## 1

#### **The 1AC’s techno orientalist discourses cement the racialized tropes of Yellow Peril which frames Asian technological progress as dangerous and dystopian – none of these threats are real but are self-produced by Western anxieties**

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The term yellow peril emerged in the late nineteenth century in response to Japan’s arrival to the geopolitical stage as a formidable military and industrial contender to the Western powers of Europe and the United States.9 The concept was further elaborated and given a tangible racial form through Sax Rohmer’s series of novels and films that provided the early content for the social imaginary of “yellow peril” along with its personification in the character of Dr. Fu Manchu, the iconic supervillain archetype of the Asian “evil criminal genius,” and his cast of minions.10 Strikingly, Dr. Fu Manchu’s characterization as evil, criminal, and genius continues to inform the racial trope of the Asian scientist spy; and more recently, we may add to the list the bioengineer, the CFO, the international graduate student, to name just a few. Moreover, the notion of the non-differentiable “yellow” masses continues to function as a homogenizing and dehumanizing device of Asian racialization, which makes possible the transference of Sinophobia to Asian xenophobia. In its inherent attempt to construct a racial other, “yellow peril” is more a projection of Western fear than a representation of an Asian object/subject, and in this sense, it may be better understood as a repository of racial affect that can animate a myriad of representational figures, images, and discourses, depending on context. Indeed, the images and discourses of yellow peril have surfaced multiple times throughout the twentieth century, capturing a multitude of ever-shifting perceived threats that range from the danger of military intrusion (i.e., Japanese Americans during WWII), economic competition (i.e., Chinese laborers in the late nineteenth century, Japan in the 1980s), Asian moral and cultural depravity (i.e., non-Christian heathens, Chinese prostitutes, opium smokers), to biological inferiority (i.e., effeminacy, disease carriers). As Colleen Lye observes, “the incipient ‘yellow peril’ refers to a particular combinatory kind of anticolonial [and anti-West] nationalism, in which the union of Japanese technological advance and Chinese numerical mass confronts Western civilization with a potentially unbeatable force.”11 Arguably, the yellow peril of today represents heightened Western anxieties around China’s combined forces of population size, global economic growth, and rapid technological-scientific innovation—all of which emerge from a political system that is considered ideologically oppositional to ours. The current context, we suggest, is best understood through the lens of techno-Orientalism. When the idea of techno-Orientalism first appeared in David Morley and Kevin Robins’s analysis of why Japan occupied such a threatening position in Western imagination in the late 1980s, techno-Orientalism offered a framework to make sense of the technologically imbued racist stereotypes of Japan/the Japanese that were emerging within the context of Western fears and anxieties around Japan’s ascendancy as a technological global power. They proposed that if technological advancement has been crucial to Western civilizational progress, then Japan’s technological superiority over the West also signals a critical challenge to Western hegemony, including its cultural authority to control representations of the West and its “others.” They claimed that the shifting balance in global power—the West’s loss of technological preeminence—has induced an identity crisis in the West. In response, techno-Orientalism, in which “[idioms of technology] become structured into the discourse of Orientalism,” is produced in large part to discipline Japan and its rise to techno-economic power.12 The United States, for instance, externalized its anxiety into xenophobic projections of Japan as a “culture that is cold, impersonal, and machine-like” in which its people are “sub-human” and “unfeeling aliens.”13 Techno-Orientalism, born from the “Japan Panic,” was effectively consolidated through and around political-economic concerns that frame Japanese and, by extension, Asian techno-capitalist progress as dangerous and dystopian. Extending Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism,14 techno-Orientalism marks a geo-historical shift where the West no longer has control over the terms that define the East—the “Orient”—as weak, inferior, and subordinate to the West. It marks a shift not only in political-economic power but also in cultural authority. Techno-Orientalism, then, is the expressive vehicle (cultural productions and visual representations) by which Western and Eastern nations articulate their fears, desires, and anxieties that are produced in their competitive struggle to gain technological hegemony through economic trade and scientific innovation.15 Analogous to Japan’s position in the late 1980s, China currently figures into the techno-Orientalist imaginary as a powerful competitor in mass production, a global financial giant, and an aggressive investor in technological, infrastructural, and scientific developments. At the same time, the increasing purchasing power of China provokes American fear of a future global market that is economically driven by Chinese consumptive desires and practices. It is this duality—the domination of both production and consumption across different sectors of the techno-capitalist global economy—that undergirds American anxieties of a sinicized future.16 Further amplifying these anxieties around Chinese techno-economic domination is our imagination of China/the Chinese as the ultimate yellow peril, whose state ideology is oppositional to that of the United States and whose unmatched population size combined with its economic expansion and technological advancements may actually pose a real challenge to U.S. global hegemony. We turn now to examine how the ideology of yellow peril is manifesting in the current context of techno-Orientalism, beginning first with an analysis of the racial trope of “Chinese as contagion” and its connection to anti-Asian aggression.

#### The 1ac’s knowledge production reinforces techno-orientalist discourses surrounding international threats and US heg that perpetuates endless stereotyping and violence

Roh et al 15, David S. Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media. Rutgers University Press (138-144), 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1647cqh>. //wr tanya

