# 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: the affirmative must defend all members of the world trade organization.

Nebel 19. [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution.” Vbriefly. August 12, 2019. <https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/?fbclid=IwAR0hUkKdDzHWrNeqEVI7m59pwsnmqLl490n4uRLQTe7bWmWDO_avWCNzi14> TG

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions.

Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window.

So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why.

“Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons.

First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural.

Second, “colleges and universities” fails the [upward-entailment test](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#IsolGeneInte) for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals.

Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universitiesz generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution.

#### It applies to “the member nations”-

#### Standards:

#### [1] Limits and Ground – they can spec any combinations of countries, allowing them to pic out of any argument concerning a country that links to them. This destroys neg prep, since we have to individually prep out every single country.

**Limits – they allow Affs about ANY specification of nations. Justifies an infinite number of affs.**

**That outweighs:**

1. **Iterative content mastery: debaters learn best from successive strategic iterations, so engaging in debates about the same core issues challenges students to innovate and adapt their arguments based on feedback from opponents and judges.**
2. **Prep: nuanced research requires a stasis point. A large caselist results in shallow debates and pushes argumentation to the fringes to find broad theses that disagree with everything. This prevents rigorous argument testing – anyone can skim a Wikipedia article, but the process of clash is unique to debate.**

#### [2] precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### [3] clash – if the aff defends the whole resolution, it allows for more clash since there are more links to aff, which creates more topic analysis, which is key to more education

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. o/w because it’s the only intrinsic part of debate – all other rules can be debated over but rely on some conception of fairness to be justified.

#### Education – the only portable impact of debate, that’s the only reason schools fund debate is to give students a fun way of education

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps –

#### [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm

#### [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs –

#### a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument

#### b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

## 2

#### Interp: the aff must defend an action that reduces intellectual property protections on medicines

#### Violation: they defend the shifting of burden of proof regarding a company’s practices in a whistleblower lawsuit, not the protections of the actual IP itself – acquisition is an indictment of the company, not the product – text of the res says “protections on medicines”

Definition:

In general terms, intellectual property is any product of the human intellect that the law protects from unauthorized use by others.

<https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intellectual_property>

#### that’s the Cornell Legal Information Institute

#### trade secrets are not IP – the law doesn’t protect the use of a trade secret since they aren’t patented

#### Standards – precision – not defending the text of the resolution justifies the aff doing away with random words in the res - a] means they’re not within the topic which is a voter for jurisdiction since you can only vote affirmative on the resolution and this debate never should have happened, b] they’re unpredictable and impossible to engage in so we always lose

#### Cross apply voters and paradigm issues from above

## 3

### NC – Thesis

#### The affirmative has mystified the condition of violence. It has colluded in liberal efforts at pacification by portraying war and the ills of society as individual aberrations in (il)liberal nation-state competition and world-making. The affirmative’s rush to existential magnitude in debate persists in a settler-colonial ordering of who controls the justification for violence, wherein the colonized are bound to pathology, but extracted for “value”.

Baron et. al 19 – [(Ilan Zvi, Associate Professor in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University; Jonathan Havercroft is an Associate Professor in International Political Theory at the University of Southampton; Isaac Kamola is assistant professor of political science at Trinity College; Jonneke Koomen is Associate Professor of Politics, Sociology and Women’s and Gender Studies at Willamette University; Alex Prichard is senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter) “Liberal Paciﬁcation and the Phenomenology of Violence,” March 2019, pg. 204-206] TDI //cut wwajd

The Romans understood violence as a necessary condition for pax. The liberal imagination blinds itself to the ways that paciﬁcation functions as violence in our world order. International relations scholarship’s strict distinction between peace and violence reinforces this obfuscation. Yet, the violence of (and in) paciﬁcation is central to the contemporary world. A phenomenological approach shows that moments of violent rupture are not aberrations of the world order. Violent outbreaks are breakdowns of paciﬁcation. It follows that multiple structures of the world order function as the violence of paciﬁcation, of pacavere.12 These structures include liberal capitalism, colonialism and the postcolonial aftermath, and war. Each functions as a key site of paciﬁcation. Anarchist thought reveals the paciﬁcation in liberal capitalism. Postcolonial thought reveals the paciﬁcation of colonial projects. Both anarchist and postcolonial thought demonstrate how war is a breakdown of paciﬁcation, revealing the hidden violent structures of our worldhood.

Anarchist critiques of capitalism, unlike Marxist and liberal interpretations, take seriously the decisive role of state violence in structuring society and markets. Anarchists view the state as an institution that sustains elite appropriations of political and economic power (Proudhon [1861] 1998; Sorel 1999; Prichard 2015). Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy bear the costs of this enforced order. The state diffuses violence (paciﬁcation) throughout the entire society—often in ways that go unrecognized by its subjects (Sorel 1999, 65). The naturalization of violence consolidates arbitrary regimes of domination in society. While speciﬁc, countable incidents of violence may decline, the social order is largely premised on the threat of violence for contravening social norms making speciﬁc, countable incidents of violence relatively rare (Kinna and Prichard, forthcoming).

Anarchist thinkers view rising inequality in the context of declining riots, insurgencies, and assassinations (see Figure 1) as evidence of paciﬁcation. Incidents of proletarian violence, anticolonial violence, riots, and protests are all examples of resistance to the “regimes of domination” that shape contemporary society, regimes easily identiﬁable by those subject to them (Gordon 2007, 33). Drawing on these accounts, we interpret declining rates of riots as a sign of increased paciﬁcation, rather than evidence that the system is becoming less violent. Conversely, eruptions of antistate and anticapitalist direct violence are signs of a breakdown in paciﬁcation. Much like Heidegger’s example of broken equipment (1962, 102–3, 412–13), which draws our attention to the background structures of our world, brief instances of direct violence reveal violently structured social relations.

