**1AC -- Space Settlers**

**Space appropriation is a *re-entrenchment* of settler colonialism built on the lens of *‘conservation’* representing yet another *‘unknown’* to be conquered**

**Smiles 20**[ Deondre Smiles is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria, in B.C., Canada. Society Space October 26, 2020, SETTLER COLONIAL AND INDIGENOUS GEOGRAPHIES “The Settler Logics of (Outer) Space”] //aaditg

‍“In reaffirming our heritage as a free nation, we must always remember that **America has always been a frontier nation.** Now we must embrace the next frontier. America’s **Manifest Destiny in the** stars…The American nation was carved out of the vast frontier by the toughest, strongest, fiercest and most determined men and women ever to walk on the face of the Earth… Our ancestors braved the unknown, tamed the wilderness, settled the Wild West…This is our glorious and magnificent inheritance. We are Americans. We are pioneers. We are the pathfinders. **We settled the New World.** We built the modern world.” -President Donald J. Trump, 2020 State of the Union address T o most scholars, and certainly to the virtual majority of Indigenous peoples on Turtle Island, it is no secret that the country we call the United States of America was built upon the brutal subjugation of Indigenous people and Indigenous lands**. Fueled by** the American settler myths of **terra nullius** (no man’s land) and Manifest Destiny, the American settler state proceeded upon a project of cultural and physical genocide, with lasting effects that endure to the present day. The ‘**settler myth’ permeates American culture. Words such as ‘pioneer’, the ‘West’, ‘Manifest Destiny’ grab the imagination as connected to the growth of the country in its early history.** America sprang forth from a vast open ‘wilderness’. Of course, for Indigenous people, we know differently—these lands had complex cultural frameworks and political entities long before colonization. Words like ‘pioneer’ and ‘Manifest Destiny’, have deep meanings for us too, as they are indicative of the very real damage dealt against our cultures and nations, damage that we have had to work very hard to undo. Trump’s address raises key insights into the continuing logics of settler colonialism, as well as questions of its future trajectories. Trump’s **invocation of ideas such as the ‘frontier’ and ‘taming the wilderness’** draws attention to the brutal violence that accompanied the building of the American state. Scholars such as Greg Grandin (2019) make the case that the frontier is part of what America is—whether it is the ‘Wild West’, or the U.S.-Mexican border, America is always contending with a frontier that must be defined. **Language surrounding ‘frontier’ is troubling because it perpetuates the rationale of why the American settler state even exists**—it could make better use of the land than Native people would, after all, they lived in wilderness. This myth tells us that what we know as the modern world was built through the hard work of European settlers; Indigenous people had nothing to offer or contribute. For someone like Mr. Trump, whose misgivings and hostility towards Native people have been historically documented, this myth fits well with his narrative as President—he is building a ‘new’ America, one that will return to its place of power and influence. The fact that similar language is being used around the potential of American power being extended to space could reasonably be expected, given the economic and military potential that comes from such a move. **Space represents yet another ‘unknown’ to be conquered and bent to America’s will**. However, **such interplanetary conquest does not exist solely in outer space. I wish to situate the very real colonial legacies and violence associated with the desire to explore space, tracing the ways that they are perpetuated and reified through their destructive engagements with Indigenous peoples.** I argue that **a scientific venture such as space exploration does not exist in a vacuum, but instead draws from settler colonialism and feeds back into it through the prioritization of ‘science’ over Indigenous epistemologies.** I begin by exploring the ways that space exploration by the American settler state is situated within questions of hegemony, imperialism, and terra nullius, including a brief synopsis of the controversy surrounding the planned construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea. I conclude by exploring Indigenous engagement with ‘space’ in both its Earthbound and beyond-earth forms as it relates to outer space, and what implications this might have for the ways we think about our engagement with space as the American settler state begins to turn its gaze skyward once again. I position this essay alongside a growing body of academic work, as well as journalistic endeavors (Haskins, 2020; Koren, 2020) that demands that the American settler colonial state exercise self-reflexivity as to why it engages with outer space, and who is advantaged and disadvantaged here on Earth as a result of this engagement. Settler Colonialism and ‘Space’ A brief exploration of what settler colonialism is, and its engagement with ‘space’ here on Earth is necessary to start. Settler colonialism is commonly understood to be a form of colonialism that is based upon the permanent presence of colonists upon land. This is a distinction from forms of colonialism based upon resource extraction (Wolfe, 2006; Veracini, 2013). What this means is that the settler colony is intimately tied with the space within which it exists—it cannot exist or sustain itself without settler control over land and space. **This permanent presence upon land by ‘settlers’ is usually at the expense of the Indigenous**, or original people, in a given space or territory. To reiterate: control over space is paramount. As Wolfe states, “Land is life—or at least, land is necessary for life. Thus, contests for land can be—indeed, often are—contests for life” (2006: 387). Without land, the settler state ‘dies’; conversely, deprivation of land from the indigenous population means that in settler logic, indigeneity dies (Povinelli, 2002; Wolfe, 2006.) The ultimate aims of settler colonialism is therefore the occupation and remaking of space. As Wolfe (2006) describes, the settler state seeks to make use of land and resources in order to continue on; whether that is through homesteading/residence, farming and agriculture, mining, or any number of activities that settler colonial logic deems necessary to its own survival. **These activities are tied to a racist and hubristic logic that only settler society itself possesses the ability to make proper use of land and space (Wolfe, 2006).** This is mated with a viewpoint of landscapes prior to European arrival as terra nullius, or empty land that was owned by no one, via European/Western conceptions of land ownership and tenure (Wolfe, 1994). Because of this overarching goal of space, **there is an inherent anxiety in settler colonies about space**, and how it can be occupied and subsequently rewritten to remove Indigenous presence. In Anglo settler colonies, this often takes place within a lens of conservation. Scholars such as Banivanua Mar (2010), Lannoy (2012), Wright (2014) and Tristan Ahtone (2019) have written extensively on the ways that **settler reinscription of space can be extremely damaging to Indigenous people from a lens of ‘conservation’**. However, **dispossession of Indigenous space in favor of settler uses can also be tied to some of the most destructive forces of our time**. For example, Aboriginal land in the Australian Outback was viewed as ‘empty’ land that was turned into weapons ranges where the British military tested nuclear weapons in the 1950s, which directly led to negative health effects upon Aboriginal communities downwind from the testing sites (Vincent, 2010). Indigenous nations in the United States have struggled with environmental damage related to military-industrial exploitation as well. Saturn V rocket. (Image credit: NASA) But, what does this all look like in regard to outer space? In order to really understand the potential (settler) colonial logics of space exploration, we must go back and explore the ways in which space exploration became inextricably tied with questions **of state hegemony and geopolitics** during the Cold War. US and Soviet space programs were born partially out of military utility, and propaganda value—the ability to send a nuclear warhead across a great distance to strike the enemy via a ICBM and the accompanying geopolitical respect that came with such a capability was something that greatly appealed to the superpowers, and when the Soviets took an early lead in the ‘Space Race’ with Sputnik and their Luna probes, the United States poured money and resources into making up ground (Werth, 2004). The fear of not only falling behind the Soviets militarily as well as a perceived loss of prestige in the court of world opinion spurred the US onto a course of space exploration that led to the Apollo moon landings in the late 1960s and the early 70s (Werth, 2004; Cornish, 2019). **I argue that this fits neatly into the American settler creation myth referenced by Trump—after ‘conquering’ a continent and bringing it under American dominion, why would the United States stop solely at ‘space’ on Earth?** To return to Grandin (2019), **space represented yet another frontier to be conquered and known by the settler colonial state**; if not explicitly for the possibility of further settlement, then for the preservation of its existing spatial extent on Earth. However, scholars such as Alan Marshall (1995) have **cautioned that newer logics of space exploration such as potential resource extraction tie in with existing military logics in a way that creates a new way of thinking about the ‘openness’ of outer space to the logics of empire, in what Marshall calls res nullius (**1995: 51)[i]. Telescopes on Mauna Kea. (Photo credit: University of Hawaii-Hilo) But we cannot forget the concept of terra nullius and how our exploration of the stars has real effects on Indigenous landscapes here on Earth. We also cannot forget about forms of space exploration that may not be explicitly tied to military means. **Doing so deprives us of another lens through which to view the tensions between settler and Indigenous views of space and to which end is useful.** Indeed, even reinscribing of Indigenous space towards ‘peaceful’ settler space exploration have very real consequences for Indigenous sovereignty and Indigenous spaces. Perhaps **the most prominent example** of the fractures between settler space exploration and Indigenous peoples **is the on-going controversy surrounding the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea, on the island of Hawaii**. While an extremely detailed description of the processes of construction on the TMT and the opposition presented to it by Native Hawai’ians and their allies is beyond the scope of this essay, and in fact is already expertly done by a number of scholars[ii], the controversy surrounding TMT is a prime example of the logics presented towards ‘space’ in both Earth-bound and beyond-Earth contexts by the settler colonial state as well as the violence that these logics place upon Indigenous spaces, such as Mauna Kea, which in particular already plays host to a number of telescopes and observatories (Witze, 2020). In particular, astronomers such as Chanda Prescod-Weinstein, Lucianne Walkowicz, and others have taken decisive action to push back against the idea that settler scientific advancement via space exploration should take precedence over Indigenous sovereignty in Earth-space. Prescod-Weinstein and Walkowicz, alongside Sarah Tuttle, Brian Nord and Hilding Neilson (2020) make clear that **settler scientific pursuits such as building the TMT are simply new footnotes in a long history of colonial disrespect of Indigenous people and Indigenous spaces in the name of science, and that astronomy is not innocent of this disrespect**. In fact, Native Hawai’ian scholars such as Iokepa Casumbal-Salazar strike at the heart of the professed neutrality of sciences like astronomy: One scientist told me that astronomy is a “benign science” because it is based on observation, and that it is universally beneficial because it offers “basic human knowledge” that everyone should know “like human anatomy.” Such a statement underscores the cultural bias within conventional notions of what constitutes the “human” and “knowledge**.” In the absence of a critical self-reflection on this inherent ethnocentrism, the tacit claim to universal truth reproduces the cultural supremacy of Western science as self-evident.** Here, the needs of astronomers for tall peaks in remote locations supplant the needs of Indigenous communities on whose ancestral territories these observatories are built (2017: 8). As Casumbal-Salazar and other scholars who have written about the TMT and the violence that has been done to Native Hawai’ians (such as police actions designed to dislodge blockades that prevented construction) as well as the potential violence to come such as the construction of the telescope have skillfully said, when it comes to the infringement upon Indigenous space by settler scientific endeavors tied to space exploration, there is no neutrality to be had—dispossession and violence are dispossession and violence, no matter the potential ‘good for humanity’ that might come about through these things. Such contestations over outer space and ethical engagement with previously unknown spaces will continue to happen. Outer space is not the first ‘final frontier’ (apologies to Gene Roddenberry) that has been discussed in settler logics and academic spaces. In terms of settler colonialism, scholars have written about how Antarctica was initially thought of as the ‘perfect’ settler colony—land that could be had without the messy business of pushing Indigenous people off of it (see Howkins 2010). Of course, we know now that engagement with Antarctica should be constrained by ecological concern—who is to say that these concerns will be heeded in ‘unpopulated’ space? What can be done to push back against these settler logics?