. The president asserted that the world was divided between good and evil and that American disarmament would abandon Christianity to the threat of communism and reward “the aggressive impulses of an evil empire.” Two weeks later Reagan sought to make the revived prospect of nuclear war less terrifying by announcing on television, and without consulting the Defense Department, a billion-dollar Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to build a computerized shield to protect Americans from Soviet missiles that might be launched in response to Reagan’s renewal of the arms race. The fantastic technology of the SDI would allow the United States to assert global military dominance without risking nuclear annihilation. Most analysts and academics considered SDI (or “Star Wars” as it was termed in the media) scientifically impossible. Many commentators noted that Reagan’s SDI proposals were eerily similar to the plot of one of the president’s earliest films, Murder in the Air (1940), about a weapon that “not only makes the United States invincible in war, but in so doing promises to be the greatest force for world peace ever discovered” (Boyer 205). But this did not stop the administration from opening nearly unlimited funding channels for developing the proposed military technology. However, the American psyche is not static, but continually reproduced, remade, and cultivated by image makers backed by the power of the state. Since World War II, politicians and pundits have used the specter of “Oriental” enemy invasions to scare Americans into defending themselves against a succession of intractable foes by embracing the emancipatory promise of military technology. Defenders and definers of America have replaced Soviet communism with new archenemies across East Asia and the Middle East. Cyberwar has replaced the Space Race. The ease of this transition suggests how the shifting goals of U.S. policy, not any overarching immutable cultural or geostrategic affinity across the “Orient,” shape how Americans understand the implicit “Eastern” threats to an imagined “West.” This complements Edward Said’s central contention that the Orient is not a real place that experts in the West analyze: the Orient is a fantasy, produced by analysts with the power to assert its existence. Adding “techno” to Orientalism registers the embeddedness of such civilizational logic within the sixty-year American struggle for military industrial techno-dominance in the supposedly epic contest over the fate of the world. The defense of techno-Orientalist militarism has become literally hardwired into American political institutions. The cultivated need for enemies for Americans to define themselves against was complicated when the supposedly intractable Soviet Union crumbled under its own weight to everyone’s surprise in 1991. Think tanks such as the Center for Security Policy, founded by Reagan’s former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (and CPD member) Frank Gaffney in 1988, and the Middle East Forum, founded in 1990 by Pipes’s son Daniel Pipes, scrambled to find new spectral enemies endangering the world’s largest military in order to maintain their political influence. These think tanks repurposed and remade security discourse rooted in the idea of an intractable civilizational clash between the West and communism into one between the West and the rest—simply recasting new actors into the well-established roles of American strategic drama (Little 226–266). The neoconservative Project for a New American Century (PNAC) outlined the necessity for a more aggressive stance against China and Iraq under the title Present Dangers, edited by Robert Kagan and William Kristol (vii) in its bid to revive a “Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity.” When PNAC-supported George W. Bush assumed the presidency later that year, his advisors (including former CPD member Paul Wolfowitz) immediately began strategizing about how to scare the American people and Congress into another round of war against intractable Oriental enemies. However, even the pursuit of this techno-Orientalist fantasy betrayed its own ambivalence. The U.S. military named the December 2003 hunt for deposed Iraqi leader (and former U.S. ally) Saddam Hussein “Operation Red Dawn,” and code named his two suspected hiding places “Wolverine 1” and “Wolverine 2”—as if to suggest that the United States was the overpowering evil occupying force in “Indian country,” and Hussein an Iraqi hiding in the hills to lead a patriotic resistance (Sirota 139–169). Nonetheless, as Americans increasingly equated the mounting failures in Iraq to the failures in Vietnam three decades before, hawkish politicians sought to remake and refocus the war’s goals by founding a short-lived third CPD in 2004 dedicated to channeling American fears of government manipulation toward the threat radical Islamic terrorists pose to the safety of the world (Barry).

#### Their fabricated threats “china rise bad” are rooted in techno-orientalist epistemology that forces us to bear xenophobic antipathies

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1 The Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council in the United States reported over one thousand cases of anti-Asian incidents in a two-week period in March 2020.2 Outside the United States, a Singaporean student in the United Kingdom was violently kicked and punched by an angry group of men after they uttered, “we don’t want your coronavirus in our country” (my emphasis).3 In Australia, a survey taken by the community group Asian Australian Alliance recorded a total of 178 reports of anti-Asian incidents in two weeks, ranging from racial slurs to physical assault.4 Though President Trump has dropped the “Chinese virus” for “kung flu” and tweeted on March 23 that “It is very important that we totally protect our Asian American community . . . the spreading of the virus is NOT their fault,” it seems that Sinophobia and racial violence against Asian Americans have been unleashed. Make no mistake, as long as President Trump continues to take a confrontational stance, using the rhetoric of blame against China with the intention to punish it with new sanctions, tariffs, and even the cancellation of U.S. debt obligations,5 the racial aggressions against Asian Americans will continue to rise, if not intensify. By now, it is widely accepted that the novel coronavirus emerged first in Wuhan, and scientists believe that the zoonotic disease might have jumped from animals to humans at Wuhan’s Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, a wet market where vegetables, seafood, meat, and a small number of exotic wildlife were sold. Despite this, on April 30, President Trump casually offered a new theory, which Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted: that COVID had originated in the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which houses a biosafety level-4 lab, and that the virus might have “leaked” from that lab. The implicit suggestion is that China had either intentionally bioengineered the novel coronavirus to cause massive destruction, thereby attributing malice, or carelessly leaked the virus due to scientific negligence, thereby attributing incompetence. In either case, these kinds of unsubstantiated speculations work to further stoke anger and disdain against the Chinese state. More disturbingly, they traffic in the idea of China as a biotechnology threat, resonating with pre-existing filmic representations of futuristic dystopian worlds. As the COVID pandemic story transpires in real time, engulfing the entire global community, taking unexpected twists and turns, making divergences and transgressions, we have become increasingly aware that the layers of entanglements cannot be easily parsed out, nor will we know anytime soon how and when the story will end. We offer a query into how we might assess and make sense of the intensifying Sinophobia and xenophobia in this current context. To do so, we must resist the temptation to confine our analysis to the narrow parameters of the pandemic. Rather, we insist on examining the rise of anti-Asian aggression within the concomitant vectors of the pandemic, the escalation of the U.S.-China trade war, and the growing concerns about cyber- and techno-security. Here we assert that the ideology of yellow peril set within a techno-Orientalist imaginary is powerfully animating the racial form and racial affect mediating the multiple terrains of public health, technology, global trade, and national security. While it is tempting to treat this historical conjuncture as extraordinary, it is crucial that we situate the current unfolding within the long history of Asian racialization, one that indexes the abiding tension between the political impetus to define national belonging and the shifting economic imperatives of the nation-state.8 The outbreak of the pandemic could not have had worse timing (as if it could be timed), but timing is critically important here. Its emergence amid the ongoing intensive trade war between the United States and China is significant in that the prevailing tensions between the two countries and the discourses of Chinese unfair trade competition, scientific espionage, and technological surveillance frame the reception of the pandemic. One may argue that President Trump’s insistence on blaming China for the spread of the deadly virus is yet another tactic in his administration’s sustained attempt to quell China’s economic power at the same time that it provides a foil to distract from—and a scapegoat to blame for—the economic and public health crisis in which we find ourselves. s the abiding tension between the political impetus to define national belonging and the shifting economic imperatives of the nation-state.8 At this particular juncture, we unfortunately have been inundated with media coverage of a plethora of accusations and actions launched against China and Chinese Americans. Within the past two years, we have witnessed the implementation of trade sanctions and tariffs against China, the removal of prominent Chinese American scientists from research institutions, and the severing of nationwide economic transactions with certain China-based telecommunications corporations, with Huawei Technologies Company being the most notable. All these have been advanced in the name of national security. The discursive formation and the representational devices that have been used to justify these state directives play a critical role in constructing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as culprit and as America’s enemy number one. These constructions, some of which will be examined in this essay, are layered upon one another, each building and elaborating on the last, and each invoking and simultaneously inciting a different set of anxieties that lie within the broader repertoire of China/ Chinese as threat. Indeed, the inundation of media about China makes it difficult, if not impossible, to decipher truth from falsehood, myth from reality, rhetoric from evidence. Our task here is not to weigh the truth-value of these representations but to treat them as ongoing contests embedded in power and to draw out their material effects. It is worth noting that while the explicit target of U.S. state aggression has been the mainland Chinese state or the PRC, the actual effects are much more wide-ranging and extend into everyday aggressions against all those who present as East Asian American. In our examination of the variegated representations of China/Chinese, we suggest that the longstanding ideology of “yellow peril” remains not just pertinent, but extremely forceful in constructing a multifaceted repertoire of Chinese state threat and, by extension, of Chinese/Asian American threat. What is particular about this recent iteration of yellow peril is its configuration through the lens of techno-Orientalism, a framework that is primarily used to examine the explicitly fictional genres of novels, videogames, and films but that we now assert as being actively deployed in this current historical conjuncture.

