# 1AC

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### Framework

#### Capital has seeped into educational sites and has corrupted our epistemology, means the K is a prereq to knowledge production

Giroux 8 [Henry A, Global Network Television Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, and Susan S, Associate Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, “Education after Neoliberalism”, December 31, 2008,<http://www.truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/item/81781:education-after-neoliberalism>

In spite of the crucial connection between various modes of domination and pedagogy, there is little input from progressive social theorists of what it might mean to theorize how education as a form of cultural politics actually constructs particular modes of address, identification, affective investments and social relations that produce consent and complicity with the ethos and practice of neoliberalism. Hence, while the current economic crisis has called into question the economic viability of neoliberal values and policies, it often does so by implying that neoliberal rationality can be explained through an economic optic alone, and consequently gives the relationship of politics, culture and inequality scant analysis. Neoliberal rationality is lived and legitimated in relation to the intertwining of culture, politics and meaning. Any viable challenge to the culture of neoliberalism as well as the current economic crisis it has generated must address not merely the diffuse operations of power throughout civil society and the globe, but also what it means to engage those diverse educational sites producing and legitimating neoliberal common sense, whether they be newspapers, advertising, the Internet, television or more recent spheres developed as part of the new information revolution. In addition, it is crucial to examine what role public intellectuals, think tanks, the media and universities actually play pedagogically in constructing and legitimating neoliberal world views, and how the latter works pedagogically in producing neoliberal subjects and securing consent.

#### The ROTJ is to break down neoliberal systems of power - Debate should be a pedagogical space in which to produce emancipatory education and nurture radical agency—our framing is a pre-requisite to ethical political engagement, necessary for anti-capitalist solidarity, and determines whether the project of the 1AC is a good idea. Academic spaces are specifically key for this struggle to take place – means our disruptive move within debate represents an independent reason to vote aff off framework alone.

Giroux 20 [Henry Armand Giroux is an American and Canadian scholar and cultural critic. One of the founding theorists of critical pedagogy in the United States, he is best known for his pioneering work in public pedagogy, cultural studies, youth studies, higher education, media studies, and critical theory. 6-19-2020. Accessed 12/30/2020. “Racist Violence Can’t Be Separated from the Violence of Neoliberal Capitalism” <https://socialistproject.ca/2020/06/racist-violence-neoliberal-capitalism//vg>

It should be clear that questions of economic and social justice cannot be addressed by a neoliberal pedagogy that enshrines self-interest and privatization while converting every social problem into individualized market solutions or regressive matters of personal responsibility. Under neoliberalism’s disimagination machine, individual responsibility is coupled with an ethos of greed, avarice, and personal gain. One consequence is the tearing up of social solidarities, public values, and an almost pathological disdain for democracy. This radical form of privatization is also a powerful force for the rise of fascist politics because it depoliticizes individuals, immerses them in the logic of social Darwinism, and makes them susceptible to the dehumanization of those considered a threat or disposable. Just as the spread of the pandemic virus in the United States was not an innocent act of nature, neither is the rise and pervasive grip of inequality. What is clear is that neoliberal support for unbridled individualism has weakened democratic pressures and eroded democracy and equality as governing principles. Moreover, as a mode of public pedagogy, it has undercut social provisions, the social contract, and support for public goods such as education, public health, essential infrastructure, public transportation, and the most basic elements of the welfare state. As a form of pedagogical practice, neoliberalism has morphed into a form of pandemic pedagogy that sacrifices social needs and human life in the name of an economic rationality that values reviving economic growth over human rights. As a lived system of meaning and values, self-reliance and rugged individualism are the only categories available for shaping how individuals view themselves, and their relationship to others and to the planet. The individualization of everyone and the reduction of social problems to private troubles is paralleled by sanctioning a world marked by borders, walls, racism, hate, and a rejection of government intervention in the interest of the common good. Most importantly, neoliberal individualization personalizes power, creating a depoliticized subject whose only obligation as a citizen is defined by consuming and living in a world free from ethical and social responsibilities. In many ways, it does not just empty politics of any substance, it destroys its emancipatory prospects. The neoliberal strategists use education not only to mask their abuses and the effects of their criminogenic policies, they also – in a time of crisis, when dissatisfaction of the masses might lead to chaos, revolts, and dangerous levels of resistance – move dangerously close to creating the conditions for a fascist politics. The noted theologian Frei Betto is right in stating that under such conditions, “…they cover up the causes of social ills and cover up their effects with ideologies that, by obscuring causes, fuel mood in the face of the effects. That’s why neoliberalism is now showing its authoritarian face – building walls that divide countries and ethnic groups, executive power over legislature and judiciary, disinformation about digital networks, the cult of the homeland, the brazen offensive against human rights.” Neoliberalism and its regressive notion of individualism and individual responsibility has undermined the belief that human beings both make the world and can change it. The pandemic has ushered in a crisis that undermines that belief and opens the door for rethinking what kind of society and notion of politics will be faithful to the creation of a socialist democracy that speaks to the core values of justice, equality, and solidarity. Under such circumstances, private resistance must give way to collective resistance, and personal and political rights must include economic rights. If inequality is to be defeated, the social state must replace the corporate state, and social rights must be guaranteed for all. There can be no adequate struggle for economic justice and social equality unless economic inequality on a global level is addressed along with a movement for climate justice, the elimination of systemic racism, and a halt to the spiraling militarism that has resulted in endless wars. **This can only take place if the anti-democratic ideology of neoliberalism, with its collapse of the public into the private and its institutional structures of domination, are fully addressed and discredited.** Étienne Balibar is right in stating that the triumph of neoliberalism has resulted in the “death zones of humanity.” Following Balibar, what must be made clear is that neoliberal capitalism is itself a pandemic and a dangerous harbinger of an updated fascist politics. Overcoming Pandemic Pedagogy The kinds of societies that will emerge after the pandemic is up for grabs. In some cases, the crisis will give way to authoritarian regimes such as Chile, Hungary, and Turkey, all of which have used the urgency of COVID-19 as an excuse to impose more state control and surveillance, squelch dissent, eliminate civil liberties, and concentrate power in the hands of an authoritarian political class. As is well documented, history in a time of crisis also has the potential to change dominant ideologies, rethink the meaning of governance, and enlarge the sphere of justice and equality through a vision that fights for a more generous and inclusive politics. It is crucial to rethink the project of politics in order to imagine forms of resistance that are collective, inclusive and global, and capable of producing new democratic arrangements for social life, more radical values, and a “global economy which will no longer be at the mercy of market mechanisms.” This is a politics that must move beyond siloed identities and fractured political factions in order to build transnational solidarities in the service of an alternative radically democratic society. Making the pedagogical more political means challenging those forms of pandemic pedagogy that turn politics into theater, a favorite tactic of Trump. In this case, the performance works to suspend disbelief, hold power accountable, and unravel one’s sense of critical agency. Pandemic pedagogy does more than undermine critical thinking and informed judgments; it dissolves the line between the truth and lies, fantasy and reality, and in doing so, destroys the foundation for understanding, engaging, and promoting that social and economic justice. The endgame under the rubric of a pandemic pedagogy is not simply the destruction of the truth, but the elimination of democracy itself. Central to developing an alternative democratic vision is development of a language that refuses to look away and be commodified. Such a language should be able to break through the continuity and consensus of common sense and appeal to the natural order of things. At stake here is the need to reclaim both critical and redemptive elements of a radical democracy in order to address the full spectrum of violence that structures institutions and everyday life in the United States. This is a language connected to the acquisition of civic literacy, and it demands a different regime of desires and identifications to enable us to move from “shock and stunned silence toward a coherent visceral speech, one as strong as the force that is charging at us.” Of course, there is more at stake here than a struggle over meaning; there is also the struggle over power, over the need to create a formative culture that will **produce informed critical agents who will fight for and contribute to a broad social movement that will translate meaning into a fierce struggle for economic, political, and social justice**. Agency in this sense must be connected to a notion of possibility and education in the service of radical change. **Reimagining the future only becomes meaningful when it is rooted in a fierce struggle against the horrors and totalitarian practices of a pandemic pedagogy that falsely claims that it exists outside of history.** Václav Havel, the late Czech political dissident-turned-politician, once argued that politics follows culture, by which he meant that changing consciousness is the first step toward building mass movements of resistance. What is crucial here in the age of multiple crises is a thorough grasp of the notion that critical and engaged forms of agency are a product of emancipatory education. Moreover, at the heart of any viable notion of politics is the recognition that politics begins with attempts to change the way people think, act, and feel with respect to both how they view themselves and their relations to others. There is more to agency than the neoliberal emphasis on the “empire of the self,” with its unchecked belief in the virtues of a form of self-interest that despises the bonds of sociality, solidarity, and community. The US is in the midst of a political and pedagogical crisis. This is a crisis defined not only by a brutalizing racism and massive inequality, but also by a constitutional crisis produced by a growing authoritarianism that has been in the making for some time. The recent attacks by the police on journalists, peaceful protesters, and even elderly people marching for racial justice, echoes the violence of the Brownshirts in the 1930s. Let’s stop the futile debate about whether or not the US is in the midst of a fascist state and shift the register to the more serious question of how to resist it and restore a semblance of real democracy. Under such circumstances, education should be viewed as central to politics, and it plays a crucial role in producing informed judgments, actions, morality, and social responsibility at the forefront not only of agency, but politics itself. In this scenario, truth and politics mutually inform each other to erupt in a pedagogical awakening at the moment when the rules are broken. Taking risks becomes a necessity, self-reflection narrates its capacity for critically engaged agency, and thinking the impossible is not an option, but a necessity. Without an informed and educated citizenry, democracy can lead to tyranny, even fascism. Trump represents the malignant presence of a fascism that never dies and is ready to re-emerge at different times in different context in sometimes not-so-recognizable forms. The COVID-19 crisis and the pandemic of inequality and racism have revealed elements of a fascist politics that are more than abstractions. The struggle against a fascist politics is now visible in the rebellions taking place across the United States. While there are no political guarantees for a victory, there is a new sense that the future can be changed in the image of a just and sustainable society. There is a new energy for reform taking place in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd. Massive protests for racial, economic, and social justice are emerging all over the globe. As I have argued in The Terror of the Unforeseen, at stake here is the need for these protests to transition from a pedagogical moment and collective outburst of moral anger to a progressive international movement that is well organized and unified. Such a movement must build solidarity among different groups, imagine new forms of social life, make the impossible possible, and produce a revolutionary project in defense of equality, social justice, and popular sovereignty. The racial, class, ecological, and public health crisis facing the globe can only be understood as part of a comprehensive crisis of the totality. **Immediate solutions such as defunding the police and improving community services are important, but they do not deal with the larger issue of eliminating a neoliberal system structured in massive racial and economic inequalities**. David Harvey is right in arguing that the “immediate task is nothing more nor less than the self-conscious construction of a **new political framework for approaching the question of inequality**, through a deep and profound critique of our economic and social system.” This is a crisis in which different threads of oppression must be understood as part of the general crisis of capitalism. The various protests now evolving internationally at the popular level offer the promise of new global anti-fascist and anti-capitalist movements. In the current moment, democracy may be under a severe threat and appear frighteningly vulnerable, but with young people and others rising up across the globe – inspired, energized and marching in the streets – the future of a radical democracy is waiting to breathe again. •

#### You should view the ballot as a way to change our subjectivities – each ballot forms a neurochemical process that shapes our habits

**Weheliye 14**. Alexander Weheliye is an Associate Professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University (“Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human,” 2014, Duke University Press) vikas //recut aaditg

**Wynter’s large-scale intellectual project**, which she has been pursuing in one form or another for the last thirty years, ***disentangles Man from the human*** in order **to use the space of subjects placed beyond the grasp of this domain as a *vital point from which to invent*** hitherto unavailable ***genres of the human*.** 27 According to this scheme **in western modernity the religious conception of the self gave way to** two modes of secularized being: first, **the Cartesian “Rational Man,”** or homo politicus, **and** then beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, **“Man as a selected being and natural organism . . . as the universal human, ‘man as man.’”** 28 The move from a supernatural conception of world and the self’s place within this cosmos, however, does not signal the supersession of a primitive axiomatic with an enlightened and rarefied type of the human. Rather, one genre of the human (Judeo-Christian, religious) yields to another, just as provincial, version of the human, and, although both claim universality, neither genre fully represents the multiplicity of human life forms. **In the context of the secular human, black subjects, along with indigenous populations, the colonized**, the insane, **the poor, the disabled, and so on serve as *limit cases by which Man can demarcate himself as the universal human***. 29 Thus, **race**, rather than representing accessory, **comes to define the very essence of the modern human** as “the code through which one not simply knows what human being is, but experiences being.” 30 Accordingly, **race makes its mark in the dominion of the ideological and physiological**, or rather **race scripts the elision of the former with the latter in the flesh.** In her latest writings, Wynter identifies homo politicus’s successor in the long road from “theodicy” to “biodicy” as the liberal “bio-economic man.” 31 The idea of “bio-economic man” marks the assumed naturalness that positions economic inequities, white supremacy, genocide, economic exploitation, gendered subjugation, colonialism, “natural selection,” and concepts such as the free market not in the realm of divine design, as in previous religious orders of things, but beyond the reach of human intervention all the same. In both cases, this ensures that a particular humanly devised model of humanity remains isomorphic with the Homo sapiens species. **Wynter’s approach differs markedly from arguments that seek to include the oppressed within** the already existing **strictures of liberal humanism or**, conversely, **abolish humanism** because of its racio-colonial baggage; **instead Wynter views *black studies and minority discourse as liminal spaces*, simultaneously *ensconced in and outside the world of Man*, from which to construct new objects of knowledge and launch the reinvention of the human** at the juncture of the culture and biology feedback loop. Even though the genre of the human we currently inhabit in the west is intimately tied to the somatic order of things, for Wynter, the human cannot be understood in purely biological terms, whether this applies to the history of an individual organism (ontogenesis) or the development at the level of a species (phylogeny). **This is where Fanon’s** important **concept of sociogeny comes into play, offering** Wynter **an approach of thinking of the human** — the “science in the social text,” to echo Spillers’s phrase— **where culture and biology** are not only not opposed to each other but in which their **chemistry discharges mutually beneficial insights**. 32 In this scenario, a symbolic register, consisting of **discourse, language, culture, and so on (sociogeny) always already accompanies the genetic dimension of human action** (ontogeny), and it is only in the imbrication of these two registers that we can understand the full scope of our being-in-the-world. Fanon’s concept of sociogeny, arising from the inadequacy of traditional psycho­analytic models in the analysis of racialized colonialism, builds on Freud’s appropriation of recapitulation theory. 33 Thus, according to Fanon, Freud breaks with the strict codes of Darwinism and social Darwinism (phylogenetic theory) in order to analyze the psyche of the modern individualized subject from an ontogenetic vantage point. While the ontogenetic technique yields, depending on your general sympathy for the now very antiquated protocols of Freudian psychoanalysis, abundant results when evaluating white subjects ensconced in the liberal nuclear family, it encounters a roadblock when transplanted to the colonial settlement, which is why “the alienation of the black man [black people] is not an individual question. Alongside phylogeny and ontogeny, there is also sociogeny. . . . Society, unlike biochemical processes, does not escape human influence. Man is what brings society into being.” 34 Why does the colonial situation specifically necessitate a reformulation of Freud’s and Darwinism’s procedural frame of reference? Since colonial policies and discourse are frequently grounded in racial distinctions, the colonized subject cannot experience her or his nonbeing outside the particular ideology of western Man as synonymous with human, or, as Fanon writes, “not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man.” 35 The colonial encounter determines not just the black colonial subject’s familial structure or social and physical mobility and such, but colors his or her very being as he-or-she-which-is-not-quite-human, as always already tardy in the rigged match of the survival of the fittest. Conversely, in this ontological face-off, the white colonial subject encounters herself or himself as the “fullness and genericity of being human.” However, he or she only does so in relation to the deficiency of the black subject and indigenous (Wynter, 40). To be precise, Fanon and Wynter locate racializing assemblages in the domain of being rather than the realm of epiphenomena, showing how humans create race for the benefit of some and the detriment of other humans. Yet because race is thought to rest in biology, it necessitates different analytic protocols than bare life and bio­ politics, namely ones that draw on both ontogeny and sociogeny. Whereas Fanon’s mobilization of ontogeny remains rooted in the Freudian paradigm as pertaining to the individual subject, Wynter summons the explanatory apparatus of neurobiology to elucidate how **racialization**, despite its origins in sociogeny, **is converted to the stuff of ontogenesis; this is what Wynter refers to as “sociogenetic.”** 36 **Although human life has a biochemical core defined by a species-specific adaptive reward and punishment mechanism** (**poison = bad and food = good**) that “determines the way in which each organism will perceive, classify, and categorize the world,” **it is** “**only through the mediation of the organism’s experience of what feels good to the organism and what feels bad to it, and thereby of what it feels like to be that organism**” **that *a repertoire of behaviors*, which ensure the continued existence of the species, *develops*** (Wynter, 50). For **the human** species, because it **is defined by** both **organic and symbolic registers**, this is complicated by the way culturally specific **sociogenic principles** such as what is good or bad work to **trigger *neurochemical reward and punishment processes*, in the process “*institut[ing] the human subject as a*** culture-specific and thereby verbally defined, if ***physiologically implemented***, mode of being and **sense of *self***. One, therefore, whose phenomenology . . . is as objectively, constructed as its physiology” (Wynter, 54). 37 **Phenomenological perception must** consequently **don the extravagant drag of physiology in order to “turn theory into flesh**, . . . **[into] codings in the nervous system,” so as to signal the extrahuman instantiation of humanity**. 38 Wynter’s description of the autopoiesis of the human stretches Fanon’s concept of sociogeny by grounding it in an, albeit false or artificial, physiological reality. In other words, **Wynter summons neurobiology not** in order **to take refuge in a prelapsarian field anterior to** the registers of **culture and ideology, but to provide a transdisciplinary global approach to** the study of **human life that explains how *sociogenic phenomena*, particularly race, *become anchored in the*** ontogenic ***flesh***.

