# 1nc

## 1

#### A] Interpretation—the aff must disclose the plan text, framework, and advantage area 30 minutes before the round. To clarify, disclosure can occur on the wiki or over message.

#### B] Violation—they didn’t, see ss below

Graphical user interface, text, application, email

Description automatically generated

#### C] Vote neg –

#### 1] prep and clash —two internal links—

#### a] neg prep—4 minutes of prep is not enough to put together a coherent 1nc or update generics—30 minutes is necessary to learn a little about the affirmative and piece together what 1nc positions apply and cut and research their applications to the affirmative. Also allows substantive engagement through prepping out specific args instead of trying to respond to nuanced warranting w generics

#### b] aff quality—plan text disclosure discourages cheap shot affs. If the aff isn’t inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, it should lose—this will answer the 1ar’s claim about innovation—with 30 minutes of prep, there’s still an incentive to find a new strategic, well justified aff, but no incentive to cut a horrible, incoherent aff that the neg can’t check against the broader literature.

#### 2] inclusion – not disclosing widens structural disparaties btwn big schools and under-resourced debaters – I don’t have multiple pages of blocks or backfiles or prepped out 1ncs to every single aff

#### 3] Evidence ethics – disclosure allows debaters to check each other’s evidence before the round instead of needing to use prep to do so, meaning it’s easier to find misconstrued evidence. Evidence ethics is a voter because misconstruing evidence is academic dishonesty and prevents actual engagement with the literature.

#### 4] New non topical affs are a voting issue. They are able to monopolize prep AND be antitopical while claiming the moral high ground. This turns all of their education claims because it proves they arent genuinely interested in having a good debate, but only care about strategy.

#### 5] New K affs are bad because we cant develop case-specific strategies, only generic responses. This also means we can’t test political strategies or their method because they refuse to disclose. This turns the aff because we can’t debate over movements, methods, or compare theories of power. Disclosure solves our offense AND theirs-- voting issue for competitive equity, education, and engagement.

#### D] Paradigm issues:

#### Fairness and education r voters – it’s a prereq to debate and it’s why schools fund debate, their counterinterp is a horrible model for debate bc it decks both

#### DTD for norm setting and to deter future abuse, DTA makes no sense bc the abuse was pre-round

#### Use competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention

#### No RVIs – you don’t win for being fair

## 2

#### a] interpretation: The aff may not defend that a subset of private entities

#### “Private entities” is a generic bare plural. The upward entailment test and adverb test determine the genericity of a bare plural

Leslie 16 [Sarah-Jane Leslie, Ph.D., Princeton, 2007. Dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy. Served as the vice dean for faculty development in the Office of the Dean of the Faculty, director of the Program in Linguistics, and founding director of the Program in Cognitive Science at Princeton University.] “Generic Generalizations.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. April 24, 2016. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/> TG //recut tanya

1. Generics and Logical Form In English, generics can be expressed using a variety of syntactic forms: bare plurals (e.g., “tigers are striped”), indefinite singulars (e.g., “a tiger is striped”), and definite singulars (“the tiger is striped”). However, none of these syntactic forms is dedicated to expressing generic claims; each can also be used to express existential and/or specific claims. Further, some generics express what appear to be generalizations over individuals (e.g., “tigers are striped”), while others appear to predicate properties directly of the kind (e.g., “dodos are extinct”). These facts and others give rise to a number of questions concerning the logical forms of generic statements. 1.1 Isolating the Generic Interpretation Consider the following pairs of sentences: (1)a.Tigers are striped. b.Tigers are on the front lawn. (2)a.A tiger is striped. b.A tiger is on the front lawn. (3)a.The tiger is striped. b.The tiger is on the front lawn. The sentence pairs above are prima facie syntactically parallel—both are subject-predicate sentences whose subjects consist of the same common noun coupled with the same, or no, article. However, the interpretation of first sentence of each pair is intuitively quite different from the interpretation of the second sentence in the pair. In the second sentences, we are talking about some particular tigers: a group of tigers in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), some individual tiger in ([2b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex2b)), and some unique salient or familiar tiger in ([3b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex3b))—a beloved pet, perhaps. In the first sentences, however, we are saying something general. There is/are no particular tiger or tigers that we are talking about. The second sentences of the pairs receive what is called an existential interpretation. The hallmark of the existential interpretation of a sentence containing a bare plural or an indefinite singular is that it may be paraphrased with “some” with little or no change in meaning; hence the terminology “existential reading”. The application of the term “existential interpretation” is perhaps less appropriate when applied to the definite singular, but it is intended there to cover interpretation of the definite singular as referring to a unique contextually salient/familiar particular individual, not to a kind. There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) does not entail that animals are striped, but ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995). Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.)