Although the liberal imagination obscures the centrality of violence, violence has always been central to the liberal world order—to the liberal worldhood—particularly during the colonial and imperial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bell 2007a, 2007b). Colonial violence was diffused throughout the entire society, often in ways that went unrecognized by the colonized themselves. The violence of paciﬁcation structured the very existence of the colonized subject. This violence transformed the colonized subjects into a different “species” (Fanon 1963, 35– 40, 43). Colonial paciﬁcation was more than direct and indirect violence; it was sufﬁciently diffuse to remake the psyche of the colonized, affecting their mental health and emotions (Fanon 1963, 35–106). Fanon (1963, 31) described it as “atmospheric violence,” a “violence rippling under the skin.” Unable to lashout against the colonizer, the colonized lived everyday within a world ordered by violence. In this world, the colonized could not respond to the colonizers for fear of directly violent reprisals and would turn to symbolic activities such as a dance circle to expose the violence experienced on a daily basis (Fanon 1963, 57). For the colonized, rituals such as the dance were a means of expressing existential frustrations with and resistance to the violence of colonial paciﬁcation through reenactments of direct violence. Ultimately, anticolonial struggles exposed the violence of colonialism by directing that violence back on its authors. Practices of colonial rule were central to developing liberal norms of sovereignty, as well as to the domination and control of recalcitrant populations whether within Europe, such as the English domination of the Welsh, Irish, and Scots, or outside of Europe by settler colonialists against indigenous populations (Deloria Jr 1974; Anghie 2005; Miller 2006; Havercroft 2008; Shaw 2008; Barkawi and Stanski 2012; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014; Lightfoot 2016; Rueda-Saiz 2017). This civilizing imagination functioned phenomenologically. It produced insiders as civilized and peaceful and outsiders as violent, external threats to civilization. In doing so, this imagination successfully obscured how the structures of liberalism produced colonial violence.13

The idea of war as an external practice of states, not tied to their internal workings and located according to speciﬁc normative projections of Western identity, followed from this colonial mentality. This mentality legitimized the exporting of violence to create a Western imperial pax and was so widespread that it shaped the development of modern warfare (Ellis 1986; Proudhon [1861] 1998). The colonial wars reproduced and reinforced ideologies of Western superiority, evidenced in part by the West’s superior military technology. A consequence of this racist hubris was the inability to foresee the destructive tendencies of Western warfare when unleashed against themselves (Ellis 1986). The discipline of international relations, founded in response to the unexpectedly destructive character of the First World War, reproduced this understanding of war.14 This understanding disguises the possibility of increasing violence within the liberal world by presuming a historical narrative of progress and being shocked by its aberration. War, however, is not the absence of peace or an aberration of liberal progress, but is instead a phenomenological breaking of the liberal worldhood.15 Once a liberal order of democracy, free markets, and international institutions are spread throughout the world, liberal ideology imagines peace as the end state. Yet, states often deploy war under liberal guises.16 Wars under the aegis of humanitarian values and regime change are examples of the multifaceted character of liberal paciﬁcation. Liberal regimes emphasize the violence of those that they are invading, while minimizing the violence involved in these military undertakings and the violence necessary to sustain the liberal societies themselves. What Pierre-Joseph Proudhon called “the moral phenomenology of war” (Prichard 2015, 112–34; Proudhon [1861] 1998) becomes an integral part of the everyday workings of society that shape innumerable aspects of our daily language. The upshot is that, within liberal ideology, the violence committed by liberal states is justiﬁed, whereas the violence committed by illiberal states is not.

Postcolonial and anarchist scholarship focuses on the incorporation of violence in the production of liberal spaces (Barkawi and Laffey 1999). These same concerns can be directed onto the liberal order itself. Seen from the perspective of marginalized and oppressed populations, the structures of liberal paciﬁcation take on a distinctly violent aspect. The liberal world is not less violent. Rather, the liberal world involves a sophisticated phenomenological process of legitimating certain types of violence in order to render other types of violence invisible.

### Link – Multilateralism/Liberal International Order

#### The Liberal International Order that their commitment to multilateralism upholds is one that breeds explicitly settler colonial ideology, which is how presidents like Trump get produced and conservative policy gets produced. That means our critique controls a stronger internal link to a foreign policy impact than the aff does because it’s the United States that produces the crises that they are talking about through the pathologization of colonized subjects and countries that differ in class ideology.

Parmar 18 – [(Inderjeet, Professor of international politics, and head of the Department of International Politics at City, University of London and an Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Manchester) “The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name?” 7-26-2018, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_1_9_240_Parmar.pdf>] TDI //cut wwajd

The overall finding is that liberal internationalist thinking/theory is, in effect (albeit unconsciously on the part of its proponents), a legitimating ideology rather than an effective explanatory frame for understanding the way in which the LIO actually works. That conclusion is reached, in part, by suggesting the applicability of a rather different perspective on the operations of the LIO and US power: specifically, a synthesized Gramscian–Kautskyian framework, explained below.