#### Our a priori ethicopolitical obligation is to reject the violence of global capitalism by confronting the naturalized forms of violence implicit in capital’s organizational forms

Zizek and Daly 4 [Conversations with Zizek pg 14-16]

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture- with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette- Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. While the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci and more recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enables the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say the prohibitive anxieities surround the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freeudan-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjure up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizeks point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose universalism fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s population. In this way neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for certain diversity least for the central capitalist regions but it’s neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rational and in consequence social exclusion remains mystified and nameless. (viz, the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’. And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or to reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### Reject ethical NCs – there is no objective morality separate from material conditions – ethical objections are a smokescreen by which the capitalist organization of the world is obscured and maintained

Rosen 2k [Michael Rosen (Michael Rosen is the Senator Joseph S. Clark Professor of Ethics in Politics and Government at Harvard University); "The Marxist Critique of Morality and the Theory of Ideology”; Morality, Reflection, and Ideology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); <https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/michaelrosen/files/the_marxist_critique_of_morality_and_the_theory_of_ideology.pdf>; WJ] //recut wwajd

IV The Origins of Abstract Morality For Hegel, the separation between Sittlichkeit and Moralität and their subsequent reconciliation are both stages in the self-development of Geist -- Hegel's word for the collective intellect in which we all, according to him, participate. Now Marx, as we have seen, agrees with (and, indeed, reinforces) Hegel's criticism of the abstractness of Moralität. But what he obviously cannot do is endorse Hegel's Idealist account of how this abstract form of moral life has come about. This is not an issue that Marx addresses in the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, but in The German Ideology (written in 1845-46 but again notpublished) he gives an account of the genesis of ideas in society that includes an account of the origin of abstract morality. Instead of seeing the development of ideas in the context of a series of stages in the self-development of Geist, Marx tries to explain them in relation to the stages of the division of labour in society. The account of the production of ideas in The German Ideology starts from the claim that thought (including moral thought) is always constrained by the conditions and circumstances under which it is produced: The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of people, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc. of a people.15 At this initial stage of social development, then, the connection between the lives led by individuals and the ideas to which they adhere was, according to Marx, immediately clear and intelligible. Yet that is now no longer the case, he believes. On the contrary, politics, law, morality, religion and metaphysics have turned into apparently independent bodies of thought with their own internal history and dynamics. The reason, Marx claims, is that, in the course of the division of labour, mental and manual labour have become separated from one another: Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labour appears. (The first form of ideologists, priests, is concurrent.) From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of "pure" theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc.16 The separation between mental and manual labour, Marx maintains, explains the formal, abstract character of moral ideas, but it does not lead to the formation of autonomous ideas in fact; the ideologists who produce ideas are still part of the ruling class whose interests their ideas represent. In this way the division of labour offers an explanation as to why such ideas should be accepted by those, the dominated classes, whose interests they go against. They are accepted because they are apparently disinterested. The ideologist, on this view, is like a bribed referee: able to influence the outcome of a game all the more effectively for the fact that he is falsely believed to be impartial. The ideologist is not engaged in deception, however. On the contrary. According to Marx, ideologists are sincere -- and, because they sincerely believe in the independence and objective validity of their own ideas, they are able to persuade others to accept them as such all the more effectively. Here, however, is the problem. How are we to suppose it to be true that the ideologists should both be constrained so that they produce ideas in the interests of the ruling class of which they are, appearances to the contrary, a part and that they (and those who accept the ideas from them) remain sincerely unaware of the nature of this connection? Why do they think that they are independent when in fact they are not? And, if they are not independent, how do their shared class interests with the rest of the ruling class assert themselves? In any case, it is clear why Marx should be so hostile to morality: like any supposedly "pure" theory, morality represents a deceptive abstraction from the particular circumstances and material interests that it serves. The move to detach ideas that are the products of material interests from the interests that they represent is epitomized, for Marx, in Kant: We find again in Kant the characteristic form which liberalism, based on real class interests, assumed in Germany. Neither he, nor the German burghers, whose whitewashing spokesman he was, noticed that these theoretical ideas of the bourgeoisie had as their basis material interests and a will that was conditioned and determined by the material relations of production. Kant, therefore, separated this theoretical expression from the interests it expressed; he made the materially motivated determinations of the will of the French bourgeois into pure self- 11 determinations of "free will", of the will in and for itself, of the human will, and so converted it into purely ideological determinations and moral postulates.17 For Marx at this stage "moral postulates" are, by their very nature, ideological.

#### Our radical planning uproots the legitimacy of the capitalist state to legislate as representative of the people.

Butler 18 [Judith Butler writes comparative literature on gender theory and is a gender theorist who works at UC Berkeley, Hannah Arendt Chair at the European Graduate School, Developed the theory on Gender Performativity, LGBTQ activist, “Notes Toward A Performative Theory of Assembly”, First Harvard University Press paperback edition published in 2018 (copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College in 2015), pg. 117-119) ahsBC

IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY, “we the people” is nevertheless first and foremost a speech act. Someone says “we” along with someone else, or some group says it together, perhaps chanting, or they write it and send it out into the world, or they stand one by one, or perhaps provisionally together, motionless and wordless, enacting assembly; when they say it, they seek to constitute themselves as “the people” from the moment in which it is declared. So considered as a speech act, “we the people” is an enunciation that seeks to bring about the social plurality it names. It does not describe that plurality, but gathers that group together through the speech act. It would seem, then, that a linguistic form of autogenesis is at work in the expression “we the people”; it seems to be a rather magical act or, at least, one that compels us to believe in the magical nature of the performative. Of course, “we the people” starts a longer declaration of wants and desires, intended acts, and political claims. It is a preamble; it prepares the way for a specific set of assertions. It is a phrase that gets us ready for a substantive political claim, and yet, we have to pause at this way of starting up the sentence and ask whether a political claim is already being made, or is in the making even before someone speaks or signs. It is perhaps impossible for all the people who might say “we the people” at the same time to speak that phrase in unison. And if somehow an assembled group were to yell out, “we the people,” as sometimes happens in the assemblies of the Occupy Movement, it is a brief and transitory moment, one in which a single person speaks at the same time that others speak, and some unintended plural sounding results from that concerted plural action, that speech act spoken in common, in sequence, with all the variations that repetition implies. But let us admit that such a moment of literally speaking in unison, and naming ourselves as “the people,” rarely happens quite like that—simultaneous and plural. After all, the declaration of “we the people” in the United States is a citation, and the phrase is never fully freed of its citationality. The Declaration of Independence of the United States begins with such a phrase, one that authorizes the writers to speak for the people more generally. It is a phrase that establishes political authority at the same time that it declares a form of popular sovereignty bound by no one political authority. Derrida has analyzed this in some very important ways, as has Bonnie Honig. Popular sovereignty can give itself (in assent) and withdraw itself (in dissent or in revolution), which means that every regime is dependent on it being given if it hopes to base its legitimacy on something other than coercion. The speech act, however punctual, is nevertheless inserted in a citational chain, and that means that the temporal conditions for making the speech act precede and exceed the momentary occasion of its enunciation. And for yet another reason the speech act, however illocutionary, is not fully tethered to the moment of its enunciation: the social plurality designated and produced by the utterance cannot all assemble in the same place to speak at the same time, so it is both a spatially and temporally extended phenomenon. When and where popular sovereignty—the self-legislative power of the people—is “declared” or, rather, “declares itself,” it is not exactly at a single instance, but instead in a series of speech acts or what I would suggest are performative enactments that are not restrictively verbal. So I suppose my question might be formulated this way: What are the bodily conditions for the enunciation of “we the people,” and do we make a mistake if we separate the matter of what we are free to say from how we are free to assemble? I propose to think about the assembly of bodies as a performative enactment, and so to suggest not only that (a) popular sovereignty is a performative exercise, but (b) it necessarily involves a performative enactment of bodies, sometimes assembled in the same place and sometimes not. First, I propose that we have to understand the idea of popular sovereignty that “we the people” seeks to secure. If “we the people” set forth in the Constitution “declare a set of truths to be self-evident” as they apparently do in the Declaration of Independence, then we are already in a bit of a bind. A performative declaration seeks to bring about those truths, but if they are “self-evident” then they are precisely the kind of truths that don’t need to be brought about at all. Either they are performatively induced or they are self-evident, but to bring about that which is self-evident seems paradoxical. We could say that a set of truths is being brought into being or we could say that we found those truths somewhere and that we did not bring them into being. Or we can say that the kind of truths at issue here have to be declared as self-evident for that self-evidence to be known. In other words, they have to be made evident, which means that they are not self-evident. This circularity seems to risk contradiction or tautology, but perhaps these truths only become evident in the manner in which they are declared. In other words, the performative enactment of the truth is the way of making evident that very truth, since the truth in question is not pregiven or static but enacted or exercised through a particular kind of plural action. If it is the very capacity for plural action that is at stake in claiming popular sovereignty, then there is no way to “show” this truth outside of the plural and invariably conflictual enactment we call self-constitution. If the plural subject is constituted in the course of its performative action, then it is not already constituted; whatever form it has prior to its performative exercise is not the same as the form it takes as it acts, and after it has acted. So how do we then understand this movement of gathering, which is durational, and implies occasional, periodic, or definitive forms of scattering? It is not one act, but a convergence of actions different from one another, a form of political sociality irreducible to conformity. Even when a crowd speaks together, they have to gather in close enough proximity to hear each other’s voice, to pace each person’s own vocalization, to achieve rhythm and harmony to a sufficient degree, and so to achieve a relation both auditory and corporeal with those with whom some signifying action or speech act is undertaken. We start to speak now and stop now. We start to move now, or more or less at a given time, but certainly not as a single organism. We try to stop all at once, but some keep moving, and others move and rest at their own pace. Temporal seriality and coordination, bodily proximity, auditory range, coordinated vocalization—all of these constitute essential dimensions of assembly and demonstration. And they are all presupposed by the speech act that enunciates “we the people”; they are the complex elements of the occasion of that enunciation, the nonverbal forms of its signification. If we try to take vocalization as the model of the speech act, then the body is surely presupposed as the organ of speech, both the organic condition and the vehicle of speech. The body is not transmuted into pure thought as it speaks, but signifies the organic conditions for verbalization, which means, according to Shoshana Felman, that the speech act is always doing something more and other than what it is actually saying. So just as there is no purely linguistic speech act separated from bodily acts, there is no purely conceptual moment of thought that does away with its own organic condition. And this tells us something about what it means to say “we the people,” since whether it is written in a text or uttered on the street, it designates an assembly in the act of designating and forming itself. It acts on itself as it acts, and a corporeal condition of plurality is indexed whether or not it appears on the occasion of the utterance. That bodily condition, plural and dynamic, is a constitutive dimension of that occasion. The embodied character of the people proves quite important to the kinds of demands that are made, since it is more often than not that basic bodily needs are not being met by virtue of the devastated ways of life. It may offend us theoretically to speak of “basic bodily needs,” as if a certain ahistorical notion of the body is invoked for the purposes of making moral and political claims to fair treatment and the just distribution of public goods. But perhaps it would be even less acceptable to refuse to speak about bodily needs at all for fear of falling into a theoretical impasse. It is not a matter of accepting the ahistorical or historical version of the body, for even the formulation of historical construction has its invariant features, and every universal concept of the body is drawn from very specific historical formations. So neither side of that debate knows what kind of relation it is in to the other. Every particular bodily need can be articulated historically in one way or another, and it may well be that what is called a “need” is precisely a historical articulation of urgency that is not for that reason a mere effect of the articulation. In other words, there is no way to separate the idea of a bodily need from the representational scheme that differentially recognizes bodily needs and, too often, fails to recognize them at all. This does not make bodily needs fully ahistorical, but neither does it make them into pure effects of a specifically historical discourse. Once again, the relation between the body and discourse is chiastic, suggesting that the body has to be represented and that it is never fully exhausted by that representation. Moreover, the differential ways that it is and is not represented saturate the representation of needs in fields of power. One can also take into account the production of needs discussed by Marx and amplified theoretically by Agnes Heller13 without claiming that “there is no such thing as a need.” We could doubtless use other words, and trace the productive character of the words we use to amplify the phenomena, but we would still be talking about something, even if there is no way to get at that something without the language we use, even if we invariably transfigure that something by using the language we do. The notion of “needs” then would be an always already linguistically transfigured sense of requirement or urgency, and would be adequately captured neither by those synonyms nor by any others.

#### You should understand the aff as a project of counter-hegemony – every debate and argument is a testing ground for revolutionary strategy – voting affirmative is an investment in the war of position.