#### The resolution is generic – () is unjust doesn’t entail all private entities

**1] Semantics outweigh: It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it.**

#### b] violation – They specified ()

#### c] vote neg:

#### 1] precision ­– their interp justifies the aff getting away w random words in the res which decks neg ground and prep bc they’re no longer bounded by the res

#### 2] limits ­– they explode the topic since they can spec infinitely any private entity in any country ie china, the us, spacex, amazon, etc ­– spec means generic da’s don’t link which decks neg ground, kills in-depth clash, causing appropriation of the week affs which makes reciprocal prep impossible

#### tva ­– just read your aff as advantages under a wholres aff – pics don’t solve because potential neg abuse doesn’t justify aff abuse

#### d] paradigm issues:

#### 1] accessibility – it is literally impossible for me to cut nc’s to every possible aff, esp bc i am not from a big school like hwl which has multiple competitors and coaches helping cut prep in between rounds

#### 2] fairness is a voter ­– debate’s a competitive activity that requires equal opportunities for both sides

#### 3] education is a voter ­– its why schools fund debate, nobody’s learning if we are having blippy debates about blippy args bc the aff was non t

#### 4] dtd to deter future abuse – dta makes no sense bc we indict their advocacy, use competing interps ­– reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention, no rvis ­– you don’t win for being fair

## 3

#### Settler colonialism is the permeating structure of the nation-state which requires the elimination of indigenous life and land via the occupation of settlers. The appropriation of land turns Natives into ghosts and chattel slaves into excess labor.

Tuck and Yang 12, (Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts - though they can overlap - and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place - indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves, whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making a new "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6 The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire - utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces.

#### The 1ac’s prioritization of science justifies manifest destiny and the erasure of Indigenous epistemologies

Smiles 20, Deondre Smiles, 10-26-2020, "The Settler Logics of (Outer) Space," Society + Space, <https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/the-settler-logics-of-outer-space> [Dondre Smiles is an Indigenous geographer whose research interests lie at the intersection of several fields, including critical Indigenous geographies, human-environment interactions, political ecology, tribal cultural resource preservation, and science and technology studies. Their current academic position is as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria, in B.C., Canada.] //tanya

