### 1AC

#### I affirm that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### To win this round we simply have to prove that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. We believe this round should center maximizing life and minimizing death because that proves and measures what is just and what isn’t.

#### Private companies circumvent OST obligations – that implodes international space law

Yuan 21 [Alda Yuan, Public Health Analyst U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and visiting attorney at the Enivornmental Law Institute with a JD from Yale, 2021, “FILLING THE VACUUM: ADAPTING INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW TO MEET THE PRESSURES CREATED BY PRIVATE SPACE ENTERPRISES,” Hein Online, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/denilp49&i=27]/Kankee

Finally, since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, there have been no additional binding space treaties. 192 Instead, as the number of parties, both state and non-state, have increased, non-binding guidelines have been released instead. 193 The U.N. COPOUS has also adopted non-binding procedures and announcements rather than pass binding resolutions, or propose guidelines for the General Assembly to pass. At least part of this difference is due to the types of agreements being forged. 194 Whereas the Outer Space Treaty is foundational and necessarily vague in some places, many of the recent guidelines deal with a single aspect of the space regime, such as the recommendations on the categorization, tracking, and mitigation of space debris. 195 These are technical guidelines and will necessarily change over time in response to both technological advances and the development of better practices.196 Surely, there is something to this. But it is also the case that U.N. COPOUS and other such bodies are not making the new comprehensive agreements necessary to lay proper ground rules to smooth the path to space for private parties. That is to say, there is a need for new guidelines and rules, many of which are not technical in nature. Yet, there has been little activity on this front. At least some of the reason for this is the proliferation of actors and the difficulty of reaching a consensus that takes into account the interests of private parties, developing as well as developed nations. The unwillingness to develop and sign on to new treaties is yet another indication that nations are not following the precepts of the Outer Space Treaty out of mere convenience but instead because of the belief they have real legal obligations to act in certain ways. These examples show the states acting in accordance with the interpretation of the principle of preserving space as the province of all humankind are indeed doing so out of a sense of legal obligation. Thus, this principle, which involves non-appropriation and free access, has passed into customary international law. IV. PRIVATE ACTORS ARE ANALOGOUS TO NEW STATES AND SUBJECT TO CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW Application of customary international legal duties directly to non-state actors is particularly apt in space because private parties enter a vacuum of sovereignty. In that respect, they are analogous to new states. Though these private nonstate actors are not henceforth welcomed into the community of states, they achieve an independence from external control that is like new states becoming sovereign. Analogizing private non-state actors to new states means the main principle derived from the Outer Space Treaty attaches as a customary international law obligation. This analogy offers a path by which the legal duty to preserve space as the province of humankind may be extended. The analogy to new states is particularly useful because while international law generally relies upon consent, new states are subject to customary international law whether or not they offer explicit consent. This means that, for instance, the International Court of Justice could rely upon a principle of customary international law in a case involving a state that never signed a treaty consenting to the principle. 197 When a new state is created and joins the international community, recognition of nationhood transmits certain obligations including adherence to customary international law.198 Newly formed states are expected to abide by the principles and practices of the international community they enter, regardless of whether they offer explicit consent. 199 States have no right to reject customary international law even though they never had an opportunity to be a persistent objector.200 Instead, to be recognized as members of the international community, new states must accept the limitations and be obliged to respect the norms of the legal system they are entering. So it should be with private, non-state actors entering space. Just as the behavior of new states affects the interpretation of customary international law, private companies will necessarily help shape and determine general practice in outer space. As private non-state actors begin to outnumber and outweigh state actors, their actions will alter common practice and, thus, what is considered legal in space. Though they do not address international space law specifically, international law scholars, such as Wolfgang Friedmann, have been arguing since the 1960s that corporations participate in the evolution of international law. 201 The argument is stronger fifty years later given the size and power of multinational corporations, especially in space. If corporations will be creating or at least affecting customary space practice, they should also be subject to it. Thus, this is, above all, a pragmatic approach aimed at preserving the long-term accessibility of space and the legitimacy of space law. Nation-states