Carrol ‘6 [William, University of Victoria. 2006. “Hegemony, Counter-hegemony, Anti-hegemony,” <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279801161_Hegemony_Counter-hegemony_Anti-hegemony>] pat

The term counter-hegemony seems misleadingly complementary to hegemony. In actuality, there is an asymmetry between the two, rooted in the different forms of power that are at stake. John Holloway, working within an autonomist framework inspired by Zapatismo, has written of the struggle to liberate power-to from power-over as “the struggle for the reassertion of social flow of doing, against its fragmentation and denial” (2005: 36). So long as power-over is sustained through an effective blending of persuasion and coercion, hegemony remains intact. To distinguish practices that liberate power-to from practices that contribute to the replication of power-over, we must return momentarily to critical realism’s transformational model of social activity. If hegemony is deeply grounded beneath the fray of conjunctural politics, we need to distinguish between activity that merely alters a certain state of affairs without effecting any deeper transformation and activity that is transformative (Joseph, 2002: 214). It is the latter that holds the possibility of liberating power-to from power-over. To invoke Nancy Fraser’s (1995) distinction, remedies for social injustice that merely affirm a group’s status or entitlements within an existing order must be distinguished from remedies that transform the world in ways that abolish underlying generative mechanisms of injustice. Such transformation can only take place through concrete political initiatives. Counterhegemony may portend deep transformation, but it gets its start on, and draws much of its vitality from, the immediate field of the conjunctural, in resistance to the agenda of the dominant hegemony (Hall, 1988). A good deal of counter-hegemonic struggle occurs in direct opposition to the aspects of capitalist hegemony we reviewed earlier – in the rejection of social and semiotic fragmentation, of neoliberal insulation and dispossession, of globalization from above. It is precisely through these oppositional politics that a global justice movement has, since the mid-1990s, taken shape and gained a sense of ethical purpose. As important as the concreteness of conjunctural politics is, counter-hegemony cannot simply remain on the terrain of hegemony, contesting its issues within its discursive frames. It is not enough to “celebrate the fragments” in a politics of difference, if such celebration simply intensifies the problems of postmodern fragmentation; nor can “reclaiming the commons” be a resumé of resistance to neoliberalism. Like the trade-unionism of the fordist era, such politics buy too heavily into hegemonic forms; they seek solutions within the existing hegemony (cf. Russell, 1997; Kebede, 2005). The question is how to relate creatively to the immediate conjuncture while avoiding capture by the hegemonic discourses and practices that inform and organize that conjuncture – how to weld the present to the future, as Gramsci once put it. Historic bloc, war of position If hegemony is deeply grounded then counter-hegemony needs to address those grounds. This stricture points to the articulation of various subaltern and progressive-democratic currents into a counter-hegemonic bloc that effectively organizes dissent across space and time. Historic blocs are all about articulation, but which articulations matter? In Stuart Hall’s (1986: 53) conception, articulation is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time. You have to ask, under what circumstances can a connection be forged or made? ... The ‘unity’ which matters is a linkage between the articulated discourse and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but not necessarily, be connected. From a critical realist perspective the most promising articulations are those that mobilize social forces in ways that challenge the underlying bases for hegemony while building bases for a radical alternative. In opposing an hegemony that fragments the social, that valorizes the anonymous market and possessive individual, that privileges ‘security’ over justice, movements need to rearticulate and transform, to build solidarities, including those spanning South and North. In a Gramscian problematic, a viable counter-hegemony draws together subaltern social forces around an alternative ethico-political conception of the world, constructing a common interest that transcends narrower interests situated in the defensive routines of various groups. Such counter-hegemony “has to adopt the organisational capacity to establish a rival historical bloc to the prevailing hegemony by sustaining a long war of position” (Morton, 2000: 261). In this perspective, historic bloc and war of position are dialectically linked at the organic level, representing respectively the synchronic and diachronic aspects of counter-hegemony (Carroll and Ratner, 2000). A war of position “opens space for new spatio-temporal totalities” (Joseph, 2002: 218); it creates the conditions under which a democratic culture and new social order can thrive. As a radical politic, this approach emphasizes the need for counter-hegemonic movement to walk on both legs, taking up state-centred issues as well as issues resident in national and transnational civil societies. Indeed, reclaiming the state – democratizing state practices in the wake of neoliberal globalization – is elemental to counter-hegemony today (Wainwright, 2003). Within this framework, states are neither privileged nor forsaken as sites of struggle and change, but state-centred politics is understood as one part of broader transformations (Brand, 2005b: 248). Often romanticized as the world’s first post-modern movement, the Zapatistas actually exemplify what walking on two legs might look like in a world dominated by transnational neoliberalism. Their rejection of Leninist and social democratic strategies to take state power directly, their emphasis on the political struggle over the military struggle, their attention to dignity as an ethical principle are all obvious aspects of a creatively conducted war of position. The Zapatista’s “Other Campaign”, launched in 2005, engaged subversively with the electoral process to consolidate the anti-capitalist left. Instead of running candidates, the Other Campaign called for the enactment of a new national constitution that would bar privatization of public resources and other neo-liberal moves, and insure autonomy for Mexico’s 57 distinct indigenous peoples (Ross, 2005). The call for a new constitution is hardly a rejection of state-centred politics; rather, it is a refusal to be co-opted into the game of bourgeois statist politics. With their clever approach to the state and civil society, the Zapatistas provide clues as to how “to conduct politics with reference to the state without moving oneself in state forms and thus actually reproducing existing relationships of domination” (Brand and Hirsch, 2004: 377).

#### Reclaiming public institutions is key – organizing is necessary to prevent the ceding of institutions to neoliberal interests

Not An Alternative 16 . Not An Alternative is a New York-Based Collective and Non-Profit Organization That Works at the Intersection of Art, Activism and Pedagogy [“Institutional Liberation,” 2016, *E-Flux 77*]//vikas

The planetary scale of anthropogenic climate change poses problems for the Left. How do we identify appropriate targets and build strong alliances? **What resources can we use** to support this building and targeting? New tactics from an array of art and activist collectives signal that institutions are sites of struggle. Collectives **concerned with fossil fuels, labor, and decolonization are deploying institutions as targets and resources for radical political practice**. Multiple reinforcing systems produce climate change—capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, militarism, extractivism. The fossil fuel sector mobilizes to keep on drilling. Dispossessed communities divide within themselves over devastating and hopeless economic alternatives. States push for further exploration and amplified production to preserve their hegemony. Some countries demand the right to develop. Various groups and nonstate actors insist that we “keep it in the ground.” It’s clear that the 1 percent sacrifice the futures of the rest of us for their own economic interest. Yet the complex interworking of multiple systems makes it close to impossible to envision the politics of climate justice. Time is running out. Climate change is happening now and future warming is locked in. The question is how fast and how much. There are no simple solutions. Food shortages, droughts, rising sea levels, record-breaking temperatures, mass migration, and war force the urgency of organization. Organizing is no longer a choice for the Left. It’s a necessity. Some on the Left respond with **refusal**. Advocates of neo-primitivist lifestyle **politics retreat to the forests and mountains**, to DIY off-the-grid living that abandons the millions in the cities. This “not my problem” individualist survivalism reflects the ideological orientation of neoliberal capitalism. Survival-themed reality television has been big for over a decade. Others on the Left side with the things. They advocate horizontal relationships with rocks and nonlife, shift to deep time, and celebrate the microbes and weeds likely to thrive in a posthuman world. Here the genocidal mindset cultivated in the sixteenth century’s colonization of the Americas expands and turns back in on human life as a whole. **The** failure to value black and brown life, the inability to conceive living with and in diverse egalitarian communities, **becomes the** incapacity to value human life **at all.** **So long as the Left looks on in despair** (**or averts its gaze**), **capitalism determines the horizon of our response** to the changing climate. Carbon markets, green technology, and geoengineering appear as the only way forward even as they reinforce the systems of exploitation, dispossession, and domination already dismantling the possibility of a future for the majority of the planet’s inhabitants. The supposition that climate solutions can only be market solutions is afforded by the infrastructures and institutions that reproduce capitalist class power. The last forty years of neoliberalism hollowed out our public institutions. From the corporate capture of the legislative process, to the evisceration of schools and universities, to the widespread selling off of public land, assets, and services to the highest bidder, neoliberal capitalism sucked the life out of those components of the state that promised to serve the people. It reinforced strategies for private capital accumulation, socializing risk and privatizing reward to produce new forms of extreme inequality. At the same time, neoliberal governance intensified **the** coercive power of the state, amping up the police, **the** military, and **the apparatuses of** surveillance. **Neoliberal ideology rose to hegemony by seizing and repurposing existing institutions.** Public institutions—such as museums, libraries, parliaments, parks, and schools—supply an infrastructure **for creating and communicating common understandings of the world.** They offer perspectives on politics, culture, nature, and society, delineating the limits of thought and action. Because these perspectives are essential to the maintenance of power, institutions are sites of ideological struggle. The capitalist class relies on ideological apparatuses like museums to produce and reproduce the subjects it needs. Such subjects are classed, sexed, raced, and gendered. They are **configured as primitive or civilized, exotic or everyday, foreign or “like us.”** Underlying the complex of state projects that establish some as backwards and others as advanced are political and economic assumptions regarding natural development and balanced systems. Fossils elide with fuel; some people are treated as nature; extractivism signifies progress; and even systems driven by crisis and exploitation are described in terms of equilibrium. Neoliberal capitalism’s intensified competition pushes the corporate sector to ratchet up this war for hearts and minds. Museums and other public institutions become little more than apparatuses for public relations, resources for reshaping common sense according to capitalist values and priorities. Institutions have been starved into submission by private interests. No wonder much of the Left does not recognize itself within them. **But the practice deployed by neoliberals to seize institutions is now being deployed against neoliberal purposes**. Co-optation goes both ways. This is the wager of the insurgent movement to liberate institutions from the grip of capitalism.

### Offense

**Capitalism’s desire to accumulate via Intellectual Property Rights is an inherent structural contradiction – all IPR does is re-entrench existing capitalist structures**

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\*IPR = intellectual property rights