To most scholars, and certainly to the virtual majority of Indigenous peoples on Turtle Island, it is no secret that the country we call the United States of America was built upon the brutal subjugation of Indigenous people and Indigenous lands. Fueled by the American settler myths of terra nullius (no man’s land) and Manifest Destiny, the American settler state proceeded upon a project of cultural and physical genocide, with lasting effects that endure to the present day. The ‘settler myth’ permeates American culture. Words such as ‘pioneer’, the ‘West’, ‘Manifest Destiny’ grab the imagination as connected to the growth of the country in its early history. America sprang forth from a vast open ‘wilderness’. Of course, for Indigenous people, we know differently—these lands had complex cultural frameworks and political entities long before colonization. Words like ‘pioneer’ and ‘Manifest Destiny’, have deep meanings for us too, as they are indicative of the very real damage dealt against our cultures and nations, damage that we have had to work very hard to undo. Trump’s address raises key insights into the continuing logics of settler colonialism, as well as questions of its future trajectories. Trump’s invocation of ideas such as the ‘frontier’ and ‘taming the wilderness’ draws attention to the brutal violence that accompanied the building of the American state. Scholars such as Greg Grandin (2019) make the case that the frontier is part of what America is—whether it is the ‘Wild West’, or the U.S.-Mexican border, America is always contending with a frontier that must be defined.  Language surrounding ‘frontier’ is troubling because it perpetuates the rationale of why the American settler state even exists—it could make better use of the land than Native people would, after all, they lived in wilderness. This myth tells us that what we know as the modern world was built through the hard work of European settlers; Indigenous people had nothing to offer or contribute. For someone like Mr. Trump, whose misgivings and hostility towards Native people have been historically documented, this myth fits well with his narrative as President—he is building a ‘new’ America, one that will return to its place of power and influence. The fact that similar language is being used around the potential of American power being extended to space could reasonably be expected, given the economic and military potential that comes from such a move. Space represents yet another ‘unknown’ to be conquered and bent to America’s will. However, such interplanetary conquest does not exist solely in outer space. I wish to situate the very real colonial legacies and violence associated with the desire to explore space, tracing the ways that they are perpetuated and reified through their destructive engagements with Indigenous peoples. I argue that a scientific venture such as space exploration does not exist in a vacuum, but instead draws from settler colonialism and feeds back into it through the prioritization of ‘science’ over Indigenous epistemologies. I begin by exploring the ways that space exploration by the American settler state is situated within questions of hegemony, imperialism, and terra nullius, including a brief synopsis of the controversy surrounding the planned construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea. I conclude by exploring Indigenous engagement with ‘space’ in both its Earthbound and beyond-earth forms as it relates to outer space, and what implications this might have for the ways we think about our engagement with space as the American settler state begins to turn its gaze skyward once again. I position this essay alongside a growing body of academic work, as well as journalistic endeavors (Haskins, 2020; Koren, 2020) that demands that the American settler colonial state exercise self-reflexivity as to why it engages with outer space, and who is advantaged and disadvantaged here on Earth as a result of this engagement. Settler colonialism is commonly understood to be a form of colonialism that is based upon the permanent presence of colonists upon land. This is a distinction from forms of colonialism based upon resource extraction (Wolfe, 2006; Veracini, 2013). What this means is that the settler colony is intimately tied with the space within which it exists—it cannot exist or sustain itself without settler control over land and space. This permanent presence upon land by ‘settlers’ is usually at the expense of the Indigenous, or original people, in a given space or territory. To reiterate: control over space is paramount. As Wolfe states, “Land is life—or at least, land is necessary for life. Thus, contests for land can be—indeed, often are—contests for life” (2006: 387).  Without land, the settler state ‘dies’; conversely, deprivation of land from the indigenous population means that in settler logic, indigeneity dies (Povinelli, 2002; Wolfe, 2006.) Because of this overarching goal of space, there is an inherent anxiety in settler colonies about space, and how it can be occupied and subsequently rewritten to remove Indigenous presence. In Anglo settler colonies, this often takes place within a lens of conservation. Scholars such as Banivanua Mar (2010), Lannoy (2012), Wright (2014) and Tristan Ahtone (2019) have written extensively on the ways that settler reinscription of space can be extremely damaging to Indigenous people from a lens of ‘conservation’. However, dispossession of Indigenous space in favor of settler uses can also be tied to some of the most destructive forces of our time. For example, Aboriginal land in the Australian Outback was viewed as ‘empty’ land that was turned into weapons ranges where the British military tested nuclear weapons in the 1950s, which directly led to negative health effects upon Aboriginal communities downwind from the testing sites (Vincent, 2010). Indigenous nations in the United States have struggled with environmental damage related to military-industrial exploitation as well. But, what does this all look like in regard to outer space? In order to really understand the potential (settler) colonial logics of space exploration, we must go back and explore the ways in which space exploration became inextricably tied with questions of state hegemony and geopolitics during the Cold War. US and Soviet space programs were born partially out of military utility, and propaganda value—the ability to send a nuclear warhead across a great distance to strike the enemy via a ICBM and the accompanying geopolitical respect that came with such a capability was something that greatly appealed to the superpowers, and when the Soviets took an early lead in the ‘Space Race’ with Sputnik and their Luna probes, the United States poured money and resources into making up ground (Werth, 2004). The fear of not only falling behind the Soviets militarily as well as a perceived loss of prestige in the court of world opinion spurred the US onto a course of space exploration that led to the Apollo moon landings in the late 1960s and the early 70s (Werth, 2004; Cornish, 2019). I argue that this fits neatly into the American settler creation myth referenced by Trump—after ‘conquering’ a continent and bringing it under American dominion, why would the United States stop solely at ‘space’ on Earth? To return to Grandin (2019), space represented yet another frontier to be conquered and known by the settler colonial state; if not explicitly for the possibility of further settlement, then for the preservation of its existing spatial extent on Earth.

