### 1AC -- Mining

#### Space mining coming now and a lack of regulations makes conflicts likely.

Zeisl 19 [Yasemin Zeisl, MSc in International Relations and Affairs from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), “Three Salient Risks of Mining in Space,” 05/03/19, *GlobalRiskIntel*, https://www.globalriskintel.com/insights/three-salient-risks-mining-space, EA]

The harvesting of natural resources from space objects is the goal of numerous companies such as Planetary Resources or Deep Space Industries in the United States, Asteroid Mining Corporation in Scotland, or iSpace in Japan. While some companies such as iSpace are focusing on resources inside the Moon, others are developing strategies to identify and extract resources from asteroids and extinct comets. Given that calculations evaluate space mining as a highly lucrative business with potential profits amounting to trillions in U.S.-dollars, it is unsurprising that investment into space mining rose from 534 million USD in 2014 to 3.1 billion USD in 2018.

Research institutions such as the Center for Near-Earth Object Studies (CNEOS) — which cooperates with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) — detects, traces, and assesses risks of objects moving close to the Earth. Such calculations are relevant for future ventures into space mining, which will focus on metals such as platinum, gold, iron, rhodium, zinc, cobalt, and nickel, as well as water and carbon found in asteroids and extinct comets. Celestial ice would be particularly useful for generating rocket fuel by splitting it into hydrogen and oxygen. This may facilitate long space travel to destinations such as Mars. The usage of extinct comets as gas stations may bring engineers and scientists one step closer to the goal of colonizing Mars. While rocket fuel extraction may be a relatively feasible project for the near future, it is expected that harvesting metals from space may require several more decades to realize.

Spotting the potential profitability of space mining, the United States passed the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act in 2015 to grant U.S. citizens the right to harvest natural resources from celestial bodies. Similarly, Luxembourg established a space mining law and provided investment opportunities in August 2017. In January 2019, Russia started negotiating a bilateral cooperation arrangement with Luxembourg.

The fact that there is no clearly defined international treaty on space mining poses a major risk. Although the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1984 may provide some detail on the issue by asserting that no state, organization, or natural person can lay claim to any object in space, the fact that only 18 countries have committed to this multilateral treaty leaves the majority of states unbound by this regulation. An inconsistent legal landscape in regard to resource extraction of celestial bodies could lead to legal clashes between different countries and potential disadvantages for companies or organizations from certain countries. Mining in space could turn into a fierce competition among various private businesses and states. Therefore, licensing regulations will also have to be clearly defined. Licenses will help to clarify both ownership of yields and the relationships among miners, investors, and governments in order to avoid conflict in the future.

#### Two Impacts:

#### 1 – Resource Wars – empirics prove.

Kelvey 14 [Jon Kelvey, writer and journalist based in central Maryland. Is It Legal to Mine Asteroids?,” 10/13/14, *Slate*, https://slate.com/technology/2014/10/asteroid-mining-and-space-law-who-gets-to-profit-from-outer-space-platinum.html]

If these mining ventures are successful, the world could see billions of dollars flowing down from space to American companies. Is there a system for dealing with any conflicts that asteroid mining will likely arouse? The historical record certainly suggests the possibility of bitter, even violent disputes.

Just consider the Arctic. Impenetrable ice was once the foil for those who dreamed of a Northwest Passage, but global warming has made the oil- and natural-gas-rich Arctic seabed accessible for the first time, and there has been a rush to lay claims to territory. The United States and Canada have been making careful geological measurements in order to determine territorial boundaries. Russia has pursued a different path: In 2007, the country used a submersible to plant its flag on the seabed at the North Pole. It’s an example of how contested things can get even when there is a system of rules in place, according to Joanne Gabrynowicz, a space lawyer and editor emeritus of the Journal of Space Law at the University of Mississippi School of Law. There is a system of international governance in place for the Arctic, but she says it is being strained by the recent thaw because, “it’s so much easier to govern something when you can’t get to it.”

If emerging space technologies can be thought of as melting Arctic ice, it might be time to start discussing some basic rules before everything thaws.

#### Its not just asteroids but cascades into warfare over celestial territory

Renstrom 15 [Joelle Renstrom, Lecturer of Rhetoric at Boston University, “Will Mining Celestial Bodies Ruin Space?,” 12/09/15, WBUR, https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2015/12/09/asteroid-mining-joelle-renstrom, EA]

We could certainly use these resources on Earth — especially water, if catastrophic drought predictions are accurate. Of course, asteroid mining companies that sell water to the rest of the world would need to be regulated, but that’s not really a new proposition. As with oil and gas companies, extracting, processing and selling water could promote worldwide competition and boost the economy. But how, exactly, would that competition work?

Planetary Resources might be the first asteroid mining company, but it won’t be the last. Once the technology and resources are in place, other companies from the U.S. and elsewhere will join them in the hunt for viable, resource-rich asteroids. And then what?

Earth has a history of oil crises, embargoes and conflicts. What’s to prevent similar clashes from arising in space?

Perhaps enough asteroids exist to keep companies from various countries out of each other’s way if they can’t share. But the situation could get tricky, especially because the asteroids themselves would remain sovereign territory, as dictated by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The new law makes clear its consistency with this Treaty: “the United States does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.”