#### The alternative is to reject the AFF in favor of an epistemic rejection of Area Studies that define knowledge production through mapping the external world as unstable, hostile and target. Only de-centering knowledge production from the self can solve inevitable conflict and orientalist violence

Chow 6 (Rey, Anne Firor Scott Professor of Literature at Duke University, April 2006, “Age of the World as Target”, Rey Chow Reader) APS

Among the most important elements in war, writes karl von Clausewitz, are the “moral elements.”32 From the United States’ point of view, this phrase does not seem at all ironic. Just as the bombings of Afghanistan and Iraq in the first few years of the twenty-first century were justified as benevolent acts to preserve the united States and the rest of the world against “the axis of evil,” “weapons of mass destruction,” and the like, so were the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki considered pacific acts, acts that were meant to save lives and save civilization in a world threatened by German Nazism. (Though, by the time the bombs were dropped in Japan, Germany had already surrendered.) even today, some of the most educated, scientifically knowledgeable members of U.S. society continue to believe that the atomic bomb was the best way to terminate the hostilities.33 And, while the media in the united States are quick to join the media elsewhere in reporting the controversies over Japan’s refusal to apologize for its war crimes in Asia or over France’s belatedness in apologizing for the Vichy government’s persecution of the Jews, no U.S. head of state has ever visited Hiroshima or Nagasaki, or expressed regret for the nuclear holocaust.34 In this—its absolute conviction of its own moral superiority and legitimacy—lies perhaps the most deeply ingrained connection between the foundation myth of the United States as an exceptional nation and the dropping of the atomic bombs (as well as all the military and economic interventions the united States has made in nationalist struggles in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle east since the Second World War).35 even on occasions such as Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) and September 11, 2001, when the united States had to recognize that it was just part of the world (and hence could be attacked like any other country), its response was typically that of reasserting U.S. exceptionalism—This cannot happen to us! We are unique, we cannot be attacked!—by ferociously attacking others. In the decades since 1945, whether in dealing with the Soviet union, the People’s republic of China, north korea, vietnam, and countries in Central America, or during the gulf Wars, the United States has been conducting war on the basis of a certain kind of knowledge production, and producing knowledge on the basis of war. War and knowledge enable and foster each other primarily through the collective fantasizing of some foreign or alien body that poses danger to the “self” and the “eye” that is the nation. once the monstrosity of this foreign body is firmly established in the national consciousness, the decision makers of the u.S. government often talk and behave as though they had no choice but war. War, then, is acted out as a moral obligation to expel an imagined dangerous alienness from the United States’ self-concept as the global custodian of freedom and democracy. Put in a different way, the “moral element,” insofar as it produces knowledge about the “self” and “other”—and hence the “eye” and its “target”—as such, justifies war by its very dichotomizing logic. Conversely, the violence of war, once begun, fixes the other in its attributed monstrosity and affirms the idealized image of the self. In this regard, the pernicious stereotyping of the Japanese during the Second World War—not only by u.S. military personnel but also by social and behavioral scientists—was simply a flagrant example of an ongoing ideological mechanism that had accompanied Western treatments of non-Western “others” for centuries. In the hands of academics such as geoffrey gorer, writes Dower, the notion that was collectively and “objectively” formed about the Japanese was that they were “a clinically compulsive and probably collectively neurotic people, whose lives were governed by ritual and ‘situational ethics,’ wracked with insecurity, and swollen with deep, dark currents of repressed resentment and aggression.”37 As Dower points out, such stereotyping was by no means accidental or unprecedented: The Japanese, so “unique” in the rhetoric of World War Two, were actually saddled with racial stereotypes that europeans and Americans had applied to nonwhites for centuries: during the conquest of the new World, the slave trade, the Indian wars in the united States, the agitation against Chinese immigrants in America, the colonization of Asia and Africa, the U.S. conquest of the Philippines at the turn of the century. These were stereotypes, moreover, which had been strongly reinforced by nineteenthcentury Western science. In the final analysis, in fact, these favored idioms denoting superiority and inferiority transcended race and represented formulaic expressions of Self and Other in general.38 The moralistic divide between “self” and “other” constitutes the production of knowledge during the U.S. occupation of Japan after the Second World War as well. As Monica Braw writes, in the years immediately after 1945, the risk that the united States would be regarded as barbaric and inhumane was carefully monitored, in the main by cutting off Japan from the rest of the world through the ban on travel, control of private mail, and censorship of research, mass media information, and other kinds of communication. The entire occupation policy was permeated by the view that “the united States was not to be accused; guilt was only for Japan”:39 As the occupation of Japan started, the atmosphere was military. Japan was a defeated enemy that must be subdued. The Japanese should be taught their place in the world: as a defeated nation, Japan had no status and was entitled to no respect. People should be made to realize that any catastrophe that had befallen them was of their own making. until they had repented, they were suspect. If they wanted to release information about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and nagasaki, it could only be for the wrong reasons, such as accusing the united States of inhumanity. Thus this information was suppressed.40 As in the scenario of aerial bombing, the elitist and aggressive panoramic “vision” in which the other is beheld means that the sufferings of the other matters much less than the transcendent aspirations of the self. And, despite being the products of a particular culture’s technological fanaticism, such transcendent aspirations are typically expressed in the form of selfless universalisms. As Sherry puts it, “The reality of Hiroshima and nagasaki seemed less important than the bomb’s effect on ‘[hu]mankind’s destiny,’ on ‘humanity’s choice,’ on ‘what is happening to men’s minds,’ and on hopes (now often extravagantly revived) to achieve world government.” On Japan’s side, as yoneyama writes, such a “global narrative of the universal history of humanity” has helped sustain “a national victimology and phantasm of innocence throughout most of the postwar years.” going one step further, she remarks: “The idea that Hiroshima’s disaster ought to be remembered from the transcendent and anonymous position of humanity . . . might best be described as ‘nuclear universalism.’ once the relations among war, racism, and knowledge production are underlined in these terms, it is no longer possible to assume, as some still do, that the recognizable features of modern war—its impersonality, coerciveness, and deliberate cruelty—are “divergences” from the “antipathy” to violence and to conflict that characterize the modern world.43 Instead, it would be incumbent on us to realize that the pursuit of war—with its use of violence—and the pursuit of peace—with its cultivation of knowledge—are the obverse and reverse of the same coin, the coin that I have been calling “the age of the world target.” rather than being irreconcilable opposites, war and peace are coexisting, collaborative functions in the continuum of a virtualized world. More crucially still, only the privileged nations of the world can afford to wage war and preach peace at one and the same time. As Sherry writes, “The united States had different resources with which to be fanatical: resources allowing it to take the lives of others more than its own, ones whose accompanying rhetoric of technique disguised the will to destroy.”44 From this it follows that, if indeed political and military acts of cruelty are not unique to the united States—a point which is easy enough to substantiate—what is nonetheless remarkable is the manner in which such acts are, in the united States, usually cloaked in the form of enlightenment and altruism, in the form of an aspiration simultaneously toward technological perfection and the pursuit of peace. In a country in which political leaders are held accountable for their decisions by an electorate, violence simply cannot—as it can in totalitarian countries—exist in the raw. even the most violent acts must be adorned with a benign, rational story. It is in the light of such interlocking relations among war, racism, and knowledge production that I would make the following comments about area studies, the academic establishment that crystallizes the connection between the epistemic targeting of the world and the ‘‘humane’’ practices of peacetime learning. From Atomic Bombs to Area Studies As its name suggests, area studies as a mode of knowledge production is, strictly speaking, military in its origins. Even though the study of the history, languages, and literatures of, for instance, ‘‘Far Eastern’’ cultures existed well before the Second World War (in what Edward W. Said would term the old Orientalist tradition predicated on philology), the systematization of such study under the rubric of special geopolitical areas was largely a postwar and U.S. phenomenon. In H. D. Harootunian’s words, ‘‘The systematic formation of area studies, principally in major universities, was . . . a massive attempt to relocate the enemy in the new configuration of the Cold War.’ As Bruce Cumings puts it: It is now fair to say, based on the declassified evidence, that the American state and especially the intelligence elements in it shaped the entire field of postwar area studies, with the clearest and most direct impact on those regions of the world where communism was strongest: Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia.’ In the decades after 1945, when the United States competed with the Soviet Union for the power to rule and/or destroy the world, these regions were the ones that required continued, specialized super-vision; to this list we may also add Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As areas to be studied, these regions took on the significance of target fields— fields of information retrieval and dissemination that were necessary for the perpetuation of the United States’ political and ideological hegemony. In the final part of his classic Orientalism, Said describes area studies as a continuation of the old European Orientalism with a different pedagogical emphasis: No longer does an Orientalist try first to master the esoteric languages of the Orient; he begins instead as a trained social scientist and ‘applies’ his science to the Orient, or anywhere else. This is the specifically American contribution to the history of Orientalism, and it can be dated roughly from the period immediately following World War II, when the United States found itself in the position recently vacated by Britain and France. Whereas Said draws his examples mainly from Islamic and Middle Eastern area studies, Cumings provides this portrait of the East Asian target field: The Association for Asian Studies (AAS) was the first ‘‘area’’ organization in the U.S., founded in 1943 as the Far Eastern Association and reorganized as the AAS in 1956. Before 1945 there had been little attention to and not much funding for such things; but now the idea was to bring contemporary social science theory to bear on the non-Western world, rather than continue to pursue the classic themes of Oriental studies, often examined through philology. . . . In return for their severance, the Orientalists would get vastly enhanced academic resources (positions, libraries, language studies)—and soon, a certain degree of separation which came from the social scientists inhabiting institutes of East Asian studies, whereas the Orientalists occupied departments of East Asian languages and cultures. This implicit Faustian bargain sealed the postwar academic deal. A largely administrative enterprise, closely tied to policy, the new American Orientalism took over from the old Orientalism attitudes of cultural hostility, among which is, as Said writes, the dogma that ‘the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible).’Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the ‘‘scientific’’ and ‘‘objective’’ production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special ‘‘areas’’ became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target. In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war— if, for instance, the ability to translate a diffcult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes —is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to ‘‘know’’ the other cultures? Can ‘‘knowledge’’ that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare’s accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign ‘‘self ’’/‘‘eye’’—the ‘‘I’’—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that— a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber— such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter— will never receive the attention that is due to them. ‘‘Knowledge,’’ however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences. This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by ‘‘the absence of a definable object’’—and by ‘‘the problem of the vanishing object.’’