However, scholars such as Alan Marshall (1995) have cautioned that newer logics of space exploration such as potential resource extraction tie in with existing military logics in a way that creates a new way of thinking about the ‘openness’ of outer space to the logics of empire, in what Marshall calls res nullius (1995: 51)[i]. But we cannot forget the concept of terra nullius and how our exploration of the stars has real effects on Indigenous landscapes here on Earth. We also cannot forget about forms of space exploration that may not be explicitly tied to military means. Doing so deprives us of another lens through which to view the tensions between settler and Indigenous views of space and to which end is useful. Indeed, even reinscribing of Indigenous space towards ‘peaceful’ settler space exploration have very real consequences for Indigenous sovereignty and Indigenous spaces. Perhaps the most prominent example of the fractures between settler space exploration and Indigenous peoples is the on-going controversy surrounding the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea, on the island of Hawaii. While an extremely detailed description of the processes of construction on the TMT and the opposition presented to it by Native Hawai’ians and their allies is beyond the scope of this essay, and in fact is already expertly done by a number of scholars[ii], the controversy surrounding TMT is a prime example of the logics presented towards ‘space’ in both Earth-bound and beyond-Earth contexts by the settler colonial state as well as the violence that these logics place upon Indigenous spaces, such as Mauna Kea, which in particular already plays host to a number of telescopes and observatories (Witze, 2020). In particular, astronomers such as Chanda Prescod-Weinstein, Lucianne Walkowicz, and others have taken decisive action to push back against the idea that settler scientific advancement via space exploration should take precedence over Indigenous sovereignty in Earth-space. Prescod-Weinstein and Walkowicz, alongside Sarah Tuttle, Brian Nord and Hilding Neilson (2020) make clear that settler scientific pursuits such as building the TMT are simply new footnotes in a long history of colonial disrespect of Indigenous people and Indigenous spaces in the name of science, and that astronomy is not innocent of this disrespect. In fact, Native Hawai’ian scholars such as Iokepa Casumbal-Salazar strike at the heart of the professed neutrality of sciences like astronomy:  One scientist told me that astronomy is [as] a “benign science” because it is based on observation, and that it is universally beneficial because it offers “basic human knowledge” that everyone should know “like human anatomy.” Such a statement underscores the cultural bias within conventional notions of what constitutes the “human” and “knowledge.” In the absence of a critical self-reflection on this inherent ethnocentrism, the tacit claim to universal truth reproduces the cultural supremacy of Western science as self-evident. Here, the needs of astronomers for tall peaks in remote locations supplant the needs of Indigenous communities on whose ancestral territories these observatories are built (2017: 8). As Casumbal-Salazar and other scholars who have written about the TMT and the violence that has been done to Native Hawai’ians (such as police actions designed to dislodge blockades that prevented construction) as well as the potential violence to come such as the construction of the telescope have skillfully said, when it comes to the infringement upon Indigenous space by settler scientific endeavors tied to space exploration, there is no neutrality to be had—dispossession and violence are dispossession and violence, no matter the potential ‘good for humanity’ that might come about through these things. Such contestations over outer space and ethical engagement with previously unknown spaces will continue to happen. Outer space is not the first ‘final frontier’ (apologies to Gene Roddenberry) that has been discussed in settler logics and academic spaces. In terms of settler colonialism, scholars have written about how Antarctica was initially thought of as the ‘perfect’ settler colony—land that could be had without the messy business of pushing Indigenous people off of it (see Howkins 2010). Of course, we know now that engagement with Antarctica should be constrained by ecological concern—who is to say that these concerns will be heeded in ‘unpopulated’ space? What can be done to push back against these settler logics? I want to now turn our attention towards the possibilities that exist regarding Indigenous engagement with outer space.  After all, the timing could not be more urgent to do so—we are now at a point where after generations and generations of building the myth that America was built out of nothing, we are now ready to resume the project of extending the reach of American military and economic might in space. To be fair, there are plenty of advances that can be made scientifically with a renewed focus on space exploration. However, history shows us that space exploration has been historically tied to military hegemony, and there is nothing in Mr. Trump’s temperament or attitude towards a re-engagement with space that suggest that his push toward the stars will be anything different. A sustained conversation needs to be had—will this exploration be ethical and beneficial to all Americans?

#### **The 1ac’s wrong starting point for critiquing space appropriation only reinforces western space projects that justify settler colonialism**

Sammler and Lynch 19, Katherine G Sammler, Casey R Lynch, California State University Maritime, University Of Nevada, USA, 9-2-2021, "Apparatuses of observation and occupation: Settler colonialism and space science in Hawai'i," SAGE Journals, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/02637758211042374> //tanya