The key point is that the LIO is a class-based, elitist hegemony—strongly imbued with explicit and implicit racial and colonial/imperial assumptions—in both US domestic and foreign relations. At home, this analysis helps to explain in part the phenomenon of the ‘left behind’ white working/middle class, including the affluent but economically anxious voters whose salience on the right has transformed US politics since the Reagan revolution of the 1980s.2 Responding to the (minorities’) rights revolution of the 1960s, and the loss of economic opportunity and decline in living standards due to technological change and the global redistribution of industry,3 white working- and middle-class voters drifted towards the Republicans as the party of low taxes and fiscal conservatism.4 This delivered little in material terms, however; and, as inequality increased with market freedom and real wages stagnated, workers in the ‘rust belt’ and other areas grew increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo of establishment politics, their frustration exacerbated by anxieties about ethno-racial diversity and American identity as the United States moves towards a society in which whites are a minority.5 The result was the election as president in 2016 of Donald Trump on an overtly anti-conservative and barely concealed white identity platform at home and a programme of protectionism and non-interventionism—America First—abroad.6

Yet political dissatisfaction or disaffection was not confined to the political right.7 ‘Occupy Wall Street’ and other movements and groups vented their anger at the inequalities of power, wealth and income, particularly in the wake of the Iraq War and the 2008 financial crisis.8

In external policy, the analysis helps to explain the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of the US readily embracing a more diverse international order, as well as the character of that very embrace.9 Accepting nations of the global South on an equal footing may become a strategic necessity, but the process remains problematic given the racialized discourses of western power over the past several centuries, fortified in the United States by the experience of the slave trade, slavery, the ‘Jim Crow’ era, Orientalist views of Asians, and other factors.10 Class power helps to explain the strategic embrace of foreign elites as the sources of change and the agents of American influence, however diluted it may have been due to target states’ national interest considerations. Those at the apex of America’s hierarchies sought to forge alliances with and incorporate their foreign elite counterparts— with their full cooperation—in South Korea and China.11 Hence, the liberal internationalist ‘successes’ in the cases of South Korea and China must be qualified by considering the repercussions of developing market-oriented societies marked by economic inequality, rising social unrest and varying degrees of political repression. In ‘successful’ China and South Korea, as in India and other emerging powers, there remain major challenges underpinned by profound inequalities in power, wealth and income, associated with a politics that is frequently class-based but also heavily racialized and xenophobic.12

### Link – Economic Growth

#### The valorization of economic growth turns black life into death. The impact is the negation of value.

Bledsoe and Wright 18 – [(Adam, Assistant professor in the Department of Geography and African American Studies Program at Florida State University; Willie Jamaal; Assistant professor of geography at Florida State University) “The anti-Blackness of global capital,” 10-18-2018, pg. 4-7] TDI //cut wwajd

The increasing globalization of capital and spatial marginalization of “superfluous” populations is fundamentally tied to the negation of Black life and assumptions of Black nonbeing. The treatment of Black lives as the embodied absence of value, or, “the very condition of existence and the determination of value,” underpins Black non-being and the assumed lack of Black cartographic capacity in the dominant spatial imaginary, making global capitalism possible (Ferreira da Silva, 2017: 1). The interconnected nature of capitalism and race is a well-worn topic. Scholars have theorized race as an ideological outgrowth of the economy (Hall, 1996); as an apparatus used to facilitate flows of people and commodities (Lowe, 2015); as a central component of capitalist maturation (James, 1989); and as a phenomenon necessary for the establishment of the world system (Robinson, 2000), among countless other approaches. Geographers, too, have unpacked the ways in which regimes of capitalism employ racialized concepts to reproduce. Geographic interrogations of racial capitalism have analyzed the role of racist assumptions in implementing neoliberal reforms in the wake of a natural disaster (Derickson, 2014); the manipulation of racial distinction to prevent labor organizing (Wilson, 2000); how resistance to Black landownership underpinned early 20th-century industrial agriculture (Williams, 2017); the role of capitalism in perpetuating environmental racism (Pulido, 2017); and the centrality of plantation relations to numerous variations of capitalism (Woods, 1998).

Nonetheless, we must push further to explicate the ways in which capitalism is actually dependent on anti-Blackness to realize itself, instead of understanding anti-Black racism as a secondary effect of the economy or a phenomenon that emerges periodically. That is to say, reflections on the interlinked nature of race and capitalism must move beyond an assumption of economic causality and grapple with the ways in which anti-Blackness is actually an always-present precondition for capital accumulation. In explicating anti-Blackness, we draw on an Afro-Pessimist framework, as Afro-Pessimism makes distinct claims about the nature of Blackness in the modern world. An Afro-Pessimist analysis of anti-Blackness does not treat anti-Black racism as a contingent phenomenon (Wilderson, 2011: 3–4) but rather as a global, ever-present factor that exists as the basis “for expansion and unending space within the symbolic economy of settlement” (King, 2014). Such an approach forces us to recognize how anti-Blackness punctuates the modern epoch by identifying the underlying logics that inform concrete manifestations of anti-Black racism around the world. In this way, Afro-Pessimism adds new dimensions to already-existing work on the connections between anti-Blackness and political economy by recognizing that, while capitalism exploits all of the world’s populations, it does not dominate all of them in the same way. With regard to the question of space, anti-Blackness helps us understand how the afterlife of slavery (Hartman, 2007: 6) leads to Black populations being conceptually unable to legitimately create space, thereby leaving locations associated with Blackness open to the presumably “rational” agendas of dominant spatial actors. Black populations, then, serve as the guarantor of capitalism’s need to constantly find new spaces of accumulation. In this section, we offer an explanation of how capitalism relies on anti-Blackness by foregrounding anti-Blackness as a phenomena with its own internal logics and concrete expressions.

Capitalism is rooted in violent forms of captivity and murder unleashed on indigenous and Afro-descendant populations the world over (Ferreira da Silva, 2004; James, 1989; Rodney, 1972; Williams, 2014; Wynter, 1995). At its origin and in its contemporary manifestations, then, capitalism is systemically related to slavery and its various global permutations (Robinson, 2000: 313–314). The assumption that Black populations lack both humanity and “space, that is ethno- or politico-geography,” defines the treatment of enslaved Black peoples. Today, the assumed a-spatiality that defined conditions of chattel slavery continues to imprint the socio-spatial relations that reproduce global capital (Robinson, 2000: 81, 200).

