#### **Logistics constitutes a worldhood that engenders extractive an containerizing violence with the flow of assembly. It begins at loss and then births new space time coordinates for management resulting in the dissemination of governance via supply chain**

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Because what are we to make of the fact that today it is the science of logistics that most seems to have realized the Heart Doctrine of Zen Buddhism? It is the science of logistics that dreams of flow without blockage, and tries to turn these dreams into reality. Hard logistics and soft logistics work together. Te yang of the Belt and Road and the yin of the algorithm fantasize together of no block.

If this is true, we should be worried. In its origins, and its contemporary mutations, logistics is a regulatory force standing against us, standing against the earth. Logistics begins in loss and emptiness. And it begins in a fundamental misapprehension called spacetime. The loss that marks ownership, specifcally the ownership of private property, the loss of sharing, the loss of the earth and the consequent making of the world, is simultaneously the misapprehension that what is privatized is empty and will be flled by ownership itself, by properties, by properties placed into it. Tis emptiness will be flled with an interior. Tis emptiness is confirmed by logistics, by the mobilization, the colonizing drive, of this interior – where properties are imported into empty space.

Tis begins, again, with Locke or, at least, we can begin again through him. His concept of the mind as tabula rasa – often portrayed as an Enlightenment move away from predetermination – is a projection of this emptiness that must be owned and flled. For this emptiness to become private property it must be flled with and located in the coordinates of space and time. Space emerges as the delimitation of what is mine, and time begins with the theft and imposition when it became mine. Te individual mind and its coming to maturity out of the tabula rasa mark this frst conquest. Enlightenment interiority emerged from this emplotment of time and space – to borrow from Hayden White – this separation from what is shared. But interiority is only for the owning mind. Because what allows this mind to take possession of itself is its ability to grasp property, which is something it now posits as beyond itself. It takes what it is taken from for what it needs to create itself, and not just needs but compulsively, interminably, voraciously seeks without end. In other words, the emplotment of time and space in the mind takes place through the emplotment of time and space on earth, in a conversion of emptiness into world, and is simultaneously taken as a fulflment of mind, its interior appointment in and of what can now be conceptualized as body. Is it a leap to say logic and logistics start here inseparably?

Tis is why there is no separating Locke the Enlightenment thinker from Locke the writer on race, the author of the notorious colonial constitution of the Carolinas. Ownership was a feedback loop – the more you own the more you own yourself. The more logistics you apply the more logic you acquire; the more logic you deploy the more logistics you require. As Hortense Spillers says, the transatlantic slave trade was the supply chain of Enlightenment. It was never-ending quest and conquest, because ownership is perpetual loss. Gilles Deleuze said that he would rather call power “sad.” We might say the same of ownership, where lies the most direct sense of loss of sharing. This feeling of loss translates into a diabolical obsession with loss prevention. Logistics emerges as much as the science of loss prevention as the science of moving property through the emptiness, of making the world as it travels by filling it. Tis is not making the road as we walk, in the anarchist tradition. This is converting everything in its path into a coordinated time and space for ownership.

Such seizing, such grasping, and such loss prevention is the mode of operation for the wickedness of the Atlantic slave trade, the frst massive, diabolic, commercial logistics. Already this feedback loop of ownership experiences amplifed loss, the loss of sharing, with each emplotment. But now, in taking up the European heritage of race and slavery that Robinson identifes as emerging in the class struggle in Europe in the centuries directly before Locke and extending into Locke’s own time, a double loss is experienced, an intensifcation of the ownership feedback loop (and what we call the subject reaction). Tis evil emplotment of Africans is experienced as the potential loss of property that can fee. It is in this double loss of sharing – given in owning and in the imposition of being-owned – that the most deadly, planet-threatening, disease of the species-being emerges: whiteness. And it is for this reason that we can say logistics is the white science. (Tis is what many white people – who are the people, as James Baldwin says, who think they are white or that they ought to be – are doing when you see them walk straight past a queue of people and take a seat, or move to the center of a crowded room, or speak more loudly than those around them, or block a sidewalk while discussing ‘choices’ with their toddler. Making theory out of practice, they are emplotted, as they’ve been taught to do, establishing the spacetime of possession and self-possession in ownership. Every step they take is a standing of ground, a stomping of the world out of earthly existence and into racial capitalist human being. It grows more pronounced the more it is threatened, consumed by its own feedback loop, and it produces sharper and sharper subject reactions in the face of this threat. This is the old/new fascism: not the anonymity of following the leader, but the subject reaction to leadership, which can just as easily imagine itself to be liberal dissent from, as supposedly opposed to a lock(e)-step repetition of, its call. In emplotted time and space, the shortest distance between two abstract and dimensionless points – the empty spaces that are conjured to be (ful)flled as world, or worlds, or parts of world – is a straight and dimensionless line. Given imaginary extension, nature’s nest of boxes is a supply chain, a partnership of trade, a progress of henchmen in the wake of imaginal sovereignty. Te basic building blocks of the science of logistics emerge from this narrow geometry as brutalist geography. Te Traveling Salesman Problem is the problem of how to extend this idea – that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line – when there are multiple destinations and stops. Of course, logistics has often found this empty earth contains blocks and denies access. But the science builds itself up to overcome these blocks and achieve this access. Logistics aims to straighten us out, untangle us, and open us to its usufruct, its improving use; such access to us, in its turn, improves the fow line, the straight line. And what logistics takes to be the shortest distance between us requires emplotting us as bodies in space where interiority can be imposed even as the capacity for interiority can be denied, in the constant measure and regulation of fesh and earth.