So no one would own the asteroids, but people would own the spoils. Would other countries recognize that? Would we recognize it if a Chinese or Russian company found a stockpile of platinum on an asteroid? Would asteroid mining become a first-come, first-served proposition?

The Asteroid Resources Property Act also paves the way for resource exploitation on planets, such as Mars. One of the primary arguments made for colonizing the Red Planet is its resources. Mars Society founder and colonization advocate Robert Zubrin argues that Mars “is endowed with all the resources needed to support not only life but the actual development of a technological civilization.” These resources include water, carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, oxygen and deuterium, a rare (on Earth) and valuable hydrogen isotope used to make rocket fuel. As such endeavors become more feasible, their implications raise some slippery-slope fears -- namely, that in addition to lifeless asteroids, planets with the potential for microbial life such as Mars may become competitive mining stations.

#### 2 – Redirection – private asteroid mining causes proliferation of NEO redirection capabilities – accidents and terrorism cause extinction.

Drmola 15 [Jakub Drmola and Miroslav Mareš, \* PhD Security Studies, International Relations and Political Science at Masaryk University, \*\* Professor, at the Division of Security and Strategic Studies, Masaryk University, “Revisiting the deflection dilemma,” 2015, *Astronomy & Geophysics*, Vol. 56, Issue 5, pp. 5.15-5.18, https://academic.oup.com/astrogeo/article/56/5/5.15/235650, EA]

These authors presented a stark dilemma. We now know that the planet Earth orbits our Sun among thousands of other objects of varying sizes and trajectories. So far, well over 12 000 near-Earth objects (NEOs) have been discovered. Such objects are known to have collided with the Earth in the past and are certain to hit it in the future, with potentially catastrophic results. All the known rocky planets and moons are dotted with impact craters (with the notable exception of Jupiter's geologically hyperactive moon Io). Even the surface of the Earth, despite all its weathering, erosion, volcanic activity and cover of the biosphere, bears clear marks of past impacts, with dozens of craters of more than 10 km in diameter still discernible today. It is a dangerous neighbourhood that we live in – sometimes described as a shooting gallery.

The role of the Chicxulub impactor in the Cretaceous–Paleogene mass extinction event some 65 million years ago helps to make the severity of this point fairly apparent. Direct observations of events such as the jovian impact of the Shoemaker-Levy 9 comet in July 1994 further emphasized that we live in an active solar system and large collisions are not a thing of the past. The recent Chelyabinsk bolide (or the less recent but somewhat larger Tunguska airburst) remind us that Jupiter is not the only planet that can be hit by sizable objects (Chapman 2004).

The Shoemaker-Levy 9 collision made its mark not only in Jupiter's upper atmosphere, where it left blotches the size of our entire planet, but it also shook our perceptions and served as an inspiration for Hollywood films as well as for “planetary defence” concepts – often calling on nuclear weapons to break up the object or deflect it away from the Earth. The 2013 deluge of videos, injuries and damage reports from Chelyabinsk reinvigorated interest.

Sooner or later, in order to avoid the fate of the dinosaurs, humanity needs to develop scientific and technological capabilities to prevent extinction-level impact events. But most solutions bring about new challenges, because new technologies rarely have only one application. Here lies the dilemma: any technology allowing us to deflect asteroids from a collision trajectory with the Earth could also be used to direct them towards the Earth. This means we could potentially turn any future near-miss into an impact, with all its devastating consequences.

Sagan & Ostro (1994b) concluded that this is a risk not worth taking. Considering the very low probabilities of impacts with objects larger than 1 km (generally less than 1 in 5000 for a given century), they were more worried about the misuse of such trajectory-altering technology than the undiverted asteroids themselves. Humans visited a great deal of violence upon each other during the 20th century; war has been prevalent and increasingly technological. The beginning of the 21st century does not seem overly promising either. The risk that one of humanity's irrational totalitarian powers decides to have some nearby asteroid steered towards Earth might simply be too high. Many people still see the default cosmic odds as preferable to the lessons of recent history.

Later on, a modification of sorts to the deflection dilemma appeared, positing that the “real” dilemma (Schweickart 2004, Morrison 2010) lies in putting various parts of the Earth and its population in harm's way during a deflection attempt. Inevitably, any mission to deflect an object that is on a collision course with the Earth will involve moving its supposed point of impact across the surface until it misses the planet entirely. Should such a deflection attempt fail to modify the trajectory sufficiently, the impact would still occur, albeit in a different area. This could expose to risk countries that were not originally threatened by the asteroid (depending on its size and path), while diminishing the risk to those living near the original point of impact. The damage and casualties around this new and modified point of impact would then, to some extent, be caused by those who tried but failed to deflect the asteroid. The repercussions of such an event would certainly be grave.