**That manifests into tropes of space exploration that arise the return of colonial exploitative dynamics under the guise of ‘manifest destiny’.**

**Koren 20** [ Marina Koren Staff writer at Atlantic 9/17/2020“No One Should ‘Colonize’ Space” https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/09/manifest-destiny-trump-space-exploration/612439/]//aaditg

Even if Martians aren’t going to protest our arrival, **space exploration presents plenty of other opportunities for the exploitative dynamics of the colonial era to reemerge**. Colonial-era travel spread invasive species across the planet; space-era travel could seed earthlings all over the solar system. Last year, for instance, an Israeli spacecraft crash-landed on the surface of the moon and spilled several thousand dehydrated tardigrades, microscopic animals that can survive extreme conditions. The creatures had been snuck aboard by a space entrepreneur who was only supposed to contribute a DVD-size compilation of human knowledge. “Technically, I’m the first space pirate,” he said when news of the stowaways was revealed, much to the horror of space lawyers and planetary-protection researchers. **Connecting colonial language to space travel also helps shore up expansionist behavior on Earth: For the past six years in Hawaii, astronomers and local protesters have been locked in a standoff over the construction of a new telescope near the site of Mauna Kea, on land that native Hawaiians consider sacred.** Read: The Thirty Meter Telescope and a fight for Hawaii's future **“It’s a real failure of imagination to just keep recycling really harmful language and saying that it doesn’t matter because space is somehow different,” says Lucianne Walkowicz, an astronomer at the Adler Planetarium, in Chicago, and the organizer of the 2018 Decolonizing Mars conference. “We are still human beings, even if we go to space.”** If astronauts are the elite of space workers, in the future a less powerful class could form, and language associated with exploitation and domination could make those people that much more vulnerable. “**The use of this language can give policy makers and decision makers excuses to do bad things because it’s in the name of these really lofty things,”** Divya Persaud, a planetary scientist at University College London who has written about the meaning of language in space domains, told me. Asteroid miners, for instance, would be dependent on their faraway employers for health care, safe working conditions, and, quite literally, life support. Oversight can be dicey when your operations are millions of miles away from the only planet with regulatory agencies (that we know of). People are drawn to sweeping rhetoric, wrapped up in fate and higher purpose, because it offers romantic ways of thinking about places they’ve yet to visit. But bringing God into space exploration, as the concept of manifest destiny does, complicates the issue even further. “It does hurt. This idea of It’s provenance; it’s inspired by God—they are taking it out of a human aspect and saying, ‘Hey, we’re being led by something else, something that’s greater than we are,’” Herrington says. “Take ownership and responsibility for what you’re doing. Don’t say somebody else is making us do it.” The way **past manifest destiny and other colonial-era language can be simple: Be specific. Just as crewed is a more accurate word than manned, other phrases could easily sub in for the more outdated ones. “**Instead of trying to say ‘settlement on Mars’ or ‘colony on Mars,’ why don't we just say, ‘We sent 12 astronauts to Mars?’” Persaud said. Melvin, who is Black, suggested pitching space exploration as something to benefit all humankind, not just the United States. He’s seen Earth as it truly is, a borderless place set against the boundless darkness of space. “You’re watching the world below you while you’re breaking bread with French, German, Russian, Asian American, African American [astronauts]—people from all around the world working together as a team,” Melvin said. “And you know that if Yuri does something wrong, or I do something wrong, or Peggy does something wrong, we can all die.” American leaders have, at times, sold space exploration as an international effort, as a boon for all humankind, as a push for scientific discovery. But in the U.S.—and Russia and China and India and other spacefaring nations—**space travel is still a nationalist project.** This spring, when NASA launched astronauts from U.S. shores for the first time in nearly a decade, the agency’s leaders pointed out, over and over, that the job was done by “American astronauts on American rockets from American soil.” And the next people to go to the moon, NASA officials have emphasized, will be Americans, and so will the first visitors to Mars. Language matters. When presidents speak of the country’s spirit and its space program in the same breath, when they yoke America’s strength to its feats beyond Earth, they end up describing the nation both as it exists today and as they imagine it in the future. By borrowing from a time when the dominant philosophy staked out American land for white settlers at the expense of the people who already lived there, Trump shows his hand about whom he believes the future of this country is for, whether here on Earth or on worlds beyond.

**Any process of space colonization will merely serve to *recreate* earth’s crises – it’s founded on absent a recognition of the *exploitative* nature of colonialism.**

**Weitzel 21**[ Elic Weitzel is a Human Ecologist, Anthropologist, and Archaeologist Interested In Understanding Humans In Their Environmental And Social Contexts. He Is Affiliated With The Department Of Anthropology At The University Of Connecticut. Dissident Voice “History Shows Privatized Space Colonization Will Be Disastrous” March 9th 2021 <https://dissidentvoice.org/2021/03/history-shows-privatized-space-colonization-will-be-disastrous/> ] //aaditg

These accomplishments and setbacks from SpaceX and the world’s richest man are the most recent in a long series of launches by the first private company to engage in spaceflight. SpaceX is pushing many new boundaries to popular acclaim, but they are also simply the most recent continuation of a decades-long effort to privatize space travel, albeit an effort that is accelerating in recent years. Yet, **while SpaceX may be developing beneficial new technologies and finding ways to lower the costs of space travel, their free-market perspective on space exploration will not provide the benefits they claim**. Such **privatization will only reproduce the Earth’s current exploitative economy and environmental destruction in outer space. Our climate and economic crises today are not inevitable outcomes of human existence**, or of human population growth as other space-obsessed technocrats like Jeff Bezos have **argued. They are instead the result of a particular set of social and economic forces, mostly arising during the last five centuries, which constitute capitalism.** Capitalism requires the exploitation of both nature and people, leads to outward expansion and colonization, and is really the root cause of climate change. Yet instead of working to develop new social and economic structures here on Earth, Elon Musk is planning the colonization of Mars explicitly as a backup plan for Earth. He is not alone, as Jeff Bezos’ own aerospace company, Blue Origin, operates with the long-term goal of outsourcing destructive manufacturing to space in order to save Earth by shifting the exploitation of nature and people into orbit. With plans such as these, SpaceX and related companies are advocating escapism instead of dealing with the reality of deteriorating conditions on our own planet. By **failing to acknowledge that privatizing industry and taking advantage of workers and the environment are the true causes of these Earthly crises, SpaceX will inadvertently reproduce the same conditions that are destroying the Earth in space.** We need not engage in speculation informed by science-fiction to know this, either. **History is full of examples of privatized, for-profit exploration and colonization that have caused more harm than good.** For some of the clearest lessons, we can look to the colonization of what is now the United States, just a few hundred years ago. \*\*\*\*\*\* This past autumn marked the four hundredth anniversary of the Mayflower landing on the shores of what is now Massachusetts. Stories of this ship and its Pilgrim passengers are familiar to many people who were educated in the American school system. As the common narrative goes, **these Puritan settlers sought freedom from religious persecution in England, and thus set sail to the “New World.” The Mayflower arrived in North America, and finding the land beautiful and productive, the Pilgrims “fell upon their knees and blessed the God of Heaven” for delivering them to safety and freedom.** Yet key details of this story were not emphasized in our elementary school educations, such as the motivations behind the actual owners of the Mayflower. The Pilgrims did not own the ship they sailed upon, nor could they have afforded the voyage on their own. They needed investors, and the financial backers of this journey were not religious separatists seeking freedom, but some of the modern world’s first international venture capitalists. They funded the Pilgrims in the hope that they could reap the rewards of a profitable colony in North America capable of yielding cheap goods for European markets: largely fish, timber, and furs. The Pilgrims who established a colony at Plymouth may have been seeking liberty, but the **financiers who backed them hardly cared. They were just in it for the money, and there was a lot to be made.** There was also a lot of damage to be done. Within fifteen years of the Mayflower making landfall, epidemic disease had decimated the Native American population of New England. Wars and genocide followed, with Native peoples being killed and enslaved across the continent, before largely being forced onto reservations which still experience shockingly poor conditions today. All the while, the land of New England was gradually being divided into privately owned parcels of land in a process known as enclosure. **When European colonists arrived in New England, they entered into a variety of agreements with Native peoples pertaining to land rights**. European settlers often paid Native tribes or leaders for the right to limited use of tribal land, but the colonists often interpreted these transactions as wholesale, permanent purchase of land. **These lands which were often communally owned by the tribe and managed as a “commons” – land or resources collectively owned by a community – were slowly carved up into privately owned parcels over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries.** This privatization of land ownership and the incorporation of colonial New England into a globalized market economy led to profound environmental destruction nearly immediately. **Settlers cleared forests for timber and farmland, nearly deforesting much of New England by the early 20th century.** Beaver and deer were all but exterminated in the region by the 19th century, hunted for their pelts which were sold for profit in European markets. As early as 1646, Portsmouth, Rhode Island established the first prohibitions on hunting deer out of season, recognizing that the species’ population was dwindling. All of this local extirpation and deforestation occurred within a few decades of European arrival in New England, while the Indigenous peoples of the region had hunted deer and beaver and managed their forests sustainably for millennia prior. **Exploitation of labor arose alongside this exploitation of nature**. European settlers in 17th century New England exploited Native American hunters to acquire beaver furs, obtaining these pelts at little cost to themselves through the exchange of cheap cloth, metal trinkets, and shell beads. **Merchants then in turn exploited these European settlers**, paying only a small fraction of what these furs would be worth, and manufacturers back in Europe exploited their workers, paying them less than their labor was worth to produce products like fashionable felt hats for sale to the high-society aristocrats of the time. This exploitation of nature and labor is not a bug, but a feature of privatized, for-profit capitalist ventures. **It is inherent in a capitalist economic model, as history has shown time and again.** If profit maximization for the benefit of investors and owners is the goal, as it was for the owners of the Mayflower and as it is for SpaceX, the necessary materials and labor must be cheaply obtained. If they are not cheap, earnings will suffer. **Colonization is a short-sighted solution to this problem.** Colonialist companies and nations incorporate peripheral locations into their global economic system, where resources and labor can be cheaply obtained. The mercantile capitalism of the 17th century Atlantic world reflected this economic structure, with abundant timber, furs, and fish being obtained at low costs in New England and returned to European markets where they had greater value. Whether in the form of colonialist extraction of raw materials or the contemporary outsourcing of jobs, this search for cheap labor and resources is necessary for the perpetuation of capitalism, and remains the structuring force behind the global economy to this day. This **same outward expansion in search of cheap raw materials** and labor **is exactly what will end up driving the colonization of space.** The Moon, Mars, and even asteroids may all become the peripheral, privatized, and exploited locations that permit corporations on Earth to profit. Similar to Indigenous understandings of certain land rights in precolonial New England, space is currently viewed as a global commons. This means that all people have rights to it and none should be able to claim exclusive rights over it. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prevents any nation from claiming territory in space, although the treaty is known to be vague concerning the power of corporations in space and will certainly be challenged legally in the coming years. The enclosure and privatization of space may therefore lead not only to the direct and immediate exploitation of the environment and of people, but may also lay the groundwork for long-term systems of exploitation and dispossession. \*\*\*\*\*\* Elon Musk intends to colonize Mars as soon as possible. Thankfully, there is no potential for genocide of indigenous Martians as there was for Native Americans and other Indigenous peoples around the world under European colonialism. **Yet because the endeavor is privatized and operating under centuries-old colonialist mindsets, exploitation and destruction will assuredly manifest in other ways. Mining and resource extraction is one avenue for profit, although Musk acknowledges that it is unclear if the natural resources on Mars could be extracted for the profit of companies on Earth**. Even if the costs of transporting raw materials back to Earth are too great, natural resources extracted in space could be manufactured in space and shipped to Earth. Colonization of Mars may therefore differ slightly from cases of colonization on Earth, but the fundamental exploitative relationship remains. Plus, there are other ways to profit besides the extraction of raw materials. Space tourism by wealthy thrill-seekers is poised to be a cash cow for companies, and a relatively autonomous SpaceX colony on Mars could also have a potentially great degree of freedom to profit from all sorts of business ventures, especially if they are legally independent of the United States government as has been hinted. Musk has also alluded to other “extraordinary entrepreneurial opportunity” on Mars, ranging from manufacturing to restaurants to tourism. However, it remains to be seen just how the financing, ownership, and taxation of these enterprises will be handled in what may be a semi-autonomous colony. In the case of English colonists arriving in North America, it was often the case that the company financing the colony claimed ownership over all property and all economic products of the settlers for a set number of years. Any colonists on a settled Mars will certainly be exploited as well, in one form or another, for the profit of shareholders and company executives. More than a colony of Earth, Mars may become a colony of SpaceX, and this is a troubling thought. Resisting exploitation is exceedingly difficult in a privately funded, owned, and operated colony because such a colony is, by its very nature, undemocratic. Private companies like SpaceX are not democracies. CEOs are not elected representatives of the employees and business decisions are not voted upon by all workers. Thus, with a corporation calling the shots, settlers on Mars may have disturbingly little input in decision-making processes concerning their businesses and lives. Fundamentally, **the privatization of space exploration is not the beneficial solution that many think it is. It will simply result in a continuation of the colonial exploitation of nature and people as our capitalist global economy transcends our own atmosphere.** Exploitation is an inherent part of such for-profit ventures in a capitalist system, and this will carry over into space. Privatized exploration of our solar system will be biased towards profitable ventures instead of those with public benefits and will certainly have numerous detrimental environmental impacts. As private corporations begin to stake claims and enclose the commons of space, the rest of us lose our rights to it. We must avoid this outcome at all costs. Studying the repercussions of historical and contemporary colonialism on Earth permits us to engage with questions of space exploration from a decolonial and democratic perspective. Space cannot be privatized or exploited for profit, but must remain a commons for the benefit of all humanity.