#### The ROB is to engage and critique the orientalist reps of the 1AC.

#### We control uniqueness – Orientalism as a social construct is still perpetuated through academic discourse, flips try or die because the debate space is one of our last fighting grounds

Said 85 (Edward, literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, Published in 1985, Page 90-91, “Orientalism Reconsidered”, <http://courses.arch.vt.edu/courses/wdunaway/gia5524/said85.pdf>) RR Jr

As a department of thought and expertise, Orientalism of course refers to several overlapping domains: firstly, the changing historical and cultural relationship between Europe and Asia, a relationship with a 4000 year old history; secondly, the scientific discipline in the West according to which beginning in the early 19th century one specialized in the study of various Oriental cultures and traditions; and, thirdly, the ideological suppositions, images, and fantasies about a currently important and politically urgent region of the world called the Orient. The relatively common denominator between these three aspects of Orientalism is the line separating Occident from Orient, and this, I have argued, is less a fact of nature than it is a fact of human production, which I have called imaginative geography. This is, however, neither to say that the division between Orient and Occident is unchanging nor is it to say that it is simply fictional. It is to sayemphatically - that as with all aspects of what Vico calls the world of nations, the Orient and the Occident are facts produced by human beings, and as such must be studied as integral components of the social, and not the divine or natural, world. And because the social world includes the person or subject doing the studying as well as the object or realm being studied, it is imperative to include them both in any consideration of Orientalism, for, obviously enough, there could be no Orientalism without, on the one hand, the Orientalists, and on the other, the Orientals. Far from being a crudely political apprehension of what has been called the problem of Orientalism, this is in reality a fact basic to any theory of interpretation, or hermeneutics. Yet, and this is the first set of problems I want to consider, there is still a remarkable unwillingness to discuss the problems of Orientalism in the political or ethical or even epistemological contexts proper to it. This is as true of professional literary critics who have written about my book, as it is of course of the Orientalists themselves. Since it seems to me patently impossible to dismiss the truth of Orientalism's political origin and its continuing political actuality, we are obliged on intellectual as well as political grounds to investigate the resistance to the politics of Orientalism, a resistance that is richly symptomatic of precisely what is denied. If the first set of problems is concerned with the problems of Orientalism reconsidered from the standpoint of local issues like who writes or studies the Orient, in what institutional or discursive setting, for what audience, and with what ends in mind, the second set of problems takes us to a wider circle of issues. These are the issues raised initially by methodology and then considerably sharpened by questions as to how the production of knowledge best serves communal, as opposed to factional, ends, how knowledge that is non-dominative and non-coercive can be produced in a setting that is deeply inscribed with the politics, the considerations. the positions, and the strategies of power. In these methodological and moral re-considerations of Orientalism, I shall quite consciously be alluding to similar issues raised by the experiences of feminism or women's studies, black or ethnic studies, socialist and anti-imperialist studies, all of which take for their point of departure the right of formerly un- or mis-represented human groups to speak for and represent themselves in domains defined, politically and intellectually, as normally excluding them, usurping their signifying and representing functions, overriding their historical reality. Nor was this all. The challenge to Orientalism and the colonial era of which it is so organically a part was a challenge to the muteness imposed upon the Orient as object. Insofar as it was a science of incorporation and inclusion by virtue of which the Orient was constituted and then introduced into Europe, Orientalism was a scientific movement whose analogue in the world of empirical politics was the Orient's colonial accumulation and acquisition by Europe. The Orient was therefore not Europe's interlocutor, but its silent Other. From roughly the end of the eighteenth century, when in its age, distance, and richness the Orient was re-discovered by Europe, its history had been a paradigm of antiquity and originality, functions that drew Europe's interests in acts of recognition or acknowledgement but from which Europe moved as its own industrial, economic, and cultural development seemed to leave the Orient far behind. Oriental history - for Hegel, for Marx, later for Burkhardt, Nietzsche, Spengler, and other major philosophers of history - was useful in portraying a region of great age, and what had to be left behind. Literary historians have further noted in all sorts of aesthetic writing and plastic portrayals that a trajectory of "Westering," found for example in Keats and Holderlin, customarily saw the Orient as ceding its historical preeminence and importance to the world spirit moving westwards away from Asia and towards Europe. I shall be giving examples of this dissolving and decentering process in a moment. What needs to be said about it immediately is that it is neither purely methodological nor purely reactive in intent. You do not respond, for example, to the tyrannical conjuncture of colonial power with scholarly Orientalism simply by proposing an alliance between nativist sentiment buttressed by some variety of native ideology to combat them. This, it seems to me, has been the trap into which many Third World and anti-imperialist activists fell in supporting the Iranian and Palestinian struggles, and who found themselves either with nothing to say about the abominations of Khomeini's regime or resorting, in the Palestine case, to the time-worn cliches of revolutionism and, if I might coin a deliberately barbaric phrase, rejectionary armed-strugglism after the Lebanese debacle. Nor can it be a matter simply of re-cycling the old Marxist or world-historical rhetoric, which only accomplishes the dubiously valuable task of re-establishing intellectual and theoretical ascendancy of the old, by now impertinent and genealogically flawed, conceptual models. No: we must, I believe, think both in political and above all theoretical terms, locating the main problems in what Frankfurt theory identified as domination and division of labor, and along with those, the problem of the absence of a theoretical and utopian as well as libertarian dimension in analysis. We cannot proceed, therefore, unless we dissipate and re-dispose the material of historicism into radically different objects and pursuits of knowledge, and we cannot do that until we are aware clearly that no new projects of knowledge can be constituted unless they fight to remain free of the dominance and professionalized particularism that come with historicist systems and reductive, pragmatic, or functionalist theories.

#### The k comes first – before we engage in the 1ac’s discussions of a hypothetical, speculative future, we must first challenge the way we perceive asia and form stereotypes to ensure effective representations and policy action – anything else results in serial policy failure

Fang 14, Jenn Fang, (Jenn Fang is a proud Asian American feminist who currently blogs at [Reappropriate.co](http://reappropriate.co/), one of the web’s oldest AAPI feminist and race activist blogs. She was recently featured as one of [the Frederick Douglass 200](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ng-interactive/2018/jul/05/the-frederick-douglass-200) for her work as an Asian American feminist.) 4-16-2014, "What is Orientalism, and how is it also racism?," Reappropriate, <http://reappropriate.co/2014/04/what-is-orientalism-and-how-is-it-also-racism/> //wr tanya