are simply a centrally controlled unit that possesses a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a given area. That is to say, states are a useful organizing unit, but there is nothing divinely ordained about nation-states. Surely when we say there is a jus cogens standard against the use of torture, we do not mean an action is wrong when a state engages in it but not when a different entity does the same. Rather, we mean this standard should be common to all governments and peoples. Indeed, the doctrine on International Humanitarian Law offers a good example of how this is so. Recently, the ICRC has interpreted Common Article I202 of the Geneva Convention as saying states have a responsibility to make sure non-state actors are working with and supplying, respect the customary international law standards articulated and proliferated by the Geneva Convention.203 In this case, it makes sense to try to affect the behavior of non-state actors by binding states because a direct relationship exists that is reminiscent of agency. Additionally, when the activities are bounded by territory, in the sense that they happen in a location covered by a well-defined jurisdiction, it makes sense to use states as a proxy and medium to ensure that the central precepts of international law are followed by all parties and not only sovereign states. In space law, exclusive use of states as the unit of control may endanger international law. Without beginning to think about the way international law should best operate in a world where private parties take on activities previously limited to states, the international community of states risks irrelevancy. Thus far, states have proved a workable avenue by which to develop global legal standards and duties. States will doubtlessly remain important, but in some arenas, the centrality of nation-states is already beginning to erode. This is very apparent in international space law because states are, by their very nature, bounded to a certain territory. Yet, private commercial space enterprises act primarily, perhaps soon exclusively, in space, which is beyond the territorial control of any nation. Applying practices developed for entities bounded to land fails to recognize the changing circumstances and underlying assumptions with respect to territorial control. It is also a waste of an opportunity to ensure that customary international law and other legal structures that reflect the will of the international community are strengthened rather than weakened by changing technologies and new geopolitical realities. Customary international law should not be permitted to collapse and become outdated. Instead, it should be extended over the actors that have taken up the activities those principles were developed to affect. The expansion of international law to include private actors is necessary in many fields of international law but is especially pressing in the law of outer space where attachment to state-mediated regulation in the face of proliferating non-state actors risks an existential threat to the accessibility of space. The expansion has been developed in human rights law, 204 and it should likewise be developed in space law. V. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW SHOULD APPLY DIRECTLY TO PRIVATE ACTORS A. Extending Legal Duties to Private, Non-state Actors Ever since the first spacecraft owned by a private corporation soared into space, legal scholars have been conscious of the need to adapt the international space law scheme. 205 Yet, most of their proposals still focus on the states alone or else do not engage deeply with the problem of how authority should be extended over private actors to coordinate and regulate their behavior in an area beyond the jurisdiction of any individual nation. The method outlined in this paper, of analogizing states to new states and applying direct legal duties under customary international law responds to the unique coordination problems in space and the outsize position of non-state actors. Born in the wake of the digital revolution, these companies may have the capability to place people on new planets and to exploit resources that can change the way humankind uses energy.206 A single unified and internally consistent body of law is crucial particularly in space where entities will be forced to plan decades in advance and rely on technologies still in development. The potential benefits of space travel will not be realized unless parties accessing space have clear cut legal principles. So, while regulations may sometimes limit the activity of particular entities in the short term, a stable legal order can only lead to a more robust industry in the long run which may be more mindful of sustainable practices and more likely to cooperate for collective benefit. The preceding sections have discussed how applying customary international law obligations to private, non-state actors in space is based on the existential threat to a global commons and the fact that the private actors will be entering a vacuum of sovereignty in a manner that is analogous to the creation of new states. Because of all the practical coordination problems and legal barriers already discussed, space cannot be preserved as a global commons or the 'province of all humankind,' without centralized coordination and the application of direct legal duties to permit it. Other proposals to regulate these entities are not sufficiently attentive to the unique problems of space law, nor do they lay the groundwork for the evolution of human interaction in space. B. Existing Models ofInternational Regulation and Coordination Don't Address the Unique Problems Presented by Space Law B. Existing Models ofInternational Regulation and Coordination Don't Address the Unique Problems Presented by Space Law