**Thus, I affirm the resolution: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.**

**The Role of the Ballot is to vote for the debater that best engages in decolonial praxis.**

**Saraceno 12** [ Johanne Saraceno works at University of Victoria. 2012 International Journal of Child, Youth and Family Studies (2012) 2 & 3: 248–271 “MAPPING WHITENESS AND COLONIALITY IN THE HUMAN SERVICE FIELD: POSSIBILITIES FOR A PRAXIS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN CHILD AND YOUTH CARE” <https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/ijcyfs/article/view/10869> Brackets in Original ] //aaditg

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**A multicultural discourse of “embracing difference”** too often **defaults to essentialized images that inevitably foreground those who represent the dominant traditions or practices** of the group, while further marginalizing those who do not fit within the prescribed boundaries (Pereira, 2008). Furthermore, as noted by Fee and Russell (2007), because of our less violent and divisive race history when compared to the U.S., Canadians “typically represent themselves as tolerant and polite [creating a] mythology of racelessness” (p. 193). This presents a serious challenge to making transparent intersections of racialized and gendered violence and inequity. As Rodriguez (2000), quoting McLaren (1997, p. 262), notes: **color-blind discourse is not a racial project of benignly looking past race** to the person under the skin motif… **it is a project set up to “protect” white privilege and power by permitting “white people to construct ideologies that help them to avoid the issue of racial inequality while simultaneously benefiting from it.”** (p. 9) The concepts of “empowerment” and “liberation” have limitations for achieving what they set out to do as they are inevitably constituted by a colonial history and a modernist-derived neo-liberal construction of the “individual” as an actor capable of social change (Jackson, 2007). For example, **Freire’s work is built on “assumptions about the individual capacity for change through critical reflection” which ignore that “our life chances may certainly be determined by racism or sexism”** (Jackson, p. 208) and further contextualized by structural power and economic inequities. **Mohanty (2003) explicitly interrogates the neo-liberal ideology embedded in this notion that increased consciousness can enable an individual to change the structures of oppression and inequity**. This implicit pressure on individuals to ameliorate their life circumstances often results in feelings of powerlessness, inadequacy, and an acceptance that compromise is the best or only way to achieve change for individuals who try to tackle social issues (Jackson, 2007) in the face of deeply entrenched institutional structures. **It is time to shift from focusing on problems at the margins to centring whiteness and taken-for-granted norms in order to interrogate how these perpetuate social problems.** Rodriguez (2000) advocates the **positioning of whiteness within multiculturalism discourses in order to shift the focus from the “other” and to centre “critical analyses of whiteness as an invisible norm**” (p. 3). Harper (2000) **emphasizes that it is important to consider “issues of power and powerlessness in relation to how racialized identities are produced and normalized”** (p. 129). **In centring whiteness and foregrounding issues of power, we can better map out the structures and practices that reify forms of discrimination that lead some groups to be overrepresented in our systems of care and justice.** Critical feminists have struggled to conceptualize issues of social justice in the wake of the disruptions to identity categories through post-structural analysis. Lorraine (2007) states that “many feminists share [the] concern that poststructuralist feminist theory’s antifoundationalist wariness of overarching principles does not provide adequate grounding for the kind of social critique necessary for feminist change” (p. 268). Lather (2008) raises this tension as well: International Journal of Child, Youth and Family Studies (2012) 2 & 3: 248–271 260 “essentialism and identity politics might be bad objects from the vantage point of antifoundational theory, but they are often seen as the only, if not the best, strategy for advancing minority-based claims” (p. 223). Wood (1995, as cited in McLaren, 2000) cautions against the risk to social justice presented by post-structural ideas: **We should not confuse respect for the plurality of human experience and social struggles with a complete dissolution of historical causality where there is nothing but diversity, difference, and contingency, no unifying structures, no logic of process, no capitalism and therefore no negation of it, no universal project of human emancipation**. (p. 153) Lather (2008) identifies that **a “tension around a realist position that mediates the essentialism of identity politics is a mark of postcolonialism** in its use of histories of exploitation to foster strategies of resistance” (p. 222). Like Braidotti (2006), Lather underlines the value in mapping out what is, in order to see how to uncover, track, and resist privilege and structural power to begin to work for change. Ultimately, this tension is captured and summarized in Braidotti’s (2009) reflection: “**how [do we] engage [in] affirmative politics, which entails the production of social horizons of hope, while at the same time doing critical theory, which means resisting the present?” (p. 42).** The invitation here is to consider productive strategies for working toward social justice by confronting existing structural inequities, while simultaneously thinking with complexity to conceptualize social change at the level of cultural transformation that eventually takes us beyond rigid identity categories and into new ways of knowing, doing, and being. **In order for significant social transformation to occur, it is perhaps time to consider an ontological orientation that moves beyond a focus on human emancipation and makes conscious connections between human, animal, and plant ecologies. All life forms are interconnected** (Braidotti, 2006; Haraway, 2008) **and it is the modernist project that has entrenched a hierarchy and disconnection between different categories of beings.** A **stance of co-implication** (Mohanty, 2003) **also resonates with many Indigenous world views**, for example the Nuu-chah-nulth concept “heshook ish tsawalk” or “everything is one” (Atleo, 2004, p. 10). Decolonizing practice In contemporary settings, **decolonization is the term frequently used to describe the reclaiming of a proud identity by Indigenous people who have suffered the ravages of colonialism.** With a decolonizing stance and vigilant critical reflection, we can **begin to poke at and peel away layers of convention – social and professional practices – to disrupt privilege and make explicit how neo-colonialism continues to operate in normative ways of knowing, doing, and being in professional helping and CYC. Decolonization “involves profound transformations of the self, community, and governance structures [and] can only be engaged through active withdrawal of consent and resistance to structures of psychic and social domination**… a historical and collective process” (Mohanty, 2003, p. 7). The literature suggests that **it is time to move away from the dominant conceptualization of “helping” as a benign phenomenon, to think critically and creatively in order to “step outside the frameworks of colonial youth work and engage a different set of ideas, beliefs, and practices**” (Skott-Myhre, 2004, p. 92). The link between solidarity work and decolonization must be explicit and “can only be achieved through ‘self-reflexive collective praxis’” (Schutte, 2007, p. 172). As Laenui (2000) asserts: International Journal of Child, Youth and Family Studies (2012) 2 & 3: 248–271 261 true decolonization is more than simply placing Indigenous people into the positions held by colonizers. **Decolonization includes the re-evaluation of the political, social, economic, and judicial structures themselves and the development, if appropriate, of new structures that can hold and house the values and aspirations of the colonized people.** (p. 155) **Decolonizing praxis** is not about substituting a new set of rules or codes but **rather mapping out new, engaged methods to uncover, track, and resist these hidden hegemonic normative values and practices. Adopting a decolonizing stance demands an openness and willingness to map out coloniality and to dialogue with Indigenous and other minoritized ways of knowing, doing, and being in a praxis of solidarity and social justice.** This is crucial as **“silencing Indigenous worldviews has been and continues to be one of the major tools of colonization”** (Walker, 2004, p. 531). Nevertheless, how do we engage authentically with Indigenous wisdom and ways of knowing in ways that might benefit new approaches to relating and thus practice, without appropriating or recolonizing this knowledge? A question of justice In her discussion of social service work with marginalized and minoritized people, Reynolds (2010) claims “this inherently political work requires an Ethic of resistance that takes a position for justice” (p. 5). Similarly, Newbury (2010a) critiques “the dichotomy between care (as emotional and private) and justice (as rational and public) [as] false. Care is justice” (p. 21). This has powerful implications made clear in Reynolds’ (2010) assertion that neutrality is not possible; it is in itself an ethical stance not to work for justice. As Derrida (as cited in Caputo, 1997) advances, “the condition of possibility of deconstruction is a call for justice” (p. 16) and yet he also advanced the idea that one can never be just; “the only thing that can be called ‘just’ is a singular action in a singular situation” (as cited in Caputo, 1997, p. 138). This requires that one who seeks to be just must remain engaged, alert, and self-reflexive. What implications does this hold for CYC practitioners? How can we cultivate practices to track how we enact justice (or not) in our work with children, families, and communities? In her call for making social justice explicit in CYC, Newbury (2010a) discusses how the social service field conceptualizes its role as helping people to overcome “their” problems (care), which then renders invisible the fact that these are “our” problems. This latter stance, of acknowledged collective ownership of social problems, allows us to begin to think in terms of social justice and productive social change. Kivel (2007) differentiates: “social service work addresses the needs of individuals reeling from the personal and devastating impact of institutional systems of exploitation and violence… social change work addresses the root causes of exploitation and violence” (p. 129). It is critical to adopt a praxis of solidarity and social justice to promote concepts that go beyond “service work” or “helper” to open up possibilities for individual healing that are grounded in a broader context of social transformation. As McKnight (1995) states, “human service is only one response to a human condition. There are always many other possibilities that do not involve paid experts and therapeutic concepts” (p. 103). Furthermore, it is because of the influence of neo-colonial and modernist concepts of regulation and control of environments that services have evolved with medicalized, International Journal of Child, Youth and Family Studies (2012) 2 & 3: 248–271 262 formulaic, and standardized approaches to helping, in turn facilitating the development of experts, but which do very little to mitigate or change the circumstances of individuals struggling amidst the racialized, gendered, and economic inequities of Canadian society (Scott, 1998). Solidarity as strategy **An orientation to a praxis of social justice requires that we make explicit the connections between the challenges faced by individuals and collective experiences**, **given the Western hegemony** entrenched in Canadian social, political, and economic structures. This next section explores strategies and actions to propose some beginning possibilities for mobilizing a socially just praxis. As discussed above, Western ontology has strongly shaped existing models of human service which has led to professionalization and regulation which, through specialized technical interventions, have resulted in the growth of the non-profit and professional helping sectors but which have not succeeded in resolving issues of inequity and injustice such as inadequate and unequal access to health, housing, food, and education, or issues of interpersonal violence, mental health, and substance abuse. McKnight (1995) calls for a commitment “to reallocation of power to the people we serve so that we will no longer need to serve” (p. 100). **Solidarity strategies for mobilizing across identity groups against global capitalist inequities offer some potential for moving beyond** “the **binaries that structure liberatory struggle [as] ‘us versus them’ and ‘liberation’ versus ‘oppression’** **to a multi-centered discourse with differential access to power**” (Lather, 1991, p. 25). As Mohanty (2003) advocates, **we must “move away from the ‘add and stir’ and the relativist ‘separate but equal’ (or different) perspective to the co-implication/solidarity one.** The solidarity perspective requires understanding historical and experiential specificities and differences” (p. 242). Mohanty promotes a feminist solidarity which foregrounds the intersection of gender with colonial repression and white dominance. May (2009) notes “the damage done by identity politics, and [that] it no longer holds the imagination of many… as early as the misnamed ‘anti-globalization’ movement, really an anti-neoliberalism movement, solidarity began to return to the scene in place of ghettoized identities” (p. 2). Rancière (1999, as cited in May, 2009) presents an alternate construction of equality to support a solidarity approach to social change: “For liberals, equality is what must be granted and/or preserved by state institutions with regard to citizens. For Rancière, equality is what is presupposed by those who act” (p. 9). This alternative provides a “bottom up” view of equality allowing “people [to] act collectively out of the presupposition of their equality, both to one another and to those in [power] that are said to be superior … Equality, then, cuts against individualism and toward solidarity” (May, p. 9). McLaren (2000) sees the anti-capitalist struggle as a site of common ground from which to organize “revolutionary praxis and social transformation productively [as in this way] agency is neither limited to nor does it exclude agential spaces of ethnic struggle” (p. 155). This is liberating as it opens up possible ways of being with increased accountability and engagement in everyday life to and with one another as a viable and vital alternative to the current dominant, individualistic culture of self-interest. International Journal of Child, Youth and Family Studies (2012) 2 & 3: 248–271 263 Socially just praxis **Praxis is a concept that offers constructive possibilities for a solidarity-focused, decolonizing practice that is dynamic and responsive and mobilized through an ethic of social justice.** White (2007) defines praxis as: the integration of knowledge and action (theory and practice … Specifically, theory and practice are integrated and one does not precede nor hold greater value than the other (Carr 1987). Praxis is creative, “other-seeking” and dialogic (Smith 1999). It is the place where words and actions, discourses and experience merge… Praxis is expressed in particular contexts and thus can never be proceduralized or specified in advance. (p. 226) Considering all the elements of this definition, **praxis can be viewed as a potentially constructive model** for anti-capitalist, solidarity work toward social justice. **Transformative or liberatory models of praxis strive to engage community members in shifting from an individualized view of an issue or problem to one that is more collective and politicized** (de Finney, 2007; Lang, 2005; Reyes Cruz & Sonn, 2011; Reynolds, 2010; Skott-Mhyre, 2005; Wade, 1995; White, 2007). A socially just model of CYC praxis will require an approach that integrates theorization and practice rooted in working and thinking collaboratively with diverse community members (de Finney, Dean et al., 2011). Conscious awareness and a commitment to socially just praxis offer a site of possibility for transforming practice and supporting change at broader levels by connecting those who are currently pathologized on an individual basis to collective endeavours, and supporting meaningful engagement in regard to issues of concern to them. **For white practitioners, our everyday interpersonal interactions and habituated responses warrant critical attention.** As Bordo (2008) writes, “**white people, even those who theorize with sophistication about ‘cultural difference’ and the perils of ethnocentrism, are often clueless when it comes to the practical, concrete ways race matters”** (p. 410). It is critical that “**white settler societies transcend their bloody beginnings and contemporary inequalities by remembering and confronting the racial hierarchies that structure our lives**” (Razack, 2002, p. 5). Here is a further invitation to interrogate instances of (white, male, class, or heterosexual) privilege in our own lives and practice. It can be a painful process requiring courage and compassion for oneself in order to begin the deep and honest examination of the ways in which privilege is reified through how we speak, move, take up space, and the assumptions that underpin our judgements. Derrida’s (as cited in Caputo, 1997) thinking could be useful with regard to this dynamic and dilemma. Like hospitality and justice, the importance and possibility of being conscious of and disrupting privilege, is “sustained by its impossibility” (p. 111). This edge or tension requires us to always be vigilant in our reflexivity and endeavours to map out inequities and our complicity, and to make a commitment to integrate an ethic of social justice in an engaged and vital model of praxis.