In short, when the Orient becomes a land of the “Other”, the people of the Orient become the “Other”, too; Orientalism becomes dehumanization. This, not surprisingly, paved the way for multiple Western efforts to colonize — economically, culturally, and militaristically — Asia. I needn’t go into the many examples of the West’s incursions into the East, all of which share at their core the perception that the West has a moral and cultural imperative to subdue through whatever means necessary the bizarre traditions and abnormal people of the Eastern “Other” based entirely upon the Orient’s “deviancy”. A quick consideration of the many anti-Asian stereotypes of today reveal their roots in the over-arching Orientalism that still persists in the West’s conception of the East. We are the Perpetual Foreigner — never quite normal, never quite “one of us”: this is a contemporary recapitulation of the Asian as the “Orientalized Other”. Sexually, many of the gender stereotypes that were first invented during Marco Polo’s time — the hypersexualized lotus blossoms and dragon ladies; the barbaric and cowardly effeminate men — still thrive today. Even the Model Minority myth has its roots in Orientalism: simultaneous awe of exotic Asian cultural traditions that emphasize academia with fear of the intellectual Chinese Yellow Peril threat. Furthermore, Orientalism refers not just to the cultural appropriation, but to the impact this appropriation has on our percepetion of Asia and Asian-ness. Orientalism is more fundamentally the positioning of Asian people as the proverbial “Other”, always serving as a counter-point to the normative West, forever an orbiting satellite, never able to define itself for itself within the Western cannon. Orientalism eternally casts the Asian person as stereotype, and never allows the Asian body to be “normal”. Orientalism is the cultural framework against which tangible racism is practiced against Asian people in the West. In America, when Chinese coolies are lynched, the act is justified by the perception of Chinese men as physically weak, economically invasive, and culturally barbaric. When Japanese Americans are interned, the act is justified by the belief that these citizens are innately un-American and perpetually foreign. When Asian and Asian American women are brutally raped, the act is justified by the assertion that the sexuality of Asian women invites deviancy. When Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz beat Vincent Chin to death, the act is justified by the conflation of Chinese and Japanese as the faceless “Other”. We must be willing and able to explore how the West continues to advance the theatre of Orientalism, and how that Orientalism forever positions the Asian body as “the Other”.

# Case

#### 1] Jamasmie 21 is about the artemeis accord which the us proposed but we didn’t’ escalate as per the tag– means the a) aff can’t solve because the us will always find loopholes and implement other treaties b) err neg on probability

#### 2] they don’t solve debris, it’s also the state – we’ll read green

Swinhoe 21 – Editor at Datacenter Dynamics. Previously he was at IDG in roles including UK Editor at CSO Online and Senior Staff Writer at IDG Connect. [Dan, “China’s moves into mega satellite constellations could add to space debris problem,” 4/20/2021, <https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/chinas-moves-into-mega-satellite-constelations-could-add-to-space-debris-problem/>]

Of the 3,000-odd operational satellites currently in orbit, a little over 400 belong to China or Chinese companies. The number of commercial companies in the West launching satellites has skyrocketed in recent years, and SpaceX now operates more satellites than any other company or government.

But refusing to be left behind, China is planning both state and commercial deployments of constellation satellites in huge numbers in the coming years, which could post an increased risk to in-orbit operations if Chinese companies don’t take due care in how they behave.

A report by the Secure World Foundation says a 2014 document from the Chinese Government known as “Document 60” (Official English Language Title: Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Innovating the Investment and Financing Mechanisms in Key Areas and Encouraging Social Investment) was the start of China’s modern commercial space sector. And in 2020, satellite Internet was included in the scope of China’s New Infrastructure policy initiative. Space is also part of China’s expansive Belt and Road initiative, which all combined have led to an explosion in the country’s commercial space ambitions.

#### 3] johnson doesn’t say it goes nuclear – proves Siu and Chun in the k that says the us fabricates these threats under techno-orientalist epistemology

#### 4] No debris cascades—This ev answers all aff warrants

Fange 2017 (Daniel Von Fange, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler\_syndrome\_is\_over\_hyped/)

Kessler Syndrome is overhyped. A chorus of online commenters great any news of upcoming low earth orbit satellites with worry that humanity will to lose access to space. I now think they are wrong. What is Kessler Syndrome? Here’s the popular view on Kessler Syndrome. Every once in a while, a piece of junk in space hits a satellite. This single impact destroys the satellite, and breaks off several thousand additional pieces. These new pieces now fly around space looking for other satellites to hit, and so exponentially multiply themselves over time, like a nuclear reaction, until a sphere of man-made debris surrounds the earth, and humanity no longer has access to space nor the benefits of satellites. It is a dark picture. Is Kessler Syndrome likely to happen? I had to stop everything and spend an afternoon doing back-of-the-napkin math to know how big the threat is. To estimate, we need to know where the stuff in space is, how much mass is there, and how long it would take to deorbit. The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here. GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be?Let’s imagine a worst case scenario. An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000. So even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space. Now though you can travel through the debris, you couldn’t keep a satellite alive for long in this orbit of death. Kessler Syndrome at its worst just prevents us from putting satellites in certain orbits. In real life, there’s a lot of factors that make Kessler syndrome even less of a problem than our worst case though experiment. Debris would be spread over a volume of space, not a single orbital surface, making collisions orders of magnitudes less likely.Most impact debris will have a slower orbital velocity than either of its original pieces - this makes it deorbit much sooner.Any collision will create large and small objects. Small objects are much more affected by atmospheric drag and deorbit faster, even in a few months from high LEO. Larger objects can be tracked by earth based radar and avoided. The planned big new constellations are not in High LEO, but in Low LEO for faster communications with the earth. They aren’t an issue for Kessler. Most importantly, all new satellite launches since the 1990’s are required to include a plan to get rid of the satellite at the end of its useful life (usually by deorbiting) So the realistic worst case is that insurance premiums on satellites go up a bit. Given the current trend toward much smaller, cheaper micro satellites, this wouldn’t even have a huge effect. I’m removing Kessler Syndrome from my list of things to worry about.

#### 5] gautel 21 doesn’t say it goes nuclear!

#### 6] No China war – MAD, interdependence, deterrence, and no-first use – even if we got into conflict, it wouldn’t go nuclear

Fravel & Cunningham 15—M. Taylor Fravel an Associate Professor of political science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT // Fiona S. Cunningham a PhD candidate in political science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT [“Assuring Assured Retaliation – China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” *International Security*, Vol. 40, No. 2, Emory Libraries]