Privatization and industry

Both of these versions of the deflection dilemma are essentially state-centric and neither presumes that this technology might be wielded by private companies and non-state actors. But the current trend of greater involvement of private companies in space suggests that states might be unable (or unwilling) to maintain their exclusive hold on the advanced space technologies. The private sector is currently hot on the heels of national and international space agencies in exploring feasible and economically viable options. At the moment, private companies are already in the business (or at least in the process of making it a profitable business) of resupplying the International Space Station, taking tourists to the edge of space and operating communication satellites. And, recently, a new area of potential commercialization of space, asteroid mining, has received increased attention and investment. It has already spawned private companies (such as Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources, Inc.); this industry is highly relevant to the deflection dilemma (Ostro 1999).

While the idea of mining asteroids carries with it an air of science fiction (as all space-based endeavours do, at some stage), it is based on science fact. One of the most significant facts on which to base a space mining industry is the apparent abundance of highly valued raw materials in asteroids. Platinum, rhodium and other precious metals are extremely useful because of their catalytic and electrical properties, but are also exceedingly rare in the Earth's crust. While such metals sank deep into the planet during core formation, asteroids retained their original composition and even delivered much of the accessible reserves to our planet in the form of meteorite bombardment (Willbold et al. 2011). Some of the largest known deposits of these metals on Earth are found within ancient impact craters.

Platinum-group metals are deemed critical to our modern technology-based civilization, without substitutes in many applications, and their supply is at risk of “geopolitical machinations” (Graedel 2013). The combination of natural scarcity and industrial demand leads to their high price, which easily rivals that of gold. Because space missions are inherently expensive, these precious metals are prime high-value candidates for economically viable asteroid mining. Since the projected market value of these metals within an asteroid is in the order of billions or even hundreds of billions of US dollars (depending on the size of the asteroid), the success of the industry comes down to developing technically feasible and cost-effective methods of mining them and retrieving them (Blair 2000, Gerlach 2005).

The other interesting and potentially worthwhile resource we could harvest from asteroids is water. Not only is liquid water required by astronauts to survive, but it can also be broken down into oxygen and hydrogen to be used as fuel. And, while water is abundant and cheap here on Earth, it is very expensive to transport it to orbit. It costs $3000–$10 000 per kilogramme to launch water (or anything else) to low Earth orbit and about two or three times more for geostationary transfer orbit (Jain & Trost 2013). It is not the prospect of procuring something we covet here on the surface of the Earth that makes this venture attractive, but rather the idea of not having to wage an expensive battle with Earth's gravity each time we want to make use of something as mundane as water in space.

If the costs associated with mining water from asteroids can be brought below the cost of launching water from Earth, this seemingly counter-intuitive industry might take off and become profitable. Additionally, through the use of some form of refuelling depots, it would probably in turn make space endeavours more affordable and sustainable. The same would apply if some of the more common metals found in asteroids (such as iron or nickel) were used to build structures directly in orbit instead of launching them from the Earth.

The risks of mining asteroids

There are two basic ways to go about moving the resources contained within a given asteroid to the Earth. They can be extracted from the asteroid during its natural orbit and then transported to the Earth, or the entire asteroid might be moved closer to a more convenient location before starting mining. Thus repositioned, it might even be used as a shielded habitat, once hollowed out (Ostro 1999). There are different speculative costs and benefits associated with either option, which would vary with the size, orbit and composition of the asteroid. But, crucially, the second option would entail putting asteroids into orbit around the Earth, the Moon or possibly at one of the Earth's Lagrangian points. Indeed, NASA has already planned a mission to capture a small asteroid and place it in a high cislunar orbit, where it would serve as a destination for future manned missions and experiments. This “Asteroid Redirect Mission” is to take place in the next decade and is being pitched mainly as a stepping stone towards a future mission to Mars (see box “NASA's Asteroid Redirect Mission”; Brophy et al. 2012, Burchell 2014, Gates et al. 2015).

Programmes to redirect asteroids and, especially, plans to mine asteroids on an industrial scale essentially resurrect the deflection dilemma. But it is no longer a matter of superpowers intentionally misusing technology designed to prevent dangerous impacts. It becomes an issue of proliferation among private entities. Once private mining companies acquire the technical ability to redirect suitable NEOs (Baoyin et al. 2011) in order to extract platinum or water from them, perilous inflections become more likely.

The probability of accidents will rise with the number of asteroids whose trajectories we decide to manipulate. Such accidents might be very unlikely, but even a tiny technical or human error in the execution of an inflection meant to place an asteroid into the lunar or geocentric orbit might send it crashing into the Earth with potentially devastating consequences. And while we might find solace in the low probabilities associated with such an accident, even contemporary industries which are considered very safe suffer from unlikely tragedies. Despite being dependable and reliable, airliners do crash; there are a lot of them flying and very improbable accidents do happen if the dice are rolled often enough. Undoubtedly, we will not be steering as many asteroids as we steer planes any time soon, but industries tend to be more accident-prone during their infancy. Furthermore, a single asteroid can do a lot more damage than a single plane. And who is to say how much metal or water we are going to need in space over the course of the 21st century, or the next?

The second source of risk is the intentional misuse, similar to the original deflection dilemma. But the entry barrier for asteroid weaponization gets much lower if mining them and moving them around becomes a common industrial activity. This is in stark contrast to the original scenario which envisioned this technology to be used solely for planetary defence and under control of a very small number of the most powerful countries (Morrison 2010). If such a powerful technology becomes widely and commercially available, even rogue states and well-funded terrorist groups might be tempted to use it for an unexpected and devastating attack. In addition, an active asteroid mining industry would make it more difficult to detect any hostile inflection attempts among the number of legitimate and benign ones.