International space law often evokes comparisons to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Antarctica Treaty. In both cases, the international community sought to address pressing coordination problems. To be sure, both offer lessons but these models cannot be lifted wholesale into the international space context because they are not adapted to its unique risks. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes the International Seabed Authority as the trustee for the deep seabed. 207 The seabed is like outer space in that no single country may own it and that it must remain open for use. 208 The International Space Authority has the authority to grant exclusive but temporary rights to qualified parties for the exploitation of deep seabed resources. 209 Yet, the seabed is not so easily weaponized as space. Even though pollution is a problem in the seabed as well, the seabed doesn't present the same potential for disaster at even small concentrations.210 Additionally, private vessels on the seabed are only transitory. That is, they originate from one jurisdiction and end their journey in another. That need not be the case with private, non-state actors in space, who may have their endpoints or staring points on extraterrestrial bodies. A model designed to merely distribute property rights will not solve the coordination problems in space, nor mitigate the existential threat private companies present to the preservation of outer space. The authority managing Antarctica is not as systemized as the one governing the deep seabed for the simple reason that there is less activity. Nations with territorial claims upon Antarctica formed a consultative body and have developed a series of treaties and protocols over the years to avoid direct conflict and ensure the continent is open to researchers of all nations. 211 The most important agreement is the Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection, also known as the Madrid Protocol.21 It provides for a fifty-year moratorium on mining for resources in Antarctica. 213 This compromise was reached because the parties failed to agree on environmental protections sufficient to protect the continent from pollution created by mining practices.214 The Madrid Protocol, produced by the consultative body on Antarctica, didn't so much solve the problems as delay them. The moratorium on mining prevents further conflict and protects the Antarctic environment; but not in the long term.2m This model is untenable for space because there are more actors, there is already activity in space, and the principal actors would be extremely unlikely to agree to cease extractive efforts. Indeed, as long as they can be performed in a safe, sustainable, and equitable manner, these efforts have the potential to address terrestrial resource limits and catalyze technological transformation. C. Other Proposals Do Not Offer Long Term Solutions One interesting proposal advocates the creation of a system of space visas. 2 1 6 These would license individuals to go into outer space while extending jurisdiction over them. 217 Space visas would solve certain problems created by the rise of space tourism and the employees of private corporations entering space. Space visas would permit personal liability for crimes to attach and enable spacefaring countries to control traffic in and out of their airspace. 218 However, space visas are not enough because they fail to account for the ease with which commercial space programs will be able to move their base of operations to evade jurisdiction. Space visas also fail to extend jurisdiction over corporations and their instrumentalities, which is crucial in the coming space age. A space visa program for corporations is possible but a mere license to operate, especially if issued by states without robust regulatory regimes, will not solve the coordination problems which endanger space travel for all. Most critically, however, this does not provide an answer to the issue of what will happen if, in the not too distant future, individuals or companies are able to launch from non-terrestrial locations. Another proposal calls for a whole new international treaty,219 but this risks undoing the good practices and customs built up under the existing treaty system. With more actors and varied interests than ever, many of whom have become increasingly unwilling to sign on to binding treaties,2 2 0 the effort to draft and convene for a new international treaty might require years of mobilization. Thus, an international treaty neither offers an immediate solution nor promises a better regime under which both states and non-states will cooperate and coordinate to minimize the collective dangers of operating in outer space. Yet another proposal recognizes the difficulties of arranging for a binding agreement. Instead, it advocates for continuing with the current model, which involves various non-binding agreements.2 2 1 Though flexibility certainly needs to be preserved for technical matters that will need to respond rapidly to changes in available technology,2 2 2 too much flexibility can also cause unacceptable uncertainty. This would endanger the whole enterprise, allowing a few opportunistic actors to strong-arm and crowd out their competitors or else trigger disasters that curtail our ability to access space in the near future. Additionally, these non-binding agreements would not apply to non-state actors. As mentioned earlier, some have argued that the key to spurring private innovation is to recognize that the admonition in the Outer Space Treaty and in subsequent treaties against the appropriation of celestial bodies only applies to nation-states. 