Black populations are deemed a-spatial as a result of the fact that modern notions of space and practices of spatial production are rooted in specific relations of power (Massey, 2005: 64, 100–101). These power relations are themselves organized around logics that have particular historical roots (Santos, 2008: 21). In the colonial epoch, chattel slavery—the social, legal, and political reduction of Africans to the status of nonhumans—produced the figure of the Black, which had a nullified spatial capacity (Wilderson, 2010: 279), was disavowed as a human being (Ferreira da Silva, 2015: 91), and was a priori structurally prevented from enacting “rational” spatial expressions (Santos, 2009: 24). Locations associated with Black populations became wholly “unhallowed” spaces, which would never receive recognition as legitimately occupied (Wynter, 1976: 81). This is not to suggest that Black peoples were or are understood as not physically present. Black bodies are certainly recognized as existing in exteriority (Raffestin, 2012: 129). Still, this recognition of physical presence does not signify that Black populations’ are understood as establishing legible space. Despite physical presence, Black populations nonetheless remain rendered “ungeographic” in dominant understandings of space (McKittrick, 2006: x). Hence, the geographic locations in which Black populations reside are treated as open to the varied agendas espoused by dominant spatial actors.

Capitalism’s new rounds of accumulation require access to spaces that previously had different relations to capitalist practices. The assumed a-spatiality of Black populations often leads to purveyors of capitalism treating locations inhabited by Black people as available for emerging modes of accumulation. Put another way, spaces that were once marginal or peripheral to the perpetuation of capital accumulation become sites of appropriation precisely because the (Black) populations occupying them receive no recognition as viable spatial actors. The spaces necessary for new forms of accumulation are thus conceptually open because of this assumed a-spatiality and subsequently physically opened via the spatial removal and dispersal of Black residents. This dispersal entails violent actions that are a priori legitimate because of the assumed lack of Black spatial agency. In other words, new spaces of “investment have been mapped onto previous racial and colonial (imperial) discourses and practices” evidencing an inextricable relationship between anti-Black notions of space, capitalism’s logic of perpetual expansion, and the acceptable subordination of Black physical presence (Chakravartty and Silva, 2012: 368). This is what Frank Wilderson terms the “deterritorialisation of Black space” (2003: 238) that is necessary for accumulating capital vis-a`-vis emerging political economic practices. Katherine McKittrick similarly notes that Black geographies are cast as “the lands of no one” and “emptied out of life” in order that “suitable capitalist life-support systems” be put into place and globally propagated (McKittrick, 2013: 7).

A number of present-day practices demonstrate the reliance of capital on this notion of empty, lifeless, Blackened spaces, such as capital disinvestment, white flight, gentrification, urban renewal, incarceration, and policing. These spatial arrangements identify Black peoples as inhuman and locations associated with Black populations as lacking a legitimate form of occupation and usage. Such assumptions contribute to the subordination of Black populations and spaces to dominant notions of “appropriate” uses of space, while “illegitimate” spaces of Blackness remain under siege by purveyors of capital. As this occurs, new spaces of accumulation open in areas formerly peripheral to the capitalist agenda. At the same time that these new rounds of accumulation take place, sovereign expressions of power serve to forcibly remove Black people and ensure they remain separated from these new spaces of accumulation. Subsequently, Black people are routinely harassed for existing in the communal spaces in which they have resided for generations.1

Along with public policy shifts, policing, incarceration, and extrajudicial killings simultaneously disqualify Black spatial agency and remove Black bodies from spaces deemed open for appropriation by capitalism’s purveyors, thereby simultaneously spatializing anti-Blackness and reproducing global capital. The systemic casting of Black spaces as lifeless and open to appropriation for the continuation of capital breathes new life into “civil society’s political economy: [the Black body] kick-starts...capital at its genesis and rescues it from its over-accumulation crisis at its end—black death is its condition of possibility” (Wilderson, 2003: 238). Put simply, the endless accumulation of capital and its legitimating sovereign practices are, in part, made possible through the continued societal insistence on Black inhumanity and a Black lack of cartography, which casts Black spaces as empty.

Hence, there exists an unquestionable connection between the colonial logics inaugurated centuries ago and today’s capitalist agenda. The lack of recognition of Black humanity underpins both projects. Early capitalism flourished thanks to the relegation of enslaved Blacks to the ontological and legal condition of non-humans on the plantations, in the forests, and in the mines of the Americas, while slaveholders and early insurance companies made fortunes off their investments in the transatlantic slave trade. Similarly, real estate speculation (Harvey, 2010), urban renewal (Perry, 2013), the roll-back of social wages (Wacquant, 2009), and the explosion of prisons (Gilmore, 2007)—all of which have allowed present-day capitalism to continue its agenda of accumulation—are only possible via the understanding of spaces inhabited by Black populations as empty and naming and treating those same populations as abject, inhuman beings. In this way, the anti-Blackness and assumed lack of Black being that originated in and defined the colonial epoch remains present with us today, despite the new material practices and justifications it takes on.

Anti-Blackness remains an ever-present condition, defining the modern world. Scholars can and should look to Black thinkers and activists to help make sense of the interrelated phenomena of anti-Blackness and global capital, as Black grassroots actors explicate the linkages between these phenomena (Burton, 2015).

### Link – Warming

#### Environmental apocalypticism recapitulates to the same root causes of warming and intentionally downplays the uneven effects of climate change that are distributed along settler colonial lines in favor of a focus on the collective. It proves our thesis that our goals are incompatible, since the way they have chosen to construct their scholarship persists in settler colonial and antiblack technics.