### **1AC -- Congestion**

#### Congestion creates rivalrous orbits.

Fabian 19 (Christopher; January 2019; B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy, thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a M.S. from the University of North Dakota, approved by the Faculty Advisory Committee and in coordination with Dr. Michael Dodge, David Kugler, and Brian Urlacher; University of North Dakota Scholarly Commons, “A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy,” <https://commons.und.edu/theses/2455/>)

b. Defect/Defect The ubiquity of space technology has also yielded the negative externality of overcrowding the space domain. Despite its seemingly unlimited size, there are a limited number of useful earth-centric orbits to optimize terrestrial coverage. It is projected that there are over 300,000 medium sized objects capable of causing catastrophic failure of a satellite upon collision currently in earth’s orbit.159 Of these objects, 20,000 are actively tracked by the comparatively robust space surveillance network (SSN) of the United States Air Force, only 1,000 are active payloads, and even fewer have maneuver capability.160 Recent trends indicate that the problem of orbital congestion will only worsen in the coming decades as the barriers to entry are reduced. Launch service cost is rapidly decreasing due to an increased number of service providers and technology revolutions such as reusable rockets. Also, the miniaturization and simplification of satellite payloads further reduces the cost and infrastructure needed to be a spacefairing nation.161 This is evidenced by the near doubling of state operated satellites from 27 in 2000 to over 50 in 2012, coupled with a near doubling in total space objects from 1997 to 2007.162 The accumulation of space debris is a vital concern to the sustainable development of the space environment due to the increased probability of conjunction between active payloads and all other objects that results from crowded orbits. This increase in collision probability occurs proportionally to the number of objects in a given orbital domain. The tripling of orbital debris projected to occur in the next century, due to routine use and accumulation alone, would cause a tenfold increase in the probability of collision. In the event of a catastrophic collision between two objects, the resulting debris cloud could cause a cascading effect. Each successive collision increases the probability of another occurrence in a given orbit until an instability threshold is reached. At this threshold, debris removal due to decay would be negligible compared to debris created by subsequent collisions. As the propagation of debris continues, the cost of launching a satellite would eventually outweigh the benefits received due to the probability of that asset being destroyed by errant debris, effectively rendering the given orbit unusable. This debris propagation model and the dangers associated with it are colloquially referred to as the Kessler Syndrome. Kessler asserts unstable regions of low earth orbit (LEO) currently exist and that, barring the addition of more debris, a major collision would occur once every 10-20 years. If debris doubles, as it has in the last decade, the collision rate would increase to 2.5 years. Although most models’ time scales are on the order of centuries, it is widely accepted that the current rate of debris accumulation will render critical orbits unusable unless immediate measures are taken to return stability.163 There is near universal acceptance of the danger space debris presents, yet little substantive action has been taken to solve the problem. Current debris accumulation and propagation models show that earth orbiting domains are finite resources. Continued unsustainable development moving forward may preclude future usage, making earth orbits rivalrous goods.164 Furthermore, orbital domains are made a non-excludable good by the OST which states, “Outer space… shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind.”165 As a non-excludable public good, space succumbs to the tragedy of the commons where the privately beneficial strategy of space utilization differs significantly from the socially optimal strategy promoting orbital stability.166 Understandably, most analysis has focused on solving the problem of orbital instability by addressing the market failure responsible for debris creation. The current reasoning suggests that if actors creating space debris internalize the cost of their actions, a solution can arise. Proposed solutions run the gamut of ideologies from free market tax incentives, to command and control legislation, to restructuring orbital property rights. Scientific solutions have also been proposed, but technological feasibility and cost remain major problems. Furthermore, analogous environments susceptible to the tragedy of the commons have been examined in hopes that they may prove applicable to the problem of orbit instability.167 This analysis is ultimately useful if the problem is to be solved under nominal conditions, but there is an underlying problem that needs to be addressed before any of these proposed solutions can realistically be enacted.

#### That triggers missile radars.

Hoots 15 (Felix; Fall 2015; Distinguished Engineer in the System Analysis and Simulation Subdivision, Ph.D. in Mathematics from Auburn University, M.S. in Mathematics from Tennessee Tech University; Crosslink, “Keeping Track: Space Surveillance for Operational Support,” <https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/Crosslink%20Fall%202015%20V16N1%20.pdf>)

The launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, marked the beginning of the Space Age. It also marked the beginning of an intense space race that brought a remarkable rate of rocket launches. In a very short time, the number of objects in orbit grew dramatically. This created a host of strategic challenges, including the need for space surveillance. In particular, the Air Force needed a way to prevent false alarms as satellites came within view of missile-warning radars, while the Navy needed a way to alert deployed units of possible reconnaissance by satellites overhead. These needs led to the establishment of a military mission to maintain a catalog of all Earth-orbiting objects—active payloads, rocket bodies, and debris—along with detailed information about trajectory and point of origin. Such a catalog could be used to filter normal orbital passages from potential incoming missiles and predict the passage of suspected spy satellites. The first catalog was relatively small in comparison with today’s version, which lists more than 22,000 items (as of May 2015). Also, the current version supports much more than the original military mission—and Aerospace is helping to extend its utility even further. The Space Catalog The Space Catalog is maintained by the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, part of U.S. Strategic Command. One of the missions of JSpOC is to detect, track, and identify all artificial objects in Earth orbit. A key component of this mission is the Space Surveillance Network, a worldwide system of ground-based radars along with ground-based and orbital telescopes. The radars are used primarily for tracking near-Earth satellites with orbital period of 225 minutes or less, as well as some eccentric orbits that come down to near-Earth altitudes as they go towards their perigee. Ground-based telescopes are used for tracking more distant satellites, with orbital period greater than 225 minutes, and space-based sensors are used to track both near and distant satellites. The JSpOC tasks these sensors to track specific satellites and to record data such as time, azimuth, elevation, and range. This data is used to create orbital element sets or state vectors that represent the observed position of the satellite. The observed position can then be compared with the predicted position. The dynamic models used for predicting satellite motion are not perfect; factors such as atmospheric density variation caused by unmodeled solar activity can cause the predicted position to gradually stray from the true position. The observations are used to correct the predicted trajectory so the network can continue to track the satellite. This process of using observations to correct and refine an orbit in an ongoing feedback loop is called catalog maintenance, and it continues as long as the satellite remains in orbit. Ideally, the process is automatic, with manual inter vention only required when satellites maneuver or get near to reentry due to atmospheric drag. Sometimes, however, more effort is required. For example, a sensor may encounter a satellite trajectory that does not correspond well to anything in the catalog. Such observations are known as partially correlated observations if they are somewhat close to a known orbit or uncorrelated observations (or uncorrelated tracks) if they are far from any known orbit. Also, if a satellite is not tracked for five days, it is placed on an attention list for manual intervention. In that case, an analyst will attempt to match the wayward satellite to one of these partially correlated or uncorrelated tracks. If that effort succeeds, then the element sets are updated, and the object is returned to automatic catalog maintenance. On the other hand, if the satellite cannot be matched to a partially correlated or uncorrelated track, the satellite information continues to age. If it reaches 30 days without a match, the satellite is placed on the lost list. Risk Prediction One of the most visible uses of the catalog is to warn about collision risks for active payloads. This function predicts potential close approaches three to five days in advance to allow time to plan avoidance maneuvers, if necessary. Unplanned maneuvers may disturb normal operations and deplete resources for future maneuvers, so one would like to have high confidence in the collision-risk predictions. The reliability of the predictions depends directly on the accuracy of the orbit calculation, which in turn depends on the quality and quantity of the tracking data, which is limited by the capability of the Space Surveillance Network. Simply put, there are not enough tracking resources in the network to achieve high-quality orbits for every object in the catalog. Furthermore, many smaller objects can only be tracked by the most sensitive radars, and this tracking is infrequent. Most objects in the catalog are considered debris, which can neither maneuver nor broadcast telemetry. On the other hand, some satellite operators depend exclusively on the satellite catalog to know where their satellites are, and users of the satellite orbital data depend on the catalog to know when the satellites will be within view. This situation creates a challenging problem in balancing Space Surveillance Network resources to support the collision-warning task (tracking as many potential hazards as possible) while also providing highly accurate support to operational satellites (tracking the spacecraft as precisely as possible). The practical solution is to perform collision risk assessment using a large screening radius to ensure no close approaches are missed despite lower-quality predictions. Once an object is identified as having a potentially close approach, then the tasking level is raised, with the expectation that more tracking data will be obtained to refine the collision risk calculations. When the danger has passed, the object reverts to a normal tracking level. Collisions and spontaneous breakups do happen. The first satellite breakup occurred on June 29, 1961, when residual fuel in an Ablestar rocket body exploded, creating 296 trackable pieces of debris. Since that time, there have been more than 200 satellite breakups, the most notable being the missile intercept of the Fengyun-1C satellite, which created more than 3300 trackable fragments. In most cases, these breakups are first detected by the phased-array radars in the Space Surveillance Network. When multiple objects are observed where only one was expected, the downstream sensors are alerted, but no tasking is issued because specific debris orbits are not yet established. Tracks are taken and tagged as uncorrelated. Analysts at JSpOC then attempt to link uncorrelated tracks from different sensors to form a candidate orbit. Subsequent tracking improves the orbit to the point that the object can be named and numbered and moved into the catalog for automatic maintenance.