While other imaginaries are possible (Sammler and Lynch, 2019), this paper demonstrates how Western space science projects are inextricably entangled in the imaginaries and practices of settler colonialism (Prescod-Weinstein, 2020; Smiles, 2020). We refer to offworld colonies not to reproduce this imaginary but to recognize that this is the project being carried out by both traditional public space agencies like NASA and emerging private space industries. The paper examines HI-SEAS and TMT to consider the complex imbrications between historical, ongoing, and projected future settler colonialism and ideologies 946 EPD: Society and Space 39(5) and practices of Western space science. HI-SEAS and TMT seemingly represent very different projects. While TMT defenders describe the telescope as a passive and innocuous piece of infrastructure used to produce “universal” knowledge, HI-SEAS presents a more active form of exploration towards offworld colonization. Yet, examining the two projects in relation, we show how both rely on logics of colonial totality (Matson and Nunn, 2017), the existing material relations of the colony, and the erasure of lived Native peoples and places (Hobart, 2019), while enacting distinct yet co-dependent subject positions key to the projection of settler colonialism across space and time. TMT and HI-SEAS, respectively, enact the disembodied god’s-eye-view of Enlightenment science and the idealized Enlightenment subject-body of the colonizer. While we are not the first to recognize the co-constitution of observation and occupation, by highlighting this relationship in TMT and HI-SEAS, we set up a critical dialog between Indigenous and anti-colonial critiques and interdisciplinary literature on social studies of outer space (SSOS). SSOS literature explores how socio-technical projects of visualization produce astronomical knowledge (Vertesi, 2015); how space agencies simulate Moon and Mars with earthly analogs (Olson, 2018) superimposing spaces onto one another (Messeri, 2016); and how offplanet activities reshape geopolitics, environmental politics, and resource economies (Dunnett et al., 2019; Klinger, 2021). Others examine space science infrastructures as projects of state-building, displacement, and development in colonial contexts (Mitchell, 2018;Redfield, 2002). While many of these authors recognize that offworld activities are within colonial imaginaries and practices, anti-colonial critiques are not often made explicit, focusing instead on the perspectives and actions of scientists and engineers (Messeri, 2016). In contrast, Indigenous and allied critical scholars offer analyses of spatial and temporal logics of settler colonialism as manifested through space science infrastructures and their related imaginaries (Maile, 2015; Matson and Nunn, 2017; Smiles, 2020). For TMT, scholars examine the multiple practices, logics, and institutions of Western space science that have worked to lay claim to Native Hawai’ian lands. Hobart (2019: 42), for instance, examines how TMT has been justified through narratives that reframe Maunakea within imaginaries of scientific progress in which the site “transcend[s] international politics in the name of the greater good of humanity” as part of a longer historical trajectory of discursively emptying or “deanimating” landscapes. Goodyear-Ka‘opua argues that settler tem- porality reserves modernity and futurity for colonial projects and relegates Indigeneity to a premodern past, but that TMT activists “enact Indigenous futurities and open space to transform present settler colonial conditions” (2017: 185). Casumbal-Salazar makes clear that TMT controversies cannot be understood without explicitly questioning settler colonialism, writing: How are we to understand the controversy over Mauna a Wakea and the TMT if we fail to identify or accept the context in which this battle is being waged; if we fail to critically analyze settler-colonization under U.S. occupation? (2017: 24) Unseating the purported universality and objectivity of space science projects requires categorical anti-colonial analyses. We argue that Barad’s (2007) theorization of the apparatus is useful for bridging SSOS and anti-colonial scholarship because it traces techno-scientific production as part of broader apparatuses extending spatially and temporally from what is traditionally understood as the sites and moments of scientific practice. Through the apparatus, we show how projects of scientific observation and colonial occupation are co-constituted through the Sammler and Lynch 947 production and maintenance of space science infrastructures on colonized lands. In turn, we consider how these infrastructures reproduce the subject–object relations key to settler colonial projects – the view-from-nowhere (or Archimedean point) and embodied colonizer subjectivities. Observation is never a passive enterprise; rather, observation-occupation is active and employs apparatuses to iteratively enact differences between subject and object, colonizer and colonized. Since Cook’s expeditions, the West has subjected the constellation of Pacific Islands to a multitude of science experiments (DeLoughrey, 2012; Farbotko, 2010). Salmond (2003: ix) explains how “[a]s the edges of the known world were pushed out, wild nature – including the ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’ at the margins of humanity - was brought under the calm, controlling gaze of Enlightenment science, long before colonial domination was attempted.” 948 EPD: Society and Space 39(5) There is a long history of the liveliness of islands being abstracted by colonial powers and scientists alike, from seemingly innocuous use of the Gala´pagos as discrete microcosms for theorizing evolution (Matsuda, 2006); to the United States’ devastating testing of nuclear weapons on the Marshall Islands; to botany’s role in the colonization of Hawai’i and its extension into contemporary experiments with genetically-modified organisms replacing native plant species (Goldberg-Hiller and Silva, 2015). As with other landscapes, specific imaginaries of place play a unique role in colonial practices on islands. Continental views of islands align with Enlightenment scientific desire for blank slates, perfect laboratories (Greenhough, 2006; Matsuda, 2007). Mobilizing imaginaries of frontier and isolation, representations of islands within a continental and colonial gaze are, as Matsuda explains, “distant, isolated, uninhabited, and abstract spaces” (2007: 230). The purported distance of the island colony enacts a separation between colonizer and colonized landscape that allows for specific relations and forms of observation. Islands become simplified models of a complex world, acting as “quintessential sites for experimentation” (Baldacchino, 2007: 165) based on fetishized assumptions about island spatiality. Scientists use islands to isolate variables and substitute space for time to construct linear timestreams. Islandness functions as stand-in for a computational time-step within an experimental design. These purported blank slates endow the initial time-step essential to modelling. Islands and their peoples have been employed to examine theories of geological, biological, human, and socio-cultural evolution. DeLoughrey describes how island spatiality is considered bound by “the theme of isolation, a model that had been deployed