**Nativeness is coterminous with savageness. Refuse the narrative arc of future redemption as demanded by the affirmative. The libidinal process of clearning and commodification brackets the possibility of any moment of plenitude for nativeness.**

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**The aim here is thus to engage in a paradigmatic analysis of Red bodies within the libidinal and political coordinates that, in line with Jared Sexton, I am inclined to call the world. This analysis focuses on how the ontological position of Redness is defined by its position and relationships in the political and libidinal economy and how it is expressed historically.** Drawing primarily from the economic works of Georges Bataille, I frame political economy in two ways: firstly, as a “general economy” that sees the production and consumption as an artificial divide between the total movement of energy across the global occurring on both molecular and molar scales; secondly, as intricately linked and intertwined with the libidinal economy. [[1]](#endnote-1) The libidinal economy follows Wilderson’s definition in *Red, White, and Black* in which he quotes **Jared Sexton as saying that the libidinal economy is “the economy, or distribution and arrangement, of desire and identification (their condensation and displacement), and the complex relationship between sexuality and the unconscious**.”[[2]](#endnote-2) Furthermore, this paradigmatic analysis seeks to interrogate and advance Leftist theorization of ontology and to reveal, in line with Jodi Byrd, how the “Indian errant” at the heart of theorization serves to articulate the coherence of the general economy.[[3]](#endnote-3) Whereas Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism or any number of (potentially intersecting) fields of thought may focus on the dispossession its chosen subject faces, these fields still have within themselves the ability to articulate that loss. The Marxist can name and locate their loss at the site of the wage relation in which the dispossession of labor-power creates alienation and exploitation as definitive grammars of suffering for the Human worker. The feminist and queer subject, even when subjected to the most profound suffering by heteropatriarchal violence, can articulate and locate their concern and loss within the political imagination: the equality of the wage, the destruction of the gender binary, the end of the objectifying male gaze. **Even the postcolonial subject, often the focus of contemporary Native Studies, can locate loss at the site of the dispossession of land, sovereignty, culture, or genealogy, something not afforded to the Red Native who not only serves as the model of possibility for settler colonialism, but through co-operative processes of clearing and civilization is transformed into a genocided object.[[4]](#endnote-4) The ability to speak of one’s loss - to mark it, to understand it, and to conceive of its absence–is, the privilege of Humanness, the ability to live—to exist—within the coordinates of the world. The implication of this and Afropessimism’s interrogation is unsettling to these fields of thought insofar as it troubles readings of the political and libidinal economy and negates the ability for theory to provide coherent solutions for the dead Indian who no longer contains within itself the ability to possess life, which is always already to say Humanness.** The focus of this critique then aims not at the politically conservative nor at the fields of political science and sociology, which seek to understand the experiences of Red life as purely empirical phenomena and attempts to articulate a solution to such problems within the structuring logic of the White Settler-Master. Given that Redness exists as non-Human, that is, if it exists as that which lacks relationality to Humanity, then the concern is not with empirics or conservative ideology, but with so-called “allies.” Fields of thought such as Marxism, Feminism, Postcolonialism, and their fellows are parasitic upon Redness as outside the exchange of loss that is alienation and exploitation in so far that the humanist structures within those fields must presume the continual, gratuitous, structural violence of Red non-Being. **There will of course be those who seek to cite successes made by the American Indian Movement, the political structures of treaties, and the mixture of White and Red societies as evidence against such claims. They will surely ask why I insist upon such a pessimistic understanding of Native American life throughout the Western hemisphere. One could reply to these claims by asking for an example of policy, social movements or anything else that has served to separate Redness from Savageness, to ask for a moment in which the genocide of Red bodies stopped.** **To speak of Red life is to always already be speaking of mass impoverishment, police brutality, mass incarceration, alcoholism, and mental illness. Ultimately, though, this empirical citation would fall under the rubric of gains and losses that defines alienation and exploitation – and we would find ourselves in an endless hall of mirrors that would leave us with contradictory and clashing sociological analysis that leads nowhere. While such empirical appeals may aid our understanding, they certainly cannot explain our predicament.** While a single article can hardly encapsulate and explicate the conditions of Redness to the extent which authors such as Frank B. Wilderson, III, Saidiya Hartman, and Jared Sexton have done for the Slave, it aims to provide a conceptual framework with which to understand Redness within the ontological triangulation provided by Wilderson in *Red, White, and Black*. Readers accustomed to the trend of intersectionality within academic discourse will surely criticize the usage of Human, Black and Red as essentialist and as paving over the unique differences amongst groups contained in each category, yet I would contend that Redness be understood as a structural position first and an identity second. [[5]](#endnote-5) To put it another way, Redness stands as a structural position in which identity is then formulated, but not as identity itself since the Beings occupying that position may not even be aware of their relationship to the world as a Being defined by clearing and civilization. It is here, with the ontological modalities of Red life, that Redness Studies must begin its interrogation. Killing the Indian In the first instance, the ontological modality of clearing must be examined in the ways it comes to shape and define Indigenous life. While meditations on Native life as a whole attempt to focus on the ways in which the potential for culture or sovereignty can resolve the problems of Redness, these meditations are disrupted by the raw violence that defines Native American life. That is, the violence of a genocidal clearing that has come to define what it means to be an Indian.[[6]](#endnote-6) Arising from the violence of never-ending genocide is a psychic burden that causes a sense of anxiety that must be constrained and managed in even the most radical Indigenist texts, forcing one to tease out the various moments in the theorization of Native American scholars in which the fires of their works overwhelm them and fail to be incorporated within the traditional solutions of postcolonial theory.[[7]](#endnote-7) Various authors touch upon this insolvable aspect of existence, and it is found most profoundly in the works of Jodi Byrd, Vine Deloria Jr., Ward Churchill, Frank B. Wilderson III, and Leslie Marmon Silko, all of whom will be used to supplement our understanding of Red life. [[8]](#endnote-8) Of these authors, only Wilderson deals with the conditions of Red life at the highest levels of abstraction and, thus, is the starting point for analysis. While Wilderson’s work on Red existence is unparalleled, there is a need for a restructuring of his framework. In his work, Wilderson compartmentalizes the Red ontological position of clearing into genocide and (the loss of) sovereignty, ultimately failing to recognize the nature of Red life as the condition of being cleared *a priori* to existence, what Wilderson articulates as the shift from clearing as a verb to clearing as a noun at the moment of the “discovery.”[[9]](#endnote-9) This understanding of clearing as the defining aspect of Redness is seen most profoundly in the Marshall rulings, particularly in *Johnson v. McIntosh*. Indigenous legal scholar Steven Newcomb remarks that: …Marshall noted that Cabot was authorized to take possession of lands, "notwithstanding the occupancy of the natives, who were heathens, and, at the same time, admitting the prior title of any Christian people who may have made a previous discovery." In other words, the Court affirmed that United States law was based on a fundamental rule of the "Law of Nations" - that it was permissible to virtually ignore the most basic rights of indigenous "heathens," and to claim that *the "unoccupied lands" of America rightfully belonged to discovering Christian European nations*. Of course, it's important to understand that, as Benjamin Munn Ziegler pointed out in The International Law of John Marshall, the term "unoccupied lands" referred to "the lands in America which, when discovered, were 'occupied by Indians' but 'unoccupied' by Christians" (emphasis mine).[[10]](#endnote-10) Essential here is that one understand the ontological structure—the grammar of suffering—necessary for such a ruling to make sense. The Marshall rulings ontologically determine Redness from the moment the Settler meets the Savage. For the concept that the United States had eminent domain over the land to gain coherence it must presume, in the *a priori*, that the *terra nullius* of the Americas always was. Here, Native Americans emerge barred from sovereignty at the ontological level, and thus can only be regarded as non-Human occupants. This *a priori* clearing becomes the necessary grounding for the Marshall ruling to make sense because the clearing of land must be scaled to the level of a hemisphere in order for colonial land-grabbing to even begin to play out within the Americas. What this also serves to highlight is the misdirection that authors such as Wilderson, Deloria, and others point us towards when they attempt to emphasize Indigenous sovereignty – that as far as the Settler is concerned, as far as the world is concerned, the Red Indian never had sovereignty, never had any claim to the land at all. Careful examination of the *Johnson v. McIntosh* ruling further clarifies this: While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves, and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil while yet in possession of the natives. *These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy* (emphasis mine).[[11]](#endnote-11) **Here Marshall makes clear that Native American sovereignty never existed, but rather the existence (and thus the sovereignty) of Native Americans is decided only within the prerogative of the White Settler. This ontological structuring echoes throughout history and into the present, reflected as a defining aspect of Redness at every level of spatial and temporal cartography. While the reservation may appear to be a moment in which the Savage is able to map space into place, that is, to imbue space with value and have that space resist Human interventions, it is an illusion. As the Marshall rulings show, there is never a moment in which the Indian is sovereign. Furthermore, the fungible locality of the reservation shown through the Indian Removal Act suggests that not only is the reservation not a moment in which Indians own land, but the reservation is subject to movement and displacement at the prerogative of the Settler. Whether it be forced removal or the gratuitous dumping of radioactive waste on reservations, the reservation has never been a safe-haven for Red bodies.**[[12]](#endnote-12) **The act of clearing is equally applicable to the level of the individual Red body. The gratuitousness of violence committed against Red bodies, that is, violence that is based not on a prior transgressive act within the social field, but rather a condition of existence is expressed over and over as the Indian Savage is murdered again and again across time and space. These converging “vectors of death” (Churchill, *A Little Matter of Genocide*) meet at the level of the Red body through co-operative processes of alcoholism, drug abuse, suicide, mental illness, and abject poverty which, in collusion with police brutality and violent victimization, work to wipe out Red bodies. How might one explain such violence? Can any empirical statistic explain this violence? Red bodies face the second highest rate of police brutality, the highest rate of violent victimization, they are more than three times more likely than the average person to die from alcohol abuse, they have triple the rate of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS), Native American men are the fastest dying group in the United States, suicide rates are triple the national rate – the statistics and the violence never end.[[13]](#endnote-13) This ontological clearing is never limited to the spatial, it bleeds into the temporal cartography of Red bodies**. Returning to the Marshall ruling, one is faced with the considerable notion of how Redness would have had to been conceptually conceived within the world. For Marshall’s ruling to make sense, Red bodies had to be cleared not only at the moment of the temporal present, but there would also have to be no Native ownership *prior* to colonization. The eminent domain of the United States is justified only through an understanding that no political subject had laid claim to the land, that there were no subjects in the Americas. This is not only the transformative moment that creates an aspect of Settler life as having the ability to transform time and space at the level of a hemisphere, but also displaces the Indian from time. The Indian must be cleared from time so that the *terra nullius* can create the plane upon which intra-settler discussions spatially and temporally play out. Such a condition echoes back to the question Byrd poses for us: “Do Indians live the ordinary life in the contemporary now?”[[14]](#endnote-14) Following Byrd, I read Tocqueville carefully when, in describing the displacement of the Chocktaw, he writes in 1835 that “[t]hese savages had left their country and were endeavoring to gain the right bank of the Mississippi, where they hoped to find an asylum that had been promised them by the American government.”[[15]](#endnote-15) Even here, at the moment Tocqueville is describing the Chocktaw being displaced in the present, they are past perfect: they *had* left, they *were* endeavoring, they *had been* promised. Byrd is explicit here in stating that the Indian is “always already past perfect”[[16]](#endnote-16). Deloria, thirty years earlier in 1973, would speak on this condition when speaking about the surge of activism in the American Indian Movement, remarking that “[s]incere but uninformed whites honestly asked Indians during the height of the activist movement if we still lived in tents, if we were allowed to leave the reservations, and other relevant questions, indicating that for a substantial number of Americans, we were still shooting at the Union Pacific on our days off.”[[17]](#endnote-17) Given this level of temporal absence, one is left wondering: can the Indian be said to even have a future, given that it lacks a past or a present? Building off of Judith Butler, Byrd writes that for a future to exist a life must first be grievable because: Grieving… calls people to acknowledge, to see, and to grapple with lived lives and the commensurable suffering, and in Butler’s frame apprehend – in the sense of both its definitions that include to understand and to stop – the policies creating unlivable, ungrievable conditions within the state-sponsored economies of slow death and letting die.