Gergan, Smith, and Vasudevan 18 – [(Mabel, Assistant Professor of Geography at Florida State University; Sara, Associate Professor of Geography at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Pavithra is a scholar-activist) “Earth beyond repair: Race and apocalypse in collective imagination,” 2-7-2018, pg. 4-5] TDI //cut wwajd

Analyzing climate change as a literary narrative explores how scientiﬁc knowledge gains traction, “[crystallizing] the anxieties of a wider public” (Buell, 2014: 272). For Yusoff (2013), this “geological turn” pushes our focus beyond social relations with fossil fuels and human impacts on Earth, to think of human being as itself geologically composed; the social then emerges as an expression of geology and geochemistry. The Anthropocene debate offers critical scholars a rare opportunity to engage with the scientiﬁc community, making possible a more political geoscience (Castree, 2015: 15). However, these proposals may elide who is contained within the “human,” while potentially legitimating “non-democratic and technophilic approaches, such as geoengineering” (Baskin, 2015: 11). Ahuja (2016) argues, “Geology is a spawn of the colonial capitalist assemblage that is rapidly transforming the planet... the discipline cannot stand objectively outside the relations that term clumsily attempts to name.” We ﬁnd ourselves in agreement with theorization of the Capitalocene that challenges the narrative of a “ﬁctitious human unity” erasing the unevenness of ecological violence (Haraway, 2016; Moore, 2017), and in agreement with critiques centering the persistent role of colonial processes and settler colonialism as inseparable from climate-driven conditions of violence (Davis and Todd, 2017; Whyte, 2016, 2013). For Baldwin (2014: 525), climate change anxieties reiterate the human as a racial category “at a moment often characterized as simultaneously post-racial and post-human.” While post-humanist scholarship has presented an important critique of the anthros, postcolonial, decolonial and critical race studies suggest that analysis of the Anthropocene must consider how colonial demarcations of the human–nonhuman boundaries were premised upon and developed alongside racial hierarchies of human difference (Gilroy, 2018; Jackson, 2013; Livingstone et al., 2011).

Ecological anxieties abound (Robbins and Moore, 2013), and “fantasies of apocalypse are both a product and a producer of the Anthropocene” (Ginn, 2015: 352). But what politics do visions of future catastrophe engender (e.g. Baldwin, 2012; Ginn, 2015; Katz, 1995; Schlosser, 2015; Skrimshire, 2010; Swyngedouw, 2013)? Following the premise of popular geopolitics, we understand that popular culture narratives enable particular forms of truth making, inciting affective predispositions that generate political action (or inaction) (Dittmer and Gray, 2010; Dodds, 2008; Sharp, 1998). Apocalyptic ﬁlm can be consumed as a spectacle of future ruin that closes space for political action by fetishizing causes (such as carbon), proposing technological ﬁxes, and downplaying unevenly violent results of ecological change. But it can also be a form of social dreaming that makes different futures possible (Ginn, 2015; Schlosser, 2015).

### NC – Alt

#### Pacification, which the affirmative is shot through with, upholds the violent ordering practices of liberalism and conditions life as fraught with suffering. Thus, the alternative is an insurgency against pacification.

Baron et. al 19 – [(Ilan Zvi, Associate Professor in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University; Jonathan Havercroft is an Associate Professor in International Political Theory at the University of Southampton; Isaac Kamola is assistant professor of political science at Trinity College; Jonneke Koomen is Associate Professor of Politics, Sociology and Women’s and Gender Studies at Willamette University; Alex Prichard is senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter) “Liberal Paciﬁcation and the Phenomenology of Violence,” March 2019, pg. 206-207] TDI //wwajd

What does it mean to apply this third type of violence to our understanding of international relations? Paciﬁcation reveals liberalism as a violent process as opposed to a system that is emblematic of the absence of direct violence. There are parallels between the Pax Britannia, Pax Americana, and the ancient peace of the Pax Romana (Neocleous 2010, 13). However, our account emphasizes the crucial role of paciﬁcation as a distinct kind of violence in maintaining these paciﬁc orders. Our theory offers the novel insight that incorporating paciﬁcation into the analysis of the liberal peace reveals crucial aspects of this peace that conventional and critical accounts neglect.

A focus on paciﬁcation provides three critical insights. First, it recovers the crucial role of paciﬁcation in the historical founding of the liberal order. Second, by distinguishing between three kinds of violence (Figure 2), we account for the empirical observations of the liberal peace as leading to a decline in direct violence and an increase in violence overall as part of the paciﬁcation of the Pax Americana. Conversely, the liberal version of the Pax Americana cannot account for key anomalies. Third, our approach draws attention to the violent ordering of social relations. This dimension of violence is neglected even in Marxist, postcolonial, neo-Gramscian, and post-structuralist critiques of the liberal peace, which primarily focus on the role of direct and indirect violence in maintaining the Pax Americana.

Contemporary liberal international relations theory emphasizes the nonviolent role of the liberal triad (democracy, free markets, and institutions) in causing the liberal peace. Yet, a quick review of the history of liberalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that key ﬁgures in liberalism, from John Stuart Mill, to Joseph Galliéni, to American foreign policy elites, understood paciﬁcation as a necessary step in establishing and maintaining the liberal order.

Mill, one of the philosophical founders of liberalism, conceptualized and deployed liberalism as a domination strategy. Mill argued that it is appropriate to impose despotism or slavery on “savages” who incline to “ﬁghting and rapine,” but the government should use force as little as possible:

What they require is not a government of force, but one of guidance. Being, however, in too low a state to yield to the guidance of any but those to whom they look up as the possessors of force, the sort of government ﬁttest for them is one [that] possesses force, but seldom uses it. (Mill 1998, 232–33)

In terms of our conceptual distinction, Mill argued that liberalism as paciﬁcation was a more effective instrument of violence than the direct modes of violence that governments usually deploy.