#### This triggers nuclear war.

Rogoway 15 (Tyler; November 12; Defense Journalist and Editor of Time Inc’s The War Zone; Jalopnik, “These Are The Doomsday Satellites That Detected The Explosion Of Metrojet 9268,” <https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/these-are-the-doomsday-satellites-that-detected-the-exp-1737434876>)

For over 50 years the Pentagon has had early warning satellites in orbit aimed at spotting launches of ballistic missiles, especially the big intercontinental kind that can fly around the globe in less than 30 minutes and bring about nuclear Armageddon. Recently, these satellites have made news for their “secondary capabilities,” spotting the downing of Metrojet Flight 9268 and Malaysian Airlines Flight 17. These are the shadowy satellites that are capable of such amazing feats, and an idea of how they work. In 1960, at the height of the Cold War and at the dawn of the space age, the first Missile Defense Alarm System (MiDAS) satellite was launched into low earth orbit. Six years later there was a constellation of nine of these satellites roaming the heavens, each scanning the Soviet Union for large infrared plumes, the tell-tale sign of a ballistic missile or rocket launch. These fairly crude, low-earth orbit satellites, along with the radar-based Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, would be the basis for a Cold War ballistic missile surveillance system that would become ever more complex and capable as the years went by. If ballistic missile launches were detected and deemed a threat, the decision to retaliate would mean the National Command Authority making the call to do so within half an hour, an act that could bring an the end of humanity’s reign on Earth, permanently. The first really reliable and full coverage space-based ballistic missile early warning capability came with the launch of the first Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite in 1970. These new satellites were much more capable than their MiDAS predecessors. Early DSP satellite design was relatively straight forward, with the satellites’ spinning around their center axis while in geosynchronous orbit. This allows their telescopic infrared sensor to continuously sweep an area of the planet in a relatively brief amount of time, around six times in one minute. If something were detected, the information would immediately be data-linked to controllers on the ground at the 460th Space Wing located at Buckley AFB in in Colorado. A total of 23 of these satellites have been launched over the program’s life, with constant upgrades made along the way. A DSP satellite was launched by the Space Shuttle on STS-44 in 1991, and the last one was launched by a Delta IV Heavy in 2007. Most famously, the Defense Support Program constellation of satellites were used to detect launches of SCUD missiles during Operation Desert Storm.

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks

* Checked

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

### 1AC -- Plan

#### Thus we affirm that the appropriation of space by private entities is unjust through the implementation of a global public trust doctrine regulating outer space.

#### It results in a legally binding regime that curbs unsustainable development – ensures closing of legal loopholes.

Babcock 19 (, H., 2019. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, OUTER SPACE, AND THE GLOBAL COMMONS: TIME TO CALL HOME ET. [online] Lawreview.syr.edu. Available at: <https://lawreview.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/H-Babcock-Article-Final-Document-v2.pdf#page=67> [Accessed 15 December 2021] Professor Babcock served as general counsel to the National Audubon Society from 1987-91 and as deputy general counsel and Director of Audubon’s Public Lands and Water Program from 1981-87. Previously, she was a partner with Blum, Nash & Railsback, where she focused on energy and environmental issues, and an associate at LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae where she represented utilities in the nuclear licensing process. From 1977-79, she served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy and Minerals in the U.S. Department of the Interior. Professor Babcock has taught environmental and natural resources law as a visiting professor at Pace University Law School and as an adjunct at the University of Pennsylvania, Yale, Catholic University, and Antioch law schools. Professor Babcock was a member of the Standing Committee on Environmental Law of the American Bar Association, and served on the Clinton-Gore Transition Team.)-rahulpenu