[[18]](#endnote-18) This thus leaves us with the question: Do Indians lead grievable lives? Byrd goes on to explain that “[a]ccording to Butler, in order for life to be grievable, it needs to be faceable; to exist, it needs to ‘cast a face, a life, in the future anterior’” and that so long as the Indian lacks the capacity to exist within the future anterior, that is, so long as it is impossible for Indians to ever have the capacity to look back and say “this was,” there can never be a future in which Redness is not defined by clearing.[[19]](#endnote-19) Once again, Deloria speaks of this condition when he writes that “Americans simply refuse to give up their longstanding conceptions of what an Indian is. It was this fact more than any other that inhibited any solution of the Indian problems and *projected the impossibility of their solution anytime in the future*” (emphasis mine).[[20]](#endnote-20) It is here, in the work of Deloria and Byrd and in the rulings of Marshall that we are faced with the imbroglio of a Being that is defined through its clearing, a Being that not only never was, but isn’t and never will be. Saving the Man If one were only to account for the theoretical road blocks that clearing presents to Red bodies, one might be inclined to register Red suffering within a realm of violence that could, at some time, be stopped through reform, but this would fail to take into account the second modality of Redness, that of civilization. Emerging in the English language between 1765 and 1775, civilization originally meant “the act or process of bringing out of a savage or uneducated state.” [[21]](#endnote-21) Having a specifically settler colonialist connotation at its development, civilization was seen not as a place, but a process by which Savages would be rescued from their condemnation and ignorance. This process, the process of extracting the savageness from the Savage, is what will be examined here. Civilization as a grammar of suffering is multifaceted in its manner of manifestation within Red existence. Manifesting in three ways, the grammar of civilization transposes indigeneity from the Red body onto the Settler, commodifies the ontological resistance to whiteness found in indigenous lifeways to the point of no longer having any resistance to the ravishing of capitalist valuation and deracinates the Savage to the point of social death. [[22]](#endnote-22) A tri-operative process, the grammar of civilization hollows out the Indian, mines any cultural accouchements and values, and places them within the prerogative and definitions of value of the Settler. To understand how indigeneity is moved from the body of the Red Savage to the body of the White Settler, I will draw on the work of Jodi Byrd and Michael Yellow Bird. Yellow Bird notes that some Indigenous Peoples “[avoid] the label ‘Native American’ because [they have] encountered people without ‘American Indian ancestors’ who claim to be Native American because they were born in America.”[[23]](#endnote-23) Exploring this issue at a more theoretical level, Byrd writes that: At the most basic level, what Spivak identifies as the “worlding of a world” is the discursive work of colonialism that enters lands already inhabited by peoples with their own laws, customs, languages, and orderings of the world; declares said lands “uninhabited”; and then proceeds to establish another alien world as the dominant order. Key to this discursive work is the paradigmic uninscribed, uninhabited earth, the *terra nullius* convenient colonial construct that maintained lands were empty of meaning, of language, of presence, and of history before the arrival of the European. For a worlding to take place to such a degree that the native comes to cathect her/himself as other, the native must be rendered as an unknowable blankness that can then be used to reflect back the colonizer’s desires and fantasies. And such a worlding is accomplished by denying that an “originary” world or peoples exist.[[24]](#endnote-24) She continues, posing a guiding question: How does the emptying out and reinscription of [indigenous] referents facilitate the processes of colonization and racialization in the Americas, where the land had to be physically and psychically emptied of its prior inhabitants and refilled with newly arrived “natives” who compete for subjectivity within the emptied referent?[[25]](#endnote-25) What Byrd’s analysis and questions reveal are vital for they pierce the obscure veil that postcolonial studies creates when either it assumes complete knowledge of the machinations of settler colonialism within the Western hemisphere or attempts to frame the question of the Settler and the Savage as a conflictual relationship over land. The mechanism by which civilization hollows out indigeneity is co-operative with clearing in that once the Native is cleared on the symbolic level and the indigenous referent made empty, civilization transposes this referent upon the body of the Settler so that it secures the ontological position of the Settler as that which has *a priori* dominion over the Americas and justifies the infinite deferral of the Savage’s potential claim to indigeneity that could disrupt the cartographic capacity of the Settler in the “New World.” Following this, the process of civilization begins the commodification of indigeneity to the point of removing any ontological resistance that it might hold against the Settler’s regime of value. Drawing from indigenous activist John Trudell here, I am inclined to understand this specific process as a “mining of our spirit” that serves to hollow out the integrity of traditions and lifeways to the point at which they become unable to be claimed as indigenous.[[26]](#endnote-26) Examples in this are most explicitly seen in the mass commodification of dream catchers, headdresses, sage burning as an act of cleansing, and the appropriation of Native American artwork by the fashion industry. This application of civilization is most important in the understanding that proclamations of ownership are firstly met with surprise that Indians even exist and are secondly pushed aside as so old that there is no way any indigenous group can claim it. This formation mirrors aspects of Blackness in that at this moment, there is no longer indigenous culture that can be used as a safe haven away from the ravishes of capitalism, but must rather be understood in the context of a commodification of cultural accouchements so extreme that “Native American culture” becomes “tribal style.” This “mining” serves not only to sever Indigenous Peoples from any spiritual connection to any tradition or lifeway available to them, but works in tangent with other facets of civilization in which the lifeway and the tradition of the Native no longer belongs to them because they are no longer Native, but have been emptied into a blank referent transposed onto the Settler, ensuring that any cultural production of the Indian is always already the Settler’s to use and do with as they please.[[27]](#endnote-27) This object status, while not quite the fungiblity of the Slave, resounds with the Slave’s grammars of suffering in that the status of object leaves one open to the use of subjects within civil society. The last aspect of this civilization is the deracination of the Savage which echoes throughout the boarding school system in the United States, its mission summarized by Captain Richard Pratt’s Indian-hating maxim that the boarding school should “kill the Indian in him, and save the man.” Native American boarding schools were designed to do exactly as Captain Pratt intended – they were designed to strip Native children of their culture, language, genealogy, and lifeways. Even after the boarding school system was dismantled, this process of deracination was transmuted into adoption policies and the removal of Indian children by force from reservations in which state courts and welfare agencies had no jurisdiction. The deracination of foster care was so severe that before 1978, the rate of children in states with large Native American populations could see 25 to 35 percent of all Native American children in foster care, the majority ending up in non-Native American homes.[[28]](#endnote-28) Though, even following the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, this form of deracination continues. One can find statistic after statistic displaying this, whether it be that in Canada there are more First Nations children in foster care at the height of the boarding school or that in the United States Native American children across the nation are more than twice as likely as white children to be taken from their homes.[[29]](#endnote-29) The process of removing Native children from their homes is part of a structure which not only seeks the physical death of Indians, but is also a structural deracination of culture and spirit that robs Natives not only of their family, but of all social life. This dispossession is the final mechanism by which civilization removes the Savage from time and space – it is the moment of absolute loss. Given that the modality of civilization gives coherence to the Settler world by animating the Settler’s ability to create civil society outside of empty space, it shifts the relationship between the Settler and the Savage into a purely antagonistic formation. The resolution to this problem is shifted into antagonism by the implications of parity for the ontological death secured through civilization. Parity would not only require the absolute destruction of a civilization/nature divide, but would obliterate the Settler as an ontological position through the complete destruction of that Settler’s civilized existence and civilization. This destruction of the spatio-temporal logics of Being for the Human would be one in which the Settler’s lifeways, the Settler’s culture, the Settler’s Being enter into the death space of the Indian. Understanding the fundamental antagonism between Settlers and Savages is one which not only revitalizes and raises the stakes of engagement, but is one that gives new meaning to Fanon’s maxim, “To work means to work for the death of the colonist.”[[30]](#endnote-30) Savage (Non)Life In his work, *Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms*, Wilderson takes a marked stance of articulating the Savage as Human (albeit a uniquely positioned Human) or, at worst, liminal to life and death (Humanness and Blackness).[[31]](#endnote-31) Writing about other Human positionalities, Wilderson writes that: Latinos and Asians stand in conflictual relation to the Settler/Master, that is, to the hemisphere and America writ large—they invoke a politics of culture, not a culture of politics. They do not register as antagonists. But this is only partially true of “Savage” position… [the differences between the “Savage” and the Settler] are not differences with an antagonistic structure, but differences with a conflictual structure; because articulation, rather than a void, makes the differences legible. In other words, “Savage” capacity is not obliterated by these differences.[[32]](#endnote-32) Wilderson’s claim here is simple enough; that while Savages and Settlers are surely irreconcilably different at every level, that irreconcilability does not (completely) obliterate the Savage’s capacity for life (i.e. Humanness). This belief is ultimately a product of a Lacanian psychoanalytic interpretation of the Lacanian analysand and its alienation into the field of Being, Wilderson explains that: Lacan’s analysand (meaning a subjective capacity for full or empty speech) does not *require* the Indian as its parasitic host, *despite the fact that the Indian was forcibly removed to clear a space for the analyst’s office* [emphasis original]. This is because alienation is essential to both the “Savage” and the Settler’s way of imagining structural positionality; to the way Native American meta-commentaries think ontology. Thus, the analysand’s essential capacity for *alienation from being* (alienation that takes place in language) is not parasitic on the “Savage’s” capacity to be *alienated from the spirit world or the land* (which for Indians are cosmologically inseparable) [emphasis original]. Whereas historically, the secular imperialism which made psychoanalytic imaginings possible wreaked havoc on the “Savage” at the level of Fanonian existence, that contact did not wipe out his/her libidinal capacity—or Native metaphysics.[[33]](#endnote-33) Surely embedded here is the potential for a critique of Wilderson’s (and much of Afropessimism’s) reliance on Lacanian psychoanalysis as a way of explaining the potential for antagonism, but the clearest way to respond is simply in the same psychoanalytic terms Wilderson uses here. Within the Lacanian framework Wilderson elaborates here, the conclusion is simple: that while the Indian’s death is needed for the analyst’s office to be built, it does not require the death of the Indian for analysis to function; that Indians are not Thanatos, they do not embody “the lethal action of the signifier on the subject.”[[34]](#endnote-34) Wilderson proceeds to then articulate multiple historical accounts by which the Native American is seen as having sovereignty by European colonizers and the differences in the Savage/Settler encounter and the Slave/Master encounter, relying heavily on missionary statements (primarily from Thomist ecclesiastics of the School of Salamanca). The problem with this theorization arises when there are contradictory historical accounts. How might one reconcile the Marshall rulings with the Thomist ecclesiastics? Furthermore, one might ask, as Byrd does, how “Indian naturalization and U.S. citizenship serve as the juridicial, legislative, and executive means to justify and legalize the subordination of other peoples within the imperial grasp of the United States.”[[35]](#endnote-35) In fact, as Wilderson articulates the Black Slave’s banishment from the Hegelian dialectic, he forgets Hegel’s own prescription of Native American life and its deracinating implications. As Hegel understands his own dialectic, there is a process of *geist*, a “spirit becoming aware of itself by manifesting itself in the real world” which drives Human history.[[36]](#endnote-36) This process, according to Hegel, began in Asia and found its completion in Europe, with Africa (and Africans) being in a perpetual state of unawareness that can serve as a stasis point by which to judge the progress of *geist*. This is surely Wilderson’s understanding, that the African *enabled* the dialectical process, but begs the question: “Where, in all this, is the Indian?” Hegel later goes on to understand that, given that the *geist* met its completion in Europe, Indigenous Americans are not only not a reference point for progress (such as the African) but are completely left out of the dialectic in any way, shape, or form.[[37]](#endnote-37) Hegel’s conception of the “off-the-map-ness” of Native Americans is so far reaching and absolute that when he articulates the condition of possibility to ability to enter into European law and be recognized he makes a noted exception for the Savage in that the Savage is just that: a savage that has not left the immediacy of nature and thus cannot be considered part of society any more than the buffalo and mountains that co-populated the region.[[38]](#endnote-38) This rejection is an absolute rejection in that it is not that the Savage is recognized and then rejected as conscious or seen as lacking self-awareness, but rather the Savage is rejected from the possibility of being judged as either. Where does this leave us with Wilderson’s pronunciation that the Indian is not over-determined in death in the libidinal framework of the analysand? Unlike the pronunciation of half-life given to the Indian by Wilderson, both the colonizing society (Europe) and the settler colony (the United States) proclaim the Indian not only non-sovereign, but denied the condition of possibility of sovereignty: Humanness. Within both the philosophizing discourse of Europe and the legal and social coding of the United States, the Indian *is* coded within the imaginative process of the analysand, but not as a contemporary nor as death personified. What Wilderson does is confuse the Savage with the Slave because, just as in Hegel, the Slave surely does represent death personified in the libidinal economy of the analysand and his contemporaries, **but the Savage is not death, nor is not life. It is nothingness. Whereas Humanity is directly parasitic on the Black body for coherence, the Indian is wiped out of time and space**. **The libidinal vampirism of Humanity is performed not in contradistinction but through the indirect parasitism performed in/on the Red body’s disappearance which, not only bars the Settler from the vertigo of gratuitous violence that is genocide, but also creates the space of relationality by which law, culture, and politics are formed (civilization) so as to mediate Human relationality**.