2 23 This means that private companies should be permitted not only to claim land- but to also have permanent property rights.224 This proposal is irresponsible for a number of reasons. Not only does this proposal fail to respect existing treaties thereby eroding the legitimacy of space law, but it also wildly disadvantages the vast majority of states without space programs and sets up perhaps insurmountable barriers. This failure to take into account the needs of all parties would reduce buy-in. Finally, this proposal would also fail to produce the efficient result its advocates aim for. Permanent grants of private property rights without proper governmental structure could easily result in monopolies and extreme barriers to entry. This would eliminate competition and contravene the responsibilities states accepted in the Outer Space Treaty to ensure space remains open for all. Finally, many have proposed the creation of an international space agency.225 It could certainly provide the type of centralized coordination that is necessary to preserve space as the province of all humankind. Yet these proposals largely deal with the appropriation of property rights and fail to engage with the need for establishing jurisdiction over private parties or the larger scale coordination problems that threaten space travel. Nor do they generally deal with the issues of where such a space agency would derive the authority to regulate. The method of grappling with these problems outlined in this paper, extending rules of customary international law to private parties entering space by analogy to new states, permits clear rules and lines of authority, providing desperately needed clarity to both state and non-state actors. Though the potential dangers mentioned throughout this paper may not be immediately apparent, a legal framework that can deal properly with them and prevent disasters from coming to fruition must be delineated now. It is crucial to establish firm law for private actors in space while preserving flexibility as the Outer Space Treaty did for states by outright banning military uses of space while still allowing states to develop their space programs.2 2 6 The legal framework must be robust and capable of lasting in the long run, not just for the near future. Thus, it cannot be content exercising indirect control over private commercial space corporations through states that may themselves not be members of the space-faring community. In the short term, it is possible to imagine such a scheme ordering the behavior of private corporations. Even in that case, such indirect authority would cause coordination problems and may well trigger the adverse consequences described in the first part of this paper. In the long term, however, such an indirect system becomes patently unworkable. What will the international community do when the spacecraft of states are dwarfed in number by those owned by private corporations and most states are unable to control or extend jurisdiction over private spacecrafts even if they are operating in adjacent space? How will international law, as it is currently interpreted, cover the activity of corporations who remove themselves from the jurisdiction of states by establishing a base in space? The proposal of this paper is to take the instruments of international law that already exist and interpret them in a way that is both legally defensible and pragmatic. Customary international law, like the concept of nation-states, is shaped by practice and bounded by reality. These are important legal constructs because of their utility for ordering a global legal system. Nation-states have their place as the units upon which international law acts because of the functions they carry out. Importing the single-minded focus on states into international space law is inefficient and impractical both because such an approach endangers the effort to preserve space and because private corporations have and will continue to take over many of the functions thus far taken on by states in space. Due to the necessity of coordination and the extreme negative externalities that can be caused by even carelessness, direct authority to modify behavior needs to be extended over non-state actors. VI. CONCLUSION This paper makes the case that space is a unique arena because of the existential threat to a principle of customary international law, all of which provide support for legal duties to attach directly. It is certainly true these problems are exacerbated in space. Yet, some of the factors outlined here may also exist in other areas of the law. One salient example is in international environmental law. Here, as in space, the law is a patchwork of international and domestic standards, more or less stringent and better or worse enforced. Here, as in space, non-state actors have a high degree of independence, with the capability to move both their headquarters and their factories in response to changes in the laws. The method of extending direct duties to non-state actors and requiring them to abide by customary international law may thus also be applicable in international environmental law. Thus, a legal framework that can help to make space safer might ask us to question the existing international law regime as a whole. As states lose their prominence in some areas as the primary actors while national borders and identity bleed into cosmopolitanism, international law will require new tools to protect the interests of all and to maintain a legal order that provides certainty and reliability. The decline of states in some areas of activity should not entail the decline of international law. In fact, the practices and customs of states, codified in customary international law, should become binding on the parties that take over some of their functions. In the international space law context, this means analogizing private commercial enterprises to new states subject to the binding power of customary international law. Only then can the final frontier be made open and safe for all who wish to go boldly into it.