The history of European colonialism is replete with this line of reasoning. “[L]iberal improvement” was a regular plank of colonial strategy by France and Britain in the nineteenth century (Owens 2015, 154). Consider one example from the French colonial tradition. Galliéni, a military commander and administrator, consciously deployed liberalism as a domination strategy in the paciﬁcation of Tonkin during the 1890s. Galliéni’s strategy involved slowly spreading military outposts and deploying civil administrators to create markets, schools, and amenities. The rationale was that locals would gain a personal interest in the continuation of French control and would help to quell Chinese brigandage. “Piracy,” said Galliéni, “is the result of an economic condition. It can be fought by prosperity” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). Galliéni devised a “theory of paciﬁcation” in which “the correct combination of force and politics can socialize, pacify, and domesticate a population into regulating itself” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). What Mill proposed in theory, Galliéni enacted in practice; paciﬁcation—the violent reordering of social relations in a colony—was a more effective means of maintaining liberal rule than the deployment of direct violence.

While less explicit, the relationship between liberalism and imperialism remained present in the twentieth-century development of the Pax Americana. During this era, US policy makers sought to construct a zone of peace distinct from the zones of war associated with authoritarian regimes. The US State Department ﬁrst recognized the concept of “hegemonic paciﬁcation” in the Euro-Atlantic conference diplomacy of the 1920s (Cohrs 2008, 619). The United States’ “strategic restraint” in the aftermath of World War Two was motivated by this concept of liberal, hegemonic paciﬁcation (Ikenberry 2009; Ikenberry 2011, 173). US defense ofﬁcials Stimson, Patterson, McCloy, and Assistant Secretary Howard C. Peterson agreed that it was a matter of the security interests of the United States to maintain “open markets, unhindered access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much—if not all—of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines” (Lefﬂer 1984, 349–56; Barkawi and Laffey 1999). Liberalism as a domination and pacifying strategy continued throughout (and long after) the Cold War (Laffey 2003; Stokes 2003), as evident in one of the founding documents of the post–World War Two liberal order, NSC-68 (Ikenberry 2011, 168). While the enforcement of a Pax Americana eventually yielded a decline in direct violence, it produced an increase in other types of violence. The ﬁrst insight of our theory is that paciﬁcation has always been part of the liberal project and that the violence in the liberal project never went away.

The second insight is that by reinterpreting the liberal peace as liberal paciﬁcation we are able to grant the empirical ﬁndings of liberal peace theorists while maintaining that the Pax Americana represents an intensiﬁcation of violence overall. In the language of positivist social science, our theory is observationally equivalent to that of liberal peace theory. We expect that the quantity of direct violence inversely associates with the degree of paciﬁcation in a society. Therefore, our interpretation challenges research that identiﬁes liberal institutions as the cause of declining violence. Liberal institutions, as apparatuses of liberal paciﬁcation, ensure that direct violence is increasingly rare while leaving the structures of violence and domination in place. The observational equivalence on particular dependent variables (in our case, all forms of direct violence) produces a theoretical change requiring the generation of novel observable implications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 30).

Furthermore, increased suffering in liberal societies provides evidence contradicting the main claims of liberal peace theories, while remaining consistent with liberal paciﬁcation. At its core, liberalism is a project that tries to maximize the utility of its subjects (in other words, minimize suffering while maximizing happiness). As such, a state of liberal peace should lead to a decrease in markers of suffering. However, there is more slavery in the world today than ever before, with conservative estimates of between 12.3 and 27 million people in debt bondage, chattel, or contract slavery (Gordon 2012).17 Moreover, there is ample evidence of rising psychological disorders in liberal societies. A preponderance of evidence from the United States suggests that depression, anxiety, alienation, opioid dependency, stress, other related psychological disorders, increased social isolation, and the decline of community have increased throughout the twentieth century (Twenge, Zhang, and Im 2004, 320; Adler, Boyce, Chesney, et al. 1994; Twenge 2000; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, et al. 2008; Twenge, Gentile, DeWall, et al. 2010; Cohen and Janicki-Deverts 2012; American Society of Addiction Medicine 2016). Changes to human life associated with modernity have caused psychological stress to increase (Jackson 2014). Mortality rates have increased for some white, non-Hispanics aged 45–54 in the United States between 1999 and 2013 (Case and Deaton 2015). Modern technological advances from television to the Internet may contribute to increasing separation and alienation of the social human animal into individualized bodies connected by increasingly weak and empty bonds (Putnam 2000; Gray 2011; Turkle 2011). At minimum, new information communication technology such as Facebook can increase the stress and anxiety of its users (Lee-Won, Herzog, and Park 2015). The violent structuring of liberalism enables increases in social alienation, anxiety, stress, and human bondage through repression, economic control, and social isolation.

These are not isolated instances of suffering. They are fundamental structural features of our liberal world. If liberalism is a process of paciﬁcation rather than simply peace, then this rise in individual suffering in liberal spaces may be evidence of a similar process that Fanon equated with the psychic life of the colonist. Just as Fanon’s colonial subjects, unable to lash out at the settler through direct violence, internalized their suffering, modern liberal subjects, unable to resist liberal paciﬁcation, internalize their suffering (1982, chap. 6; cf.Sorel 1999, 118). Liberal peace should bring about a rise in happiness; that it has instead led to rising suffering is evidence of liberal paciﬁcation.