#### **That management of loss causes pacification which intensifies violence over time**

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Phenomenology, as we are using it, is not about lived experience. It is the philosophical tradition of revealing different types of beings and things that contain meaning in our world, the structures and/or contexts in which they exist, and how these structures and contexts are meaningful. Understood in this way, violence is one of these structures and/or contexts. A phenomenological perspective does not approach violence from a particular normative position, although it does not preclude normative critique. A phenomenological approach does not treat violence as a discrete thing that one agent does to another, although it does not preclude such acts being described as violent. Instead, a phenomenological perspective adds to our intellectual and methodological toolbox by identifying violence as a condition or context in which people function. Phenomenology allows us to identify violence occurring in ways and in places that we otherwise would not be able to recognize. It does not change the meaning of violence (as harm, for example). Instead, it treats violence ontologically, enabling us to reveal more accurately the extent to which violence exists in the world. From a phenomenological perspective, violence is often inconspicuous. Violence can function as a naturalized or internalized regime of compulsion or domination. Pacification reveals both the pervasiveness of violence and forms of violence that may otherwise remain inconspicuous. The erasing of tradition and the enforcement of particular legal codes at the expense of indigenous cultural norms is one example of an inconspicuous form of violence that involves conspicuous and inconspicous consequences (Cocks 2014). In understanding violence phenomenologically, as a structure of revealing across multiple worlds, we are better able to reveal the extent to which violence shapes our world and how we are then shaped by violence. Pacavere The Romans understood violence as a necessary condition for pax. The liberal imagination [erases] itself to [obfuscates] the ways that pacification functions as violence in our world order. International relations scholarship’s strict distinction between peace and violence reinforces this obfuscation. Yet, the violence of (and in) pacification is central to the contemporary world. A phenomenological approach shows that moments of violent rupture are not aberrations of the world order. Violent outbreaks are breakdowns of pacification. It follows that multiple structures of the world order function as the violence of pacification, of pacavere.12 These structures include liberal capitalism, colonialism and the postcolonial aftermath, and war. Each functions as a key site of pacification. Anarchist thought reveals the pacification in liberal capitalism. Postcolonial thought reveals the pacification of colonial projects. Both anarchist and postcolonial thought demonstrate how war is a breakdown of pacification, revealing the hidden violent structures of our worldhood. Anarchist critiques of capitalism, unlike Marxist and liberal interpretations, take seriously the decisive role of state violence in structuring society and markets. Anarchists view the state as an institution that sustains elite appropriations of political and economic power (Proudhon [1861] 1998; Sorel 1999; Prichard 2015). Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy bear the costs of this enforced order. The state diffuses violence (pacification) throughout the entire society—often in ways that go unrecognized by its subjects (Sorel 1999, 65). The naturalization of violence consolidates arbitrary regimes of domination in society. While specific, countable incidents of violence may decline, the social order is largely premised on the threat of violence for contravening social norms making specific, countable incidents of violence relatively rare (Kinna and Prichard, forthcoming). Anarchist thinkers view rising inequality in the context of declining riots, insurgencies, and assassinations (see Figure 1) as evidence of pacification. Incidents of proletarian violence, anticolonial violence, riots, and protests are all examples of resistance to the “regimes of domination” that shape contemporary society, regimes easily identifiable by those subject to them (Gordon 2007, 33). Drawing on these accounts, we interpret declining rates of riots as a sign of increased pacification, rather than evidence that the system is becoming less violent. Conversely, eruptions of antistate and anticapitalist direct violence are signs of a breakdown in pacification. Much like Heidegger’s example of broken equipment (1962, 102–3, 412–13), which draws our attention to the background structures of our world, brief instances of direct violence reveal violently structured social relations. Although the liberal imagination obscures the centrality of violence, violence has always been central to the liberal world order—to the liberal worldhood—particularly during the colonial and imperial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bell 2007a, 2007b). Colonial violence was diffused throughout the entire society, often in ways that went unrecognized by the colonized themselves. The violence of pacification structured the very existence of the colonized subject. This violence transformed the colonized subjects into a different “species” (Fanon 1963, 35– 40, 43). Colonial pacification was more than direct and indirect violence; it was sufficiently diffuse to remake the psyche of the colonized, affecting their mental health and emotions (Fanon 1963, 35–106). Fanon (1963, 31) described it as “atmospheric violence,” a “violence rippling under the skin.” Unable to lash out against the colonizer, the colonized lived everyday within a world ordered by violence. In this world, the colonized could not respond to the colonizers for fear of directly violent reprisals and would turn to symbolic activities such as a dance circle to expose the violence experienced on a daily basis (Fanon 1963, 57). For the colonized, rituals such as the dance were a means of expressing existential frustrations with and resistance to the violence of colonial pacification through reenactments of direct violence. Ultimately, anticolonial struggles exposed the violence of colonialism by directing that violence back on its authors. Practices of colonial rule were central to developing liberal norms of sovereignty, as well as to the domination and control of recalcitrant populations whether within Europe, such as the English domination of the Welsh, Irish, and Scots, or outside of Europe by settler colonialists against indigenous populations (Deloria Jr 1974; Anghie 2005; Miller 2006; Havercroft 2008; Shaw 2008; Barkawi and Stanski 2012; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014; Lightfoot 2016; Rueda-Saiz 2017). This civilizing imagination functioned phenomenologically. It produced insiders as civilized and peaceful and outsiders as violent, external threats to civilization. In doing so, this imagination successfully obscured how the structures of liberalism produced colonial violence.13 FOOTNOTE 13 Arguments about the foundational role of colonialism, primitive accumulation, and white supremacy in structuring the modern international system are particularly useful in thinking about phenomenological violence (Jones 2006; Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015; Du Bois 1915; Shaw 2008; Coulthard 2014; Deloria 1974; Lowe 2015; Hartman 1997). The legacy of these practices pervades contemporary liberal peace-building (Richmond 2014; Sabaratnam 2015; Bouka 2013; Autesserre 2009) and liberal global governance (Koomen 2014a, 2014b, 2013), while trade liberalization can facilitate mass violence (Kamola 2007; Smith 2016). Césaire argues that colonialism produced a “boomerang effect” within European societies; Nazism was the return of violence previously “applied only to non-European peoples” (Césaire 2000, 36). At independence, international law became a mechanism for reinforcing this international order upon the previously colonized world (Grovogui 1996). The idea of war as an external practice of states, not tied to their internal workings and located according to specific normative projections of Western identity, followed from this colonial mentality. This mentality legitimized the exporting of violence to create a Western imperial pax and was so widespread that it shaped the development of modern warfare (Ellis 1986; Proudhon [1861] 1998). The colonial wars reproduced and reinforced ideologies of Western superiority, evidenced in part by the West’s superior military technology. A consequence of this racist hubris was the inability to foresee the destructive tendencies of Western warfare when unleashed against themselves (Ellis 1986). The discipline of international relations, founded in response to the unexpectedly destructive character of the First World War, reproduced this understanding of war.14 This understanding disguises the possibility of increasing violence within the liberal world by presuming a historical narrative of progress and being shocked by its aberration. War, however, is not the absence of peace or an aberration of liberal progress, but is instead a phenomenological breaking of the liberal worldhood.15 Once a liberal order of democracy, free markets, and international institutions are spread throughout the world, liberal ideology imagines peace as the end state. Yet, states often deploy war under liberal guises.16 Wars under the aegis of humanitarian values and regime change are examples of the multifaceted character of liberal pacification. Liberal regimes emphasize the violence of those that they are invading, while minimizing the violence involved in these military undertakings and the violence necessary to sustain the liberal societies themselves. What Pierre-Joseph Proudhon called “the moral phenomenology of war” (Prichard 2015, 112–34; Proudhon [1861] 1998) becomes an integral part of the everyday workings of society that shape innumerable aspects of our daily language. The upshot is that, within liberal ideology, the violence committed by liberal states is justified, whereas the violence committed by illiberal states is not. Postcolonial and anarchist scholarship focuses on the incorporation of violence in the production of liberal spaces (Barkawi and Laffey 1999). These same concerns can be directed onto the liberal order itself. Seen from the perspective of marginalized and oppressed populations, the structures of liberal pacification take on a distinctly violent aspect. The liberal world is not less violent. Rather, the liberal world involves a sophisticated phenomenological process of legitimating certain types of violence in order to render other types of violence invisible. Liberal Pacification What does it mean to apply this third type of violence to our understanding of international relations? Pacification reveals liberalism as a violent process as opposed to a system that is emblematic of the absence of direct violence. There are parallels between the Pax Britannia, Pax Americana, and the ancient peace of the Pax Romana (Neocleous 2010, 13). However, our account emphasizes the crucial role of pacification as a distinct kind of violence in maintaining these pacific orders. Our theory offers the novel insight that incorporating pacification into the analysis of the liberal peace reveals crucial aspects of this peace that conventional and critical accounts neglect. A focus on pacification provides three critical insights. First, it recovers the crucial role of pacification in the historical founding of the liberal order. Second, by distinguishing between three kinds of violence (Figure 2), we account for the empirical observations of the liberal peace as leading to a decline in direct violence and an increase in violence overall as part of the pacification of the Pax Americana. Conversely, the liberal version of the Pax Americana cannot account for key anomalies. Third, our approach draws attention to the violent ordering of social relations. This dimension of violence is neglected even in Marxist, postcolonial, neo-Gramscian, and post-structuralist critiques of the liberal peace, which primarily focus on the role of direct and indirect violence in maintaining the Pax Americana. Contemporary liberal international relations theory emphasizes the nonviolent role of the liberal triad (democracy, free markets, and institutions) in causing the liberal peace. Yet, a quick review of the history of liberalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that key figures in liberalism, from John Stuart Mill, to Joseph Galliéni, to American foreign policy elites, understood pacification as a necessary step in establishing and maintaining the liberal order Mill, one of the philosophical founders of liberalism, conceptualized and deployed liberalism as a domination strategy. Mill argued that it is appropriate to impose despotism or slavery on “savages” who incline