in the 19th century to propose the theory of evolution, and which re-energized the longstanding colonial understanding of the island as a laboratory” (2012: 168). The expansion of U.S. empire specifically enrolled island colonies from Puerto Rico to the Philippines as sites for grisly experimentations, from weapons to biomedical research on non-white bodies who were seen as relics of earlier stages of evolution (Immerwahr, 2019). Just as islands and their peoples have been used to model past evolutions, they are also established as models for specific futures. Baldacchino describes islands as sites of novelty; they tend toward clairvoyance; they are disposed to act as advance indicators or extreme reproductions of what is present or future elsewhere ... with fallacious simplicity, [they] can be conceived as a convenient platform for any whim or fancy. (2007: 165) Islands have emplaced visions of future climate dystopias (Farbotko, 2010) and imagined libertarian capitalist utopias (Lynch, 2017). The continuation of these projects of empire and white supremacy are shaping plans for human colonization of Moon and Mars. Such projects re-articulate debates around questions of race, ability, eugenics, reproduction, and human psychology in journals like Futures – including a 2019 special issue on ethics in offworld colonization. Through these projects, islands and peoples are erased and overwritten by the totality of the model world they represent. As DeLoughrey explains, “Western colonizers had long configured tropical islands into the contained spaces of a laboratory, which is to say a suppression of island history and Indigenous presence” (2012: 172). An affective landscape of history, more-than-human relationality (Watts, 2013), and lived social place gets transformed into independent, sterile variables instrumentalized in the projection of specific futures. Such discourses intersect with space science imaginaries of exploration, exoticism, and otherworldliness. Allen examines how U.S. empire depends upon three notions of time: a romanticized historical time recounting myth of the nation’s founding, the geological time of natural history, and the mechanized time of the clock and apparatuses of measurement. The organization and control over these three temporalities constitutes a colonial totality (Matson and Nunn, 2017) that works to settle time as much as space in the projection of settler futures. In dominant discourses, Indigenous time is linked to the past, with the present constituted on assimilation and the future on complete erasure (Rifkin, 2017). The existence of contemporary Indigenous peoples poses a challenge to ongoing settler colonial hegemony. Goodyear-Ka‘opua explains how “settler state officials cast the kia ʻi [land protectors, caretakers] as impediments on the road to ‘progress’ (aka settler futurity) ... (mis)representing us as fixed in place, pinned in a remote time” (2017: 191–192). Enlightenment notions of universality erase difference and thus Indigenous claims to prior rights or sovereignty. While these conceptions of time have long been critiqued, they continue to shape the central logics of contemporary Western science, including space science. While notions of linear, progressive time are used to justify settler colonial projects, the relative and contingent relationships among space, time, and matter complicate claims to universality. Time, like space, is subject to practices of organization and control that produce subject–object relations key to the Western colonial project. For instance, geologic time, or what Allen refers to as “vertical time,” is the spatial-temporal imaginary of geologic strata. He describes that, while “history often depicted time advancing horizontally across space, the geological revolution made it possible to imagine time extending perpendicularly into the territory beneath the nation” (Allen, 2008: 165). The deep time of geology historicizes Western civilization as the top layer, the apex of natural history, and thus stands to justify colonialism and its civilizational projects. The exploration of cosmological time in the space sciences extends the colonial project further into the far expanses of the future and the totality of the universe. In Barad’s deconstructive reading of Enlightenment science, linear time and evacuated space are both the product of active material processes through which a purportedly universal “Man” continually enacts a separation between himself and the universe. It is this supposed separation from the rest of existence that constitutes “Man” as the subject of a masculinist science and the remainder of the universe as the object of his will. Practices of scientific observation and colonial occupation work in tandem to re-enact and reinforce this fundamental subject–object relationship. Critical scholars of science have long argued against the purported passivity of observation, from critiques of the Archimedean point (Yaqoob, 2014) to feminist theories of the embodied and situated nature of knowledge production (Haraway, 1988). Yet, beyond simply noting the ontological impossibility of Man’s separation from the universe, Barad theorizes an emergent and contingent form of separability – what she calls agential separability – that is (re)produced through the material practices of apparatuses. Barad explains that “apparatuses enact agential cuts that produce determinate boundaries and properties of entities within phenomena” (2007: 148). Apparatuses determine what comes to matter and how, thus producing differences between Sammler and Lynch 951 subject and object, which are not stable positions but rather enacted and contingent forms of relationality. We employ the apparatus to explore how subject–object relations of Western colonial science are not universal and absolute, but rather enacted through material practices that selectively produce the privileged subject positions on which settler colonialism and space science both depend. Ontologically, apparatuses produce spatial, temporal, and material relations that constitute projects of Western colonial science. This approach helps elaborate arguments like those of Matson and Nunn that “even the most futuristic space telescopes have embedded within them a lineage of Euro-western cultural supremacy” (2017: n.p.). This is not to simply claim that telescopes are in some way symbolic of settler colonial relations, but to recognize how space science apparatuses actively orient relations of observation and materialize settler colonial relations. Both TMT and HI-SEAS constitute apparatuses that extend spatially well beyond the infrastructural footprint on these mountains, to the island and surrounding ocean, into the atmosphere, to Moon, Mars, and cosmos. As part of these apparatuses, mountain environments of Hawaii become both a gateway to the cosmos and simulation of an alien landscape. Temporally, the apparatus stretches beyond contemporary scientific practices, drawing on longstanding histories of European imperialism, Western law, and settler colonial logics, and projecting these ideologies into offworld futures. Materially, these projects enroll technological, logistical, and physical systems, including roads, mirrors and lenses, sensors and surveillance devices, electromagnetic waves and domes, the geology of the Hawaiian landscape, and bodies of observer and observed.