F. The Public Trust Doctrine (PTD) as a Gap Filling, Place-Holding Management Approach506 The PTD offers both an approach for managing an open access commons and a gap-filling tool until a regulatory regime is adopted.507 The doctrine is based on the idea that the “sovereign holds certain common properties in trust in perpetuity for the free and unimpeded use of the general public.”508 The public’s right to access and use trust resources is never lost, and neither the government nor private individuals can alienate or otherwise adversely affect those resources unless for a comparable public purpose.509 The resources the doctrine protects “have long been part of a ‘taxonomy of property’ [that recognizes] the division of natural wealth into private and public property.”510 “The doctrine places on governments ‘an affirmative, ongoing duty to safeguard the long-term preservation of those resources for the benefit of the general public,’”511 thus limiting the sovereign’s power on behalf of both present and future individuals.512 It directs the government to manage trust resources for public benefit, not private gain.513 It applies to private as well as public resources and is used to preserve the public’s access to CPRs.514 Government agencies have the non-rescindable power to revoke uses of trust resources that are inconsistent with the doctrine.515 This effectively places a permanent easement over trust resources that burdens their ownership with an overriding public interest in the preservation of those resources.516 However, trust resources can be alienated in favor of private ownership, if the alienation will still serve the public’s interest in those resources and not interfere with trust uses of the remaining land.517 The PTD, therefore, protects the “people’s common heritage,”518 just as Article 11 of the Moon Treaty protects outer space as part of the common heritage of mankind.519 The doctrine also appears to be infinitely malleable. Original uses of the doctrine were restricted to only that “aspect of the public domain below the low-water mark on the margin of the sea and the great lakes, the waters over those lands, and the waters within rivers and streams of any consequence,”520 and covered only traditional uses of those lands, like fishing and navigation.521 Over time, the scope and application of the doctrine broadened to protect more public resources and different uses.522 Thus, the **doctrine** expanded to protect new trust resources, such as dry sand beaches, inland lakes, groundwater, dry riverbeds, and wildlife,523 and passive uses of those resources, like scientific study.524 The original link to navigable water and tidelands disappeared.525 Supporters of the doctrine successfully advocated that it be applied to “wildlife, parks, cemeteries, and even works of fine art,”526 while arguing more recently its application to the atmosphere.527 A doctrine that imposes a perpetual duty on the sovereign to preserve trust resources, prevents their alienation for private benefit, assures public access to them, and can be invoked by anyone seems particularly useful as a management tool in outer space.528 The fact that **public** **access** to trust resources is so **central** to the doctrine **makes** it **reflective**, not contradictory, **of** international space **law’s** **bar** **against** **appropriation** of outer space and of the principle of space being the “province of all mankind.”529 It **avoids** the problems of alienation and **exclusion** associated with any of the management approaches associated with some form of private property and requires neither the creation of a new administrative authority nor the presence of a close-knit group of like-minded people.530 Members of the public, both rich and poor, can invoke and enforce the doctrine as easily as the sovereign.531 It is cost effective to the extent that no separate apparatus is required to implement it, and the doctrine has shown itself to be highly adaptable and innovative as different needs arise.532 It could also fill the gap in international law with respect to managing celestial property. Therefore, of all the management approaches studied here, the PTD seems the most suited to keep order in space until a regulatory regime is imposed. However, the doctrine provides no incentives for development of trust resources; rather, it might be used to limit or curtail that development, making it an imperfect, perhaps even counter-productive solution by itself to the extent that such development might be beneficial.533 Modifying the doctrine to allow limited use of private property management approaches, like tradable development claims, might buffer that effect—a form of overlapping hybridity between one type of property, a commons, and a management regime from another, private property, enabled by application of the PTD. CONCLUSION “Only a legal system that accommodates both the human need for resources and the necessary preservation of mankind’s common heritage can fulfill these criteria.”534 The future is now with regard to the development of outer space and its resources—it is no longer a question of whether humans will engage in these activities, but how soon they will. Technically advanced countries and private commercial enterprises are probing outer space and preparing for landing on an asteroid or the moon to extract their resources.535 Speculators are selling deeds to the moon’s surface and preparing to exploit the tourism potential that space offers.536 But, the legal framework for managing these initiatives is almost nonexistent.537 International treaties came into being before all this activity began in earnest and national laws that might apply are stunted by jurisdictional quandaries like the absence of national boundaries in outer space.538 Thus, there is an urgency to figure out how to control what happens in outer space before its resources are irreparably damaged or permanently monopolized by powerful countries and individuals. In the absence of regulation, much of the current debate centers on what property regime should be applied in outer space.539 The assumption is that by only allowing private property rights in space, countries and commercial enterprises will undertake the risks and costs of space development.540 However, unless international space law changes, it may prevent this from happening. If it changes, strong management controls will be necessary to prevent destruction or over-consumption of celestial resources, as well as monopolization and competitive behavior by participants, which could lead to hostilities and inequities. This Article examines various private property regimes, including those of less than full fee ownership, to see if any would avoid the conflict with the international prohibition on appropriation of outer space and its resources. It concludes that none will because each retains the right to exclude and each is insensitive to the treaties’ equity concerns. In contrast, considering outer space to be common is consistent with international space law in both respects. Hypothesizing that private property in outer space may yet prevail, this Article investigates different private property management approaches, such as the right of first possession, lotteries, and tradable development rights, to see if any would be cost effective, easy to implement and equitable, and would also prevent over-consumption, monopolization or the slide into rivalrous behavior. The Article concludes that each comes up short in some respect. Social norms as a management tool for property held in common, although compliant with international law, are also not up to the task. Instead, although ancient, the PTD, with its malleability, easy and cost-effective implementation and enforcement, non-consumption principle, and consistency with the goals that animate international space treaties, seems best suited to the task of protecting the public’s interests in the global commons that is outer space as it has done for centuries in Earth-bound commons. But, as its principal terrestrial use has been to protect trust resources from development, the doctrine needs some modification to encourage development of celestial resources. Hence, this Article suggests that modifying the PTD to allow the application of private property management tools, like tradable development rights, will not only allow development, but also will assure that when it happens, it will not be just profitable for a few, but will also be sustainable and equitable.

#### Public Trust threads the needle by allowing sustainable exploitation without appropriation.

Pastorius 13 [Claudia Pastorius, J.D., Barry University School of Law, “Law and Policy in the Global Space Industry's Lift-Off,” 2013, *Barry Law Review*, Vol. 19, Issue 1, https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=barrylrev, EA]

C. The Public Trust Doctrine

Rooted in Roman law, the public trust doctrine, whereby a state actor holds and manages property in trust for the benefit of the public, is now regularly applied through common law and statutory regulations around the world.280 The origins of the public trust doctrine are found in the Justinian Institute’s declaration that the air, running water, and the seas (and seashores) were common to mankind, and as such, are resources to be protected by the sovereign.281 Virgiliu Pop, a Romanian Space Agency researcher, postulates that the Outer Space Treaty essentially creates a public trust in the agreement by stating: “for the benefit of and in the interest of all countries” in Article I.282 The missing piece of the puzzle, he claims, is the undesignated trustee(s).283 The sovereign or state is traditionally the trustee in a public trust.284