to “fighting and rapine,” but the government should use force as little as possible: What they require is not a government of force, but one of guidance. Being, however, in too low a state to yield to the guidance of any but those to whom they look up as the possessors of force, the sort of government fittest for them is one [that] possesses force, but seldom uses it. (Mill 1998, 232–33) In terms of our conceptual distinction, Mill argued that liberalism as pacification was a more effective instrument of violence than the direct modes of violence that governments usually deploy. The history of European colonialism is replete with this line of reasoning. “[L]iberal improvement” was a regular plank of colonial strategy by France and Britain in the nineteenth century (Owens 2015, 154). Consider one example from the French colonial tradition. Galliéni, a military commander and administrator, consciously deployed liberalism as a domination strategy in the pacification of Tonkin during the 1890s. Galliéni’s strategy involved slowly spreading military outposts and deploying civil administrators to create markets, schools, and amenities. The rationale was that locals would gain a personal interest in the continuation of French control and would help to quell Chinese brigandage. “Piracy,” said Galliéni, “is the result of an economic condition. It can be fought by prosperity” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). Galliéni devised a “theory of pacification” in which “the correct combination of force and politics can socialize, pacify, and domesticate a population into regulating itself” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). What Mill proposed in theory, Galliéni enacted in practice; pacification—the violent reordering of social relations in a colony—was a more effective means of maintaining liberal rule than the deployment of direct violence. While less explicit, the relationship between liberalism and imperialism remained present in the twentieth-century development of the Pax Americana. During this era, US policy makers sought to construct a zone of peace distinct from the zones of war associated with authoritarian regimes. The US State Department first recognized the concept of “hegemonic pacification” in the Euro-Atlantic conference diplomacy of the 1920s (Cohrs 2008, 619). The United States’ “strategic restraint” in the aftermath of World War Two was motivated by this concept of liberal, hegemonic pacification (Ikenberry 2009; Ikenberry 2011, 173). US defense officials Stimson, Patterson, McCloy, and Assistant Secretary Howard C. Peterson agreed that it was a matter of the security interests of the United States to maintain “open markets, unhindered access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much—if not all—of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines” (Leffler 1984, 349–56; Barkawi and Laffey 1999). Liberalism as a domination and pacifying strategy continued throughout (and long after) the Cold War (Laffey 2003; Stokes 2003), as evident in one of the founding documents of the post–World War Two liberal order, NSC-68 (Ikenberry 2011, 168). While the enforcement of a Pax Americana eventually yielded a decline in direct violence, it produced an increase in other types of violence. The first insight of our theory is that pacification has always been part of the liberal project and that the violence in the liberal project never went away. The second insight is that by reinterpreting the liberal peace as liberal pacification we are able to grant the empirical findings of liberal peace theorists while maintaining that the Pax Americana represents an intensification of violence overall. In the language of positivist social science, our theory is observationally equivalent to that of liberal peace theory. We expect that the quantity of direct violence inversely associates with the degree of pacification in a society. Therefore, our interpretation challenges research that identifies liberal institutions as the cause of declining violence. Liberal institutions, as apparatuses of liberal pacification, ensure that direct violence is increasingly rare while leaving the structures of violence and domination in place. The observational equivalence on particular dependent variables (in our case, all forms of direct violence) produces a theoretical change requiring the generation of novel observable implications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 30). Furthermore, increased suffering in liberal societies provides evidence contradicting the main claims of liberal peace theories, while remaining consistent with liberal pacification. At its core, liberalism is a project that tries to maximize the utility of its subjects (in other words, minimize suffering while maximizing happiness). As such, a state of liberal peace should lead to a decrease in markers of suffering. However, there is more slavery in the world today than ever before, with conservative estimates of between 12.3 and 27 million people in debt bondage, chattel, or contract slavery (Gordon 2012).17 Moreover, there is ample evidence of rising psychological disorders in liberal societies. A preponderance of evidence from the United States suggests that depression, anxiety, alienation, opioid dependency, stress, other related psychological disorders, increased social isolation, and the decline of community have increased throughout the twentieth century (Twenge, Zhang, and Im 2004, 320; Adler, Boyce, Chesney, et al. 1994; Twenge 2000; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, et al. 2008; Twenge, Gentile, DeWall, et al. 2010; Cohen and Janicki-Deverts 2012; American Society of Addiction Medicine 2016). Changes to human life associated with modernity have caused psychological stress to increase (Jackson 2014). Mortality rates have increased for some white, non-Hispanics aged 45–54 in the United States between 1999 and 2013 (Case and Deaton 2015). Modern technological advances from television to the Internet may contribute to increasing separation and alienation of the social human animal into individualized bodies connected by increasingly weak and empty bonds (Putnam 2000; Gray 2011; Turkle 2011). At minimum, new information communication technology such as Facebook can increase the stress and anxiety of its users (Lee-Won, Herzog, and Park 2015). The violent structuring of liberalism enables increases in social alienation, anxiety, stress, and human bondage through repression, economic control, and social isolation. These are not isolated instances of suffering. They are fundamental structural features of our liberal world. If liberalism is a process of pacification rather than simply peace, then this rise in individual suffering in liberal spaces may be evidence of a similar process that Fanon equated with the psychic life of the colonist. Just as Fanon’s colonial subjects, unable to lash out at the settler through direct violence, internalized their suffering, modern liberal subjects, unable to resist liberal pacification, internalize their suffering (1982, chap. 6; cf. Sorel 1999, 118). Liberal peace should bring about a rise in happiness; that it has instead led to rising suffering is evidence of liberal pacification. Third, in addition to offering an alternative interpretation of the liberal peace, our theory of liberal pacification supplements key insights from critical approaches to peace. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey’s work on imperial processes and liberal spaces makes a similar point to ours, that the celebrated zone of liberal peace rests on practices of violence (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 2002; cf. Neocleous et al. 2013). Their account, however, focuses on practices of direct violence, such as humanitarian interventions against authoritarian regimes or corporations hiring local militias to make work sites in the global south safe for economic extraction (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 422). Our point is that these moments of direct violence lead to pacification wherein social relations have been so violently reordered as to make direct violence no longer necessary. Once direct violence has established liberal space, pacification functions as a structure of violence that sustains the space. Direct violence only manifests itself when pacification weakens. Pacification, however, does not merely operate through manipulating the conscience of its subjects. While Marxist and Gramscian concepts of ideology and hegemony are consistent with our theory of pacification (Peceny 1997, 418), they do not address how the constructed political order sustains itself through a violent reordering of social relations. A Gramscian-inspired critique of the democratic peace can yield a bird’s-eye view of the ways in which liberal peace theory is itself deployed as an ideological tool (Ish-Shalom 2006, 569–75). However, Gramscianinspired approaches do not account for the ways that everyday practices of violence (for example, surveillance technologies, implied threats from weapons, security barriers, etc.) sustain liberal pacification. While ideational factors are important in pacification, these factors rest upon practices and structures that are of an ontological-existential character. To review, our reinterpretation of the liberal peace as liberal pacification offers three novel insights. First, liberal scholars and others associate the development of the liberal order with peace and a decline in violence by ignoring how pacification is part of the liberal project. Second, the empirically observed decline in violence equated with the liberal peace is not necessarily a sign of human progress but could be a sign of intensified repression or increases in other forms of suffering across the liberal world order. Third, our concept of pacification reveals violence that is neither direct nor indirect but is phenomenologically structured into the world order. Understanding liberalism as pacification produces a paradigm shift. Liberal pacification is violent in the sense that it coerces a specific type of liberal docility, while also preventing types of resistance that might be understood as violent, including riots, insurrections, civil wars, and interstate wars. Pacification reveals the ongoing violence at the heart of a political project that imagines itself to be against violence. Conclusion Our account of pacification recovers a crucial aspect of pax, one originally etched into Roman monuments. The heading of the Res Gestae (the funeral monument to Emperor Augustus) reads, “[t]his is how he [Augustus] made the world subject to the power of the people of Rome” (Beard 2016, 364). This monument does not celebrate peace as the absence of violence; it celebrates pacification. Pax takes the form of a process that violently reorders the world so that imperial subjects are rendered incapable of using violence to resist Roman rule. The absence of overt acts of violence depends upon the maximization of pacification. The practice of pacification includes threats, coercion, intimidation, and surveillance to restructure and sustain social and political relations. When this type of violence operates effectively, it appears as the absence of violence; pacification’s violence resides in the structuring of the prevailing order. While such an outcome may appear peaceful, it entails, at best, a negative peace that operates through a violent and coercive reordering of society. Liberal peace advocates measure direct violence and equate the decline in that kind of violence with peace. However, our claim is that the spread of liberal institutions does not necessarily decrease violence but transforms it. Our phenomenological analysis captures empirical trends in human domination and suffering that liberal peace theories fail to account for, including increased inequality, slavery, anxiety, addiction, and anomie. Our analysis also highlights how a decline in direct violence may actually coincide with the transformation of violence in ways that are concealed, monopolized, and structured into the fabric of modern liberal society. If our theory is correct, we will find increases in markers of suffering as society liberalizes. While we cannot say whether these indicators are unique to pacified liberal societies, it is significant that they are rarely, if ever, discussed in terms of violence and the liberal peace. Liberal pacification is observationally equivalent to liberal peace. This is not a semantic argument. Liberal peace advocates claim that processes that promote individual freedom and autonomy (that is, democracy, free markets, and global institutions) cause peace. While the restructuring of the global order—pacification—reduces direct violence, it also restructures social relations in ways that are violent. Declines in directly observable violence render other forms of violence invisible as violence; in fact, insidious, coercive, and violent systems of military deterrence and compellence, nuclear terror, surveillance, and intimidation constitute the worldhood of the liberal order.