\*\* brackets are in original text

In industrial capitalism, the juridical and institutional arrangements that regulate the content and implementation of property rights in general and intellectual property rights in particular were not always at the forefront as a subject of debate. Especially in the latter case, the overall volume of “intellectual” products such as knowledge(s), designs, ideas, codes, images was quite limited (largely R&D specific), and their trade under monopolistic conditions was structured and secured by the mechanisms of patents, trademarks/branding, and copyright. The central function of these mechanisms was to facilitate the transformation of these immaterial products into forms of scarce commodities on the market. In this way, **the owners of intellectual property rights could possess a sort of monopoly** before the law and thus enjoy the profits it brought. Enclosure, in other words, was largely an unproblematic presupposition of capitalist relations. With the transformation of industrial capitalism into cognitive capitalism (Boutang, 2011; Corsani et al., 2001; Dieuaide et al., 2003; Fumagalli, 2011; Lucarelli and Vercellone, 2013; Negri, 2008; Paulré, 2000; Vercellone, 2007), nevertheless, something has happened and, as a consequence, the subject of intellectual property rights has come to the forefront as a distinctive issue on both public and academic platforms. This something, we will argue, consists in the tendency of the organisation of (immaterial) production within and through the common and the rise of the digital revolution. In cognitive capitalism, specifically, the value and wealth have come to rest on immaterial production which is increasingly conducted within and through the common. This development is accompanied by the massive diffusion of the results of immaterial production (**e.g. knowledge, idea, code, images)** largely free by means of new information and communication technologies. The mass and free circulation of what is economically valuable has created a “threat” to well-established relations of capitalism. One of the apparatuses to intercept the free circulation of immaterial products or better, the emerging union between workers and means of production has been directed towards the enclosure of common through the aggressive enforcement of intellectual property rights. This development stimulates me to re-address a fundamental question: is the extension and implementation of intellectual property rights a precondition for economic health? For those who draw on orthodox economic theory, the answer tends towards “yes” - even though ambivalence marks the literature. **In this very journal and beyond, for example, the enclosure via intellectual property rights has largely been viewed as an apparatus that must be strengthened to increase companies' ‘financial performance’** (Bollen et al., 2005; Suh and Oh, 2015; Willoughby, 2013), to sustain ‘innovation’ (Horlbulyk, 1993; Hu and Hung, 2014; Pérez et al., 2018; Sweet et al., 2015), and to facilitate economic growth (Gould and Gruben, 1996; Park and Ginarte, 2007). In turn, Archibugi and Filippetti (2018), Baker et al. (2017), Boldrin and Levine (2002, 2010), Lerner (2009), Stiglitz (2014), developed alternative arguments, challenging these general assumptions to a certain extent. In this paper, I will **contribute to the second position by problematizing the “intellectual property rights are a socio-economic need” thesis by engaging in a critical update on the concept through autonomist Marxist theory.** In the second and third sections, I will focus on the current state of socio-economic affairs and offer a ‘political reading’ (Cleaver, 2000) of intellectual property rights. I will bring forward that the aggressive enforcement of intellectual property rights pertains to, first and foremost, the re-separation of wage-workers from the ownership of the new means of production. In the fourth section, I will **discuss the structural contradiction manifested by the capital's desire to enclose via intellectual property rights.** In particular, I will argue that the current regime of intellectual property rights i) prepares a basis for a social crisis in terms of **established relations of production and, at the same time, ii) curtails a part of socio-economic opportunities for innovation, profit-making, and growth**. A brief conclusion will ensue. 2. Cognitive capitalism and the becoming of production common **Capitalism is an unstable, destructive, and crisis-prone mode of production.** Thrift notes that ‘**we live in a world that exists on the economic edge**, close to an abyss but never quite falling into it … It [**capitalism] is like a battery that continues to accumulate energy without pause’** (2011: vi). **Capitalism survives;** and it survives precisely **by transforming itself into a new modality**. Tronti (1979) formalised one of the most important methodological lessons for the study of the transformation of capitalism, which is acknowledged within autonomist Marxist theory as a sort of ‘Copernican revolution’ (Toscano, 2009: 114). He puts that ‘we too have worked with a concept that puts capitalist development first, and workers second. This is a mistake… At the level of socially developed capital, capitalist development becomes subordinated to working class struggle; it follows behind them, and they set the pace to which the political mechanisms of capital's own reproduction must be turned’ (Tronti, 1979: 1).2 **That is, working class is always anterior in the ‘reactive history’ (**Hardt and Negri, 2000: 268) of capitalism; it sets the terms and nature of transformation. Embracing this lesson, MATISSE scholars and other autonomist Marxist theorists have periodised capitalism by placing emphasis on one of the central dimensions concerning the reactive history of capital-labour relation, namely the control of ‘the intellectual powers of production’ (Marx, 1990).3 Capitalism is older than industrial capitalism. The first period in the trajectory of capitalism in the Braudelian longue durée was discerned as mercantilist capitalism, developing between the beginning of the sixteenth century and the end of the eighteenth century. The model of production in this period was based on the system of putting-out model or concentrated manufacture with its main capitalist persona, mercantile entrepreneur. While the latter was enjoying the fruits of production by appropriating surplus-labour, the production itself was largely organised and executed by independent artisans, craftsmen, artists working in cooperation and collaboration. In this period, Vercellone notes, ‘capital subsumes a labour process … which pre-exists it and in which the co-operation of workers does not require mechanisms of capitalist direction of production’ (2007: 20). From technical point of view, in other words, the **production process was autonomous in relation to capital.** In this regard, the central “concern” from the perspective of capital was that even though workers depended strictly on the figure of mercantile entrepreneur in monetary terms, they were in fact powerful actors in political terms, for they were controlling the intellectual powers of production. Accordingly, the workers could always resist mercantile entrepreneur and claim control over the organisation, methods and intensity of the production process. Therefore, in this period, Marx states, ‘capital is constantly compelled to wrestle with the insubordination of the workmen’ (1990: 489). It was not a historical coincidence that mercantilist capitalism dissolved and industrial capitalism began with the arrival of cutting-edge (for that period) technological innovation and progress. The industrial technological revolution conditioned the rise of industrial capitalism, the second period in the longue durée. **The industrial capitalism eventually found its historical fulfilment in the Fordist system of accumulation, whose driving force was Manchester-style big factories with heavy machinery and assembly lines.** The specialisation was primarily in the mass-production of durable and standardised goods. The organisation of labour was typically administered through scientific methods (e.g. Taylorist production methods), involving the establishment of prescribed simple-tasks, performed in pre-determined timeslots and measured by a chronometer. What capital achieved with scientific methods and machinery is diverse. What interests us here, nonetheless, is the results of the integration of labour into intricate processes of machinery from the perspective of working class. In industrial capitalism, Marx argues, ‘the production process ceases to be a labour process in the sense of a process dominated by labour as its governing unity. Labour appears, rather, merely as conscious organ … subsumed under the total process of the machinery itself’ (1993: 693). Technology and machinery terminated the hegemony of workers' “living” knowledge over “dead” knowledge of capital by separating the workers from cognitive elements of work. They facilitated capital to decompose the autonomous worker and establish control over the intellectual powers of production. The worker became an ‘ox than any other type’ (Taylor, 1911: 59). How can we think of the dynamics of transition from industrial capitalism to cognitive capitalism? The main argument of autonomist Marxist theory is that it was precisely the accumulated social struggles of workers in the 1960s and 70s against the deepening of Fordist mode of working and living that brought about the structural crisis of industrial capitalism (Castellano et al., 1996). The mass insurgency, first, led to the ‘development of the institutions of the welfare state, [above all] mass education was established’ (Vercellone, 2007: 25). It, second, led to the extension of wage and hence created a new margin for converting a part of surplus-labour into free time. **The free time spent on education, research, art, communication, public interaction and all other activities of human development ‘permitted wage-labourers to accumulate a technological, theoretical, and practical knowledge adequate to the level attained by the capitalist development of the social and technical division of labour’** (Vercellone, 2007: 27). This state of affairs was termed ‘mass intellectuality’ by Virno (1996) and ‘diffuse intellectuality’ by Vercellone (2013) which denotes, the intellect that is diffused across the whole society. The workers of mass intellectuality consequently began to demand more creative, flexible, communicative, innovative, or in a word, more fulfilling forms of labour which will correspond to their cognitive capacities. Once again, workers invented and ‘dictated the terms and nature of [capitalism's] transformation’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 268). Indeed, capital had to address the demands of workers because capital produces nothing without labour, which is the sole element of value creation (Marx, 1990). **Capital responded to the demands by mutating itself into a new form, a new ‘system of capital accumulation’** (Dieuaide et al., 2003), which was based on the mobilisation and absorption of the creative, innovative, affective, relational, and communicational capacities of workers. In contemporary capitalism, the principle source of value and wealth does not lie much in manual labour (e.g. physicalenergy, dedicated to the accomplishment of prescribed tasks) but increasingly in the ensemble of mental and affective capacities of workers which are set in motion in production processes. This new system of accumulation entered into the autonomist Marxist literature as cognitive capitalism.4 At this point, we need to elucidate that what is cognitive in cognitive capitalism is not capitalism but the labour upon which the extraction of surplus-value rests. One of the most prominent figures of autonomist Marxism, Vercellone, defines the concept as follows: ‘Capitalism’ refers to the persistence, within the process of change, of certain fundamental invariants of the capitalist system, such as the driving role of profit and the centrality of the wage-relation, or more precisely of the various forms of dependent labour upon which the extraction of surplus-value rests. ‘Cognitive’ draws attention to the new character of the labour, value-sources and property forms on which the accumulation of capital is now based, as well as to the contradictions thereby engendered. (2013: 418) The rise of cognitive capitalism, a new system of accumulation which succeeds mercantilist and industrial capitalisms, is reflected in the tendency that immaterial products (e.g. knowledge, codes, ideas, information, symbols, images, logos, designs) or immaterial dimensions of products (i.e. their symbolic, aesthetic, and social value) have come to preponderate over material products or the material dimensions of products in the process of capitalist valorisation (Hardt and Negri, 2009; Lazzarato, 1996). This does not to convey that the production of material commodities (e.g. computers, cars, furniture) is in the process of gradual disappearance. Instead, the **argument is that the value of material commodities too increasingly rests on intangible factors.** In their report to the The French Ministry of Treasury, Lévy and Jouyet put that ‘in recent years, a new constituent has emerged as a key driver in the economic growth: immaterial… Today, **the real wealth is not concrete, it is abstract. It is not material, it is immaterial’** (2006: 1, my translation). For Morini and Fumagalli, the creation of wealth and value is increasingly based on immaterial production hence subordinated to the use of ‘intangible raw materials’ (2010: 235). For Boutang, the capture of gains from immaterial elements, constitutes ‘the central issue for accumulation, and it plays a determining role in generating profits’ (2011: 57). Vercellone, along the same line, argues that ‘the component of capital intangible, which is essentially embodied in human beings, now makes up a larger part of the overall capital-stock than material capital, becoming the crucial growth factor’ (2013: 434). One of the key characteristics of immaterial labour is that it intrinsically exceeds the bounds set in relation to capital. Excedence seems to me an underdeveloped notion -even in the literature mentioned above. By excedence, one might envision two ideas. First, with the great mutation from industrial capitalism to cognitive capitalism, ‘we pass from the static management of resources to the dynamic management of knowledges’ (Vercellone, 2007: 33). That is to say, ‘the knowledge mobilised by living labour is now hegemonic with regard to the knowledge embodied in fixed capital’ (Vercellone, 2013: 433). Boutang underlines that ‘the essential point is no longer the expenditure of human labour-power, but that of invention-power: the living know-how that cannot be reduced to machines’ (2011: 32). Therefore, on the one side, we affirm that today's economic production is directed towards absorbing the creative, innovative, affective, relational, and communicational capacities of living labour. On the other side, in immaterial production, labour is not crystallised in a material commodity that can be divorced from its producer. A car, for example, which is produced with material labour is immediately divorced from its producer. However, a research article, a code, an analysis, and alike cannot be divorced from the producer inasmuch as these products intrinsically reside within the mind and body of those who produced them in the first place. Therefore, immaterial labour increasingly exceeds; it potentially overflows the subsumption mechanisms set by today's economic production. Secondly, in industrial capitalism, which found its fulfilment in Taylorist production processes, workers' innovative, creative, technical capacities were rigorously confined to a particular site, that is, the site of material production. Consider, for instance, an assembly line worker producing in a cable factory. The whole ensemble of technological and mechanical knowledge s/he has accumulated through her/his lifetime was rarely put into work, and more significantly, those put into work were almost exclusively site specific. However, the production of immaterial products or immaterial elements of material products immediately mobilises producers to actualise and ameliorate their intellectual, communicational, affective, and social capacities. Furthermore, the **results of immaterial labour, not confined by the corporate walls, exceed work and spill over different spheres of life (as economists call externalities), and they begin to produce the common forms of wealth.** This is the point from where one might begin to envision the linkage between the excedence of immaterial labour and the accumulation of immaterial products in the common. De Angelis (2004), Hardt and Negri (2004, 2009), Negri (2008), Fuchs (2010), Hardt (2011), and Vercellone (2017) have theorised immaterial production with its connection to the concept of common. What is meant by the common? **Typically, the common denotes the wealth of nature (e.g. earth, water, air, elements, animal life) to be shared by all humanity.** In other words, the common refers to the natural world, harbouring the natural resources, outside of society. By a fair extension, the common also denotes ‘those results of social production that are necessary for social interaction and further production’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009: viii, emphasis added). The concept of common thus permeates equally all spheres of life, blurring the division between nature and culture, referring not only to the fruits of nature shared by human beings but also, and above all, to the artificial common(s): the creative, social, knowledge common(s); for example, the languages we construct, the knowledge we create, the social practices we enact. According to this second formulation, the common makes an appearance both at the beginning (as a presupposition) and at the end (as 4 The various pillars of the theory of cognitive capitalism in general and the concept of immaterial labour in particular have been challenged by many critical scholars, including Callinicos (2001), Dyer-Witheford (2001), Thompson (2005), Camfield (2007), Gill and Pratt (2008), Lanoix (2012). In this paper, it is not possible to delve into these criticisms and the ensuing discussions. However, it is important to note that the point of reference of all these challenges lies largely in Hardt and Negri's trilogy (Empire, Multitude, Commonwealth), which were written by the simplification of theory and in a provocative tone to mobilise human bodies towards partisan action. The publications of Invisible Committee via MIT-Semiotext(e) keep this form of expression alive. One who is interested in how these challenges are addressed at a more robust theoretical level might want to look at Negri (1992), Vercellone (2007), Casarino and Negri (2008), Negri (2008), Fumagalli and Mezzadra (2010), Hardt and Negri (2009), Lucarelli and Vercellone (2013), Vercellone (2013). In addition, a sound analysis of these discussions can be found in the special issue of Ephemera on Immaterial and Affective Labour, Dowling et al. (2007). E. Karakilic Technological Forecasting & Social Change 147 (2019) 1–9 3 an outcome) of immaterial production. To put it more precisely, the common consists of both the results as well as the means of immaterial production. In terms of being the presupposition, it might appear convincingly in mind that immaterial labour performs, and it can actually perform only on the terrain of common. Indeed, no one produces all alone but only within and through the spectres of the others' past and present existence. Consider, for example, the production of immaterial products such as ideas, knowledge, solutions, images, codes, language, and so forth. These products cannot really be produced by such a persona of “genius” in an ivory tower, that is, by a human being who is entirely isolated from the accumulated common intellect. Marx elegantly notes that knowledge and such products are ‘universal labour’, that is, ‘brought about partly by the cooperation of men now living, but partly also by building on earlier work’ (1992: 199). As Hardt and Negri maintain, ‘our common knowledge is the foundation of all new production of knowledge; linguistic community is the basis of all linguistic innovation; … and our common social image bank makes possible the creation of new images’ (2004: 148). The workers then must have an open-direct access to the common intellect in order to produce. This open-direct access to the common is essential for one's creativity, productivity, and more importantly for the realization of one's potentiality. The outcome of immaterial production, on the other side, exceeds and accrues to the common that then becomes a condition for the expanded production. The **results of immaterial production are not identical to material products, for they immediately tend towards being common through their circulation in social, cultural, and digital networks.** Gorz argues that when knowledge is produced and diffused, ‘it no longer has proprietors’ (1997: 18, my translation). From the perspective of economics, Boutang (2013) argues that today scarcity is no longer fatal. What we witness is that the ‘digital world restores abundance that had been destroyed partly or fully by industrial organisation of scarcity of commons’ (Boutang, 2013: 86). In other words, since the outcome of immaterial production can be coded in the digital media, reproduced, and delivered virtually at zero marginal cost, we may speak of the inversion of scarcity of commons in terms of immaterial products. Considering the technical developments, in particular the peer-to-peer protocols, Boutang underscores how the digital revolution has challenged (with respect to immaterial products) the statue of ‘a) reproduction; b) monopoly of circulation; c) authority that tackles with monopoly in interpretation; d) and finally authorship’ (2013: 86). The latter aspect of the commonality as well as how capital counter-acts will be discussed in the final part of this chapter. So, what we have here is a sort of virtuous cycle which is typical of immaterial production process. Immaterial labour force, through working on the accumulated common forms of wealth, creates new commons which, in turn, becomes the base (i.e. raw materials) for expanded production. Fuchs (2010) upholds that all humans benefit from the commons: the present generation works on the commons produced in the past and then hands over enriched commons to the future generation. From what we have noted until now, we can discern another aspect of immaterial production. Let me to consider, for instance, the production of scientific knowledge. The potential outcome in our case might be a journal paper, monograph, conference speech, series of lectures, accruing to the general intellect and, at the same time, contributing to the ground basis for the production of further scientific knowledge. We have already pointed this out. In addition, the production of scientific knowledge necessitates, by its nature, engagement in communication, cooperation, collaboration, affective relation etc. between researchers, students, supervisors, editors, reviewers, and fellow academicians. Marx writes that ‘communal labour … simply involves the direct cooperation of individuals’ (1992: 199). No scientific knowledge, no idea, no computer code, no natural language, no artificial language, no authorship etc. can be produced without this sort of engagement. From this point of view, the common appears at the centre as well. That is to say, the immaterial production is increasingly conducted in the common. In this respect, Negri puts that: We assume not only that value is constructed within social production (which is obvious), but also that social production today presents itself in a manner which increasingly has the quality of the common, in other words as a multiplicity of increasingly cooperative activities within the process of production. (2008: 183) To sum up, the general outlines of the technical composition of immaterial labour indicate the growing autonomy of the labour process. First, the workers of diffuse intellectuality tend to get direct access to the common where the raw materials of production are located. They work on it in cooperation and collaboration and produce a new product that tends towards to common, which facilitate tomorrow's production. In addition, Hardt and Negri recognise that ‘labour itself tends to produce the means of interaction, communication, and cooperation for production directly’ (2004: 147). Producers, in this context, are virtually in no need of a figure from “outside” (e.g. leaders, capital owners, board of directors, shareholders, state representatives) that would administer the design, surveillance, and control of labour process. Production tendentially reveals itself as a sort of shared; a common process. The essential aspects of economic production no longer have to be made available by an “outsider” because these aspects increasingly flourish internally within the networks of production (i.e. by-product). The increasing power and growing autonomy of workers, based on the control of intellectual powers of production, had created a threat to existing capitalist production relations which was, in turn, counteracted by various political mechanisms enforced by the forces of “outside”. 5 One of the key mechanisms has been oriented towards enclosing the common. 