#### Space law prevents space militarization and war

Loon 21 [Fabio van Loon, Researcher and Writer Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers with a Master of International Policy National Security & Diplomacy from Texas A&M University and a Bachelor of Arts in Politics, Philosophy and Economics From Luiss Guido Carli University, 2021, “Codifying Jus in Bello Spatialis— The Space Law of Tomorrow,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15\_Issue-1/VanLoon.pdf]/Kankee

With a deep-rooted history of customary space law, state activities in outer space have largely been established for the areas of research, exploration, and scientific inquiry.3 The teleological origins of today’s space law—namely the principles of peaceful exploration and the freedom of navigation—were candidly expressed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a letter he wrote to then-Soviet premier Nikolai Bulganin in 1958. He stated, “I propose that we agree that outer space should be used only for peaceful purposes. We face a decisive moment in history in relation to this matter. . . . Should not outer space be dedicated to the peaceful uses of mankind and denied to the purposes of war?”4 President Eisenhower’s commitment to cosmic peace in the opening months of the space race proved foundational to the negotiation of the historic Outer Space Treaty (OST) a decade later, the keystone of today’s corpus juris spatialis—the body of law in space. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, similar to the landmark 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, epitomized the success of international legal cooperation. Mutual restraint, advanced through the treaty’s notion of space as “the province of all mankind,” effectively prevented the likely weaponization of space both during and after the Cold War.5 Washington’s leadership in defining and upholding the principles of international space law has since guaranteed peace in the cosmos for over 60 years, a testament to the successes of American space diplomacy and the strength of international space law. Today, evolving security challenges in the outer space environment have placed an unprecedented strain on the stability of the international space regime. The challenges of the return to great power competition in space have been compounded by the seemingly unavoidable militarization of the cosmos. This issue has highlighted how the “customary principles of this body of law are probably neither sufficiently specific nor entirely appropriate for military action in outer space.”6 Filling this normative void in the spirit of national and international security must be at the center of US-led efforts to draft and define tomorrow’s jus in bello spatialis. Ultimately, to determine tomorrow’s law of war in space, strategists must pay particular attention to the normative applicability of the UN Charter, the compelling analogy of the high seas, the law of armed conflict (LOAC), and existing protections for astronauts and satellites. The Applicability of the UN Charter

#### Space war escalates to nuclear use - only ensuring peaceful use through cooperation solves

Stratfor 19 (Stratfor, Stratfor Worldview is a geopolitical intelligence and advisory firm, “Russia and China Would Try and Blind the U.S. Military In a War”, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-and-china-would-try-and-blind-us-military-war-55807>, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-and-china-would-try-and-blind-us-military-war-55807>, May 4, 2019)