In a public trust holding property ownership rights, the bundle of property rights285 is thus divided between the trustee (the State) and the beneficiaries (the Public).286

There are two co-existing interests to trust lands: the jus publicum which is the public’s right to use and enjoy trust lands; and the jus privatum which is the private property rights that may exist in the use and possession of trust lands. The State may convey the jus privatum to private owners, but this private interest is subservient to the jus publicum, which is the State’s inalienable interest that it continues to hold in the trust land or water.287

The ownership of the property thus remains with the trustee; but, the rights to exclude, use, and enjoy could be allocated to a group, an individual, or an entity.288

The United Nations created a Trusteeship Council in the hopes of applying the common heritage of mankind doctrine, but its operations centered on work with post-war decolonization territories and were suspended in 1994..289 In its inception, it was conceived that the Trusteeship Council would operate as the “trustee of the common heritage of humankind to ensure the necessary coordinated approach to this concern” and manage the jus privatum rights of common heritage properties.290 The board of trustees consisted of: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—the five permanent members of the Security Council.291 Proposals to utilize the Trusteeship Council to address management of “global commons” have made little progress.292 One contributing factor to the ineffectiveness of the Trusteeship Council may be that the political differences between Security Council members often leads to a stalemate in decisionmaking.293

Despite the dissolution of the Trusteeship Council, there are utilitarian reasons why the formation of a trust for outer space resources would minimize economic detriments to all nation-states and optimize economic benefits of outer space development for all, particularly for spacefaring pioneer nations.294 The common heritage of mankind and public trust doctrine’s proposals and applications have been met with resistance due to the tension between the “haves” and the “have-nots,” or the developed and developing nations.295 However, the successful application of public trusts to environmental resource management could be changing perspectives on the utility of the doctrine.296 Where there are common preservation and conservation goals for a given resource, the public trust is more likely to succeed as the means for managing the benefits and responsibilities relative to the resource.297

Two successful applications of the public trust principles that could influence the management of outer space resources are the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM).298 The ITU issues licenses for orbital allocations of satellites and the use of radio frequencies.299 By necessity, the nation-states of the world have peaceably participated in the licensing regime.300 A true tragedy of the commons would result if our telecommunications channel appropriations were chaotic, and, if entities placed satellites into orbit unilaterally with no precautionary coordination.301 Without coordination and commitment to the rules, the overlapping noises would prevent people from hearing each other on the radio, and millions of dollars of satellite equipment, as well as our communication systems, would be at risk.302

The BLM raises an incredible amount of revenue for the government by selling leases of publicly managed lands for oil and natural gas exploration and exploitation to the United States.303 The BLM raised $233 million through leases of public lands in 2012 alone.304 Methods the BLM employs that could be adopted for use with outer space leaseholds are: (1) the auctioning of leases; (2) relative pricing per acre of lease payments depending on whether or not the land is producing; (3) imposing environmental resource management limits on resource exploitation, and (4) issuing fixed term leases with conditions for renewal.305 Some space law academics have noted that United Nations’ treaties and other space law accords will need to distinguish surface property rights on celestial bodies and extraction rights.306 Some even argue that asteroids should be treated as chattel and not land.307 The BLM legal property rights management is an excellent model to look to for establishing the legal property rights that will be needed in outer space for mining minerals, extracting water, and harvesting Helium-3.

If leasehold estates held in trust were conferred in outer space, then measures could be taken to ensure optimal and equitable allocation of outer space leaseholds, and rules could be imposed to manage the sustainable exploitation of space resources.308 Problems such as space debris pollution could be avoided by reviewing development plans to ensure measures to prevent pollution, exit strategies of endeavors, or plans of relative permanence are in place before the projects take-off.309 Controversies regarding planned celestial land use and competing claims to more lucrative territories could be arbitrated and resolved on Earth. From an economic perspective, even though the possibility of “free” appropriation of outer space resources might encourage more space exploration initiatives, development with consistent and reliable rules would provide the stronger incentive of protecting the commercial investments in space exploration.310

### 1AC -- Framework

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### 1] Death is bad and outweighs – a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b] it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life

#### 2] Specifically, extinction outweighs – magnitude, irreversibility, uncertainty.

MacAskill 14 [William MacAskill, Associate Professor in Philosophy and Research Fellow at the Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford, “Normative Uncertainty,” 2014, University of Oxford PhD Thesis, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.677.4121&rep=rep1&type=pdf]

However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. 188 On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the future, given that we don’t go extinct anytime soon, would be 2×10^14. 189 So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction.

Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date.

Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have.

#### 3] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning – they’re our baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Professor of Ethics at Oslo Metropolitan University, “An Argument for Hedonism,” 2016, *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, Vol. 50, pp. 267-281, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10790-015-9506-9]

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. ‘‘Pleasure’’ and ‘‘pain’’ are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2

The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: ‘‘What for?’’ This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: ‘‘To buy soda.’’ This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: ‘‘What is buying the soda good for?’’ This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: ‘‘Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.’’ If I then proceed by asking ‘‘But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?’’ the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: ‘‘We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.’’4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says ‘‘This is painful!’’ we never respond by asking: ‘‘And why is that a problem?’’ We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad.

If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.