#### The supply chains recontextualizes workers into positions of synaptic labor

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Taken together as contemporary phenomena and in their long, braided historical trajectories, these two shifts in operations management – kaizen and logistics – lead us to a diferent understanding of what is extracted from labor today. Rather than displaying individual labor power, workers must manifest synaptic labor, a capacity for composition given in having been entered, as it were, into the flow of assembly upon command. And with every email, with every text or post, the command is given. One is, at once, instantiated and called upon as data and as syntactic unit. Tis is logistical capitalism, where what is valued is work directed toward the improvement of the flow, whichflows everywhere and over everybody. **Workers – if that is the right term for those who are called upon to assemble or asked to operationalize these non-linear, infnite lines of assembly – must connect the flow while also improving it, pass on the data while also enhancing and augmenting and embodying it, enter a given affective zone while providing passage to a new zone, read what is sent while also commenting on what they send**. Te language of operations management is the language of synaptic labor at work. Te terms of operations management have become the terms of our common sense: lead time, fexibility, availability, resources, scheduling, and resource allocation. Synaptic labor plugs in anywhere, translates anything, and one must devise one’s own forms of “queue theory” for the flow of lines that run in every direction, like a sea. Workers themselves are responsible for the forms of conditioning that render and maintain their accountability. The importance of the commodity pales in comparison to that of the quality of the flow along which it travels, which is the infrastructure workers make and make better, more resilient.

#### **This means that they are either those who logistics extracts from or those who improve logistics’ ability to extract.**

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Still, today this beating of commodity on commodity insists on a world as never before, wraps its beats around the earth in which the party is compulsory. And it penetrates deep into what did not appear vulnerable or even possible to force into its time and space. Its one-two becomes a zero-one, zero-one as it sorts thoughts, affects, flesh, information, nerves, in ever more precise and minute attributes of duplicate separation. In short, this rhythm becomes an algorithm. Every thing it captures, every thing it invades, every thing it settles is set with a beat that is compelled to hear itself everywhere, feel itself everywhere. This compulsion drives deeper into the bodies it activates, the information it circulates, the nerves it fires to new connections, new networks of discretion and equivalence. Its arbitrage opens this discretion in what was thought to be indivisible, whole, singular, and then opening this discretion closes it in equivalence, clears it for the next beat at the new margins of its rapacious drumming. So, too, does its time and space force every thing into the claustrophobia of its world beat, every thing that is not fugitive is lost.”

To be formed is to be formed in this rhythm, to be algorithmically composed, to be compelled to carry this rhythm but also to develop it, to improve it, to export and import it, which is to say that to be algorithmically composed is not just to be beaten but to beat. This beaten beating is what might be called synaptic labor. To answer the compulsion of logistical capitalism it is necessary not just to carry this beat but to improve it, not just to be available to this rhythm but to make this rhythm available, to assail with this rhythm, to prevail in this rhythm against the surrounding informality that unsettles this zero-one, one-two, with a militancy that is neither one nor its absence.

What is synaptic labor? It is in the first instance to be opened involuntarily, by compulsion, capriciously, to this rhythm that kills. But this moment of equivalence, of subject embodiment, of exploitable nerve and affect is matched by a degraded discretion, an impulse to take the beating in order to be worthy of holding the whip, an impulse to plot the rhythm upon the earth, to regulate with the rhythm, to form roving beats against fugitive grooves. To improve the land, to make new the people, these old cries uttered over the killing rhythm come back intensively, invasively, internally in synaptic labor, which always begins with administering the beat to one’s own rhythm by administering a one to own. The drummer is discrete but indifferent.