The idea is simple: kill the satellites. Would it work? Another country, another test, yet more debris floating through the crowded realm of near-orbit space. On March 27, India became the latest country to carry out an anti-satellite (ASAT) test resulting in debris. India sought to frame the test as a sign of its prowess in space, but on a global level, the event serves as an important wake-up call about the risks of ASAT-related technology. More and more countries are developing ASAT technologies for exploration and defense — especially as the great power competition among the United States, China and Russia heats up — which increases the risk that space will be littered with dangerous debris that could collide with important satellites either accidentally or during conflicts. And the tense dynamic among countries with ASAT technology will stall any attempts to develop international norms or treaties to reduce the consequences of space debris and ensure the long-term sustainable use of space. The Danger of Debris India's test, despite being carried out at the low orbit of about 300 kilometers (186 miles), created significant space debris; some fragments will take several years to decay. Space debris can collide with and destroy satellites, creating a multiplier effect known as the Kessler syndrome or "ablation cascade": Collision between objects in space (such as through the destruction of a satellite) creates space debris that then collides with other objects and creates even more space debris. The resulting expanding debris field increases the likelihood that satellites could be damaged — either intentionally or accidentally, which would have disastrous effects on humanity's day-to-day functionality. Individuals, companies and entire nations rely on satellites for all manner of navigation, communications, research and security functions. If certain satellites were to be unexpectedly disabled, society and the economy at large would experience dramatic consequences. But despite the fact that errant space debris could disrupt airplane navigation, render weaponry inoperable or cut off many forms of communication, countries are still likely to take deliberate actions that create more debris for a variety of reasons. The Many Causes of Increased Space Debris In the event of a major war between global powers, adversaries could choose to deliberately impede opponents' use of space by damaging their satellites in a way that also forms major debris fields and interrupts the opponent's space-based expeditionary warfare efforts. And deliberately fomenting space debris would still escalate a situation less than the use of nuclear weapons, so a losing country would be more likely to choose this method, especially if its own satellite constellations had been already destroyed. The proliferation of space debris can be unintentional, as well. Just as a limited nuclear strike could deteriorate into full thermonuclear war by causing cycles of retaliation and escalation, a similar process could occur in space. An initial limited first strike by one power against an adversary's satellites could trigger a bigger retaliation (and perhaps even be misread as a harbinger of a more extreme offensive), which could then spiral into an all-out battle of satellite destruction. Even without much escalation, the initial destruction of a small number of satellites could trigger major damage to day-to-day affairs on earth. Even countries not engaging in combat can increase the levels of space debris and drive an ablation cascade. All kinetic ASAT tests inevitably produce a debris cloud that could potentially collide with other objects in space and trigger more debris. This applies especially to tests that occur at a significant altitude, like the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. But India's recent ASAT test at a fairly low altitude of about 300 kilometers still led to significant space debris, with some fragments reaching an altitude above 1,000 kilometers. NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine has stated that the risk of the International Space Station being hit by small debris increased by 44 percent over a period of 10 days as a result of India's test. Handling the Present and Rising Threat Millions of pieces of debris currently in orbit already pose a major hazard to the safety of important satellites. Wary of the possibility of satellite destruction, various states and space agencies are increasingly viewing space debris as a serious issue distinctly associated with national security, and they are developing ways to mitigate or reduce debris in space. Technologies in this effort include lasers, robotic arms that can maneuver satellites, magnets and even a 100-kilogram (220-pound) spacecraft featuring a harpoon and net, which British company Surrey Satellite Technology tested in 2018. However, these same technologies that can clean up space debris are also ideally suited for missions involving the destruction of enemy satellites, meaning that the better nations become at eliminating debris in the future, the more efficiently they can destroy enemy satellites. During an actual major conflict extending to space, these technologies could be a greater part of the problem than the solution. After all, it's far easier to find and destroy satellites than to clean up the uncountable fragments of space debris produced by disintegrated satellites during conflict. As the United States looks to expand its investments in space as part of its great power competition with Russia and China, the U.S. military is acutely aware of the risks of a war in space. Today, the United States possesses approximately half of all satellites in orbit and is very dependent on space to wage war. Consequently, its space strategy remains primarily centered on deterrence, though Washington is certainly preparing to defend its satellites and counterattack if necessary. Deterrence alone, however, may not be enough. As more and more countries develop ASAT capabilities, and as other great powers — particularly China — rapidly perfect theirs, conflicts on earth are increasingly likely to extend to space in the form of direct attacks on enemy satellites. Indeed, this outcome is almost guaranteed during any large-scale peer-to-peer conflict between the great powers, especially given the United States' heavy dependence on its space architecture. An Uncertain Future Right now, there are no treaties regulating the development, fielding or testing of ASAT weapons. A general taboo against kinetic ASAT tests exists, given the well-known danger posed by space debris, but it has not stopped countries such as the United States, China and now India from conducting ASAT tests. The United States itself likely contributed to the normalization of ASAT technology when it conducted the 2008 intercept of the USA 193 satellite. While the intercept happened at a very low orbital altitude (less than 300 kilometers) and resulted in far less space debris than China's 2007 ASAT test, it still produced considerable debris — and it paved the way for India to conduct a "responsible" ASAT test at about the same altitude later on. A growing number of voices within the United States are calling to establish and strengthen norms aimed at preventing more space debris. These include the head of U.S. Strategic Command, Gen. John Hyten, who discussed the dangers of space debris on April 9 in the wake of the Indian ASAT test. However, the rising great power competition among strong, space-faring nations is driving mistrust and undermining U.S. efforts — as is the United States' own significant role in dismantling a number of key arms control agreements over the past couple of years. The seemingly imminent demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the questionable status of New START indicate that it will be less and less likely for nations to establish cohesive norms around ASAT capabilities in the near future. The fact that missiles used as ballistic missile defense interceptors (which many nations have been openly developing) are also applicable as ASAT interceptors adds further barriers to such an effort. The peaceful use of space will be increasingly threatened not only by active conflict but also accidents, ASATs and miscalculations that spiral out of control. As the competition among great powers propels more technological breakthroughs in space, it also drives the production of space debris, which amplifies the risk that important satellites could be disabled — either intentionally or accidentally.

#### In summary we have isolated that if private appropriation of space were to ensue then the governing system would collapse entirely as it violates the contract set aside for how space appropriation is limited. Violations of this make space extremely chaotic and risks space war because of tensions. Space War doesn’t just stay up their but is brought down here to our homes. Nuclear tensions arise as countries hover over the read buttons this threat is primarily due to the violation of international law. We must center nuclear war because it uniquely risks the greatest number of lives across the entire globe. Thus I urge you to vote negative to secure international law from being violated.