3. Enclosure of the common: revisiting ‘so-called primitive accumulation’ One of the most enlightening ways to approach the enclosure of the common will be revisiting Part Eight of Capital volume I, So-Called Primitive Accumulation (1990: 873–940), where Marx often uses the terms of primitive accumulation and enclosure interchangeably. This is rather a controversial part in Capital which has predominantly been read through three different lenses within the Marxist literature. After discussing the first conventional interpretation briefly, I will focus on Bonefeld's (2001, 2002) reading which separates itself from the former fundamentally. I will then articulate my position through De Angelis (1999, 2001, 2004), contributing to Bonefeld by reading Marx “politically” (see Cleaver, 2000). The historicist interpretation of primitive accumulation is evident within the works of Lenin (1899), Dobb (1963), and Sweezy (1986). Here, the primitive accumulation is conceptualised as a temporally crystallised process whereby the preconditions of capitalist mode of production (i.e. (i) a section of population divorced from all means of production but their labour power, and (ii) an initial accumulation to be used for emerging industries) have emerged. Here, the primitive accumulation conveys, above all, ‘causality, where an historical event is understood to have caused the formation of a distinct mode of social relations which renders the causing event obsolete’ (Bonefeld, 2002: 3). Accordingly, the accent is on the transiency of the phenomenon; that is to say, once the process (a history of blood and fire, as Marx says) had been completed, we were no longer in the realm of primitive accumulation. Embracing this perspective, one inquiries into either the transition from feudalism to capitalism by rendering it a question of 5 One of the important figures of autonomist Marxist thinking, Lazzarato (2014, 2015), does not agree with this postulate. He finds it too optimistic and argues, through Deleuze and Guattari, that capital achieved to produce “selfnegating” and “automatically responsive” worker-subjectivity in tune with the priorities of capital (also see his arguments in Karakilic, 2017). genealogy or the complex issues of the capital-relation by rendering it a question of economics. Ultimately, both orientations assume a linear model of development, where the primitive accumulation indicates only a one-off epoch that is distinctly separated from capitalismproper.6 Bonefeld (2001, 2002) and De Angelis's (1999, 2001, 2004) political and theoretical formulation re-evaluates Marx's primitive accumulation, that is enclosure. Against the conventional one-off-in-history thesis, the theorists bring forward an alternative analysis that ‘primitive accumulation is necessarily present in mature capitalist systems and, given the conflicting nature of capitalist relations, assumes a continuous character’ (De Angelis, 2001: 2, emphasis added). Even though this key argument (i.e. primitive accumulation is a continuous process in capitalist mode of production) is shared by both theorists, they go separate at a certain juncture. Bonefeld argues that ‘primitive accumulation is Aufhebung in accumulation proper’ (2002: 4). The Hegelian term Aufhebung ‘connotes the dialectic process in which the negation of a form transforms the negated into a new form, in which it loses its independent existence and at the same time maintains its essence, constituting the substance of the new form’ (2002: 4). Translating into our context, the historic form of primitive accumulation is argued to be ‘raised to a new level where its original form and independent existence is eliminated (or cancelled) at the same time as its substance or essence (Wesenhaftigkeit) is maintained’ (2002: 4 and 6). Bonefeld's perspective thus brings forward two ideas: first, primitive accumulation principally specifies a historical epoch preceding capitalist mode of production; however (this however is everything), second, the essence of primitive accumulation maintains its existence as the indivisible principle of capitalism-proper. But what is the essence of primitive accumulation that Bonefeld speaks of as a living substance? **Marx formulates capital against the definitions given by the vulgar economists. It is not a thing referring to a stock of commodities but, first and foremost, a social relation.** For Marx, the capital-relation embodies a precise ‘presupposition’, namely ‘a complete separation between the workers and the ownership of the conditions for the realization of the labour’ (Marx, 1990: 874). In other words, ‘which creates the capital-relation can be nothing other than the process which divorces the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his own labour’ (Marx, 1990: 874). And, he precisely identifies the process here as primitive accumulation. Primitive accumulation is therefore viewed ‘nothing other than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production’ (Marx, 1990: 875). The essence (wesenhaftigkeit) of primitive accumulation is thus understood through the term of separation: workers' separation from the means of production. One may then bring forward (by considering the last quote) that Marx's examination of primitive accumulation defines a question of genealogy (‘historical process’, Marx says). There is no doubt that one can capture akin statements that associate primitive with pre-history or others in which primitive accumulation is identified as the historical presupposition of the capitalism-proper. For example, Marx indeed states that ‘primitive accumulation … is the historical basis … of specifically capitalist production’ (1990: 775). He further states ‘a division between [the separation of] … subjective labour-power from the objective conditions of labour was therefore the real foundation in fact, and the starting-point of capitalist production’ (Marx, 1990: 716). Does it then mean that the primitive accumulation was one-off separation process in history? Bonefeld (2001, 2002) provides a closer reading of Marx to answer this question. He refers to the Grundrisse (see. 1993: 459–461) where Marx articulates the distinction between conditions of capital's ‘becoming’ or arising, and the conditions of capital's ‘existence’ or being. He argues that the conditions of capital's becoming ‘disappear as real capital arises’, and the conditions of capital's existence do not appear as ‘conditions of its arising, but results of its presence’ (Marx, 1993: 459). Marx thusly puts that ‘once developed historically, capital itself creates the conditions of its existence (not as conditions for its arising, but as results of its being)’ (1993: 459). According to Marx, in simpler terms, ‘whatever happened for the first time at the origin of the history of capitalism must logically repeat itself’ (Mezzadra, 2011: 305). Indeed, the continuity of the essence of primitive accumulation is everywhere in Marx's works. In The Process of Accumulation of Capital, Marx argues that ‘what at first was merely a starting-point [the separation] is constantly renewed and perpetuated by simple reproduction’ in capitalist production (1990: 716). In the Theories of Surplus Value, he argues that ‘accumulation of capital … on the basis of the relationship of capital and wage-labour, reproduces the separation … on an ever-increasing scale’; therefore, ‘accumulation merely presents as a continuous process what in primitive accumulation appears as a distinct historical process’ (1971: 315 and 271). In volume III of Capital, he puts that capital proper is ‘simply’ the separation which is ‘raised to a higher power’ (1992: 354). Bonefeld (2001, 2002) accordingly argues that primitive accumulation is a process occurring in present-day capitalism precisely because the accumulation proper indicates a posterior stage that reproduces the very essence of it, that is separation, on a greater scale. At this point, De Angelis (1999, 2001, 2004) makes a crucial contribution which informs my position. He does not merely argue that the essence of primitive accumulation (re)presents itself in accumulation proper as a by-product of economic reproduction. He, rather, underlines that it is precisely the processes of ex-novo separation (which characterises the primitive accumulation) that maintain their existence in accumulation proper. He argues that the separation ‘must not be seen as the necessary result of its [capital's] dynamic’, rather ‘as necessary aspiration embedded in its drives and motivation as well as its survival instinct vis-à-vis emerging alternatives to capital’ (2004: 69). He elegantly discerns what primitive accumulation in Marx refers to: ‘the problematic of the preservation and expansion of the capitalist mode of production any time the producers [and the spaces of life] set themselves up as an obstacle to the reproduction of their separation from the means of production’ (De Angelis, 2004: 69). Accordingly, primitive accumulation is conceived as ‘those social processes or sets of strategies aimed at dismantling those institutions that protect society from the market’ (2004: 13). In my view, one can only understand through this reading of Marx that, even if primitive accumulation were a problem of genealogy, the genealogy would manifest itself until a radical historical reversal would take place. Marx's account of capital, a process of circulation of values which are congealed in different things at various points, refers to the ad infinitum movement in which money is recapitalized in search of more money (Harvey, 2010). ‘What capital does is that it attempts to create life-worlds in its own image or to colonise existing ones, to put them to work for its priorities and drives … since the beginning of its history … until it has colonised all of life’ (De Angelis, 2004: 67). However, there arise some limits any one of which has to be transcended by capital. Marx (1993), in the Grundrisse, argues that the circulation and accumulation of capital cannot abide limits; whenever it encounters a limit, it turns them into barriers that then could be transcended or by-passed. At this point, Marx cites Hegel's Science of Logic as a footnote: ‘something's own boundary posited by it as a negative which is at the same time essential, is not merely boundary as such but barrier … and it does overcome it’ (Hegel in Marx, 1993: 334). Marx adapts the argument for capital: ‘capital is the endless and limitless drive to go beyond its limiting barrier … Every limit appears as a barrier to overcome’ (1993: 334 and 408). Capital is thusly conceptualised as a social force devoted to transcend every limit it encounters in order to expand itself continuously. 6 This type of linear reading of the development of capitalism is evident in Lenin's (1899) The Development of Capitalism in Russia in which he considered the expropriation of peasants as a “positive” and inevitable process in the creation of capitalist market in Russia. The “distinctive quality” of the Marxian limit which is tried to be overcome by capital through the strategies of ex-novo separation pertains to the tendency of workers' open-direct access to social wealth that is not mediated by the natural laws of capitalist mode of production. When capital's eternal desire to colonise and accumulate is constrained or threatened by the workers, capital encounters with an alarming situation. In cognitive capitalism, the becoming-centrality of the common provides a political opportunity for workers to invert the essential separation and claim their autonomy in relation to capital. In this context, capital strives to separate people ex-novo from the growing common forms of wealth by mobilising aggressive commodification strategies such as intellectual property rights. 3.1. A structural contradiction: the enclosure of the common through intellectual property rights From the standpoint of classical economics and property law, the system of private property (be it real estate or intellectual property) rights is based on two levels of provisions. The first level concerns the rules, norms, conventions, laws, etc. (these are the forms of obligations in differing intensity) that establish the usus (the delimitation of uses), fructus (the exclusive right to enjoy), and abusus (the alienability; the ability to exchange at mutually agreeable terms) of goods, where good is understood to be anything that is recognised as an object of economic, symbolic or social value (Alchian, 2019). The second level concerns the institutional arrangements, that is, the conditions for the enforcement of those laws, rules, and so forth. These two levels are interrelated inasmuch as if the forms of obligation are ignored, they fall into disuse and the character of enforcement is rendered obsolete. In industrial capitalism, on the whole, the jurisdictional and institutional arrangements which inform the nature and execution of private property rights in general, and intellectual property rights in particular were not a subject of major debate for two reasons. First, in industrial capitalism ‘the production of wealth and value is [largely] based on material production and manual labour’ (Morini and Fumagalli, 2010: 235) and, accordingly, the volume of “intellectual” products such as knowledge(s), designs, ideas, codes, images along with the artefacts which are innately not separable (divisible), rival, and excludible was quite limited. **Second, the formation of monopoly with regard to the trade of intellectual products was firmly established and regulated by the system of i) patents, ii) trademarks/branding, and iii) copyrights**. These mechanisms secured the unity of usus, abusus and fructus of intellectual goods and enabled the transformation of them into scarce goods on the market, thusly providing the tenant of IPR legal right to have monopoly. The evolving technical means of reproduction surely challenged the IPR enforcement by overstepping the legal apparatuses, which was followed by a new writing of the law(s). In cognitive capitalism, the issue of IPR, has become a central topic. The legal proceedings and the increasing court cases over the conflicts of IPR are indeed everywhere (Reuters, 2014). It is not a coincidence that in 1996, a journal was launched which was dedicated to this subject (i.e. Journal of Intellectual Property Rights). Here, we may underline two main interrelated reasons. Firstly, as discussed in the previous sections, the value and wealth have increasingly come to rest on immaterial production (and its intellectual products) which is increasingly **conducted within and through the common. This corresponds to the tendency of workers' re-appropriation of intellectual powers of production, reversal of workers' separation from the means of production, and hence their increasing autonomy in terms of production relations; a tendency which creates a distressing situation from the perspective of capital.** This “distressing” situation, secondly, was raised to an “alarming” situation with the tendential breakdown of the strong links between usus, fructus, and abusus, which was engendered by the force of digital revolution. The new information and communication technologies transformed the results of immaterial production (i.e. intellectual products) into a sequence of binary digits via, for instance, software compression and encryption. In the digital world, the reproduction which is based on meta-data is virtually identical with the original, whereas in the analogical world the latter is always distinguishable, for it is necessary to utilise a physical medium (e.g. tape recorder) for the process of its reproduction. Since the digital data could be coded in the digital media, reproduced, and delivered virtually at zero marginal cost, the inversion of scarcity of creative, social, knowledge commons in relation to intellectual goods has come to the forefront. The rise of ‘digital multitudes’, the elimination of the limits to reproduction, the inversion of scarcity of commons, the developments in the capacity for the repository of intellectual goods have culminated in the ‘limited user rights, conditional fructus, and non-alienability’ (Boutang, 2011: 106) of intellectual goods. As a response to this “alarming” situation, we have witnessed an aggressive plan directed towards enclosing the commonality of immaterial production through IPR. To mention a few, some strict measures [i.e. laws and treaties] were set out, via the World Trade Organisation (WTA), in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), as finalised at the Marrakesh Agreement in 1994. The measures were then strengthened in Doha Development Rounds. In 1998, Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) passed in the United States, followed by the European Union Copyright Directive in 2001. The final version of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market by EU was approved on 26 March 2019. According to the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), there are currently twenty-six international intellectual laws, treaties and conventions, binding 191 member-states legally. In cognitive capitalism, nevertheless, the process of enclosure through enforcement of IPR manifests a paradox or, using Marxian terminology, a structural contradiction in two ways. First, **capital's attempts to enclose the commons through IPR in order to (re)establish hegemony over intellectual powers of production actually inhibits the development of productive forces, and thereby capital prepares its own social crisis in terms of established relations of production. Second, the enclosure through IPR curtails the business opportunities in terms of innovation, profit-making, and growth. In what follows, I will discuss these two critical points.** Marx's (1977) theory of societal transformation has three key elements which are articulated in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. 7 Human beings produce their livelihoods by working together. The way in which this production is organised becomes objectified into certain relations of production which are administered by a ruling class that exploits the people at the bottom - as in the cases of feudalist and capitalist relations of production. The ruling class then institutes a political and ideological superstructure, diffusing and imposing certain ways of thinking and living, to maintain the exploitation process. However, Marx notes, there is a tendency in human history for human beings to create new ways of producing which confront both the existing relations of production and superstructure, that is, a tendency which might result in a crisis and class struggle for the transformation of the mode of production. Harman and Brenner (2006, para. 25) recapitulates Marx's argument well: ‘the rise in the forces of production begin to change relations of production at the micro level, which then challenges the wider relations of production, the political superstructures and the ideologies of the older order [and in turn class relations], which lead to potentially revolutionary upheavals’. Marx's general theory of social transformation is articulated in his and Engels's (2004) reading of the transition from feudal mode of production to the capitalist mode of production. Marx and Engels discuss how feudal relations could not contain already developed productive forces in itself and thereby was inevitably superseded by a new relation of property, to wit capitalist relations of property. In particular, they state that: We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundations the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organisation of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder. (Marx and Engels, 2004: 9–10, emphasis added) The significant question is, then, whether the social productive forces, or rather the human, social, and subjective powers are in a process of being fostered, expanded, and developed to their fullest in a particular mode of production. To put it differently, the question is really concerned with whether the enclosure of the common via IPR contradicts with the expansion of human, social, and subjective forces in cognitive capitalism. We have argued in the first section of this article that immaterial labour performs creatively and productively only within and through the common. In a plain expression, the production process begins with an access to the common resources and, at the end of the process, provides much-enriched common which, in turn, must be open and directly accessible to be the foundation for a new cycle of production. An undisturbed accumulation of the common, in my point of view, corresponds precisely to the development of social productive forces. By immaterial production or by accumulation of the common wealth, it is meant not solely some quantitative expansion of our forces (e.g. more information, more knowledge) but also, and above all, that ‘our powers and senses increase: our powers to think, to feel, to see, to relate to one another, to love’; that is, our relational and productive qualities and capabilities (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 283). At a higher-level of abstraction, immaterial production comes to convey not the production of objects for subjects but the production of forms of life, subjectivity: the bios. Hardt and Negri reflect on immaterial production through the term of biopolitical production and put that: ‘the immaterial production … [is] the the production of subjectivity through the common and the production of common through subjectivity … [a blockage in the common] should be understood, then, as a blockage in the production of subjectivity’ (2009: 299–300). From this perspective, the enclosure of the common should be considered a structural fetter on the development and growth of human beings. In particular, **intellectual property rights act as forms of structural restraints for the expansion and development of productive forces.** They block the qualities and capabilities, that is, the very human potentiality of wage-workers. They precisely interrupt the Foucauldian circuit in which l'homme produit l'homme (man produces man). In this regard, it is fair to state that by imposing IPR, capital prepares its own social crisis in terms of established capitalist relations of production. Furthermore, the enclosure through IPR hinders the opportunities for innovation, profit-making, and growth. From the perspective of neoclassical economics, Boldrin and Levine (2002, 2010) challenge the ‘common argument [that] the presence of strong intellectual property rights spurs innovation leading to higher economic growth and increasing benefits for all’ (2002: 209). By drawing on quantitative models, they analyse the difference between property rights applied to material and immaterial goods and show that IPR constitute a monopoly, ‘intellectual monopoly’, ultimately hindering free market, competition, growth, and wealth. Again, from the perspective of neoclassical economics, Lerner examines the impact of IPR policy shifts in 60 nations over the past 150 years and finds a ‘lack of a positive impact of strengthening of patent protection on innovation’ (2009: 347), which is key for profit making and economic growth. Martin (1998) inquiries into the relationship between IPR and innovation from a different perspective. By using real-life cases, he demonstrates how big companies purchase someone else's idea to inhibit other companies from transforming this idea to an innovative product and selling it on the market as a competitor of their product. Along the same lines, Baker, Jayadev and Stiglitz's comprehensive -policy- paper argue that ‘the current global regime of intellectual property rights is inadequate in serving the purpose of development and welfare … both in developed and developing countries’ (2017: 7). They state that ‘if **the knowledge economy and the economy of ideas is to be a key part of the global economy and if static societies are to be transformed into ‘learning societies’ that are key for growth and development, there is a desperate need to rethink the current regime [of IPR]’ (2017: 7).** The famous Manchester Manifesto, signed by fifty international scholars from various disciplines, underlines ‘the significant drawbacks’ of IPR in ‘its effects on economic efficiency’ (2009: 2), especially in terms of ‘reducing competition and allowing large companies to dominate markets’ (2009: 4). My own perspective is informed by Boutang (2011, 2013) who underscores ‘the absolute and internal need for this kind of capitalism, cognitive capitalism’ to disclose, that is to say ‘to create the spaces [the commons in general] of liberty and new digital commons as a fundamental and inescapable condition for extracting value’ (Boutang, 2013: 90). He grounds his argument in the idea of ‘human pollination’. We have noted that the originality of cognitive capitalism ‘consists in capturing, within a generalised social activity, the innovative elements which produce value’ (Negri, 2008: 64). In other words, economic value depends increasingly on the pollination of “human bees”, interacting and participating within and through the common. The remarkable difference between industrial capitalism and cognitive capitalism lies in the fact that ‘the former needed to destroy the ancient commons in order to transform the independent worker into proletariat whereas the later requires disclosure and constitution of a new kind of commons (Boutang, 2013: 90–1). From the perspective of capital, therefore, the implementation of IPR blocks the common's richness, and this is another way of saying farewell to the profit opportunities offered by the knowledge society. 4. Conclusion Is the implementation of intellectual property rights a socio-economic need -as it is largely advocated in the literature? Focusing on the contemporary state of socio-economic affairs, informed by cognitive and digital turn, this article attempted to provide an autonomist Marxist critical update on the concept of intellectual property rights, and argued that the **enclosure of commons through the strict regime of intellectual property rights acts as a barrier before economic health**. By economic health, we should not understand the present-day performance of an economy identified by a set of quantitative indicators such as gross domestic product, country deficit, inflation-rate, currency rate, and so forth. According to Schumpeter, ‘capitalist performance is not even relevant for prognosis’ of capitalism's future (2010: 115). Economic health, rather, concerns the question of whether there exists a structural contradiction acting as a fetter on the development of productive forces and economic growth. In this regard, this article argued that the regime of intellectual property rights, directed towards separating workers from the ownership of new means of production, does not only curtail the actualisation of workers' potentiality and block the development of productive forces but it also curtails the socio-economic opportunities for innovation, profit-making, and growth.