The rhythm operates by way of a line. This line is two, zero and one. It is an assembly line where the same is done and the same is improved, as if in courtship with difference, until it is done again. The forwarded email with a comment is the mundane kaizen of this rhythm. But this example is deceptive, too, because it is not action but composure, comportment, algorithmic composition that is at stake. Improvement occurs in synaptic labor mostly not through making, but through making more available for exploitation, a primitive accumulation of the senses, and expropriation of intention, attention, and tension. The rhythm operates by way of an assembly line that runs through society, through the social factory, not to make anything in particular but itself. The line of production is its own product. This was the real meaning of kaizen, the improvement of improvement: metrics, algorithmic composition for itself. This means another connection must always be made, and another zero-one opened by that connection. Every connection becomes an arbitrage, every nerve is speculative as it fires in synapsis with another connection, discrete, equivalent, discrete again in nervous metrics of improvement. This metrics is both neurological and pathological in the face of all undercommon measure. And it must pursue such fugitive measure by necessity, by the compulsion to make available and be made available to this rhythm everywhere, all the time, in the where and when of this killing beat.

#### Prefer our definition because alternative defintitions utilize racial capitalist precision used by operations management to sever us from generative discussion of affective labor

Moten & Harney 21 [Fred Moten works in the Departments of Performance Studies and Comparative Literature at New York University Stefano Harney is Professor of Strategic Management at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University, “All Incomplete”, book chapter “AGAINST MANAGEMENT: Watermelon Mannishness ”]//sripad

The capstone students were in the right place to attempt to study this laboring of the algorithm. The class read Marx on alienation, and then read him on the senses too – on how the senses might become theoreticians in their practice. Tey read Marx talking about nature losing its mere utility by becoming human use, or by fully becoming means. Logistics, however, requires us to utilize our means rather than to (sensually, thoughtfully) practice (as) them. Our senses have long been understood as the means to knowledge, but not often as social means without ends, which is not the same as if they were ends in themselves but is, rather, that they are means in themselveslessness; not as theoreticians in their own right but, rather, in a rite that is not owned but shared in a jurisgenerativity whose making and unmaking is given in a general disbursement way on the other side of right’s philosophy. On the one hand, logistics intensifes the opportunities to live a sensuous collective life that is immediately material in its means and as its means. But on the other hand, logistics also wants to dematerialize our means, to abstract them and submit them to the concept – the concept of valuation, and the concept of proft.

And most immediately, logistics wants to submit our means to the concept of flow. Te class could well have studied Marx for this insight too. He predicted that “continuous flow” in capitalist production would increasingly become the focus of productivity eforts and would increasingly contribute to proft. But even though the capstone did not study his predictions onflow, Marx has been taken up and dematerialized in the business school by the discipline of operations management. Looking at operations management in a way it would not look at itself, we could say it is a capitalist science that studies the relationship between variable and constant capital in motion. Operations management understands itself as the science of the factory, and especially of the assembly line, and even more particularly of what we might call after Marx (and, in a diferent vein, Raymond Williams), “the flow of the line.” By the flow of the line we mean operations management’s attention not to workers or machines, nor even to the relationship between the two. While other management sciences, focus on variable capital, like the study of organizational behavior, or on constant capital, like accounting, what characterizes operations management is attention to a certain kind of motion. Not the assembly line then but the assembly line’s motion, in flow. Operations management focuses on workers and machines as they appear along the flow of the line in order to make that flow line flow. In other words, the flow of the line mediates the relationship between worker and machine and determines, rather than is determined by, the proportions of variable and constant capital.

#### **Logistics employs the European model of domination to manage its human resources -- That ensures exhaustion via the rhythm of work – which resistance cant solve and only worsens**

Harney 15 [Stefano Harney is Professor of Strategic Management at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University, “Hapticality in the Undercommons, or From Operations Management to Black Ops,” 2015, The Routledge Companion to Art and Politics, URL if you need it <https://www.academia.edu/6934195/Hapticality_in_the_Undercommons_or_From_Operations_Management_to_Black_Ops>. bracketed] gendered language used by fanon]//sripad

In the conclusion to Frantz Fanon’s classic work Les damnés de la terre  something remarkable happens. In the course of the book, Fanon has taken us through his searing analysis of the psychology, culture, class, and nationalism of the colonizedand the colonizer. He has examined revolutionary thought and action as never before.And he has vividly portrayed the gravediggers of colonialism. Then, in the conclusion, he focuses sharply and suddenly on the relation of the newly liberated post-colonial peoples to work. Fanon begins his conclusion by calling for the rejection of what he calls the‘European model’ in the coming post-colonial world:

When I search for someone [Man] in the technique and the style of Europe, I see only asuccession of negations of someone[man], and an avalanche of murders.But what is this European model, what is at the heart of this model, why thenegations, the unending blood-soaked dawns? Here is Fanon’s answer: But let us be clear: what matters is to stop talking about output, and intensification, and the rhythm of work. The coming post-colonial nations must break not only with the negations of history ,culture, and personality wrought by colonialism but with the ‘rhythm of work’ imposed by the European model. And he clarifies: No, there is no question of a return to Nature. It is simply a very concrete question of not dragging them [men] towards mutilation, of not imposing upon the brain rhythms that very quickly obliterate it and wreck it. The pretext of catching up must not be used to push them [man] around, to tear them [him] away from themselves [himself] or from their [his] privacy, to break and kill them [him].

Here is that word ‘rhythm’ again. ‘Rhythms imposed on the brain’ this time, imposed by a drive to ‘catch up.’ Catching up was a phrase much circulated in the takeofftheories of capitalist development pushed by the United States in the Cold War. But,Fanon points out, this catching up constitutes a rhythm that ‘breaks’ and ‘kills’ people people [man].This is a rhythm that ‘tears people [people [man]] away from themselves [himself],’ that ‘obliterates’ and ‘wrecks’ their [his] brain. Fanon uses the metaphor of the ‘caravan’ for a system that tears people [man] awayfrom themselves [himself]. No, we do not want to catch up with anyone. What we want to do is to goforward all the time, night and day, in the company of People [man], in the company ofall people [men]. The caravan should not be stretched out, for in that case each line willhardly see those who precede it; and people [men] who no longer recognize each other meet less and less together, and talk to each other less and less.

