2021. The Serum Institute has also entered into manufacturing licenses with a number of developers of yet to be approved COVID-19 vaccines, as have several other Indian vaccine manufacturers. Many of these doses will be procured on a non-profit basis by new collective procurement bodies such as COVAX, for distribution to low and middleincome countries. IP is important because it allows the innovator to control which partners manufacture the product, ensuring the quality of supplies, while maximising low-cost access for low and middle-income countries. It also allows the innovator to preserve its ability to recoup costs from richer markets, meaning the preservation of incentives for future R&D investment. Voluntary licensing has worked well in the past, particularly for low and middle-income countries. A recent academic analysis of hepatitis C voluntary licenses published by The Lancet Global Health concluded that they have increased access to medicines at a considerably faster pace than alternative access models, by avoiding the need for lengthy patent disputes and bringing to bear intercompany competition and economies of scale. But again, these licenses model were criticised by public health NGOs and other stakeholders, who called for the confiscation of IP rights via compulsory licensing. Time has shown such calls to be mistaken. As of January 2021, there are three vaccines approved by stringent regulatory authorities with several more likely to follow in the coming months. Prices of COVID-19 vaccines vary between more expensive but complex to manufacture, and cheaper ones based on existing technologies. Companies are offering their vaccines at cost, with pooled procurement mechanisms such as COVAX ready to leverage their enormous purchasing power to drive economies of scale and bring prices down further for developing countries, many of which will have the cost of vaccination subsidised by Overseas Development Assistance. Meanwhile, the existence of multiple vaccines means there is no COVID-19 vaccine “monopoly”, and minimal risk of premium pricing. In fact, there is a competitive marketplace in which manufacturers are incentivised to refine and improve their vaccines – vital given the new strains of the virus which constantly emerge. Providing COVID-19 vaccines rapidly at scale is a pressing challenge for all countries but there is no evidence that overriding intellectual property rights will achieve more than the licensing agreements currently being forged between innovators and reputable vaccine manufacturers in countries like India and Brazil. Manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines is continuing at speed, and mechanisms are gearing up to ensure a rapid global role out. Forceable tech transfer and other forms of IP abrogation such as those proposed by India and South Africa at the WTO TRIPS Council would throw manufacturing supply chain planning, financing and distribution systems into chaos for little upside. Instead of sowing division and creating major distractions at venues such as the WTO, opponents of IP should stop the rhetoric. The IP system has put us in a position to end the pandemic. We should allow it to continue doing its job.

**The aff doesn’t solve – access to medicine is not a one-way street and there are multiple other factors that they just can’t resolve**

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Although this paper focuses on the role of intellectual property rights on access to medicines, it is recognized that limited access to medicines in countries of the World Health Organization (WHO) African Region[Footnote3](https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-021-10374-y#Fn3) is a multidimensional problem. It is affected by other factors such as lack of public financing for health care and over-reliance on out of pocket expenditure[[7](https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-021-10374-y#ref-CR7)], fragile logistics, storage challenges and high transport and distribution costs [[2](https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-021-10374-y#ref-CR2)] and inadequate or inappropriate medicines regulatory frameworks [[8](https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-021-10374-y#ref-CR8)]. These factors are further exacerbated by insufficient scientific, technological and local manufacturing capabilities in the Region [[9](https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-021-10374-y#ref-CR9)].

#### Waiving IPRs doesn’t shift the status quo – enough incentive exists

**Drezner 5/10,** Daniel. “Perspective | The End of Intellectual Property Protections?” The Washington Post, WP Company, 10 May 2021, www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/05/10/end-intellectual-property-protections/.