[[39]](#endnote-39) The *a priori* necessity for Humanity to define its civilized/savage coordinates maintains the inside/outside of subjecthood and stands in contradiction to Wilderson’s claim that “the analysand’s essential capacity for alienation from being (alienation that takes place in language) is not parasitic on the “Savage’s” capacity to be alienated from the spirit world or the land(which for Indians are cosmologically inseparable).”[[40]](#endnote-40) The analysand’s existence as a Settler is sutured by “a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence… [that] is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler”[[41]](#endnote-41) This violence destroys the condition of possibility for an Indian world and is parasitic upon *the capacity to be alienated* in that this alienation is *a priori* to integration into the social field. **As the raw violence of Settler society demands that “the corpse of tribal society… [lay] its body down as a host on which White ethical aggrandizement can feed and through which the collective ego of Settler civil society can be monumentalized,” Natives are wretched out of their living cosmos and thrown into the dead world of the Indian Savage.[[42]](#endnote-42) This endless process of genocide obliterates traditional lifeways and deracinates the Native to the point where being Native means nothing more than an empty signifier defined through the eyes of the Settler**.[[43]](#endnote-43) The Native does not represent life (Humanity) or death (Slave), but rather fails to represent at all.[[44]](#endnote-44) This is to say that rather than act as a stasis point of death by which one’s progression into life can be judged, the Savage is not judged at all as living *or* dead. Wilderson does not recognize this and he continues this theoretical errant when he writes that: The “Savage” on the other hand, though s/he is a genocided object, is not a “genealogical isolate.” … Sovereignty… rescues the “Savage” from the genealogical isolation of the Slave. Sovereignty has the capacity to embrace the ethical dilemmas of both “social heritage of…ancestors” and “social relations with those who live.” Sovereignty, however battered or marginalized, is not a form of “borrowed institutionality,” it requires no structural adjustment. Therefore, the relation of negation between Red and White *cannot be sustained as an absolute*: While White exploitation and alienation can no more secure structural articulation between their modalities and those of Red genocide than they can with accumulation and fungibility, they can (and historically do) secure such articulation with Red Sovereignty [emphasis original].[[45]](#endnote-45) What occurs here is semantically confusing and requires some teasing out. Wilderson understands that the Slave is a genealogical isolate since the social relationships of the Slave are defined solely in relationship to the condition of being owned. This full disimbrication from all social relationality outside of being a Slave causes the Slave to lose its Being and become “being for the captor.”[[46]](#endnote-46) Wilderson claims that then, given that sovereignty is based in the ethical obligation to one’s ancestors and in one’s social relationship with others, while genocide may be a modality of genealogical isolation, the ontological modality of (the loss of) sovereignty is not and prevents the Savage from being a genealogical isolate. This, however, is fallacious given the intricate nature of civilization and its method of deracination. Given that Native Americans are never formally recognized as sovereign in either legal or philosophical discourse (treaties being seen as “privileges” granted to Savages by the colonizing nation), this claim is already called into question at the level of (the loss of) sovereignty even being an ontological modality of Native American existence. Rather than understand sovereignty as an ontologically prior condition by which the Savage is granted genealogical coherence, one should first understand that co-operative processes of civilization and clearing make any knowledge of one’s genealogy unlikely (the loss of a heritage *and* a past), but that also social formations are within Native American communities founded primarily on the condition of being Native American. While there is the potential for intra-tribal social relations, these relations are not legitimized within the eyes of the Settler when all Indigenous Peoples are categorized under a single racial group defined by a blood quantum as exemplified by the Cherokee Nations declaration that “you have to be Indian to be Indian.”[[47]](#endnote-47) The social formations created by Red bodies is founded upon this deracination and, perhaps, this is something that was not so obvious to the older theorists Wilderson cites. Leslie Marmon Silko, in her novel *Ceremony*, describes this disjunction between older and younger generations of Native Americans when she writes that: He [Tayo] had heard Auntie talk about the veterans—drunk all the time, she said. But he knew why. It was something the old people could not understand. Liquor was medicine for the anger that made them hurt, for the pain of the loss, medicine for tight bellies and choked-up throats.[[48]](#endnote-48) Later in the story Silko goes on to describe how this pain, dealt with through drunkenness, would be the catalyst for the telling of stories and social invitation into discussion. The pain and anger over a loss without name is the formation of the social group, it transforms all narratives into narratives of surviving, every act of “culture” by Native Americans becomes a survival strategy in which the dualism between the overwhelming violence of being a Being of nothingness and the deathly comfort of alcoholism and drug use is put off. Wilderson’s concern with the irreconcilable “worlds” of the Settler and the Savage is far too reductionist in the intricacy of the violence inflicted against Red bodies. It is not that there is a Savage world that stands in irreconcilable opposition to the world of the Settler, but rather that Red life (as far as it can be called life) is a survival strategy that no longer possesses the potential for world creation.[[49]](#endnote-49) Whether it is the absolute loss of entire tribes, the cultural deracination of Indigenous groups in Latin America, or just massive, unending violence, the “world” of Redness is lost to the gratuitous violence of being Savage. Thus, when Wilderson seeks to push the Savage into the fold of the human writing that the Settler and the Savage share: ….a capacity for time and space coherence. At every sale – the soul, the body, the group, the land, and the universe – they can both practice cartography, and although at every scale their maps are radically incompatible, their respective “mapness” is never in question. This capacity for cartographic coherence is the thing itself, that which secures subjectivity for both the Settler and the “Savage” and articulates them to one another in a network of connections, transfers and displacements.”[[50]](#endnote-50) He ignores that the violence Red face extends far beyond the reservation into time and space because it is a violence that silenced languages, burned books, obliterated people, erased history, and shattered families. His belief that even in the midst of the loss of sovereignty and genocide Red bodies have maintained a “capacity for cartographic coherence” (something which would grant them subjectivity) occurs because the theorists Wilderson cites in the context of the loss of sovereignty are all Indigenous Peoples who know their culture, who were born into a world that granted them cartographic coherence and, on a psychic level, are motivated to disavowal their status as a non-Being. The concept of “having maps at every scale” only makes sense if one were to assume that the Native American who has avoided the pure horror of genocide is the same as the Indian stolen from their people and shot in the street. This would be as if one analyzed the condition of Black existence in the Americas by the ability for native Africans to map time and space; if one did that, of course one would be led to believe that while the condition of Blackness is one in which while Black bodies may face colonialist violence they had surely maintained culture and subjectivity – which is surely false and would lead one to any and all manner of mistheorization. To fully understand the condition of social life or death faced by Native Peoples one would have to examine whether or not American Indians exist within the same conditions that afropessimists themselves articulate as creating social death. Beginning with Saidiya Hartman, **she defines social death as the condition by which “[t]he everyday practices of the enslaved occur in the default of the political, in the absence of the rights of mean or the assurances of the self-possessed individual, and perhaps even without a ‘person’ in the usual meaning of the term.”[[51]](#endnote-51) Through the eyes of the Savage, there is a relationality here in a common condition between the enslaved and the savage in that Redness exists in the default of the political insofar as the “Indian Savage” exists outside of and defines through contradistinction the warm glow of Human civilization, forever denied access and entrance into that civilization.[[52]](#endnote-52) Furthermore, the vectors of death which converge upon Redness from the individual body to the reservation places Indians in a constant state of emergency which not only clears their personhood through defining them as non-Humans, but also rids them of their ability to map time and space – things which are assured to the existent and civilized individual.** When Wilderson articulates this condition, he issues multiple overlapping definitions of social death, concluding that “[social death] means that our existence is not *our* existence, but is embedded in ‘the master’s prerogative’” (Emphasis original).[[53]](#endnote-53) He goes further in describing social death in the historical sense writing that: “…the Black position, is indeed a position, not an identity; and that its constituent elements are coterminous with and inextricably bound to the constituent elements of social death which is to say, that for Blackness, there is no narrative moment prior to slavery.[[54]](#endnote-54) Applying this historical perspective to what culture might mean for Black bodies, Wilderson writes that: [c]ulture emanates from a social formation of human beings. As such they have the capacity to transform space into place and time into event or chronology. Language and genealogical coherence are effects of the later; homeland is an effect of the former. Such are the necessary currency for the “purchase” of culture. The Slave forfeits both forms of currency at the moment s/he is given social death (natal alienation) as a substitute for real death.[[55]](#endnote-55) Likewise, in Wilderson’s understand of social death and its manifestations we find relationality between the Savage and the Slave. Firstly, our existence is not ours, but rather exists within the Settler’s prerogative, as exemplified by the Marshall opinion. C**learing and civilization as grammars of suffering exemplify this quite well, showing that the Savage has no ontological resistance in the face of Whiteness and as such is endlessly open to the whim of the Settler which decides the Savage’s fate.** In the second quote, the Marshall decisions once again show us that at the moment of “discovery,” at the moment the Settler meets the Indian, the Red body is structured as Indian, with no prior moment of existence outside of the Settler’s recording of it. The **Indian is always already defined by the referents and signifiers of the Settler**.[[56]](#endnote-56) Furthermore, as Wilderson defines culture, it is necessary that one understand a group’s capacity for cartography following their grammars of suffering in order to judge its cultural capacity. This interpretation would then ask: Following the simultaneous processes of clearing and civilization, can the Savage map time and space**? The Indian is left with no language, no genealogical coherence or even knowledge of where their homeland is as the civilizing of the Settler obliterates and deracinates all traces of it. As for homeland, not only does clearing potentially negate the concept that Turtle Island was ever home for Native Americans within the conception of the world, the process of civilization prevents access to knowledge of that homeland** at any scale smaller than that of a hemisphere and, as Wilderson himself writes, “‘homeland’ implies a cartographic scale much smaller and more intimate than a continent.”[[57]](#endnote-57) Finally, in Jared Sexton’s work he writes that: *Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society*, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—the modern world system. Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space. …black life is not social, or rather that black life is lived in social death (emphasis mine).[[58]](#endnote-58) **Sexton’s articulation suggest that in order for Indians to be said to face social death one is obliged not to prove that there is no Red (social) life at all, but rather that Red life is not considered life within the codes and mores of the Settler. In fact, Wilderson does this work for us when he explains that “at every scale [the Settler and the Savage’s] maps are radically incompatible.”[[59]](#endnote-59) While the colonized may have things in common with the colonizer (i.e. Israel and Palestine), this is not the case between the Savage and the Settler. For the Savage, there is no life within the codes of civil society because any cultural accouchements are simply markers of “primitiveness” and reify that savagery and that marking**.[[60]](#endnote-60) Conclusion **I am inclined to agree with Wilderson that the Leninist question of “what is to be done” is in the wrong direction. The question itself fails to grasp the severity of the problem we face. To ask “what is to be done” is to first understand the problem one faces and secondly presumes that the problem one faces can be articulated, that one is deprived of something that can be named rather than deprived of being able to lose. To address this, what is needed is a radical shift in orientation in our scholarship and ethics that focuses on the question of understanding and ending the structures that make our, Red and Black, existence impossible rather than asking what is to be done within the epistemologies and ethics of those structures.** When Subcomandante Marcos asks Presidente Salinas why do we need to be pardoned, when he asks what are we to be pardoned for, and when he asks who should ask for pardon, and who can grant it, he is not merely exposing the gratuitous violence of the Settler upon Red bodies, he is revealing the impossibility of an answer. **If this paper is forced to offer a solution, however meager, it is for Red bodies to relinquish their desire to be structurally adjusted into the Human fold, a fold which will never solve or relieve our problems because our problems are the condition of possibility for that fold’s existence. In realizing how our desire is structured not only as a fear of Slaveness, but of Savageness, we can better come to form survival strategies for our communities and, as Fanon suggests, set to work.**