The ‘caravan,’ or what would come to be called globalization, or what might betermed more precisely, logistics. Notice that the caravan, a term of trade, is here transposed to a chain of work, a line, an assembly line with a rhythm that breaks and kills people [man]. This is a pathological caravan that ‘tears apart the functions’ of people [man]. It is a question of the Third World starting a new history of People [man], a history which will have regard to the sometimes prodigious theses which Europe has put forward, but which will also not forget **Europe’s crimes**, of which the most horrible was committed in the heart of people [man], and **consisted of the pathological tearing apart of their [his] functions and the crumbling away of their [his] unity** .Fanon reminds us here too of the ‘prodigious theses,’ Marxism, and the history ofenlightenment thought. But it has not been enough to prevent ‘the most horriblecrimes.’ This crime is wrapped in racism and colonialism but at its heart, Fanon says,it is this rhythm of work, this pathological global caravan of work. Even if racism and colonialism cannot be reduced to the crime of slave, indentured, and coloniallabour, that crime lies at the heart. The European model of domination, Fanonreminds us in his conclusion, was to steal land and people not to support their mode of production as in past empires, but to impose a new rhythm of work on a global scale,a global assembly line tearing apart the functions of people [man]

#### The resolution assumes a neoliberal progression instead of logistics violent stasis – extrinsic resistance is commodified and reincorporated as “disruptive innovation” which logistics is able to capture. Only starting the discussion at the level of subjecthood can we plot escape without ensuring adaptive governance

Moten & Harney 21 [Fred Moten works in the Departments of Performance Studies and Comparative Literature at New York University Stefano Harney is Professor of Strategic Management at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University, “All Incomplete”, book chapter “AGAINST MANAGEMENT: Watermelon Mannishness ”]//sripad

**Disruptive innovation is the term in management science** – especially in the feld of strategy – that is used to designate a kaizen event in the social feld. A kaizen event is **an unexpected turn in the flow of the line**, or a surprising insight about thatflow, **that is then integrated as an improvement to the flow**. As Marina Vishmidt astutely points out in the context of contemporary art, this disruption of the flow lines of assembly makes no distinction between the flow and those who reproduce it.64 We are called things and are then called upon to be nimble Canadian salesmen full of innovative volition in a Great White North gone global. We are everywhere degraded in common loneliness and fattered every day in being made to make new theories of connection. Social life is subject to metrics that seek out and valorize disruption as improvement and improvement as the only metric, leaving any repose in social life – what we would call, with Valentina Desideri, our militant conservation, the fermentation of our desires – subject to attack as anti-social. And so, we must dissemble in order to renew our habits of assembly so we can breathe in the breadth of our means. Communal sensual life emerges in the hapticality of those called upon to assemble thisflow, those who dissemble thisflow in their renewed assembly, running underground and overhead and undercommon. Tis is the uncontrollable improvisational efect of a general and material communicability that refuses the virtualization that forms its shadowed, accidental fellow travelers. Tis living, poetic communicability lays down other lines that it exceeds, riding the blinds, jaywalking the streets, or staying home in sub-domestic, ante-logistic transmutation.

Blackness and the Bug

Subject-reactive recoil can never produce the full refusal, sabotage, or indirection that (the demise of) logistical capitalism requires. Though it is a reaction to the degradation of means, it is itself, in its individuation, a degraded reaction. What synaptic labor does begin to make clear is that any kind of subject formation, or individual identity dematerialized from the general and generative ecology of the society of labor under logistical capitalism, is already bound up with a value chain of brain, mind, identity, and subject. Consider, for instance, as the very embodiment of the very idea of the considered instance, Gregor Samsa, a traveling salesman who wakes up one morning and finds – his body having been accessed so completely by the flow that he cannot move in it, or pass as its embodiment, or accept its passage through him, or foster its improvement – that he is a bug. He is, in this regard, the apotheosis of individual resistance in individual defeat. He cannot accede to the monstrousness of his body’s loss, though this would be the only way for him to block this access, to fnd a way out or a way of schedule, to keep from being straightened out by another in the flow. His hardness means he can only move wrongly for his family, scurrying, dragging the monstrosity that is his but that he cannot own or control. And rather than being protected by this hardness, this unstraightened movement, his only idea, and that of his family, is that the monstrosity that is not him, or his, must be dematerialized.

#### That’s why you vote affirmative for disassembly – the unmaking of the neoliberal self. It constitutes both the catastrophic potential to let the social factory burn in its own access and the generative possibility of living in brokenness. It’s a strike of synaptic laborers via disassembly – remember we are the workers

**Moten and Harney 15** (Fred Moten, Professor of Performance Studies at the Tisch School of the Arts at NYU, PhD from UC Berkeley, Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University, co-founder of the School for Study, PhD from the University of Cambridge, September 2015, “Mikey the Rebelator,” *Performance Research: A Journal of the Performing Arts* Volume 20 Issue 4) gz

When we move we move to access, which is to say we **assemble and disassemble anew**. And in logistical capitalism the assembly line moves with us by moving through us, accessing us to move and moving us to access. We can’t deny access, because access is how we roll, and roll on, **in and as our undercommon affectability**, as Denise Ferreira da Silva might say.4 **But we make access burn** and we love that, the **line undone in the undoing of every single product**, our **renewed assembly in the general disassembly**, our **dissed assembly offline on the line**, strayed staying, stranded beneath the strand, at rest only in unrest, making all the wrong moves, because **our doing and undoing ain’t the same as theirs**.5 They know, sometimes better than we do, that to move wrong, or not to move, is now no longer just an obstruction to logistics or an obstacle to progress. **To move wrong or not to move is sabotage**. **It is an attack on the assembly line, a subversion of logistical capitalism**. **To move wrong is to deny access to capital by staying in the general access that capital desires and devours and denies**. To move wrong, to move nought, is **to have our own thing of not having**, of handing and being handed; it is our continuous breaking up – before, and against that, we were told – of our continuous get together. But with the critical infrastructure that is the new line, and with the resilient response that protects it, the jay-walker becomes no longer just a rube in the way of logistics, a country bukee in traffic, **but a saboteur, a terrorist, a demon**. Jay-walkers do not sabotage by exodus or occupation as once a maroon, or a striking miner, or a ghost dancer may have. Jay-walkers disturb the production line, the work of the line, the assembly line, the flow line, by **demanding inequality of access for all**. When the line don’t stop to let you catch your breath, **jay-walkers stand around and say this stops today**. Jay-walking is dissed assembly for itself. **Such sabotage is punishable by death**. It’s hard to know what we institute when we don’t institute but we do know what it feels like.

**Total value and its violence not only never went away**, but as da Silva says, they are the **foundation of the present as time**, the condition of time, of **the world as a time–space logic founded on the first horrible logistics of sale, the first mass movement of total access**.6 Now continuous improvement **drives us toward total value**, **makes all work incomplete**, **makes us move to produce**, compels us to get online. We are liberated from work in order **to work more, to work harder**. We are **violently invited** to exercise our right to connect, our right to free speech, our right to choose, our right to evaluate, our right to right individuality in order that we may **improve the production line running through our liberal dreams**. Freedom through work was never the slave’s cry but we hear it all around us today. Continuous improvement is the **metric and metronomic meter of uplift**. Those who won’t improve, those who won’t collectivize and individuate with the correct neurotic correctness, those who do the same thing again, those who revise, those who tell the joke you’ve heard and cook the food you’ve had and take the walk you’ve walked, those who plan to stay and keep on moving, those who keep on moving wrong – **those are the ones who hold everybody back, fucking up the production line that’s supposed to improve us all**. **They like being incomplete**. **They like being incomplete and incompleting one another**. Their incompleteness is said to be a dependency, a bad habit. They’re said to be partial, patchy, sketchy. They lack coordinates. They’re collectively uncoordinated in total rhythm. They’re in(self)sufficient.