Third, in addition to offering an alternative interpretation of the liberal peace, our theory of liberal paciﬁcation supplements key insights from critical approaches to peace. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey’s work on imperial processes and liberal spaces makes a similar point to ours, that the celebrated zone of liberal peace rests on practices of violence (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 2002; cf. Neocleous et al. 2013). Their account, however, focuses on practices of direct violence, such as humanitarian interventions against authoritarian regimes or corporations hiring local militias to make work sites in the global south safe for economic extraction (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 422). Our point is that these moments of direct violence lead to paciﬁcation wherein social relations have been so violently reordered as to make direct violence no longer necessary. Once direct violence has established liberal space, paciﬁcation functions as a structure of violence that sustains the space. Direct violence only manifests itself when paciﬁcation weakens.

#### This evidence describes what that process will look like---a complete de-securisation of society mobilized through an ethic of mutual aid and a reconfigured social schema in the face of fascism.

Karatzogianni and Robinson 17 – [(Athina, Associate Professor in Media and Communication at the University of Leicester; Andrew is an independent scholar) “Schizorevolutions versus microfascisms: The fear of anarchy in state securitization,” 7-20-2017, pg. 10-11] TDI //cut wwajd

If the security state is able to wrest control from global capital and from active and reactive networks, fascism is the likely outcome. In a new twist on the old Marxist tale of the means of production outstripping the social relations which produce them, capitalism now produces technologies which enable the exercise of diffuse power, at the same time as trying in increasingly paranoid ways to restrict them. The existing technologies vital to contemporary capitalism – such as the Internet, global travel and financial flows – are already profiled as ‘risks’ in securitisation discourse (which in many ways reflects a backlash by the state against the loss of control suffered under 1990s liberalisation). New technologies underpinning any economic revival – such as mass-market drones, artificial intelligence, three-dimensional (3D) printing, distributed ledger technologies, biological self-modification – pose even greater ‘risks’ which may prove uncontrollable. If the deep state continues to see security as the bottom line, it may ultimately have to rupture with its global capitalist allies and impose a similar generalised chilling of social life and antiproduction against unregulated flows, including those unleashed by capitalism.

There are several alternatives, all of which require de-securitising society. First, the system could switch from a subtraction to an addition of axioms approach, using social policy rather than securitisation/militarisation to respond to ‘risks’. Second, people could seek security in diffuse rather than concentrated power, moving towards smaller-scale, more densely networked patterns of life and work, which reduce both the anxiety underpinning securitisation and risks originating from global flows. Third, the securitisation system itself is ineffective so new visions developed are needed for creating possibilities for trust-building and conflict transformation in the situations of systemically produced scarcity which currently generate ‘risk’. A Clastrean balance of power among diffuse social actors, or a situation of mutual tolerance based on a global ethic of valuing locality and diversity, might succeed in keeping relations among empowered diffuse groups largely peaceful.

On the other side, we should find hope in the proliferation of resistance among the excluded. We need to see in movements of the excluded the radical potential and not only the reactive distortions. To take Tupac Shakur’s metaphor, we need to see the rose that grows from concrete, not merely the thorns. The problem is, rather, that many of the movements on the network side of the equation are still thinking, seeing and feeling like states. Such movements are potential bearers of the Other of the state-form, of networks as alternatives to states, affinity against hegemony, abundance against scarcity. Hence, as Vaneigem (1967) argues, ‘[t]o work for delight and authentic festivity is barely distinguishable from preparing for a general insurrection’ (1967: 50–51). It has been argued in utopian studies that fear and hope form part of a continuum, expressing ‘aspects of affective ambivalence’ connected to the indeterminacy of the future (McManus, 2005). The type of hope needed is active and immanent, brought into the present as a propulsive force rather than deferred to the future. Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘absolute deterritorialisation’ for this possibility.

In his work on conflict transformation, John Paul Lederach emphasises the need to turn negative energies into creative energies and mobilising hope against fear (Lederach, 2005; Lederach and Maiese, n.d.: 2–3). How is this change in vital energies to be accomplished? Deleuze and Guattari (1983) invoke a figure of the shaman as a way to overcome reactive energies (1983: 67–68). They call for a type of revolutionary social movement ‘that follows the lines of escape of desire; breaches the wall and causes flows to move; assembles its machines and its groups-in-fusion in the enclaves or at the periphery’, countering reactive energies (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 277). As Zevnik (2016) discusses, disrupting scopic regimes involves moments of anxiety, where the anxious gaze puts one’s identity and one’s places in the social fantasy under question (2016: 133). Countering reactive energies while belonging to a hierarchical productive structure involves a dismantlement of the illusion, while ‘subjectification is never without a black hole in which its lodges its consciousness, passions and redundancies’ (Zevnik, 2016: 133).

Hence, it is in open spaces, safe spaces and spaces of dialogue that hope can be found to counter the spiral of terror. This opening of space, this creation of autonomous zones, should be viewed as a break with the majoritarian logics of social control. The coming ‘other worlds’ counterposed to the spaces of terror are not an integrated ‘new order’, but rather a proliferation of smooth spaces in a horizontality without borders. These ‘other worlds’ are being built unconsciously, wherever networks, affinity and hope counterpose themselves to state terror and the desire for fixed identity be it national, ethnic, religious or cultural. It is in the incommensurable antagonism between the autonomous zones of these ‘other worlds’ and the terror-state’s demands for controlled spaces to serve capital that the nexus of the conflicts of the present and near-future lies.