**Systems of knowledge serve to institute and replicate settler colonialism — the human is a storytelling species and knowledge systems are always already being chartered through the replication of sociogenic codes**

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To resolve the aporia of this cognitive dilemma, I turn again to Césaire’s proposed new and hybrid bios / mythoi science of the Word. Here because, as he proposed, and as earlier cited, the study of the Word / the mythoi will now determine the study of the bios / of the brain, and this will thereby enable us to gain an external (demonic ground) perspective on the always already storytellingly chartered / encoded discursive formations / aesthetic fields, as well as of, co- relatedly, our systems of knowledge. And, with this gain insight into how these **systems of knowledge**, each together with its genre- specific “truth of solidarity,” all **institute and stably replicate** our **genres of being hybridly human** with the also communitarian viability of each respective societal order. Yet **with all of the above—including, in macro terms, the instituting of our contemporary secular and “single model” liberal (now neoliberal) monohumanist Western / Westernized transnational world system—what again must be emphasized is** that **the respective “truths” of** their **knowledge systems are always already prespecified by our storytellingly chartered sociogenic replicator code** of symbolic life / death, its Word and / or Bateson- type “descriptive statement” as rigorously discursively elaborated by its “status quo system of learning” and its overall epistemological order. **This order circularly ensures that each such genre- specific regime / program of truth, will law- likely function to semantically- neurochemically induce the performative enactment of** our ensemble of **always already role- allocated individual and collective behaviors** within the reflexly and subjectively experienced terms of a cognitively closed, thereby genre- specific and fictively eusocializing, autonomously functioning, higher- level living autopoietic system. Cosmogonies of Our Planetary Life and Our Chartered Codes of Symbolic Life and Symbolic Death: Fictively Induced Modes of Inter- Altruistic Kin Recognition and Auto- Instituted Pseudospeciated Mode of Kind KM: Here Wynter elaborates on storytelling beginnings and cosmogonies. She returns to her extension of Frantz Fanon’s conception of our being hybridly human, both bios and mythoi, in order to address the unsolved phenomenon of human consciousness. She explores how our chartering / encoding genre- specific cosmogonies provide the narrative source of our fictively eusocializing subjectivities, thus enabling us to be reborn- through- initiation as always already sociogenically encoded inter- altruistically kin- recognizing members of each referent- we. At the same time, however, **the law- like reification of each fictively induced and subjectively experienced order of consciousness of each referent- we is, itself, absolutized by** what Wynter identifies as **the law of cognitive closure**. SW: Fanon put forward the idea of our skin / masks, thereby of the hybridity of our being human, in 1952. Crick and Watson cracked the genetic code in 1953. Now, I argue that Fanon’s masks enact a “second set of instructions”: that of the sociogenic code of symbolic life / death. Further, within the overall enactment of each such “second set of instructions,” the ism of gender is itself—while only one member class—a founding member class. Gender is a founding member because in order to auto- institute ourselves as subjects of a genre- specific referent- we, we must, first, co- relatedly and performatively enact each such code’s “second set of instructions” at the familial level, in terms of our gender roles. We know of this brilliant concept of the performative enactment of gender from Judith Butler.60 I am suggesting that the enactments of such gender roles are always a function of the enacting of a specific genre of being hybridly human. Butler’s illuminating redefinition of gender as a praxis rather than a noun, therefore, set off bells ringing everywhere! Why not, then, the performative enactment of all our roles, of all our role allocations as, in our contemporary Western / Westernized case, in terms of, inter alia, gender, race, class / underclass, and, across them all, sexual orientation? All as praxes, therefore, rather than nouns. So here you have the idea that with being human everything is praxis. For we are not purely biological beings! As far as the eusocial insects like bees are concerned, their roles are genetically preprescribed for them. Ours are not, even though the biocentric meritocratic iq bourgeois ideologues, such as the authors of The Bell Curve, try to tell us that they / we are.61 So the question is: **What are the mechanisms, what are the technologies, what are the strategies by which we prescribe our own roles?** What is common to all are cosmogonies and origin narratives. The representations of origin, which we ourselves invent, **are then retroactively projected onto an imagined past.** Why so? Because each such projection is the shared storytelling origin out of which we are initiatedly reborn. In this case we are no longer, as individual biological subjects, primarily born of the womb; rather, we are both initiated and reborn as fictively instituted inter- altruistic kinrecognizing members of each such symbolically re- encoded genre- specific referent- we. This is to say we are all initiatedly reborn—renatus in Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Christian term—to subjectively experience ourselves as subjects of the same encoded symbolic life kind. Why this imperative? Because **for all genre- specific subjects who are reborn from the same eusocializing origin myth and / or cosmogony, their genetically encoded individual biological life and its attendant imperative of naked self- preservation must at the same time be**, via initiation, **aversively experienced as symbolic death.** 62 This is the concomitant condition of inducing in all subjects the mimetic desire for the group- collective symbolic life of its genre- specific referent- we, its fictive mode of pseudospeciated kind. **The centrality of the ritually initiated and enacted storytelling codes, and thus their positive / negative, symbolic** life / death **semantically- neurochemically activated “second set of instructions,”** **emerges** here: these codes are specific to each kind. **The positive verbal meanings attributed to their respective modes of kind are alchemically transformed into living flesh, as its members all reflexly subjectively experience themselves, in the mimetically desirable, because opiate-rewarded, placebo terms of that mode of symbolic life prescribed by the storytelling code**. This at the same time as they subjectively experience their former “born of the womb” purely biological life as mimetically aversive, because they are doing so in now opiate- reward- blocked symbolic death, nocebo terms.63 For the preservation of which of these lives, then, do you think wars are fought? In the wake of the answer to the above, we see our chartering cosmogonies as being isomorphic with what we now define as our “cultures”— in both cases **we are talking about our hybrid sociogenic codes and their “second set of instructions.”** These are **codes that are even able to override where necessary**—this with respect to our auto- instituted, non– genetically restricted fictive modes of eusociality—**the first set of instructions of our own dna** (unlike as is the case with all other primates). The logical corollary is this: our modes of auto- institution, together with their initiatory rituals of rebirth—as iconized by the ritual of Christian baptism—are indispensable to the enacting of the human as the only living species on Earth who is the denizen of its third and hybrid bios / mythoi level of existence! Our mode of hybrid living being alone—this together with our also hitherto always genre- specific bios / mythoi enacted orders of supraindividual consciousness—is thereby to arrive on the scene all at once! With the Big Bang of the biomutational Third Event! So you see now why we still can’t solve the problem of consciousness? In spite of the most dedicated efforts of natural scientists, brain scientists, and philosophers? For what becomes clear here is that our human orders of consciousness / modes of mind cannot exist outside the terms of a specific cosmogony. Therefore, human orders of consciousness / modes of mind cannot preexist the terms of the always already mythically chartered, genre- specific code of symbolic life / death, its “second set of instructions” and thus its governing sociogenic principle— or, as Keith Ward puts it, its nonphysical principle of causality.64 To give an example: here we are, we are talking and thinking. We are, in fact, reflexly talking and thinking in terms of Darwin’s biocosmogonically chartered definitive version—in The Descent of Man (1871)—of the British bourgeoisie’s ruling class’s earlier reinvention of Man1’s civic humanist homo politicus as that of liberal monohumanist Man2 as homo oeconomicus, together with its now fully desupernaturalized sociogenically encoded order of consciousness. These are the very terms, therefore, in which we ourselves, in now historically postcolonial / postapartheid contexts, are. If in our case, only mimetically so! This at the same time as we are also struggling to think outside the limits of the purely biocentric order of consciousness that is genre- specific to the Western bourgeoisie’s homo oeconomicus. But it’s extremely difficult to do, right? You know why? Because Darwinism’s powerful, seductive force as a cosmogony, or origin narrative, is due to the fact that it is the first in our human history to be not only part myth but also part natural science. In fact, this mutation—the part myth / part natural science workings of Darwinism—draws attention to Darwin’s powerful neoMalthusian conceptual leap.65 A leap by means of which—over and against Cardinal Bellarmine—Darwin was to definitively replace the biblical Cre- ation account of the origin of all forms of biological life, including the major bios aspect of our being hybridly human, with a new evolutionary account. Why, then, say that this Darwinian account is only part science? Biologist Glyn Isaac, in his essay “Aspects of Human Evolution” (1983), provides the answer. Isaac makes us aware of the ecumenically human trap into which Darwin had also partly fallen: Understanding the literature on human evolution calls for the recognition of special problems that confront scientists who report on this topic. Regardless of how the scientists present them, accounts of human origins are read as replacement materials for genesis. They fulfill needs that are reflected in the fact that all societies have in their culture some form of origin beliefs, that is, some narrative or configurational notion of how the world and humanity began. Usually, these beliefs do more than cope with curiosity, they have allegorical content, and they convey values, ethics and attitudes. The Adam and Eve creation story of the Bible is simply one of a wide variety of such poetic formulations. . . . The scientific movement which culminated in Darwin’s compelling formulation of evolution as a mode of origin seemed to sweep away earlier beliefs and relegate them to the realm of myth and legend. Following on from this, it is often supposed that the myths have been replaced by something quite different, which we call “science.” However, this is only partly true; scientific theories and information about human origins have been slotted into the same old places in our minds and our cultures that used to be occupied by the myths. . . . Our new origin beliefs are in fact surrogate myths, that are themselves part science, part myths. 66 So the trap, you see, is that of the paradox that lies at the core of our metaDarwinian hybridity. For what I’m saying is that as humans, we cannot / do not preexist our cosmogonies, our representations of our origins—even though it is we ourselves who invent those cosmogonies and then retroactively project them onto a past. We invent them in formulaic storytelling terms, as “donor figures” or “entities,” who have extrahumanly (supernaturally, but now also naturally and / or bioevolutionarily, therefore secularly) mandated what the structuring societal order of our genre- specific, eusocial or cultural present would have to be.67 As the French cultural anthropologist Maurice Godelier also makes clear, with respect to the above: we, too, hitherto have also systematically kept the reality of our own agency—from our origins until today—opaque to ourselves. 68 Thus all our humanly invented chartering cosmogonies, including our contemporary macro (monohumanistic / monotheistic) cosmogonies, are law- likely configured as being extrahumanly mandated.69 All such sacred theological discourses ( Judaism, Islamism, Christianity, for example) continue to function in the already theo- cosmogonically mandated cognitively closed terms that are indispensable to the enacting of their respective behavior- inducing and behavior- regulatory fictively eusocializing imperative. This is especially apparent, too, in the secular substitute monohumanist religion of Darwin’s neo- Malthusian biocosmogony: here, in the biocosmogony of symbolic life / death—as that of selection / dysselection and eugenic / dysgenic codes—the incarnation of symbolic life, will law- likely be that of the ruling- class bourgeoisie as the naturally selected (eugenic) master of Malthusian natural scarcity. With this emerges, cumulatively, the virtuous breadwinner, together with his pre- 1960s virtuous housewife, and, corelatedly, the savvy investor, the capital accumulator, or at least the steady job holder.70 In effect, wealth, no longer in its traditional, inherited freehold landowning form, but in its now unceasingly capital- accumulating, global form, is itself the sole macro- signifier of ultimate symbolic life. Symbolic death, therefore, is that of having been naturally dysselected and mastered by Malthusian natural scarcity: as are the globally homogenized dysgenic non- breadwinning jobless poor / the pauper / homeless / the welfare queens. Poverty itself, therefore, is the “significant ill” signifier of ultimate symbolic death and, consequently, capital accumulation, and therefore symbolic life signifies and narrates a plan of salvation that will cure the dysselected significant ill! **The systemic reproduction of** the real- life **categories** of both signifiers **are indispensable to the continued enactment of the ruling - class** bourgeoisie’s **governing code** of symbolic life / death and the defining of liberal (now neoliberal) monohumanist Man2. This now purely secular coding of life / death is itself discursively—indeed rigorously—elaborated bioepistemologically, on the model of a natural organism, by the disciplines of our social sciences and humanities, together with their respective genre- specific and ethno- class truths of solidarity.71 Consequently, **within the laws of** hybrid auto- institution and / or pseudospeciation the (**humanities and social science**) **disciplinary truths of solidarity enact** their biocosmogonically chartered **sociogenic code** of symbolic life / death, also **imperatively calling to be discursively elaborated in cognitively** (cum psychoaffectively / aesthetically) **closed terms.**

**Extinction outweighs should be rejected as an impact framing – explicit in their utilitarian calculus is the death of billions of indigenous and black communities to preserve a white future – it’s not the best of both worlds, it’s the protection of white futures in the name of human progress.**