#### The alternative is to refuse the research project of the affirmative – this is a generative event that creates space for alternative modalities of knowing around outer space and insists upon the interrogation of the epistemological underpinnings of the 1ac.

Tuck and Yang 14 – associate professor of critical race and indigenous studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto and director of ethnic studies at UC San Diego Eve Tuck and Wayne C Yang, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” Humanizing research: Decolonizing qualitative inquiry with youth and communities, vol 223 pp 239 – 243 [https://townsendgroups.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/tuckandyangrwords\_refusingresearch.pdf //](https://townsendgroups.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/tuckandyangrwords_refusingresearch.pdf%20//) sam

For the purposes of our discussion, the most important insight to draw from Simpson’s article is her emphasis that refusals are not subtractive, but are theoretically generative (p. 78), expansive. Refusal is not just a “no,” but a redirection to ideas otherwise unacknowledged or unquestioned. Unlike a settler colonial configuration of knowledge that is petulantly exasperated and resentful of limits, a methodology of refusal regards limits on knowledge as productive, as indeed a good thing. To explore how refusal and the installation of limits on settler colonial knowledge might be productive, we make a brief detour to the Erased Lynching series (2002–2011) by Los Angeles–based artist Ken Gonzales-Day (see Figure 12.1). Gonzales-Day researched lynching in California and the Southwest and found that the majority of lynch victims were Latinos, American Indians, and Asians. Like lynchings in the South, lynchings in California were events of public spectacle, often attended by hundreds, sometimes thousands of festive onlookers. At the lynchings, professional photographers took hours to set up portable studios similar to those used at carnivals; they sold their images frequently as postcards, mementos of public torture and execution to be circulated by U.S. post through- out the nation and the world. Lynching, we must be reminded, was extralegal, yet nearly always required the complicity of law enforcement—either by marshals or sheriffs in the act itself, or by judges and courts in not bothering to prosecute the lynch mob afterward. The photographs immortalize the murder beyond the time and place of the lynching, and in their proliferation, expand a single murder to the general murderability of the non-White body. In this respect, the image of the hanged, mutilated body itself serves a critical function in the maintenance of White supremacy and the spread of racial terror beyond the lynching. The spectacle of the lynching is the medium of terror. Gonzales-Day’s Erased Lynching series reintroduces the photographs of lynching to a contemporary audience, with one critical intervention: The ropes and the lynch victim have been removed from the images. Per Gonzales-Day’s website (n.d.), the series enacted a conceptual gesture intended to direct the viewer’s attention, not upon the lifeless body of the lynch victim, but upon the mechanisms of lynching themselves: the crowd, the spectacle, the photographer, and even consider the impact of flash photography upon this dismal past. The perpetrators, if present, remain fully visible, jeering, laughing, or pulling at the air in a deadly pantomime. As such, this series strives to make the invisible visible. The Erased Lynching series yields another context in which we might consider what a social scientist’s refusal stance might comprise. Though indeed centering on the erasure of the former object, refusal need not be thought of as a subtractive methodology. Refusal prompts analysis of the festive spectators regularly backgrounded in favor of wounded bodies, strange fruit, interesting scars. Refusal shifts the gaze from the violated body to the violating instruments—in this case, the lynch mob, which does not disappear when the lynching is over, but continues to live, accumulating land and wealth through the extermination and subordination of the Other. Thus, refusal helps move us from thinking of violence as an event and toward an analysis of it as a structure. Gonzales-Day might have decided to reproduce and redistribute the images as postcards, which, by way of showing up in mundane spaces, might have effectively inspired reflection on the spectacle of violence and media of terror. However, in removing the body and the ropes, he installed limits on what the audience can access, and redirected our gaze to the bodies of those who were there to see a murder take place, and to the empty space beneath the branches. Gonzales-Day introduced a new representational territory, one that refuses to play by the rules of the settler colonial gaze, and one that refuses to satisfy the morbid curiosity derived from settler colonialism’s preoccupation with pain. Refusals are needed for narratives and images arising in social science research that rehumiliate when circulated, but also when, in Simpson’s words, “the representation would bite all of us and compromise the representational territory that we have gained for ourselves in the past 100 years” (p. 78). As researcher-narrator, Simpson tells us, “I reached my own limit when the data would not contribute to our sovereignty or complicate the deeply simplified, atrophied representations of Iroquois and other Indigenous peoples that they have been mired within anthropologically” (p. 78). Here Simpson makes clear the ways in which research is not the intervention that is needed—that is, the interventions of furthering sovereignty or countering misrepresentations of Native people as anthropological objects. Considering Erased Lynchings dialogically with On Ethnographic Refusal, we can see how refusal is not a prohibition but a generative form. First, refusal turns the gaze back upon power, specifically the colonial modalities of knowing persons as bodies to be differentially counted, violated, saved, and put to work. It makes transparent the metanarrative of knowledge production—its spectatorship for pain and its preoccupation for documenting and ruling over racial difference. Thus, refusal to be made meaningful first and foremost is grounded in a critique of settler colonialism, its construction of Whiteness, and its regimes of representation. Second, refusal generates, expands, champions representational territories that colonial knowledge endeavors to settle, enclose, domesticate. Simpson complicates the portrayals of Iroquois, without resorting to portrayals of anthropo- logical Indians. Gonzales-Day portrays the violations without reportraying the victimizations. Third, refusal is a critical intervention into research and its circular self-defining ethics. The ethical justification for research is defensive and self-encircling—its apparent self-criticism serves to expand its own rights to know, and to defend its violations in the name of “good science.” Refusal challenges the individualizing discourse of IRB consent and “good science” by high- lighting the problems of collective harm, of representational harm, and of knowledge colonization. Fourth, refusal itself could be developed into both method and theory. Simpson presents refusal on the part of the researcher as a type of calculus ethnography. Gonzales-Day deploys refusal as a mode of representation. Simpson theorizes refusal by the Kahnawake Nation as anticolonial, and rooted in the desire for possibilities outside of colonial logics, not as a reactive stance. This final point about refusal connects our conversation back to desire as a counterlogic to settler colonial knowledge.