#### Oppressive structures of capitalism worsen the effects of the broken system of IP protections.

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While the coronavirus (COVID-19) disease continues to destroy human lives and economies, the response to this paralyzing global pandemic has also brought to the fore the ingenuity of humanity. Within a few months of the pandemic, researchers in China, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States shared information on the genome sequence of COVID-19 to reveal the structures of key proteins that make up the new coronavirus. This particular scientific breakthrough could have taken years had these scientists not jointly collaborated by sharing findings and expertise. Furthermore, as COVID-19 devastation worsened and its global impact became known, partnerships emerged between several governments, research institutions, international organizations, private sector actors, and philanthropic institutions for the development of vaccines targeting the virus. Triumphantly, in the twelve months since COVID-19 was first detected, several vaccine candidates are being rolled out and many more are in clinical trial stages. While the response to COVID-19 has shown what can be accomplished when the world works together, it has also underscored three interrelated points. First, the neoliberal framework – including the critical role intellectual property (IP) law plays in constituting this form of civilisation – is an unsuitable model for delivering the goods needed to respond to global health emergencies. The current economic/market system does not allow for equitable responses to infectious diseases, particularly access to sufficient medical and health resources. This inequity was obvious in the early days of the pandemic when test kits, PPEs, and ventilation machines were being distributed on the basis of who could pay the most rather than who needed them the most. Second, the beggar-thy-neighbor response currently adopted by developed countries hurts everyone because failing to stop the spread of the virus globally allows more mutations, which makes existing vaccines less effective. As COVID-19 has shown, no one is safe until everyone is safe. Yet, despite this warning, the hoarding of vaccines by developed countries continues unabated and speaks to the wider racist capitalist system we live in. If anything, this crude accumulation of vaccines reinforces North-South economic and political dominance and marks, as Onur Ince observes, the conceptual locus of political violence operative in the global genealogy of capitalism. Third, while COVID-19 may endanger us all, it is far more costly to some than others. Numerous reports have shown how black and brown people are most impacted by the pandemic. In the United States, for example, indigenous Americans have the highest COVID-19 mortality rates nationwide while African American communities have COVID-19 mortality that is 2.3 times higher than the rate for Asians and Latinxs, and 2.6 times higher than the rate for Whites. Similar data is also emerging in the UK where people from black and minority ethnic groups are at greater risk of dying from coronavirus. This means those groups suffer higher loss of life compared to other racial groups due to inequities in healthcare access as well as higher rate of pre-existing conditions. In other parts of the world, the most vulnerable and the economically marginalized such as those working in the informal sector and living in shanty towns are feeling the effects of the pandemic the most. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 70 per cent of domestic workers have been affected by the pandemic where most have stopped receiving income. In Ghana, residents of slums at Old Fadama – a suburb in Accra – were made homeless when the government demolished their homes. The ensuing homelessness means there is little to no space of observing social distancing rules, access to running water and access to other resources to practice basic hygiene. Meanwhile in India, the pandemic has unsurprisingly hit the country along caste lines where the Dalits are most impacted because many are poor and have limited access to healthcare. As Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw reminds us, the high number of minority deaths is not new. Rather, this crisis simply amplified racism and other forms of structural inequality as a pre-existing condition – an intersectional issue – where those disproportionately hurt are those who are already structurally marginalized. Thus, while recognising a broken global IP regime that triggered the scramble for vaccines, the racialized impact of the pandemic cannot be ignored, and it points to the entangled roots of race and capitalism.

#### Capitalism is unsustainable and guarantees market collapse and extinction – multiple impact scenarios – capital is the greatest threat to humanity and is an a priori impact under any framework

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Capitalism has always been an improbable social formation, full of conflicts and contradictions, therefore permanently unstable and in flux, and highly conditional on historically contingent and precarious supportive as well as constraining events and institutions. Capitalist society may be described in shorthand as a 'progressive' society in the sense of Adam Smith 1 and the enlightenment, a society that has coupled its 'progress' to the continuous and unlimited production and accumulation of productive capital, effected through a conversion, by means of the invisible hand of the market and the visible hand of the state, of the private vice of material greed into a public benefit.' Capitalism promises infinite growth of commodified material wealth in a finite world, by conjoining itself with modern science and technology, making capitalist society the first industrial society, and through unending expansion of free, in the sense of contestable, risky markets, on the coat-tails of a hegemonic carrier state and its market -opening policies both domestically and internationally. 3 As a version of industrial society, capitalist society is distinguished by the fact that its collective productive capital is accumulated in the hands of a minority of its members who enjoy the legal privilege, in the form of rights of private property, to dispose of such capital in any way they see fit, including letting it sit idle or transferring it abroad. One implication of this is that the vast majority of the members of a capitalist society must work under the direction, however mediated, of the private owners of the tools they need to provide for themselves, and on terms set by those owners in line with their desire to maximize the rate of increase of their capital. Motivating non-owners to do so- to work hard and diligently in the interest of the owners - requires artful devices - sticks and carrots of the most diverse sorts that are never certain to function - that have to be continuously reinvented as capitalist progress continuously renders them obsolescent. The tensions and contradictions within the capitalist political-economic configuration make for an ever-present possibility of structural breakdown and social crisis. Economic and social stability under modern capitalism must be secured on a background of systemic restlessness4 produced by competition and expansion, a difficult balancing act with a constantly uncertain outcome. Its success is contingent on, among other things, the timely appearance of a new technological paradigm or the development of social needs and values complementing changing requirements of continued economic growth. For example, for the vast majority of its members, a capitalist society must manage to convert their ever-present fear of being cut out of the productive process, because of economic or technological restructuring, into acceptance of the highly unequal distribution of wealth and power generated by the capitalist economy and a belief in the legitimacy of capitalism as a social order. For this, highly complicated and inevitably fragile institutional and ideological provisions arc necessary. The same holds true for the conversion of insecure workers - kept insecure to make them obedient workers - into confident consumers happily discharging their consumerist social obligations even in the face of the fundamental uncertainty oflabour markets and employment.' In light of the inherent instability of modern societies founded upon and dynamically shaped by a capitalist economy, it is small wonder that theories of capitalism, from the time the concept was first used in the early 1800s in Germany" and the mid-1800s in England/ were always also theories of crisis. This holds not just for Marx and Engels but also for writers like Ricardo, Mill, Sombart, Keynes, Hilferding, Polanyi and Schumpeter, all of whom expected one way or other to see the end of capitalism during their lifetime." What kind of crisis was expected to finish capitalism off differed with time and authors' theoretical priors; structuralist theories of death by overproduction or underconsumption, or by a tendency of the rate of profit to fall (Marx), coexisted with predictions of saturation of needs and markets (Keynes), of rising resistance to further commodification oflife and society (Polanyi), of exhaustion of new land and new labour available for colonization in a literal as well as figurative sense (Luxemburg), of technological stagnation (Kondratieff), financial-political organization of monopolistic corporations suspending liberal markets (Hilferding), bureaucratic suppression of entrepreneurialism aided by a worldwide trahison des clercs (Weber, Schumpeter, Hayek) etc., etc." While none of these theories came true as imagined, most of them were not entirely false either. In fact, the history of modern capitalism can be written as a succession of crises that capitalism survived only at the price of deep transformations of its economic and social institutions, saving it from bankruptcy in unforeseeable and often unintended ways. Seen this way, that the capitalist order still exists may well appear less impressive than that it existed so often on the brink of collapse and had continuously to change, frequently depending on contingent exogenous supports that it was unable to mobilize endogenously. The fact that capitalism has, until now, managed to outlive all predictions of its impending death, need not mean that it will forever be able to do so; there is no inductive proof here, and we cannot rule out the possibility that, next time, whatever cavalry capitalism may require for its rescue may fail to show up. A short recapitulation of the history of modern capitalism serves to illustrate this point. 10 Liberal capitalism in the nineteenth century was confronted by a revolutionary labour movement that needed to be politically tamed by a complex combination of repression and co-optation, including democratic power sharing and social reform. In the early twentieth century, capitalism was commandeered to serve national interests in international wars, thereby converting it into a public utility under the planning regimes of a new war economy, as private property and the invisible hand of the market seemed insufficient for the provision of the collective capacities countries needed to prevail in international hostilities. After the First World War, restoration of a liberal-capitalist economy failed to produce a viable social order and had to give way in large parts of the industrial world to either Communism or Fascism, while in the core countries of what was to become 'the West' liberal capitalism was gradually succeeded, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, by Keynesian, state-administered capitalism. Out of this grew the democratic welfare-state capitalism of the three post-war decades, with hindsight the only period in which economic growth and social and political stability, achieved through democracy, coexisted under capitalism, at least in the OECD world where capitalism came to be awarded the epithet, 'advanced'. In the 1970s, however, what had with hindsight been called the 'post-war settlement' of social-democratic capitalism began to disintegrate, gradually and imperceptibly at first but increasingly punctuated by successive, ever more severe crises of both the capitalist economy and the social and political institutions embedding, that is, supporting as well as containing it. This was the period of both intensifying crisis and deep transformation when 'late capitalism', as impressively described by Werner Sombart in the 1920s, 11 gave way to neoliberalism. Crisis Theory Redux Today, after the watershed of the financial crisis of 2008, critical and indeed crisis-theoretical reflection on the prospects of capitalism and its society is again en vogue. Does Capitalism Have a Future? is the title of a book published in 2013 by five outstanding social scientists: Immanuel Wallerstein, Randall Collins, Michael Mann, Georgi Derluguian and Craig Calhoun. Apart from the introduction and the conclusion, which are collectively authored, the contributors present their views in separate chapters, and this could not be otherwise since they differ widely. Still, all five share the conviction that, as they state in the introduction, 'something big looms on the horizon: a structural crisis much bigger than the recent Great Recession, which might in retrospect seem only a prologue to a period of deeper troubles and transformations: 12 On what is causing this crisis, however, and how it will end, there is substantial disagreement- which, with authors of this calibre, may be taken as a sign of the multiple uncertainties and possibilities inherent in the present condition of the capitalist political economy. To give an impression of how leading theorists may differ when trying to imagine the future of capitalism today, I will at some length review the prospects and predictions put forward in the book. A comparatively conventional crisis theory is probably the one offered by Wallerstein (pp. 9-35), who locates contemporary capitalism at the bottom of a Kondratieff cycle (Kondratieff B) with no prospect of a new (Kondratieff A) upturn. This is said to be due to a 'structural crisis' that began in the 1970s, as a result of which 'capitalists may no longer find capitalism rewarding'. Two broad causes are given, one a set of long-term trends 'ending the endless accumulation of capital', the other the demise, after the 'world revolution of 1968', of the 'dominance of centrist liberals of the geoculture' (p. 21 ). Structural trends include the exhaustion of virgin lands and the resulting necessity of environmental repair work, growing resource shortages, and the increasing need for public infrastructure. All of this costs money, and so does the pacification of a proliferating mass of discontented workers and the unemployed. Concerning global hegemony, Wallerstein points to what he considers the final decline of the U.S.-centred world order, in military and economic as well as ideological terms. Rising costs of doing business combine with global disorder to make restoration of a stable capitalist world system impossible. Instead Wallerstein foresees 'an ever-tighter gridlock of the system. Gridlock will in turn result in ever-wilder fluctuations, and will consequently make short-term predictions - both economic and political - ever more unreliable. And this in turn will aggravate ... popular fears and alienation. It is a negative cycle' (p. 32). For the near future Wallerstein expects a global political confrontation between defenders and opponents of the capitalist order, in his suggestive terms: between the forces of Davos and of Porto Alegre. Their final battle 'about the successor system' (p. 35) is currently fomenting. Its outcome, according to Wallerstein, is unpredictable, although 'we can feel sure that one side or the other will win out in the coming decades, and a new reasonably stable world-system (or set of world-systems) will be established: Much less pessimistic, or less optimistic from the perspective of those who would like to see capitalism dose down, is Craig Calhoun, who finds prospects of reform and renewal in what he, too, considers a deep and potentially final crisis (pp. 131-61). Calhoun assumes that there is still time for political intervention to save capitalism, as there was in the past, perhaps with the help of a 'sufficiently enlightened faction of capitalists' (p. 2). But he also believes 'a centralized socialist economy' to be possible, and even more so 'Chinese-style state capitalism': 'Markets can exist in the future even while specifically capitalist modes of property and finance have declined' (p. 3). Far more than Wallerstein, Calhoun is reluctant when it comes to prediction (for a summary of his view see pp. 158-61 ). His chapter offers a list of internal contradictions and possible external disruptions threatening the stability of capitalism, and points out a wide range of alternative outcomes. Like Wallerstein, Calhoun attributes particular significance to the international system, where he anticipates the emergence of a plurality of more or less capitalist political-economic regimes, with the attendant problems and pitfalls of coordination and competition. While he does not rule out a 'large-scale, more or less simultaneous collapse of capitalist markets ... not only bringing economic upheaval but also upending political and social institutions' (p. 161), Calhoun believes in the possibility of states, corporations and social movements re-establishing effective governance for a transformative renewal of capitalism. To quote, The capitalist order is a very large-scale, highly complex system. The events of the last forty years have deeply disrupted the institutions that kept capitalism relatively well organized through the postwar period. Efforts to repair or replace these will change the system, just as new technologies and new business and financial practices may. Even a successful renewal of capitalism will transform it ... The question is whether change will be adequate to manage systemic risks and fend off external threats. And if not, will there be widespread devastation before a new order emerges? (p. 161) Even more agnostic on the future of capitalism is Michael Mann ('The End May Be Nigh, But for Whom?: pp. 71-97). Mann begins by reminding his readers that in his 'general model of human society', he does 'not conceive of societies as systems but as multiple, overlapping networks of interaction, of which four networks - ideological, economic, military and political power relations - are the most important. Geopolitical relations can be added to the four .. : Mann continues: Each of these four or five sources of power may have an internal logic or tendency of development, so that it might be possible, for example, to identify tendencies toward equilibrium, cycles, or contradictions within capitalism, just as one might identify comparable tendencies within the other sources of social power. (p. 72) Interactions between the networks, Mann points out, are frequent but not systematic, meaning that 'once we admit the importance of such interactions we are into a more complex and uncertain world in which the development of capitalism, for example, is also influenced by ideologies, wars and states' (p. 73). Mann adds to this the possibility of uneven development across geographical space and the likelihood of irrational behaviour interfering with rational calculations of interest, even of the interest in survival. To demonstrate the importance of contingent events and of cycles other than those envisaged in the Wallerstein-Kondratieff model of history, Mann discusses the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession of 2008. He then proceeds to demonstrate how his approach speaks to the future, first of U.S. hegemony and second of 'capitalist markets'. As to the former, Mann (pp. 83-4) offers the standard list of American weaknesses, both domestic and international, from economic decline to political anomy to an increasingly less effective military- weaknesses that 'might bring America down' although 'we cannot know for sure: Even if U.S. hegemony were to end, however, 'this need not cause a systemic crisis of capitalism'. What may instead happen is a shift of economic power 'from the old West to the successfully developing Rest of the world, including most of Asia. This would result in a sharing of economic power between the United States, the European Union and (some of) the BRICS, as a consequence of which 'the capitalism of the medium term is likely to be more statist' (p. 86). Concerning 'capitalist markets' (pp. 86-7), Mann believes, pace Wallerstein, that there is still enough new land to conquer and enough demand to discover and invent, to allow for both extensive and intensive growth. Also, technological fixes may appear any time for all sorts of problems, and in any case it is the working class and revolutionary socialism, much more than capitalism, for which 'the end is nigh: In fact, if growth rates were to fall as predicted by some, the outcome might be a stable low-growth capitalism, with considerable ecological benefits. In this scenario, 'the future of the left is likely to be at most reformist social democracy or liberalism. Employers and workers will continue to struggle over the mundane injustices of capitalist employment [ ... ] and their likely outcome will be compromise and reform .. .' Still, Mann ends on a considerably less sanguine note, naming two big crises that he considers possible, and one of them probable - crises in which capitalism would go under although they would not be crises of capitalism, or of capitalism alone, since capitalism would only perish as a result of the destruction of all human civilization. One such scenario would be nuclear war, started by collective human irrationality, the other an ecological catastrophe resulting from 'escalating climate change'. In the latter case (pp. 93ff.), capitalism figures - together with the nation state and with 'citizen rights', defined as entitlements to unlimited consumption - as one of three 'triumphs of the modern period' that happen to be ecologically unsustainable. 