Paolo Friere thought **our incompleteness is what gave us hope**.7 **It is our incompleteness that inclines us toward one another**. For Friere, the more we think of ourselves as complete, finished, whole, individual, **the more we cannot love or be loved**. Is it too much to put this the other way around? To say, by way of Friere, that **love is the undercommon self-defence of being-incomplete?** This seems important now when our incompleteness is something we are invited and then compelled to address and improve, when we are told to be impatient with it, and embarrassed by it. We need to be intact. We’re told to raise our buzz because we’re all fucked up. **But in our defence we love that we are complete only in a plained incompletion, which they would have undone, finished, owned, and sent on down the line**. **We do mind working because we do mind dying**.

**This isn’t just abstraction but ongoing resistance that happen in our thoughts, actions, provocations, and explorations. Our model of debate seeks to extend towards new levels of understanding and immanent processes of resistance that unleash beautiful insurgencies from the ground up.**

**Shukaitis and Graeber 7** (Stevphen Shukaitis is Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex, Centre for Work and Organization, and a member of the Autonomedia editorial collective. David Rolfe Graeber is an American anthropologist and anarchist activist, perhaps best known for his 2011 volume Debt: The First 5000 Years. He is professor of anthropology at the London School of Economics. “Constituent Imagination: Militant Investigations // Collective Theorization.” ISBN 978-1-904859-35-2. Library of Congress Number: 2006924199 ©2007 p intro //shree)

Thoughts. Provocations. Explorations. Forms of investigation and social research that expand possibilities for political action, proliferating tactics of resistance through the constituent power of the imagination. Walking, we ask questions, not from the perspective of the theorist removed and separate from organizing, but rather from within and as part of the multiple and overlapping cycles and circuits of struggle. For the removed theorist, movements themselves are mere abstractions, pieces of data to be categorized, analyzed, and fixed. The work of militant investigation is multiple, collectively extending forms of antagonism to new levels of understanding, composing flesh-made words from immanent processes of resistance. Far from vanguardist notions of intellectual practice that translate organizing strategies and concepts for populations who are believed to be too stupid or unable to move beyond trade union consciousness, it is a process of collective wondering and wandering that is not afraid to admit that the question of how to move forward is always uncertain, difficult, and never resolved in easy answers that are eternally correct. As an open process, militant investigation discovers new possibilities within the present, turning bottlenecks and seeming dead ends into new opportunities for joyful insurgency. A beautiful example of this is John Holloway’s book, Change the World Without Taking Power World Without Taking Power. Holloway, a soft-spoken Scottish political . Holloway, a soft-spoken Scottish political philosopher, was associated with the “Open Marxism” school developed at the University of Edinburgh where he taught in the 1970s and ’80s. In 1991, he moved to Mexico where he took a position with the Instituto de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales in the Universidad Autónoma de Puebla. After the Zapatista rebellion broke out in 1994, he quickly became one of its chief intellectual supporters. In 1998, he helped compile a book of essays on the Zapatistas called Zapatista! Reinventing Revolution in Mexico; this was his attempt to think through the implications of this new revolutionary paradigm, one which rejected classic Marxist ideas of vanguardism and the very project of trying to seize state power for one of building autonomous communities rooted in new forms of direct democracy, using the categories of Marxist theory. The result was an extremely dense book. At certain points, it reads like a mixture of Marxist jargon and lyric poetry: In the beginning is the scream. We scream. When we write or when we read, it is easy to forget that the beginning is not the word, but the scream. Faced with the mutilation of human lives by capitalism, a scream of sadness, a scream of horror, a scream of anger, a scream of refusal: NO. The starting point of theoretical refl ection is opposition, negativity, struggle. It is from rage that thought is born, not from the pose of reason, not from the reasoned-sitting-back-and-refl ecting-on-the-mysteries-of-existence that is the conventional image of the thinker. We start from negation, from dissonance. The dissonance can take many shapes. An inarticulate mumble of discontent, tears of frustration, a scream of rage, a confi dent roar. An unease, a confusion, a longing, a critical vibration.1 More than anything else, it’s a book about knowledge. Holloway argues that reality is a matter of humans doing and making things together: what we perceive as fi xed self-identical objects are really processes. The only reason we insist on treating objects as anything else is because, if we saw them as they really are, as mutual projects, it would be impossible for anyone to claim ownership of them. All liberatory struggle therefore is ultimately the struggle against identity. Forms of knowledge that simply arrange and classify reality from a distance—what Holloway refers to as “knowledge about”—may be appropriate for a vanguard party that wants to claim the right to seize power and impose itself on the basis of some privileged “scientific” understanding, but ultimately it can only work to reinforce structures of domination. True revolutionary knowledge would have to be different. It would have to be a pragmatic form of knowledge that lays bare all such pretensions; a form of knowledge deeply embedded in the logic of transformational practice. **Furious debates ensued**. Leninists and Trotskyites lambasted the book as utopian for adopting what they considered a naïve anarchist position—one that was completely ignorant of political realities. Anarchists were alternately inspired and annoyed, often noting that Holloway seemed to echo anarchist ideas without ever mentioning them, instead writing as if his positions emerged naturally from a correct reading of classic Marxist texts. Others objected to the way he read the texts. Supporters of Toni Negri’s Spinozist version of Marxism denounced the book as so much Hegelian claptrap; others suggested that Holloway’s argument that any belief in self-identical objects was a refl ection of capitalist logic seemed to imply that capitalism had been around since the invention of language, which ultimately made it very diffi cult to imagine an alternative. In Latin America, where the battle was particularly intense, a lot of the arguments turned around very particular questions of revolutionary strategy. **Who has the better model**: the **Zapatistas** of Chiapas or **Chavez**’s Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela? Were the Argentine radicals who overthrew four successive regimes in December of 2001 right to refuse seizing power, to reject the entire domain of formal politics and try to create their own autonomous institutions? Or had they allowed an opportunity for genuine revolutionary change to slip through their grasp? For many in the global justice movement in Europe and North America, the book provided the perfect counterpoint to Michael Hardt and Negri’s Empire, then being hailed in the media as the bible of the movement. Where Hardt and Negri were drawing on an Italian autonomist tradition that saw capital not as imposing itself on labor but as constantly having to adjust itself to the power of workers’ struggle, Holloway was arguing that this approach did not go nearly far enough. In fact, capital was labor and capitalism the system that makes it impossible for us to see this. Capitalism is something we make every day and the moment we stop making it, it will cease to exist. There were endless Internet debates. Seminars and reading groups were held comparing the two arguments in probably a dozen different languages.