#### The role of the ballot is to center indigenous scholarship and resistance-- Any ethical commitment requires that the aff place themselves in the center of Native scholarship and demands.

Carlson 16 (Elizabeth Carlson, PhD, is an Aamitigoozhi, Wemistigosi, and Wasicu (settler Canadian and American), whose Swedish, Saami, German, Scots-Irish, and English ancestors have settled on lands of the Anishinaabe and Omaha Nations which were unethically obtained by the US government. Elizabeth lives on Treaty 1 territory, the traditional lands of the Anishinaabe, Nehiyawak, Dakota, Nakota, and Red River Metis peoples currently occupied by the city of Winnipeg, the province of Manitoba, (2016): Anti-colonial methodologies and practices for settler colonial studies, Settler Colonial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1241213, JKS

Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colonized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’.42 Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies. I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral, and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoples, and take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous erasure, but rather take a longer and broader view. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. There is much pressure to claim unique space, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemonic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic. As has been argued, ‘the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices and to marginalize Indigenous resistance’.44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humi- lity and accountability. We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty. We can view oral Indigenous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and pro- vided the foundations for our work. If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholarship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic.

# Case

#### Representations and epistemology perpetuate settler practices – the way we understand and discuss the structures around us overdetermines our praxis.

Seawright 14 Gardner Seawright is a doctoral candidate in the Education, Culture, and Society department at the University of Utah. “Settler Traditions of Place: Making Explicit the Epistemological Legacy of White Supremacy and Settler Colonialism for Place-Based Education.” EDUCATIONAL STUDIES, 50: 554–572, 2014, American Educational Studies Association. JJN

Situating Settler Traditions Settler traditions of place are an epistemic genealogy—the ethics, logics, and ideologies foundational to a knowledge system that have been passed down across generations, a knowledge framework that establishes what is known (the socially constructed commonsense of a culture), how things come to be known (the process of attaining new knowledge), how the world is to be interpreted according to what is known (the social construction of reality), and how the self is known in relation to perceived reality (the politics of self). Tradition is used as a conceptual tool allowing for domination to be empha- sized as an on-going historical process, while also allowing for epistemology as tradition to simultaneously be evolutionary and a cherished cultural artifact. As a cultural product, settler traditions of place are transmitted across generations through discipline, teaching, modeling and other forms of direct and subtle so- cial communication resulting in normalized habits, beliefs, values, and practices. In speaking about “western cultural traditions,” Val Plumood (2002) argues that there are “epistemic and moral limitations” embedded in these traditions—these normalized habits—that perpetuate hierarchized notions of the world that privi- lege white-hetero-landowning males (99). As Martusewicz et al. (2011) explain, these subtle discourses manifest as taken-for-granted cultural assumptions that are rooted in racism, sexism, classism that intertwine with and reflect the cultivation of violent relationships with the more-than-human world and natural systems that we depend on for life (119). The tradition in question here is the social air that penetrates the Western world, interacting with human beings whether they want it to or not. Using tradition as a metaphor for epistemology allows me to emphasize the way epistemology can im- pact every aspect of life while remaining removed from a deterministic position. Embedded in discourse, tradition appears as ever-present; despite this, individual social actors have the agency to break tradition. Consequently, in the same way that an individual breaks from familial, cultural, or religious tradition and faces the ramifications for transgressing, epistemic transgression can also incur social fallout and cause friction. When an individual epistemically transgresses, they employ an epistemic praxis (the operationalization of an alternative or critical epistemology) that goes against the grain and is counter to the tradition that defines the social environment. For conversations concerning the cultivation of criticality (like the one herein) this break in tradition is absolutely desirable and can inspire what Jose ́ Medina (2013) calls epistemic friction. Epistemic friction is contained in those uncomfortable moments in which our taken-for-granted assumptions about the world begin to crack. These moments can be transformative and cat- alyze critical consciousness to imagine and hopefully actualize an alternative epistemology.