Last week, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai [announced](https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/may/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-covid-19-trips-waiver) a pretty big shift in the U.S. position on intellectual property rights for [coronavirus](https://www.washingtonpost.com/coronavirus/?itid=lk_inline_manual_2) vaccines: “The Administration believes strongly in intellectual property protections, but in service of ending this pandemic, supports the waiver of those protections for COVID-19 vaccines. We will actively participate in text-based negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) needed to make that happen.” The reactions to [this news](https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2021/05/05/biden-waives-vaccine-patents/?itid=lk_inline_manual_4) ran the gamut from progressives shocked that the Biden administration sided with them to libertarians disdainful of the announcement as worse than meaningless. And as near as I can determine, these reactions are not mutually exclusive. The shift is not insignificant, but it also does not presage all that much change. Compared with expectations, this policy shift means less good to come now and less bad to come in the future. For progressives, this is the latest sign that Democrats are shifting away from the neoliberal position on trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS). The United States has been adamant about enforcing strong intellectual property rights protections ever since the beginning of the Uruguay round of GATT that led to the creation of the WTO in the first place. In 2001, it seemed that the United States had retreated from this position with the Doha declaration that allowed for countries to waive intellectual property rights to advance public health. After Doha, however, the United States and the European Union [took steps](https://www.amazon.com/All-Politics-Global-Explaining-International/dp/0691096422) to limit that contingency by promoting “TRIPS-plus” standards in their bilateral free-trade agreements. Democrats have genuinely changed their tune on TRIPS in recent years. When the North American Free Trade Agreement was renegotiated into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, House Democrats [refused to ratify](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/15/lighthizer-acknowledges-usmca-concessions-democrats-won-the-house.html) it until the Trump administration agreed to remove a provision that would have offered decade-long patent protections for “[biologics](https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/biological-drug)” drugs. This latest announcement could be seen as another example in which the pharmaceutical sector has not gotten what it wanted from Democrats. They were certainly [less than thrilled](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/07/pfizer-ceo-biden-backed-covid-vaccine-patent-waiver-will-cause-problems.html) about the announcement. [That their stocks took a hit](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/may/06/pharmaceutical-firms-shares-tumble-after-us-plans-for-patent-waiver-on-covid-vaccines) from it hints that maybe they are not just posturing. This leads us to the libertarian position — that this was a short-term exercise in symbolic politics at the expense of long-term innovation. Libertarians argue, correctly, that this will change very little in terms of vaccine dissemination, because patents have not been the binding constraint. In October, Moderna [announced](https://investors.modernatx.com/news-releases/news-release-details/statement-moderna-intellectual-property-matters-during-covid-19) that it would not enforce its coronavirus-related patents during the pandemic. That did not trigger a tsunami of vaccine generics. As [the Financial Times’s Alan Beattie notes](https://www.ft.com/content/b3c2ae3c-4688-4ea9-a1ed-9e72bc01eedb), “India has all the IP and know-how it needs and yet still can’t produce enough for itself, let alone supply the world.” In addition to patents, a lot of tacit knowledge is required to manufacture mRNA vaccines. Last month, [the Economist](https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2021/04/22/how-to-think-about-vaccines-and-patents-in-a-pandemic) laid out the rationale behind granting patent protection for pharmaceuticals: The economic argument for IP protections seems compelling enough. Innovation is costly and risky. Pharmaceutical companies invest heavily in drug development with no guarantee of success. If other firms could freely copy a newly discovered treatment, then its price would quickly fall to the marginal cost of production, leaving the innovator unable to cover the costs of development. A short-term monopoly on production granted to innovating firms is needed to make the upfront investments economically worthwhile. Patents provide this protection. The Center for Global Development’s Amanda Glassman, [writing in Barron’s](https://www.barrons.com/articles/big-pharma-is-not-the-tobacco-industry-51620315693), fears the long-term consequences of making this move: Vaccine manufacturing is not just a recipe; if you attack and undermine the companies that have the know-how, do you really expect they’ll be eager to help you set up manufacturing elsewhere? Is the plan to march into Pfizer and force its staff to redeploy to Costa Rica to build a new factory? Do the U.S. administration or activists care that this decision could take years to negotiate at the World Trade Organization, and will likely be litigated for years thereafter? Does it make sense to eliminate the incentive for private companies to invest in vaccine R&D or in the response to the next health emergency? And if the patent waiver is only temporary and building a factory takes months or years, will anyone bother to do so, even if they could? This might be a concern, but the closer one looks at how this is likely to play out, the less disconcerting it seems. For one thing, the United States is not the only veto player on TRIPS, and Germany’s Angela Merkel seems willing to [play the heavy](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/asian-vaccine-makers-shares-slammed-053253681.html) if the United States chooses not to. This is also an excellent reminder that the United States is not the only trading power to push for stronger intellectual property rights protections. For another, as [Brink Lindsey](https://twitter.com/lindsey_brink/status/1390721234372108289?s=20) pointed out, intellectual property rights matter as a driver for long-term innovation, but they’re a poor inducement for pandemic responses. During a global pandemic, drug manufacturers are already going to feel incentivized to act as quickly as possible, because they are just as affected as everyone else. It is easy for governments to sweeten the pot even more with purchasing agreements and prizes for successful antidotes and vaccines — no patents required. A close read of Tai’s statement makes it clear that this is an extraordinary situation, not that this is the new normal. Or, rather, that this is only the new normal when a pandemic the magnitude of the coronavirus hits the globe. So, in the end, this move is mostly symbolic as it applies to the current pandemic and mostly symbolic as it applies to future drug innovations. It matters for future pandemics. In that situation, I suspect that the libertarians will be wrong.