'All three triumphs would have to be challenged for the sake of a rather abstract future, which is a very tall order, perhaps not achievable' (p. 95). While related to capitalism, ecological disaster would spring from 'a causal chain bigger than capitalism' (p. 97). However, 'policy decisions matter considerably', and 'humanity is in principle free to choose between better or worse future scenarios- and so ultimately the future is unpredictable' (p. 97). The most straightforward theory of capitalist crisis in the book is offered by Randall Collins (pp. 37-69) - a theory he correctly characterizes as a 'stripped-down version of (a] fundamental insight that Marx and Engels had formulated already in the 1840s' (p. 38). That insight, as adapted by Collins, is that capitalism is subject to 'a long-term structural weakness: namely 'the technological displacement of labor by machinery' (p. 37). Collins is entirely unapologetic for his strictly structuralist approach, even more structuralist than Wallerstein's, as well as his mono-factorial technological determinism. In fact, he is convinced that 'technological displacement of labor' will have finished capitalism, with or without revolutionary violence, by the middle of this century - earlier than it would be brought down by the, in principle, equally destructive and definitive ecological crisis, and more reliably than by comparatively difficult-to-predict financial bubbles. 'Stripped-down' Collins's late-Marxist structuralism is, among other things, because unlike Marx in his corresponding theorem of a secular decline of the rate of profit, Collins fails to hedge his prediction with a list of countervailing factors,' 3 as he believes capitalism to have run out of whatever saving graces may in the past have retarded its demise. Collins does allow for Mann's and Calhoun's non-Marxist, 'Weberian' influences on the course of history, but only as secondary forces modifying the way the fundamental structural trend that drives the history of capitalism from below will work itself out. Global unevenness of development, dimensions of conflict that are not capitalism-related, war and ecological pressures may or may not accelerate the crisis of the capitalist labour market and employment system; they cannot, however, suspend or avert it. What exactly does this crisis consist of? While labour has gradually been replaced by technology for the past two hundred years, with the rise of information technology and, in the very near future, artificial intelligence, that process is currently reaching its apogee, in at least two respects: first, it has vastly accelerated, and second, having in the second half of the twentieth century destroyed the manual working class, it is now attacking and about to destroy the middle class as well - in other words, the new petty bourgeoisie that is the very carrier of the neocapitalist and neoliberal lifestyle of 'hard work and hard play', of careerism-cum-consumerism, which, as will be discussed infra, may indeed be considered the indispensable cultural foundation of contemporary capitalism's society. What Collins sees coming is a rapid educational work by machinery intelligent enough even to design and create new, more advanced machinery. Electronicization will do to the middle class what mechanization has done to the working class, and it will do it much faster. The result will be unemployment in the order of 50 to 70 per cent by the middle of the century, hitting those who had hoped, by way of expensive education and disciplined job performance (in return for stagnant or declining wages), to escape the threat of redundancy attendant on the working classes. The benefits, meanwhile, will go to 'a tiny capitalist class of robot owners' who will become immeasurably rich. The drawback for them is, however, that they will increasingly find that their product 'cannot be sold because too few persons have enough income to buy it. Extrapolating this underlying tendency', Collins writes, 'Marx and Engels predicted the downfall of capitalism and its replacement with socialism' (p. 39), and this is what Collins also predicts. Collins's theory is most original where he undertakes to explain why technological displacement is only now about to finish capitalism when it had not succeeded in doing so in the past. Following in Marx's footsteps, he lists five 'escapes' that have hitherto saved capitalism from self-destruction, and then proceeds to show why they won't save it any more. They include the growth of new jobs and entire sectors compensating for employment losses caused by technological progress (employment in artificial intelligence will be miniscule, especially once robots begin to design and build other robots); the expansion of markets (which this time will primarily be labour markets in middle-class occupations, globally unified by information technology, enabling global competition among educated job seekers); the growth of finance, both as a source of income ('speculation') and as an industry (which cannot possibly balance the loss of employment caused by new technology, and of income caused by unemployment, also because computerization will make workers in large segments of the financial industry redundant); government employment replacing employment in the private sector (improbable because of the fiscal crisis of the state, and in any case requiring ultimately 'a revolutionary overturn of the property system' [p. 51]); and the use of education as a buffer to keep labour out of employment, making it a form of 'hidden Keynesian ism' while resulting in 'credential inflation' and 'grade inflation' (which for Collins is the path most probably taken, although ultimately it will prove equally futile as the others, as a result of demoralization within educational institutions and problems of financing, both public and private). All five escapes closed, there is no way society can prevent capitalism from causing accelerated displacement of labour and the attendant stark economic and social inequalities. Some sort of socialism, so Collins concludes, will finally have to take capitalism's place. What precisely it will look like, and what will come after socialism or with it, Collins leaves open, and he is equally agnostic on the exact mode of the transition. Revolutionary the change will be - but whether it will be a violent social revolution that will end capitalism or a peaceful institutional revolution accomplished under political leadership cannot be known beforehand. Heavy taxation of the super-rich for extended public employment or a guaranteed basic income for everyone, with equal distribution and strict rationing of very limited working hours by more or less dictatorial means a la Keynes' 4 - we are free to speculate on this as Collins's 'stripped-down Marxism' does not generate predictions as to what kind of society will emerge once capitalism will have run its course. Only one thing is certain: that capitalism will end, and much sooner than one may have thought. Something of an outlier in the book's suite of chapters is the contribution by Georgi Derluguian, who gives a fascinating inside account of the decline and eventual demise of Communism, in particular Soviet Communism (pp. 99-129). The chapter is of interest because of its speculations on the differences from and the potential parallels with a potential end of capitalism. As to the differences, Derluguian makes much of the fact that Soviet Communism was from early on embedded in the 'hostile geopolitics' (p. 110) of a 'capitalist world-system' ( 111). This linked its fate inseparably to that of the Soviet Union as an economically and strategically overextended multinational state. That state turned out to be unsustainable in the longer term, especially after the end of Stalinist despotism. By then the peculiar class structure of Soviet Communism gave rise to a domestic social compromise that, much unlike American capitalism, included political inertia and economic stagnation. The result was pervasive discontent on the part of a new generation of cultural, technocratic and scientific elites socialized in the revolutionary era of the late 1960s. Also, over-centralization made the state-based political economy of Soviet Communism vulnerable to regional and ethnic separatism, while the global capitalism surrounding it provided resentful opponents as well as opportunistic apparatchiks with a template of a preferable order, one in which the latter could ultimately establish themselves as self-made capitalist oligarchs. Contemporary capitalism, of course, is much less dependent on the geopolitical good fortunes of a single imperial state, although the role of the United States in this respect must not be underestimated. More importantly, capitalism is not exposed to pressure from an alternative political-economic model, assuming that Islamic economic doctrine will for a foreseeable future remain less than attractive even and precisely to Islamic elites (who are deeply integrated in the capitalist global economy). Where the two systems may, however, come to resemble each other is in their internal political disorder engendered by institutional and economic decline. When the Soviet Union lost its 'state integrity', Derluguian writes, this 'undermined all modern institutions and therefore disabled collective action at practically any level above family and crony networks. This condition became self-perpetuating' (p. 122). One consequence was that the ruling bureaucracies reacted 'with more panic than outright violence' when confronted by 'mass civic mobilizations like the 1968 Prague Spring and the Soviet perestroika at its height in 1989', while at the same time 'the insurgent movements ... failed to exploit the momentous disorganization in the ranks of dominant classes' (p. 129). For different reasons and under different circumstances, a similar weakness of collective agency, due to de-institutionalization and creating comparable uncertainty among both champions and challengers of the old order, might shape a future transition from capitalism to post-capitalism, pitting against each other fragmented social movements on the one hand and disoriented political-economic elites on the other. My own view builds on all five contributors but differs from each of them. I take the diversity of theories on what all agree is a severe crisis of capitalism and capitalist society as an indication of contemporary capitalism having entered a period of deep indeterminacy - a period in which unexpected things can happen any time and knowledgeable observers can legitimately disagree on what will happen, due to long-valid causal relations having become historically obsolete. In other words, I interpret the coexistence of a shared sense of crisis with diverging concepts of the nature of that crisis as an indication that traditional economic and sociological theories have today lost much of their predictive power. As I will point out in more detail, below, I see this as a result, but also as a cause, of a destruction of collective agency in the course of capitalist development, equally affecting Wallerstein's Davos and Porto Alegre people and resulting in a social context beset with unintended and unanticipated consequences of purposive, but in its effects increasingly unpredictable, social action. '5 Moreover, rather than picking one of the various scenarios of the crisis and privilege it over the others, I suggest that they all, or most of them, may be aggregated into a diagnosis of multi-morbidity in which different disorders coexist and, more often than not, reinforce each other. Capitalism, as pointed out at the beginning, was always a fragile and improbable order and for its survival depended on ongoing repair work. Today, however, too many frailties have become simultaneously acute while too many remedies have been exhausted or destroyed. The end of capitalism can then be imagined as a death from a thousand cuts, or from a multiplicity of infirmities each of which will be all the more untreatable as all will demand treatment at the same time. As will become apparent, I do not believe that any of the potentially stabilizing forces mentioned by Mann and Calhoun, be it regime pluralism, regional diversity and uneven development, political reform, or independent crisis cycles, will be strong enough to neutralize the syndrome of accumulated weaknesses that characterize contemporary capitalism. No effective opposition being left, and no practicable successor model waiting in the wings of history, capitalism's accumulation of defects, alongside its accumulation of capital, may be seen, with Collins, '6 as an entirely endogenous dynamic of self-destruction, following an evolutionary logic moulded in its expression but not suspended by contingent and coincidental events, along a historical trajectory from early liberal via state-administered to neoliberal capitalism, which culminated for the time being in the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath. For the decline of capitalism to continue, that is to say, no revolutionary alternative is required, and certainly no masterplan of a better society displacing capitalism. Contemporary capitalism is vanishing on its own, collapsing from internal contradictions, and not least as a result of having vanquished its enemies - who, as noted, have often rescued capitalism from itself by forcing it to assume a new form. What comes after capitalism in its final crisis, now under way, is, I suggest, not socialism or some other defined social order, but a lasting interregnum - no new world system equilibrium ala Wallerstein, but a prolonged period of social entropy, or disorder (and precisely for this reason a period of uncertainty and indeterminacy). It is an interesting problem for sociological theory whether and how a society can turn for a significant length of time into less than a society, a post-social society as it were, or a society lite, until it may or may not recover and again become a society in the full meaning of the term. ' 7 I suggest that one can attain a conceptual fix on this by drawing liberally on a famous article by David Lockwood'' to distinguish between system integration and social integration, or integration at the macro and micro levels of society. An interregnum would then be defined as a breakdown of system integration at the macro level, depriving individuals at the micro level of institutional structuring and collective support, and shifting the burden of ordering social life, of providing it with a modicum of security and stability, to individuals themselves and such social arrangements as they can create on their own. A society in interregnum, in other words, would be a de-institutionalized or under-institutionalized society, one in which expectations can be stabilized only for a short time by local improvisation, and which for this very reason is essentially ungovernable. Contemporary capitalism, then, would appear to be a society whose system integration is critically and irremediably weakened, so that the continuation of capital accumulation - for an intermediate period of uncertain duration - becomes solely dependent on the opportunism of collectively incapacitated individualized individuals, as they struggle to protect themselves from looming accidents and structural pressures on their social and economic status. Undergoverned and undermanaged, the social world of the post-capitalist interregnum, in the wake of neoliberal capitalism having cleared away states, governments, borders, trade unions and other moderating forces, can at any time be hit by disaster; for example, bubbles imploding or violence penetrating from a collapsing periphery into the centre. With individuals deprived of collective defences and left to their own devices, what remains of a social order hinges on the motivation of individuals to cooperate with other individuals on an ad hoc basis, driven by fear and greed and by elementary interests in individual survival. Society having lost the ability to provide its members with effective protection and proven templates for social action and social existence, individuals have only themselves to rely on while social order depends on the weakest possible mode of social integration, Zweckrationalitiit. As pointed out in Chapter 1 of this book, and partly elaborated in the rest of this introduction, I anchor this condition in a variety of interrelated developments, such as declining growth intensifying distributional conflict; the rising inequality that results from this; vanishing macroeconomic manageability, as manifested in, among other things, steadily growing indebtedness, a pumped-up money supply; and the ever-present possibility of another economic breakdown;'9 the suspension of post-war capitalism's engine of social progress, democracy, and the associated rise of oligarchic rule; the dwindling capacity of governments and the systemic inability of governance to limit the commodification of labour, nature and money; the omnipresence of corruption of all sorts, in response to intensified competition in winner-take-all markets with unlimited opportunities for self-enrichment; the erosion of public infrastructures and collective benefits in the course of commodification and privatization; the failure after 1989 of capitalism's host nation, the United States, to build and maintain a stable global order; etc., etc. These and other developments, I suggest, have resulted in widespread cynicism governing economic life, for a long time if not forever ruling out a recovery of normative legitimacy for capitalism as a just society offering equal opportunities for individual progress- a legitimacy that capitalism would need to draw on in critical moments - and founding social integration on collective resignation as the last remaining pillar of the capitalist social order, or disorder. 20