#### Restricting affirmation to the resolution is a tactic of policy, as it embodies the criminalization of fugitivity – under this model of predictability, governance thrives through an established atmosphere of risk. With every utterance of framework another team offers themselves up into abstractive regimes to ensure smoother flows of production

Moten & Harney 9 [Fred Moten works in the Departments of Performance Studies and Comparative Literature at New York University Stefano Harney is Professor of Strategic Management at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University, Social Text Volume 27 Number 3 “Policy and Planning”, <https://read.dukeupress.edu/social-text/article-abstract/27/3%20(100)/182/33673/Policy-and-Planning?redirectedFrom=fulltext>, 9/1/2009]//sripad

By policy, we mean not a particular policy, as in company policy or public policy, but rather policy as something in contradistinction to planning. By policy, we mean a resistance to the commons from above, arrayed in the exclusive and exclusionary uniform/ity of imposed consensus, that both denies and at the very same time seeks to destroy the ongoing plans, the fugitive initiations, the black operations of the multitude. As a resistance from above, **policy is a class phenomenon because it is the means to advantage in the post-Fordist economy, a means that takes on the character of politics in an economy dominated structurally by immaterial labor**. **This economy is powered by the constant insistence on a radical contingency producing a steady risk for all organic and nonorganic forms, a risk that allows work against risk to be harvested indefinitely.**

**Policy is the form that opportunism takes in this environment**. **It is a demonstration of willingness to be made contingent and to make contingent all around you by demonstrating an embrace of the radically extraeconomic, political character of command today**.1 It is a demonstration des**igned to separate you from others**, in the interest of a universality reduced to private property that is not yours, for your own survival, for your own advantage in this environment. Opportunism sees no other way, has no alternative, but separates itself by its own vision, its ability to see the future of its own survival in this turmoil against those who cannot imagine surviving in this turmoil (even if they must all the time) and are thus said by policy to lack vision, and in the most extreme cases to be without interests, on the one hand, and incapable of disinterestedness, on the other. Every utterance of policy, no matter its intention or content, is first and foremost a demonstration of one’s ability to be close to the top in the hierarchy of the post-Fordist economy. (**Thus every utterance of policy on the radical Left is immediately contradiction**.)

As an operation from above designed to make the multitude productive for capital, policy must first deal with the fact that the multitude is already productive for itself. This productive imagination is its genius, its impossible, and nevertheless material, collective head. And this is a problem because plans are afoot, black operations are in effect, and, in the undercommons, all the organizing is done. The multitude uses every quiet moment, every peace, every security, every front porch and sundown to plan, to launch, to improvise an operation. It is difficult for policy to deny these plans directly, to ignore these operations, to pretend that those already in motion need to stop and get a vision, to contend that base communities for escape need to believe in escape. And, if this is difficult for policy, then so, too, is the next and crucial step, teaching the value of radical contingency, teaching how to participate in change from above. Of course, some plans can be dismissed plans hatched darker than blue, on the criminal side, out of love. But most will instead require another approach.

So what is left for those who want to dwell in policy? Obviously, the most salient and consistent aspect of policy—help and correction. Policy will help. Policy will help with the plan, and even more policy will correct the planners. Policy will discover what is not yet theorized, what is not yet fully contingent, and most important what is not yet legible. Policy is correction. Policy distinguishes itself from planning by distinguishing those who dwell in policy and fix things, from those who dwell in planning and must be fixed. This is the first rule of **policy**. It **fixes others**. In an extension of Michel Foucault, we might say of this first rule that it remains concerned with how to be governed just right, how to fix others in a position of equilibrium, even if this today requires constant recalibration. But the objects of this constant adjustment provoke this attention because they just don’t want to govern at all.

And because such policy emerges materially from post-Fordist opportunism, policy must optimally, for each policy maker, fix others as others, as those who have not just made an error in planning (or indeed an error by planning) but who are themselves in error. And from the perspective of policy, of this post-Fordist opportunism, there is indeed something wrong with the multitude. They are out of joint—instead of constantly positing their position in contingency, they seek solidity, a place from which to plan, some ground on which to imagine, some love on which to count. Nor is this just a political problem from the point of view of policy, but an ontological one. Seeking fixity, finding a steady place from which to launch a plan, hatch an escape, signals a problem of essentialism, of beings who think and act like they are something in particular, like they are somebody, although at the same time that something is, from the perspective of policy, whatever you say I am.

To get these planners out of this problem of essentialism, this fixity and repose, this security and base, they have to come to imagine they can be more, they can do more, they can change, they can be changed. Because right now, there is something wrong with them. We know there is something wrong with them because they keep making plans. And plans fail. Plans fail because that is policy. Plans must fail because planners must fail. Planners are static, essential, just surviving. They do not see clearly. They hear things. They lack perspective. They fail to see the complexity. Planners have no vision, no real hope for the future, just a plan here and now, an actually existing plan.

They need hope. They need vision. They need to have their sights lifted above the furtive plans and night launches of their despairing lives. Vision. Because from the perspective of policy, it is too dark in there to see, in the black heart of the multitude. You can hear something, you can feel something, feel people going about their own business in there, feel them present at their own making. But hope can lift them above ground into the light, out of the shadows, away from these dark senses.

Whether the hope is Fanonian redemption or Arendtian revaluation, policy will fix these humans. Whether they lack consciousness or politics, utopianism or common sense, hope has arrived. With new vision, planners will become participants. And participants will be taught to reject essence for contingency, as if planning and improvisation, flexibility and fixity, and complexity and simplicity were opposed within an imposed composition there is no choice but to inhabit, as some exilic home. All that could not be seen in the dark heart of the multitude will be supposed absent, as policy checks its own imagination. But most of all they will participate. Policy is a mass effort. Left intellectuals will write articles in the newspapers. Philosophers will hold conferences on new utopias. Bloggers will debate. Politicians will surf. Change is the only constant here, the only constant of policy. Participating in change is the second rule of policy.

Now hope is an orientation toward this participation in change, this participation as change. This is the hope policy gives to the multitude, a chance to stop digging and start circulating. Policy not only offers this hope, but enacts it. Those who dwell in policy do so not just by invoking contingency but riding it, by, in a sense, proving it. Those who dwell in policy are prepared. They are legible to change, liable to change, lendable to change. Policy is not so much a position as a disposition, a disposition toward display. This is why policy’s chief manifestation is governance.

Governance should not be confused with government or governmentality. Governance is the new form of expropriation. It is the provocation of a certain kind of display, a display of interests as disinterestedness, a display of convertibility, a display of legibility. Governance offers a forum for policy, for bidding oneself, auctioning oneself, to post-Fordist production. Governance is harvesting of immaterial labor, but a willing harvest, a death drive of labor. As capital cannot know directly affect, thought, sociality, imagination, it must instead prospect for these in order to extract and abstract them as labor. This is the real bioprospecting. Governance, the voluntary but dissociative offering up of interests, willing participation in the general privacy and privation, grants capital this knowledge, this wealth-making capacity. Who is more keen on governance than the dweller in policy? On the new governance of universities, hospitals, corporations, governments, and prisoners, on the governance of NGOs, of Africa, of peace processes? Policy offers to help by offering its own interests, and if it really seeks to be valuable, provoking others to offer up their own interests, too.

But governance despite its own hopes to universality is for the initiated, for those who know how to articulate interests disinterestedly, who know why they vote (not because someone is black or female but because he or she is smart), who have opinions and want to be taken seriously by serious people. In the meantime, policy also orders the quotidian sphere of aborted plans. Policy posits curriculum against study, child development against play, careers against jobs. It posits voice against voices, and gregariousness against friendship. Policy posits the public sphere, and the counterpublic sphere, and the black public sphere, against the illegal occupation of the illegitimately privatized.