## Case

#### Frame the case page not as a perf con but as an even-if statement – even within the framework of liberal pacification, the aff is wrong

#### Be skeptical of their solvency claims – lots of internal links, hidden uncertainties – the aff shouldn’t start at 100% probability – we’ll do the specific work – collapses to 0 risk

### 1NC – No Impact

#### No impact to disease

**Posner ‘5** (Richard A, judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Winter. “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them.” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_kmske/is\_3\_11/ai\_n29167514/pg\_2?tag=content;col1, March 11, 2005)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extiinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

#### Science means extinction is impossible

#### a.) Any disease that kills its host too fast will die off

UE 07 **–** understanding evolution, Website on Evolution from UC Berkeley (December, "Evolution from a virus's view," http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/news/071201\_adenovirus)

Since transmission is a matter of life or death for pathogen lineages, some evolutionary biologists have focused on this as the key to understanding why some have evolved into killers and others cause no worse than the sniffles. The idea is that there may be an evolutionary trade-off between virulence and transmission. Consider a virus that exploits its human host more than most and so produces more offspring than most. This virus does a lot of damage to the host — in other words, is highly virulent. From the virus's perspective, this would, at first, seem like a good thing; extra resources mean extra offspring, which generally means high evolutionary fitness. However, if the viral reproduction completely incapacitates the host, the whole strategy could backfire: the illness might prevent the host from going out and coming into contact with new hosts that the virus could jump to. A victim of its own success, the viral lineage could go extinct and become an evolutionary dead end. This level of virulence is clearly not a good thing from the virus's perspective.

#### b.) Natural Immunities

Sowell 01 **–** Fellow at Hoover Institution (Thomas, March 5, Jewish World Review, “The Dangers of “Equality”, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell030501.asp)

People have different vulnerabilities and resistances to a variety of diseases. That is why one disease is unlikely to wipe out the human species, even in one place. An epidemic that sweeps through an area may leave some people dying like flies while others remain as healthy as horses.

New disease control models allow reducing diseases to extinction and predicting outbreaks allowing control

Ira 09, American Physical Society, (Schwartz, “Fluctuations in epidemic modeling - disease extinction and control” Physical Society, 2009 APS March Meeting, March 16-20, 2009, abstract #D7.003http: adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2009APS..MAR.D7003S)

The analysis of infectious disease fluctuations has recently seen an increasing rise in the use of new tools and models from stochastic dynamics and statistical physics. Examples arise in modeling fluctuations of multi-strain diseases, in modeling adaptive social behavior and its impact on disease fluctuations, and in the analysis of disease extinction in finite population models. Proper stochastic model reduction [1] allows one to predict unobserved fluctuations from observed data in multi-strain models [2]. Degree alteration and power law behavior is predicted in adaptive network epidemic models [3,4]. And extinction rates derived from large fluctuation theory exhibit scaling with respect to distance to the bifurcation point of disease onset with an unusual exponent [5]. In addition to outbreak prediction, another main goal of epidemic modeling is one of eliminating the disease to extinction through various control mechanisms, such as vaccine implementation or quarantine. In this talk, a description will be presented of the fluctuational behavior of several epidemic models and their extinction rates. A general framework and analysis of the effect of non-Gaussian control actuations which enhance the rate to disease extinction will be described. In particular, in it is shown that even in the presence of a small Poisson distributed vaccination program, there is an exponentially enhanced rate to disease extinction. These ideas may lead to improved methods of controlling disease where random vaccinations are prevalent.

### No impact to econ

**No impact to economy**

**Drezner ’14** (Daniel Drezner, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164)

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. **The aggregate data suggest otherwise**, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has **declined** since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

**Econ resilient, US isn’t key, and impact empirically denied**

**Lamy ’11**(Pascal Lamy is the Director-General of the World Trade Organization. Lamy is Honorary President of Paris-based think tank Notre Europe. Lamy graduated from the prestigious Sciences Po Paris, from HEC and ÉNA, graduating second in his year of those specializing in economics. “System Upgrade” BY PASCAL LAMY | APRIL 18, 2011)

The bigger test came with the 2008-2009 Great Recession, the first truly global recession since World War II. When the international economy went into free fall, trade went right along with it. Production and supply are today thoroughly global in nature, with most manufactured products made from parts and materials imported from many other countries. These global value chains have a multiplier effect on trade statistics, which explains why, as the global economy contracted by 2 percent in 2009, trade volume shrank by more than 12 percent. This multiplier effect works the other way around as well: Growth returned to 4.6 percent and trade volume grew by a record 14.5 percent over the course of 2010. Projections for trade in 2011 are also strong, with WTO economists predicting that trade volume will rise 6.5 percent during the current year. This sharp rebound in trade has proved two essential things: Markets stayed open despite ever-stronger pressures to close them, and trade is an indispensible tool for economic recovery, particularly for developing countries, which are more dependent on trade. Shortly after the crisis broke out, we in the WTO began to closely monitor the trade policy response of our member governments. Many were fearful that pressures to impose trade restrictions would prove too powerful for governments to resist. But this is not what happened. Instead, the system of rules and disciplines, agreed to over 60 years of negotiations, held firm. In a series of reports prepared for WTO members and the G-20, we found that governments acted with great restraint. At no time did the trade-restrictive measures imposed cover more than 2 percent of world imports. Moreover, the measures used -- anti-dumping duties, safeguards, and countervailing duties to offset export or production subsidies -- were those which, in the right circumstances, are permissible under WTO rules. I am not suggesting that every safeguard measure or countervailing duty imposed during those difficult days was in compliance with WTO rules, but responses to trade pressures were generally undertaken within an internationally agreed-upon framework. Countries by and large resisted overtly noncompliant measures, such as breaking legally binding tariff ceilings or imposing import bans or quotas. As markets stayed open, trade flows began to shift, and countries that shrugged off the impact of the crisis and continued to grow -- notably China, India, and Brazil -- became ever-more attractive markets for countries that were struggling, including those in Europe and North America. Trade has been a powerful engine for growth in the developing world, a fact reflected in the far greater trade-to-GDP ratios we see there. In 2010, developing countries' share of world trade expanded to a record 45 percent, and this trend looks set to continue. Decisions made in Brasilia, Beijing, and New Delhi to open their respective economies to trade have been instrumental in enabling these countries to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.