#### Additionally, the system of capital currently demarcates global zones of death subject to killings on a mass scale. This continual dehumanization is part and parcel of capital’s propensity to destroy value to life.

**Balibar 04** Etienne Balibar. Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Paris and Distinguished Professor of Humanities at University of California-Irvine. We, The People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. 2004. pp. 126-129 [This evidence has been gender-modified]

I am aware of all these difficulties, but I would maintain that a reality lies behind the notion of something unprecedented.” Perhaps it is simply the fact that a number of heterogeneous methods or processes of extermination (by which I mean eliminating masses of individuals inasmuch as they belong to objective or subjective groups) have themselves become “globalized,” that is, operate in a similar manner everywhere in the world at the same time, and so progressively form a “chain,” giving full reality to what E. P. Thompson anticipated twenty years ago with the name “exterminism.”’3 In this series of connected processes, we must include, precisely because they are heterogeneous—they do not have one and the same “cause,” but they produce cumulative effects: 1. Wars (both “civil” and “foreign,” a distinction that is not easy to draw in many cases, such as Yugoslavia or Chechnya). 2. Communal rioting, with ethnic and/or religious ideologies of “cleansing.” 3. Famines and other kinds of “absolute” poverty produced by the ruin of traditional or nontraditional economies. 4. Seemingly “natural” catastrophes, which in fact are killing on a mass scale because they are overdetermined by social, economic, and political structures, such as pandemics (for example, the difference in the distribution of AIDS and the possibilities of treatment between Europe and North America on one side, Africa and some parts of Asia on the other), drought, floods, or earthquakes in the absence of developed civil protection. In the end it would be my suggestion that the “globalization” of various kinds of extreme violence has produced a growing division of the “globalized” world into life zones and death zones. Between these zones (which indeed are intricate and frequently reproduced within the boundaries of a single country or city) there exists a decisive and fragile superborder, which raises fears and concerns about the unity and division of [hu]mankind—something like a global and local “enmity line,” like the “amity line” that existed in the beginning of the modern European seizure of the world.’4 It is this superborder, this enmity line, that becomes at the same time an object of permanent show and a hot place for intervention but also for nonintervention. We might discuss whether the most worrying aspect of present international politics is “humanitarian intervention” or “generalized nonintervention,” or one coming after the other. Should We Consider Extreme Violence to Be “Rational” or “Functional” from the Point of View of Market Capitalism (the “Liberal Economy”)? This is a very difficult question—in fact, I think it is the most difficult question—but it cannot be avoided; hence it is also the most intellectually challenging. Again, we should warn against a paralogism that is only too obvious but nonetheless frequent: that of mistaking consequences for goals or purposes. (But is it really possible to discuss social systems in terms of purposes? On the other hand, can we avoid reflecting on the immanent ends, or “logic,” of a structure such as capitalism?) It seems to me, very schematically, that the difficulty arises from the two opposite “global effects” that derive from the emergence of a chain of mass violence—as compared, for example, with what Marx called primitive accumulation when he described the creation of the preconditions for capitalist accumulation in terms of the violent suppression of the poor. One kind of effect is simply to generalize material and moral insecurity for millions of potential workers, that is, to induce a massive proletarianization or reproletarianization (a new phase of proletarianization that crucially involves a return of many to the proletarian condition from which they had more or less escaped, given that insecurity is precisely the heart of the “proletarian condition”). This process is contemporary with an increased mobility of capital and also humans, and so it takes place across borders. But, seen historically, it can also be distributed among several political varieties: 1. In the “North,” it involves a partial or deep dismantling of the social policies and the institutions of social citizenship created by the welfare state, what I call the “national social state,” and therefore also a violent transition from welfare to workfare, from the social state to the penal state (the United States showing the way in this respect, as was convincingly argued in a recent essay by Loic Wacquant).’5 2. In the “South,” it involves destroying and inverting the “developmental” programs and policies, which admittedly did not suffice to produce the desired “takeoff’ but indicated a way to resist impoverishment. 3. In the “semiperiphery,” to borrow Immanuel Wallerstein’s category, it was connected with the collapse of the dictatorial structure called “real existing socialism,” which was based on scarcity and corruption, but again kept the polarization of riches and poverty within certain limits. Let me suggest that a common formal feature of all these processes resulting in the reproletarianization of the labor force is the fact that they suppress or minimize the forms and possibilities of representation of the subaltern within the state apparatus itself, or, if you prefer, the possibilities of more or less effective counterpower. With this remark I want to emphasize the political aspect of processes that, in the first instance, seem to be mainly “economic.” This political aspect, I think, is even more decisive when we turn to the other scene, the other kind of result produced by massive violence, although the mechanism here is extremely mysterious. Mysterious but real, unquestionably. I am thinking of a much more destructive tendency, destructive not of welfare or traditional ways of life, but of the social bond itself and, in the end, of “bare life.”’6 Let us think of Michel Foucault, who used to oppose two kinds of politics: “Let live” and “let die.”’7 In the face of the cumulative effects of different forms of extreme violence or cruelty that are displayed in what I called the “death zones” of humanity, we are led to admit that the current mode of production and reproduction has become a mode of production for elimination, a reproduction of populations that are not likely to be productively used or exploited but are always already superfluous, and therefore can be only eliminated either through “political” or “natural” means—what some Latin American sociologists provocatively call poblacion chatarra, “garbage humans,” to be “thrown” away, out of the global city.’6 If this is the case, the question arises once again: what is the rationality of that? Or do we face an absolute triumph of irrationality? My suggestion would be: it is economically irrational (because it amounts to a limitation of the scale of accumulation), but it is politically rational—or, better said, it can be interpreted in political terms. The fact is that history does not move simply in a circle, the circular pattern of successive phases of accumulation. Economic and political class struggles have already taken place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the result of limiting the possibilities of exploitation, creating a balance of forces, and this event remains, so to speak, in the “memory” of the system. The system (and probably also some of its theoreticians and politicians) “knows” that there is no exploitation without class struggles, no class struggles without organization and representation of the exploited, no representation and organization without a tendency toward political and social citizenship. This is precisely what current capitalism cannot afford: there is no possibility of a “global social state” corresponding to the “national social states” in some parts of the world during the last century. I mean, there is no political possibility. Therefore there is political resistance, very violent indeed, to every move in that direction. Technological revolutions provide a positive but insufficient condition for the deproletarianization of the actual or potential labor force. This time, direct political repression may also be insufficient. Elimination or exter-mination has to take place, “passive,” if possible, “active” if necessary; mutual elimination is “best,” but it has to be encouraged from outside. This is what allows me to suggest (and it already takes me to my third question) that if the “economy of global violence” is not functional (because its immanent goals are indeed contradictory), it remains in a sense teleological: the “same” populations are massively targeted (or the reverse: those populations that are targeted become progressively assimilated, they look “the same”). They are qualitatively “deterritorialized,” as Gilles Deleuze would say, in an intensive rather than extensive sense: they “live” on the edge of the city, under permanent threat of elimination; but also, conversely, they live and are perceived as “nomads,” even when they are fixed in their homelands, that is, their mere existence, their quantity, their movements, their virtual claims of rights and citizenship are perceived as a threat for “civilization.” In the End, Does “Extreme Violence” Form a “Global System”? Violence can be highly “unpolitical”—this is what I wanted to suggest— but still form a system or be considered “systematic” if its various forms reinforce each other, if they contribute to creating the conditions for their succession and encroachment, if in the end they build a chain of “human(itarian) catastrophes” where actions to prevent the spread of cruelty and extermination, or simply limit their effects, are systematically obstructed. This teleology without an end is exactly what I suggested calling, in the most objective manner, “preventive counterrevolution” or, better perhaps, “preventive counterinsurrection.” It is only seemingly “Hobbesian,” since the weapon used against a “war of all against all” is another kind of war (Le Monde recently spoke about Colombia in terms of “a war against society” waged by the state and the Mafiosi together).’9 It is politics as antipolitics, but it appears as a system because of the many connections between the heterogeneous forms of violence (arms trade indispensable to state budgets with corruption; corruption with criminality; drug, organ, and modern slave trade with dictatorships; dictatorships with civil wars and terror); and perhaps also, last but not least, because there is a politics of extreme violence that confuses all the forms to erect the figure of “evil” (humanitarian intervention sometimes participates in that), and because there is an economics of extreme violence, which makes both coverage and intervention sources of profitable business. I spoke of a division between zones of life and zones of death, with a fragile line of demarcation. It was tantamount to speaking of the “totalitarian” aspects of globalization. But globalization is clearly not only that. At the moment at which humankind becomes economically and, to some extent, culturally “united,” it is violently divided “biopolitically.” A politics of civility (or a politics of human rights) can be either the imaginary substitute of the destroyed unity, or the set of initiatives that reintroduce everywhere, and particularly on the borderlines themselves, the issue of equality, the horizon of political action.

### Advocacy

#### Thus we defend: The member nations of the WTO ought to reduce intellectual property protections on medicines. CX checks any T or theory interps as there are infinite things I could spec/violate, making it impossible to verify everything – if a shell is unchecked, grant me an auto I-meet

#### The resolution is a good idea, but you can and should not separate policy proposals from their broader framework. Capital and the state have become almost inseparable, and public debates serve to reify the role of neoliberalism in modern society and rhetorically insulate it from critique. Therefore, you should evaluate the 1AC as part and parcel of a holistic rhetorical intervention in a curriculum maintained and overrun by neoliberal ideology.

#### Our alternative is a revolutionary working-class pedagogy. We present resistance in the material lived realities of the oppressed - doing so activates a form of class struggle that is necessary to disrupt the neoliberalization of higher education. Furthermore, our framework is key to create revolutionary spaces to push back against the sanitized reality perpetuated by capitalism — surrendering to capitalism’s lies makes unending violence and inequality inevitable

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One centerpiece of a revolutionary working-class pedagogy is engaging in ideology critique in light of understanding the unseen grammar of commodity logic that serves as the regulatory lexicon of everyday life. Such a pedagogy involves struggle over the production of meaning, a struggle that would enable marginalized social groups to name, identify, and take initial steps to transform the sources of their oppression and exploitation (McLaren, 1998a). It would also encourage them to analyze the myriad ways in which asymmetrical relations of power are ideologically concealed by the dominant discourses of equality, difference, and freedom (Giroux & McLaren, 1986). Although students are admittedly more than unconscious bearers of social structures, we are cognizant of the power of objective social structures to engineer complicity among both students and teachers in relations of exploitation and oppression. Consequently, a revolutionary working-class pedagogy stresses the importance of acquiring a critical literacy—where literacy is defined as a practice of reflecting, analyzing, and making critical judgments in relation to social, economic, and political issues (see Lankshear & McLaren, 1993; see also Giroux, Lankshear, McLaren,&Peters, 1996). Furthermore, it invites subordinate groups to represent through classroom interaction and dialogue their lived reality in relation to objective social structures that shape their lives. This is done to solidify their beliefs, values, and experiences and also to challenge their everyday beliefs when they are discovered to be hegemonically advantageous (in the sense that they constitute dispositions that lead to concrete social practices or a complicity with certain social arrangements) to the reproduction of capitalist relations of exploitation (Giroux et al., 1996). In addition, this approach challenges students and workers to analyze the various meanings that underlie commonsensical concepts by drawing on everyday understandings that reflect their own social experiences. Teachers as revolutionary intellectuals contest the manufactured meaning of democracy by calling on students, workers, and intellectuals to critically examine socially constructed concepts such as freedom and democracy, which have been manufactured by neoliberal ideologues in the service of transnational capitalism (Fischman & McLaren, 2000; McLaren & Fischman, 1998). Students are invited to analyze the stories and narratives that animate their lives by setting them against a normative backdrop of heterosexist and Eurocentric assumptions (McLaren, 1998a; Ovando & McLaren, 2000; Sleeter & McLaren, 1995). Mainstream pedagogy assiduously disregards as crucial a knowledge of how asymmetrical relations of power become embedded in race, gender, and class antagonisms that are reinforced through the dominant social and ideological apparatuses of the state. In contrast, a revolutionary working-class pedagogy sets as its goal the transformation of existing social and economic relations by encouraging marginalized social groups both to critique and transform capitalist social relations of production. Here the classroom is conceived as a political arena for legitimizing the lived experiences of the oppressed social classes without assuming that such experiences are transparent or absent of racism or sexism (Freire, 1970, 1998; Giroux, 1988; McLaren, 1995, 1997). A working-class pedagogy entails struggles over meaning, representation, and identity in relation to a moral and ethical commitment to social justice (Cole, 1998; Cole & Hill, 1995; Cole, Hill, & Rikowski, 1997). Knoblauch and Brannon (1993) argue that citizenship within a capitalist democracy includes an allegiance to passive consumerism, rather than active engagement in the construction of social life, and a long-standing hostility to practices of critical inquiry, certainly including liberatory pedagogy but also, historically, the challenges of labor unions, feminists, gays, environmental activists, and anyone else posing a conceivable threat to economic interests and managerial hierarchies that the media help to maintain. (p. 31) This is in marked contrast to a revolutionary working-class pedagogy that underscores the active participation of students and workers in their own self-education as active citizens linked to the struggle for self-realization and coexistence—a process by which workers gain control over both their intellectual and their physical labor. This also entails promoting among students and workers—especially in countries where subsistence or state coercion dominate everyday life—alternative networks of popular organizing that include revolutionary social movements (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 2000). A revolutionary working-class pedagogy aims at transforming the consciousness of being in alienation by developing a critical consciousness. We should stress that alienation is not rooted in the world of Hegelian abstractions but rather embedded within the social and material relations of production. This raises questions as to whether an alienated consciousness is an inert totality and if it can be transcended. According to Mészáros (1989), alienated activity not only produces an alienated consciousness but also a consciousness of being in alienation. Therefore, it is advisable to create those pedagogical conditions that, for the working class, facilitate the development of a critical consciousness to overcome economic alienation and transform the existing social conditions of production through mass political action. Such action must be capable of creating egalitarian structures that are able to achieve—at an increasing level and in an ever-expanding scope—the institutionalization of popular democracy. Of course, this means aggregating diverse constituencies that might be distrustful of one another. We want to be clear that pedagogically we are not arguing for the teacher to serve as the mediator between imputed and factual consciousness, as someone who compels the student to activate or actualize revolutionary consciousness, who imports socialist insight from her rucksack in the Sierra Maestra to student foco groups in the United States. Because this position is tantamount to an externally imposed dictatorship of the teacher that relies on the false opposition of ideal type and factual actualization. Rather, our approach is Freirean in that it argues that revolutionary consciousness is a political act of knowing, an active intervention against the barriers that prevent the students from achieving their role as agents of history. It is critical to remember that as revolutionary educators, we need to identify alternative subject positions that we might assume or counternarratives and countermemories that we might make available to our students to contest existing regimes of representation and social practice. But, we cannot be content to remain here. We need to identify the historical determinations of domination and oppression as part of the struggle to develop concrete practices of counterrepresentation. The search for external causes of domination and exploitation should not be forgotten in the fashionable rush on the part of some postmodern educators to encounter and explain différence in subjective terms. Emphasizing freedom as the realization of humanity’s purpose, by which labor as a social means fulfills its human needs, is an important characteristic of the revolutionary working- class pedagogy that we are envisioning. It engages teachers as reflexive practitioners in their daily lives. To become critically reflective practitioners requires the ability to engage in complex analyses of social class accompanied by trenchant analyses of other forms of oppression as they are linked to capitalist exploitation—relations linked to race, gender, and sexual orientation. In short, it requires a comprehensive form of political agency that moves beyond the particular struggles of select groups (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 2000). A revolutionary working-class pedagogy seeks to transgress the boundaries that set high culture apart from popular culture and that privilege the former over the latter. Empowering the working-class and marginalized social groups in society means giving them an opportunity to interrogate theoretically (in the sense articulated by both Marx and Lenin) forms of both high culture and popular culture so that they can analyze, articulate, express, and construct meaning from multiple positionalities located in their lived experiences dealing with racism, sexism, and class exploitation. In addition, disenfranchised groups need to control the means of production of their symbolic economies, not to mention their material existence. Because a revolutionary working-class pedagogy also recognizes that the language and the discourses practiced within the classroom setting as well as in the workplace are ideologically tainted with the values, beliefs, and interests of the privileged social classes so as to conceal asymmetrical relations of power, an important step involves the encouragement of critical dialogues among teachers, students, and workers. The central purpose of such dialogues would be to raise class consciousness and help students and workers recognize how their subjectivities and social identities are configured in ways that are structurally advantageous to the status quo. This requires that students are able to see themselves in relation to their role as workers and to be provided with an opportunity to develop class consciousness. This does not mean that class consciousness excludes other aspects of identity. As Reed (2000) points out, The claim that being a worker is not the most crucial identity for members of marginalized groups is debatable. To say the least. But even if that claim were true, what it means simply is that people see themselves in many ways simultaneously. We all have our own sets of experiences fashioned by our social position, our family upbringing, our local political culture, and our voluntary associations. Each of these goes into the mix, modifying, cross-cutting, even at times overriding identities based on race or ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation. . . . The fact of the existence of a capitalist economic order doesn’t automatically tell us how people interpret their positions within it. Class consciousness, no less than other identities, is contingent, the product of political debate and struggle. (p. 137) It is imperative in our view that the struggles of teachers in schools are linked to the struggles of other workers. A revolutionary workingclass pedagogy of labor stresses that the empowerment of workers (i.e., teachers, postal workers, factory workers) can be successfully achieved through organizing labor unions that committed to anticapitalist struggle and a proletarian praxis. Yet, we must also emphasize that the political and economic empowerment of workers will depend on their active participation and self-education. Here we oppose the tradition of “workerism” that is often anti-intellectual and looks on theory with suspicion and often contempt. Instead, we applaud the recent struggles of intellectuals such as Pierre Bourdieu of France to coordinate the efforts of numerous European social movements through his organization, Raisons d’Agir. The ability of teachers and prospective teachers to interpret contemporary social relations of production as a set of interconnected social and material practices helps them to understand that success in a capitalist society is not the result of individual capacities but rather is constrained and enabled by asymmetrical relations of power linked to race, class, gender, and sexual economies of privilege. We believe that workers committed to social justice have the opportunity to become liberatory intellectuals (what Antonio Gramsci, 1971, referred to as “organic” intellectuals) who possess the capacity to make meaningful choices and decisions in their lives (McLaren, Fischman, Serra, & Antelo, 1998). Thus, teachers who are central to the process of raising students’ political consciousness must themselves become theoreticians of their own teaching practices. Accordingly, our task as organic and committed intellectuals is to create the conditions for the development of a revolutionary consciousness among the working class in general and teachers and students in particular. In developing a framework for forging solidarity and collective action among workers and students, we find the three conditions that Weinbaum (1998) proposes to be particularly instructive. First, the central role of critical educators must be directed at facilitating dialogues among workers and students concerning everyday labor practices at the workplace and teaching practices within schools. Second, teachers and workers must be presented with opportunities for transforming those relationships that link their individual interests and issues at the local and community level to broader social and economic relations at a global level. And finally, Weinbaum stresses the active political role that critical educators in labor unions and schools must play both in their communities and in progressive organizations. We believe that a revolutionary workingclass pedagogy that aims at consciousness-raising, political activism, and social empowerment can be a critical tool for self-determination and also for transforming existing social conditions. Yet, we feel it is necessary to stress that working-class pedagogy can be effective only to the degree that marginalized social groups are able to organize into oppositional social and political movements against global capitalism and remain committed to a metanarrative of social justice both inside and outside the classroom. This stipulates that a stress on difference not undercut the possibility of political solidarity. As Reed (2000) notes, Insofar as identity politics insists on recognizing difference as the central truth of political life, it undercuts establishing a broad base as a goal of organizing. Its reflex is to define ever more distinct voices and to approach collective action from an attitude more like suspicion than solidarity. (p. xxii).