The most important factor in Chinese assessments of crisis stability is the stakes involved in the scenarios that could result in a crisis. Many interlocutors believe that mutual possession of nuclear weapons is sufficient to deter a high-intensity or protracted war and would therefore ensure that any U.S.-China crisis or conflict would be limited and controlled. For example, the Science of Military Strategy concludes that “in the present and long-term future, there is a miniscule (shenwei) possibility of an enemy initiating a large-scale ground invasion of China.”125 Some Chinese analysts also note that U.S.-China economic and political interdependence would further constrain the role of nuclear weapons in any future U.S.-China contingency.126 As a result, the most likely U.S.-China contingencies in which nuclear weapons could play a role would involve Taiwan or U.S. allies. In these conflicts, Chinese analysts believe that the stakes would not warrant the use of nuclear weapons by China (unless attacked first). They implicitly assume that the stakes would be too low for the United States, as well, and that Washington would either restrain or abandon its allies if defending them gave rise to a situation in which the United States would need to threaten to use nuclear weapons.127 The general view was that the United States would not want to become entangled in a conflict with China on behalf of its allies or other states. One interlocutor suggested that Taiwan and North Korea were the only third-party contingencies over which the United States and China would be willing to risk a nuclear crisis. Nevertheless, this interlocutor maintained that China would not use nuclear weapons against the Taiwanese people and that the Chinese government had distanced itself from the remarks of a senior PLA officer who commented in 2005 that China would use nuclear weapons if it were defeated in a conventional war over Taiwan.128 Another interlocutor was concerned about the possible spillover effect of a U.S. preemptive strike on North Korea’s nuclear weapons. These Chinese views likely underestimate the strength of U.S. interests at stake in any conflict between a U.S. ally and China, as Christensen and Goldstein note. Although tensions have eased across the Taiwan Strait in recent years, the possibility of U.S. involvement in a conflict over Taiwan remains a real concern [End Page 35] for the PLA. The Science of Military Strategy acknowledges that cross-strait relations have improved, “but the key factors obstructing a solution to the Taiwan problem have not fundamentally disappeared.”129 As a result, the risk of a war over Taiwan’s unification is “relatively high.” The book states that such a war would be a relatively large-scale and relatively high-intensity conflict in which China would need to “guard against foreign military intervention” and that such a conflict would occur “against the background of nuclear deterrence.”130 Nevertheless, for the second reason below, most interlocutors did not believe that China would threaten or use nuclear weapons without being threatened or attacked first. A second reason for a relatively optimistic view of crisis stability is the Chinese view that China’s limited ambiguity over its no-first-use policy remains consistent with a clear firebreak between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons. China’s strategic community maintains that China would not use nuclear weapons first in a crisis or conflict. A recent textbook from AMS, for example, describes one of the Second Artillery’s main missions as “preventing (ezhi) an enemy from escalating a conventional war to a nuclear war.”131 In the context of a Taiwan contingency, Maj. Gen. Yao Yunzhu explains that “it would be useless for China to deter U.S. conventional intervention by using China’s nuclear weapons. It is the United States, not China, which has the nuclear capabilities to control and even dominate conflict escalation.”132 Some Chinese interlocutors also claimed that U.S. conventional superiority contributes to a clear conventional-nuclear firebreak, as the United States would always have conventional options to escalate a conflict and would therefore not need to resort to nuclear threats or use.133 Most interlocutors expressed confidence that the United States would have no reason to attack China’s nuclear arsenal with conventional weapons, but some interlocutors recognized that nuclear escalation control was a part of U.S. war planning, despite the United States’ conventional superiority.134 If China views a conventional attack on its nuclear weapons or infrastructure as a first strike that [End Page 36] would justify nuclear retaliation, its belief about a clear firebreak rests more on a belief that the United States will be deterred from initiating such an attack than it does on a principled constraint. A third factor in China’s optimistic assessment of crisis stability is the perceived deterrent effectiveness of the limited ambiguity that China has allowed regarding its no-first-use policy. Some strategists saw a greater temptation for the United States to attack China’s nuclear capabilities with conventional weapons as U.S. conventional precision strike capabilities improved. All inter-locutors indicated that China has carefully considered the possibility that the United States might use conventional force against China’s nuclear capabilities. As discussed earlier, China’s response has been to allow limited ambiguity over its no-first-use posture to deter such an attack. One interlocutor maintained that the United States did not believe that China would view an attack on China’s command and control facilities as an attack on its nuclear facilities and that China could do little to deter such an attack. Chinese strategists have noted that identifying what constitutes a nuclear command and control facility is challenging given the different levels of command and control.135 As a result, China is allowing the ambiguity surrounding its no-first-use policy in the hope that this will undermine U.S. confidence that China would not escalate a conflict if its nuclear capabilities

#### 6] fabian is just another link into the k – no reason why china space advancements are bad

#### Clinging causes great power war—only disengagement solves

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To answer these questions, we need a better understanding of the sources of conflict in a unipolar world. In this chapter, I develop causal mechanisms stemming from a unipolar distribution of military power and lay out a theory of how a unipolar structure of international politics generates important incentives for conflict. My argument is that a unipolar distribution of military power, while removing important incentives for conflict - such as competition among several great powers - is likely to trigger other, specific war-producing causal mechanisms. Furthermore, to the extent that the unipole remains engaged in the world, it is likely to be involved in conflict. This means that any military unipolar strategy other than disengagement will entail a conflict cost. In what follows, I show how each of the strategies the unipole may follow will trigger conflict dynamics that counter the pacifying effect of unipolarity described in extant scholarship on the topic. Therefore I question the view that unipolarity is peaceful.¶ To be more specific, the argument I lay out in this chapter shows how unipolar systems provide incentives for wars of two types: those pitting the sole great power against another state and those involving exclusively other states. I do not question the impossibility of great-power war in a unipolar world, but rather aim at fleshing out the picture by looking beyond great-power wars.

#### Heg is the opposite of peace—their studies rely on a bloodless retelling of history that enshrines the U.S. as a beacon of progress, eliding its own coercive and imperial legacy—turns every conceivable scenario.

Porter 18 (Patrick Porter - Chair of Strategic Studies at the University of Exeter, Academic Director of Strategy and Security Institute and Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI. 6/5/18, “A World Imagined: Nostalgia and Liberal Order” *POLICY ANALYSIS* (NO. 843) <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order>, DOA: 10/21/18, kbb)