**Mitchell & Chaudhury, ’20** (Audra, Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and Aadita, PhD candidate at the Department of Science and Technology Studies at York University, “Worlding beyond ‘the’ ‘end’ of ‘the world’: white apocalyptic visions and BIPOC futurisms,” International Relations, Research Article, pp. 7-9, ZW) recut aaditg

In addition, many authors working in this genre worry about the interruption of the perceived stadial progression of ‘humanity’, a narrative that celebrates the emergence of whiteness through the elimination of ‘inferior’ races or cultures.51 For example, Canadian settler scholar Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (italics ours) warns that the extinction of ‘humanity’, which she associates with ‘rational life’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘civilization’ (terms all deeply linked to Euro-centric and colonial subjectivities) would be ethically wrong ‘if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing’.52 In this vein, Bostrom idealizes a future in which the continued evolution of ‘(post)humanity’ culminates in a form of ‘technological maturity’ that adheres to mainstream norms of white maleness: deeply disembodied, unattached to place, and dominant over, or independent from, ‘nature’.53 Closely-linked to worries about the loss of potential ‘human progression’ is the fear of de-volution or back-sliding. In some cases, fears of demographic decline in ‘white-majority’ regions (see above) extend to worries about the biological ‘extinction’ of white people. For instance, a recent report asserts that there has been 59.3% decline in total sperm count in men from North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, but no comparable or significant decline in South America, Asia, and Africa, despite a paucity of studies in the latter regions (Ghosh 2017). While warning of a biological decline of whiteness, the articulation of these fears and the funding of research to address them undergirds a resurgence of whiteness formed in the perceived face of its destruction.54 Indeed, many contributors to ‘end of the world’ discourses offer strategies for the reconstruction and ‘improvement’ of existing power structures after a global catastrophe. For example, American settler economist Robin Hanson calculates that if 100 humans survived a global catastrophic disaster that killed all others, they could eventually move back through the ‘stages’ of ‘human’ development, returning to the ‘hunter-gatherer stage’ within 20,000 years and then ‘progressing’ from there to a condition equivalent to contemporary society (defined in Euro-centric terms).55 Other authors focus on social, political, and economic forms of regeneration through simplification, which Homer-Dixon56 calls ‘catagenesis’. ‘Western civilization is not a lost cause’, he insists, ‘using reason and science to guide decisions, paired with extraordinary leadership and exceptional goodwill, human society can progress to higher and higher levels of well-being and development. . . But that requires resisting the very natural urge. . .to become less cooperative, less generous and less open to reason’ (italics ours).57 In this vision, Western civilization – which, is elided here with ‘human society’ – can salvage the future using some of its trademark claims: the possession of reason, science, and cooperativeness. However, this requires assimilating all human communities into a Western liberal-cosmopolitan mode of civility and suppressing forms of resistance that threaten to knock this goal off course. If ‘humanity’ is able to achieve this goal and develop a ‘prospective mind’ capable of seeing opportunity in destruction, Homer-Dixon argues it will be able to ‘turn breakdown to our advantage’58 (italics ours). Recalling that the ‘us’ in this discourse actively interpellates whiteness, this discourse frames global catastrophe as an opportunity to consolidate white structures of domination, assimilate resistors, and ultimately increase their power. Other **authors who foresee post-apocalyptic movement toward a dazzling future (for whiteness) are clear about its costs**. In his seminal book on human extinction, Canadian settler philosopher John Leslie states that ‘**misery and death for billions [caused by an ecological crisis]** would be immensely tragic, but might be followed by slow recovery and then a glittering future for a human race which had learned its lesson’.59 Similarly**, Bostrom argues** even the **fractional reduction of threats to the possibility of posthuman**, techno-infused **subjectivities, by any means**, **would be worth ‘at least a hundred times the value of a million [contemporary] human lives’.**60 Although rarely explicitly stated, it is not difficult to discern whose lives these authors believe might be sacrificed for the ‘greater good’ of ‘learning lessons’ and rescuing ‘humanity’ as they see it. This can be gleaned from these authors’ assessments of the ‘winners and losers’ of previous global upheavals. For example, in assessing the tumult of the twentieth century, Homer-Dixon states that Western capitalist societies were amongst the ‘most adaptive’ – and therefore closest to his ideal of the ‘prospective mind’ – while ‘at the other end of the spectrum, we find societies, including many in sub-Saharan Africa and some in Asia and Latin America, that have much lower ability to manage or adapt. . . a few, like Haiti and Somalia, have completely succumbed.’61 While this statement refers historical patterns, it is presented as part of an analysis that explicitly analyzes historical trends as indicators of future scenarios. As such, it inscribes ongoing racial inequalities and stereotypes far into the future.

1. For more explanation and explication on the term “general economy,” see Georges Bataille’s *The Accursed Share: An Essay on the General Economy (Volume 1: Consumption)*. Terms “molecular” and “molar” here pay homage to Deleuze and Guattari and are used to signify both the micro and the macro. The specific usage here is preferred in that it signifies the group nature of activity even at the level of the individual. For more on these terms, see Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 7. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), xxxv. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. For more on the American Indian as the model and condition of possibility for settler colonial struggles, see Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor.” [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. “Intersectionality” is used here as it is understood by Kimberlé Crenshaw to indicate the study of intersections between forms or systems of oppression, domination or discrimination. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. For more work on this, see Ward Churchill’s *A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust And Denial In The Americas 1492 To The Present*. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. The nature of this never-ending genocide is described at length by Jared Sexton in “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism” when he writes: “Some may chafe at the notion of permanence here, because it seems not to admit of historicity or, more radically, of a certain impossibility of permanence. But we are talking about permanence in the pedestrian sense that something ‘lasts or remains without essential change.’ It is the logic of change as permutation.” [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. It should be noted at this point that of the following authors to be listed as primary understandings of Native American life, only Jodi Byrd, Vine Deloria Jr, and Leslie Marmon Silko. are Indigenous Peoples. Frank B. Wilderson III is Black and Ward Churchill, while they falsely claim Native American ancestry, are White and used as historians for the purpose of this work. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 146-47. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Steve Newcomb, "Five Hundred Years of Injustice: The Legacy of Fifteenth Century Religious Prejudice," Shaman's Drum (1992): 18-20. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 21, Marshall, 1823. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Andrea Smith, "Not an Indian Tradition: The Sexual Colonization of Native Peoples," *Hypatia* 18.2 (2003): 81-82. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. United States Bureau of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Criminal Victimization, 2013 (Revised)*, By Jennifer L. Truman and Lynn Langton (2013), 9; United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *Fatal Injury Reports, National and Regional, 1999 – 2013* by the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (2013); Vanessa Ho, "Native American Death Rates Soar as Most People Are Living Longer," *Seattle PI*,11 Mar. 2009, <http://www.seattlepi.com/> (accessed 27 Apr. 2015); Sari Horwitz, "The Hard Lives — and High Suicide Rate — of Native American Children on Reservations," *The Washington Post*, 9 Mar. 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/> (accessed 27 Apr. 2015); Kathleen L. Irwin, Salvatore Mannino, and Janet Daling, "Sudden Infant Death Syndrome in Washington State: Why Are Native American Infants at Greater Risk than White Infants?" *The Journal of Pediatrics* 121.2 (1992): 242-47; "1 in 10 Native American Deaths Alcohol Related," *MSNBC*, 28 Aug. 2008, <http://www.nbcnews.com/> (accessed 27 Apr. 2015). The rate of police brutality for Native Americans is .01 per 100,000 behind Black Americans. Violent victimization includes rape or sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 37. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Alexis De Tocqueville, "The Present and Probable Future Condition of the Three Races That Inhabit the Territory of the United States," *Democracy in America*, Ed. Phillips Bradley, Trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1945). [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 37. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Vine Deloria Jr, *God Is Red: A Native View of Religion* (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Pub., 2003), 25. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 38. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid., 38. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Vine Deloria Jr, *God Is Red: A Native View of Religion* (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Pub., 2003), 29-30. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. “civilization,” *Online Etymology Dictionary*, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=civilization (accessed 30 April 2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. “Lifeway” is opposed to “Lifestyle” in that it first implies a group’s traditional way of living and also indicates a more ecologically centered understanding, one in which the human animal is understood as part of a larger ecosystem. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Michael Yellow Bird, “What We Want to Be Called: Indigenous Peoples' Perspectives on Racial and Ethnic Identity Labels,” *American Indian Quarterly* 23.2 1999: 13. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 64-65. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Ibid., 69 [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. John Trudell, “John Trudell Speaks at Judi Bari Memorial” (Speech, Judi Bari Memorial Fundraiser, Berkley, California, 26 April 1997). [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 63. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Kelly Gaines-Stoner, Billy Joe Jones, and Mark Tilden, *The Indian Child Welfare Act Handbook: A Legal Guide to the Custody and Adoption of Native American Children* (Chicago: American Bar Association Publishing, 2008), 1. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Adrian Humphreys, “‘A lost tribe': Child welfare system accused of repeating residential school history,” *National Post*, 15 Dec. 2014, http://news.nationalpost.com/ (accessed 30 Apr. 2015); Laura Sullivan and Amy Walters, “Incentives And Cultural Bias Fuel Foster System,” *National Public Radio*, 25 Oct. 2011 [www.npr.org/](http://www.npr.org/) (accessed 30 Apr. 2015); Joshua Padilla and Alicia Summers, “Disproportionality Rates for Children of Color in Foster Care,” *The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges*, May 2011, <http://www.ncjfcj.org/> (accessed 30 Apr. 2015); The rate of this deracination is surprisingly high, with some states, such as South Dakota, failing to put Native American children in Native American homes over 90 percent of the time. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Fanon Franz, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 44. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. It is in this section that I sustain my most in depth and prolonged critique of Wilderson’s work. I am truly forever indebted to his work both personally and scholastically. Much like Fred Moten, I hope that we can still be friends. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Frank B. Wilderson, III, Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 45. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Ibid., 46 [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Massimo Recalcati, “The Empty Subject: Un-Triggered Psychoses in the New Forms of the Symptom,” Trans. Jorge Jauregui, *Lacanian Ink* 26 2005: n. pag. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 169. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Scott L. Pratt, *Native Pragmatism: Rethinking the Roots of American Philosophy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002), 4 [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Ibid., 5-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. William E. Conklin, “The Legal Culture of Civilization: Hegel and His Categorization of Indigenous Americans” in *Europe in Its Own Eyes, Europe in the Eyes of the Other*, ed. David B. McDonald and Mary-Michelle DeCoste (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2014), 56. The term “off the map” is borrowed from Frank B. Wilderson, III. For more on this term and its meaning, see his “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal.” [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1.1 2012: 6, 18. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 46. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1.1 2012: 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 168; Vine Deloria, Jr., *The World We Used to Live in: Remembering the Powers of the Medicine Men* (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 2006), xviii. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 63. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. Ibid., 63. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 51. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. Hortense Spillers, *Black , White and in Color: Essays on American Literature and*

    *Culture* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 206. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 139. Quoted in Byrd, the endnote for that quotation reads “This is one of the memes circulating as the Cherokee nation and its spokespeople respond to the media and question regarding their March 3, 2007, vote.” While the quotation is used to justify the racist exclusion of Cherokee Freedmen from tribal enrollment, it does exemplify the racializing (and therefore racist) logic that pervades throughout the Americas. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Leslie Marmon Silko, *Ceremony* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006). [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Vine Deloria Jr. describes this most directly when in his book *The World We Used to Know* when he writes that “Wrenched from a free life where the natural order had to be understood and obeyed, confined within a foreign educational system where memorization and recital substitute for learning and knowledge, each generation of Indians has been moved farther and farther away from the substance of the spiritual energy that once directed our lives. We no longer have the testimony of eyewitnesses who saw the spectacular feats of our spiritual leaders and understood that there were much larger boundaries than the life of accumulating goods. We no longer depend on the presence and wisdom of elders who can consult with the spirits and give or their counsel when making important decisions. Most of us cannot even fathom how living in that manner would be.” [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 181. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Saidiya Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 65. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), xviii. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. Frank B. Wilderson, III, "The Black Liberation Army and the Paradox of Political Engagement" *Postcoloniality –Decoloniality – Black Critique: Joints and* *Fissures*, Ed. Sabine Broeck and Carsten Junker (Frankfurt-on-Main, Germany: Campus Verlag, 2014), 176. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 45-46. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. Ibid., 408. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 63. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. Frank B. Wilderson, III, “Grammar & Ghosts: The Performative Limits of African Freedom” *Theatre Survey*, 50.1 2009: 123. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. Jared Sexton, "The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism," *InTensions* 5 (2011): n. pag. [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. Frank B. Wilderson, III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010), 181. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 2011), 63. [↑](#endnote-ref-60)