After its chief competitor, the Soviet Union, collapsed in 1989-1991, it extended this strategy globally. Proponents of liberal order draw on the logic of hegemonic stability theory.[7](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor007)According to that theory, one dominant state exercises such a preponderance of power that it lessens the insecurities that lead to arms races and spirals of alarm, enabling other states to ease their security competitions with neighbors and rivals, relax their arms programs, and focus on economic growth. More ambitiously, it not only reshapes institutions and markets but remakes the preferences of other states. To its admirers, this order, for all its imperfections, achieved unprecedented general peace and prosperity. It was based on a harmony of interests between the United States and the rest of the world. It made the world a single system or “whole,” as Council on Foreign Relations president Richard Haass claims.[8](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor008) Revision of the order, and retreats by the hegemon, will lead to increased disorder. On the campaign trail Donald Trump explicitly threatened the status quo. He denounced allies as delinquent and threatened to shred alliances, tolerate nuclear proliferation, re-erect tariff walls, and abandon international agreements. To security traditionalists who oppose Trump, his revisionist challenge accelerates the collapse of a “liberal order” under a transnational assault by authoritarian forces. In a state of shock, they seek orientation in an ahistorical myth about the world before this dark age. As Princeton’s Aaron Friedberg tweeted, “After WWII US built a system of democratic states, tied together by trade, institutions and common values — a liberal order. Now it needs to defend that order against the illiberal powers it tried to incorporate after the Cold War.”[9](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor009) Historian Jeremy Suri charges that Trump is plunging the world into a great regression by “launching a direct attack on the liberal international order that really made America great.” The elements of this order include “a system of multilateral trade and alliances that we built to serve our interests and attract others to our way of life.” Suri explains: Through the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World Trade Organization), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, among other institutions, the United States led a postwar capitalist system that raised global standards of living, defeated Soviet communism, and converted China to a market economy. Through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe and a web of alliances in Asia and the Middle East, the United States contained aggressive states, nurtured stable allies, and promoted democratic reforms when possible.[10](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor010) This sunny “highlights package” offers a strangely bloodless retelling of history. It is a euphemistic rendering of the Cold War and the actual practice of anti-Soviet containment by the superpower and its proxies. The Bay of Pigs, napalm, East Timor, the shah of Iran, and the Contras fade into the background. That this pristine retelling should come from distinguished historians of American diplomacy like Friedberg and Suri suggests how seductive the vision of an earlier and better order has become. Trump, too, is complicit in this mythmaking. Like his opponents, he frames his own election in stark terms. Trump speaks of a dark prehistory of “globalism,” of open borders, predatory capitalism, futile wars, and general American victimhood, and a return to wholesome nationalism, industrial regeneration, civilizational rebirth, and, of course, making America “great.”[11](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor011) What was the liberal order, as its defenders define it? If an “order” is a coming together of power with social purpose, a “world order” is an international design of institutions, norms, and patterned relationships that defines the global balance of power.[12](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor012) Some commentators argue that for a viable world order to emerge in a time of turbulence, the United States may have to compromise. Amitav Acharya, Michael Mazarr, and Henry Kissinger seek to revive the concept of world order, but unlike those of other “world order” visionaries, their proposed designs are pluralistic and require the United States to temper its universalism for the sake of stability and negotiated coexistence in a polycentric world.[13](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor013) By contrast, the liberal order is a missionary project that looks to extirpate rival orders and demands the perpetuation of American dominance. As an ideal type, the “liberal order” entails a copious number of norms and institutions, suggesting that good things go together. In accounts of the postwar liberal order, many or all of the following features appear, though with varying emphasis: the rule of law and the supremacy of “rules,” humanist globalism and humanitarian development, free trade, multilateral cooperation, the security provision of the United States (principally through its permanent alliances), and a commitment to liberal progress through the advocacy of democratic and market reforms. Its institutions span the United Nations, NATO, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (followed by the World Trade Organization), the IMF, and the World Bank. A commitment to protocols and the bridging of divides figure centrally. Hence phrases like “open, rule-based international economy” abound.[14](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor014) The “order,” proponents argue, embodied also a pattern of behavior, or, as Jake Sullivan at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace explains, a “system of norms, institutions, and partnerships” whereby, under the hegemon’s stewardship, collective cooperation trumped competition for relative advantage, significant shares of sovereignty were ceded for the benefits of collective action, and a global consensus spread.[15](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor015) An “illiberal order” would presumably be the opposite of these things: politically and economically divided and closed, authoritarian, uncooperative, coercive, and disrespectful of rules and norms. The liberal order is necessarily hierarchical. To speak of liberal order is to speak also of American primacy, with the former depending on the exercise of the latter. Nostalgists do not deny that the American superpower upheld it partly through overwhelming military strength. However, they emphasize the nonbloody uses of force, for example, deterring and dissuading adversaries, reassuring and uniting allies, and preventing conflict. And they stress the consensual, attractive quality of American hegemony. Postwar continental Europe therefore stands out as a favorite area of emphasis, as an “empire by invitation.”[16](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor016) Most anxious observers agree that a significant “fall” is occurring.[17](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor017) To explain it, they weigh heavily an alleged loss of political will within the West. Leading theorists of liberal order, such as Princeton’s G. John Ikenberry, have long warned that “the hallmarks of liberal internationalism — openness and rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism — could give way to a more contested and fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist networks, and regional rivalries.”[18](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor018) Once optimistic that the order would withstand geopolitical challenges and prove resilient, Ikenberry now fears a different kind of insurgent threat, flowing not from hostile subversive states but from within. Working- and middle-class populations, he suggests, may lose faith in the order as democracy degenerates.[19](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor019) Similar complaints have arisen across the Atlantic. Warnings against U.S. disengagement are a staple of rhetoric from security thinkers in allied countries.[20](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor020) For Robin Niblett, director of the internationalist Chatham House, Trump replicates and feeds on the destructive forces that powered “Brexit,” forcing liberalism into retreat.[21](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor021) For the University of Exeter’s Doug Stokes, as for Ikenberry and Niblett, domestic discontent may unravel the worldwide arrangements that best served America’s “globalized” interests. For the old order to reproduce itself, it must make a new settlement with the American working class.[22](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor022) Most of these diagnoses have a common premise. All offer an upbeat, potted history of the world created in and after 1945. Many then blame the crumbling of that world on agents or forces that are separate from it.[23](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order#_idTextAnchor023) If the order is perishing, they argue, it is being assassinated rather than dying from its internal failures. They have little to say about the significant reverses that occurred while the order reigned. These included some of America’s most disastrous wars, geopolitical chaos in the Persian Gulf from the Iran-Iraq War to the present sectarian breakdown, resurgent jihadi Islamism, the greatest act of urban terrorism committed by a nonstate actor in history, the eurozone crisis, the economic regression of Russia under “shock therapy,” mounting and unsustainable debt, the global financial crisis, the entrenchment and immobility of wealth, and the growing underclass of working poor. Rather than attributing to the old order the failures that occurred on its watch, nostalgists blame mismanagement, or popular fatigue, or “populism” and demagogues that whipped up mass discontent. They give credit to the order and U.S. primacy for benign developments, discounting other possible contributors